Reply Brief — City of Cincinnati v. Miller

upreme Court, U.

5 FILED

1 22

No. 01-1054

In The

Supreme Court of the United [States CLERK

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LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; FRANKLIN E. WHITE,

MTA Chief Executive Officer in his Individual and Official

Capacities; JOSEPH NMI DREW, MTA Acting Chief

Executive Officer in his Individual and Official Capacities,

Vs. Petitioners,

LABOR/COMMUNITY STRATEGY CENTER; BUS RIDERS

UNION; SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP

CONFERENCE OF GREATER LOS ANGELES COUNTY;

KOREAN IMMIGRANT WORKERS ADVOCATES; MARIA

GUARDADO; RICARDO ZELADA; NOEMI ZELADA;

PEARL DANIELS; HENRY FREDERICK RAMEY, JR.; O.

HOWARD WATTS; WILLIAM TUT HAYES; VICTOR DIBAS,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

.

REPLY BRIEF

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Orrice Or THE County Counset CHRISTENSEN, MILLER, FINK,

Lioyp W. PELLMAN Jacoss, Giaser, Wer &

STEVEN J. CARNEVALE SHAPIRO, LLP

One Gateway Plaza Patricia L. GLASER

Los Angeles, California 90012 James S. SCHREIER

Telephone: (213) 922-2000 2121 Avenue of the Stars,

Morrison & FOERSTER LLP 18th Floor

Suirtey M. HUursTEDLER Los Angeles, California 90067

Counsel of Record Telephone: (310) 553-3000

555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500

Los Angeles, California

90013-1024

Telephone: (213) 892-5200

Counsel for Petitioners

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 g ¢?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PPP E TCT OTOTT ETT CUTER TOTTY COT RT ET TTT TTT 1

I. The Lower Courts Did Not Construe the Consent

Decree as a Contract ..ccccccccccvvce ao 1

II]. The Lower Courts’ Excessively Intrusive Orders

Violate this Court’s Federalism Principles...... 3

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861,

CO 1... Bek. 2G OOF CAF a ohn cctnetcccrsecnscess

Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 96 S. Ct. 598,

WG L. BG. Be WOE Caine ken isiscaesends uence

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

502 U.S. 367, 112 S. Ct. 748,

L1G 1. Ee. 20. BOF CaP ic eecce recs vevswksines

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267,

2B Li. Be. Ze FOR CARTS) oss ccc ccceccnvicsviacuss

United States v. Armour & Co.,

402 U.S. 673, 91 S. Ct. 1752,

So Ui. BR. Bh Be FRO a) bc dein vet cessecwmar ones ss

United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,

E20 US. Zam (ESV OE eva dvs tvedeuerduseuteneces

STATUTES

Cal. Civ. Code § 1645....... PP tarr Seer ey ee

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(b)

CSG ids sink <a ceneeeeewesd ie cee

Page

ARGUMENT

Introduction. Respondents’ opposition ignores the

extensive evidence introduced in 1999 in the district

court. Instead, they choose to rely on evidence produced

in the district court in 1994 and on the Special Master’s

findings and conclusions based on declarations and argu-

ments presented in 1998. The evidence before the Special

Master was fragmentary, and it was seriously out of date

when the matter was heard by the district court in 1999.

In 1999, petitioners presented substantial uncontradicted

evidence about the meaning of the technical term “load

factor targets” and the intention of the parties in using

that terminology in the settlement agreement. At the

same time petitioners presented extensive evidence about

the financial inability of the MTA to comply with the

Special Master’s “Order,” while also complying with the

federal and state statutory mandates.

I. THE LOWER COURTS DID NOT CONSTRUE THE

CONSENT DECREE AS A CONTRACT

Respondents’ contention that the lower courts con-

strued the Consent Decree as a contract is not supported

by the language used by the courts below nor by their

conduct. In 1999, petitioners presented substantial uncon-

tradicted evidence in the district court that the technical

term “load factor targets” was intended to incorporate

the meaning of the term as it is understood in the bus

transportation industry. Contrary to the lower courts, a

load factor target is not “a mathematically precise method

of measuring bus overcrowding.” (App. A at 14a.)

United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S.

223, 238 (1975) explained how consent decrees are to be

interpreted:

“

Since a consent decree or order is to be con-

strued for enforcement purposes basically as a

contract, reliance upon certain aids to construc-

tion is proper, as with any other contract. Such

aids include the circumstances surrounding the

formation of the consent order, any technical

meaning words used may have had to the parties,

and any other documents expressly incorpo-

rated in the decree. Such reliance does not in

any way depart from the “four corners” rule of

Armour. [Emphasis added.]?

A standard principle of contract interpretation is that

technical words in a contract are to be interpreted as

usually understood by persons in the profession or busi-

ness to which they relate, unless those words were truly

used in a different sense. E.g., Restatement (Second) of

Contracts § 202(3)(b) (1981).?

Construing a corisent decree as a contract requires

ascertaining the intention of the parties. Despite peti-

tioners’ uncontradicted evidence about the meaning of

the technical terminology and the parties’ intent in using

it in the Consent Decree, the district court made no

finding on the point. The failure of the district court to

1 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 91 S. Ct. 1752,

29 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1971).

2 Accord Cal. Civ. Code § 1645: “Technical words are to be

interpreted as usually understood by persons in the profession

or business to which they relate, unless clearly used in a

different sense.”

make any finding on the intent issue supports the conclu-

sion that the court did not construe the Consent Decree as

contract, but rather as a judgment reached without the

parties’ consent. The court of appeals accepted the dis-

trict court’s conclusion.

Il. THE LOWER COURTS’ EXCESSIVELY INTRUSIVE

ORDERS VIOLATE THIS COURT’S FEDERALISM

PRINCIPLES

Respondents’ arguments reveal their serious misun-

derstanding about the impact of federalism constraints

imposed by this Court on lower federal courts. (R. Br. at

18-24.)

A deficiency, if any, in a state agency’s plan to com-

ply with the terms of a consent decree does not empower

the federal courts to impose extremely intrusive manda-

tory injunctions on the agency. Even to remedy a proved

constitutional violation, federal courts are required to

respect the fiscal constraints and statutory duties

imposed on state agencies. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 547, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979).

Respondents are simply wrong in arguing that the

lower courts respected the MTA’s funding limitations and

its need to meet other statutory obligations. (R. Br. at 20.)

Respondents again ignore the extensive evidence pre-

sented on those points to the district court. They rely

instead on the Special Master’s conclusions.

Respondents’ argument that the Special Master’s

mandatory injunction gave the MTA an escape hatch is

disingenuous. (R. Br. at 23-24.) All the Special Master said

was that a late arrival of mandated buses would not be

deemed to violate his “Order” if the delay was due to

circumstances beyond the MTA’s control. Nothing in the

Special Master’s “Order” relieved the MTA of the obliga-

tions he imposed upon it to buy hundreds more buses

than the MTA’s own remediation plan specified. The MTA

did not have the financial resources to operate the Special

Master’s expanded bus fleet.

None of respondents’ arguments justified the lower

courts in disregarding the principles underlying coopera-

tive federalism. None justified the federal courts in issu-

ing mandatory injunctions that intrude deeply into the

MTA’s management of its public transportation systems.

None justified the lower courts in disrupting the MTA’s

access to State and federal funding that is the lifeblood of

the Agency.

The lower courts granted more intrusive injunctive

relief against the MTA than a federal court is permitted to

do in remedying a proved constitutional violation.

Respondents’ arguments ignore Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976). Considerations

of federalism required reversal of the district court's

remedial order revising the internal operations of a state

3 Throughout their brief, respondents assume that the

Special Master had the equitable powers of a federal court. He

does not. They argue that the MTA was somehow estopped from

arguing the point because years earlier a former MTA lawyer

asked the Special Master for a temporary restraining order. The

Special Master issued - but promptly rescinded - a TRO because

he recognized that he was not empowered to issue it. Petitioners

gained no benefit and respondents suffered no detriment from

the lawyer's error. No estoppel existed.

or local agency in absence of extraordinary circum-

stances. No extraordinary circumstances exist here to jus-

tify the gross intrusion of the federal courts into the

MTA’s financing resources and its management of its

extremely complicated public transportation systems in

the guise of enforcing the Consent Decree. See, e.g., Swann

v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16,

91 S. Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971); Rufo v. Inmates of

Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116

L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992).

Unless certiorari is granted and the decision below is

overturned, the MTA will be crippled thereby endanger-

ing its service to millions of users of its Los Angeles

County transportation systems.

Dated: March 1, 2002

Respectfully submitted,

Orrice Or THe Los ANGELES

County CounseEL

Morrison & FOorRSTER, LLP

CHRISTENSEN, MILLER, Fink, JACoss,

Giaser, Wer & SHAPIRO, LLP

By Srr.ey M. Hursrepier

Attorneys for Petitioners

Los Angeles County Metropolitan

Transportation Authority