Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt

® Supreme , (Cour, US.

Not 2 4830 MAY 12 2001

OFFIGE OF THE CLERK —

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

JAY NOLAN RENOBATO,

Petitioner

versus

BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT

Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION(APPEAL) FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI,

Jay Nolan Renobato

Arbitrageur, Contractor, and Proprietor of Record

Post Office Box 9771

The Woodlands, Texas. 77387

(213)364-8250

Natural Person Pro Se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Certified Federal Questions. Commonly described as a federal

question in equity, the Renobato contest against Bureau of the

Public Debt arises under dual federal treatise including the

Constitution, and Acts of Congress, and involves their appropriate

application to the property and contracts at issue, and of which

jurisdiction is given to federal courts at all levels. (See U.S. CONST.

art. III, sec. 2, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1292, 1331.)

(a) Constitutio Reconstitution and the Bill of Rights. In

general terms, does the Constitution of the United States of America

vest Petitioner with certain fundamental and inalienable civil rights,

powers, and privileges in redressing grievances via recourse in the

federal court system to recoup remuneration? And further, does the

Bill of Rights draw provisions the Claimant is entitled, empowered,

and warranted to use in seeking damage in a court of last resort?

(b) United States Code, and Code of Federal Regulations.

In particular terms, is Respondent liable in various United States

capital market venues for its omissions and/or commissions of acts

in violation of certain definitive trade customs, duties, and

obligations promulgated under federal code appurtenant to

Commerce and Trade and Money and Finance? (15 U.S.C., 31

US.C., 31 C.F.R., & Reg T) ;

PARTICIPANTS TO THE PROCEEDING

2. Natural Person Claimant v. Artificial Person Respondent. The

only real entities (‘parties’[sic]) in interest concerning Renobato v.

Bureau of the Public Debt now pending before the U. S. Court of

Appeals for the 5 Circuit are listed in the caption. The petitioner is

Jay Nolan Renobato, a sole proprietor and arbitrageur who

advances pro se. The respondent is Bureau of the Public Debt (in

the Bureau of Printing and Engraving in the Department of the

Treasury), a fiscal service factor. In the courts below, Renobato is

called Plaintiff, Claimant, and Appellant, whereas the Bureau is

customarily referred to as the Defendant, Respondent, and

Appellee. The interstate commerce controversy originates between

Texas and the District of Columbia where the participants reside. In

addition to those listed on the face of the cover, defense attorneys

incorrectly purport that the United States, an intervenor, is the

actual defendant named in the case. Real Defendant Bureau,

however, is in fact a subsidiary! inter-governmental organization

(‘IGO’). Also, the Government is a participant in a high proportion

of litigation in the Supreme Court.?

1 The United States is the parent of Bureau of the Public Debt.

2 The statistics for any Term[sic] can be found in the Annual Report of the Solicitor

General, which is printed as a part of the Annual Report of the Attorney General.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Capital Case Terms Page:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....---:sssesrrrrresrrrrene i.

PARTICIPANTS TO THE PROCEEDING «...------sssseeeresrrrre i.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....--++ssesesessesrrensesenser tener iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......---+0sssererersseereee eer Vv

OPINIONS BELOW .......:-csecsesrsessorenenenesrerenenenenensen ener 1

EPA CHUM ..00<<..crrersvessrerssesneserneroresnmncnersseneerneere" 1

II. Southern District of Texas .....-----ssrerrrrereesreerer eee 2

NATURE OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION .....--:+0::20¢¢ersrrer™ 2

Ill. Affirmative Jurisdiction on Appeal

LAWS, STATUTES, KULES, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

NINE. ou casas dautcanenes saree tervesnesenersenessereneseenterreenee 5

IV. Regulatory Codification

BASIS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH

SR MMMEAE BAICTS ..,csscsenvnnnvscsnennsncennornesererrensreness rere 6

V. Legal Statements and Factual Data ......--++++srseerrrerstee 6

VI. Account ny caaiaaeurnncnuerevereiewnnnssverne ren ss™* 8

INTL Cli Calesprantorsorensennoresseoseorersonerereer’.°7°°°"S 9

VIII. Electronic Trespass on the CASE ...ecccsesceeceeeneceeeee sees 10

IX. Standing in the Zone of Interest and Passing the Zone

eit Sennett THAAD <<<na0ssssnnoocesereosesseoneneesnestee ts renee 10

X. Indispensability of the structure of the United States

Government outside the scope of Real Parties in

OMNI 2c dacunsenncavoseneseveweesesorevecserteres ener 2 "°°" 12

XI. Key Control ISstaes .<....00s-ersserneneronessonseverssnsvcnererer® 13

XII. Program Schedule and Leverage Tool Use ...------+-++ 15

-continued-

ill

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT .............02..e00ee00 16

Panes CSTE FINED Sesh cctndiccavesenvcnsesssivnccccexvons 16

1. Separation of Powers Restructured ................+. 17

2. Fundamental Property Rights and Preferred

RUN BE GIN selissesnscnsiesunindersugutedersisivvne 18

Ds SION one htc sev eccececiceesvesssesens 19”

4. Direct Equal Access Protection ..........::.2cs00e000: 20

XIV. Commerce and Trade, Money and Finance, and Rule of

POOR TD vvsdsscscrnes cane nmednccpiseisiniessss 21

1. Permissible Reverse Repurchase Contracts,

Presentment, and Trade Acceptance ................. 21

2. Securities entitlements in STRIPS TRADES

I saisos sks ceicivescccvchocnvnascsbuciuscnsdises ae

DI iis saseciivnscnssccerapeicaiennanenveiien ae

Ti eT I itr sis tks ities knnstedienniandeohitborbasess 24

Do PUNE CE PRINTS 00s svccsescscceccsensvesccoswess 24

6. Conflict Among Circuits Messages ............00.+. 25

Ce ie itetaininccspecisalesedeavcensinincdecorsaeniabiivebiusueipaed 27

FeV CIEE oncvvesisccasescvcnversuseciscssenasentummagess 27

PUREE kxrencphosenncisndinsiivadusdianiiaksrnideliininsabsecbetasnatalice 28

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES

A. U.S.C.A. MEMORANDUM of 13 February 2001.......... la

B. Transcript of Rule 16 Conference[sic] of 19 May 2000.... 3a

C. U.S.D.C. ORDER[sic] of 23 May 2000.............0seceeeeeeee 7a

D. U.S.C.A. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC[sic] of

SD Fe si ihr ecntets snidieosencnpitntrqneneeipsawinatiancienses 9a

E. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (excerpts)............ lla

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Precedent Cases- Page:

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947)....-: RE

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751(1984).......022eeee » 1 sadintabenin’ 10

Allmon v. Allmon, Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 651, 655......--eeeeeeeeer recone 21

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)......2sceeeeseereeeeees 19

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations Inc. v.

Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).....cscceeeeeeeeseseeeceeeeere seen 11

Balmoral Cinema v. United Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d

313 (6 Cir.1989)....-..cecoeeeessrerecersessenecorsesscser sess eeeee 26

Bob Maxfield Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033,

1037 (5% Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 US. 860, 102 S.Ct.

SE CO sce veces cncecentereneisionsnncrsonseretantenstnners ert 26

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)....ccecceeeeeerrrneeeeeresesssees 3

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)..--eeecereeeeeerersaessessserenes 3

Brown v. Texas, Tex.1997, 118 S.Ct. 355, __ U.S. __, 139 L.Ed.2d

We ns oid. iiss ulakparnonaenenenennaenycovenereertet ore 28

Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 82

S.Ct. 1502, 1524, (1962)....---.-eeeeeerreeeecncecererseseneee esse 6

Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of

State of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 633, 67 L.Ed.

CO i, sedegiperepumnnreraeontomemnmnnernemennere eters r6*** 14

Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Defense Resources Council, 467

US. 837(1984)....----cseeeeeeecoees "a sc ogduadennvencnunnsetesy’ 15

Chiniche v. Smith, Ala. 374 S0.2d 872, 873...--ccereneerecreseesereererse ees 6

City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)......--02seeeeeeereer eens 21

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 4AG US. 55 (1980)...-----eeceeeerereeseesensces 21

Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 (1987)......... 11

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532

POR co ssciescarvecenstaacentoratntnstesensderereresereress’e~ 13, 19

Colgate v. Harvey, 296 US. 404, 428 (1935).....--eereeeeecceereeeessre ss 20

Colgate v. United States, Ct.C1.1929, 50 S.Ct. 22, 280 U.S. 43, 74

ON GUT ss Lecncditaeannstausderbuonsevacnteteserary eters ters" 5

Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470, 475.....---+++: 15

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579

RN acacaectnenihensasnavas enstan stucteneneneseteessenseserserer”*"* 23

East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945)..-.+-++++ 19

Easterline v. Bean, 121 Tex. 327, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429.....eeeereerecees 25

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941).......2ceeeeeeeeeee sere nes 3

ESI Montgomery County Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899

F.Supp. 1061, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)....----eeceeeesererereesstens 13

Vv

Ex parte Republic of Peru, La.1943, 63 S.Ct. 793, 798........cccceceee0e 3

Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935, 29 L.Ed. 89.............0 000 19

FN Oe GI Re Bale By i acne sccescaticasetccecdivtcciecoesese 11.

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).............ccceeeeeeeee eens 12

Forro Precision Inc., v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9% Cir.1982),

appeal after remand, 745 F.2d 1283 (9' Cir.1984) cert.

denied, 471 U.S. 1130, 105 S.Ct. 2664 (1985)...............00000e 13

FIG Ci eg ee a CRN ie CRG ea Aas batt Nevedin sus dnisvesiavcseveses 8

Fry v. United States, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 1972, 421 U.S. 542, 44

icDe ny NI <i ape sa vaaeaba cde venubaiyns siscueeiatatetiveviarenesiseses 5

Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).........cscececseeecseceeeereeseens 3

Goldberg -v. Keily, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).......sersccccserccrscsvccececeee sve eceee 3

Grae ©. GENO, TEE UIs 1d CAPPER ori vicenecvncwecceccevesovecssccseséoeoes 3

Grumman Corp., v. LTV Corp., 527 F.Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.)

affirmed, 665 F.2d 10 (294 Cir. 1981)...........csccsssseseeseceeeees 6

Hambsch v. United States, Cl.Ct.1989, 109 S.Ct. 1969, 490 U.S.

TOBE, POG Te Ge icc cen se cstassecteseeseccessesscovecicoees Sieccem

Holley v. Capps, 468 F.2d 1366 (C.A. 5!, 1972)........ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeee ees 3

Hopfman v. Connolly, Mass.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2106, 2107, 471

U.S. G59, 461, BS Ee GOR, Gi ao icccnsrcescscncsvcscvessescoscens 28

Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines Inc., N.Y.1973, 93

S.Ct. 667, 409 U.S. 363, 34 L.Bl.2d S77.......0csesevcseseseeseees 28

In re Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 69, 21 L.Ed. 394........ 19

Interstate Circuit v. United States; 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct. 467

CRO occisenn ce ie ita ie iierseees 26

Jones 0. Bard, 4635 UB. Fay Fae CAP sass sbcectucsewsseerssccesevesscces 25

Kartell v. Blue Shield (Mass.), 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984), cert.

denied, 471 U.S. 1029, 105 S.Ct. 2040 (1985)..............ceeeees 26

Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524

(ROD soci deists cece areata ede twas n sn saci esd Sa seyee 17

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881).............eceece eee eceees 17

King v. Citizens Bank of DeKalb, 88 Ga.App. 40, 76 S.E.2d 86,

DA... osisusonasdiieday dabei ie EARP ARN NEI ahascaseculabicesesgeseren 10

King v. Idaho Funeral Services Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744

(0 Cae FI vivo tactics vata varobntchs ba thsadietesescoveceedsesesess 13

Klugh v. United States, D.C.S.C., 620 F.Supp. 892, 901...............00 25

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)........scscscsesecesccesecseeseeeeee 18

Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)...........8

Lane 0. Beoeiths TIE Ui GFF ata sak cthnicucdvboncdveswerscedecssicecccseses 3

Lawrence v. Chater, N.C.1996, 116 S.Ct. 604, 516 U.S. 163, 133

Li. Al Dias sidscaicanigrtes alsa biskntast bvletastubsdecvontesveksieves 29

Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948)..........cccc ccc eeeeeceseeeeee 18

vi

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 77.......:s:sceeseeceeeeeeeceseesseeneeeeeeeeeesens 3

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 401 U.S. 371, 377

CRO ivcvidnccict docenccscteccosincneviotsovessesnsosessocescevescveenecscs 3

Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966)......---:seeseeeeeeeeees 3

Lords Landing Village v. Continental Ins. Co., Md.1997, 117

S.Ct. 1731, 520 U.S. 893, 138 L.Ed.2d 91..........:cceeeeeeeen ees 29

Louisiana v. Texas, 1899, 20 S.Ct. 251, 176 U.S. 1, 44 L.Ed. 442........ 4

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934)........cesseeeereeneeeneees 13, 18

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).........2:02sseeeeeee 20

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330-31 (1816)..... 11

Martin v. Texas, 1965, 86 S.Ct. 307, 382 U.S. 928, 15 L.Ed. 2d

Dis sdiviskccevtarescivcntovted Wi eo aiandebincebneberidetegibrscoustss 28

Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Okla. 501 134 P.2d 976,

DIT skin cincesctcecssbvecevesveviecesenturassvessavedniusasontecsesgtecess 29

May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 45 S.Ct. 456, 69 L.Ed. 870....... 28, 29

McCrary v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 429 So.2d 1121, 1123.......22+-+0+s000 14

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 265 (1971).......-.seceeeeeeeere eens 8

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)........:ccsseceeeeeeesssnenseeese ees 20

Moore v. West Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977).........cccecereeeeees 19

Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d 171, 313 N.W.2d 790. 794.........0000+ 10

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).........sseeeeeeee ees 12

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)........:cceceeeeceeeeeeeen een eneeees 3

Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).........++++00++ 13,19

Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).........-seseeeeeeee scene 9

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.

FEF, FAO ID an ccscsitvcacssivesesevecscvecossvsivavevesevevseseseves 13

People v. Banks, Colo.App., 655 P.2d 1384, 1387.......-++2sesseseeeeee eens 23

People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 103 Cal.Rptr. 7, 11 ............ 21

Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58

Cal.App.2d 729, 137 P.2d 729, 731........ssecceeeeeesseeeeeeeeeees 8

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353-54 (1935)........:eseeeeeeeeeeee 18

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961)........cccecceeeceeeeneeeeeeeeeeeees 19

Porta v. Mayor City of Omaha, Neb., D.C.Neb., 593 F.Supp.

QBS, BEB. iccvescccvccesescccvcccccccccccccscsvcsservevevsssscsssscesceees 14

Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959)........cececeesseeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeen anne es 19

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 99 S.Ct. 2326 (1979), on

remand, 602 F.2d 179 (8 Cir.1979).........:.ceseeseeeeeeeeeeeees 26

Renobato v. Merrill Lynch et. al., NYSE Inc., Arbitration

B1GI7-OOEGOD.......cvecceseccsecccccecccscrsccsccrsonsensecesssesccocees 15

Renobato v. Merrill Lynch et. al., U.S.D.C. case H-98-0360 now -

pending in the SDOT...........:00sseeeceeceeeseseneecseneseneen ee senees 15

Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80

RVers CeO n rcs chuseuigpabrsecenvesticheietedertesecutrevesesen 25

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715......... 19

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).........sccecceeseeeeeee scenes 18

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., Mo.1957, 77 S.Ct. 443, 450,

532 U.S. 500, 509, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, 517...........ccccccscccececsereee 15

Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43, 46............cccceeeeecees 14

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)..........cccccceeeceeseeeeseeeeees 18

Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9% Cir.1971),

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955, 92 S.Ct. 1172 (1971).......... ccc eees 26

Se Es ee ee Fa edhe rane bara Cidcinccbectccecdsecescses 3

Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911)....... 26

State v. Ducey, 25 Ohio App.2d 50, 266 N.E.2d 233, 235...........006+ 20

State v. Hudson, Tenn.Cr.Ap., 487 S.W.2d 672, 674. ........00cceeeeeeees 21

State v. Scheuering, 226 La. 660, 76 S0.2d 921, 924.........cecceeeeceecees 18

State v. Stephens, Mo.App., 556 S.W.2d 72, 723.......:.eceeceeeeeeeeeeees 23

State ex rel. Herbert v. Whims, 68 Ohio App. 39, 38 N.E.2d 596,

FR I Si ihisinktiesictansetanipiibaknisctesstcakcisenices cesses 10

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rickhoff, Mo.App., 509

S.W.2d 485, 487 SuperTurf v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d

Be Ga irsvvin tecincccastutbeste Secisvincccs i recedensecseas 10

State of Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, Ohio 1959, 79 S.Ct. 978,

979, 360 U.S. 246, 247, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200, 1202.......2......000ce0 28

Stutson v. United States, Ala.1996, 116 S.Ct. 600, 516 U.S. 193,

SO EE ie Oe in saci tactnbcakeciditi dent vinakidvccinteietalatetersenn 29

Sunal v. Large, Conn.1947, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1592, 332 U.S. 174,

SBR FE E.G Soe BOM sire caved isichadacidisteiventistccesense 28

SuperTurf v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275 (8% Cir. 1981) fdeshatieendincen’ 6

Teague v. Lane, 111.1989, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1069, 489 U.S. 288, 296,

SEE Bi a ines nn se nditarkkcencesacssthichibsinnssboses 28

Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232 (D.C.Cir. 1996)......... 8

Tyson & Bro. United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 271 U.S.

SED, GS GE. Baa FE Ue FB iii snsisicsccccienctisconssscscenseon 14

United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct.

Wis are ncsccnrinictnrciinissnbtcndedberixectotatdectenn ceases 26

United States v. Briggs, C.A.Fla., 514 F.2d 794, 804...........::ceseeeee 21

United States v. California, 1936, 56 S.Ct. 421, 297 U.S. 175, 80

° SR we cievsictedsscwsistccbisectdnsatexctudiactdaga ben eidiestevesence 4

United States v. Carver, N.Y. 1923, 43 S.Ct. 181, 260 U.S. 482,

QR CE Bs BOG ss ocknvivtintitsatesvisiienteietebiddaisnec snes 28

United States v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 77

A Wie Ca isan cctetclntiinebenninepinintclantnctziceccon 26

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973)........cccececereeeeeeeeers 21

United States v. Shearer, Ct.Cl.1944, 65 S.Ct. 187, 189, 323 U.S.

GPG; OD LD. BOD. occas civccsctviestcrsocccnsesectesecsrssseseerecesees 5

United States v. State of Utah, 1931, 51 S.Ct. 438, 283 U.S. 64,

FEU Ii sites tests isn ctccorideeiscnsscenetenssticitneesesecvien 4

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F.Supp. 295,

340, 341 (D.Mass.1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S.

521, 74 S.Ct. G99 (19B4).......cccsescocrsscevcoresscecccescossscssccesere 7

United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, Clearwater County,

State of Minnesota, D.C.Minn. 1939, 27 F.Supp. 167,

affigmned 125 F.2d G36.......cccsceccccscessescvccssesscsoesevesscossses 4

Valmont Industries Inc., v. Yuma Mfg. Co., D.C.Colo., 296

F.Supp. 1291, 1294.........:.cccceeveceeeeseeeeeeeeseeeseeceeae eres sees 7

Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass‘n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)......... 19

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1(1974).....2.--+eeeceeeeeeeeeeeees .)

Wilson v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., Ala., 331 So.2d 617, 619...........-. 6

Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley Jr. Co.,

Wis.1992, 112 S.Ct. 2447, 2452, 505 U.S. 214, 219, 120

CE FFE, TOG scciiccicdsveteseteciiivvrnccesscassessessvseevecsese 28

Yentsch v. Texaco Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (274 Cir.1980)...........2+++ 26

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)...........0eceeeereeeeeeees 20

Constitutional Guarantees- Referenced Throughout as:

Constitution of the United States of America ............ (U.S. CONST.)

Bill of Rights.............cccccseccerccesscccecsceescceccsscerecsess (art./amend.)

Regulatory Provisions, Codes, and Rules- Citation:

Title 12 United States Code- Banks and Banking ...(12 U.S.C. et seq.)

Chapter 3- Federal Reserve System

Subchapter IV- Federal Open Market Committee

Subchapter IX- Powers and Duties of Federal Reserve Banks

Title 12 Code of Federal Regulations .................. (12 C.F.R. et seq.)

Section 220- Regulation T

Title 15 United States Code- Commerce and Trade.(15 U.S.C. et seq.)

Chapter 1- Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade

Chapter 34- Antitrust Civil Process

Chapter 41- Consumer Credit Protection

Part E- Consumer Leases

Subchapter VI- Electronic Fund Transfers

1X

Title 28 United States Code- Judiciary and Judicial Procedure

sevcesenseavewiguguensebrrendetsessanteiibeiuiveieiibmunreeeel (28 U.S.C. et seq.)

Part IV- Jurisdiction and Venue

Chapter 81- Supreme Court

Part V- Procedure

Chapter 115- Evidence: Documentary

Chapter 133- Review, Miscellaneous Provisions

Part VI- Particular Proceedings

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Tide 28> ABDOREEK ..cvcccccsecvssevecrsossessosveseess (28 U.S.C.- Appendix)

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

Federal Rules of Evidence

Rule of the Supreme Court of the United States of America

Title 31 United States Code- Money and Finance ...(31 U.S.C. et seq.)

Subtitle III- Financial Management

Chapter 31- Public Debt

Subchapter I- Borrowing Authority

Chapter 310i- Public Debt Limit

Chapter 3104-Certificates of Indebtedness/Treasury bills

Chapter 33- Depositing, Keeping, and Paying Money

Subtitle IV- Money

Chapter 51- Coins and Currency

Chapter 53- Monetary Transactions

Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations- Money and Finance: Treasury

ocvcacencuesedeevacedsveesecosentetnesecdaudnsseenseibadtnesdinene (31 C.F.R. et seq.)

Subtitle B- Regulations Relating to Money and Finance

Chapter II- Fiscal Service

Subchapter B- Bureau of the Public Debt

Part 306-General Regulations Governing U.S. Securities

Part 309- Issue and Sale of Treasury Bills

Part 356- Sale and Issue of Marketable Book-Entry

Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds ;

Part 357- Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury

Bonds, Notes, and Bills

Title 17 Code of Federal Regulations Chapter II Part 240 Section

153-1 Securities Mairead ......ccesscvsesecseess (17 C.F.R. § 240.15¢3-1)

Secondary Sources:

General Accounting Office; Payments, Clearance, and Settlement: A

Guide to the System, Risks, and Issues, GAO-GGD-97-73....... 10

S.Cottle, R. Murray, and F. Block; “Graham and Dodd’s Security

Analysis,” Fifth Ed. (1988).............cscccseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenees 16

B. Bailyn, “The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution” 55,

ea FI Ca ia ectik sibs adacaicetnntenssncepeseeerncncecseverveonn 18

G. Wood, “Creation of the American Republic” (1969)................. 18

Westen, “The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math and

Morals: A Reply,” 81 Mich.L.Rev. 604 (1983); Westen, “The

Empty Idea of Equality,” 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982) ......... 20

xi

xii

CERTIORARI

ONE SOLE PROPRIETOR Jay Nolan Renobato a basis trader

proceeding pro se, comes forward to request, appropriately appeal,

and firmly call for a rightful Writ of Certiorari to issue from the

United States Supreme Court in reviewing opinions of various

federal Judges in territorial and local venues constituted within the

United States of America in conjunction with commerce and trade.

OPINIONS BELOW

I. Fifth Circuit. On 13 February 2001 the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit filed, docketed, and entered into the

record a two-part ‘MEMORANDUM’ and “Conference Calendar”

combination representing apparent actions that confirm printing

and other errors and also proffers misjudged opinions about

Plaintiff's motives in the controversy on trade and competition. (See

St Circuit’s ‘MEMORANDUM‘- (Appendix A); and “Conference

Calendar” of 13 February 2001.) The overlying paper credit confirms

typographical and printing errors on the face of such underlying

instrument, whereas the actual underlying decision is unsigned by

any judge and therefore rendered invalid under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. (See FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 11) In the lower case

numbered 00-20555 at the intermediate level, the government has

requested the so-called “Conference Calendar” document not be re-

published and in honoring such request, Claimant will not reprint

such document in any appendix hereto. (See 5 Cir. “Conference

Calendar” of 13 February 2001.) Note also that the 5 Circuit Court

did not affirm the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas ruling and did not contain particular findings of

fact, draw lines of reasoning, make conclusions of law, or grant

evidentiary concessions; whereas no valid ORDER has been

rendered by any United States court appertaining to any oral

argument hearing, trial contest, or final judgement. Further, on

Appellant's Application for Hearing(Re)? and Motion for En Banc

Determination originally stamped 27 February 2001, and later re-

entered on 14 March 2001, the said court filed a document titled “On

Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc” [sic] of 18

April 2001 ratifying stay of the mandate under Rule 41, where no

per curiam certification on the en banc authority were given. (See 5

3 Appellant is of the position that no formal hearing[sic], argument, or trial has

transpired as purported in such referenced 13 February screening process, and

subsequent 18 April DENIAL; and that the minority Smith, Barksdale, and Garza of

the full Circuit have not auditorily participated in any conference scheduled or

argument contest. (5% Cir. Rule 33)

l

Circuit’s 18 April 2001 Ruling ‘Note’.) Appellant's timely petition

for hearing, and request to poll the individual judge’s positions,

opinions, and standing was entered on 13 March 2001. (See FED. R.

APP. P. Rule 35) In addition, on 8 November 2000 the Fifth Circuit

denied Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record, an Emergency Writ

of Habeas Corpus Cum Onre, and from the onset has neglected to

execute a Monetary Product and Electronic Credit Currency Attachment.

(See 8 November 2000 Court filing; & Appellant's Brief Attachment.)

II. Southern District of Texas. As a result of an original United

States District Court antitrust proceeding commenced under seal on

9 February 2000 and numbered H-00-0425 in the Southern District of

Texas, Bureau of the Public Debt (Defendant, Respondent, and

Appellee below) an inter-governmental quasi-corporation within

the Bureau of Printing and Engraving in the Department of the

Treasury of the United States Executive Branch, obtained an

internally biased and unwarranted verbal opinion on 19 May, and

an insequens void written order of 23 May 2000 from a United States

District Court Judge situated on the same Judiciary Branch side of

government. (See 19 May 2000 “Transcript of Rule 16[sic]

Conference” Before the Honorable Vanessa D. Gilmore docket entry

#26, and such 23 May 2000 Court ORDER{sic] constituting docket

entry #27.) Now since the Money credit and Commerce clause in

Article I Section 8, and since the Full Faith and Credit obligation

issue declared under Article IV Section 1 of the Constitution of the

United States have both been completely obliterated by the acts in

legislation promulgated in paper form by such justice, the operation

of the law has inappropriately precluded Renobato (Plaintiff,

Claimant, or Appellant) from obtaining relief in the form of

consideration on good forward derivative government securities

contracts, and must be adjusted and changed. (See U.S. CONST.)

This stands to reason as the 5 Circuit neither affirmed nor

concurred such acts of the Houston Division. The opinions and

order(s) of the courts entered in the case are unreported. The 19 May

statements and trailing decree of the U.S. District Court granting a

preliminary injunction filed 23 May 2000 are reproduced in

Appendix B and Appendix C to this petition.

THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI (JURISDICTIONAL

GROUNDS)

Ill. Affirmative Jurisdiction on Appeal. To frankly acknowledge

and freely lay before the court body the sundry constitutional,

statutory, and codified in personam and in rem ways on which

jurisdiction positively rests is plain, simple, and straightforward.

2

(See U.S.CONST,., 15 U.S.C. Ch. 1 §§ 4, 9 et. seq., 28 U.S.C. Ch. 81 et.

seq., 31 U.S.C. Ch. 35 et. seq.) In truth, beginning with the Judiciary

Act of 1925, Congress by successive enactments greatly increased

the extent of discretionary control lodged in the Supreme Court to

determine for itself the kinds of appellate litigation which would be

decided by the Court on the merits. (See Ex parte Republic of Peru,

La.1943, 63 S.Ct. 793, 798; and see also “The Supreme Court under the

Judiciary Act of 1925,” (1928) 42 Harvard L.Rev. 1.) However, before

that act, the First and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States had guaranteed the inalienable right of citizens to

equal litigation opportunity. (See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371

(1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963).) In addition, the declaration of a mere notice of

appeal has been characterized as being jurisdictional, and

accordingly the ability to come to the Court by the appeal route

remains a right of noteworthy value to the litigant. (See e.g. Holley v.

Capps, 468 F.2d 1366 (C.A. 5, 1972).) In fact, the Supreme Court's

treatment of such right of access to meaningful civil adjudication of

disputes illustrates the principle that decision-making processes,

made essential by the government, must not be simultaneously

denied because of economics to those who are obliged to rely upon

such processes. (See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).) Otherwise

the government is free to ignore its trial hearing duties with

impunity, leaving our heritage of procedural safeguards to be “only

a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like

a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will.” (See Edwards v. California,

314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 401

U.S. 371, 377 (1971).) Although the original jurisdiction conferred

upon the Supreme Court by Article 3 Section 2 of the Constitution is

not exclusive by virtue of that provision alone, the State may not

deprive someone of that access, and must give litigants a

meaningful opportunity to be heard in court. (See Lindsey v. Normet,

405 U.S. at 77; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Smith v. Bennett,

365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Long v.

District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Gardner v. California, 393

U.S. 367 (1969).) Moreover, this action covers jurisdiction of

numerous specific federal questions involving a natural person in

the Republic of Texas and an artificial person contemporaneously

situated in both the territories of the District of Columbia and

Parkersburg, West Virginia. Thus, interpreting an action between an

entity in one State against another entity in another part of the

United States to enforce penalties for violations of federal statutes

3

against a State-owned utility qualifies and confers express exclusive

jurisdiction. (See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1251; and Louisiana v. Texas, 1899, 20

S.Ct. 251, 176 U.S. 1, 44 L.Ed. 442; United States v. State of Utah, 1931,

51 S.Ct. 438, 283 U.S. 64, 75 L.Ed. 844; United States v. 4,450.72 Acres

of Land, Clearwater County, State of Minnesota, D.C.Minn. 1939, 27

F.Supp. 167, affirmed 125 F.2d 636; United States v. California, 1936,

56 S.Ct. 421, 297 U.S. 175, 80 L.Ed. 567.) Now without question in

establishing the remainder of positive jurisdiction in this particular

matter, the codified boundaries putting forward such affirmative

jurisdiction for plenary consideration on appeal will be reinforced

by numerous legislative means within certain United States Code

titles involving but not limited to; (1) decisions of three judge

federal courts, and (2) as of right directly to the Supreme Court

under occasional special statutes which may be used to create

jurisdiction in any particular situation. (See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254)

In judicial terms, this Court's jurisdiction stands perfectly in pleas to

the court of last resort concerning ‘Direct appeals from decisions of

three-judge courts’ wherefore- “any party may appeal to the

Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and

hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil

action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of Congress to be

heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” (28 U.S.C.

§ 1253) In fact, historically the instant provision consolidates Section

28 of title 15 U.S.C., 1940 ed. Commerce and Trade, and section 44 of

title 49 U.S.C., 1940 ed. Transportation, are identical and provide for

convening three-judge panels to try and determine cases arising

under the Sherman anti-trust law and the Interstate Commerce Act,

respectively, or any decisions holding Federal laws repugnant to the

Constitution of the United States. A three-judge panel headed the

unsigned 13 February 2001 decision of the 5th Circuit Court of

Appeals that is sought to be reviewed. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. §

1254 ‘Court of appeals; certiorari; certified question’ facilitates

jurisdiction enabling that- “Cases in the courts of appeals may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1) By

Writ of Certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil

or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgement or decree; (2)

By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of

law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired,

and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding

instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of

the entire matter in controversy.” (28 U.S.C. § 1254) Moreover, a

redesignated way of invoking jurisdiction that is par for the course

4

and that is to be followed in the same manner and with like effect of

the antecedent statutes are found under 15 U.S.C. § 4- Jurisdiction of

Courts, 15 U.S.C. § 9- Jurisdiction of Courts, and 15 U.S.C. § 29-

Appeals. At this point, it should be added that certiorari review was

expressly provided for in cases coming from certain special

economic controversies. (See Fry v. United States, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 1972,

421 US. 542, 44 L.Ed.2d 363; Colgate v. United States, Ct.C1.1929, 50

S.Ct. 22, 280 U.S. 43, 74 L.Ed. 157; United States v. Shearer, Ct.Cl.1944,

65 S.Ct. 187, 189, 323 U.S. 676, 89 L.Ed. 549.) Drawing from defense

testimony, in papers filed on 15 September 2000, attorneys for

Defendant conceded the allegation of jurisdiction as such record

clearly states in respect of such territorial courts jurisdiction to hear

claims that Plaintiff's notice of appeal was timely filed “thereby

vesting this Court with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”

(See 15 Sep. 2000 Brief of Appellee p.2, par.1, sen.2) Recently,

Petitioner’s timely Application for Hearing, and Motion for En Banc

Determination (incorporated as Appendix D) was denied on 18 April

2001, which directly sanctions this court with statutory jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). Overall, the overriding premise and

larger point taken is that the referenced statutory class shall not be

construed to be in derogation of any right in Appellant for direct

appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States under existing

provisions of federal law. Additionally, this petition is filed

according to Rule 11. (See Rules of the Supreme Court.) Thus in

sum, it is easy to see, in respect of cases coming from the United

States courts, that the statutory authorization for review on

certiorari is extremely comprehensive and guaranteed under federal

law. The notification required by Rule 29 has been made, whereas

28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) may be applicable. (See Rules of the Supreme

Court Rule 29) This favors safety of the people’s rights.

LAWS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED

IV. Regulatory Codification. Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt

involves pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the United

States, United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, Regulation

T of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal

Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, and Federal Rules of

Evidence. Originally the matter primarily used 15 United States

Code Chapter 1- Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of

Trade (15 U.S.C.) (Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Wilson Tariff Act,

Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, Expediting Act, and

Hart-Scott-Rodino Act); 31 United States Code Chapter 31- Money

and Finance (31 U.S.C.), 31 Code of Federal Regulations- Money and

5

Finance: Treasury (31 C.F.R.), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations-

(12 C.F.R.) (‘Reg T’ Section 220.7- “Arbitrage”). Similarly, the

Constitution as well as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable and relevant. Recent

developments have invoked the Texas Business and Commerce

Code § 17.41- § 17.63 (Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer

Protection Act) Certain of the laws, statutes, and rules involved are

cited and put forward at Appendix E to this petition.

BASIS AND CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE

WITH MATERIAL FACTS

V. Legal Statements and Factual Data. Renobato v. Bureau of the

Public Debt is a large and complex case. Originally at the United

States District Court level, the indictment numbered H-00-0425

included a total of twenty-six counts of complaint of which nine

were common law pleadings, seven causes of complaint were

statutory infringements, and the remaining ten were regulatory

breaches. (See Plaintiff's Original Complaint and Statement of Claim of 9

February 2000) Moreover, prosecution’s Bill of Exchange filed

concurrently derives $1,337,962,000 in gross mense profits on such

zero coupons, and is supported in case law. (See Brown Shoe

Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1524,

(1962); Grumman Corp., v. LTV Corp., 527 F.Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.)

affirmed, 665 F.2d 10(2"4 Cir. 1981); SuperTurf v. Monsanto Co., 660

F.2d 1275 (8 Cir.1981).) Neither of said Original Complaint and

Statement of Claim (on a point by point basis), or such Bill of Exchange

(on an accounting basis), have ever been denied by the Defendant

Bureau of the Public Debt or any United States attorney to date. (See

Defendant United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) and, alternatively, Motion

for Summary Judgement [sic] filed 10 April 2000.) Obviously, if the

weight of import of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are equal, then

in balance the parallel Rules 7 and 8 would strike out the Defense’s

pleas on the grounds that their motion (1) was not denominated as a

third-party ‘answer’ as stipulated under Rule 7(a), (2) is essentially

an abolished demurrer (according to Rule 7(c)) titled under the

guise of a secondary Motion for Summary Judgement sans ce que

minimum scintilla of evidence rule (See Chiniche v. Smith, Ala. 374

So.2d 872, 873; Wilson v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., Ala., 331 So.2d 617,

619), (3) admits the twenty-six counts of complaint for failure to -

deny pursuant to Rule 8(d), and (4) is not constructed under to Rule

8(f) to the specifications of Rule 8(c). (See FED. R. CIV. P. generally.)

Notwithstanding, technically the subject matter involves patent

6

Oe ee ee ee ee eS ae eee lee

eee SS ee oe ee

settlements in issues appurtenant to an antitrust lawsuit

encompassing over one billion dollars in surety claims underlying

the notion of relevant national securities issues. (See CIVIL COVER

SHEET (Form JS 44) of 8 February 2000; see 31 C.F.R. Part 309; and

see also e.g. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F.Supp.

295, 340, 341 (D.Mass.1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S. 521, 74

S.Ct. 699 (1954); Valmont Industries Inc., v. Yuma Mfg. Co., D.C.Colo.,

296 F.Supp. 1291, 1294).) In the most basic sense, the particular

derivative action commenced by financier Plaintiff seeks nothing

more than timely execution of instructions and transactions after

issue culminating in rightful due pecuniary payments, appropriate

‘E-Z CLEAR’ relations with the Fed corresponding to an

Administrative Bank Account (‘ABA’) routing number or

‘Participant’s Securities Account’, and established customer status

with the Department. (See 31 C.F.R. Subchapter B; 31 C.F.R. § 321.14;

31 C.F.R. 357.2, Federal Reserve Operating Circular No. 1)

Nonetheless, although it is incontrovertible that the Bureau is the

correct entity to be “charged with matters relating to transactions in

securities” (31 C.F.R. 306.1(b)) in competing claims regarding

securities held in TREASURY DIRECT , the matter has been totally

mischaracterized by the lower tier United States District Court as

being suit against the United States (who is not a real party in

interest or named in the caption) and therefore barred by the notion

of sovereign immunity; whereas the sovereign immunity exception

would only be applicable to judicial proceedings versus the

Treasury Department or a Federal Reserve Bank. (See 31 C.F.R. §

357.23 Judicial proceedings- sovereign immunity.) It is redundant to

note and point out that the Department, the Fed, and the United

States are not parties to the antitrust suit coined and entitled

Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt. On top of that, the Fifth

Circuit (who abandoned and did not affirm the Houston Division

judgment) also inaccurately purported that the case was

commenced solely to embarrass the opposing Respondent and thus

would not hear oral argument. (See 5% Cir. “Conference Calendar”

of 13 February 2001.) Now what is left, insofar as factual data is

concerned, is that it seems clear that the local and territorial courts

have arbitrated a hypothetical trial that has never occurred or been

heard -and not the legitimate arbitrage cause of action actually

before it. The invalid court orders have nullified rightful payments

in the denominated currency futures injuring credit Claimant's

economic standing and disparaging his commercial operations,

holding that the suit was tried and dismissed as if United States

7

Code, Federal Regulations, and Federal Rules did not exist in

ordinary calculations.

VI. Account. TREASURY DIRECT® account 4000-012-0872 is owned

by and registered under Plaintiff Appellant Renobato’s single

ownership name in the so-called TREASURY DIRECT” / TRADES

programs of participation. (See Appellant’s TREASURY DIRECT”

Account 4000-012-0872; 31 C.F.R. Part 357 Subpart B-

Treasury /Reserve Automated Debt Entry System (TRADES), and 31

C.F.R. Part 357 Subpart C- TREASURY DIRECT® Book-Entry

Securities System.) This account rendering is a common form of

action at law against any entity, who by reason of some fiduciary

relation (as factor, safe-keeper, etc.) was bound to render an account

to another on the basis of federal law, but has refused to do so. (See

Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal.App.2d 729,

137 P.2d 729, 731; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).) It should be

restated that Plaintiff has properly attempted to enjoin his due

rights and property interests through the legal process of

attachment, however, United States employees who act as judges in

the judicial branch have refused to grant access to such appropriate

securities account of Claimant within the executive branch. (31

C.F.R. § 357.44) This exclusion of investment banker Renobato from

the electronic payments system is wholly unwarranted, as even non-

bank entities are entitled to participate in the bidding process for

contracts to deliver federal benefits payments through electronic

terminals. (See Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232 (D.C.Cir.

1996).) Conspicuously, TREASURY DIRECT” is a registered monetary

product “trade-mark” of the instant fiscal service program in the

Department of the Treasury which positively confirms a direct

account relationship between the beneficial owner of Treasury

securities and the Department of the Treasury. (31 C.F.R. Part 357

App. B) Now, the high Court acting as a responsible organ of

government, is called on in good faith to represent the best values of

the judiciary in independently sorting out each and every count,

and to secure the widely circulated and explicit underlying issues of

restructuring the spread of stock options across a straddled

digitization gap of rightful asset ownership in such account

statement of Appellant. (See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.

1(1974); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 265 (1971).)

VII. Debt. In this case, the fundamental debt articles heretofore

neglected to be executed and enforced lie principally with the

Article I Section 8 commerce clause; the Fourteenth amendment

Section 4 where the validity of the public debt of the United States,

authorized by law, shall not be questioned; and the forgotten

Fifteenth amendment in the Bill of Rights vesting voting rights

protection. (See U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV

sec. 4, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) A posteriori the referenced

legislation transmuted the nation-state’s operation of the public

commodity property use into a constructive “waiver” of immunity,

and is plenary, and brooks no restraint by the state on its exercise.

(See Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).) Technically, at

the same time, Title 31 United States Code Subtitle III- Financial

Management Chapter 31 Public Debt; and parallel Title 31 Code of

Federal Regulations Subtitle B Regulations Relating to Money and

Finance, Chapter II- Fiscal Service, Subchapter B Bureau of the

Public Debt make statutory provisions for commerce, securities

regulations, exchanges, trades, transfers, limit orders, borrowing

authority, privileges, options, markets, prices, etc.. A fortiori this

debt action is commonly for a sum of money owing to one person

from another entity in the form of electronic zeros; including not

only obligations of debtor to transact redemption, but also rights of

a public customer creditor to receive and enforce payment. (See State

v. Ducey, 25 Ohio App.2d 50, 266 N.E.2d 233, 235.) Clearly,

Appellant's current claims before the high court are within the

collar or cap enumerated according to the bottom line of Title 31

U.S.C. 31 § 3101 Public debt limit wherefore “the face amount of

obligations issued under this chapter and the face amount of

obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the

United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by

the Secretary of the Treasury) may not be more than

$4,900,000,000,000, outstanding at any one time, subject to changes

periodically made in that amount” (See 31 U.S.C. 31 § 3101(b).)

Furthermore, 31 U.S.C. 31 § 3123- Payment of obligations and

interest on the public debt states that (a) “The faith of the United

States Government is pledged to pay, in legal tender, principal and

interest on the obligations of the Government issued under this

chapter,” and authorizes (b) “The Secretary of the Treasury shall

pay interest due or accrued on the public debt.” Certainly then, the

debt liability on this credit claim, TRADES duty, and open market

obligation in certificates of indebtedness including bills and hybrid

federal reserve notes securing collateral payments constitute

government derivatives under banking rules and are enforceable by

law. (Bankruptcy Code § 101)

VIII. Electronic Case. It seems to reason that one must inspect the

overlying prima facie contractual evidence and investigate the

underlying cost of bills before framing an opinion or rendering a

decision about this commerce lawsuit brought under the law of

competition. (See State ex rel. Herbert v. Whims, 68 Ohio App. 39, 38

N.E.2d 596, 599, 22 O.O. 110; State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Rickhoff, Mo.App., 509 S.W.2d 485, 487; and see also FED. R. CIV. P.

Rule 26 and Rule 34.) Certainly, the appropriate form of action

commonly adapted for the recovery of damages for some economic

injury resulting to the Appellant from the wrongful commission or

omission of the Appellee is ‘trespass on the case’ and comprehends

any misfeasance, transgression or offense which damages Plaintiff's

property or reputation. (See e.g. Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d 171, 313

N.W.2d 790, 794; King v. Citizens Bank of DeKalb, 88 Ga.App. 40, 76

S.E.2d 86, 91) However, zeroing in on exactly what acts constitute

the assertion of electronic trespass on the case is not so readily

apparent on the face of the litigation and pleadings because the

Bureau of the Public Debt facility front is housed in the Bureau of

Printing and Engraving in the Department of the Treasury, whereas

it maintains back office operations in Parkersburg, West Virginia.

Comprehending the key issue of the electronic case connects the

Departments intranet software transferring the specific keyed

amount or denomination of monetary value through the

intermediary ‘E=Z CLEAR’ primary bank reserve system into the

designated depository account at such secondary retail banking

institution.* However, only United States coin and currency,

including Federal Reserve notes, (and not electronic money) are

legal tender by law and is the form of currency to be accepted by

creditors legally discharging debts. (31 U.S.C. § 5103) Finally insofar

as the scope of electronic case is concerned 15 U.S.C. Chapter 41

Subchapter VI is relevant. (15 U.S.C. §1693 et seq.)

IX. Standing in the Zone of Interest and Passing the Zone of

Interest Trial. Plaintiff's claim and complaint fall within the

prudential zone of interests protected by the federal commerce and

trade law invoked, and is built on the separation of powers and

recognizes “the proper- and properly limited —role of the courts in a

democratic society.” (See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751(1984).) In

4 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; Payments, Clearance, and Settlement: A Guide

to the System, Risks, and Issues, GAOQ-GGD-97-73

10

recess

particular terms relating to access and review combined, Article III,

§ 1 makes it apparent that, while the constitution itself provides for

a Supreme Court, it does not similarly mandate lower federal

courts: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in

one Supreme Court...” Moreover Article III, § 2 provides that “the

Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to both Law and

as to Fact.” (See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330-

31 (1816).) These notions are important in screening and

determining that the competitor Appellant’s cause qualifies for

review by the Supreme Court as one aggrieved by court “action

within the meaning of a relevant statute” when “the interest sought

to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of

interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional

guarantee in question.” (See Association of Data Processing Service

Organizations Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); Clarke v.

Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 (1987).) In contrast, what

has transpired below is that the district court improperly looked

beyond the zone of antitrust statutes under which the Plaintiff

originally brought suit and imported such ideas of “waiver of

sovereign immunity”, the over-broad “Federal Tort Claims Act”,

and the “Tucker Act”, to find inapplicable, irrelevant, and repealed

laws upon which to summarily dismiss the action and pass the zone

of interest trial to the Circuit Court for discovery. (See Defendant

United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) and, alternatively, Motion for

Summary Judgement [sic] filed 10 April 2000.) Factually, there was

no need for the court to look beyond the concrete evidence of

contracts (Form PD 3905) in discerning its zone of interest (See Form

3905 for issue instructions on CUSIP(s) 912795- BNO, BL4, CF6, CJ8,

and FG1), because the United States court agencies decisions have

“by its own force, raise(d) separation of powers problems” by

illustrating coordination between branches of government,

inasmuch as such problems arose “from the substantive issues the

individual seeks to have adjudicated.” (See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.

83, 99 (1968).) Likewise, there is simply no “interplay” between the

laws the action was commenced under and what rules the courts

have relied on, that are relevant to shedding light on the law of

competition, in order to avoid regulation of an ‘IGO’ Bureau in the

executive branch. Overall, the recurring and overriding fact is that

Appellant had established standing in the court of first instance

commonly and statutorily on 15 U.S.C. 1, 31 U.S.C. Subtitle III, 31

C.F.R. Subtitle B, and Reg T, whereas there should be no question as

to whether the Bureau of the Public Debt has the capacity to be sued

in a court of law.

X. Indispensability of the structure of the United States

Government outside the scope of Real Parties in Interest. In —

validating the necessity of governmental institutions, the American

“people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest

it (i.e. ‘government’) with requisite powers” conducive to the

interest of the people. (The Federalist Papers No. 2 (J. Jay).) In other

words, the federal court system structure identified pursuant to

Article III of the Constitution is essential in providing a way, means,

and venues for the people to redress their grievances according to

Article I of the Bill of Rights. (See U.S.CONST. art. III; and Bill of

Rights art. I) This axiom is undeniable, however, “among the most

formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to

encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a

certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may

hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequences of

the office they hold under the State establishments.” (The Federalist

No. 1 (A. Hamilton).) To the danger that the judges themselves

might stray beyond their constitutionally delegated sphere of

authority and thereby serve personal impulse to shield and protect

another Bureau of their employer, rather than the Constitution,

leaders of post-Revolutionary opinion replied by arguing that the

judiciary would “be bound down by strict rules and precedents.”

(The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).) The founders added that,

lacking ultimate “influence over either the sword or the purse,” the

federal judiciary “may truly be said to have neither force nor will

but merely judgement” and may thus be expected to remain “the

least dangerous” branch. (The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).) For

this very reason the court is trusted to serve as “an intermediate

body between the people and the legislature” but is not expected to

allow government intrusion of Appellant’s preferred rights, or

intervene as the United States appurtenant to the presentation of

security interest evidence in lawsuits in equity. (See Murdock v.

Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); and compare 28 U.S.C. § 2403.)

Albeit now, it is up to the Supreme Court to execute the

implementation of such rules and precedents. Consequently in

Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt, the Supreme Court has the

delicate job of differentiating the overlap of branches, commingling

of real parties in interest, and separating undue influence and

internal bias from judgements which fail to restrain the impairment

of the obligation of contracts. (See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)

12

87 (1810); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Pension

Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984);

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).)

XI. Key Control Issues and Public Interest Satisfaction. The

development of electronic banking and commerce technologies has

strained traditional regulatory concepts and raised questions as to

when and how the government should regulate various products

and services that have emerged in today’s markets, although the

important legal right of Petitioner to go forward in front of a court

at every level of government remains long standing. (See King v.

Idaho Funeral Services Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744 (9t Cir.1988); Forro Precision

Inc., v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9t Cir.1982), appeal after remand,

745 F.2d 1283 (9% Cir.1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130, 105 S.Ct. 2664

(1985); ESI Montgomery County Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899

F.Supp. 1061, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).) Factually, on 8 February, 1

March, 3 May, and 14 August 2000, purchases / sales were

transacted via non-competitive tenders for investment grade bills

directly between registered owner Plaintiff and the Department of

the Treasury. The indexed bills were issued 11 February, 4 March, 8

April, 6 May, and 17 August 2000. Stripped discount refunds (IO

tint component) were cleared and deposited 10 February, 3 March, 7

April, 5 May, and 16 August 2000. Claimant's reverse repurchase

instruction orders were drawn on Form PD 3905 for all issues, and

the noncertificated principal government warrants (PO corpus

component) were surrendered and presented for denominational

exchange in a timely manner in each instance. Nonredemption

electronic funds transfers occurred 13 May, 3 June, 8 July, 5 August,

and 16 November 2000 in the incorrect amount. The overlying

financials are T-bills and have resembling Fed Note physicals

underlying the currency options. The United States Court for the

Southern District has confirmed, verified, and admitted the true

ownership of securities entitlements saying that Renobato’s claims

“concern his Treasury bills”, whereas the opinion of the three-judge

panel for the Fifth Circuit, which abandoned Judge Gilmore’s

position, throws the law governing arbitrage, commerce and trade,

money and finance, and settlement payment into complete disarray

because of the split in vague judgements. (See 23 May 2000 Court

‘ORDER’ [sic], and compare 5% Circuit 13 February 2001 ‘Conference

Calendar’.) This square conflict and change in rules among

commercial enterprise and judiciary legislation means that, until the

Supreme Court of the United States resolves the issues, courts

13

aici

reviewing simple purchases and sales of securities will not be sure

what criteria to apply in deciding federal questions according to the

vagueness doctrine. (See McCrary v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 429 So.2d

1121, 1123; Porta v. Mayor City of Omaha, Neb., D.C.Neb., 593 F.Supp.

963, 865.) As it stands under the lower Court's rule, bona fide 15

U.S.C. 1 class cases are re-stated and erroneously classified under 28

U.S.C. 171 tort actions essentially putting the action in a place where

it cannot be settled but must go through years of grinding litigation.

Therefore, if the Fifth Circuit opinion is wrong but ruling remains

unreviewed, the decision will unjustifiably deter parties from

settling and force them unnecessarily to litigate this cause of action

on the property, contract, and evidentiary merits. If the Fifth Circuit

is right and access to the judicial system and the United States

capital marketplaces are closed, then parties that choose to enter

into common reverse repurchase agreements cannot rely on justice

of federal courts and should eventually see those rulings

overturned. This court must reverse the stance of the circuit court

panel and should grant review to clarify the governments exchange

and trade standards and prevent the enormous waste of both

judicial and personal resources that are the inevitable real-world

result of the conflicting rulings. Note that the whole public has some

common interest in this cause because the preservation and use of

property held for the benefit of people, and devoted to public use

and interest, and may be regulated and protected so that future

generations shall not be deprived of the general benefit of such

resources. (See Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43, 46.) The

circumstances which clothe this particular kind of business with the

requisite “public interest” is the close relationship between the

public and those engaged in the business world, and raises

implications of affirmative obligation on part of the judiciary to be

reasonable in dealing with the public. (15 U.S.C. § 16(e)) Plaintiff

does not have to dedicate his property or business solely to public

use, or cover it with a public interest, merely because he co-makes

commodities for, and trades with the public in common callings.

(See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of

Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 633, 67 L.Ed. 1103.) Here,

Appellant's business presses and bears upon meeting the public

interest standard because it is large, because the public has a

concern in respect of its maintenance, and derives benefit,

accommodation, ease, and enjoyment from it. (See Tyson & Bro.

United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 271 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 71

L.Ed. 718.) The fact is that in addition to the former positive reasons,

14

the competitive impact and impact of entry is in the public interest

for any potential would-be participant. (See Chevron USA Inc. v.

Natural Defense Resources Council, 467 U.S. 837(1984).) Even so, be

reminded that all Judges on the bench are employees of the United

States and therefore subject to recusal, and that for many years it

has been the Court's invariable practice to grant certiorari when

four of the nine justices affirmatively press and vote for a grant of

certiorari. (See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., Mo.1957, 77 S.Ct. 443,

450, 532 U.S. 500, 509, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, 517.)

XII. Program Schedule and Leverage Tool Use. Arbitrage and

leveraged buyout transactions are perfectly legal and regular

practice in the equity, commodity, and treasury markets

respectively. (Reg T _ 220.7) Basically, leverage or capitalization can

be defined as the use of a smaller investment to generate a larger

rate of return through debt usage. (See e.g. Community Bank v. Jones,

278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470, 475.) This efficient use of leverage is

critical to any arbitrageur’s scheduled rate of return or animus

lucrandi. Records will show that Plaintiff Renobato is well versed in

the positive effect of gearing long positions and unwinding or

matching a corresponding short position in order to complete such

permissible arbitrage transactions. (See Renobato v. Merrill Lynch et.

al., NYSE Inc., Arbitration #1997-006649, and see also Renobato v.

Merrill Lynch et. al., U.S.D.C. case H-98-0360 now pending in the

SDoT.) In this particular cause of action styled Renobato v. Bureau

of the Public Debt, the lawful and proper program schedule or

leverage tool to use in procuring transfers and exchanges in

government securities is Form PD 1827 or Form PD 3905 as

appropriate. (31 C.F.R. § 306.15) ‘Minimum to hold’ means the

smallest amount of a security that will be issued to a bidder and

may be held in any book-entry account, and is equivalent to

securities haircuts. (See 31 C.F.R. § 356.2, and compare 17 C.F.R. §

240.15c3-1.) The reverse repurchase deficit represented as the

differential between the market value of securities subject to the

contract price for the repurchase of the securities at appropriate

market values has lead to charging the Bureau with conspiring to

eliminate the competition for product versions, and by tying up the

supply of key trigger mechanisms (i.e. transactions after issue) used to

create them. (31 C.F.R. § 306.1(b).) The investor Claimant's

relationship with the Bureau’s back office operations, that supplies

the key electronic credit entries and is responsible for servicing this

function, has lead up to the commencement of action. The most

common element and ground on the Bureau’s antitrust violations

15

involve vertical mergers that restrain lawful arbitrage trade and

commerce, and lessen free competition. (15 U.S.C. § 7) From a

historical view, the Cellar-Kefauver Act is of significance since it

expanded the scope of Section 7 in a number of ways, including

bringing asset acquisitions within its scope. Thus, when the change

in capitalization results from a sale of additional stock at a

comparatively low price (through the exercise of subscription

rights/warrants) or to the convertibility of senior equities,

adjustments are usually made in rights> and this must be enforced.

DIRECT REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

There are numbers of affirmative reasons why the Supreme Court

should grant this Petition for Certiorari that have traditionally

deemed to warrant plenary review, not the least of which are

conflicting judgments and inferences drawn against articles of the

Constitution, 15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 31 C.F.R.. Generally, this

volume presents major issues of commerce, exchange and arbitrage.

Next, the renditions of lower court decrees create restraint problems

in the securities industry and are contrary to the language of the

open market system. (12 U.S.C. § 263(c)) Also, the opinions below

question nationwide issues concerning the enforcement of contracts

and property rights under statutory federal law. Particularly, the

differing legal standards split between the district and circuit courts,

if permitted to stand, cause confusion regarding the proper rule,

makes settlements chancy propositions, violates the rule of

evidence, and will strongly discourage business investment within

U.S. capital markets at large. Last, this cause is of public importance

to society as a whole because of the economic expansion created, the

monetary stimulus provided, and the commerce/trade benefits

directly bearing on the area’s credit status and should be reviewed. _

XIII. (A.) CONSTITUTIONAL PORTFOLIO- Fundamental property

and contract examinations. The total range of legal issues

heretofore put forward and explored in Renobato v. Bureau of the

Public Debt are numerous and many fold. (See generally Plaintiff's

Original Complaint and Statement of Claim, Creditor’s Bill of Exchange

filed 9 February 2000; and Appellants Brief of 16 August 2000.)

Concurrent listing of each and every particular encroachment and

breach claimed committed or omitted by Defendant Appellee

perpetrator is such that investigation of each in turn herein would

exceed the page limitation set for this economic treatise

denominated as certiorari in the appeals process. (See Rules of the

> COTTLE, MURRAY, BLOCK; Graham & Dodd's Security Analysis, 5% Ed. (1988)

16

Ee eee e Tn Te CMe Re ae RE eae EN NN

S.Ct. Rule 33.3) Notwithstanding, an intermediate three-judge court

arbitrarily writes an unsigned and vague opinion apparently setting

aside the claims of Claimant merchant at the appellate level (See 5'

Circuit Conference Calendar of 13 February 2000), whereas a lower

level federal district court enters an injunction appurtenant to a

subsidiary Defendant Bureau exactly coinciding with the point and

time scheduled for discovery (See U.S.D.C. ORDER filed 23 May

2000), and each referenced and identified act constitute the official

U.S. employees renditions upon which the following great

exceptions and weighty legal issues are based, founded, raised and

are matched to the notion that property can be attacked without any

enforcement.

1. Separation of Powers Restructured. Generally, on one

hand in guaranteeing certain civil and political rights under Article

I, Article II, and Article III the Magna Carta’s doctrine of separation

of powers is enacted as; “We the people of the United States”

provide for the severability of authority among the legislative

(writes and passes bills), executive (carries out acts), and judicial

(adjudicate disputes under laws) branches inside government. (See

U.S. CONST.) Particularly, on the other hand in terms of the

national security, Title 31 Money and Finance Code of Federal

Regulations Section 356.2; and 31 C.F.R. § 356 Subpart D legally

defines and makes provisions for the Separate Trading of Registered

Interest and Principal Securities which actually multiplies the

distribution of powers for the corpus and/or tint entitlement holder.

(See 31 C.F.R. § 356 generally.) Analogous, arranged in terms the

Supreme Court has promulgated and will understand, the executing

or reconstitution of such system of checks and balances will dictate

that an extreme branch “be limited to the exercise of the powers

appropriate to its own department and no other” (See Kilbourn v.

Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881); Kendall v. United States ex rel.

Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838)), thus, the judicial branch in

fulfilling its mission to arrest the other branches so as to preserve

settled expectations that the body of federal legal principles has set,

the Court will exercise its judicial power pursuant to Article III, and

this is just. However, the foregoing coined postulate that flows from

the obligations of good faith stands to be affirmed or denied in

whole or in part because:

(a) if the current political system in place actually works,

operates, and produces results as a tried and true democratic

republic in checking one another to shield the individual from

governmental oppression and discrimination in a framework

17

ultimately supervised by disinterested judiciary, then the said legal

outcomes on this subject must be reversed, changed, or adjusted to

reflect a more appropriate model of settled government regularity

in separating the hegemonic monopolistic powers that be; and

(b) if the degree to which various governmental

arrangements comport with or threaten to undermine the

independence and integrity of one of the Plaintiff's species of

property rights, or if the extent of government trust combinations

manipulates determinations in subsidiary levels of government,

then the resulting conclusion drawn about the ability of the actions

at any one level renders another incapable of reaching the actual

goal of the constitutional design forming a well-balanced

government; or then the degree to which complicity between and

among levels of government yields damaging opinions in which no

one has to be adequately answerable, is righteous. (See Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); State v. Scheuering, 226 La. 660, 76

So.2d 921, 924.)

2. Fundamental Property Rights and Preferred Liberty of

Contract. The general notion that governmental authority has limits

which preserve subjects autonomy predates the establishment of the

American republic.* Without question, Article I, § 10 commands

that, “No State shall...pass any...Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts...” (Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) Lichter v.

United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,

353-54 (1935).) Likewise, rights of property ownership emerged as

an interpretation of, and are insured under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, virtually guaranteeing that

“no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections

of the Bill of Rights” safeguards. (Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,

74-75 (1947).) In fact, Supreme Court justice Frankfurter believed

that he could identify “those liberties of the individual which

history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as

against a closed society” (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949).) by

a “disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit cf science, on a

balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached

consideration of conflicting claims...on a judgement not ad hoc and

episodic, or arbitrary but duly mindful of reconciling the needs of

both continuity and of change in a progressive society.” (Rochin v.

California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).) Here, in particular, if

© See B. BAILYN, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 55-93, 175-98

(1967); G. WOOD, Creation of the American Republic (1969).

18

oe a a a RE |

each level and branch of government is bound to be confined to a

sphere of authority defined by the nature of the function of that

level or branch and by the inherent rights of citizens, pertinent

questions are:

(a) ultimately, whether justice protects little beyond the

entitlements that government chooses to confer, or unless

government operations were not infused with substantive values

beyond those of assuring the implementation of the state’s own

dispositive decisions, whether subjects property improvement

transactions are warranted and protected from improvident

impairment at law, or not? (See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12

Wheat.) 213 (1827); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532 (1985); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).)

(b) whether the basic relation between federal judges and

political bodies has continued, without real interruption, to be one

in which general constitutional principles are regularly invoked to

strike down sub-optimal governmental choices in the industrial

digital age, or will a last resort judicial intervention protect subject

property and contract liberties? (See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517

(1961); cf. Moore v. West Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977); Aptheker

v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).); and/or

(c) whether an affirmative Defense restatement followed in

combination with judicial non-intervention in respect of matter

protecting subject’s property rights and contractual liberties will

end without hearing by jury, or rather how the nation-state will

cover, propagandize, or justify their abridgement of the individual

natural person’s business, prosperity, welfare, property and

contracts leaving a wholesale abandonment in the authorities of

record? (See e.g. East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S-230, 232

(1945); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).)

3. Indentured Servitude. Involuntary servitude can be said

to be the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or

imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he

is paid or not, ipso facto. (Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935,

29 L.Ed. 89; In re Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 69, 21 L.Ed.

394; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715.)

Ipso jure, the Thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution

prohibits slavery peonage or compulsion labor for all debts. (U.S.

CONST. amend. XIIl). Also in context, debt service (i.e. fiscal

service; see 31 U.S.C. 3 § 306) can be defined as the interest and

charges currently payable on a debt, including principle payments,

or a sum of money due by certain and express agreement including

19

not only obligation of debtor to pay, but right of creditor to receive

and enforce payment. (State v. Ducey, 25 Ohio App.2d 50, 266 N.E.2d

233, 235; see also Black’s Law Dictionary) Inasmuch as judicial

review is concerned on this particular question, remote levels of

relations with distant federal bureaucracies and institutions seem to

be the antithesis of respect for personal integrity and autonomy.

Hence, prosecution will emphasize its rightful place to stand in the

persistent war waged against capricious subjugation at the whim of

the sovereign. (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).)

Definitively, “the very idea that one may be compelled to hold his

means of living, or of any other material right essential to the

enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another” has been ruled

“intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the

essence of slavery itself.” (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370

(1886).) Now, the wholesale questions positioned in remainder are:

(a) whether gridlock in governments and the sum total of

global judicial errors blocking grants, issues under the guise of court

conferences, mandate reversal to secure and enforce prohibition of

involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.

(b) whether admitted printing errors will face the necessary

corrections as identified in such MEMORANDUM of 13 February

2001 thus implementing, executing, and perfecting appropriate, and

transparent fiscal debt service operations pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3 §

306, and the Fourteenth Amendment Section 4 where the validity of

the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, shall not be

questioned. (31 U.S.C. § 306; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV sec. 4)

4. Direct Equal Access Protection. The Supreme Court's

reservations about the efficacy and legitimacy of intrusive federal

injunctive remedies may have first surfaced in the school

desegregation context. (Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).)

Obviously, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of the United States...” (See U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV sec. 1, and see also Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 428

(1935).) Regardless, the central concept of the clause, equality,

requires the specification of substantive values before it has full

meaning.” Here, the opacity of the clause as applied in this case,

7 See WESTEN, “The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math and Morals: A

Reply,” 81 Mich.L.Rev. 604 (1983); WESTEN, “The Empty Idea of Equality,” 95

Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982).

20

cries out for a mediating principle and for supplying some variety

of anti-discrimination policy relevant to equal access protection.

Thus, Plaintiff requests resolution as to: when mediated by an anti-

discrimination principle, will the Fourteenth Amendment (or the

Fifteenth, and perhaps the Thirteenth) become a tool for

overturning: (1) injurious judicial decisions that deny equal

protection of the laws like Article I Section 8: (2) legislative acts that

are based on invidious rather than rational grounds, and (3)

executive or administrative opinions that are motivated by

unacceptable types of internal bias, or not? (See e.g. City of Mobile v.

Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100

(1981); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).)

XIV. (B.) COMMERCE AND TRADE, MONEY AND FINANCE,

AND RULE OF PROCEDURE PORTFOLIO- Technical Antitrust,

Rule of Law, and Valid Debt Claims. More interest should be paid

to the following group of legal prescripts, supervisory schemes, and

regulatory channels named or used hereafter that are to be »

scientifically tested for validity, integrity, and reliability in terms of

applying the referenced statutory legislation, cannon, or rule to acts

of BPD, embedded in the disparity of demand outstripping supply.

1. Permissible Reverse Repurchase Contracts, Presentment,

and Trade Acceptance. Assuming the production of a negotiable

Bill of Exchange instrument to the drawee (i.e. Defendant Respondent

Appellee) on acceptance, or of a promissory note to the said party

liable for payment of the same, is presentment in this sentence (See

People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 103 Cal.Rptr. 7, 11; Allmon v.

Allmon, Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 651, 655.); whether a district judge is

correct in giving a public interest determination favoring a Bureau

in a separate branch of her employer's (i.e. United States)

organization before the prosecution (i.e. Plaintiff Claimant

Appellant) had put in any of ‘ITS’ contractual evidence in

admittance, is valid, because of the ensuing contrary reasons: (Note,

see NYSE Rule 15- definition of ‘its’- Intermarket Trading System.)

(a) the commercial property ownership and contractual

rights transgressions commissioned by Defendant Bureau warrant

presentment (See e.g. U.S. v. Briggs, C.A.Fla., 514 F.2d 794, 804; State

v. Hudson, Tenn.Cr.Ap., 487 S.W.2d 672, 674) against the same on

such personal chattel forward contract breaches at issue as clear

restraint of commerce (15 U.S.C. § 1), monopolizing trades (15

U.S.C. § 2), and discrimination in price, services, and facilities (15

U.S.C. § 13); whereas the un-heard, but related and admissible

contractual evidence filed as proof (See Appellant's Restraint of

21

Trade/Monopolization Proofs, Clear Demonstration of Forced Wash Sales

or more commonly Price, Services, and Facilities Discrimination Proofs

filed 28 February 2001) is another simultaneous demand for

“electronic funds transfer” (‘EFT’) redemption and payment made

upon the drawee, acceptor, or maker Appellee by or on behalf of the

entitlement holder or payee Appellant (U.C.C. § 3-104; § 3-504(1))

and can not be merely voided, annulled, or improperly restated by

the governments own justice as pay back for the remedy on such an

anti-trust violations.

(b) the hypothetical (31 C.F.R. § 357 App. B- J. Hypotheticals)

case that has not been heard (15 U.S.C. § 18(f) hearings) to this point

is whether the courts acts (intermediate and below) constitute errors

in legislating and fixing trial results pendente lite by holding,

through one statutory. employee and also via a territorial three-

judge panel, that Claimant Appellant could be precluded from

recovery (15 U.S.C. § 15), injunctive relief (15 U.S.C. § 26), or

obtaining distribution (15 U.S.C. § 15e) of civil pecuniary

consideration legally measured (15 U.S.C. § 15d) on the basis that

such order ticket (Form PD F 3905) elections clearly establish

empirical evidence in the public interest (15 U.S.C. § 16e) relating to

obligations drawn on the face of the Full Faith and Credit clause in

United States derivative Treasury bills.

(c) and whether the completion of the transaction in

permissible bona fide arbitrage (12 C.F.R. § 220.7) transaction

settlements are subsequently enforceable ex post facto through the

court system’s application of federal laws to wit: U.S. CONST., 15

U.S.C. 1, 31 U.S.C. 31, and Regulation T, or not?

2. Securities entitlements in STRIPS TRADES valuation.

Assuming free trade and open market conditions, whether the

rights and property interest of an Entitlement Holder with respect

to a Book-entry Security are of any value an a relevant sub-market?

(See 31 C.F.R. Subpart A § 357.2; 31 C.F.R. Subpart B § 357.11) And

more fundamentally, whether the provisions endowing Congress

with the power to pay the domestic Debts of the United States, to

borrow money on the credit of the United States, to regulate

Commerce among the several States, to coin Money and regulate the

value thereof, is obsolete as Defense attorneys’ claim, or not? (See

e.g. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, and compare 31 U.S.C. 31 et seq.)

8 The Electronic Funds Transfer Act, was enacted in 1978, its primary objective is

the provision of individual consumer rights. (See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et.seq.)

22

3. Rule of Evidence. One part of positive lawmaking is the

bearing that clear proof and physical evidence have on the outcome

of legal situations, and candor will oblige us to admit that Federal

Rules of Evidence is a significant component of adjudicating any

controversy. (See FED. RK. EVID. generally.) In the course of

preceding observations written in Federalist Papers, all American

citizens (including judges and attorneys) are warned to “guard

against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your

decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any

impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of

truth.” (The Federalist Papers, No. 1 Hamilton) The res ipsa loquitur

evidence doctrine is summed up as requiring the best available

evidence be presented and is properly admissible. (See Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); People v. Banks,

Colo.App., 655 P.2d 1384, 1387; State v. Stephens, Mo.App., 556

S.W.2d 72, 723; and FED. R. EVID. Rule 1002.) Be advised that the

United States District Court transcript of the Rule 16 Discovery

Conference confirms that the sole judge only “looked at the

government's motion to dismiss” and not any of the prosecutions

litigation, or even one piece of evidence; whereas on another level in

a letter document to the Appellant, the local circuit court declared

that they were “unable to take any action on (Plaintiff's) ‘Restraint

of Trade /Monopolization Proofs, etc.’” that was submitted as part

of prosecutorial litigation EXHIBITS in order to make a clear cut

route to executing Claimants legal collection rights, powers, and

privileges. (See 5‘ Circuit’s March 5, 2001 generic letter.) Questions

remaining in principle part before the Supreme Court are:

(a) whether statutory government employee's opinions, who

only look at inter-governmental parties pleadings and do not take

evidence in making public interest determinations as to remedy, are

to be treated as questions of interpretation and application of the

proffered statements, or rather as questions of law to be decided in

entirety by the Supreme Court of the United States?

(b) whether after a nation-state court has suppressed

evidence, and has enjoined the arbitrage firms officials from

testifying concerning such evidence, and inappropriately applied

the Federal Tort Claims Act to an Anti-trust lawsuit; if a federal

conviction may thereupon be had and stand when not affirmed at

the local level, and correctly involves application of the Federal

Rules of Evidence; Commerce and Trade Code, and Money and

Finance Code rather than a sole generic hybrid tort count against

23

the United States (who is not named as a party in the action) and are

remedial, or not?

(c) whether the differential zone between scientific analysis

and discovery processes will eventually recognize the force in the

underlying principle message that the prosecution satisfied the

“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof insofar as clear and

convincing evidence is concerned, and as a result to what extent will

the deduction be drawn from established Acts of Congress in the

particular Commerce and Trade field of controversy and contest?

4. Triers of Fact. Commonly triers of fact include the jury,

and the court when the court is trying an issue of fact other than one

relating to the admissibility of evidence. (See e.g. Calif.Evid.Code.)

In this cause of action, Claimant’s Original Complaint and Statement of

Claim dated 8 February 2000 was covered by Form JS 44 which

clearly established the following facts: (1) the only Defendant

Bureau of the Public Debt resides in the District of Columbia, (2) the

basis of jurisdiction is diversity and amount, (3) that the nature of

suit is Antitrust and not Torts, (4) that the cause of action is

pursuant to 15 United States Code for denominational exchange

gains under 31 Code of Federal Regulations, and (5) that demands

were made for $1,337,962,000 in legal tender and also for a jury trial.

The question is: after the Respondent's counsel concede the

allegation of jurisdiction at both lower levels’, whether in a

continuing federal appellate court suit brought by Petitioner against

Defendant Bureau, and after courts have unilaterally held via

partisan United States employees who hold offices as Judges, that

no Defense attorney in government would compete with Appellant

Plaintiff who opposes a subsidiary intergovernmental quasi-

corporation in a positive contest for monetary reparations before a

jury, is a perfectly competitive market, equally efficient, and

facilitating consumer benefits?

5. Want of Assignments. First and foremost, Title 31 C.F.R. §

357.22 empowers rightful transfers whereby: “A security may be

transferred only as authorized by this part. A security may be

transferred from an account in TREASURY DIRECT® to an account in

TRADES. A coat ge be transferred between accounts in

TREASURY DIRECT , or from an account in TRADES to an account

in TREASURY DIRECT®.” More, Title 31 C.F.R. § 306.15 mandates

9 “Notice of Appeal” was timely filed on June 19-22, 2000 (30-32 DOC), thereby

vesting this Court with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (See Brief of

Appellee, p.2 par. 1 sen. 2)

24

Perera

that “the transfer of registered securities should be made by

assignment in accordance of subpart F of this part. Transferable

registered securities are eligible for denominational exchange and

exchange for bearer securities. Bearer securities are eligible for

denominational exchange, and when so provided in the offering

circular, or eligible for exchange for registered securities. Specific

instructions for issuance and delivery of the new securities, signed

by the owner must accompany the securities presented. (Form PD

3905 or PD 1827, as appropriate may be used.)” The truth is that

each and every one of the foregoing criteria was followed to the

letter and complied with in all respect by the public customer

Appellant. However, at the same time, written assignments have

not existed on the face of the governments papers according to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11- Signing of Pleadings,

Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to the Court; Sanctions

where “Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be

signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual

name, or, if the party is not represented by a attorney, shall be

signed by the party...An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless

omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to

the attention of the attorney or party.” (See FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 11)

Undeniably, the fact is that the lack of signatures invalidates, voids,

and nullifies the written opinion of such three-judge panel. (See

Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087,

1092; Klugh v. United States, D.C.S.C., 620 F.Supp. 892, 901; Easterline

v. Bean, 121 Tex. 327, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429.) This assertion will stands

firm as “there are few, if any, situations in our system of justice in

which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters

concerning a person’s liberty or property.” (Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

745, 751 (1983).)

6. Conflict Among Circuits Message. Neither the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Texas nor the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the

principal underlying issues put before them for resolution and clear

determination. At the same time, Plaintiff's rights, powers, and

privileges, and corresponding customs, duties, and obligations of

the Defendant have been marred, debased, and impaired by the

messages implied by such judicial actions[sic]. Moreover, both the

void order of the Houston Division, and the unsigned opinion of the

appellate level institution stand at odds with practically every

antitrust case dealing with the basic economics of competition,

monopoly, market power, concerted refusals to deal, exclusionary

25

practices, vertical integration, tie-ins, and evidence of distribution

restraints. (See Balmoral Cinema v. United Artists Pictures Corp., 885

F.2d 313 (6% Cir.1989); Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31

S.Ct. 502 (1911); United States v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.

586, 77 S.Ct. 872 (1957); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221

U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911); Interstate Circuit v. United States; 306

U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct.467 (1939).) The Congress that enacted the Sherman

Act saw it as a way of protecting consumers against market entry

prices that were too high, not too low. (See Kartell v. Blue Shield

(Mass.), 749 F.2d 922 (1s Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029, 105

S.Ct. 2040 (1985).) Analogous, the Supreme Court has often relied on

mere circumstantial evidence in ascertaining behaviors that were

inconsistent with profit-maximization adding “While the District

Court's finding of an agreement of the distributors among

themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the

circumstances of this case such agreement * * * was not a

prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that, knowing

that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors

gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.” (See

Interstate Circuit v. United States; 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct. 467 (1939).)

Notwithstanding the convictions in those listed cases, the Clayton

Act has expanded and increased the scope of anti-trust regulation

by explicitly condemned anti-competitive price discrimination,

tying, exclusive dealing, and injury to business or property, as well

as preferring the position of consumers and competitors. (See

Yentsch v. Texaco Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2°4 Cir.1980); Bob Maxfield

Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5 Cir.1981), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 315 (1981); Siegel v. Chicken Delight

Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9% Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955, 92 S.Ct.

1172 (1971); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 99 S.Ct. 2326

(1979), on remand, 602 F.2d 179 (8 Cir.1979).) There is no doubt

that consumers have always been antitrust’s preferred plaintiffs,

and even critics whose notions of appropriate enforcement are most

restrictive recognize the value of consumer suits in correlation to a

main goal of antitrust policy that is low entry prices and high

quality output for customers. It is apparent that the recent

developments in Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt reveal

disagreement among the circuits surrounding the substance of

competition and trust, which only the Supreme Court can finally

resolve. Certiorari should be granted for this purpose as well as to

establish that uniformity of procedure for contesting commercial

arbitrage transactions that are the clear intent of the underlying

26

federal claims currently at issue before the honorable court, for if the

decisions are unreviewed it will discredit the cited authorities, and

other pro se litigants will be faced with the impossible burden of

settling lawsuits that protect property and business within the

nation-state’s federal court system.

[The foregoing basis, authorities, and choices are rightfully

presented in this instrument denominated as Appeal /

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, in Renobato v. Bureau of the

Public Debt No.H-00-0425/No: 00-20555. Claimant hereby

adopts each of the gross reasons by incorporation. ]

DRAWN CONCLUSION

XV. Harnessing the Right Powers and Privileges of Passing Bills

in Governments. Without immediate review by the Supreme Court,

Appellant's legal rights to the most effective forms of antitrust relief

will be stripped and foreclosed while simultaneously forcing a sole

proprietor to give up his professional trade, vocation, skill, and

commercial calling. In the matter of Renobato v. Bureau of the

Public Debt, even if the federal judicial business consisted of

nothing more than statutory interpretation and interstitial common

lawmaking appurtenant to this suit, then Plaintiff would prevail on

the contractual evidence alone, not to mention property ownership

rights or Defendant's encroachment of legislative grounds. Beyond

dispute, Title 31 C.F.R. § 321.6 preserves Renobato rights under law

wherefore; “Nothing contained in this part shall limit or restrict any

existing rights which holders of securities may have acquired under

the offering circulars or the applicable regulations” whereas Title 31

C.F.R. § 321.15 fixes Bureau of the Public Debt’s liability for losses;

“Under the governing statute, as amended (31 U.S.C. 3126(a)), an

agent cannot be relieved of liability for a loss resulting from an

erroneous payment...” As the cause of action stands today, the

opinions of the court agencies concerning Title 15 U.S.C. § 26, which

clearly states that “Any person, firm, corporation, or association

shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of

__ the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against

threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws,

including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the

same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against

threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by

courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and

upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an

_ injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of

irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction

27

shall issue...” has been completely plundered, destroyed, mutilated,

and overturned. As previously demonstrated, this matter is one

where certiorari ought to be granted because; (1) the United States

Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision

of another United States Court of Appeals, (2) the lower venues

have so far departed from the accepted and customary course of

judicial proceedings in the capital markets as to call for an exercise

of this court’s supervisory power, and (3) the 5» Circuit has failed to

affirm important questions arising under federal law that have not

been but should be settled in this court, or rather has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts and deviates with

relevant decisions of this court. Positively in terms this court will

comprehend “nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant

spirit which has at all times characterized political parties” and

therefore any denial of certiorari does not import any expression of

views by the Court concerning the merits of the case or whether the

case was correctly decided below. (See e.g. United States v, Carver,

N.Y. 1923, 43 S.Ct. 181, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 67 L.Ed. 361, 364; Sunal v.

Large, Conn.1947, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1592, 332 U.S. 174, 181, 91 L.Ed.

1982, 1988; State of Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, Ohio 1959, 79 S.Ct. 978,

979 note 1, 360 U.S. 246, 247 note 1, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200, 1202 note 1;

Hughes Tool Co.v. Trans World Airlines Inc., N.Y.1973, 93 S.Ct. 647

note 1, 409 U.S. 363 note 1, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 note 1; Hopfman v. ~

Connolly, Mass.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2106, 2107, 471 U.S. 459, 461, 85

L.Ed.2d 469, 471; Teague v. Lane, I11.1989, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1069, 489

U.S. 288, 296, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 349; Hambsch v. United States,

Cl.Ct.1989, 109 S.Ct. 1969, 490 U.S. 1054, 104 L.Ed.2d 437; Wisconsin

Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley Jr. Co., Wis.1992, 112 S.Ct.

2447, 2452, 505 U.S. 214, 219, 120 L.Ed.2d 174, 184; Brown v. Texas.

Tex.1997, 118 S.Ct. 355, __ U.S. __, 139 L.Ed.2d 276; see also

memorandum of Chief Justice Warren in Martin v. Texas, 1965, 86 S.Ct.

307, 382 U.S. 928, 15 L.Ed. 2d 340.) Notwithstanding, ultimately in

the Supreme Court cause, one choice will stand out above all others,

and that is to grant certiorari, vacate judgements rendered, and

reverse the principles in appropriate fashion, thus giving binding

instructions or require that the entire record be sent up for decision

of the aggregate bill matter in controversy. (28 U.S.C. § 1254)

PRAYER

Ora pro nobis. With due solemn respect, Appellant honestly prays

(1) for affirmative relief, (2) that four Justices vote for a grant of

certiorari, (3) for plenary consideration in review (May v. Henderson,

268 U.S. 111, 45 S.Ct. 456, 69 L.Ed. 870; Mashunkashey v.

28

Mashunkashey, 191 Okla. 501 134 P.2d 976, 979), (4) for reversal of

lower court choices, (5) for “GVR” where this Court grant certiorari,

vacate the judgements, and remand the case to a lower court for

further consideration in light of potentially pertinent factors that

were not considered below (See Stutson v. United States, Ala.1996,

116 S.Ct. 600, 516 U.S. 193, 133 L.Ed.2d 571; Lawrence v. Chater,

N.C.1996, 116 S.Ct. 604, 516 U.S. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 545; Lords Landing

Village v. Continental Ins. Co., Md.1997, 117 S.Ct. 1731, 520 U.S. 893,

138 L.Ed.2d 91), (6) for determination of the net long and short

positions if contrary to the Bill of Exchange accrued through the

rollout date of 21 March 2001 (31 C.F.R. 356.13), as for even

numerous Hail Mary’s can’t bring back what has been taken for

Appellant Plaintiff by the illegal omissions or commissions of the

Appellee Defendant. This sum total of the arguments, from an

ideological basis, appeals to the conservative republican justices on

business, quality maintenance, and highly structured platforms, and

to the liberal democrat justices on the notions of change,

government serving man, and such great capacity of human nature.

Plaintiff calls for the issuance of a reversal implementing sweeping

changes thus concurrently vacating such arbitrary judgements

surrounding Appellant's actual trade positions. A revolving

recurrence to the principles heretofore embodied will satisfy that

there is no color to pretend that the nation-state, by the adoption of

the business plan, be divested of its privilege of paying down the

national debt, free from constraint, best answering the ends of

public justice and security.

Respectfully Submitted,

Jay Nolan Renobato

Natural Person Pro Se

JNR

Arbitrage Firm of Record

Jay Nolan Renobato, Proprietor

Post Office Box 9771

The Woodlands, Texas. 77387

(213)364-8250 tel

INDUSTRIAL MARK:

On the spot.

Investment Banker, and Financier

Petitioner(Appellant).

Dated, 11 July 2001

29

APPENDICES

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

CHARLES R. FULBRUGE III TEL. 594-589-6514

CLERK 600 CAMP STREET

-February 13,2001 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW

Regarding: Fifth Circuit Statement on Petitions for Rehearing or

Rehearing En Banc

No. 00-20555 Renobato v. Bur of the Pub Debt

USDC No. H-00-CV-0425

Enclosed is a copy of the court’s decision. The court has entered

judgment under FED. R. APP. P. 36. (However, the opinion may yet

contain typographival or printing errors which are subject to

correction.)

FED. R. APP. P.’s 39 through 41, and 5™ CIR. RULES 35, 39, and 41

govern costs, rehearings, and mandates. 5™4 CIR. RULES 35 and 40

require you to attach to your petition for panel rehearing or

rehearing en banc an unmarked copy of the court’s opinion or

order. Please read carefully the Internal Operating Procedures

(IOP’s) following FED. R. APP. P. 40 and 5T CIR. R. 35 for a

discussion of when a rehearing may be appropriate, the legal

standards applied and sanctions which may be imposed if you

make a nonmeritorious petition for rehearing en banc.

Direct Criminal Appeals. 5™ CIR. R. 41 provides that a motion for a

stay of the mandate under FED. R. APP. P. 41 will not be granted

simply upon request. The petition must set forth good cause for a

stay or clearly demonstrate that a substantial question will be

presented to the Supreme Court. Otherwise, this court may deny the

motion and issue the mandate immediately.

Pro Se Cases. If you were unsuccessful in the district court and/or

on appeal, and are considering filing a petition for certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court, you do not need to file a motion for

stay of the mandate under FED. R. APP. P. 41. The issuance of the

mandate does not affect the time, or your right, to file with the

Supreme Court.

The judgement entered provides that the plaintiff-appellant pay to

the defendant- appellee the costs on appeal.

Sincerely,

CHARLES R. FULBRUGE III, Clerk

By: “s/ Joseph Armato “

Joseph Armato, Deputy Clerk

Enclosure

Mr Jay Nolan Renobato

Ms Nancy A Cross

Mr Keith Orlando Edward Wyatt

2a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JAY NOLAN RENOBATO 7 C.A. NO. H-00-0425

V. . HOUSTON, TEXAS

: MAY 19, 2000

BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT*

AH bbb bbb ttt bbe t + 12:45 P.M.

TRANSCRIPT OF RULE 16 CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VANESSA D. GILMORE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mr. Jay Nolan Renobato

(Pro Se)

P.O. Box 9771

The Woodlands, Texas. 77387

FOR THE DEFENDANT: Ms. Nancy Cross Graham

Assistant U.S. Attorney

P.O. Box 61129

Houston, Texas. 77208

COURT REPORTER: Kathy L. Metzger

U.S. Courthouse

515 Rusk

Room 8016

Houston, Texas. 77002

713-250-5208

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript

produced by computer-aided transcription.

3a

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Renobato versus Bureau of the Public

Debt.

MS. GRAHAM: Nancy Graham for the government,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Come on up, please.

MS. GRAHAM: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: You are, sir?

MR. RENOBATO: Plaintiff Jay Nolan Renobato, pro se,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I've had a chance to look

at the government's motion to dismiss this case, and the Court

finds that the Federal Tort Claim Applies to this case and the

government has not waived sovereign immunity in this case.

Moreover, that the Bureau of the Public Debt would not

even be the correct defendant in a case like this. The correct

defendant would have to be the United States. An agency of

the United States can’t be sued the way that this case has been

brought.

4a

ET eS ON ee Ne Te eR ee ee Te CRT ee

In any event, the Court finds that the claims that you

filed, Mr. Renobato, in this case are barred by the United

States’ sovereign immunity in this case; and the government's

motion to dismiss has been granted.

All right. The Court has just signed an order today on

the government's motion to dismiss. So the Court finds that no

further orders be entered in this case.

All right?

Okay. Thank you then. You all are excused.

MS. GRAHAM: Thank you, your honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I certify that the foregoing in a correct transcript from the

record of proceedings in the above entitled cause.

“s/__ Kathy L. Metzger “ 5-20-00

Kathy L. Metzger Date

Official Court Reporter

Sa

6a

United States Courts

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

MAY 23 2000

Michael N. Milby, Clerk of Court

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JAY NOLAN RENOBATO §

§

versus § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-0425

§

BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT §

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

or Alternatively, Notion for Summary Judgement (Instrument No.

10). Plaintiff Jay Nolan Renobato (“Renobato”) has alleged, inter alia,

various torts as well as breach of contract by the Bureau of the

Public Debt related to the purchase of Treasury bills. The Federal

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides a limited waiver of the

sovereign immunity of the United States government. The FTCA is

also a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in those cases where the

government has waived sovereign immunity and has consented to

be sued in certain situations. 28 U.S.C. § 1376(b)(1).

First, in this case the Bureau of the Public Debt is not the

proper party. A federal agency may not be sued for claims

cognizable under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). Because the United

States is the proper party in this case, not the Bureau of the Public

Debt, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case. See Galvin v.

Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5 Cir. 1988).

Furthermore, a specific exemption to the FTCA’s waiver of

sovereign immunity covers Renobato’s claims. The FTCA provides

that its provisions “shall not apply to...[a]ny claim for damages

caused by the fiscal operations of Treasury of by regulation of the

monetary system.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(i). The Bureau of the Public

Debt is an agency within the Department of the Treasury that

borrows money needed to operate the federal government, and

issues and accounts for all United States Treasury securities issued

7a

ns nsmeneernssrineeesiilnepsmsingselniasdip-cibeejpeepmsian sraasscaiatin dlaste coot nE tina s ntihet

a

pursuant to the authority of Title 31 United States Code.

(Instrument No. 10, Exh. A, Affidavit of McCoy). Accordingly,

Renobato’s claims, which concerned his Treasury bills, are barred

by the United States’ sovereign immunity.

Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

| The Clerk shall enter this Order and provide a copy to

all parties.

| SIGNED on the “s/ 19” day of May, 2000, at Houston,

Texas.

sé

“s/ Vanessa D. Gilmore

| VANESSA . GILMORE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

No. 00-20555 APR 18 2001

CHARLES R. FULBRUGE III CLERK

JAY NOLAN RENOBATO Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT _ Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-00-CV-425

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA Circuit

Judges.

(Vv) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this

panel nor Judge in regular service on the Court having requested

that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (FRAP and Local

Rule 35) the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court having

been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and

majority of the Judges who are in regular active service not having

voted in favor, (FRAP and Local Rule 35) the Petition for Rehearing

En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of this Court in active service having requested a poll

on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the

judges in active service not having vote in favor, rehearing in banc is

DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

CLERK’S NOTE:

“s/_ Emilio M. Garza “ SEE FRAP AND LOCAL

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE RULE 41 FOR STAY

OF THE MANDATE

9a

10a

Texas Business and Commerce Code § 17.41-— § 17.63

§ 17.41 Short Title

This subchapter may be cited as the Deceptive Trade Practices-

Consumer Protection Act.

§ 17.44 Construction and Application

(a) This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to

promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect

consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business

practices, and unconscionable actions, and breaches of

warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures

to secure such protection. ;

(b) Chapter 27, Property Code, prevails over this subchapter to

the extent of any conflict.

§ 17.45 Definitions

As used in this subchapter:

(1) “Goods” means tangible chattels or real property

purchased or leased for use.

(2) “Services” means work, labor, or service purchased or

leased for use, including services furnished in connection with

the sale or repair of goods.

(3) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation,

association, or other, group, however organized.

(4) “Consumer” means an individual, partnership,

corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state

who seeks to acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or

services, except that the term does not include a business

consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is

controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million

or more.

(5) “Unconscionable action or course of action” means an act

or practice which to a consumer's detriment, takes advantage

of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the

consumer to a grossly unfair degree.

lla

Ee

(6) “Trade” and “commerce” means the advertising, offering

for sale, sale, lease, or distribution of any good or service, of

any property, tangible or intangible, real personal or mixed,

and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever

situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or

indirectly affecting the people of this state

(7) “Documentary material” includes the original or a copy of

any book, record, report, memorandum, paper,

communication, tabulation, map, chart, photograph,

mechanical transcription, or other tangible document or

recording, wherever situated.

(8) “Consumer protection division” means the antitrust and

consumer protection division of the Attorney General's Office.

(9) “Knowingly” means actual awareness, at the time of the act

or practice complained of, of the falsity, deceptive, or

unfairness, of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer's

claim, or, in an action brought under Subdivision (2) of

Subsection (a) of Section 17.50, actual awareness of the act,

practice, condition, defect, or failure constituting the breach of

warranty, but actual awareness may be inferred where

objective manifestations indicate that a person acted with

actual awareness.

(10) “Business consumer” means an individual, partnership or

corporation who seeks or acquires by the purchase or lease,

any goods or services for commercial or business use. This

term does not include this state or a subdivision or agency of

this state.

(11) “Economic damages” means compensatory damages for

pecuniary loss, including costs of repair and replacement. This

term does not include exemplary damages or damages for

physical pain and mental anguish, loss of consortium,

disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of companionship

and society.

(12) “Residence” means a building:

(A) that is a single-family house, duplex, triplex, or

quadruplex or a unit in a multi-unit residential

structure in which the title to the individual units is

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transferred to the owners under a condominium or

cooperative system; and

(B) that is occupied or to be occupied as the consumer’s

residence.

(13) “Intentionally” means actual awareness of the falsity,

deception, or unfairness of the act or practice, or the condition,

defect or failure constituting the breach of warranty giving

rise to the consumer’s claim, coupled with the specific intent

that the consumer act in detrimental reliance on the falsity or

deception or in detrimental ignorance of the unfairness.

Intention may be inferred from objective manifestations that

indicate that the person acted intentionally or from acts

showing that a defendant acted with flagrant disregard of

prudent and fair business practices to the extent that the

defendant should be treated as having acted intentionally.

§ 17.46 Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful

(a) False misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the

conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared

unlawful and are subject to action be the consumer protection

division under Sections 17.47, 17.58, 17.60, and 17.61 of this

code.

(b) Except as provided in Subsection (d) of the section, the

term false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices includes,

but is not limited to, the following acts.

(1) passing off goods or services to be those of another

(2) causing the confusion or misunderstanding as to the

source, sponsorship, approval, or certifications, of the goods

or services

(3) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation,

connection, or association, with, or certification by another

(4) using deceptive representations or designations of

geographic origin in connection with goods or services

(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship,

approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or

quantities which they do not have or that a person has a

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sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which

he does not

(6) representing that goods are original or new if they are

’ deteriorated reconditioned reclaimed used or secondhand

(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular

standard quality or grade or that the goods are of a particular

style or model, if they are of another

(8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by

false or misleading representation of the facts

(9) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as

advertised

(10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply a

reasonable expectable public demand, unless the

advertisements disclosed a limitation of quantity

(11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning

the reasons for, existence of, or amount of price reductions

(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights,

remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or

which are prohibited by law

(13) knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact

concerning the need for pats, replacement, or repair service

(14) misrepresenting the authority of a salesman,

representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a

consumer transaction

(15) basing a charge for the repair of any item in whole or in

part on a guaranty or warranty instead of on the value of the .

actual repairs made or work to be performed on the item

without stating separately the charges for the work and the

charge for the warranty or guaranty, if any

(16) disconnecting, turning back, or resetting the odometer of

any motor vehicle so as to reduce the number of miles

indicated on the odometer gauge

(17) advertising of any sale by fraudulently representing that a

person is going out of business

(18) using or employing a chain referral sales plan in

connection with the sale or offer to sale goods, merchandise,

or anything of value, which uses the sales technique, plan,

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arrangement, or agreement in which the buyer or prospective

buyer is offered the opportunity to purchase merchandise or

goods and in connection with the purchase receives the seller’s

promise or representation that the buyer shall have the right

to receive compensation or consideration in any form of

furnishing to the seller the names of other prospective buyers

if receipt of the compensation or consideration is contingent

upon the occurrence of an event subsequent to the time the

buyer purchases the merchandise or goods

(19) representing that a guaranty or warranty confers or

involves rights or remedies which it does not have or involve,

provided, however, that nothing in this subchapter shall be

construed to expand the implied warranty or merchantability

as defined in sections 2.314 through 2.318 and Sections 2A.212

through 2A.216 of the Business & Commerce Code to involve

obligations in excess of those which are appropriate to the

goods.

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