Amicus Curiae Brief — Jackson v. Benson
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LY | Supreme Court, U.S,
LY FILED
\ 7
ern \ SEP 30 1998
a OFFICE OF IWE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1998
WARNER JACKSON, et al.. MILWAUKEE TEACHERS’
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al.
Petitioner,
v.
TOMMY G. THOMPSON, Governor; JOHN T. BENSON,
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
MOTION AND BRIEF OF
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
JULIE UNDERWOOD
General Counsel
National School Boards Association
1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 838-6710
Counsel of Record
No. 98-376
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1998
WARNER JACKSON, et al., MEL’ AUKEE TEACHERS’
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Petitioners,
-_—
V.
, TOMMY G. THOMPSON, Governor; JOHN T. BENSON,
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
MOTION OF NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS
ASSOCIATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
The National School Boards Association (NSBA)
respectfully moves this Court to grant it leave to file the attached
brief as amicus curiae in the above captioned case. Petitioners
have consented to NSBA’s participation in this matter. A letter
attesting to their consent has been suumitted to this Court.
Founded in 1940, NSBA is a not-for-profit federation of
state associations of school boards across the United State. and
the school boards of the District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. NSBA represents the nation’s 95,000
es
school board members. These board members govern 14,772
local school districts that serve more than 46.5 million public
school students — approximately 90 percent of all elementary and
secondary school students in the nation.
NSBA has a longstanding interest in educational policy
and has been a frequent contributor of amicus briefs in this Court
on these issues — E.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal
protection — undocumented alien students); Rowley v. Board of
Education, 510 U.S. 1202 (1982) (IDEA — educational
methodology); Washington v. Seattle Public Schools, 458 U.S.
457 (1982) (equal protection — voluntary desegregation); Board of
Education of Paris v. Vail, 466 U.S. 377 (1984) (procedural due
process — "property" interest in continued employment); /rving
Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 469 U.S. 809 (1984) (IDEA -
related services); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984)
(student search and seizure); Smith v. Robinson, 464 U.S. 932
(1983) (IDEA — attorneys’ fees); Oklahoma v. Gay Task Force,
470 U.S. 903 (1985) (teacher free speech — statute forbidding
speech outside school on subject of gay rights); Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (procedural due
process — teacher’s right to pre-termination hearing); Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (Title VII of
Civil Rights Act - accommodation of teacher’s religious beliefs),
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(student free speech); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)
(separation of powers — legislative veto); Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (teacher free speech
— damages); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 478 U.S.
1014 (1986) (equal protection — layoffs on basis of race to
promote "role models"); School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (Section 504 - teacher with
infectious disease); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuklmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988) (student free speech — school newspaper); Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (IDEA — removal of violent disabled
student); DeShaney v. Winnebago Dept. of Social Services, 489
U.S. 189 (1989) taidauaiin due process — duty to protect child
from parents/guardians); Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Equal
Access Act — establishment of religion, meaning of "curriculum-
related"); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991) (due process — punitive damages); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992) (establishment of religion — clergy-led graduation
prayer); Florence County Dist. 4 v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993)
(IDEA — duty to pay tuition at uncertified private school); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Center Moriches School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(establishment of religion, free speech — use of school facilities);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(establishment of religion — providing interpreter to child in
religious school); Grumet v. School Dist. of Kiryas Joel, 512 US.
687 (1994) (establishment of religion — state formation of separate
religious school district); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (establishment of
religion and free speech — funding of student religious
newspaper); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(interstate commerce clause — limitation of congressional
authority); Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(student search and seizure); Board of Education of Piscataway v.
Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct.
2506, writ dismissed, 118 S.Ct. 595 (1997) (Title VI — layoffs on
basis of race to promote "diversity"); Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School Dist., 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998) (Title IX -
standard of liability imposed on school district for teacher on
student sexual harassment); Cedar Rapids School District v.
Garret F., 106 F. 3d 822 (8" Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct.
1793 (1998) (IDEA- scope of medical services exclusion).
Because this case has such direct bearing on how state
legislatures will resolve this educational issue, NSBA respectfully
requests the opportunity to advise this Court more fully of the
urgency of review in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
; at School Boards Association
1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 838-6710
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
REI POE RU IIIRE TESS sc snsssasccisneasssssovsdscccecocsccecouccseideclneds ii
SP NMEA EE IM A icone sas asa. snenvesnciehn ans uccdlbcbucbsta wtbecolis ieee 2
Sic UM et TE 2
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. .........c.ccccccccccceccececcecesceceeces 6
Does the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
Violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution?..............cccccccce0e. 6
ARGUMENT
I. THE PARAMETERS AND LEGALITY OF SCHOOL
VOUCHER PROGRAMS IS ONE OF NATIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE. STATES NEED THIS COURT’S
GUIDANCE ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE..........cccccccc0---. 6
Il. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ISSUE IS OF
NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. AT THe CORE OF THIS
DEBATE IS WHETHER THE COST OF RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION CAN BE CONSTITUTIONALLY
SHIFTED FROM THE BELIEVER TO THE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Agostini v. Felton,
Sahl US. 208, T17 S.C. 1997 (IDO T vsssessicscsessssinrcecnss
Brusca v. State,
332 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1971),
Oe i Be IAD ecnicsscssicasstssnliveiechenstasetusink
County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
ABE Bs Fay OP e A peicincsqnsbencsanseasniniehinivindinestbeon
Giacomucci v. Southeast Delaware
County School District, No. 98-5805
(Del. County Ct. of Com. Pleas, argued
Sept. 2, SOWRE 2s Bis cs Soe er i i
Goodail v. Stafford County School Board,
CO F.3G 16GB Cie 1085) i aah ed
Kotterman v. Killian,
No. C-B970412-SA
(pending Ariz. BGR. 1998) ii. osha is eh
Larson v. Valente,
SIO A FiDs Za Oy LITRE) certs csonessaneracssacosiicrintnainiiiell
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
GS SE rc Oe CE EOD seehsnsttencsdaeseanitensnnnsssehieéedincsedesonssiany
Leutkemeyer v. Kaufmann,
364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973),
ONE ANGUS DG oi ii
; te
ili
Page
Lowe v. State,
id Cen I OO ADOT bn i 10
Meek v. Pittenger,
ehibeadinietssinsesis Using Ce NIE cs OE RR 16
Mueller v. Allen,
ath testi enact oe A tad NLA RN RT RRR 8,9
PEARL v. Nyquist,
STS:U Ss 756, FRR GOL AGTS) i icicesisiesssict ER EL he 16
Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of University of Virginia,
ee Ca MCR se iy 16
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball
473 U.S. 373 (1985)........... piececsasanitphisisnelodadadiniekadien.iccathactoch 16
Simmons-Harris v. Goff,
1997 WL 217583 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), stay granted,
OOF NE. 28 TOS (OMI 1997) cscs ceccsessec itsidossioseidcbéiecdec. oo: 13
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services tor the Blind
112 Wa.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119, cert. denied
sith ane br ai get, CHG 17
Wolman v. Walter,
BFS OS AAPL O YO) ccinnnn secenssunahthiisuci GhiBii Bisipdige 2 cei 2 16
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills IS.D,
RAND) sisistemscctitsivedisscllncchs cubs diisaid coterie 17
STATUTES:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 43-1089 (1997)............cccsccsecessssssseeeneens 9
DEA SI AIG, BE Ge sancti tafe ccrnvesnntccvenshti cali acectconeeriioendiecd 9
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.0674 (1997)...........ccccscceesssesessseseesessnons 9
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN § 11.157 (1997) ...s.scscsssscsecssssesssenecseenees 14
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
The Blum Center’s Educational Freedom Report,
DR, Fake MARIE ts, PRUE sesnnesesse-scnnnnbidiionsisabchniapeceaioksbiets pubbavetniy onto 10
The Blum Center’s Educational Freedom Report,
Ma. O64, Sheen FS FOG i visa sian leet in etn ll
CHURCH AND STATE MAGAZINE, Status of the States:
Tax Aid to Religious Schools (1996) ...........ssssessssesssssesensseseneees 10
SEE PUI NE FOIE raevecencnescockcbst csc deeiliitck estonia iemesencis 12
Fax from New Hampshire School Boards
Association on September 24, 1998 ...............cccceseseeeccessseseeseeseses ll
Fax from John Marshall,
Director of Legislative Services;
Oregon School Boards Association,
, irnatiiiniisccianinisrebsnensnssseenssestersiteatincipsienibseasnens 12
The Freedom Forum, May 14, 1998.............ccscccesssssssseessreneseeees 13
Heritage Foundation,
School Choice Programs (1998)..........-.....ssscssseesseess 10, 11, 12
iv
Page
Laycock, D., Nonpreferential Aid to Religion -
A False Claim About Original Intent
at WO ee 15
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, April (S| Cee eee 13,14
Schultz, Steve, Budget Lets State Fund
Parochial Schools, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL,
UN TR ick 7
Wisconsin Dept. of Public Instruction,
Basic Facts about Wisconsin
I iii 6
No. 98-376
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1998
WARNER JACKSON, et al., MILWAUKEE TEACHERS’
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
TOMMY G. THOMPSON, Governor; JOHN T. BENSON,
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
wiSCONSIN SUPREME COURT
BRIEF OF NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
SC eeeseteeetnecaee nel
Petitioners have consented to the filing of this brief.' Their
consent is on file with the Clerk.
' This brief was written by National School Boards Association (NSBA)
who is amicus curiae before this Court and not in any part by counsel for
either party. No person or entity other than NSBA has made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS
Founded in 1940, NSBA is a not-for-profit federation of
State associations of school boards across the United States and
the school boards of the District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, and
the U. S. Virgin Islands. NSBA represents the nation’s 95,000
school board members. These board members govern 14, 772
local school districts that serve more than 46.5 million public
school students — approximately 90 percent of all elementary and
secondary school students in the nation. NSBA has had a
longstanding interest in the effective development and
implementation of local school board policies, including those
touching on the Establishment Clause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1989 the Wisconsin legislature enacted the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program (MPCP). This program permitted up to
1.5% of the Milwaukee Public School population to attend private
nonsectarian schools within the city with the state paying the
tuition costs. Both the students and the schools had to meet certain
eligibility requirements. To be eligible, a student had to be
® im grades K-12:
¢ from a family whose income did not exceed the federal
poverty level by more than 1.75 times: and
¢ either enrolled in a Milwaukee public school, enrolled in a
private school under the program, or not enrolled in any
school the previous year.
School requirements involved compliance with certain
state and federal health, safety, education, and civil rights laws. In
addition, the schools had to meet defined performance criteria and
submit to state financial and performance audits. For each student
enrolled under the program, the iis sctoadiceaaks reduced the
amount of the aid it provided io the Milwaukee Public Schools.
In 1995 the Wisconsin State Legislature amended the
MPCP to increase the percentage of students eligible to 15% and
open the program to sectarian private schools. Sectarian schools,
in addition to the other eligibility requirements, had to agree under
an “opt out" provision not to require any program student to
participate in any religious training, indoctrination or education.
In addition, the amended program modified the method of
payment to participating schools. Tuition payments are issued to
3
the parent/guardian, but delivered to the school where the
parent/guardian is required to endorse the check to the private
school.
The amended program was challenged on several state
and federal grounds. On June 10, 1998 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the amended Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
(MPCP) does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
The issue involved in the requested review centers on the
Establishment Clause claim. The Wisconsin majority opinion
applied the Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), test to the
amended program to determine constitutionality. The court dealt
swiftly with the primary purpose and entanglement prongs,
providing a more detailed analysis of the primary effect prong. It
stated that the two most important factors in determining if a state
law has the primary effect of advancing religion is whether the
law is neutral regarding religion and whether any benefits it may
bestow on religion are indirect. After reviewing several cases
involving state educational assistance programs that provide
public aid to both nonsectarian and sectarian institutions, it stated
that the U.S. Supreme Court has established the general principle
4
that such programs do not have the primary effect of advancing
religion if the public aid is provided: on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neicher favors nor disfavors religion; and only
as the result of numerous private choices of individual
parents/guardians does a sectarian institution receive a benefit.
Applying this principle to the provisions of the amended MPCP,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the eligibility rules for
students are of a secular nature and selection for participation in
the program is made on the basis of religiously neutral criteria. It
also pointed out that the “opt out" provision of the program
shields students from mandatory participation in religious activity.
Finally, the court found that state funds which end up flowing to
sectarian schools, do so only after individual parents/guardians of
students make private choices to enroll students in those schools.
As a result, the court concluded that the amended MPCP does not
have the primary effest of advancing religion.
The dissent, in which the Chief Justice joined, agreed
with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that the entire amended
MPCP should be struck down because it violates Establishment
principles.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution?
ARGUMENT
I, THE PARAMETERS AND LEGALITY OF SCHOOL
VOUCHER PROGRAMS IS ONE OF NATIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE. STATES NEED THIS COURT’S
GUIDANCE ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.
Unlike the original MPCP this is not a small experimental
program. Approximately 122 private schools in the Milwaukee
area are eligible to receive taxpayer subsidized tuition under the
current MPCP. Up to 15,000 students are eligible to transfer to
eligible private school. This number exceeds the total student
population of all but 5 of Wisconsin’s 427 school districts.
Wisconsin Dept. of Public Instruction, Basic Facts about
Wisconsin Elementary and Secondary Schools. Stated another
way, the total number of students eligible to participate in the
program exceeds the student population of approximately 99% of
Wisconsin’s public school districts.
MPCP fosters private education at the expense of public
schools. MPCP is designed to provide taxpayer funding for a
specified class of private schools. With the transfer of students to
this special class of schools goes the transfer of state dollars
otherwise earmarked for the support and maintenance of the
6
Milwaukee Public Schools. The Milwaukee Journal reported that
Governor Tommy Thompson was clear in his intention to create a
new class of public schools through MCPC. Thompson has said
he wants to push education reforms that have at their root a new
definition of public schools. Steve Schultze, Budget Lets State
Fund Parochial Schools, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, March 12, 1995,
B.1. Instead of defining public education in terms of a system
publicly owned, publicly staffed, and publicly controlled, MCPC
defines public education as publicly funded but privately
controlled. He wants public funding to follow the student.
The debate surrounding the use of tax dollars to support
private and religious schools began over 25 years ago. During
that time, voucher proponents have built and refined their
arguments to attract maximum support from an array of special
interests. Voucher proponents wart public funds to support
private and religious schools in order to promote their particular
religious or moral beliefs — to have the state financially support
their retreat to their own segregated educational enclaves.
There is substantial activity in the states on school
vouchers. As can be seen graphically, many states have been
7
touched by this issue in the last two years. [See map below.] The
issue has gemerally been presented as tuition tax benefits or tuition
vouchers. This Court resolved the issue of tuition tax benefits in
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1993). Similar guidance is now
needed from this Court as they consider voucher programs.
STATE VOUCHER ACTIVITY SINCE 1996
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TTC = Tuition tax credit program
F = Voucher proposal failed
V = Voucher programs active or in pending litigation
(Currently three states have tuition tax credit/deduction
programs which allow parents/guardians to offset the cost of
private education through a reduction in state tax liability. Since
8
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1993), these state provisions have
included tuition at private and religious schools as eligible
deductions.
Arizona - The state tax code allows residents to claim a tax
credit of up to $500 for donations to charitable organizations
who provide scholarships for students to attend private and
religious schools. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (1997).
The constitutionality of this is being considered by the
Arizona Supreme Court in Kotterman y. Killian, No. C-
B970412-SA (pending Ariz. S.Ct. 1998).
Iowa - Parents/guardians are entitled to take a tax deduction of
up to $1000 per child in school with a limit of four deductions
per family. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.12.
Minnesota - Parents/guardians are allowed tax deductions for
educational expenses up to $2500 per child. Families with
incomes of less than $33,500 are entitled to a tax credit of
$1,000 per child for educational expenses. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 290.0674 (1997).
In 12 states, efforts to institute school voucher programs
have failed.
Delaware - A bill to provide vouchers was not passed out of
the state’s education committee. Heritage Foundation, School
Choice Programs (1998).
Florida - In April, 1998, the state house passed a limited
program providing a $3,500 tuition voucher for preschoolers.
The Blum Center’s Educational Freedom Report, No. 58,
April 24, 1998.
Georgia - The state refused to enforce an anti-desegregation
law which provided grants to white families seeking to opt out
of desegregated schools. Lowe v. State, 482 S.E.2d 344 (Ga.
1997).
Illinois - A bill providing means tested vouchers for students
in Chicago was considered. It was not passed out of the
state’s rules committee. CHURCH AND STATE MAGAZINE,
Status of the States: Tax Aid to Religious Schools (1996).
Kentucky - A tuition voucher bill was introduced, but failed to
be passed out of the Senate’s education committee. Heritage
Foundation, School Choice Programs (1998).
10
Maryland - A tuition voucher bill was introduced, but failed to
be passed out of committee. The Blum Center’s Educational
Freedom Report, No. 54, December 19, 1997.
Mississippi - The Governor proposed a ballot initiative called
the People’s Right to Initiate Model Education (PRIME)
which would allow local communities to adopt voucher
programs. PRIME has received the required number of
Signatures to appear on a state ballot in 1998. Heritage
Foundation, School Choice Program (1998).
Missouri - A tuition voucher bill was introduced but failed to
be passed out of committee. Heritage Foundation, School
Choice Programs (1998).
New Hampshire - A tuition voucher bill introduced in 1998
was defeated in the state legislature. Fax from New
Hampshire School Boards Association on September 24,
1998.
New Jersey - In 1997 the Lincoln Park School District
implemented a program permitting high school students to
attend either a public or private school at public expense. The
11
state education commissioner ruled against the program.
Heritage Foundation, School Choice Programs (1998).
New York - A tuition voucher bill was introduced but failed to
be passed out of committee. Heritage Foundation, School
Choice Programs (1998).
Oregon - In 1997 a tuition voucher bill was introduced, but
failed to be passed out of committee. Fax from John
Marshall, Director of Legislative Services; Oregon School
Boards Association, September 25, 1998.
Eight states have judicial action regarding vouchers.
Colorado - A class action suit was brought in 1997 by ‘
parents/guardians claiming the Denver school system had
failed to teach basic skills. The parents/guardians are seeking
tuition vouchers as a remedy. DENVER POST, May 8, 1997.
Maine - In Bagley v. Town of Raymond, a Cumberland County
Superior Court rejected parents’ allegations that the state’s
refusal to allow them use of vouchers for religious schools is a
free exercise violation. The parents’ appeal is pending before
12
the state supreme court. PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, April 7,
1998.
Massachusetts - Parents/guardians of parochial school
students filed suit against the state, challenging the state
constitution’s prohibition on the use of public funds for
religious schools as a free exercise violation. The Freedom
Forum, May 14, 1998.
Ohio - In 1996 a voucher program for Cleveland students was
enacted. The program included religious schools. The
program was challenged. In May 1997 the Ohio Court of
Appeals found both the US. a Ohio Constitutions were
violated by the program. Simmons-Harris vy. Goff, 1997 WL
217583 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.). The case was appealed to the
Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court granted a stay
pending its decision. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 684 N.E 2d 705
(Ohio 1997).
Pennsylvania - The Southeast Delaware County School Board
implemented a private school voucher program, including
religious schools. The program was challenged; the case is
still pending. Giacomucci v. Southeast Delaware County
13
School District, No. 98-5805 (Del. County Ct. of Com. Pleas,
argued, Sept. 2, 1998).
e Texas - Houston School District implemented a program
under the state’s Contracts for Educational Services Act
which allows school districts to place students at private
schools at public expense. TEX EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.157
(1997),
e Vermont - The town of Chittenden filed an action to enable its
students to attend religious schools at public expense. Trial
court ruled against the town on establishment grounds. The
case is pending before the Vermont Supreme Court.
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, April 7, 1998.
e Wisconsin - the instant case pending on writ of certiorari.
Regardless of whether voucher plans are good for needy
children in overtaxed urban public schools (and we contend they
cause more harm than good), the state must overcome the First
Amendment’s bar against church-state entanglement before it can
fund religious schools directly.
14
Il. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ISSUE IS OF
NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. AT THE CORE OF THIS
DEBATE IS WHETHER THE COST OF RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION CAN BE CONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED
FROM THE BELIEVER TO THE TAXPAYER.
The question is whether the &stablishment Clause
requires a subsidy to parents/guardians of children who attend
religious schools equal to the per pupil funding of the public
schools. The Establishment Clause does not require a public
subsidy from religious education - it prohibits it.
This Court has held that, “The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religion cannot be officially
preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244
(1982). Equally important, the Establishment Clause prohibits
favoritism to any religion. See D. Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid to
Religion - A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & M. «a
Rev. 875 (1991).
“Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean (and
we have held it to mean no official preference even for
religion over nonreligion, see, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1
(1989)), it certainly means at the very least that
government may not demonstrate a preference for one
particular sect or creed (including a preference for
Christianity over other religions).”
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989),
| 15
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of
| Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995), this Court stated that a tax
levied for the direct support of a church “would run contrary to
Establishment Clause concerns, dating from the earliest days of
the republic.”
This Court, in previous cases has dealt with the issue of
public funding of religious education. In these cases, this Court
has held that the Establishment Clause does not allow direct
public funding of religious education. E.g., PEARL v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 788 - 89 (1973); School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Neither is the state required to provide such equal
expenditures on religious education as a part of a free exercise
claim. In Leutkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo.
1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974), parents/guardians of parochial
school students challenged Missouri’s refusal to provide them
with free bus transportation while providing such transportation to
public school students. Citing Brusca v. State, 332 F. Supp. 275,
279 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1050 (1972), the three judge
16
court rejected the claim. Accord Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Services for the Blind, 112 Wa.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119, cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). While a school may constitutionally
provide services, such as a sign language interpreter, Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills 1.S.D., 509 U.S.1 (1993), it is not required to
do so constitutionally. Goodall v. Stafford County School Board.
60 F.3d 168 (4" Cir. 1995).
This Court has upheld the provision of services to
religious schools. However, permitting public school teachers to
go into religious schools to instruct students in remedial courses is
not the same as directly funding religious instrrction. The MPCP
is direct funding of religious instruction — no more, no less.
Recall Justice Souter’s words in Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997), we tend “to forget the hard
lessons, and to overlook the history of governmental partnership
with religion when ... bureaucrats have programs. That tendency
to forget is the reason for having the Establishment Clause (along
with the Constitution’s other structural and _ libertarian
guarantees), in the hope of stopping the corrosion before it starts.”
117 S.Ct. at 2021 (Souter, J. dissenting).
17
CONCLUSION
Proponents of educational vouchers offer beguiling
promises of the benefits sure to follow if rzivate schools are made
available to all parents/guardians. The assumptions are that:
private schools are better than public schools; private schools will
open their doors to any parent who knocks; innovative private
schools will spring up in the private sector; public schools,
sluggish from years of holding a monopoly, will be jolted to life
by competition from private schools and propelled toward long
needed reforms. This is not a logical reality. Vouchers are not an
educational panacea. Vouchers are not a path to improving public
education. In fact, proponents of vouchers are asking us to
abandon the public schools. They are asking for a government
handout of our tax dollars to benefit their own narrowly tailored
interests.
18
Amicus requests that this court grant certiorari to settle
the controversy over the legal parameters of school voucher
programs and offer state legislatures and courts clear guidance,
Respectfully submitted,
DERWOOD, General Counsel
al Schou! Boards Association
1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 838-6710
Counsel of Record
19
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.