Amicus Curiae Brief — Farmer-Paellman v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp (Nos. 06-1533, 06-1534)

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\ (D FILED

No. 06-1533 | JUN 2.0 2007

~f OFFICE OF THE Cierny:

| SUPREME COURT He

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

+

DEADRIA FARMER-PAELLMANN on behalf

of herself and other similarly situated persons

of African-American slave descent and

the class she represents,

Petitioners,

Vv.

BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO

CORPORATION, et al.,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

¢

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

CAUCASIANS UNITED FOR

REPARATIONS AND EMANCIPATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

-

CRAIG ALAN WEBSTER

Georgia State Bar No. 744950

Counsel for CURE as Amicus Curiae

1770 Indian Trail Road

Suite 200

Norcross, Georgia 30093

678-775-6064

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

COCKE LAW BRIEF PRINTING, CO) Soa) 22° 8964

OR CALL COLEROT t02 342-2841

III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. THE COURTS BELOW HAVE HANDED

PETITIONERS A “DOUBLE STANDARD”

OF JURISPRUDENCE IN DISMISSING

THEIR CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE ON

THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF LIMI-

TAT RPE Go atnbackbababansteninvies sessnceysecscceseescosess

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

PRESENTS A WHOLLY INADEQUATE

ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABLE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONG................:00005

1. Inaction Risks Forever Denying Legal

Pa tar rttts cnccxseciscsscce veces

2. Statute of Limitations serves no public

interest in this matter ..................:cssseee

3. Respondents are not disadvantaged......

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

DENIES STATES’ RIGHTS TO PROVIDE

REMEDY FOR CONFISCATED WAGES

AND ILLEGAL ENRICHMENT.................

TV. COORG Ear eeretiecus canahhupdeanabneastirasnsnsnnssccccrescose.

Page

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE...............00045 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. .............ccccseseeseeeee 3

PEUFU IT ase peAHAAAAAAURAse Naasivsnnvenseoseeensoces 4

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067 (7th

CI: ITED issvsniccuieeicinvanddsansnciesacoonigeibenaabccslasmuesacnes 11

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)........ 6, 8

Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum

& Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873 (D.S.D. 1981)................ ll

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)............cccccccccssssssreeee 7

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)................00e0008 8

Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 367 S.E.2d 128

RII Bs scasess caveschuiapaseeltbtciihiacsncniakidaanadagaetaalstlenbadieatectasaasdats 11

Holmberg. v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946)............000088 10

Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).................... 7, 8,15

McClendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 782 F. Supp.

1548 (M.D. Ga. 1992), summary judgment den.,

813 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Ga. 1992), motion den.,

822 F.Supp. 1580 (M.D. Ga. 1993), summary

judgment den., 837 F.Supp. 1231 (M.D. Ga.

1993), motion granted, 841 F. Supp. 415 (M.D.

Ga. 1994) and motion granted, habeas corpus

den., 837 F. Supp. 940 (C.D. Ill. 1993)...............cessesees 10

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)... eeeeeeeees 7

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) 00... cesses seee eens 6

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)... eens 6

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ............cccccccssssssssssenenes 6

STATUTE

RE Sas. Ete OF OR ikik nde see sean 6

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

www.rsgincorp.com

OTHER AUTHORITIES

SECS SHEAR EH SHHEESEE HEH SHHTEHSHESESEOHHETHE HEHEHE SEE HH SHE SEEES

BRIEF OF CAUCASIANS UNITED FOR

REPARATIONS AND EMANCIPATION AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

This amicus curiae’ brief is submitted on behalf of the

Caucasians United for Reparations and Emancipation.

I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

CURE and its members have an interest in this case

because the onus of slavery has been, and continues to be,

upon the white citizens who have benefited from slavery

and its lingering effects. For as long as we white citizens,

as a class, continue to receive benefits from slavery and

receive the advantage and privilege attributed to us by

Jim Crow segregation and the racial discrimination and

racial prejudice which endure to this day, we will be

denied equality with the slave descendants.

Caucasians United for Reparations and Emancipation

defines itself in its Statement of Beliefs, as “an organiza-

tion of white Americans, (who) express our deep remorse

for the ongoing wrongs committed by our people against

Black men, women and children in the United States and

throughout the Diaspora who are descendants of enslaved

Africans.” CURE is a non-profit membership organization

organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue

Code representing over 120 members from cwenty plus

' Counsel for both the Petitioner and Respondents have consented

to the filing of this bnef on behalf of CURE. The correspondence

regarding CURE’s requests for consent have been filed in the office of

the Clerk. Counsel for neither party took any part in drafting this brief

in whole or in part. No person or entity, other than the Amicus Curiae,

its members, or its counsel made a monetary contmbution to the

preparation and submission of this brief.

states across the United States, as well as supporters in

Canada and the United Kingdom. Of its four publicly

named officers, two have family histories rooted in Ten-

nessee and Virginia and a third, although a transplant

from South Dakota, has resided for most of her life in

Georgia. Although CURE seeks to unite an international

constituency in support of its cause, its roots and the roots

of its leadership are in those states (Georgia, Tennessee

and Virginia) in which the institution of slavery was at

one time legally sanctioned in every way.

The CURE “Statement of Beliefs” goes on to say as

well: “We state that full and complete reparations must be

paid not only for slavery and the atrocities that flowed

from slavery, but for the ongoing effects of slavery that

exist today.” This document mourns those losses that can

never be repaired, expresses appreciation for the work of

past abolitionists, finds that “the U.S. Government is

obligated to provide financial and other support,” identi-

fies the wealth of “the white American aristocracy that

directly benefited from slavery” as an appropriate source

for the capitol resources necessary to meaningful repara-

tions for the crimes against humanity practiced in this

country’s past and finally “express(es) remorse for all

crimes committed in the name of white supremacy and we

pray for justice to be done in the United States of America

and around the earth.”

Since 1992, CURE members have been active in

supporting the broad movement for reparative justice. We

decry the obstacles to equitable personal and collective

relationships with slave descendants due to the fact that

justice has been denied slave descendants and we are the

beneficiaries of the denial. We decry the economic, social

and cultural privileges that slavery and our history since

3

have given us, thus preventing equity that we so desire.

We decry the unwillingness of corporations to lift the onus

of slavery from us by disgorging the profits they earned by

financing and owning slaves.

The advocacy and research work done by CURE are

germane to this case. CURE submits this brief to illustrate

the impact of the Seventh Circuit’s decision on those who

understand the need to repair the damage left by our

nation’s institutional commitment to slavery and other

manifestations of the ideology of white supremacy. Certio-

rari review is necessary to correct the Seventh Circuit’s

erroneous finding that an evidentiary hearing was not

required on the question of whether the statute of limita-

tions ought to be tolled in this matter.

Given the ramifications of this case or the future of

healing and reparative justice for the citizens of the

United States, Caucasians United for Reparations and

Emancipation is grateful to both Petitioner and Respon-

dents for their consent for the filing of this brief amicus

curiae in support of Petitioner.

Il. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower courts have handed the Petitioners a

“double standard” of jurisprudence by expecting them to

have acted with extreme diligence in pursuing their claims

when it took over one and a half century for our judicial

system to even recognize their right to bring a civil action

against private companies. Furthermore, the lower court’s

decision presents a wholly inadequate analysis of the

applicable statute of limitations by failing to identify

which statute applies, when it began to run and whether

any tolling of the statute is permitted or required by the

4

facts of this case. The lower court’s conclusion that stat-

utes of limitation cannot be tolled for over one hundred

and fifty years is not only without any support, but is also

inconsistent with state law. Finally, the decisions of the

lower courts violate the state and local sovereignties’ right

to enact meaningful laws to redress damages stemming

from the immoral and illegal act of slavery.

IIJ. ARGUMENT

A. THE COURTS BELOW HAVE HANDED PE-

TITIONERS A “DOUBLE STANDARD” OF

JURISPRUDENCE IN DISMISSING THEIR

CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE ON THE DE-

FENSE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

In dismissing the Petitioner’s claims for replevin,

disgorgement of illegal profits, etc., the courts below have

unmercifully applied a traditional procedural defense to a

most untraditional case and, in so doing, have employed a

“double standard” of jurisprudence. In essence, the courts

below have said that because the Plaintiffs from the

Consolidated Complaint, as a representative group, have

taken so long to initiate thei. claims, they are forever time

barred from seeking civil redress from private corporations

for wrongs committed over one hundred years ago.

The message declared by the courts below is that the

former slaves themselves (and not their decedents) should

have asserted their own claims for themselves and that,

since they did not, too much time has passed to allow the

courts to perform their function of administering justice.

The District Court, in fact, stated that this case should

have been brought by the emancipated slaves no later

than 1865. The Seventh Circuit actually reasoned that,

since many of the named Respondents were located in the

North, the emancipated slaves should have sought refuge

in the protective venues of the northern courts.

The initial problem with the analysis employed by

both the District Court as well as the Seventh Circuit is

the classification in which the lower courts place the

nature of this case. Comparing this case to those of the

past involving claims made by the victims of the holocaust

and the treatment of Japanese-Americans during WWII,

the courts below have classified this case as yet another

attempt to provide redress to a group of victims “long since

dead” from a group of wrongdoers “long since dead.” The

conclusions of the courts below is that the controversy is

“too old” and “too remote” in time to allow an effective

resolution in a court of law. They defer, instead, to the

legislature to create methods of redress which are, in

effect, financed by society as a whole rather than any

identified wrongdoer.

This case is by no means comparable to the victims of

the holocaust or such. The wrongdoers named as defen-

dants in this case are not “long since dead” but are, in-

stead, living, thriving corporations that have survived and

flourished over the past one hundred and fifty years in

part on profits gained from the labor of slaves as well as

the financing, insuring and transportation of slaves. The

wrongdoers are very much alive today and have every

resource and record of their wrongdoings stored within the

very bowels of their corporate body.

The victims are, likewise, very much alive. The evils

of the enslavement of African-Americans, unlike any other

mistreatment of other groups across American history, did

not end with the abolition of slavery. For the past one

hundred and fifty years, African-Americans have been

fighting their way out of the trenches of racism that was

6

uniquely institutionalized in America with the advent

of slavery. Following President Lincoln’s Emancipation

Proclamation and the conclusion of the Civil War, African-

Americans, particularly in the South, were not restored to

equal citizenship rights with whites, much less to the basic

economic status that they would have realized had their

fathers, mothers, grandfathers and grandmothers been

free to receive an education, work for compensation and

build their economic futures for themselves and their

families just as had their white counterparts. Instead, for

over one hundred years following the legal abolition of

slavery, African-Americans, because of the wrongs inflicted

on the slaves that transcended to their children, grand-

children and great-grandchildren, were still denied the

right to an education (Brown v. Board of Education, 347

U.S. 483 (1954)), denied the right to vote (Smith v.

Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) and Terry v. Adams, 345

U.S. 461 (1953), as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42

U.S.C. § 1973, et seq.)), denied the right to rent or purchase

property (Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)) and even

denied the right to sit at the front of a city bus.

The lower courts questioned any provable connection

between the acts of slavery and the damages sought by the

Petitioners in this case. The words of the Seventh Circuit

best illustrate the lower court’s miscomprehension of the

uniqueness of this claim:

. there is a fatal disconnect between the

victims and the plaintiffs. When a person is

wronged, he can seek redress, and if he wins, his

descendants may benefit, but the wrong to the

ancestor is not a wrong to the descendants.

This is a horrifying conclusion drawn by the lower court

as the wrongs committed to slaves are, by the resulting

racism, still wrongs committed even today on the descen-

dants. Moreover, this “doubt” expressed by the lower

courts in this case is completely contrary to the recogni-

tions made even by this honorable Court:

For this Court recognized long ago that, what-

ever else they (sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866) may have encompassed, the

badges and incidents of slavery — its “burdens

and disabilities” — included restraints upon

“those fundamental rights which are the essence

of civil freedom, namely, the same right .. . to in-

herit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property,

as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Civil Rights

Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22. (fn). Just as the Black

Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the

free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for

the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes

from white communities became a substitute for

the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination

herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to

buy property turn on the color of their skin, then

it too is a relic of slavery. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392

U.S. 409 (1968).

The victims of past atrocities such as the holocaust did

not have to live under government sanctioned policies such

as the “separate but equal” doctrine for decades after

WWII. Even this honorable court, nearly fifty years after

the abolition of slavery, approved disparate racial treat-

ment and sanctioned the state’s police power to prevent

racial strife. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).

And this remained the constitutional law of this country

for another fifty years until the 1950s when our society

began its movement to accountability for wrongdoings

committed over a century before. Nor can it be said that

the strife is anywhere concluded. Virtually every state in

8

this union has in recent years enacted “hate crime” legisla-

tion aimed at redressing the very seeds of racism that

were planted hundreds of years ago with the advent of

slavery. How then can we sanctimoniously suggest that

the current victims of slavery should have just “come to

the North” to file their lawsuits in the 1850s since venue

was proper in the North over many of the named defen-

dants?

It was not until 1968 that this honorable Court

recognized that Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act

applied against private acts of racial discrimination. Jones

v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Conspiracy among

private individuals to discriminate on the basis of race was

not recognized as actionable under Section 1985 until

1971. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). While

society has, since the Brown decision in 1955, begun its

slow progress on its quest for equality, these named

corporate defendants have mever been held accountable

for the wrongs that they have committed against the

African-Americans who were enslaved or to the children,

grandchildren, great-grandchildren and even great-great-

grandchildren of those slaves who continue today to suffer

from that slavery.

The “badges and incidents of slavery” may be clearly

recognized by the human soul, but it has taken our system

of jurisprudence over one and a half centuries to respond

to the right of the victims of this horrible’ institution of

slavery to seek legal redress against the private individu-

als and corporations who only recently have made limited

admissions of wrongdoings. While there may be many

explanations for the incredibly slow process that our

system of jurisprudence has taken, it surely cannot be

denied that the most plausible explanation is that the

victims themselves have been severely incapacitated in

9

their ability to bring this action both because of the long

standing racism that followed the abolition of slavery as

well as the affirmative acts of deception by the named

Respondents themselves. To summarily dismiss this case

with prejudice on the premise that the original emanci-

pated slaves should have been diligent in the protection of

their legal rights is a “double standard” of jurisprudence

and justice to which this honorable Court should not

ascribe.

B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION PRE-

SENTS A WHOLLY INADEQUATE ANALYSIS

OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMI-

TATIONS.

Petitioner has presented a compelling set of facts

regarding willful and intentional fraud by the Respon-

dents and have asked the Court for nothing more than an

evidentiary hearing to establish whether or not any

applicable statute of limitations should be tolled. The

lower courts have responded by simply stating that the

Petitioner’s claims are dismissed with prejudice on the

basis of “the statute of limitations.”

What is glaring about the rulings of the lower courts

is that the courts do not identify what statute of limitation

is being applied, when it began to run nor to what extent,

if any, the statute was tolled. As stated above, the District

Court actually stated that the claims had to have been

brought by 1865. The Circuit Court makes no mention

whatsoever of the specifics of which statute of limitations

actually bars the claims.

There is, of course, no federal statute of limitation

applicable to this case as even Section 1982 of the Civil

10

Rights Act has no stated period of limitation. In the

absence of a federal period of limitation, it is incumbent

upon the federal court to adopt the local law of limitation.

Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). The problem

is that this case involves claims originating out of several

states and the decisions of the lower courts do not identify

which statute of limitation is applied, let alone do they

address why one state’s period of limitation should be

selected over another’s nor when that period of limitation

would begin to run.

Rather than addressing these specific questions, the

lower courts chose to jump directly to the issue of tolling of

the period of limitation on the basis of fraud alleged by the

Petitioners. Again, the lower courts do not identify what

state concept of fraud is to be applied. The state law

applied, however, is critical to a just resolution of this

issue. In Georgia, for example, where a defendant is

accused of concealing material facts, no other independent

fraudulent act is required to toll the statute and the

defendant’s continued silence is treated as a continuation

of the original act of fraud. McClendon v. Georgia Kaolin

Co., 782 F.Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ga. 1992), summary judg-

ment den., 813 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Ga. 1992), motion den.,

822 F. Supp. 1580 (M.D. Ga. 1993), summary judgment

den., 837 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D. Ga. 1993), motion granted,

841 F. Supp. 415 (M.D. Ga. 1994) and motion granted,

habeas corpus den., 837 F. Supp. 940 (C.D. Ill. 1993). If

Georgia law were applied to the only facts of record which

evidence concealed facts by, at least, J.P. Morgan Chase,

then the statute of limitation as to that Respondent may

well have been tolled until the disclosure of 2004. Thus,

the question that was before the lower courts and which

should have been answered is whether or not material

11

facts were known by the Respondents, concealed by the

Respondents and whether or not the Respondents contin-

ued their silence. All of these are pivotal issues in answer-

ing the question of whether or not fraud by the

Respondents would serve to toll the statute of limitations.

None of them are addressed at all by the lower courts.

The essence of the lower courts’ rulings, unfortunately,

is the general conclusion that, even if facts exist which

support some tolling, the statute of limitations cannot be

tolled for over a hundred and fifty years. No logic is given

by either of the lower courts and absolutely no state

citation is offered in support of this conclusion. Under

Georgia law, the lower courts would be absolutely incorrect

in their conclusion as the appellate courts of Georgia have

ruled that the sun never sets on fraud when it comes to the

tolling of the statute of limitations. Hill v. Fordham, 186

Ga. App. 354, 367 S.E.2d 128 (1988). Similar principles are

supported by the Courts in Canton Lutheran Church uv.

Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873

(D.S.D. 1981); Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067

(7th Cir. 1978).

1. Inaction Risks Forever Denying Leyal

Recourse

The record below and the Petitioner’s Brief for Certio-

rari as well as the website of the Restitution Study Group

(www.rsgincorp.com) recount the painstaking political

work and research efforts necessary to make available the

factual basis for the complaint below. The Petitioner’s

Brief to this Court makes clear that care was taken by

Plaintiffs to bring their action within two years of piecing

together the evidentiary chain which fingers Respondents

12

as culpable for their illegal involvement in the slave

industry.

If the statute of limitations cannot be tolled in this

case, brought to bar in a timely manner after the revela-

tion of the facts asserted by the original Consolidated

Complaint, then they will forever be barred on similar

grounds. For this Court to deny this Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari at this junction will serve to forever close off a

legal recourse for the grievous wrongs which all agree

constituted the institution of slavery in this nation.

The District Court below argues that the stain of

slavery has been adequately repaired by the sacrifices

made during the Civil War and the Congressional action in

the wake of that war to amend the U.S. Constitution and

to enact Civil Rights laws. An honest assessment of the

state of race relations in the United States shows the

inadequacy of such measures if they were truly intended

for that purpose.

But until the evidence linking the criminal behaviors

of the Respondent corporations was revealed in the 2004

disclosures of J.P. Morgan Chase, the post-Civil War

Congressional actions alone were not sufficient to permit

this case to be made.

2. Statute of Limitations serves no public

interest in this matter

Statute of Limitations serve an important public

interest by protecting a Defendant from having to defend

an ancient action for which all the evidence and the

witnesses are gone. A Statute of Limitations protects

defendants from being convicted by the lapse of time.

13

But in this matter, a statute of limitations serves no

public interest. There is no factual dispute as to the

involvement of the Respondent Corporations in financing

slavery and, sometimes, in owning slaves. The complaints

below are largely based on the admissions of corporations

based on a search by those corporations of their own

_archives.

Surely they do not now assert that there are circum-

stances not available now in the historic record which

somehow ameliorates their responsibility for their actions

or those of their predecessor corporations. Surely they do

not assert that the ill-gotten gains, the fruit of their

involvement in the immoral slave trade are somehow

washed clean of those past actions by the passage of time.

The question is not whether these corporations en-

gaged in the behavior they are accused of. They have

already acknowledged that in fact they were. The question

before the Courts now is to what extent are the assets now

enjoyed by these Respondents the result of their participa-

tion in the crimes against humanity which the slave trade

represents.

3. Respondents are not disadvantaged

This case does not hinge on whether they participated

in the slave trade, as their participation has already been

acknowledged by officers for the Respondent corporations

in public filings, statements and documents. The Respon-

dents are not disadvantaged by tolling the statute, and the

statute therefore serves no public purpose in this matter.

The Respondents are not disadvantaged. They still

have access to all they need. They have paid money to

o

14

maintain their corporate archives over the years. If the

Respondents are not damaged, then the statute of limita-

tions doesn’t serve the public interest. They are no worse

off in being able to defend themselves than they were one

hundred years ago.

C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION DE-

NIES STATES’ RIGHTS TO PROVIDE REM-

EDY FOR CONFISCATED WAGES AND

ILLEGAL ENRICHMENT.

Elected state Assemblies in their wisdom have en-

acted statutes in California, Illinois and Iowa to require

public disclosure of past corporate involvement with the

institution of slavery as a condition of offering insurance

products to consumers in those states. In their collective

wisdom, the elected governing municipal bodies of Berke-

ley, Los Angeles, Oakland, Richmond and San Francisco

California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit and Wayne, Michigan;

Cleveland, Ohio and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania have

enacted ordinances requiring disclosures by corporations

of their past involvement in the slave industry for contrac-

tors doing business with the City. Amicus Curiae here calls

to the attention of the Court the research found at www.

rsgincorp.com which is too voluminous to include within

the page limitations of this brief.

This action arises as a result of very recent voluntary

disclosures made by the Respondent Corporations in

compliance with state statutes and municipal ordinances

requiring these disclosures as a condition of licensing and

public contracts. These state laws and local ordinances

were enacted to force disclosure that had been withheld by

corporations directly involved in the slave industry over

one hundred and fifty years ago.

15

There can be only one conclusion drawn from the

enactment of these state and local laws: It is the intent of

those sovereignties to bring to justice wrongdoings com-

mitted by living, thriving corporations which were in-

volved in the slave industry. If the decisions of the lower

courts are upheld, then the obvious result is to deprive

these state and local governments any real meaning to

their quest. In short, if these decisions stand without

review, then the valiant acts of these local governments

will be stripped of any meaningful purpose.

In defending the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil

Rights Act, Senator Trumbull of Illinois said:

... the trumpet of freedom that we have been

blowing throughout the land has given an ‘uncer-

tain sound,’ and the promised freedom is a delu-

sion....I have no doubt that ... we may destroy

all these discriminations in civil rights against

the black man; and if we cannot, our constitu-

tional (thirteenth) amendment amounts to noth-

ing. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (cited

in) Jones v. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409.

The decisions of the lower courts in this case have

rendered the enactments of the state and local govern-

ments a “trumpet with an uncertain sound” thus depriving

those sovereignties of their constitutional mght to redress

these historic wrongdoings.

Nor should it be concluded that compliance with these

voluntary disclosure laws shields Respondents from

culpability for their previous wrongdoings. These corpora-

tions could have as easily chosen to refrain from seeking

business with those state and municipal governments

which found it to be sound public policy to require such

disclosure. By so doing they could have perpetuated their

16

fraud, which can only be resolved by the disgorgement of

their ill-gotten gains.

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be GRANTED.

This 20th day of June, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

CRAIG ALAN WEBSTER

Georgia State Bar No. 744950

Counsel for CURE as Amicus Curiae

1770 Indian Trail Road

Suite 200

Norcross, Georgia 30093

678-775-6064

Attorney for Amicus Curiae