Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Minnifield v. Louisiana Department of Education (No. 06-1512)

oO Suprere Court U.d.

061512 APR6 - 2007

NO. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES

OCTOBER TERM 2006

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD

PETITIONER

V.

LOUISIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et al

| RESPONDENTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE 5™ CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD, PRO SE

302 TANGLEWOOD DRIVE

MONROE, LOUISIANA 71202

(318) 330-9119

“J

°

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Can the State of Louisiana and any of it’

parishes use federal, state, or local provisions to

“ultimately” allow Racial Discrimination in it’s

Public Education System?

2. Can the State of Louisiana and any of it’s

parishes use fraud to “ultimately” allow Racial

Discrimination in Public Education?

LIST OF PARTIES

The petitioner in this case is Ricky Eugene

Minnifield, pro se.

The respondents in this case are:

1. Louisiana State Department of Education.

2. Ouachita Parish School Board

3. West Monroe High School

The respondents were represented by:

1. Louisiana Department of Justice

2. Louisiana Attorney General’s Office

3. Noah, Smith & Johnson, L.L.P.

i}

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................

INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH..............

Sogo | Se Ae Tere

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONG.................0065 1-2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................

Ultimate Racial Discrimination

in Louisiana

PRINS I cae nin scitecasvaess

Fraud to allow Ultimate

Racial Discrimination in

Louisiana Public Education................ 7-8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......

The decisions below conflicts

with decisions of this Court

allowing Racial Discrimination

in Pablic Education.......................

The importance of the

elimination of Ultimate Racial

Discrimination in Public Education....

ST ss iaieconvawens tecxaSicrnswaleeess

APPENDIX with-

ee Oe I on iain cas widacdbecccveccdscces

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Anderson v. Martin,

cs his ceensesy Wedsstvbenwes 5,12

Brown v. Board of Educ.

Of Topeka Kan,

EE EO crecckcsekiasccsivesonvcnesd 6, 12-13

Coddington v. Pensacola

& G. R. Co.

Ee EE I suc ck avs caccarnecesneunes 7, 13-14

Hanger v. Abbott,

MNES bai chsh exci seicdccsnasdennbenn $43

Holmberg v. Armbrecht,

I aii ca cass sands ves eoasbe hanes ye

McLaughlin v. State of Fla.,

BP IR a icin gk kk os 0 0aGessicatenviues 8, 12

Monroe v. Board of Com’ers

of City of Jackson, Tenn.

EN gcc ak ieauusssanchassaduaine 3,12

Norwood v. Harrison,

WE NN Shak i sekcdcciswersctesaitess 3-4, 12

Order of Railroad Telegraphers

v. Railway Express Agency,

UE Sai si ha i seks cave su evncdevactes 5,13

Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co.

v. Howard,

a sh aise Cannnaasdeandvet<aisens 7,8, 13

Regents of University

of California v. Bakke,

Se Rr ere pee Neb

Rindge Co. v.

Los Angles County,

BN A PIs hs cnknkeeiksdndasahackaseaae 4,13

U.S. v. State of La,

PN Bs os ibits cays kscealiivasssetaaieeue 6, 12

Federal Statues

Pe ies WE EES o kv bins ccessscaccastarsbeensac 1

United States Constitution

Thirteenth Amendment .....................0c000: 1,2

Fourteenth Amendment .......................006. 1,2

INTRODUCTION

This petition for a writ of certiorari seeks this -

Court’s review of the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The issue, a

nationally important matter, relates to racial

discrimination in public education and constitutional

limitations on the power of the states that

“ultimately” allow Racial Discrimination in Public

Education.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and judgment of the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the

district court appears in the appendix pages 15-16,

but it was not published. The judgment of the district

court appears in the appendix page 17-18. The issue

of racial discrimination in public education was never

addressed by the court below. The courts below

affirms provisions such as lack of standing, mooted

upon graduation and time barred, that are invalid and

unconstitutional. They allow ultimate racial

discrimination in public education. This is an

injustice to this Court’s authority and African

Americans, indeed.

JURISDICTION

This case was filed in the U.S. District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana December 5,

2005. The judgment of the District Court was

entered on June 23, 2006. The judgment of the 5™

Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on February 15,

2007. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to the

U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

The judgment of the United States Courts of

Appeals was entered on February 15, 2007. All

provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or

permitting racial discrimination in public education

must yield to principle that such discrimination is

unconstitutional; also, no person shall be denied the

equal protection of the laws; see U.S.C.A. Const.

Amend 14. One purpose of the 13" amendment to

the Federal Constitution was to raise the colored race

from the conditions of inferiority and servitude into

perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons

within the jurisdiction of the states. Louisiana denies

petitioner’s rights to individual dignity and freedom

from racial discrimination in public education. “No

law shall discriminate against a person because of

race...”; see Article I Section 3 Constitution of the

State of Louisiana. “In access to public areas,

accommodations, and facilities, every person shall be

free from discrimination based on race,.., or national

ancestry”; see Article I Section 12 Constitution of the

State of Louisiana. Louisiana has provisions for

equal protection and against racial discrimination, but

they remain dormant as they are not enforced in this

case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

violations of the 13" and 14" amendments to the U.S.

Constitution and 28 U.S.C. sec. 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

CAN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND ANY OF

ITS PARISHES USE FEDERAL, STATE, OR

LOCAL PROVISIONS TO ULTIMATELY

ALLOW RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC

EDUCATION?

This case seeks the removal of the

confederate rebels and battle flag from West Monroe

High School as mascot. What valid reason does

public education have for honoring the confederacy?

They made slaves of African Americans! The

confederacy has a long undeniable history of racial

discrimination toward African Americans due to their

slavery ancestry. “School board has affirmative duty

to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert

to a unitary system in which racial discrimination

would be eliminated root and branch”; see Monroe v.

Board of Com’rs of City of Jackson, Tenn., 88 S.CT

1700, 391 U.S. 450, 20 L.Ed.2d 733, conformed to

427 F.2d 1005. As an African American, nothing is

more “root” to racial discrimination than the

confederacy imposing slavery on my ancestors.

Likewise, nothing is more “branch” to racial

discrimination than the continued perpetuation of

confederate principles, and the likes of Jim Crow and

the Klu Klux Klan. Still, Louisiana allows it parishes

and cities to honor the confederacy in public

education. In turn, this waters and fertilizes racial

discrimination assuring its growth. It appears

Louisiana thinks the confederacy has a good name to

be cherished and uses public education to help

preserve it. Or maybe Louisiana thinks it’s

affirmative duty is to take whatever steps necessary

to preserve the perpetuation and emulation of

confederate principles in public education? “Racial

discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by

the Constitution, and a state may not induce,

encourage or promote private persons to accomplish

what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish”;

see Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 413 U.S.

455, 37 L.Ed2d 723, on remand 382 F.Supp. 921,

opinion supplemented 410 F.Supp. 133, appeal

dismissed 563 F.2d 722. Respondents counsel claim

West Monroe High School has had no official

connection with the confederacy or its symbols since

1990. However, every year they continue to allow its

use even during the 2006-2007 school year, some 16

or 17 years later. The rebel as mascot, the onfederate

rebel head on the school hallway floor, and West

Monroe High Schoo!l’s confederate history continue

to induce, encourage, and promote the confederate

rebel. This is nothing more than systematic racial

discrimination ultimately. “Preferring members of

any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic

origin is discrimination for its own sake and is

forbidden by the Constitution.(Per Mr. Justice Powell

with the Chief Justice and three Justices concurring

in the judgment in part; see Regents of University of

California v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 438 U.S. 265, 57

L.Ed.2d 750. The preference of the confederacy is

white racist only. This insures continued racial

discrimination against African Americans because of

slave ancestry. The confederacy has a long

undeniable history of racial violence and

discrimination toward African Americans. The

honoring of the confederacy only undermines and

stifles the removal of racial discrimination from

public education. Provisions such as lack of

standing, mootness upon graduation, and time barred

which permit the honoring of the confederacy in

public education are invalid and unconstitutional.

Lack of standing and Mootness

“A litigant can question a statue’s validity

only when so far as it is being or about to be applied

to his disadvantage”; see Rindge Co. v. Los Angles

County, 43 S.Ct. 689, 262 U.S. 700, 67 L.Ed. 1186.

Lack of standing and mootness upon graduation are

statues being applied to petitioner’s disadvantage.

These statues allow racial discrimination in public

education. This causes chronic real, absolute, private

and public injury to my person and personal rights

and those of other African Americans. These injuries

can be redressed by the removal of the confederate

rebel mascot at West Monroe High School. A more

appropriate mascot would not be connected to a hate

group like the confederacy that perpetuates racial

discrimination. This would help heal injuries to my

honor and dignity caused by the confederacy. Injury

to my civil and private rights and rights for being a

member of society can begin the healing process.

The confederacy in public education causes breeches

and violations of established rights for African

Americans against racial discrimination.

Time Barred

“A state statue of limitations cannot destroy a

claim because the period of actual contest over it in a

federal tribunal extends beyond the limitation

period”; see Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.

Railway Express Agency, 64 S.Ct. 582, 321 U.S.

342, 88 L.Ed 788. If this Court and the courts below

are federal tribunals, then time barred should not

be allowed to deny this case. This case is about the

elimination of racial discrimination in public

education which has no limitation period that expires.

“Exceptions in statues of limitations are framed to

prevent injustice ...”; see Hangar v. Abbott, 73 U.S.

532, 6 Wall. 532, L.Ed 788. Louisiana alleges

making an exception to time barred provisions to

eliminate the confederacy in public education is

inappropriate and invalid reasoning. It must be an

injustice to the state of Louisiana to eliminate the

confederacy from public education? U.S. Rep. Steve

Cohen is urging House members to vote for a bill he

introduced to apologize for slavery and Jim Crow

discrimination.

Lack of Standing, Mootness, and Time Barred

“That statue promotes ultimate racial discrimination

is sufficient to make it invalid”; see Anderson v.

Martin, 84 S.Ct. 454, 375 U.S. 399, 11 L.Ed.2d 430.

Louisiana permits the use of lack of standing,

mootness on graduation and time barred to allow the

confederacy in public education. Given the

undeniable history of the confederacy for racial

discrimination, these provisions are nothing but

systematic ultimate racial discrimination. “All

provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or

permitting racial discrimination in public education

must yield to principle that such discrimination is

unconstitutional”; see U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14

and Brown v. Board of Educ. Of Topeka, Kan., 75

S.Ct. 753, 349 U.S. 294, 57 0.0. 253, 71 Ohio Law

Abs. 584, 99 L.Ed. 1083, on remand 139 F.Supp.

468. Louisiana statues and provisions permit the

confederacy in public education instead of allowing

them to yield and eliminating racial discrimination.

This is ultimate racial discrimination and

unconstitutional. ‘Louisiana interposition statues

which asserted that Supreme Court decisions in

school segregation cases was usurpation of state

power, and which purported to interpose state

sovereignty were invalid”; see U.S. v. State of La., 81

S.Ct. 260, 364 U.S. 500, 5 .Ed.2d 245. Louisiana

interposes state provisions over Supreme Court

decisions and this permits racial discrimination in

public education which is unconstitutional. Jf

petitioner were a student at West Monroe High

School during a current school year, ‘lack of

standing, mootness upon graduation, and time barred

would not apply. Would honoring the confederacy as

mascots and school names be racial discrimination in

public education then? If yes, then respondents are

guilty of ultimate racial discrimination in public

education which make Louisiana provisions invalid

and unconstitutional.

2.

CAN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND ANY OF

ITS PARISHES USE FRAUD TO ULTIMATELY

ALLOW RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC

EDUCATION?

Louisiana wants this Court to believe the

petitioner and other African Americans have always

known the confederacy could be removed from

public education. This is a misrepresentation by the

state of Louisiana. Also, this is an attempt to mislead

African Americans to rely on false statues and false

provisions that consent to the confederacy in public

education which is nothing but fraud! Petitioner

never knew a claim could be filed to eliminate the

racially discriminatory confederacy while attending

West Monroe High School as the Mag. Judge Hayes

alleges. Petitioner first learned that racial

discrimination in public education was

unconstitutional when he purchased the Supreme

Court Digest in 2005! U.S.N.Y. 1946, “Where a

plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in

ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence

or care on his part, the bar of statue of limitations

does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered,

though there may be no special circumstances or

efforts on part of party committing fraud to conceal it

from other party”; see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327

U.S. 392. U.S.Fla. 1880, “In action for relief on

ground of fraud, the cause of action is not deemed to

have accrued until the discovery by the aggneved

party of the facts constituting the fraud’’; see

Coddington v. Pensacola & G. R. Co., 103 U.S. 409.

‘“‘Where party asserts what he knows is false or does

not no to be true to another’s loss and his own gain,

he is guilty of fraud”; see Philadelphia, W. & B.R.

Co. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307, 13 How. 307, 14 L.Ed.

157. When African Americans rely on false state

provisions, this permits racial discrimination in

public education. The state and confederacy make a

gain while the African Americans take a loss, again

fraud!

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

l.

THE DECISIONS BELOW CONFLICTS WITH

DECISIONS OF THIS COURT BY ALLOWING

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC

EDUCATION.

This Court’s opinions and the U.S.

Constitution are the law of the land. Louisiana

denies obligations to this Court and the U.S.

Constitution and permits ultimate racial

discrimination in public education. This Court

should give notice to Louisiana and other states, this

Court and the U.S. Constitution are to be respected

and obeyed, and that racial discrimination in public

education is unconstitutional. These are appropriate

reasons to grant this wnt and reverse the decisions

below. What valid interest does the confederacy

in public education as mascots and school names

have in relation to the elimination of racial

discrimination in public education? No state should

have the power to allow the honoring of the

confederacy in public education as mascots or school

name. This fosters ultimate racial discrimination and

is very inappropriate. U.S. Fla. 1964, “Central

purpose of equal protection clause was to eliminate

racial discriminating emanating from official sources

in the States”, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; see

McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184.

2.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELIMINATION OF

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC

EDUCATION.

The elimination of the honoring of the

confederacy as school names and mascots in public

education benefits society as a whole. Its elimination

decreases areas that promote racial discrimination

and moves forward the goal of public education

without racial discrimination. Furthermore, the

confederacy’s elimination decreases the amount of

people exposed to the ideology of a confederate good

name, with confederate principles that are to be

cherished and perpetuated. Additionally, it would

decrease racial discrimination overall. This gives

children, parents and alumni a better foundation for

racial respect and equality inside and outside of

classrooms. These are valid and appropriate reasons

to grant this writ and reverse the decisions below.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted and resolved by a summarily reversal of the

opinions below. This would send a stern message to

Louisiana and other southern states that ultimate

racial discrimination will no longer be tolerated in

public education. The elimination of the honoring of

the confederacy as school names and mascots from

public education will send this message. It will also

honor the “Union Soldiers” correcting that injustice

and restoring them as the true heroes of the Civil

War. West Monroe High School should not be

allowed to honor the Confederate Rebels and their

confederate flag. No public school should be allowed

to honor the confederacy as school mascots and

names, as there is no valid reason. To honor the

confederacy in public education is the same as

honoring the Klu klux Klan and Jim Crow. Itis a

designed, systematic practice in “ultimate racial

discrimination”. This injures constitutional nghts

guaranteed to the individual and established as

personal rights. Has the elimination of ultimate racial

discrimination in public education, as well as society,

become a frivolous, unreasonable, groundless issue in

the federal court sysitem?

Respectfully submitted,

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD

Pro Se

302 Tanglewood Drive

Monroe, Louisiana 71202

(318) 330-9119

10

APPENDIX: TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUPREME COURT DIGEST

EAA 10 A SEBD GADRIICE vncsnssvsanisnsoncess 12-14

DU ESV Ee CADRERING PARC UTRGEIES since ccvsisscvnsweciespans 14

APPEALS COURT OPINION

FINED Taga Eo sSieiass cba cacesssaccnens iin 15-16

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT .............. 17-18

MAGISTRATE JUDGE R@&R .................. 19-30

1]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

DIGEST: VERBATIM QUOTES ©

Preferring members of any one group for no

reason other than race or ethnic origin is

discrimination for its own sake and is forbidden by

the Constitution. (Per Mr. Justice Powell with the

Chief Justice and three Justices concurring in the

judgment in part.) Regents of University of

California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.

U.S. Miss. 1973. Racial discrimination in

state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution,

and a state may not induce, encourage, or promote

private persons to accomplish what it is

constitutionally forbidden to accomplish. Norwood

v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455.

U.S. La. 1960. Louisiana interposition statues

which asserted that Supreme Court decisions in

school segregation cases was usurpation of state

power, and which purported to interpose state

sovereignty were invalid. U.S. v. State of La. 364

U.S. 500.

U.S.Fla. 1964. Central purpose of equal

protection clause was to eliminate racial

discrimination emanating from official sources in the

States. Mclaughlin v. State of Fla. 379 U.S. 184.

U.S.La. 1964. That statue promotes ultimate

racial discrimination is sufficient to make it invalid.

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399.

School Board has affirmative duty to take

whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a

unitary system in which racial discrimination would

be eliminated root and branch. Monroe v. Board of

Com’rs of City of Jackson, Tenn., 391 U.S. 450.

U.S. Dist.Col. 1955. All provisions of

federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting

racial discrimination in public education must yield

12

to principle that such discrimination is

unconstitutional. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S.

294,

U.S.La. 1939. Equal protection to all is basic

principle upon which rests justice under the law.

U.S.C.A.Const. Amend 14. Pierre v. State of La.,

306 U.S. 354.

U.S.Md. 1851. Where party asserts what he

knows is false or does not know to be true, to

another’s loss and his own gain, he is guilty of fraud.

Philadelphia, W & B.R. Co. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307.

U.S. Cal. 1923. A litigant can question a

statue’s validity only when and so far as it is being or

is about to be applied to his disadvantage. Rindge v.

Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700.

U.S.Ga. 1944. A state statue of limitations

cannot destroy a claim because the period of actual

contest over it in a federal tribunal extends beyond

the limitation period. Order of Railroad Telegraphers

v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342.

U.S.N.Y. 1946. Where a plaintiff has been

injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it

without any fault or want of diligence or care on his

own part, the bar of statue of limitations does not

begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though

there may be no special circumstances or efforts on

part of party committing fraud to conceal from other

party”, see Holmberg v. Armbreecht, 327 U.S. 392.

U.SArk. 1867. Exceptions in statues of

limitations are framed to prevent injustice and never

to encourage laches or to promote negligence.

Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S 532.

U.S.Fla. 1880. In an action for relief on

ground of fraud, the cause of action is not deemed to

have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved

13

party of the facts constituting the fraud, see

Coddington v. Pensacola & G. R. Co., 103 U.S. 409.

U.S.Va. 1879. One purpose of the 13™ and

14" amendments to the federal constitution,

U.S.C.A., was io raise the colored race from the

condition of inferiority and servitude into perfect

equality of civil rights with all other persons within

the jurisdiction of the states. Ex parte Common

wealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339.

U.S.lowa 1969. Right to recover damages

sustained through breach of duty sprang from

principle of common law and was left to be enforced

accordingly. Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. Co.,

395 US. 164.

STEVE COHEN ARTICLE

White congressman urges slavery apology:

Memphis, Tenn—U.S. Rep. Steve Cohen is urging

House members to vote for a bill he has introduced to

apologize for slavery and Jim Crow discrimination.

Cohen commended the Virginia General Assembly

which voted unanimously on Saturday to express

“profound regret” for the state’s role in slavery.

Sponsors of the Virginia resolution say they know of

no other state that has apologized for slavery.(2007).

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30738

Summary Calendar

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;

SCHOOL BOARD OF OUACHITA PARISH;

WEST MONROE HIGH SCHOOL,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:05-CV-02074

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Pro se Plaintiff Ricky Minnifield alleges that

the West Monroe High School mascot, a confederate

rebel, manifests state-sponsored discrimination in

violation of both the Louisiana and United States

Constitution. Citing these same constitutional

provisions, Minnifield also complains that during his

years at West Monroe High, the school used the

confederate battle flag on its yearbook, on its

cheerleader uniforms, and on the school building

itself. In the early 1990s, the school stopped all

officially sanctioned use of the flag, though the rebel

15

mascot remains. The plaintiff seeks compensatory

and punitive damages totaling $22 million and

injunctive relief.

Plaintiff graduated from West Monroe High

in 1975, and he has no children attending the school.

The district court properly dismissed for lack of

standing his claim for injunctive relief. That claim

was mooted upon graduation. See Doe v. Marshall

622 F.2d 118, 119 (5" Cir. 1980) ; Newdow v.

United States Congress, Elk Grove Unified Schoo!

District, et al, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). Likewise, the

district court properly dismissed as time-barred

plaintiff's claim for damages under section 1983.

See Jacobsen v. Osbome, 133 F.3d 315 , 319 (5 Cir

1998); Peter Henderson v. City of Port Arthur, 806

F.2d 1273, 1275 (5" Cir. 1987). Such claims accrue

when the plaintiff has reason to know of the

actionable injury. See Kline v. North Texas State

University, 782 F.2d 1229 (5" Cir. 1986).

AFFIRMED

Pursuant to 5" Cir. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5" Cir. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2074

VS.

JUDGE JAMES

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

EDUCATION, ET AL

JUDGMENT

The Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge [Doc. No. 30] having been

considered, together with the written objections

thereto filed with this Court, and, after a de novo

review of the record, finding that the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation is correct and

that judgment as recommended therein is warranted,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that School Board’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. #24) be GRANTED, and his matter

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the School

Board for mootness, lack of standing, and for failure

to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED, taking cognizance of this court’s

lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining

claims, that the remaining claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety for lack of

standing.

17

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the School

Board be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this _23_ day

of __ June _, 2006, in Monroe, Louisiana.

/s/

ROBERT G. JAMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |

18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2074

VS

JUDGE JAMES

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on

reference from the District Court, is a Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. #24) filed by defendant,

School Board of Ouachita Parish (“School Board’’).

Pro se plaintiff, Ricky Eugene Minnifield

(“Minnifield”’) has not filed an opposition to the

motion. For the reasons stated below, it is

recommended that the School Board’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. # 24) be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against the Louisiana

Department of Education, Ouachita Parish School

Board and West Monroe High School alleging that

the Defendants’ use of the confederate rebels mascot

is racial discrimination and unconstitutional in public

education and state-operated schools. Plaintiff claims

that Defendants’ “have and continue to induce,

encourage, and promote racial discrimination by

allowing West Monroe High School to have the

19

Confederate rebels mascot”. Plaintiff claims that he

has experienced humiliation, emotional distress, and

mental anguish as well as “continued feelings of

disappointment, emotional deterioration and rupture”

“due to public education’s promotion of the

glorification of slavery”. Minnifield seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief as well as

$22,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive

damages.

The School Board has filed the current

Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. The School Board also

seeks recovery of attorney fees and costs.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)

‘A case is properly dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the

statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the

case”. Home builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of

Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5" Cir. 1998 (quoting

Nowak v. Ironworkers local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d

1182, 1187 (2™ Cir. 1996). The party seeking to

invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

demonstrating its existence. See Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5" Cir.2001), cert. denied,

536 U.S. 960 (2002); Howery v. Allstate ins. Co.,

243 F.3d 912, 916 (5" Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 993 (2001). In fact, “there is a presumption

against subject matter jurisdiction that must be

rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal

court”. Coury v. Prot., 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5" Cir.

20

1996) (citing Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742

F.2d 888, 889 (5" Cir. 1984)).

“Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under

Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1) come in two forms: ‘facial

attacks’ and ‘factual attacks’”. Garcia v.

Copenhaver, Bell & Assics., M.D.’s P.A., 104 F.3d

1256, 1260-1 (11" Cir. 1997) (citing Lawerence v.

Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-9 (11"™ Cir. 1990); see

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5" Cir.

1981). Facial attacks on the complaint “require the

court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged a basis of subject mater

jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are

taken as true for purposes of the motion”.

Lawenence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (5" Cir.

1990) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,

613 F.2d 507, 511(5™ Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 953 (1980) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav.

& Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3™ Cir. 1977).

“Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact,

irrespective of the pleading, and matters outside the

pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are

considered”. Id.

Mootness

The School Board first argues that the claims

against it are moot because Minnifield graduated

from West Monroe High School in 1975 and has no

children attending West Monroe High School.

““Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the

Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or

abstract propositions, ... our impotence to review

moot cases derives from the requirement of Article

III of the Constitution under which the exercises of

judicial power depends upon the existence of a case

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or controversy”. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.

244, 246, (U.S. 1971) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

The School Board argues that a case is moot

when a plaintiff complains of certain activities at a

school and subsequently graduates from that school.

However, the cases presented by the School Board in

support of this contention sought only injunctive

relief, not damages. See Doe v. Madison School

District No 321, 177 F.3d 789, 797 (9" Cir. 1999)

(“the student-plaintiff graduated. ... Because we

cannot remedy the student plaintiff's injury with

injunctive or declaratory relief, the student-plaintiff’s

claim for those forms of relief are moot”’.)

Minnifield is seeking declaratory or injunctive

relief. The School Board correctly argues that since

Minnifield graduated from West Monroe High

School over thirty years ago, and has no children

attending West Monroe High School, his claims for

declaratory or injunctive relief are moot. However,

Minnifield is also seeking compensatory and punitive

damages; therefore, the mootness doctrine does not

apply to those claims, and further analysis is

required.

Standing

The School Board also argues that

Minnifield’s claims should be dismissed because he

lacks standing. “The doctrine of standing is

distinguishable from that of mootness. The Supreme

Court has acknowledged mootness as the doctrine of

standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal

interest that must exist at the commencement of the

litigation (standing) must continue throughout its

existence (mootness)”. Pederson v. Louisiana State

22

University, 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5"" Cir.2000).

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Article III of the United States Constitution

requires that a litigant have standing to invoke the

power of a federal court. “To demonstrate standing,

the plaintiff must show an injury in fact, a

requirement assuring that the court will not pass upon

... abstract, intellectual problems, but will adjudicate

concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries. The

injury alleged must be actual or imminent and not

abstract, conjectural, or hypothetical”. Dov v.

Beaumont Independent School Dist., 240 F.3d 462,

466 (5"" Cir. 2001) quoting Federal Election Com’n

v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141

L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).

Furthermore, “[tjo have standing a plaintiff must

allege personal injury fairly traceable to the

defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to

be redressed by the requested relief”. (emphasis

added) National Park Hospitality Ass’n v.

Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 815, 123 S.Ct.

2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) Allen v. Wright, 468

U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556

(1984). Finally, the United States Supreme Court has

developed prudential limitations on standing,

including a requirement that a litigant generally must

assert his or her own legal nights and interest and

cannot rest a claim to relief in the legal nghts or

interest of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School Dist., 393 F.3d

599, 606 (5" Cir. 2004).

To have standing, Minnifield must first show

that he suffered a injury in fact. There must be a

‘personal stake in the outcome’ such as to ‘assure that

23

i rt eS | gt

concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation

of issues upon which the court so largely depends for

illumination of difficult constitutional questions’. ...

Abstract injury is not enough. Jt must be alleged that

the plaintiff ‘has sustained or is immediately in

danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result

of the challenged statue or official conduct. The

injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and

immediate’, ‘not conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’.

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-494 (U.S.

1974).

Minnifield alleges that he continues to

experience humiliation, emotional distress, and

mental anguish due to public education’s promotion

of the glorification of slavery. The defendants

continue to act in a conscious disregard for [his]

rights. ... The Confederate Rebels continue to

oppress [his] rights. ... defendants ... attempt to

induce [him] to give up his legal rights to be free

from discrimination ... {and he] has suffered

continued feelings of disappointment and emotional

deterioration and rupture due to public education’s

promotion of the glorification of slavery. Complaint

(Doc. # 1 pg. 4 — para. 6).

Minnifield’s claims of injury are conjectural

statements unsupported by any factual allegations.

Minnifield argues that the rebel mascot offends him;

however, in order to have standing, Minnifield must

present some factual basis, not just conclusory

statements, to support a claim that he has actually

been injured by West Monroe High School’s use of

the rebel mascot. Indeed, it appears unlikely

that any individual could present facts to support a

claim of actual injury as the result of a school’s

choice of mascot.

24

Plaintiff has failed to show that he has

suffered an injury in fact and he therefore lacks

standing to bring these claims. Since Minnifield

lacks standing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the

School Board’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24) be

GRANTED, and the matter DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as to the School Board. Furthermore,

in as much as this court has the duty to raise the

question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte

under Rule 12(b)(1). See Bndgmon v. Array

Systems Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 575 (5"" Cir. 2003). IT

IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Minnifield’s

claims be dismissed as to All defendants because

Minnifield lacks standing and consequently, this

court has no subject matter jurisdiction.

Prescription

In the alternative, the School Board contends

that Minnifield’s complaint fails to state a claim and

must be dismissed because it is time-barred. The

School Board has filed this argument as a Motion to

Dismiss; however, since the School Board is relying

on documentation outside the pleadings, the Court

will construe the motion as a Motion for Summary

Judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary Judgment is appropriate when the

evidence before the Court shows that no genuine

issue as to any material fact exists and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. F.R.C.P. Rule 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine”

under this standard if the non-moving party has

presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury

a

could return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)

The moving party bears the initial burden in

summary judgment and must demonstrate through

portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, and/or affidavits that no

genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has

successfully demonstrated the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-

moving party to show the opposite. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986). In doing so, the non-moving party may not

merely rely on the allegations, and conclusions

contained within the pleadings; rather, he “must go

beyond the pleading and designate specific facts in

the record showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial”. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042,

1047 (5™ Cir. 1996). Furthermore, these specific

facts must be shown through something more than

“some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by

conclusory unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere

scintilla of evidence”. Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37

F.3d 1069, 1075 (5 Cir. 1994). Ultimately,

however, the court must resolve all doubts against the

moving party and draw any reasonable inferences

raised by the evidence in favor of the non-moving

party. See Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys.,

321 F.3d 503, 507 (5 Cir. 1999).

Minnifield contends that the “defendants have

and continue to induce, encourage, and promote

Racial Discnmination by allowing West Monroe

High School to have the Confederate rebels mascot”.

Complaint (Doc. #1 pg. 2-para. 2). In addition to

monetary damages, Minnifield requests that West

Monroe High School change its mascot prior to the

26

2006-2007 school year ,and to “remove any

Confederate connected mascots or school named for

the confederacy from the Louisiana public education

system prior to the 2006-2007 school year”.

Complaint (Doc. #1 pg. 5-para. 8).

Minnifield’s Complaint alleges that this Court

has jurisdiction over this action “pursuant to the 14"

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

which prohibits Racial Discrimination in Public

Education as a fundamental right”. Complaint (Doc.

#1 pg.l-para. 1). Pro se complaints are to be liberally

construed. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5"

Cir. 1993). Therefore, it is assumed that Minnifield

intended to pursue is claims under 42 U.S.C.A. sec.

1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: Every

person who, under color of any statue, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceedings for redress. 42 U.S.C.A.

sec. 1983.

The statue of limitations to be applied in sec.

1983 cases is the state statue of limitations governing

actions for personal injury in the forum state. Wilson

v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-280 (1985). Therefore,

pursuant to Louisiana’s law governing personal

injury actions, a one-year statue of limitations

governs sec. 1983 claims. Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133

F.3d 315, 319 (5" Cir. 1998). Section 1983 actions

accrue when the injured party knows or has reason to

know of the injury which forms the basis for the

27

action”. Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port

Arthur, Tex., 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5" Cir. 1987).

Minnifield testified in his deposition that he

was born on January 17, 1957 (Depo. pg. 11) and that

he attended West Monroe High School from 1972-

1975 (Depo. pg. 22). Minnifield stated that he

graduated from West Monroe High School on his 18"

birthday January 17, 1975. (Depo. pg. 52 and 104).

Throughout his deposition, Minnifield discussed the

disdain he felt as a student for the rebel mascot and

what he perceived to be offensive symbolism. (Depo.

pg. 79-83). Minnifield did not file a formal

complaint about the school’s mascot while he was a

student, (Depo. pg. 92) and did not complain to the

school superintendent or a school board member until

recently. ( Depo. pg. 93-102).

Minnifield graduated from West Monroe

High School more than 31 years ago, and according

to his own testimony, knew or had reason to know of

his claims well before his graduation. Since the one-

year statue of limitations to bring sec. 1983 claims

has clearly passed, IT IS RECOMMENDED IN THE

ALTERNATIVE that the School Board’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Minnifield’s

complaint be dismissed as time-barred.

Attorney’s Fees

The School Board has requested attorney’s

fees. Under 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1983, the district court

may, in its discretion, award attomey’s and costs to

the prevailing party in sec. 1983 litigation. See 42

U.S.C.A. sec. 1983. While such relief is typically

awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, a prevailing

defendant may recover attorney’s fees ‘when a

28

plaintiff's underlying is frivolous, unreasonable, or

groundless”. United States v. State of Mississippi,

921 F.2d 604, 609 (5 Cir. 1991), citing

Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC 434 U.S. 412,

(1978). Not only does Minnifield lack standing and

any factual basis for a claim of injury resulting from

the school’s mascot choice, but the statue of

limitations over any possible claim has long since

expired. Minnifield’s complaint is clearly frivolous.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the

School Board’s Motion for Attorney’s fees be

GRANTED and that it be awarded reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. sec.

636(b)(1)(C) and FRCP Rule 72(b), the parties have

ten (10) business days from service of this Report and

Recommendation to file specific, written objections

with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to

another party’s objection within ten (10) business

days after being served with a copy thereof. A

courtesy copy of any objection or response or request

for extension of time shall be furnished to the District

Judge at the time of filing. Timely objections will be

considered by the District Judge before he makes a

final ruling.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN

OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS,

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WITHIN TEN

(10) BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS

SERVICE SHALL BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY,

EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR,

FROM ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE

UNOBJECTED — TO PROPOSED FACTUAL

29

am

FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Monroe

Louisiana, this 30™ day of May 2006.

KAREN L. HAYES

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

30