Opinion — Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper

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-SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No, 423.—Ocroszr Trem, 1931.

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Bradford Electric Light Company,

Inc., Appellant and .Petitioner,

vs. o* |

“: Jennie M. Clapper, Administratrix.

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> Pefition for writ. of cer-

Appeal from the United

States Cirerit. Court of

Appeals for thd First

Circuit. |

tiorari to the ~ United

States Circuit Court of. ..

Appeals’ for the First

Circhit. -

Q .

[December 7, 1931]

Mr. Chief Justice Huaugs delivered the opinion of the Court.

This fection was brought in thé. Superior Court of New Hamp-

shire bythe respondent, a citizen of that State, to recover dam-

ages for injuries resulting in the death of the respondent’s irites. _

tate, upon -the ground of the negligence of his employer, the de- —

fendant (appellant and@: petitioner here). The case was removed |

to the District Court of the United States for. the District :of -

‘rent in both Vermont and New

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_ New Hampshire. The defendant js a corporation organized under

the laws of Vermont and is _ in supplying electric cur-

ampshire. -It appeared that

the respondenit’s intestate was a resident of Vermont and received

hjs injuries in New Hampshire in the course of hig employment. :

The contract of employment was made in Vermont and ‘the de-

fendant contended that the parties were bound by the Workmen’s

Compensation Act of Vermont and that the acceptance of the pro-

‘visions. of that Act was a bar to the common law action. Upon °

_ &ppeal from the judgment in favor: of the’ respondent, the Cir- |

cuit Court of Appeals’ first sustained the defense and directed

. Teversal, but on rehearing ,affirmed the judgment,. The Court

_ Said that its attention had- been called to the fact that the de-

fendant Had accepted the Workmen’s Compensation Act of New

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2. _ Bradford Electric Light Cp., Inc. ¥s. Clapper. a

/ Hampshire which reserved to the employee or his legal represénta- f

‘tive an action at law for death caused by negligenée; ‘that no |

contract made in Vermont purporting to release an employer from

| liability for future negligence. can bar an action brought in New -

-. Hampshire for an injury there sustained, and thus change the pub..

lic poliey of New Hampshire”. 51 Fed. (2d), 992, 999, 1000. As’

the, decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was not against the

validity of the statute of Vermont, thaiappeal to this Court must’

be* dismissed: for the want of jurisdiction. Public Service Com-

mission of Indiana v. Batesville Telephone Company, 284 U. 8, —;

Samuel W: Baxter as Administrator, etc. v. Continental ‘Casualty

Company, 284 U. 8S. -; decided October 26, 1931. .

. The question is presented whether, as an appeal has been taken,

the petition-for writ of certiorari can be entertained. - Section 240

of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act ef February 13, 1925

(c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 938, 939; U.S. C., Tit. 28) sec. 347), provides:

“‘Sece. 240.:(a) In any case, civil or ‘criminal, in a circuit court |

i ‘appeals, or in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,

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it shall be competent for the Supreme Court of the United States,

pon the petition of any party thereto, whether Government or

oer litigant, to require by certiorari, either before or after -a

ju&gment or decree by.such lower court, that the cause be certified -

to the Supreme Court for determination by it with the same power’

and authority, and with like effect, as if the cause had been brought

' there-by unrestricted writ of error or appeal. , ae eee

““(b) Any ease in a cireuit court of appeals where is drawn

in question the validity of a statute of any State, on the ground

of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the

United States, and the decision is*against its validity, jo at the

election of the party relying on such State. statute, be taken to the — -

Supreme Court for review on writ of error or appeal, but in that

event a review on certiorari shall not be allowed at the instance of

such party, and the review on such writ of error or appeal shall be

" . restricted to an examination and decision of the Federal questions

presented in the case. on ty -+ 91@

““(e): No judgment or decree of a circuit court of appeals or of °

the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ‘shall be subject

_ to review by the Supreme Court otherwise than as provided in this

section’’. ;

The question’ is whether .the general authority ‘of this ‘Court,

under paragraph (a) of this section, ‘‘in any case... in a cir-

cuit court of appeals . . . to require by certiorari’’ that the cause

be certified to this Court for determination, is limited in a case like

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Bradford Electric Light Co:, Inc. vs. Clapper. 8

ae the instant one by the concluding clause of paragraph (b).. Under

the latter paragraph an appeal’ may be taken to this Court “‘at the

election’’ of the party relying on the state statute the validity of

which hs been denied by the decision of the circuit court of ap-

peals on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,

treaties, or laws of the United States, and*‘in that event”’ a review —

on certiorari is not to be allowed at the instance of such party. This

provision is in obvious contrast with that of section 237 (e) of the

Judicial Code as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925,’ (U. 8.

C., see. 344 (¢) ) relating to appeals from judgments of state courts -

and providing in such cases that papers on an appeal improvidently —

'- sought may be treated as a petition for certiorari. But the évent

_ to which ‘the limitation of section 240 (b) applies, in the case of :.

appeals from the'cireuit court of appeals, is that an appeal will lie

as provided and has been taken. If the case is one in which the cir-

‘cuit court of appeals has not denied validity to a statute of a State

_ upon the ground specified, no appeal will'lie and the bringing of the

appeal in sich @ case has no effect save to invite its dismissal.- As -

this. Courtekas no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, it leaves the

. parties as they were. There is no ground for concluding that it was .

‘the intent of the Congress to penalize a party by depriving him of a

right granted because he had made a mistake in asserting a right

not granted. Accordingly, we conclude that in a case-in a circuit

court of appeals where no appeal lies, hough one: has been, im-

- providently taken, application may be made for a writ of certiorari

_ under section 240 (a).. The application must be made within the -

_ time limited. “Act of February 3, 1925, sec. 8; U.-S. C., Tit. 28,

sec. 350. It was so made in thi | .

The petition’ for writ of certiorari is granted.

, Appeal dtsmissed.

Writ granted.

A true copy.

acy Test : :

‘ ot ae: Clerk, Supreme Court, U. 8. '

‘Writ of érror was abolished bythe Act of Jannary 31, 1928, ¢. 14, 45_

_ Btat. 54, as.amended by Aét, of April 26, 1928, ¢. 440, 45 Qtat. 466; U. 8. 0.,

Tit. 28, -sees, 861 a, 861 b- , e

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EDEL IMO LE) SP PNAS at EI AE NT

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 423.—Octoprr TERM, 1931.

Bradford Electric Light Co., Ine, ) On Certiorari to the

Petitioner, United States Circuit

| Court of Appeals for the

Jennie M. Clapper, Administratrix. | First Circuit. + -

| [May 16, 1932.)

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. -

This action for damages was brought in a court of New Hamp-

shire under the employers’ liability provisions of the Employers’

Liability and Workmen’s Compensation Act of that State, N. H.

Public Laws, 1926, ce. 302, to recover for the death of Leon J. Clap-, .

per, which the plaintiff claimed was due to his employer’s negli-

- gence.. The case was removed to the federal court on the ground

of diversity of citizenship; the defendant, Bradford Electric Light .

Co., Inc., being a citizen and resident of Vermont and the plaintiff, -

“Jennie M. Clapper, administratrix, being a citizen and resident of —

New Hampshire. It appeared that the Company had its principal

place of business in Vermont i ing i -

ont, was employed’by

_ it there as a lineman for emergency sé in either State; and that —

in the course of his duties, he was sent.to restore some burned-out

- fuses at a substation in New Hampshire and while doing so was

Killed. The Company, invoking the full faith and credit |

clause’ of the Federal Constitution, set up as a special defense that

‘the action was barred by provisions of the Vermont Compensation

Act; that the contract of employment had been entered into in

Vermont, where both parties te it then, and at all times thereafter

resided; and that the Vermont Act had been accepted by both -

employer and employee as a term of the contract.

The District Court ruled that the action was properly brought

‘ under the’ laws of the State of New Hampshire; that the action

was based on a tort occurring in that State; and that the Ver-

over Ps ae RE ee

2 Bradford Electric Inght Co., Inc. vs. Clapper.

mont Workmen’s Compensation Act had no extra-territorial effect.

Accordingly, that court rejected the special defense and denied a

motion to dismiss. The case was tried three times before a jury,

the third trial resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum

of $4,000. The judgment entered thereon was first reversed by

* the Cireuit Court of Appeals. But upon a rehearing, the judg-

‘ment of the trial court was affirmed, one judge dissenting. 51 F.

(2d) 992, 999. The Company filed in this Court both an appeal

and a petition for writ of certiorari. The appeal was denied, and

‘eertiorari granted. 284 U. S. 221. .

The Vermont Workmen’s Compensation Act provides that a

workman hired within the State shall be entitled to compensation

even though the injury was received outside the State, Vermont’*~

General Laws, c. 241, Sec. 5770; that ‘‘employers who hire work-

men within this state to work outside of the state, may agree

with such workmen that the remedies under the provisions of this

chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries received outside this

state by accident arising out of and in the course of such employ-

ment, and all contracts of hiring in this state shall be presumied to

include such an agreement,’’ Sec. 5774; that every contract of

‘ employment made within the State shall be presumed to have

been made subject to its provisions, unless prior to the accident an

express statement to the contrary shall have been made, in writing,

by one of the parties, Sec. 5765; and ‘that acceptance of the

Act is ‘‘a surrender by the parties . . . of their rights to any

. Other method, form or amount of compensation or determination

thereof’’, Sec. 5763. Neither the Company nor Leon Clapper filed

a stetensens declining to accept any provision of the Vermont Act.

The New Hampshire Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Com-

pensation Act provides that the employer shall become subject to .

the workmen’s compensation provisions of the Act only by filing a.

declaration to that effect, N. H. Public Laws, c. 178, § 4; and that

even if the declaration is filed, the employee may, subsequent to

the injury, still elect either to claizn compensation, Sec. 11,. or

to sue for damages at common law. as modified by the employers’

liability provisions of ‘the Act. Failure to file such a declaration

exposés the employer to a common law action of tiegligence in -

which the defenses of assumption of risk and -injury by a fellow

servant may not be interposed. Sees. 2, 8. The Company filed_

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Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. ‘Clapper. —

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in New Hampshire the declaration provided for by its statute.

Thus, each State has a ‘workmen’s compensation law of the elec-

tive type; but their provisions differ sharply. The New Hampshire

statute, unlike that of Vermont, permits the employee or ‘his rep-

resentative to elect, after the injury, to sue for. damages as at com-.

mon law; and it was as a result of such-an election made by the ad-

ministratrix that the case at bar arose. The main question for de-

cision is whether the existence of a right of action for Leon Clap-

per’s death should be determined by the laws of Vermont, where

both parties to the, contract of employment resided and where the

contract. was made, or by the laws of New Hampshire, where the

employee was killed. | . |

First. It clearly was the purpose of the Vermont Act to pre-

clude any recovery by proceedings brought in another State for

injuries received in the course of a Vermont employment. The

provisions of the Act leave no room for construction.: ‘The statute

declares in terms that when a workman -is Lao are the

State, he’ shall be entitled to compensation thereunden for in-

_ juries received outside, as well as inside, the State, unless one of

the parties elects to reject the provisions of the Act. And it declares

‘further that for injuries wherever received the remedy under the

statute shall exclude all other rights and remediesbof the employee

or his personal representative. If the accident had happened . in

Vermont, the statute plainly would have precluded the bringing

of an action for.damages in New Hampshire under ‘its employers’

liability act.? For such action is predicated on a tort; and in

Vermont an injury resulting from the employer’s negligence is

1°‘ Right to Compensation Exclusive : The rights and remedies granted by

the provisions of this chapter to an employee on account of a personal injury

for which he is entitled >to compensation under the provisions of this chapter,

shall exclude all other rights and~remedies of such employee, his personal

-Tepresentatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise on

account of such injury. Employers who hire workmen within this state to

work outside of the state, may agree with such workmen that’ the remedies

under the provisions of this chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries re-

ceived outside this state by accident arising out of and in the course of such

-¢mployment, and all contracts. of hiring in this state shall be presumed to —

include such an agreement.’’ Vt. Gen. Laws, c. 241, § 5774. .

*Compare Homes Insurance Co. 'v. Dick, 281 U. 8. 397. .No question is here

raised of the character of that considered jn Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe

Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55; and Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George,

4 Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper.

not a tort, if the provisions of the Compensation Act have beep ac-

cepted. The question is whether the face that the inj

curred in New Hampshire leaves its courts free to subject eis em-

_ ployer to liability as for a tort. That is, may the New Hampshire

courts disregard the relative rights of the parties as- determined

by the laws of Vermont where they resided and made the contract

~ of employment; ot must they give effect to the Vermont Act, and

to the agreement implied therefrom, that the only right of the

employee against thg employer, in case of injury, shall be the

, claim for compensatién provided by the statute?

' Second. If the conflict presented were between the laws of a

' foreign country and those of New Hampshire, its courts would

be free, so far as the restrictions~of federal law are ‘con-

sp cerned, to attach legal consequences to acts done within the State,

without referenee to the undertaking of the parties, entered into

‘at their common résidence abroad, that such consequences should

not be enforced between them.. But the conflict here i# between

thé laws of two States; and the Company in setting up as a defense

a right arising under the Vermont statute, invokes. Art. IV, §1,

of the Federal Constitution, which declares that ‘‘full faith and

. eredit shall be given in each State to the public acts .°. . of :

every other Sjate.’’ That a statute is a ‘‘public act’’ within the

- meaning of that clause is settled. Modern Woodmen of America y.

Mixer, 267 U. 8, 544, 550, 551; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dun

ken, 266 U. S.- 389, 393. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. .

George, 233 U. 8. 354, 360; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wiggins

Ferry Co., 119 U. 8. 615, 622.2 A federal court sitting in New

Hampshire is bound equally with courts of the State to observe

_ 233 U. 8. 354, of the-validity of an attempt to create a statutory cause of |

— and confine it to the courts of the enacting State. °

also saa v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U. 8. 274, 279; Pennsylvania

mice Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 248 U. S. 93, 96;

* . Western Life Indemnity Co: v. Rupp, 235 U. 8. 261, 274, 275; Texas & New

Orleans BR. Co. v: Miller, 221 U. 8. 408, 416; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. ».

- Melton, 218 U.\8. 36, 50-52; El Paso & Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, —

- 215 U. 8. 87, 92, 983; Smithsonian Institute v. St. John, 214 U. 8. 19, 28; .

‘Allen v. Alleghany/Co., 196 U. 8. 458, 464, 465; Finney v. Guy, 189 U. 8.

- 335, 340; Johnson v, New. York Jpife Insurance ‘Co., 187 U. 8. 491,, 496;

Eastern Building & Loan Association v. Ebaugh, 185 U. 8. 114,.121; Ban-

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\ 178 U. 8. 555, 567.

The precise question for decision is whether that clause is appli-

. eable to the situation here presented.

‘Compare Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. 8. 531, 544, 545; Converse ».

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- Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. ve. Clapper. 5"

the command of the full faith and credit clause, where applicable.‘

Third. The administratrix contends that the full faith and ~

credit elause is not applicable. The argument is that to recog-

nize the Vermont Act\as a defense to the New Hampshire action

would be. to give to that statute an extra-territorial effect, whereas

a State’s power to legislate is limited to its’ own territory.

It is: true that full faith and credit is. “enjoined by the Con-

stitution only in respect to those public acts which are within

the legislative jurisdiction of the enacting State. See Na

tional Mutual Building & Loan Association v. Brahan, 193 U.S.

635, 647; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386, 395.5 But, obviously,

the power of Vermont to effect legal consequences by legislation is

not limited strictly to occurrences within its boundaries. It has

power through its own tribunals to grant compensation to ‘local ©

employees, locally. employed, for injuries received ovitside its

borders, compare Quong Ham Wah Co.‘v. Industrial Accident

Commission, 255 U. 8. 445, dismissing writ of error, 184 Cal: 26;

and likewise has power to exclude from its own courts proceedings

for any other form of relief for such injuries. The, existence of

holzer v. New York Wife Insurance Co., 178-T. 8. 405, 406; Lloyd v. °

Matthews, 155 U. 8. 222, 227, 228; Glenn v. Garth, 147°U. 8. 360, 967, 369.

Hamilton, 224 U. 8. 243, 260, 261; Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176

U. 8. 640; Orapo v. Kelley, 16 Wall. 610; Green ». Van Buskirk, 5 Wall.

307. flee 2 Farrand, ‘‘ Records of the Federal Convention’’, pp. 188, 447, 577. _

Congress, acting under the authority of\ Article IV, §1, has provided fo -

the authentication of ‘‘acts of the legislature of any state or territory Sr x

any‘country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’’ Act of May

26, 1790, c. 11; Act of March 27, 1804, c. 56,.§ 2; Rev. _ § 905, U. ra

Code, Tit. 28, § 687, e

‘Compare Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481; . Rev. Stat: $$ 905, 906. See alee

Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. 8. 48, 72; Cooper v. Newell,

58ee also New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 234 U. 8. 149, 161; Bona- ‘

parte ». Tax Court, 104 U. 8. 592, 594. Compare Atchisor, Topeka & Santa

Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U. 8. 55, 70; Tennessee Coal, Tron & R, Co. v. George,

233 U. 8. 354, 360; \

| *For decisions construing state workmen’s coni tion acts as applicable,

under appropriate circumstances, tv injuries received outside the Btate, and

6°. Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clappef.

this power is not denied. It is contended only that the rights ”

thus created need not be recognized in an action brought in another

‘State; that a provision .which Vermont. may validly enforce in its

"own courts need not be given effect when the same facts are pre-

sented for adjudication in New Hampshire.

The answer is that such recognition in New Hampshire of the

rights created by the Vermont Aét,-can not, in any proper sehse,

be tefmed an extra-territorial application of that Act.’ Work-

men’s compensation act® are treated, almost universally, as creat-

ipg a statutory relation between the parties—not, like employer’s

liability acts, ‘as substituting .a statutory tort for a common law

‘ upholding the validity of the acts as so construed, see Quong Ham Wah Co. ».

Industrial Accident Commissjon, 184 Cal. 26, 36; Industrial Commission ».

Aetna Life Insurance Co.,'64 Colo. 480, 490; Kennerson v. Thames Towboat

Co., 89 Conn. 367, 375; Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Cé. v. Huhn,

165 Ga. 667, 670; Beall Bros. Supply Oo, v. Industrial Commission, 341

-Il, 193, 199; Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage ‘Co., 185 Iowa 1346, 1356;

Saunder’s Case, 126 Me. 144, 146; Pederzoli’s Case, 269 Mass, 650, 553;

Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich 218, 231; State ex rel, Cham-

bers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 208, 209; State ex rel. Loney v. In-

dustrial Accident Board, 87 Mont. 191, 195, 196; McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley

Co., 111 Neb. 609, 611, 6i2; Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., 87 N. J. Law

371, 374; Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N, Y. 544, 549 (compare

Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N. Y. 9, 11, 12; Matter of Cameron v.

Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 397); Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I.

447, 462, 463; Smith v. Van Noy Interstate Co., 150 Tenn. 25, 36; Texas

-Employers’ Ins, Ase’n v. Volek, 44 8. W. (2d)° 795, 798 .(Tex. Civ. App.) ;

Pickering v. Industrial Commission, 59 Utah 35, 38; Gooding v. Ott, 7

P, W. Va. 487, 492, 493; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron.Co., 169 Wis. 106, 114,

115. A contrary construction was reached in Altman v. North Dakota Work-

vnen’s Compensation Burean, 50 N. D. 215} Shechan Pipg Line Const. Co: 3.

State Industrial Commission, 151 Okla. 272, 273, Early degisions to like ef-

fect, in California, Illinois, and Massachusetts, have been superseded by statute.

See North Alaska Salmon Co. v- Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1; Union Bridge & Con-

struction Co.’v. Industrial Conimission, 287 Ill. 396, 398; Gould’s Case, 215

5, 480. The provisions of the state statutes in respect to injuries oc-

ater outside the state are summarized in Schneider, ‘‘The Law of Work-

’, Cqmpensation’’ (2d ed. 1932), vol. I, pp. 428-433. :

‘?The statute does not undertake to prohibit acts beyond the borders a

the State. Compare Allgbyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. 8. 578; Nutting ye:

Massachusetts, 183 U. 8. 553, 557. It does not attempt to fdérbid or regulate

subsequent modification of the Vermont contract, or the formation of sub--

sidiary contracts, or new agreements, by the parties in other States. Com-

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Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vg¢ Clapper. ame j

tort. See Cudahy Packing Co. v,.Parramore, 263 U. 8. 418, 423;

Mulhall v. Nashua Manufacturing Co., 80 N. H. 194, 197; Matter

of Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 396; Chandler

vy. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 217; Anderson v., Miller

‘Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 118, 117, 118. . The relation between

Leon Clapper and the Company was created by the law of Vermont;

and as long as that relation persisted its incidents were. properly

subject to regulation there. For both Clapper and the Company

. were at all times residents of Vermont; the Company’s principal

place of business was located there; the contract of emplayment

was made there; and the employee’s duties required him to go into

‘New Hampshire only for temporary and specific purposes, in re-

sponse to orders given him at the Vermout office. The mere recog-

nition by the courts of one State that parties by their conduct

have subjected themselves to certain obligations arising under the

law of another State is not to be deemed an extra-territorial appli-

cation of the law of the State creating the obligation.* Compare

Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527; 536, 537.-

By requiring that, under the circumstances here presented, full

faith and credit be given t e public act of Vermont, the. Fed-

eral Constifution prevents thé employee or his representative from

' asserting’ in\ New Hampshire rights which would be denied him in

the State of is residence and employment. A Vermont court

pare New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 234 U. 8. 149; New York Life _

Insurance Co, v. Dodge, 246 U. 8. 357. It affects only the rights and lia-

bilities of parties who by their conduct within the State have subjected them-

selves to its operation. As to those parties, its effect is not to create a

. liability for acts without the State, compare” Westerp Union Telegraph Co..-

~—. % Brown, 234 U. 8, 542, but to give rise to a defense in consequence of acts

within. ;

*See Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 'N. Y. 531, 535, deny-

ing recovery in‘a common law action for damages in the state of injury, on

the ground that the-employee’s remedy was for compensation under the law

of the state of employment. Compare In re Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 52 F. (24)

129, 134, reversed on other grounds, 285 U, 8. —. Compensation was pin)

, denied in Hall v. Industrial Commission, 77 Colo. 338, 339; Hopkins ».

Matchless Metal Polish Co., 99 Conn. 457, 464; Proper v. Polley, 233 N. Y.

' App. Div. 621, Compare Scott v. White Hagle Oil & Refining Co., arf. ;

(2d) 615, 616. See also Darsch v. Thearlé Diffield Fire Works Display Co., *

77 Ind. App. 357. Compare Wiley .v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 227 Fed.

127, 130; Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Jackson; 118 Fed. 549, 552, ,

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a 8 — Bradford’ Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. >. *

-,* could have enjoined Leon Clapper from ‘suing the Company in -

New Hampshire, to recover damages for an injury suffered there,

- just as it would have denied him the right to recover such damages |

~ + in Vermont. ’ Compare Cole v. Cunningham, 138 U, S. 107; Rey

} nolds v. Alden, 136 U. S. 348, 353. The rights created by the Vér.

mont Act are entitled to like protection when set up in New Hamp. .

shire by way of defense to the actiéh brought there.’ Ifthis were '

> _ not so, and the émployee ar hig, representative were free to disre-

gard the law of Vermont and his'contract, the effectiveness of the.

Vermont Act would be gravely impaired. ‘For the purpose of that

-*.. Aet, as of the worlfmen’s compensation laws’ of most other States,

is to provide, in’ respect to persons residirig and businesses lochted

in the State,-not only for employees, a remedy which is both ex-

peditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for em-

ployers 4 liability which is limited and determinate.. Compare

“New York Central B. COV. White, 248 U. 8.188; Hawkins y.

» Bleakly,-243 U.S. 210; Mowntain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243--

U.S, 219. ea ee ee

Fourth. It is urged that the provision of. the Vermont statute

which forbids resort to‘common law remedies for injuries incurred -

. in the course of employment is contrary ‘to the public poliey of

».- New Hampshire; that the full faith and credit clause does not re-

s _ quire New Hampshire to enforce an act of another-State which is

obnoxious to.its public policy; and that a federal court sitting in 1

that State may, therefore, decline to do so. : Compare Union Trust —

®~ Co. v. Grosman, 245°U. $412. It is true that. the full faith and

- :@redit clause does not require the enforcement of every right con-

% ferred by a statute of another State: There is rom for some play oo |

- of confli¢ting policies, Thus, a plaintiff suing in New Hampshire

on @ statutory cause of action arising in Vermont might be denied

-,, Relief because the forum fails to provide a court’ with. jurisdiction

"of the egritroversy; see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, -

207 U, 8. 142, 148, 149; compare Douglas v. Yew York, New Haven.

& Hartford BR, Co., 279 U. 8. 877; or because it fails to provide.

- "procedure appropriate to its determination, see Yonnessez Coal,

a

; Iron & RB. Co. v. George, 283 U. 8.854, 359; compare Slater ¥,

4° 1 Mewvicon, National B. Co., 194 U. 8. 120, 128,°129; oF Yeec vase the

« .'. @nforeement of the right conferred would be obnoxious to the pub-

“| <4 Tie policy of the forum, compare Bothwell v. Buckbée, Mears 00.)

: 6

| Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. - a ee

915 U. S. 274, 277-279; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. 8. ‘

'. 412; Bond:v. Hume, 243 U.'S. 15, 25; Converse v.-Hamilton, 224°

U. S.. 248, 260, 261; or because the liability imposed is deemed a

_ penal one, see Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co..v.

. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 490, compare Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio -

Re R., 168 U. 8. 445, 448. But the Company is in & position differ-

- ent from that of a ‘plaintiff who seeks to enforce a cause of action

conferred by the laws of another State. The right which it claims

should be given effect is set up by way of defense to art asserted

liability; and to a defense different considerations apply. Com-

pare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. 8. 397, 407, 408. A

State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. .

‘ In so doing, it merely denies: a remedy, leaving unimpaired the _.

plaintiff’s substantive right, so that he is free to ‘enforce it —~

elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect. to a substantive defense

' under the applicable law of another State, as under the cireum-

"stances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable —

liability. -This.may not be done.’ Compare Modern Woodmen of

America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 550, ‘551; Aetna Life Insurance

-Co. v. Dunken, 266 U: 8. 389; Royal Arcanum, v. Green, 237 U. 8.

_ 581 See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U. &

542; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. 8.

~~65,_69. Ra . ; : oo

'_ ‘Moreover, there is no #dequate basis for the lower’ court’s con-

- elysion that to deny recovery would be obnoxious to the public

policy of New Hampshire. No decision of the state court has béen -

cited indicating that recognition of the Vermont-statute would be

regarded iri New Hampshire as prejudicial to the interests of its

itizgns.? In support of the eontentiqn that the ‘provision of the.

Vermont ‘Act is contrary to the New Hampshire policy, it is urged

be |

. that New Hamipshire?s compensation law is unique among work-

men’s. compengation acts in that it permits the injured employee

to elect, subsequent to injury, whether to bring a suit based upon

‘Compare Saloshin v. Houle, 155 Atl.:47, an’ action of negligence ‘by. the

widow of a New York ‘resident killed in. New Hampshire while working for . °

® New York firm, brought

the Supreme

10 Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper.

negligence 2 to avail himself ft the remedy ‘provided by the..

it

Act; and the legislature of New Hampshire has steadily”

v x

refused to withdraw this privilege,*° But the mere fact that the .

Vermont legislation does not conform to that of New Hampshire

does not establish that it would be obnoxious to the latter’s public

policy to give effect'to the Vermont statute in cases involving only

the rights of residents of that State incident to the relation of em-

ployer and employee created there. Northern Pacific -R. Co.-y.

' Babcock, 154 U. 8. 190, 198. Nor does sufficient reason appear

why it should be so regarded. The interest of New Hampshire was

_ Only casual. Leon Clapper -was not a resident there. He was not.

continuously employed there. So far as appears, he had no de-

. pendent there. It is‘ difficult to see how the State’s interest would .

be subserved, under such circumstances, by burdening its. courts

_ with this litigation.

Sizth. The administratrix urges that the Company had in fact —

accepted the provision of the New Hampshire Compensation Act,

which reserves to the employee the right to elect to sue for dam-

ages as at common law. It.was upon this ground, priniarily, that

the Circuit Court of Appeals based, upon the rehearing, the affirm-

ance of the judgment of the District Court: The circumstances

under which the acceptance,of the New Hampshire Act was filed

show that the: Company did not intend thereby to abandon its

rights under the Vermont law in réspect to Leon Clapper or other

, employees similarly situated. It had had occasion. to hire in New

_ Hampshire residents of that State for employment there in con-

nection with the operation of ts lines in that State.. In case of

'- injury of. such employees, failuké to accept the New Hampshire *

Act would have made the petitioner liable to an action for negli-*

_ gence,in which it would have been denied the defenses of assump- |

tion of risk and injury by a fellow servant. Jutras v. Amoskéag

. Manufacturing Co,, 84 N. H. 171, 173; Leve@ue v. American Bow ©

. 1Attention is ealled to the following rejected compensation bills abolishing

the rightpof election after accident: 1915 Session, House Bills No. 206, 302,. .

Journal, pp. 720, 1021; 1917; Session, House Bills No. 81 485, Journal, pp.

567, ; 1919 Session, House Bill No. 184, Journal, p. 437; 1927 Session,

‘How ill No. 212, Journal, p. 752; 1980 Session, House Bill No. 292,

| Journal, p. 752.- In 1928-the statute was amended to increase the compen-

sation, N. H. Laws, 1923, ¢. 91; and in 1925, as amended, it was reénacted

without change, N. H. Publie Laws, e. 178.

2 sa ° M as j a)

4 oe

Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. u

& Lumber Co., 84 N: H. 543. Its acceptance is to. be construed as

referable only to such New Hampshire employees, and not as bring-

ing under the New ames Act employees not otherwise sub-

ject to it.

We are of opinion that the rights AS ieleinn us Company and

Leon Clapper or his representative are to be determined according

to the Vermont Act. The judgment of the. Circuit Court ‘of Ap-

' peals must accordingly be reversed. We sa occasion to.con- |

sider whether if, the injured employee had been a resident of New

Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had left

dependents there, recovery might validly ‘have ‘been permitted

under New Hampshire law. .

‘Devevesd,

‘4 : ’ ; °

Mr. Justice Carpox tot no part in the consideration or decision

of this case. .: er: |

A true copy. *

Test: : , , Hu , - ge e

t :

Clerk, Supreme Court; U. 8.

. » 2 e

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

No. 423.—Ocrosus Taam, 1931. ;

' Bradford Blectrie Light Co., Inc, ) On Certiorari to the

| Petitioner, | United - States Circuit

v8. ‘Court of Appeals for the

Jennie M. Clapper, Administratrix. | First Circuit.

. [May 16, 1932.]

Mr. Justice Sronz, concurring.

‘TL agree that in the circumstances of the present case, the courts

- of New Hampshire, in giving effect ‘to- the public policy of that —

"state, would be at liberty to apply the Vermont statute and thus,

by comity, make it the applicable law of New Hampshire. In the

absence of any controlling decision of the New Hampshire courts, _

T assume, a8 does the opinion of the Court, that they would do so

and that what they would do we should do. Hence,: it seems

unnecessary to decide whether that result could be compelled, .

against the will of New Hampshire, by the superior force of the

. full faith and credit clause. =o i eae ON:

_ . If decision of that question could not be avoided; I should hesi-

tate to say that the Constitution projects the authority of ‘the

Vérmont statute across state lines into New Hampshire, so that the

‘New. Hampshire cOurts, in fixing: the liability of: the employer

for a tortious act committed within the state, are compelled te .

apply Vermont law {nstead of their own. The full faith and

_._ edit clause has not hitherto been thought to do more than com-

"Pel recognition, outside the state, of ‘the operation and effect of

' its lows upon persons and events within it.’ Bonaparte v. Taz:

" . Court, 104. U: 8.592; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co.

" ¥. Bowers, 213 U. S..55; Olmsted v.- Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386;

Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. RB. Co. v. George, 233. U. 8. 354; Hood

~Y., McGehee, 237 U. 8, 611; see Union Trust Co. Vv. Grosman,.245

~—U~.S. 412, 415, 416; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 "es

U. 8. 542, 547, aN ee “bk: ; “, - i rc .

“

Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vB, Clapper. °

It is true’ that in this case the status of eniployer and employ

terminable at will, was created by Vermont laws operating

them while they were within that ‘state. I.assume that the #

of its creation there,must.be recognized elsewhere, whenever 4

terial. But I am-not prepared to say that that status, volunta .

continued bY employer and employe arid given a locus in N

Hampshiré by their presence within the state, may not be re

lated there according to New Hampshire law, or that the 1

consequences of acts of the employer or employe there, which g

- oat of or affect the status in New Hampshire, must, by man "

of the Constitution, be either defined\or ‘controlled, in the

Hampshire courts, nil the alee of Vermont — than of Ni

Hampshire. % 4

The interest, which New amualiine has, in arcing q

trol, derived from the presence of employer and employe witf

-its borders, and the commission of the tortious act titre, ia)

*. least ag valid as that of Vermont, derived from “the fast hat |

status is that of its citizens, and originated when they(Were in. Vj

‘mont, before going to New Hampshire. I can find nothing in, a

- history of the full faith and credit clause, or the decisions um

“ it, which lends support to the view that it compels any state,

subordinate its domestic policy, with respect: to persons and th

_ acts within its borders, to the laws of any other. On the contrél

I think it should: be interpreted as leaving the courts of New | Hag

-. shire free, in the circumstances now presented, either to apy tS

refuse to apply the law of Vermont, in accordance with their 1 0

— of New —_—e atten and law. - 3