Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jones v. Fulton County Board of Commissioners

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

ROLAND A. JONES,

Petitioner.

FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA,

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et. al.,

Respondents .

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROLAND A. JONES

Pro se

1390 Heatherland Dr.

Atlanta, Georgia 30331

(404) 344-1332

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals' decision is in

conflict with this Court's Hains v. Kerner, and a pro se's

due process where:

(a) the district court holds based on its unilateral belief

that purchase orders must be approved by the Fulton

County Board of Commissioner, and placed in its minutes,

before it is payable, when the respondent and _ his

Contracting Officer say this is not true,

(b) the district court scolds respondents' lawyer for not

making legal arguments; while also saying it will not make

arguments for "trained counsel"; then, it makes the

arguments for the "trained counsel"; and then grants the

“trained counsel" summary judgment based on the legal

arguments it made, all the same order,

and documentation to be "inadequate", but it grants

respondents summary judgment,

(d) the court of appeals affirmed for the respondents based

on the record being "inadequate", without allowing pro se

opportunity to make the record "adequate"?

il. Whether thisCourt's Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S.

317 (1986) permits lower courts to adjudicate fewer than all

pro se claims and terminate the action, where:

(a) the respondents did not dispute pro se's constitutional

and discrimination claims, and where

(b) the court of appeals' decision is in conflict with its own

previous summary judgment decisions?

LIST OF PARTIES

A list of parties to the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

Roland A. Jones

Michael J. Lomax

Commissioner

Fulton County, Georgia

Robert J. Regus

Assistant County Manger,

Fulton County, Georgia

Frank W. Bockman

Director,

Department of Public Buildings,

Fulton County, Georgia

Roland B. Welmaker

Deputy Director,

Department of Public Buildings,

Fulton County, Georgia

Jacqueline S. Groover, Assistant

Staff Counsel, Bar # 00 1 3 1 0,

Fulton County, Georgia

Franklin N. Biggins

Petitioner

Respondent

| :

Respondent :

Respondent

Attorney for

respondents.

iil

rABE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.......ccccccceeeeeeeenencenenenenneeeeees I

TABLE OF CONTENTS. ....ccseecsseerssernnseeesnnnnsnnennneneres iii

TABLE OF CITATIONS. ....c0--eecsseeresserersnnnrsnnnnenenerees iii

OPINIONS BELOW... ....---cccsseereneesesnennennnnnsnnnnnnennensnnrees I

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......c-----eseerereeee I

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........---+++- I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......-cccseeseesesresnreenseeeees 2

B CRBC.cccecccccecccccccceseccscscccccccecsssocoscsessossoosooosssooqonsesses 2

q. Set Of Facts #1 ........--ccccceeeeneeeeee avian 4

bh. Set Of Facts #2 .......-ncccccesesererreesssnnnenneessennnenereees 8

©. Set Of Facts 43.........--eeeccrereeererennssnnenensesnnnnsnerees 10

d. Set Of Facts #4.........cccccsecereseenesessenereesnsnsnnannnnrens 12

©. Set Of Facts #5.....cccccccccccccesseeneenenrenesseesennnenenerees 12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......200000-. 12

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS

ADJUDICATED FEWER THAN

ALL CLAIMS. ......cccccscssscsssessccocecsnennsnsenensnnsserees 12

a. Discrimination Not Adjudicated............--.---.

Contents

Page

b. Government Official(s) Acting

Illegally Under Color Of Law

Claim Not Adjudicated...............cccsssecccceeees 13

il. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

IS INCONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S

SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT

TO CELOTEX CORP. V. CATRETT..........+0+++- 13

lil. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS IN CONFLICT

WITH COURT OF APPEALS OWN

SR A PO ihindittindeennsesnennsaventnnsenmnsvasansinanensensneans 16

CEFR Bee ehinsitinnsiteacciniscnvecinnnseniciisnemaninnanssansniiheinien 17

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A-- COURT OF APPEALS

ORDER, DATED JULY 14, 1995................ cc cccsseees la

APPENDIX B-- COURT OF APPEALS

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING,

DA TED OC TOBER 25, 89 9S vccccscccccsecccssssscscsscossesses 4a

APPENDIX C-— AFFIDAVIT OF MR.

CLARENCE REID, AFRICAN-AMERICAN

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT

CO Fr ee EO nccericndceninnnncsinnsesiostannintsitani Sa

APPENDIX D- FULTON COUNTY

PURCHASE ORDER REQUISITION

SRE SP PRPC GPAREE Dy SPM ncnianeinisinisicnremencsenstnnsnees Ta

Contents

APPENDIX E-- AFFIDAVIT, MRS. CORNICK....... 8a

APPENDIX F-- FULTON COUNTY

RECEIVING REPORT/PURCHASE

ORDER DATED JANUARY 19, 1990........c0eceeeeees 9a

APPENDIX--G AFFIDAVIT, MRS. RENEE

DUCKWORTH, DATED JULY 5, 1991.........-0ceee++s 10a

APPENDIX H-- AFFIDAVIT, OF DEPUTY

DIRECTOR WILLIAM RUBY, DENNIS

BARNES, AND MRS. RENEE DUCKWORTH,

STATUS OF MY PERSONAL PROPERTY AS

OF OCTOBER 22, 1992.......cccccccesssersseneresereseesesezensoees 12a

APPENDIX I-- REDACTED GEORGIA LAW

ON PURCHASE ORDER. ......c..ccssessseseseesetersererenncees i3a

APPENDIX J-NOVEMBER 24, 1990,

RESPONDENT FRANK BOCKMAN,

IN ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,

STATING PURCHASE ORDERS DO

NOT REQUIRE BOARD OF COMMISSION

APPROVA Liuiu....ccccscccreccccsssccnsssessessssceseeseceeenssssessssees 15a

APPENDIX K- DISTRICT COURT

ORDER 4 1, DATED JUNE 24, 1991 .......ccecesereeeeeeeee 16a

APPENDIX L- DISTRICT COURT

ORDER # 2, DATED MARCH 27, 1992......ccceeeseeees 18a

APPENDIX M-- DISTRICT COURT

ORDER # 3, DATED SEPTEMBER 39, 1993........ 28a

( ontents

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES CITED:

Barfield v. Brierton,

883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (Lith Cir. 1989)... 16

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

B77 Ue Bo BET EEDEBprccsscesecssssccscscocenssvasesessscsessseseste 4 3,13,14

Chappell v. Wallace,

GOE UTE. SPO rcccccasssrcsssscssnscscssnsscssesneressnsssssbetenssnscesnsnensenssenete 3

Conely v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45- 46, 78 S.Ct.

ee EM OF UF OU, ee re ee as 3

Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County Comm'n,

rc} m 8 “g(t: Loe Bw See Seer lie ;

Estelle.

ys RIFF Fe Ch tee } ee eae eee 3

Hains v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519 520-21,

92 S.Ct 594, 595-96,

CR Ey RE eee Se ee ee ee 3

Hairston v. G-ainesville Sun Publ. Co..

9 F.3d 913, 918 (Lith Cir. 1993)............. SUES Ae 16

Haves v. Miami,

§2 F.3d 918, 921 (Lith Cir. 199S)............................ 16

(Contents

Page

Irby v. Bittick,

44 F.3d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1995). ....c-cccceeeeeeceeeernenennns 16

Jones, Roland A. v. Department

of the Army, U. S. Supreme Court

N umber 95-990.........cccceeeesesserecenssesersesennssnsnnseeunennssacnenes 3

Weiner v. Fulton County,

113 Ga. App. 343, 346 (1966)....-..----eseeevenerennnnnnennnnenes 10

WSB-TV v. Lee,

84? F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1988)........-----ceeeesenenees 16

STATUTES CITED:

First AMeCNAMEDL.........-<ccccccccceceeeneeenersnssnenenersrsnsensnnnees 1,13

Fifth AMeNdMeNL............-..-c-ceeeeeeeeernrnecenennnenennnnanennees 1,13

Phirteenth Amend MEDL.............ccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeennnenneeennens 1,13

Fourteenth Amendmenl............-<--ccceeeeeseeeeenneneeeenenes 1,13

QB U.S.C. 1254 1 )..ccccccccccccccceccececssessnsesensesenssssesssenensees

PB U.S.C. 1345.........cccccecccccccccccssescecccsscesssessesssnsnssseeoes

QB U.S.C. 1343 (1970).....cccecceeccsecencrsneeneennnenensnnsnnnnnes l

29 U.S.C. S 151 et seq. (1970).....ccccccceeeeennnneeennenennnnnns

See ESSSSSSES SSR SESS O SSS SS SESE TESS SESS eeeceeeeeeeeeee a4

6006000660005 SS00SSSSSSSSS SSS SOSSSHSSSOSSOOSSSODD OOOO ON" -* me

Vill

Contents

Page

GB Ue BB. Cy Bi cesasesttstancccistnchinsnscntnenstenecctescescconsese 2,12,13

Ge UE Ce, BB ccncnsntsccscsevsssnccssqescccnnnnssonecsnscssanssens 2,12,13

42 U.S.C. 20006 et seq.,

as amended (Supp. [1], 1972)..........cc.cccsccsressssssessessees I

GE Ul. BH. Co, BB cctnicccsccccscccecensnccnsnsissentnncsetionninees I

GE Ui. BH Co, FI i cenessnccansansncseciastsnentncsscentamesantens I

Cee ee Fae Ge Be kiinetcihtheciscttdcintacecnntenndociitititians 2,12

CSCO COTES AE, Be FO Geccntcnsscssnnscsscsnscnssbantintateedeate 2

Code of Laws of Fulton County.................cccccsscsccssees 2

Pro se petitioner, Roland A. Jones, respectfully prays that

a writ of certiorari be issued to review the per curiam

judgment and opinions of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit, issued in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals of which review is

sought is “unpublished" (App. A, p. 1a).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was entered on July 14,

1995. (App. A, p. la). The court of appeals denied the

petition for rehearing on October 25, 1995. ( App. B, p.

4a.). The Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1). Jurisdiction in the district court was invoked under

28 U.S.C. 1345. Jurisdiction is also invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1343 (1970), 29 U.S.C. S 151 et seq. (1970) and 42

U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended (Supp. II, 1972); and by 42

U.S. C. which conferred jurisdiction in civil matters on the

courts, as specifically conferred by 42 U. S. C. 2000e-5, and

equitable relief specifically conferred by 42 U. S. C. 2000e-

5(g) providing for injunctive and other relief against

discrimination on the basis of race.

CONSTITUTIONALAND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

This case involves the First Amendment as it provides for

the right to petition government officials with grievances;

the Fifth Amendment as it provides for due process,

prohibition against discrimination, and against the taking of

private property for public use without just compensation;

the Thirteenth Amendment as it provides against

discrimination, and against slavery and involuntary

servitude; the Fourteenth Amendment as it provides for due

process and a prohibition against discrimination; the 14th

Amendment and 42 U. S. C. 1983 as they provide for the

redress of deprivation of rights under color of law; 42 U.S.

C. 1981 as it provides for the equal rights for all persons in

every state and territory within the jurisdiction of the

United States, and against discrimination; 42 U.S. C. 1985

as it provides for relief from conspiracy to deprive persons of

their civil rights, and against discrimination; 42 U.S. C. Sec.

1988 as it provides for the protection of all persons in their

civil rights, and against discrimination; the Civil Rights Acts

of 1866; Georgia Code Ann. 3-704, providing for twenty (20)

years for the redress of discrimination; the State of Georgia

Open Records Act; and the Code of Laws of Fulton County

as it provides for a policy that a minority business enterprise

("MBE") “shall have the maximum opportunity to

participate ia County projects".

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A writ of certiorari is requested to allow this Court to

review the court of appeals' opinion (App. A, p. la) which

determined that pro se's claims lacked merit. A summary

of the case, background facts, and proceedings follows:

Case

The record references, below, where "R" indicates the

record reference of the District Court Docket Sheet, and

where "RE" indicates the Record of Excerpts provided to

the court of appeals, have been left in tact to show this Court

that the pro se facts, evidence, and case law had been

brought to the attention of the court of appeals, and to show

they were not considered. (App. A, p. la).

The pro se questions raised in this petition are of great

importance to the bench and pro se litigants in the Lith

tie aire

Re 2 Ma AD CU hE Sc SOA BAL Hes Bele y or nt

Circuit, for they ask this Court to enforce its Hains vy.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 520-21 (1972), concerning pro se

matters, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986), 325

concerning summary judgments, and Chappell v. Wallace,

462 U.S. 296, at 303, in Roland A. Jones y. Secretary of the

Army, Supreme Court #95-990, currently pending before

this Court where, in the same district court, the lawyer

admitted/ acknowledged on two (2) occasions that her clients

violated the law, yet pro se was not allowed to prevail. Since

the same district court is involved, there is a pattern of prose

bias between this case and Jones v. Secretary of the Army.

After a complaint is filed, an unrepresented litigant is

treated as a non-person/non-participant in the 11th Circuit.

The intent of this Court's Hains, which quotes Conely v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45- 46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d.

80, 1957, reaffirmed in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99, 106,97 S.Ct.

at 292, is routinely ignored in the 11th Circuit.

But for the bias against this pro se, the favoritism shown

respondents’ lawyer when his legal arguments and

documentation were found to be "inadequate" by the

district court, on several occasions, this pro se would have

prevailed. It is not right where the district court scolds

respondents’ lawyer for not making legal arguments; while

also saying it will not make arguments for "trained

counsel"; then, it makes the arguments for the "trained

counsel"; and then grants the "trained counsel" summary

judgment based on the legal arguments it made, all in the

same order. (App.L, p. 18a). This is an insult to this pro se's

intelligence. According to Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County

Com'n, 739 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1984) due process

requires hearing by an impartial tribunal, and tribunals

Should avoid even appearances of impropriety.

Using the standard this Court expressed in Hains, "|wle

cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the

prose complaint ...it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief", I request that this Court

review the following, not reviewed by the court of appeals:

Set Of Facts #1

Fulton County, Georgia, operates a Minority Business

Enterprise ("MBE") program which provides that minority

business persons "shall have the maximum opportunity to

participate in Fulton County projects". With pro se

petitioner doing business as JAR Automated Management

Services, a minority business, a Fulton County Purchase

Order Requisition for calendar year 1990 was approved by

an African-American department head. (App. C, p. Sa):

"As I have previously stated on November

15, 1990, I approved the continued services

of Mr. Roland A. Jones for calendar year

1990. I also instructed Mr. Welmaker to

execute my approval."

The approved requisition (App. D, p. 7a) was submitted to

the Fulton County Purchasing Agent by the department's

Contracting Officer, (App. E, p. 8a):

"This action was requested by an

authorized staff member, Roland

Bernard Welmaker, and was routine

in nature..."

AkK*

"IT recall submitting the required

paperwork to the Fulton County

Purchasing Department for the

issuance of a purchase order to Roland

A. Jones d/b/a J.A.R. to be effective

January 1, 1990"

aN a. eee aN Wi RD a aioe GP Sa ED

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"Once purchase order was generated,

a receiving report form was issued to

the Public Buildings Department.

The receiving report was to accompany

contractor's invoices for payment as

approved by the Public Buildings

Department. Presently, | am a

Contracting Officer for the Fulton County

Purchasing Department." (RI-7-"I",

"16", RE).

Section 11, Georgia Law, Act 426, County Purchasing

Department Created, March 27, 1941, at 412 (App. I, p.

13a), county purchase orders are payable upon receipt of

the requisition by the Fulton County Purchasing Agent:

“all purchases made by the County

Purchasing Agent shall be made upon the

receipt of requisitions signed by such

officers and employees of the several

agencies of the county...".(R2-21-1&

R2-41-"H-1"-5, "17", RE).

On January 22, 1990, the Purchasing Agent issued a

Receiving Report/Purchase Order authorizing payment. of

$28,008.00 for 1996 (App. F, p. 9a):

"THIS PURCHASE ORDER AUTHORIZES

PAYMENT FOR GOODS ORDERED AND/

OR SERVICES REQUESTED BY THE

PUBLIC BLDGS DEPT.- OF FULTON

COUNTY DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR

OF 19909 ...TO BE FURNISHED AS

CALLED FOR DURING THE YEAR 19990.

(R1-7-"i"'. and "18", RE).

The replacement Caucasian-American depa: tr.ent head

(respondent Frank Bockman) refused to pay for the work

performed, and on October 5, 1990, declared my work to be

“strictly voluntary" (App. L, p. 19a, par. 2).

During 1990, services were called for and provided the

department, as indicated by the department's supervisor for

computer operations (App. G, p. 11a, par. 4):

"During 1990, Mr. Bockman, Mr. Welmaker,

and Mr. Ruby, by way of my reports to them,

had full knowledge that Mr. Jones was

providing services on a regular basis." (RI-

11-"C"-4, and "19", 4, RE).

The district court also stated that pro se could file for

mandamus to enforce the purchase order to spread it upon

the minutes of the Commission (App. L, p. 25a, Fn 3):

"...Should plaintiff wish to enforce this

purchase order, he must...amend his

complaint to seek mandamus forentry of

the agreement on the minutes. .. PMS, 243

Ga. at 872."" See Fn. 3, pp. 10. (R1-13-10-

FN.3).

The complaint was amended for mandamus (R2-35),

but the district court refused to grant mandamus that it

said was necessary.

The lawyer provided no Georgia law, or Fulton County

Code, or regulation, that was in effect during year 1990,

which requires a purchase order to be approved by the

Commission and placed in its minutes before it is payable.

Also conversely, the lawyer's client, respondent Bockman,

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stated that "Craft was given work through a purchase

order... he also said h’; ¢spartment enters into hundreds of

similar agreements and that none of them goes before the

board for approval" (App. J, p. 15a). Bockman's

Contracting Officer for the department also states (App. E,

p. 8a) that purchase orders do not require Board of

Commissioners approval. The district court held that

purchase orders must be approved by the Commission and in

its "Board minutes", contrary to Bockman and his

Contracting Officer (App. L, p. 25a, par 2):

"it is undisputed that no contract between

plaintiff and the County existson the

Board minutes. The Court is compelled

to find that plaintiff does not have an

enforceable contract with the County...

The parties do dispute whether a

purchase order for plaintiff's services was

entered in January 1990."

The district court granted summary judgment for

respondents. (App. M, p. 32a, at Plaintiff's Renewed

Motion). The lower courts missed the point: there can be no

requirement to place a purchase order in the minutes of the

Commission to make it payable when there is no Georgia

law, or Fulton County Code, or regulation, stating a

requirement, and when the respondent (Bockman) and his

Contracting Officer have state there is no requirement for a

purchase order to be approved by the Commission. The no

"enforceable contract" and entering it in the minutes in

January 1990, as discussed by the district court, is the

unsubstantiated concept of respondents’ lawyer, and only

his. The lawyer never substantiated his concept with

documented evidence.

Set Of Facts #2

Upon the nonpayment and termination of my services, the

Caucasian-American (Bockman) department head would

not allow me to retrieve my personnel property from the

department. On September 30, 1993, the district court

found (App. M, p. 31a):

Plaintiff contends that defendants took

his software, computer applications

software, database structure, related

computer reports data entry forms, and

communications software without

compensation.''(R2-32-4, and "8", 4, RE).

On August 31,1992, Judge Robert H. Walling, court

appointed mediator, concluded my 5th Amendment

taking claim be "software tool much like a hammer a worker

might bring to a job site."" (R2-18, "25", RE).

The replacement Caucasian-American department head

(Frank Bockman) kept and destroyed my personal property

upon his refusal to pay. Prose presented evidence showing

that respondents kept and destroyed personal property.

(App. G, p. lla, par, 5, and App. H, p. 12a):

"'.. .while the Department owned all of the

Rbase software, the programs for the

specialized application of software, such

as the Work Order System, the Finance

and Accounting Systems, the Project

Management System, the Parking Control

System, the Vehicle Control and Main-

tenance, the Time and Expense System,

among others, were designed, developed,

SO et ee Se ets

and produced by Mr. Roland A. Jones

. Mr. Jones never gave ownership of

his application software to the depart-

ment. His logo (JAR) always appeared

on the screen of each department

computer when the power was turned

on." (See RI- 11-"C" and R3-44-"M"

also "19", RE).

On October 22, 1992, Mr. Ruby, the Deputy Department

Director, Mr. Barnes, the current supervisor of the

department's computer operations, and Mrs. Duckworth,

the ex-supervisor of the department's computer operations,

reported by a Spreadsheet Inventory Affidavit (App. H, p.

12a), that they had found that afew ofmy programs (.PRC

complied software tools) were still being used by the

department, while the most important programs

(proprietary .ASC uncompiled software tools) had been

removed from the computer that was assigned to me, and

destroyed (R2-22-"A", "27", RE).

The lawyer never offered any probative evidence show ing

that respondents were specifically entitled to keep my

personal property ( the tools of my trade), as the district

court concluded (App. M, p. 30a):

"Any motion that includes allegations of

fact must include supporting affidavits.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (f). . . Thus, defendants’

arguments opposing the factual basis of

plaintiff's Fifth Amendment taking claim

are only unsubstantiated allegation that

cannot support a motion for summary

judgment." (R2-32-4, see also "8", 4. RE).

‘

‘es

"Defendants have failed to offer evidence

showing what property belonged to

plaintiff. Defendants have also failed to

argue or show that if any of plaintiff's

property was retained by defendants..."

(App. M, p. 32a).

The district court's conclusion of law (App. L, p.

23a, Fn. 2):

“While most 5th Amendment takings cases

examine the acquisition of real property, the

protection is afforded the personal property

of citizens as well. Weiner v. Fulton County,

113 Ga. App. 343, 346 (1966)." (See R1-13-7).

Though my pro se facts, evidence, and law, showed the

respondents took the tools of my trade, and the respondents'

“legal arguments and documentation" were found to be

"inadequate", respondents were allowed to prevail.

Set Of Facts #3

On two (2) occasions, the district court found the lawyer's

legal arguments and documentation to be "inadequate" .

(App. K, p. 16a, and App. M, p. 29a, Fn. 1).

rhough "Jones" never contended that the attorney for the

respondents admitted anything (the attorney "stipulated",

morefully shown below), and though "Jones" never has

contended entitlement to judgment based on the terms of the

1985-1989 contracts (it is respondents who alleged that they

are entitled to keep my property based on the terms of the

1985-1989 contracts), the court of appeals affirmed for the

respondents:

"Jones also contends (1) that the attorney

for the County admitted that the 1990

purchase order for Jones’ services had

been approved and (2) that Jones is

entitled to judgment on his’ Fifth

Amendment taking claim based on the

terms of the 1985-1989 contracts. The

record on appeal is not adequate to

enable this Court to review these

challenges to the district court's findings

and holdings. Accordingly, we AFFIRM

as to these issues... (in the absence of a

complete record, the Court cannot

adequately review challenged findings and,

therefore, must affirm)." (App. A, p. 3a).

The lawyer stipulated as an undisputed fact, that the

purchase order requisition was approved (RI - 11 -"B" &

R2-23-5-7, ''9"', Undisputed Fact "7", 7, RE) (See also

Appellees Brief):

"In December, 1989, Clarence Reid, Director

of the Fulton County Public Buildings

approved Purchase Order Requisition,

#14383, to provide...consulting services

by Roland A. Jones..."', and

"The services which Roland A. Jones

provided to Fulton County ... were for the

benefit of ... the Fulton County Public

Buildings Department." R3-41-"E"-3-12).

Set Of Facts #4

Ihe respondents did not dispute pro se's discrimination

claims, brought under the Sth, 13th, 14th Amendments, 42

U.S. C. Sections 1981, 1983, 1985 , 1988, the Civil Rights

Acts of 1866; and did not dispute claim brought under the

i4th and 42 U.S. C. 1983, as they provide for the redress of

deprivation of rights under color of law. Default judgment is

appropriate, as a matter of law.

Set Of Facts #5

lhe district court made the arguments for the lawyer on

3th, Sth and 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal

Protection claims.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

As stated earlier, the pro se questions raised in this petition

are of great importance to the bench and pro se litigants in

the Lith Circuit. The summary judgment adjudicated fewer

than all claims; and is in direct conflict with this Court's

( elotex, and in conflict with summary judgment decisions of

the courts of appeals, itself:

IHRE COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDICATED FEWER

PHAN ALL CLAIMS

[he summary judgment adjudicated fewer than all of my

claims, according to the general rule that:

|Alny order or other form of decision,

however, designated, which adjudicates

fewer than all the claims ... shall not

terminate the action as te any of the claims.

Discrimination Not Adjudicated

The district court and the court of appeals orders do not

show that pro se's discrimination claims, brought under the

Sth, 13th, 14th Amendments, 42 U.S. C. Sections 1981, 1983,

1985 , 1988, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, though found by

the district court as disputed by the respondents (as shown

below), were ever adjudicated.

Government Official(s} Acting Illegally Under

Color Of Law Claim Not Adjudicated

Though both sides submitted "qualified immunity"

arguments, pro and con, (R42 and 44), the district court and

the court of appeals orders do not show that pro se's claim

brought under the 14th and 42 U.S. C. 1983, as they provide

for the redress of deprivation of rights under color of iaw,

was ever adjudicated.

il.

rHE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION ISIN

CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S CELOTEX

CORP. V. CATRETT

[he court of appeals should have granted summary

judgment for pro se, and should not have affirmed summary

judgment for the respondents. On respondents first "bite at

the apple", the district court concluded (App. Kk, p. 16a):

"Defendants response is inadequate .. .for

its failure to address all of plaintiff's claims.”

(R1-8-1, and "3", RE).

On respondents third "bite at the apple", the district

court concluded (App. M, p. 30a, par. 2):

"...the Court again found defendants’...

legal arguments and documentation

inadequate."' (R2-32-3-FN1, and "8",RE).

The court of appeals decision is in conflict with this

Court's Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), 325. In

Celotex, this Court held that summary judgment shall be

granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and

this burden could be met if the moving party demonstrates

"that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-

moving party's case." Id. at 325.

Summary Judgment Should Have Been Granted Pro Se

On The Purchase Order And 5th Amendment Taking

Claim When Summary Judgment Was First Filed

Che Celotex burden was carried by pro se in that it was

demonstrated that the purchase order was approved,

issued, and not paid by the respondents; respondents took

personal property (tools of my trade), used them and

destroyed the balance. Based these, summary judgment

should have been granted pro se, as a matter of law.

Phough this Court's Celotex provides that at this point

the burden shifts to the non-moving party (respondents) to

go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence giving

rise toa triable issue. This was not done by the

respondents where the district court found:

“Defendants response is inadequate.. .for

its failure to address all of plaintiff's claims."

(R1-8-1, and "3", RE).

Summary Judgment Should Have Been Granted

Pro Se When Respondents Did Not Dispute

When the respondents did not dispute, the district court

unfairly made-up arguments for the respondents on my

13th, Sth and 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal

Protection claims. I pray that this Court will agree that it is

not right where the district court scolds respondents’ lawyer

for not making legal arguments,

"Even more surprising, defendants, in their

second attempt. .. argue that the only issue

in this action, despite plaintiff's numerous

constitutional challenges, is whether

nlaintiff ‘has an enforceable public

contract. Almost as if in passing,

defendants argue against all constitutional

challenges in one paragraph by stating

that ‘|t]here is absolutely no proof in the

record to support or sustain plaintiff's

contentions'" (R1-13-5-1, ''7",5, RE).

(App. L, p. 21a),

kk Xe

"Defendants' primary argument in res-

ponse to plaintiff's due process charges

...iS that because plaintiff did not have an

enforceable public contract with the

County. . ."" (R1- 13-8, see also "7", 8, RE).

"Defendants do not even attempt to res-

pond to plaintiff's Ist Amendment claim in

their cross-motion, nor do they include the

claim in their request for summary

judgment" (RI -13-11,"7",11, RE).

(App. L, p. 26a);

while also saying it will not make arguments for "trained

counsel"; then, it makes the arguments for the "trained

counsel"; and then grants the "trained counsel" summary

judgment based on the legal arguments it made, all in the

same order. (App. L, p. 23a-26a). Summary judgment

should have been granted pro se when the district court had

found that the lawyer for the respondents did not dispute the

legal and factual issues of this pro se's constitutional and

statutory claims (App. L, p. 21a).

Il.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS IN CONFLICT WITH

COURT OF APPEALS' OWN DECISIONS

In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court

must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, and make all factual inferences in favor of

that party. WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.

1988); Hairston v. G-ainesville Sun Publ. Co.,9 F.3d 913,918

(lith Cir. 1993). The Court will make credibility

assessments or weigh conflicting evidence. Id. at 919.

"Where a reasonable fact finder may ‘draw more than one

inference from the facts, and that inference creates a

general issue of material fact, then the court should refuse to

grant summary judgment." Id. (quoting Barfield v. Brierton,

883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1989)). Nevertheless, the

Court is required to make only reasonable factual inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party. /rby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949,

953 (11th Cir. 1995). "A genuine issue of material fact does

not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in

its favor."' Haves v. Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995).

CONCLUSION

Since this Court is the creator of Hains and its progenies,

and since the district court and the court of appeals have

refused to honor this Court's Hains, it is incumbent upon

this Court to review my pro Se facts, evidence, and law. Pro

se petitioner respectfully prays that this Court will not allow

the 11th Circuit to bring down the long-stan¢ ing right for a

person to represent his or herself, and will not allow the 11th

Circuit to perpetuate for other pro se petitioners what it has

done tome. Pro se petitioner prays that this Court will

enforces its Hains, Celotex, and Chappell.

This Court, being the Court of last resort, I request that

the Court REVERSE the decision of the court of appeals

which affirms for the respondents, and Grant summary

judgment for pro se; that the respondents be required to

make payment in the full amount of the purchase order for

my work performed in 1990; that the respondents be

required to pay damages for the illegal taking and

destruction of my personal property; and that the

respondents be required to pay damages for discrimination

and other claims that they did not dispute.

Respectfully submitted,

Roland A. Jones, prose

1390 Heatherland Dr.

Atlanta, Georgia 30331

(404) 344-1332

APPENDIX A- COURT OF APPEALS ORDER, DATED

JULY 14, 1995.

{DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-8112

Non-Argument Calendar

D. C. Docket No. 1:91-CV-78-MHS

ROLAND A. JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FULTON COUNTY, FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS,-DEPARTMENT OF.PUBLIC

BUILDINGS, MICHAEL j. LOMAX, GORDON L.

JOYNER, ROBERT J. REGUS, FRANK M.

BOCKMAN, ROLAND B. WELMAKER,

JACQUELINE S. GROOVER, Assistant Staff Counsel,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

(July 14, 1995)

Before BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and

JOHNSON, Senior circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In January 1991, Roland A. Jones brought this suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West 1994) against Fulton

County, the Board of Commissioners of Fulton County, the

Department of Public Buildings, Michael J. Lomax, Gordon

L. Joyner, Robert J. Regus, Frank W. Bockman, Roland B.

Welmaker, and Jacqueline S. Groover (collectively,

Appellees"), alleging civil rights violations related to Jones

1985-1989 contracts with the County and to the County's

nonpayment for services Jones rendered from January 1990

to June 1990. Specifically, Jones alleged violations of the

First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as

well as violations of the Fulton County Minority Enterprise

Program.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In

June 1991, the district court granted Appellees' motion for

summary judgment on Jones' Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment due process and equal protection claims and on

his Thirteenth Amendment involunts;y servitude claim.

The district court denied Jones' motion for summary

judgment as to these claims. Remaining were Jones' First

Amendment claim (alleging that Appellees suppressed his

right to petition the government for redress of his

grievances) and his Fifth Amendment takings claim. In

September 1994, a bench trial was held on the remaining

claims, and judgment was entered for Appellees.

On appeal, Jones contends that (1) the district court

exhibited bias against him because of his pro se status; and

(2) the district court erred in denying his motions for

Summary judgment on his First Amendment claim and his

due process claim.! After careful review of the record, we

conclude that these contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

1 Jones alse contends (1) that the attorney for the County admitted that

the 1990 purchase order for Jones’ services had been approved and (2)

that Jones is entitled to judgment on his Fifth Amendment takings claim

based on the terms of the 1985-1989 contracts. The record on appeal is

not adequate to enable this Court to review these challenges to the

district court's findings and holdings. Accordingly, we AFFIRM as to

these issues. See United States v.- Dallas County Commission, 739 F.2d

1529, 1539-40 (lith Cir. 1985) (in the absence of a complete record, the

Court cannot adequately review challenged findngs and, therefore,

must affirm).

APPENDIX B- COURT OF APPEALS DENIAL OF

PETITION FOR REHEARING, -D*.TED OCTOBER 25,

1995.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ROLAND A. JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FULTON COUNTY, FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS,-DEPARTMENT OF.PUBLIC

BUILDINGS, MICHAEL j. LOMAX, GORDON L.

JOYNER, ROBERT J. REGUS, FRANK M.

BOCKMAN, ROLAND B. WELMAKER,

JACQUELINE S. GROOVER, Assistant Staff Counsel,

Defendants-Appellees

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

ee re a ew ww www we ee we ee

BEFORE: BIRCH and BILACK, Circuit Judges, and

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The petition(s) for rehearing filed by Appellant,

ROLAND JONES, is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE ORD-41

APPENDIX C- AFFIDAVIT OF MR. CLARENCE

REID, AFRIG A*!-AMERICAN DIRECTOR OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

ROLAND A. JONES

Plaintiff,

VS. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:91-CV-0078-MHS

Fulton County, et. al.

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:91-cv-0078-M HS

AFFIDAVIT OF MR. CLARENCE REID

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA

COMES NOW CLARENCE REID who under oath

deposes and states as follows:

That lam Clarence Reid and the facts contained herein are

true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

As the Director of the Department of Public Buildingst

Fulton County,v Georgia,, Mr. Roland A. JoLnes worked

under my guidance and supervision from August 28, 1985, to

December 31, 1989.

During the above periodp I was not, in any way,

dissatisfied with the services provided io my department by

Mr. Jones.

As I have previously stated on November 15th 1990, |

approved the continued services of Mr. Roland A. Jones for

calendar year 1990. I also instructed Mr. Welmaker to

execute my approval.

s/ Clarence Reid

Sworn to and subscribed before me

this Sth day of July, 1991.

s/ Gale Ward

Notary Public.

My Commission expires March 7, 1994

[FULTON COUNTY SEAL}

APPENDIX D—- FULTON COUNTY PURCHASE ORDER

REQUISITION DATED JANUARY 11, 1990.

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APPENDIX E-- AFFIDAVIT, MRS. CORNICK

AFFIDAVIT

As an Administrative Assistant III for the Fulton County

Public Buildings Department (5/86 through 11/92) my

primary responsibilites were to process all paperwork

related to contract. To the best of my knowledge, I recall

submitting the required paperwork to the Fulton County

Purchasing Department for the issuance of a purchase order

to Roland A. Jones d/b/a J.A.R. to be effective January 1,

1990. This action was requested by an authorized staff

member, Roland Bernard Welmaker, and was routine in

nature. Purchase orders were approved by the Purchasing

Agent (approval by the County Manager and/or Board of

Commissioners was not required). Once a purchase order

was generated, a receiving form was issued to the Public

Buildings Department. The _ receiving report was to

accompany contractor’ s invoices for paymeny as approved

by the Public Buildings Department.

Presently, | am a Contracting Officer for the Fulton

County Purchasing Department. Although the way

contracts are processed for Fulton County has been revised,

the purchasing department is _ still a part of the contract

process.

s/ Shelandra P. Cornick

Shelandra P. Cornick

Minnie Manuel

Notary Public

July 25, 1994

Commission FE xpires: 03-02-97

[FULTON COUNTY SEAL]

APPENDIX F-- FULTON COUNTY

RECEIVING

REPORT/PURCHASE ORDER DATED JANUARY 19,

1990.

ROG IC: AMSO641

RR NO

PG NO: 9014383

VENOOR NO: JARBSOOOB9OP

VENDOR NAME: ROLAND A JONES DBA vsR

ADDRESS: 7390 HEATHERLAND DR

FULTON COUNTs

RECEIVING RFPORT

DATE: 01/39/90 -

PAGE :

PO NC: SC 520 9014383

Rx NO: RX 520

REQUESTED BY

ORG NO: 5201

ORG NAME: PUBLIC BUILDINGS - A

PHONE :

DEt DATE: 12/31/90

SHIP 10: PSU FOB:

DEL. BLOG/RM:

PUBLIC BUILDINGS

RESPONSIBLE PERSON: BERNARD WELMAKER

ATLANTA GA

CONTACT: ROLAND A JONES

PHONE ND: 404-344-1332

BUYER: 74

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

ORO LN ONTY ORD OnTy REC ONTY GUT UNIT 1/D UNIT COST TOT COST COMMODITY CODE

00% 28 .008 .000 28008 .600 1.000 28008 .00 96 120000090

DESCRIPTION: MISCELLANEOUS PROFESSIONAL SERVICES P/F TEXT Ofy REC REC DATE

CONSULTING (NOT OTHERWISE CLASSIFIED)

THIS PURCHASE ORDER [5 NOY TO EXCEEO 28,008.00 FOR THE

vYEAR OF 1990.

THIS PURCHASE ORDER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER OF OR

AGREEMENT By FULTON COUNTY TO PURCHASE GOOOS AND/OR

SERVICES FOR TOTAL CONSIDERATION OF ANY SPECIFIC AMOUNT

WHATSOEVER. TH HA Aut PAYMENT FOR

GOODS ORDERED AND/OR SERVICES REQUESTED Sv THE PUBLIC BLOGS

DEPT. - OF FULTON ¥ AR YEAR OF 1990;

PROVIDED. HOWEVER, THAT THE TOTAL COST OF ALL GOOOS AND/OR

SERVICES REQUESTED HEREUNDER SHALL NOT EXCEED THE AGGREGATE

TOTAL OF 28,008.00 WITHOUT ISSUSANCE BY FULTON COUNTY PURCHAS-

ING DEPARTMENT OF A WRITTEN CHANGE ORDE®

ALL ORDERS PLACED AND/OR SERVICES REQUESTED HEREUNDER ARE

SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION AND OELIVERY MUST BE CONFI2MED IN

WRITING BY AN AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL OF THE PUBLIC BLOGS. DEPT

OF FULTON COUNTY.

TO BE FURNISHED AS CALLED FOR DURING THE YEAR 12990.

PLEASE RETURN THIS COMPLETED FORM TO MATERIEL CONTROL

RECEIVED Sr _ ACCEPTEO BY: ENTERED Br:

DaTE: | je cate: / Jf

DATE: _/ /

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o2 153.)

BGEST AVAILABLE COPY

10a

APPENDIX-G AFFIDAVIT, MRS. RENEE

DUCKWORTH, DATED JULY 5, 1991.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

ROLAND A. JONES

Plaintiff,

VS. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:91-cv-0078-MHS

Fulton County, et. al.

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF MRS. RENEE DUCKWORTH

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC BUILDINGST JUNE 1984

TO AUGUST 1990 FULTON COUNTY GEORGIA

COMES NOW RENEE DUCKWORTH who under oath

deposes and states as follows:

That lam Renee Duckworth and the facts contained herein

are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

As the Program Coordinator and supervisor for the day to

day operation of the department's automated data

management systems during all of the time that Mr. Roland

A. Jones was employed by the department, I worked closely

with him ona day to day basis.

& R

During all of the years that I worked with Mr. Jonesr I was

never dissatisfied with his work and I did not file any

complaints concerning his work with Mr. Clarence Reid,

11a

Mr. Frank Bockman, Mr. Bernard Welmaker,. or Mr.

William Ruby.

During 1990, Mr. Bockman, Mr. Welmaker, and Mr.

Ruby, by way of my reports to themr had full knowledge

that Mr. Jones was providing services on a regular basis. |

am also aware of facts concerning the approval of his

services for 1990.

The department owned all of the Rbase software, and I was

responsible for the accountability for this software.

However, the programs for the specialized application

software, such as the Work Order System,, the Finance and

Accounting System, the Electronics Maintenance System,,

the Project Management System, the Parking Control

System, the Vehicle Control and Maintenance, the Time and

Expense System, among others, were designed, developed,

and produced by Mr. Roland A. Jones. To the best of my

knowledge, Mr. Jones never gave ownership of his

application software to the department. His Logo (JAR)

always appeared on the screen of each department computer

when the power was turned on.

/s Renee Duckworth

Renee Duckworth

Sworn and subscribed before me

this 5 day of July, 1991.

/s Ruby C. Murry

Notary Public

Notary Public, Dekalb County, Georgia

My Comnission experies June 27, 1992

[DEKALB COUNTY SEAL]

APPENDIX H— AFFIDAVIT, OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR

WILLIAM RUBY, DENNIS BARNES, AND MRS.

RENEE DUCKWORTH, STATUS OF MY PERSONAL

PROPERTY AS OF OCTOBE

;

ae ‘, atiPee <!j.- at) ’ [2% Se lcltp et le as 6£) TOs EP >

, JASSETS/ {MAINT [INVENTORE|PARKING |PROJECT |PERSONNEL|

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TROT|BY PUBLIC | TROYED /|TROYED/TROYED| TROTED |BY PUBLIC|BY PUBLIC/BY PUBLIC|BY PUBLIC{BY PUBLIC|BY PUBLIC]

USED BY IED. IBOILDINGS.| BY PUB-|BY PUB/BY PUB] BY PUS- 1BLDGS. {BLDGS. 1BLDGS. 1BLDGS.

ROLAED ad ' ' LIC. {LIC Ic) 0O 4 «XLIC i

BLOGS. IBLDGS. IBLDGS.! BLOGS, |

COMPUTER |DES-|DESTROYED Des- |

USED BY j|TROY/BY PUBLIC | TROYED |

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ISK ON COMPUTER USED BY ROLAND A. JONES WAS REFORMATTED.

A. JONES. FPULCO RETAINED POSSESSION OF COP’ [FULTON COUNTY SEAL |

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13a

APPENDIX I- REDACTED GEORGIA LAW ON

PURCHASE ORDERS

408

PART I -TITLE VI-GENERAL CIVIL AND PENAL

LAW

County Purchasing Department Created.

COUNTY PURCHASING DEPARTMENT

CREATED.

No. 426.

An Act to create and establish a Purchasing Department in

all counties of this State having a population of twe hundred

thousand or more by the United State census of 1940 or by

any future United States census; to authorize the

employment in such counties of a County Purchasing Agent;

to fix his bond, compensation and terms of office; to define

his duties; to provide for the employment by the county

authorities of such assistants to the County Purchasing

Agent as may be necessary to maintain and carry out the

functions of a county purchasing department; to provide for

the filling of vacancies in the office hereby created; and for

other purposes.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of

Georgia and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same:

kkkk

412

Section Il. No expenditure for work, labor, supplies,

materials or equipment under contract shall be made unless

the necessity thereof be certified to by the agency for the use

of which they are intended. All purchases made by the

County Purchasing Agent shall be made upon the receipt of

requisitions signed by such officers and employees of the

Ilda

several agencies of the county as may be designated for that

purpose by the Board of Commissioners of Roads or other

county authority.

APPENDIX J-NOVEMBER 24, 1990, RESPONDENT

FRANK BOCKMAN, IN ATLANTA JOURNAL-

CONSTTi U7VION, STATING PURCHASE ORDERS DO

NOT REQUIRE BOARD OF COMMISSION APPFE-9OVAL

AT NOVEMBER 24, 1990 seo

Fulton: Some officials, other bidders raise questions

> Conunued from Ai

Mr. Elder did not return nu-

merous phone calls this week.

Craft, which cleans several

county buildings, has been han-

dling Government Center for

more than a year while the coun

ty prepared to take bids on the

work.

Commissioners Tom Lowe

and Gordon L. Joyner — and at

least three of the bidders that lost

out on the job — have questioned

the manner in which Craft won

the work.

Mr. Joyner called the selec-

tion process “improper and a ter-

rible way to run a county govern-

ment. A $1 million contract is

something that this board should

have come before it. That's not a

decision that should be made at

the staff level.”

Dust-Away Inc. of Atlants. a

losing bidder on the Government

Center job, told county officials

in a letter that Craft was “a

shocking choice.”

“We call for c correction of

the process which could allow

such a breach of the public trust

as this situation,” said the Nov. 5

letter, signed by three Dust

Away officials.

Although the county adver-

used for bids on Government

Center, county staff members

handled the selection without

putting the matter to the com-

mission for a vote Craft's fee.

Craft is owned by John Eider, president, and his wife, Erma,

who is listed es chief executve officer and regsiered agent.

Craft specializes in cleaning and maintaining public buildings,

> Fulton County's sicohol-vrestrnent center.

> The central Adanta-Fulton Courity Library downtown.

> The new Fulton County Government Center.

About 40 Craft employees have worked at Government Center

| since R opened tast year. Craft is paid about $85,843 per month for

the work, or slightly more than $1 million a year.

$85,843 a month, was the highest

of 11 proposals, according to

county Purchasing Department

records.

Craft's bid offered three cost

options — a “basic”

with the minimal services the

county asked for, and two option-

al packages offering more ser-

vices at higher prices

Craft's “basic” b bid was for

$64,392 monthly — the highest

basic bid submitted by the 11

contractors. The low basic bid,

$31,896, was submitted by Com-

mercial Office Maintenance

Corp. The county opted for

Craft's middle bid, records show.

The agreement covers 12

months, with renewal options for

another 24 months, giving it a

value of $1,030,116 for the first

year and a total of $3,090,348

awarded through a purchase or-

der, bypassing the commission.

County Attorney Elizabeth F.

Long said she has not researched

the law governing the county's

selection of services of this kind,

but she believes the county

should n « have awarded such a

substantial amount of public

money without commissioners’

approval.

“They never put that much

out without (bids|,” she said.

Fulton's director of public

buildings, Frank Bockman, said

his selection committee recom-

mended that the purchasing de-

partment award the job to Craft

— despite the higher price — be-

cause the company was judged

best able to meet the committee's

excellent job ™ the building so

far,” Mr. Bockman said, adding

that the company will continue

on a month-to-month basis until

the issue is resolved

l6a

APPENDIX K- DISTRICT COURT ORDER # 1, DATED

JUNE 24, 1991.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

ROLAND A, JONES,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION

¥. 1:91-CV-78-MHS

FULTON COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

Presently before the Court are plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment and defendants' cross-moiion for

summary judgment. Inthis 1983 action plaintiff claims that

defendants refuse to compensate him for consulting services

he performed for defendant Fulton County (the "County")

from January 1990 to May 1990 in violation of his rights

under the Sth, 13th, and 14th Amendments to the

Constitution. In response to plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment, defendants filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment with only a one page memorandum of law

containing string citations concerning whether plaintiff had

an enforceable public contract with the County. Defendants

failed to outline for the Court the material facts which they

contend are not in dispute.

Defendants response is inadequate not only for its failure

to address all of plaintiff's claims, but because it fails to

comply with the Locai Rules. Both a movant for summary

judgment and a respondent must file, in addition to a motion

and a memorandum of law, "a separate and concise

statement of the material facts to which he contends there is

no genuine issue to be tried." Local Rule 220-5(b).

Defendants' belief that plaintiff's claims are meritless does

not relieve them of the duty to comply with the rules of this

Court. In addition, failure to address the legal and factual

issues in this action may result in judgment being entered

against defendants.

Accordingly, the Court DEFERS RULING on plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment, STRIKES defendants'

cross-motion for summary judgment, and DIRECTS

defendants to refile their motion for summary judgment and

supporting memorandum in compliance with the Local

Rules within 10 days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of June , 1991.

s/ Marvin H. Shoob

Marvin H. Shoob, Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of Georgia

18a

APPENDIX L- DISTRICT COURT ORDER # 2, DATED

MARCH 27, 1992.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

ROLAND A. JONES,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION

1:91-CV-0078-MHS

FULTON COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

Plaintiff brings this S 1983 action pro se alleging several

constitutional violations stemming from his association with

defendant Fulton County Department of Public Buildings

(‘the Department"). Presently before the Court are cross-

motions for summary judgment as well as plaintiff's motion

for entry of default judgment and motion to strike. For the

reasons stated below, the Court will deny plaintiff's request

for summary judgment, will grant in part and deny in part

defendants' motion for summary judgment, and will deny

plaintiff's -motion for default and motion to strike.

I. Background

On August 28, 1985, plaintiff Roland A. Jones entered into

a contract with defendant Fulton County (''the County") to

provide maintenance, training, and related services to the

Department's Computer Office Automation Information

System. The contract was for the period July 2, 1985,

through December 31, 1985. Through a series of three other

19a

contracts, plaintiff continued providing his consulting and

training services to the Department up through December

31, 1987. Plaintiff did not perform any services for the

County in 1988, but on April 12, 1989, he entered into a

contract with the County to provide consulting services for

the Department for the period January 1, 1989, through

December 31, 1989. All of the contracts between plaintiff

and the County were approved by the Board of

Commissioners of Fulton County ("the Board"') and entered

on its minutes.

Plaintiff claims that he performed substantial services for

the Department on behalf of the County during the period

January 2, 1990, to May 2, 1990, for which he has not been

compensated. After several attempts to resolve this matter

with the Director of Public Buildings for Fulton County,

defendant Frank Bockman ("Bockman"), plaintiff

contacted certain county commissioners to obtain a hearing

before the Board. A hearing was never held and the

Assistant Staff Counsel for the County, defendant

Jacqueline S. Groover ("Groover"), informed plaintiff on

October 5, 1990, that any work he performed in 1990 was

unauthorized and considered "strictly voluntary" in

nature.

Plaintiff filed this action against the County; the Board;

the Department; Michael J. Lomax ("Lomax"),

commissioner and Chairman of the Board; Gordon L.

Joyner ("Joyner"), Commissioner; Robert J. Regus

("Regus"), Acting County Manager; Bockman; Roland B.

Welmaker (''Welmaker''), Deputy Director of the

Department; and Groover for violations of the Ist, 5th , 13th,

and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, as

well as for violations of the Fulton County Minority

Business Enterprise Program. On February 1, 4991,

plaintiff filed a motion for summary Judgment on his Sth,

13th, and 14th Amendment claim. A later supplement to his

motion added the ist Amendment claim to plaintiff's request

for sum n?ry judgment.

By Order dated June 24, 1991, the Court found

defendants' responsive cross-motion for summary judgment

inadequate because it failed to outline the material facts that

defendants contend are not in dispute and because it did not

respond to each claim contained in plaintiff's request for

summary judgment. The Court ordered the Clerk to strike

defendant's cross-motion and directed defendants to refile.

Defendants refiled their Motion for Summary Judgment on

July 2, 1991. Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion

and moved to strike portions of the motion for summary

judgment.

II. Discussion

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact genuine issue as to any

material fact ... and the moving party is entitled to

judgment asa matter of law." In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317 (1986), the Supreme Court held that this burden

could be met if the moving party demonstrates "that there is

an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's

case." Id. at 325. At that point the burden shifts to the non-

moving party to go beyond the pleadings and present

specific evidence giving rise toa triable issue. The Court,

however, must construe the evidence and all inferences

drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (lth

Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Moreover, because the

summary judgment standard mirrors that required for a

directed verdict, summary judgment is not appropriate

unless, "under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict."" Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted).

21a

The Court finds that neither side has successfully

presented its argument for summary judgment. Plaintiff's

presentation contains numerous exhibits concerning the

factual allegations in his complaint, yet he presents no

arguments for his right to judgment as a matter of law on

any of his claims. Even more su rprising, defendants, in their

second attempt at summary judgment, argue that the only

issue in this action, despite plaintiff's numerous

constitutional challenges, is whether plaintiff has an

enforceable public contract. Almost as if in passing,

defendants argue against all constitutional challenges in one

paragraph by stating that 1 1(t}here is absolutely no proof on

the record to support or sustain plaintiff's contentions."

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Siimmary Judgment at 4.1 In an effort to reach final

disposition of this action, the Court will address the

adequacy of each of plaintiff's claims below in its ruling on

the cross-motions.

A. 5th Amendment Takings claim

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his Sth

Amendment claim that defendants "seized upon the pretext

of declaring (his) services as ‘strictly voluntary' and took

[his] property (computer application software, database

structure, related computer reports, data entry, edit,

retrieval, and posting, forms, and communication softwa re)

1 The Court finds the parties’ attempt at summary disposition of this

matter at this point without more adequate and appropriate argument

and documentation to be a waste of judicial time and resources . Even in

light of plaintiff Is Pro se status, and particularly with trained counsel

representing defendants, the Court will not be put in the position of

making the legal arguments for any party to an action.

for public use without due process and compensation-" In

response, .Jefendants argue summarily that plaintiff has no

evidence that his personal property has been taken by the

County and submit the affidavit of defendant Bockman

testifying that plaintiff removed all of his personal property

from the Department and that the County is not in

possession of any of plaintiff's belongings. In addition,

Bockman states that the County purchased the RBase

database management system which was used by plaintiff in

performing his contractual obligations. Affidavit of Frank

Bockman at 2.

In response, plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of Renee

Duckworth ("Duckworth") who, during the time period in

question, was the supervisor of the Department's automated

data management systems. She states that while the

Department owned all of the RBase software,

the programs for the specialized

application of software, such as the

Work order System, the Finance and

Accounting System, the Electronics

Maintenance System, the Project

Management System, the Parking Control

System, the Vehicle Control and

Maintenance, the Time and Expense

System, among others, were designed,

developed, and produced by Mr. Roland A.

Jones. To the best of my knowledge, Mr.

Jones never gave ownership of his

application software to the department.

His logo (JAR) always appeared on the

screen of each department computer when

the power was turned on.

Affidavit of Mrs. Renee Duckworth, Department of Public

Buildings, June 1984 to August 1990, Fulton County

Georgia, at 1-2.

After review of the affidavits submitted by the parties, it is

apparent that many of the facts material toa determination

of whether the personal property2 of plaintiff was taken

without just compensation are in dispute. Accordingly, the

Court will deny both parties' motions for summary

judgment on the Sth Amendment issue.

B. 13th Amendment Involuntary Servitude Claim

One of plaintiff's primary arguments is that the County's

admission that plaintiff's work with the Department in 1990

was "strictly voluntary," is conclusive evidence of a

violation of the 13th Amendment's prohibition against

involuntary servitude. Defendants move for summary

judgment on the 13th Ainendment claim on the grounds that

there is no evidence that plaintiff was forced into

involuntary servitude.

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to show both that

he was forced to work without pay during 1990 and that he

was unable to cease working at his own volition. "Inability

to avoid continued service is the essential ingredient of

involuntary servitude." Family Div. of Trial Lawyers vy.

Mouttrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The fact that

plaintiff performed services without pay does not

Automatically amount to involuntary servitude.

Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion for

2 While most 5th Amendment takings cases examine the acquisition

of real property, the protection is afforded the personal property of

citizens aswell. Weiner v. Fulton County, 113Ga. App. 343, 346 (1966).

summary judqment on the 13th Amendment claim and

will grant defendants’ motion for the same.

C. Sth and 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal

Protection claims.

Plaintiff claims that defendants violated the Sth and the

14th Amendments by unilaterally declaring his services

voluntary and by not permitting plaintiff to appear before

the Board to discuss his services. Defendants’ primary

argument in response to plaintiff's due process charges,

although not articulated as a due process argument in their

papers, is that because piaintiff did not have an enforceable

public contract with the County, he did not possess a

property interest protected by the Sth and 14th

Amendments. Plaintiff acknowledges there was not a public

contract and points to a purchase order signed by the Deputy

Director, defendant Welmaker, authorizing plaintiff's

services. In any event, plaintiff argues that an implied

contract existed between the parties that should be honored

by the Court.

Essential to a claim of denial of due process is infringement

of a property or liberty interest. In order for the Court to

find a property interest in plaintiff's services for the County,

plaintiff must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement"

supported by contract or state law. Board of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972). Georgia law

provides that '(a] county is not liable to suit for any cause of

action unless made so by statute." O.C.G.A. S 36-1-4 (1987).

With regard to suits on contract, 11(ajll contracts entered

into by the county governing authority with other persons in

behalf of the county shall be in writing and entered on its

minutes."" O.C.G.A. S 36- 10-1 (1987). Such a matter,

therefore, must be passed upon by the legislative body and

spread upon the minutes of that body. Overlin v. Boyd, 598

F.2d 423, 424 (Sth Cir. 1979); Wilson v. Strange, 235 Ga. 156

25a

(1975).

A county contract otherwise valid is not rendered void by

not being entered on the record, rather it is unenforceable

until it is recorded and mandamus will lie to require its

recording. PMS Construction Co. v. DeKalb County, 243 Ga.

870, 871 (1979). In addition, a plaintiff must prove an

express contract with a county in order to recover for

breach of contract and no recovery may be had for an

implied contract. Id. at 872.

It is undisputed that no contract between plaintiff and the

County exists on the Board minutes.3 The Court is

compelled to find that plaintiff does not have an enforceable

contract with the County and, therefore, do not possess a

protected property right under the Sth and 14th

Amendments. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment on these claims and will

grant defendants' motion.

D. Ist Amendment Right to Petition the Government

it appears that plaintiff's Ist Amendment claim consists of

allegations that defendants Joyner, Lomax, and Groover

took action to suppress plaintiff's Ist Amendment right to

petition the government for redress of his grievances.

Plaintiff sent letters to Joyner and Lomax requesting that he

3 The parties do dispute whether a purchase order for plaintiff's

services was entered in January 1990. However, should plaintiff wish to

enforce this purchase order, he must either amend his complaint to seek

mandamus for entry of the agreement on the minutes, or pursue a

separate action for mandamus in state court. PMS, 243 Ga. at 872. If

plaintiff succeeds in having his contract entered on the minutes, he

could then seek restitution fer the value of materials furnished and

services rendered. Id. at 872-73.

26a

be placed on the Board's agenda to discuss payment for his

services. In addition, he requested ir. writing to county

Manager Regus that he be placed on the Board agenda.

Defendant Groover, and later County Attorney Elizabeth

Long, eventually informed plaintiff that his only avenue of

relief was through the Court.

in plaintiff's supplement to his motion for summary

judgment, he argues for summary judgment on the Ist

Amendment claim by merely stating as follows:

While a hearing before the (Board) can

only be obtained through Board members

or the County Manager, and though due

process before the (Board) was promised

on November 27, 1990, and was

subsequently requested through a Board

member three times, and one time through

the County Manager, due process and my

right to petition the government were

illegally denied by a staff advisor who

was not empowered to govern in Fulton

County.

Plaintiff's Supplement to Motion for Summary Judgment

at 2 (citations omitted). Defendants do not even attempt to

respond to plaintiff's ist Amendment claim in their cros

motion, nor do they include the claim in their request for

summary judgment.

Based on the insufficient argument presented by all

parties, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that

plaintiff was denied his rights to petition the goverrmen for

redress of his grievances. In fact, it appears that _ plaintiff

did in fact petition the County and certainly has exercised

his right of access to the courts in filing the present action.

See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.517, 104S.Ct. 3194 (1984).

27a

Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff's request for

summary judgmerton his lst Amendment claim.

Ill. Conclusion

Although some of plaintiff's claims have been disposed of

by this order, it is obvious to the Court that thisisa matter in

which the parties should attempt to reach a__ reasonable

settlement of the remaining claims. The Court suggests that

the parties consider submitting this matter to a Court

appointed arbitrator/mediator for consideration. The

presence of trained and objective third party may assist the

parties in reaching a just resolution.

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES

plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [#4-1] and

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants’

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (#10-1}. In addition,

the Court DENIES plaintiff's Motion to Strike [011-1] and

Motion fox Entry of Default [#12-1]. The Court DIRECTS

the parties to submit their positions on the possibility of

arbitration in this matter to the Court within 20 days of the

date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 27th day of March, 1992.

s \ Marvin H. Shoob.

Marvin H. Shoob

Senior United States District Court Judge

Northern District of Georgia

28a

APPENDIX M— DISTRICT COURT ORDER & 3.

DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1993.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

ROLAND A. JONES,

Plantiff

CIVIL ACTION

V. 1:91-cv-0078-MHS

FULTON COUNTY etal,

Defendants,

ORDER

This matter is before the (ourt on defendants’ third

motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs renewed motion

for summary judgment, and several miscellaneous motions.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies

defendants' motion and denies plaintiff's motion.

Background

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action in

January 1991 under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging several

constitutional violations stemming from his association with

defendant Fulton County Department of Public Buildings

("the Department"). From 1985 until 1989, plaintiff

entered into a series of annual contracts with defendant

Fulton County to provide maintenance, training, and

related services to the Department's Computer Office

Automation Information System. Plaintiff claims that in

1990 he performed substantial services for the county under

a purchase order. He was never compensated for those

services. Plaintiff also alleges that Fulton County took

without compensation his compuier software and his

29a

computer application software.

On February 1, 1991, plaintiff filed a motion for summary

judgment on his Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth

Amendment claims. In a later supplement to his motion, he

added his First Amendment claims to the motion.

Defendants filed a responsive cross-motion for summary

judqment which the Court denied on June 24, 1991, as

inadequate because defendants failed to outline the material

facts that they contended were not in dispute and because

defendants did not respond to each claim in plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment. With permission of the

Court, defendants refiled on July 2, 1991, and plaintiff

responded.

in its Order of March 27, 1992, the Court granted

defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's

claim that he was deprived of his property without due

process when the County failed to pay him for services he

claimed he provided under the purchase order. The Court

also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff's claim under the Thirteenth Amendment that the

County's refusal to pay for his services constituted

involuntary servitude. The Court, however, denied

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's

claim that defendants unlawfully took his personal property

without compensation and on plaintiff's First Amendment

claim. The Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment on each of the claims. In summary, following the

Court's ruling, on plaintiff's Fifth Amendment takings

claim and his First Amendment claim remain in this action. |

{ Although the Court ruled on several of the issues raised by the

parties, the Court again found defendants’ and plaintiff,’s legal

arguments and documentation inadequate. See March 27,1992 Order.

en ens

30a

At the request of the Court, the parties submitted the

dispute to a mediator but were unable to reach a resolution.

The Court then permitted the parties to conduct more

discovery and file new motions for summary judgment on

the remaining issues. These motions are presently before the

Court.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

At the outset, the Court notes that in their third motion for

summary judgment, defendants again fail to comply with

the rules of this Court. Any motion that includes allegations

of fact must include supporting affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

(e), (f) ; Local Rule 220-1, 220-5 (b) (3) ("All document and

record material relied on by a party .. . shall be clearly

identified for the Court."") Defendants refer repeatedly to

the sworn statements of Clarence Reid and Dennis Burns,

yet defendants fail to attach these statements or any other

evidence to their motion. Thus, defendants' arguments

opposing the factual basis of plaintiff's Fifth Amendment

takings claim are only unsubstantiated allegations that

cannot support a motion for summary judgment. The Court

will, however, briefly address defendants' substantive

arguments on this issue.

The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment

prohibits private property from being taken for public use

without just compensation, and the Fifth Amendment

applies to state or local action through the Fourteenth

Amendment. Rymer v. Douglas County , 764 F.2d 796, 800

(ith Cir. 1985). A permanent physical occupation of

property through some _ state usage, absent a formal

proceeding, may also be a taking. Id. (citing Loretto V.

Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).

The Fifth Amendment, however, does not protect

individuals from the arbitrary use of government power.

Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,

164 (1980).

31a

Plaintiff contends that defendants took h‘s oftware,

computer application software, database structure, related

computer reports, data entry forms, and communication

software without compensation. Defendants argue that

plaintiff removed all of his personal property from the

department and that the County was not in possession of any

of plaintiffs belongings. Defendants also argue that the

contracts under which plaintiff worked conferred on him no

property interest in the systems he designed.

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no

genuine issue as to any material fact... and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the Supreme Court

held that this burden could be met if the moving party

demonstrates that there is "an absence of evidence to

support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. At that

point, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to go

beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence giving

rise to a triable issue. Id. at 324.

The Court, however, must construe the evidence and all

inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. WSB-TV v. Lee, 842

F.2d 1266, 1270 (llth Cir. 1988). Moreover, because the

summary judgment standard mirrors that required for a

judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is not

appropriate unless “under the governing law, there can be

but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation

omitted).

Defendants allege that, under the contracts, plaintiff

agreed to design and implement certain computer systems

and that plaintiff had no property rights in what he

nr ae

32a

developed on the job. Plaintiff offers evidence, however,

that he brought in specialized software to assist in designing

these programs and that software and the other items are

still in} defendants' possession. (See Duckworth Aff.)

Defendants have failed to offer evidence showing what

property belonged to plaintiff. Defendants have also failed

to argue or show that if any of plaintiff's property was

retained by defendants, the holding of plaintiff's property

was an arbitrary act of a county employee and was not done

pursuant to some implied county authorization. In light of

the conflicting evidence on plaintiff's Fiith Amendment

claim, summary judgment is not appropriate.

Plaintiff Is Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff's "Motion to Renew Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment" raises again several issues disposed of

by the Court in its March 27, 1992, Order. For instance,

plaintiff argues again that he should recover for the services

he provided under the 1990 purchase order although the

Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment

on that issue. Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on his

Fifth Amendment claim that defendants took his personal

property -- certain computer pruperty — without

compensation. Again, however, plaintiff has failed to

produce evidence showing that there is no disputed issue of

fact as to whether defendants improperly retained

plaintiff's property. Accordingly, the Court denies

plaintiffs motion to renew his motion for summary

judgment.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS plaintiff's unopposed motion to

maintain case as originally filed, that is as a non-jury case

C#19]; DENIES AS MOOT plaintiff's motion to defer

discovery C#20); and DENIES plaintiff's motion to compel a

response from defendant Fulton County Board of

Commissioners. The Court GRANTS plaintiff's motion to

withdraw plaintiff's motion to compel [#27-1) and

accordingly WITHDRAWS plaintiff's motion to compel

C#24). The Court DENIES plaintiff's motion to strike two

depositions [#27-2]; because those depositions were not

submitted to the Court, there is no need to strike them.

Finally, the Court DENIES plaintiff's renewed motion for

summary judgment [#22] and DENIES defendants' motion

for summary judgment C#23). The Court DIRECTS the

parties to file their pretrial order within thirty days of this

order. The Court DIRECTS the parties to file no further

motions for summary judgment.

The Court DIRECTS plaintiff to correspond with the

Court only by motion and to cease sending copies of his

correspondence with defendants' counsel to the Court. The

Court DIRECTS both parties to comply with all orders of

the Court and the Local Rules. Failure to comply will result

in dismissal of this action or striking of defendants' answer.

IT ISSO ORDERED, this 30th day of September,

1993.

s/ Marvin H. Shoob

Marvin H. Shoob, Senior Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of Georgia

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.