Opposition Brief — Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais

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No. 04-1072

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RAYMOND ABRAMS, NICOLE BE SILBERKLEIT,

JANET HERMAN, LILY REDNER, BERNARD CARON,

ERNEST HAAR, HARRY CYBULSKI, YVONNE LITMAN,

CASSANDRA KIRBY CONAHAY FREUND, JEAN-JACQUES

FRAENKEL, LILIANE LICHTENSTEIN

and MARIE WEINRAUCH,

Petitioners,

v:

SOCIETE NATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER FRANCAIS,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD*

LinDA J. SILBERMAN

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012-1099

(212) 998-6208

* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Respondents

193083 ce

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does immunity from suit in United States courts

conferred on instrumentalities of a foreign state by the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 apply to claims

based on conduct prior to passage of the Act?

ii

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6

Respondent Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer

Francais (SNCF) is a corporation formed under the Laws of

France, with the task of operating the French railway and

associated facilities. All of the stock of SNCF is owned by

the French Republic.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...........0--2000:.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6 ......

pi Re eo bk i. 3 > i erie

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............

77 was a 6 Oy” » Rea a ee

ere ae ee eee

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................

ee eee ee ee ee eee

I.

Il.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY

APPLIED THE ALTMANN DECISION TO

0 Oe rT er re reer ee

A. This Court’s Decision Left No Room for

Misund@standing .................

B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied

the Judgment in A/tmann to the Present

a ee eer Pere

THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR

PETITIONERS’ ATTEMPT TO INVOKE

THE LANDGRAF PRESUMPTION

AGAINST RETROACTIVITY TO REVIVE

per erre ree eee ee ee

10

iv

Contents

Ill. PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION THAT

THEIR REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

ARE FRUSTRATED BY “RETROACTIVE

IMMUNIZATION” OF RESPONDENT

IS BASED ON A_ SERIES’ OF

ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS. ...........

Be 8 Per ei rer re ree rrr y

APPENDIX — LETTER FROM STATE AND

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO COURT OF

APPEALS DATED AUGUST 10, 2004 ........

Page

13

15

a ee ee ee

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de

Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173 (2003) ........ 11, 13, 14

Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de

Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2004)

PPT TPE CREE et rrr rrr re eo At te

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping

Corporation, 488 U.S. 428 (1989) ............ 8

Berizzi Brothers Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562

th) a eer rrrr rr ero ys rr yor rare 14

Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima,

S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938) ...... 14

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003)

PPE rer ee re hey Se 7, 8, 10, 11

Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) .. 14

Filartiga v. Peta-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.

SOOU) oihinas3ceens sae eee 13

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677,

124 S. Ct. 2240 (June 7, 2004) ............. passim

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244

(ie: Eee ee ee eee eer T 4,10, 11, 12

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945)

6 0 0s 6 0.0-6:5.0:5'5 6 55-0 0-k eee we ee 14

Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v.

Abrams, 541 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14,

Fo) re 3, 4, 5, 8,9

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) ... 13

Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774

(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003

CESGS) os vanced endabuaduau ee eeee eee 13

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.

GRO CIWS) onc csbiceeaeess see 7,14

Statutes:

40 UBS. § 1GGS 6c énaee settee eee l

20 USL. 2000 ii.inkas tence l

26 U.S.C. § HOGG ons isa sn eecsasneesee 5

l

STATUTE INVOLVED

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976

U.S. Code, Title 28

(Excerpts)

§ 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose

The Congress finds that the determination by

United States courts of the claims of foreign states

to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts

would serve the interests of justice and would

protect the rights of both foreign states and

litigants in United States courts. Under

international law, states are not immune from the

jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their

commercial activities are concerned, and their

commercial property may be levied upon for the

satisfaction of judgments rendered against them

in connection with their commercial activities.

Claims of foreign states to immunity should

henceforth be decided by courts of the United

States and of the States in conformity with the

principles set forth in this chapter.

§ 1603. Definitions

For purposes of this chapter—

(a) A “foreign state”, except as used in section

1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision

of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality

of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).

2

(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign

state” means any entity—

(1) which is a separate legal person,

corporate or otherwise, and

(2) which is an organ of a foreign state

or political subdivision thereof, or a

majority of whose shares or other

ownership interest is owned by a foreign

state or political subdivision thereof,

and

(3) which is neither a citizen of a Sate

of the United States as defined in section

1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created

under the laws of any third country.

3

STATEMENT

This is the second time the present controversy is before

this Court. When the case came before the Court for the first

time on petition of the present Respondent, the Court held

up the petition pending decision in Republic of Austria v.

Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (June 7, 2004).

Following the decision in A/tmann, the Court granted the

petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, and remanded the case for further

consideration in light of the decision in Altmann. Société

Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v. Abrams, 541 U.S.

__, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004).

Following briefing by both sides, as well as by the

U.S. government, the Court of Appeals held that it was bound

by the Court’s decision in A/tmann and directed the District

Court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de

Fer Frangais, 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2004). The present

petition is based on the assertion that the Court of Appeals

misunderstood this Court’s decision in Altmann and the

remand order in this case. There is no reason to believe that

the Court of Appeals misunderstood, and no justification for

this Court to take up the case again.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The Court of Appeals correctly followed this Court’s

instruction, based on the clear holding that the immunity of

a foreign sovereign under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act is determined as of the filing of the action, regardless of

the date of the conduct on which the action is based. There

is no dispute that Defendant SNCF was entitled to immunity

4

as of the date the action was filed, and there is no basis for

distinguishing for this purpose between the state itself and a

corporation directly owned by the state.

2. Petitioners’ attempt to invoke this Court’s analysis

in Landgraf v.USI Film Products to revive their action is

directly contrary to this Court’s judgment in A/tmann.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED

THE ALTMANN DECISION TO THIS CASE.

A. This Court’s Decision Left No Room for

Misunderstanding

In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124

S. Ct. 2240 (2004), plaintiffs sought to bring a claim for

expropriation for which immunity would not be granted under

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Their claim

was based on conduct by the government of Austria in the

1940s, when immunity from suit would have been in effect.

In response to the plea by Austria that permitting the action

to go forward would be “impermissibly retroactive,” Justice

Stevens, writing for the Court, pointed first to the preamble

of the Act:

“Claims of foreign states to immunity should

henceforth be decided by courts of the United States

and of the States in conformity with the principles

set forth in this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. 1602 (emphasis

by the Court).

541 U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2252.

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While this passage might not be an express command,

the Court’s opinion continues, “this language is

unambiguous: Immunity ‘claims’ — not actions protected by

immunity, but assertions of immunity to suits arising from

those actions — are the relevant conduct regulated by the Act;

those claims are ‘henceforth’ to be decided by the courts.”

124 S Ct. at 2252-53. Further, the judgment accepts the

District Court’s suggestion that “Congress intended courts

to resolve ali such claims ‘in conformity with the principles

set forth’ in the Act regardless of when the underlying conduct

occurred.” 541 U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.

Abrams v. Société Nationale presents the reverse fact

pattern from Altmann v. Austria, where it was defendants

that sought to avoid the FSIA, because the exception to

immunity for claims of expropriation was not adopted until

passage of the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). In the present

case, it is plaintiffs who seek to avoid the FSIA, based on

their contention (which Respondent rejects') that prior to the

passage of the Act Defendant SNCF would not have been

entitled to immunity, whereas under the Act there is no doubt

that Defendant SNCF is immune. But there is nothing in the

Court’s opinion in Altmann that could lead anyone to

conclude that application of the FSIA “regardless of when

the underlying conduct occurred” pertains only to instances

where the legislation limits immunity, thereby expanding

jurisdiction, and not when the legislation confirms or expands

immunity, thereby restricting jurisdiction.

In response to the invitation of the Court of Appeals when

considering the remand, the State and Justice Departments

filed a letter brief setting forth their view that after A/tmann

1. See pp. 14-15, infra.

6

the FSIA applied whether it broadened or narrowed the

immunity that a foreign state or instrumentality had had prior

to passage of the Act:

The Court’s analysis in A/tmann does not admit

of a distinction between instances in which the

FSIA offers a narrower immunity than foreign

states historically enjoyed and those cases in

which the current foreign policy confers a broader

immunity for foreign states. The FSIA, the

Supreme Court held in A/tmann, represents the

political branches’ current determination that

certain classes of suits present sufficient risk of

interfering with the country’s international

relations that they should not be heard in the

United States’ courts. Nothing in Altmann

suggests that only Congress’s determination that

certain cases can proceed should be given

immediate effect, or that a court is free to set aside

Congress’s conclusion that other suits should not

be heard based on the court’s own view that the

Executive Branch would historically have allowed

those suits to go forward. Indeed, if anything,

courts should be more deferential to the FSIA’s

provisions reflecting a determination that certain

cases should not proceed. Ignoring that policy

judgment risks disrupting our relations with

foreign states in a manner the political branches

have sought to avoid?

2. Letter Brief dated August 10, 2004 from Appellate Staff, Civil

Decision, U.S. Department of Justice and Office of Legal Adviser,

U.S. Department of State, at p. 4. The complete letter is reproduced

as an Appendix to this Brief in Opposition.

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7

| Petitioners seek to avoid this Court’s holding in A/tmann

by contending that the opinion did not reach government-

| owned corporations. The Court’s opinion in Altmann

expressly rejects the thrust of that contention — that some

provisions of the FSIA could be applied in a given case, others

not, pointing out that the Act’s overall structure “strongly

supports” the conclusion that all claims against foreign

sovereigns, as defined, are to be resolved in conformity with

the principles set forth in the Act:

Many of the Act’s provisions unquestionably

apply to cases arising out of conduct that occurred

before 1976. In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538

U.S. 468, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643

(2003), for example, we held that whether an

entity qualifies as an “instrumentality” of a

“foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA’s grant

of immunity depends on the relationship between

the entity and the state at the time suit is brought

rather than when the conduct occurred. In

addition, Verlinden [B.V. v. Central Bank of

Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480], which upheld against

constitutional challenge 28 U.S.C. § 1330's grant

of subject-matter jurisdiction, involved a dispute

over a contract that predated the Act.... And there

has never been any doubt that the Act’s procedural

provisions relating to venue, removal, execution, .

and attachment apply to all pending cases. Thus,

the FSIA’s preamble indicates that it applies

“henceforth,” and its body includes numerous

provisions that unquestionably apply to claims

based on pre-1976 conduct. In this context, it

would be anomalous to presume that an isolated

provision (such as the expropriation exception on

8

which respondent relies) is of purely prospective

application absent any statutory language to that

effect.

541 U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.

The State/Justice brief unequivocally supports Respondent’s

position that the FSIA applies to all actions filed following

passage of the Act:

Altmann itself makes clear that the FSIA’s

definition of foreign states to encompass agencies

and instrumentalities of those states is, like the rest

of the Act, to be applied to all post-enactment cases.

Indeed, A/tmann’s analysis of the retroactivity issue

of the FSIA relied in significant respect on the

Court’s understanding of its holding the prior year

in Dole Food, which focused on the agency or

instrumentality provision. As the Court explained

in A/tmann, Dole Food “held that whether an entity

qualifies as an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign state

for purposes of the FSIA’s grant of immunity

depends on the relationship between the entity and

the state at the time suit is brought rather than when

the conduct occurred.” A/tmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.

The scope Congress gave to the definition of a

“foreign state” to include an “agency or

instrumentality” is, as much as the other immunity

provisions of the FSIA, a foreign policy judgment

as to the extent of “comity” we should extend to

foreign states.’

3. State/Justice Letter Brief, note 2 supra, p. 5. See also Argentine

Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488 U.S. 428, 437-

38 (1989).

AO SDP» Srteet ang ®

bee wae at Hat

9

In short, any attempt to distinguish Abrams from Altmann

— either on the basis that one case involved opening and the

other involved closing the door to U.S. courts, or on the basis

that one case involved the state itself and the other a state

instrumentality — must fail, as the Court of Appeals clearly

understood.

B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied the

Judgment in A/tmann to the Present Case.

On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals

acknowledged that the inquiry it had initiated when the case

first came before it was no longer necessary or appropriate,

because the purpose of sovereign immunity, as this Court had

held, is not to help shape foreign states’ future conduct but to

“reflect ... current political realities and relationships.”

369 F.3d at 63, quoting from 541 U.S. at _, 124 S. Ct. at

2252.

As to plaintiffs’ argument that this Court’s holding in

Altmann should not bind the court in Abrams because SNCF

was a corporate entity and not a state at the time of the alleged

conduct, the Court of Appeals correctly said that this fact is

immaterial after A/tmann, 389 F.3d at 64.4 Though the Court of

Appeals was clearly unhappy with the instructions from this

Court, it made no mistake in applying them. The District Court

had dismissed the action on the basis of sovereign immunity,

4. The Court ofAppeals apparently believed that SNCF was a

non-governmental entity at the time of the alleged misconduct.

This statement is not correct. See the District Court’s opinion, 173

F. Supp. 2d 423 at 425-26. However, the Court of Appeals was correct

in stating that this allegation is immaterial. As the court said, “Once

the railroad is encompassed by the FSIA, its prior incarnation as a

private entity does not bar the statute’s retroactive application.” /d.

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and the reversal and remand of that judgment by the Court of

Appeals had been reversed by this Court. Accordingly, the Court

of Appeals recalled its mandate to the District Court and affirmed

that court’s dismissal of the actio..

The judgment of the Court of Appeals leaves no room,

and supplies no reason, for this Court to revisit the case.

Il. THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR PETITIONERS’

ATTEMPT TO INVOKE THE LANDGRAF

PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY TO

REVIVE THEIR CLAIM.

Faced with the clear statement in A/tmann that the

presumption against retroactivity “is just that — a

presumption”, 541 U.S. at __, 124. S. Ct at 2250, and that

the rationales supporting the presumption do not fit the

considerations governing foreign sovereign immunity, id. at

___, 124 S. Ct. at 2252, Petitioners seek to distinguish the

present case by contending that the Court in A/tmann focused

only on defendant’s expectations, not on those of the

plaintiffs.

In fact, this Court distinguished between reliance by

parties on settled rules in shaping their primary conduct, as

in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and

the considerations governing the grant of sovereign immunity,

both before and after passage of the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act. As the Court wrote, sovereign immunity

“reflects current political realities and relationships, and aims

to give foreign states and their instrumentalities some present

protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of

comity.” 124 S. Ct. at 2252, quoting from Dole Food Co. v.

Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 at 479 (2003). Accordingly, it was

ee ee

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more appropriate, absent contraindications, to defer to the

decisions of the political branches — namely, the policy

reflected in the FSIA — “than to presume that decision

inapplicable merely because it postdates the conduct in

question.” /d. In other words, foreign sovereign immunity is

not about expectations at all, but about a judgment, made by

Congress since 1976, concerning what entities qualify as

foreign sovereigns and what claims against foreign sovereigns

may be heard in United States courts.

The Second Circuit, which in its earlier decision had

relied on Landgraf to remand the case to the District Court,

Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais,

332 F.3d 173 at 180-86 (2003), understood clearly that it

had been reversed precisely on this issue. Quoting the

passages quoted above, the Court of Appeals wrote:

... the [Supreme] Court concluded that the

retroactivity analysis established in Landgraf .. . ,

and upon which this panel had relied, was

inappropriate. Further, the Supreme Court stated

that the Act’s preamble, as well as its overarching

thematic structure, indicated Congress’ design for

the Act to apply retroactively.

Appellants [Petitioners here] misapprehend the

Altmann holding by stating that it “turns upon the

fact that the foreign government enjoyed no settled

expectation in avoiding suit.”. .. The Supreme

Court stated, to the contrary, that reliance interests

are inapplicable in assessing the retroactivity of

sovereign immunity principles because immunity

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simply “reflects current political realities and

relationships.”

389 F.3d at 63, 64.

There is, of course, -one difference between A/tmann and

the present case: In Altmann, the post-conduct legislation

created jurisdiction where there was none before, while in

the present case the post-conduct legislation bars jurisdiction

where (at least arguably) jurisdiction existed previously.

In this connection, it is worth noting that even the dissenters in

Altmann, who would have applied the presumption against

retroactivity in that case, made clear that a statute that operated

to foreclose jurisdiction of a lawsuit (including where it in fact

stripped previously existing jurisdiction from the courts) could

be applied “without fear of working any retroactive effect.”

124 S. Ct. at 2267 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Thus, it is clear that

all nine Justices of this Court agreed that nothing in the Landgraf

doctrine would preclude recognition of immunity under the FSIA

for an entity such as SNCF, regardless of the date of the conduct

on which the claims were based.

There is no reason to revisit the relationship of the Landgraf

doctrine to the FSIA, and no reason to disturb the correct

disposition of this case by the Court of Appeals in accordance

with this Court’s instructions.

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If. PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION THAT THEIR REA-

SONABLE EXPECTATIONS ARE FRUSTRATED

BY “RETROACTIVE IMMUNIZATION” OF

RESPONDENT IS BASED ON A SERIES OF

ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS.

1. The assertion that plaintiffs in the 1940s had the

expectation of being able to sue a corporation owned by the

government of France in a United States court is inherently

incredible. Indeed, the fact is that not until well after passage of

the FSIA did some courts in the United States consider that

they had jurisdiction over the kind of claim attempted in this

case. Compare Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.

1980) with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774

(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). See also

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, esp. 2761-66 (2004).

2. The assertion (Petition p. 5) that discovery in this case

“clearly indicated” that SNCF had no immunity prior to

enactment of the FSIA is false. No such outcome appeared

in the discovery process, which was halted by the Magistrate

Judge following this Court’s decision in A/tmann.°

5. The Court ofAppeals directed the District Court to develop

a record on which the Court could base a determination whether

plaintiffs legitimately could have expected to litigate their claims in

the United States, 332 F.3d at 187-88. On remand, the District Court

wrote to the State Department to see if it could provide any

information relevant to this factual inquiry. Eventually, a reply from

an attorney at the Civil Division of the Justice Department

“respectfully declined” the invitation to participate in the inquiry, at

least until the Supreme Court decided the A/tmann case and acted on

the petition for certiorari filed by the present Respondent and then

pending. Other aspects of discovery probed SNCF’s charters and

personnel at different times, but no evidence emerged to establish

that a claim for immunity by SNCF would have been denied prior to

passage of the Act.

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4

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3. Petitioners’ entire case depends on the assertion that

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 closed a door

io their claims that had previously been open. That assertion

runs up against the well-known fact that until 1952 the United

States followed the doctrine of absolute immunity for foreign

states, i.e., the doctrine that made no distinction between

claims arising out of commercial activity and claims arising

out of government activity. See, for a concise summary,

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 at

486-88 (1983). Notwithstanding some resistance in lower

U.S. courts and abandonment of the absolute theory of

immunity in many other countries (but not the United

Kingdom and states following the British model), this Court

several times reaffirmed the doctrine in controversies arising

out of commercial activities conducted by ships or other

government-owned entities. See Berizzi Brothers Co. v.

The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Compania Espanola

de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74

(1938) (dictum); Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578

(1943).

The Court of Appeals in the present case acknowledged

this fact, and also understood that courts in the United States

uniformly granted immunity whenever the State Department

made a suggestion to that effect. 332 F.3d at 176, 187. There

were a few instances in which the State Department did not

“recognize and allow” a claim of immunity, typically when

there was doubt about the ownership or possession of a vessel

for which immunity was claimed. See, e.g., Republic of

Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The most that could

have been said about the immunity of a state-owned

corporation prior to 1952 was that one could not always be

sure what position the State Department would take.

15

It was the possibility that the State Department might

not have “recognized and allowed” a claim of immunity that

led the Court of Appeals in the present case to vacate the

decision of the District Court and order discovery concerning

the State Department’s view at the relevant time, an inquiry

subsequently rejected in A/tmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2254. There

certainly could have been no settled expectations on the part

of Petitioners that they could have obtained jurisdiction over

SNCF on the present claims in United States courts, and to

speak of “retroactive immunization” (Petition p. 14) is well

wide of the mark.

CONCLUSION

The petition presents no open issue calling for Supreme

Court resolution, and no error by the Court of Appeals that

calls for correction by this Court. The petition should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD*

Linpa J. SILBERMAN

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012-1099

(212) 998-6208

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

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