Opposition Brief — Campbell v. Louisiana

Loe sie

LPR 4 TBR

;

;

4 Cle RK

de fe OD see Dee ee ee

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1995

>

TERRY CAMPBELL,

No. 95-1240

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

«

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Louisiana Supreme Court

+

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

J. WILLIAM PUCHEU RICHARD P. IEYOUB

District Attorney Attorney General

RICHARD W. VIDRINE KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN*

Assistant District Assistant Attorney

Attorney General

Thirteenth Judicial District State of Louisiana

Parish of Evangeline Department of Justice

P.O. Drawer 780 P.O. Box 94095

Ville Platte, La. 70586-0780 Baton Rouge, La. 70804-9095

(318) 363-3438 (504) 342-7552

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Respondent

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a white defendant has standing under Rose v.

Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), to bring an equal protection claim

based upon the exclusion of blacks from service as state grand

jury foremen?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COG PIO 6 00 iin ea < cen svadbnssadévessbeceuel i

A eR 6 nbn cc cicscccascecsnspeacaneeiqesl ii

es Cr EE wien ceccctecivccavccbacninveed iv

SEG ESO SURE GEE 6.504 06 cnccerecunsnsevecceaccts 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............... 22sec eeee 6

REPT hsknsén ceeds ekgacesectasssguiebeackeeens 7

I. Given that petitioner’s case may still be subject

to further judicial review in state court on

possible federal questions of law, petition

for writ of certiorari should be dismissed for

wane OE TG ooo o.s sv cukh dabei ean Seennsace 7

II. Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State of

Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321

(La. 1995), is consistent with decisions of this

FORO GIIUD, 3 on ds oncasvaveds betschoebadivand 12

III. A perceived conflict of the Louisiana Supreme

Court's decision in State of Louisiana v. Terry

Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), with United

States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1984),

does not, ipso facto, mean that petitioner is

entitled to this Honorable’s supervisory review,

IV.

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

especially where the state court decision is

consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions. ...14

Any perceived conflict between United States v.

Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983) and other

decisions of the United States Court of Appeals,

11th Circuit, disappears when one considers that

the latter decisions pre-dated Hobby v. United

cE 16

If this Honorable Court should invoke its

supervisory jurisdiction and review the

Louisiana Supreme Court's decision below,

such review should be limited to only the equal

dari lar 55 oes Ni aes ew eas ve. 18

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Alien 0. McCurry, 408 US: SOIR) oii cece ii ieccesesecs 9

Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F. 2d 672 (11th Cir. 1985) ........-..2005. 14

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ......-.eeeeeeeeee cence 9

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) ..........005: 13,15,18

Collies 0. Milter, 25a US. SOG IGE) ossccsccccccesecccceseees 8

California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ... 6.2... eee eee eens. 11

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) ....... 11,12

Department of Banking, State of Nebraska v. Pink,

DEF A Oe PE Randa rake th ab dem RUE Kaan ehneadee 8

Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981)... 00. ices csceccees 10,11

Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Adams Extract Company, ........ 16

473 U.S. 911 (1985)

Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982) ..... 0... cece eee eee 11

Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984) .. . .4,6,13,15,16,17,18

North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug

Stare; We. GE CES. TES Care © i aE es oe )

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982)... 20... cece cece ee eee 9

PORTS 0. Ei, G07 US. GIO CITE) vc cccccccenscvcccvess 12,13,17

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270(1971) ....cccccccccccccccccecs 7)

Poe v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Co. v. City of San Diego,

ae i ce caule’ )

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) ... 02... cece cece eee eee 12,13

Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945) ........ 11,12

Ramirez v. California, 476 U.S. 1152 (1986) ...............06% 15

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) ........... i4,6,13,14,15,18

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,

Sy RE EIR tarde cg gir i nee Y

United States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (1983) ............. 6,14,16

United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340

See ee ia eer can cnis en cous 15,16,17

United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380

Bete ee 15,16,17

United States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333

OL cg awaee ai 14,15,16,17,20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) ...... 0c eee eee ee eens 11

LOUISIANA CASES

State of Louisiana v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995),

__reh’g denied, 661 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1995),

petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3535

(Jan. 31, 1996) (No. 95-1240) ......... 0. eee 4,6,7,12,13,14

State of Louisiana v. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412

(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995), rev'd, 661 So. 2d 1321

a Tees PD i Kicun cck dba ceank cavksscee 3,4,7

State of Louisiana v. Campbell, No. 94-1140,

slip op. (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., 3/13/96) __ So. 2d

___, 1996 WESTLAW 109052 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.,

DETSPI va nkesciecisdsss Gates eqeesatsenanta 5,7,10

State of Louisiana v. Mouton, 393 So. 2d 1337

EO SUED +s 0:6 0005s59s cerns eraeeruar seeneas 18,19

State of Louisiana ex rel. Williams v. Whitley,

CO Ga. Bi DAS GA, COUR ni kccsancbncdaceneiieen 13

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

MUSL..§IRD s visicsdinivi ere Riven ens 6,7,10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

III ce ae eM oes ol a ies 5,7,14

es MI EE hc v's v divnwoube PAs caked bebekack Uhecks x 10

NM HON Bion pei nite sade cnn av ay ic vuneubneadsecud 4

PM MEE aaa Vitd ce peat ee ouceas see kure dela sbe dave’ 10

RP UES A5 fy Sih cy vpvnee bec Varin site Mel shard Pha oes 10

es eee: Se OU vee canvaeena 7

Lia GANG, RU PURINE, ccc sc cccccccdccccccce 7,19,20

U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment ................... 10,14

LOUISIANA STATUTES AND RULES

SORE RO a ee ene Oy i ne En 19

CNET MEEEE Ch cnikciiiesnusncss ss ck us ox dose ck bcm eneax 19

Sly See UM ies naciesibonsadeues eet 19

tae 335 6 oh sshd ev Fede sawed denvoecesevecs 13

MCU NN, < FnciGeed ss Naked Gi aNwbShdh sco bo 0ssas asap 1,3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

ih US POON Hs SU ea na rad uev eae kes evaees UbvanvEnenaneae 19

LR CLE, FO DO RAOMOE bc tv cnnecdecs Kecheascucwasueea 5,8

er og TR eo) Sy.) rere rrr erry rar rr rT 57

OTHER

Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice

ie Py SESE RE PTY Teed ee eT Th ery Pes Phe ee 8,9,19

\

a ee

No. 95-1240

oe

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1995

-o—

TERRY CAMPBELL,

Petitioner,

V.

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

) ee

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Louisiana Supreme Court

—

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Terry Campbell, a white male, was indicted by

the Grand Jury of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Parish of

Evangeline, State of Louisiana, on February 4, 1992, in which

petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted in Docket

No. 45,690-F of the second degree murder of James L. Sharp,

also a white male, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. See Petition

For A Writ Of Certiorari at Appendixes, E-8, E-30, and E-35

through E-37 (hereinafter Pet. at App., at__), and Appendixes

herein attached at 3a (hereinafter App. at ).

Prior to trial, petitioner, through defense counsel Jesse B.

Hearin, filed a Motion To Quash Grand Jury Indictment in the

trial court, alleging that the indictment was defective because

“the grand jury foreperson selection process in Evangeline

Parish is discriminatory and violates the Sixth and the Four-

teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as

Article I, Section 2, Article 1, Section 15 and Article I, Section

16, of the Louisiana Constitution.” See Pet. at App., 1-2. Follow-

ing a hearing on the motion before the Honorable Preston N.

Aucoin, Judge, Thirteenth Judicial District, presiding, on De-

cember 2, 1993, the motion was orally denied; subsequently

the trial court issued a written judgment on December 6, 1993,

confirming the denial of the motion to quash. See Pet. at App.,

E-1 through E-39, and D-1 through D-2.

Following a 12-person jury trial, petitioner was convicted

as charged on May 12, 1994. In a Motion For New Trial filed in

the trial court by defense counsel Richard V. Burnes and Ray-

mond J. LeJeune, petitioner again claimed his previously de-

nied motion to quash was meritorious because petitioner had

been “charged by a grand jury indictment which was returned

by a grand jury which was illegally and unconstitutionally se-

lected in that the grand jury foreperson selection process in

Evangeline Parish is discriminatory and violates the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as

well as Article I, Section 2, Article 1, Section 15, and Article 1,

Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution,” and thereby re-

quested a new trial on this basis, inter alia. See Pet. at App., H-2,

H-1 through H-9. Following a contradictory hearing on May

20, 1994, the motion for new trial was subsequently denied; pe-

titioner was thereby sentenced to the mandatory sentence of

life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, pro-

bation or suspension of sentence. See Pet. at App., C-1 through

C-8 and La. R.S. 14:30.1.

During appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Cir-

cuit, through defense counsel, Mr. Burnes and Mr. LeJeune, pe-

titioner again asserted as Assignment of Error No. 1 the trial

court’s denial of the motion to quash because the petitioner’s

indictment “was returned by a Grand Jury which was illegally

and unconstitutionally selected in that the Grand Jury foreper-

son selection process in Evangeline Parish was discriminatory

and in violation of Louisiana and United States constitutional

provisions”. Also alleged as Assignment of Error No. 10 on ap-

peal was the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial;

however, petitioner did not distinguish, from among the 11

reasons previously cited to the trial court, the underlying basis

for Assignment of Error No. 10. In the original motion for new

trial filed with the trial court, one reason, inter alia, for relief

was based upon an allegation of racial discrimination in the se-

lection of grand jury foremen in Evangeline Parish. See Pet. at

App., G-1 and G-3, G-1 through G-4, and H-1 through H-9.

In State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct.

App. 3d Cir. 1995), the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Cir-

cuit, on March 1, 1995, in addressing petitioner’s first assign-

ment of error in Docket No. CR-94-1140, reversed the trial

court’s finding that petitioner, a white male, lacked standing to

allege racial discrimination against blacks in the grand jury

foreman selection process of Evangeline Parish. See Id., 651 So.

2d at 413-414 and Pet. at App., B-1 through B-5. The Third Cir-

cuit remanded the proceedings back to the trial court for fur-

ther review of the petitioner’s racial discrimination claim based

upon due process and equal protection. See Id. Given the action

by the Third Circuit, that reviewing court did not reach the

other assignments of error. See Id. and Pet. at App., B-5.

On March 31, 1995, the District Attorney for the Thirteenth

Judicial District filed an application for writ of certiorari and

review with the Louisiana Supreme Court; in an opinion is-

sued on October 2, 1995, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State

of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995),

granted the State’s writ application in Docket No. 95-K-0824,

and subsequently reversed the prior ruling by the Louisiana

Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, in State of Louisiana v. Terry

Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995), holding

that petitioner lacked standing under both the equal protec-

tion clause and the due process clause to bring a claim of racial

discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen under

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) and Hobby v. United States,

468 U.S. 339 (1984). See also Pet. at App., A-1 through A-2, and

A-3 through A-10. The Louisiana Supreme Court also re-

manded the case back to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third

Circuit, for consideration of petitioner’s remaining assign-

ments of error. A petition for rehearing with the Louisiana

Supreme Court was subsequently denied on November 3,

1995. See State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1374

(La. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Jan. 31,

1996)(No. 95-1240), and Pet. at App., F-1.

On January 31, 1996, petitioner filed the instant Petition

For A Writ Of Certiorari with this Honorable Court. Pursuant

to Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (effective Octo-

ber 2, 1995), petitioner, through defense counsel Mr. Richard V.

Burnes and Dmitrc I. Burnes, notified Honorable J. William

Pucheu, District Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District, Parish

of Evangeline, Honorable Richard W. Vidrine, Assistant Dis-

trict Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District, Parish of Evange-

line, and Honorable Richard P. leyoub, Attorney General,

Louisiana Department of Justice, of the instant petition, and

that pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 15.3 (1995), a brief in opposition to

the petition for certiorari would be due March 6, 1996.

Pursuant to a request for assistance by District Attorney J.

William Pucheu, the Attorney General is filing the instant Re-

spondent’s Brief In Opposition To Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.

In a letter sent by Federal Express to this Honorable Court on

February 23, 1996, the State of Louisiana respectfully re-

quested an extension of time upon which to file the brief in op-

position. See App. at 4a, 5a. Defense counsel Dmitrc I. Burnes

responded in a letter dated February 26, 1996, that defense

counsel had no opposition to the requested extension of time.

See App. at 6a. In a letter dated March 4, 1996, this Honorable

Court informed the State of Louisiana that the extension of

time within which to file a response to the petition for a writ of

certiorari was granted, and that the brief was now due on or

before April 5, 1996. See App. at 7a.

Subsequent to the filing of the instant petition, the

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, has denied relief on

petitioner’s remaining assignments of error, and affirmed peti-

tioner’s conviction and sentence, with the exception of a re-

mand to the trial court to amend the court minutes to reflect

that the petitioner is entitled to credit for time served. See State

of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, No. 94-1140, slip op. (La. Ct. App.

3d Cir., 3/13/96), ___ So. 2d , 1996 WESTLAW 109052

(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., 3/13/96). Under La.Ct. App. R. 2-18.1

(1995), petitioner had 14 days to petition the Louisiana Court

of Appeal, Third Circuit for a rehearing, or if no rehearing is re-

quested, under La.Sup. Ct. R. 10, § 5 (1995), petitioner had 30

days from March 13, 1996, to file an application for writ of cer-

tiorari and review with the Louisiana Supreme Court, before

the judgment is final in state court. Petitioner filed a petition

for rehearing with the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Cir-

cuit, on Friday, March 29, 1996.

6

+

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In opposing the petitioner’s application for writ of certio-

rari, the State of Louisiana argues that because the matter is

still pending in state courts upon questions of federal law, this

Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to

exercise this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Further, the

State of Louisiana contends that Louisiana Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), is con-

sistent with prior decisions of this Honorable Court. Addition-

ally, any conflict between the Campbell decision and decisions

of the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals is

clearly explained by the fact that those federal decisions cited

by the petitioner herein pre-dated this Court’s decision in

Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984), and their validity to-

day is highly questionable. Further, any conflict between the

Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals in United

States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983) and those decisions

of the Eleventh Circuit are equally explainable in that the latter

should not carry much weight, again in light of the Hobby deci-

sion. Finally, if this Honorable Court decides supervisory re-

view is necessary, the State of Louisiana would respectfully ar-

gue that such review should be limited to the only federal

question properly before this Court, i.e., whether a white de-

fendant has standing under Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979)

to bring a claim under the equal protection clause that blacks

have been excluded from service as state grand jury foremen.

ARGUMENT

I. Given that petitioner’s case may still be subject to fur-

ther judicial review in state court on possible federal

questions of law, petition for writ of certiorari should be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

In granting a petition for writ of certiorari, this Honorable

Court is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review “[flinal judgments

or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a de-

cision could be had...” (emphasis added). See also Pet. at 3. In

the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court, while admit-

tedly denying an issue of federal law concerning one assign-

ment of error, remanded the matter back to the Louisiana

Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for consideration of peti-

tioner’s remaining assignments of error. See State of Louisiana

v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), rev’ing, State of Louisiana

v. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995). Pursuant

to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s mandate, the Louisiana

Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, on March 13, 1996, reviewed

the remaining nine assignments of error (an additional assign-

ment of error was abandoned as being assigned but not

briefed), and affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence.

Petitioner’s claims for relief on appeal include both issues of

Louisiana and federal law, including but not necessarily lim-

ited to, petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right against self-in-

crimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See State

of Louisiana v. Campbell, No. 94-1140, slip op. (La. Ct. App. 3d

Cir., 3/13/96), ___So.2d__—_—, 1996 WESTLAW 109052 (La.

Ct. App. 3d Cir., 3/13/96). The instant petition for writ of cer-

tiorari was mailed by the petitioner, as pointed out above, on

January 31, 1996, forty-two days before the March 13, 1996, de-

cision of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. More-

over, as allowed by La.Ct. App. R. 2-18.1 (1995), petitioner has

filed a petition for rehearing with the Louisiana Court of Ap-

peal, Third Circuit. If no rehearing is timely requested, under

La.Sup. Ct. R. 10, § 5 (1995), petitioner had 30 days from March

13, 1996, to file an application for writ of certiorari and review

with the Louisiana Supreme Court, before the judgment is fi-

nal in state court. Further, if a rehearing was timely requested

but denied, petitioner would have 30 days to seek review from

the order denying the rehearing. Finally, if a rehearing is

timely requested and granted, the aggrieved party would have

30 days to seek review with the Louisiana Supreme Court from

the lower court’s judgment on rehearing.

Given the pending status of petitioner’s appeal, the State of

Louisiana responds that in order to avoid piecemeal litigation

on possible federal issues of law involving the same petitioner,

this Honorable Court should decline the instant application for

petition for writ of certiorari without prejudice until all matters

of federal law are resolved by the Louisiana courts. See Robert

L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice at 90 (7th ed. 1993). Clearly

the instant judgment in this matter is not final. Because this

Honorable Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is necessarily lim-

ited to final judgments of a state’s highest court of last resort

where a substantial federal question has been properly raised

and necessarily decided upon, the context of the instant litiga-

tion necessitates a ruling by this Honorable Court that the mat-

ter is not yet ready for review. Clearly the remand of the matter

from the Louisiana Supreme Court back to the Louisiana Court

of Appeal, Third Circuit, indicated that matters of substance re-

mained unresolved; it is equally clear that what was left unre-

solved was more detailed than simply a lower court perform-

ing a ministerial act, for example where a lower court simply

enters a judgment at a higher court’s direction. See Department

of Banking, State of Nebraska v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 267 (1942).

Moreover, a judgment to this Honorable Court should be final

not only as to all parties, but also as to the whole subject matter

involving all possible causes of action. See Collin v. Miller, 252

U.S. 364, 370 (1920). Most important to the instant case, the re-

mand of a case that leaves open some matter that is not simply

ministerial and which might itself create a federal question,

means, ipso facto, that the judgment is not yet final, and thus, is

not yet subject to judicial review by this “Ionorable Court.

Supreme Court Practice at 94-95; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.

City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1981); O’Dell v. Espinoza,

456 U.S. 430 (1982); and Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Co., 345

U.S. 379, 382 (1953). See also North Dakota State Board of Phar-

macy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. 414 U.S. 156, 159 (1973)(requir-

ing finality of state court judgments avoids piecemeal review

by federal courts of state court decisions.) Contrast Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85 n. 1 (1963)(review granted on federal

question because resolution of that issue would decide whether

suppression of evidence would require retrial on the merits as

well as on the issue of punishment).

Another reason counseling hesitation by this Court to

grant review at this juncture is the policy consideration of lim-

iting federal review of state courts’ determination of federal

constitutional issues as a means to minimize federal intrusion

into state affairs. Supreme Court Practice at 95. Furthermore,

this Court has often recognized and insisted that state courts

be allowed the first opportunity to pass upon federal constitu-

tional challenges to state action in the first instance, and that

state courts, as their federal counterparts, are equally as com-

petent in adjudicating federal constitutional claims. Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980)(confidence in state courts to

adjudicate federal claims). This Honorable Court had also

adopted a policy of allowing state courts the opportunity to

correct any possible constitutional violation caused by state ac-

tion. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-278 (1971). Most com-

pelling here is that further proceedings pursuant to a remand

by a state supreme court to a lower state court to resolve other

issues of federal law provides a strong basis by which this

10

Court should rule that the pending state court judgment is not

final, and thus, not reviewable.

Petitioner should be required to establish to this Court’s

satisfaction why federal review at this juncture is necessary.

Petitioner has failed to do so. Allowing a review at this point

runs counter to the general rule that only final judgments of a

state’s highest court of last resort are reviewable by this Hon-

orable Court. See Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 622 (1981)(holding

no important federal interests would be eroded if state crimi-

nal proceedings went forward following denial of a federal

claim of selective and discriminatory prosecution under the

equal protection clause.) '

Petitioner certainly has failed to establish that a federal

question or federal questions raised by the instant petition

would be lost but for this Court’s invoking its supervisory ju-

risdiction even though no final judgment has yet been ren-

dered.

In Flynt, supra, this Honorable Court held that it lacked ju-

risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review a state Supreme

Court ruling, which had rejected a federal claim of Hustler

publisher Larry »“lynt concerning discriminatory prosecution

under obscenity laws. Even though the First and Fourteenth

amendments to the U.S. Constitution were involved in the de-

' The State of Louisiana has not reproduced the opinion of State of

Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, No. 94-1140, slip op. (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.,

3/13/96), So. 2d , 1996 WESTLAW 109052 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.,

3/13/96), given the length of the decision, the added costs for printing and

reproduction, and the burden on the petitioner to establish why review

should be granted. However, the decision is available to this Honorable

Court through the Westlaw service, and petitioner has the option to include

that decision if he opts to file a reply brief under Sup.Ct.R. 15.6., which is in

compliance with Sup.Ct.R. 14.1 (i) (ii), and R. 15.8.

11

cided federal claim, this Court held that there was no final

judgment, and that none of the four exceptions to the general

rule that only final judgments are reviewable applied, citing

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479-485 (1975). In

Flynt, this Court was satisfied that federal review could wait

until final judgment without any adverse impact upon impor-

tant federal interests. Moreover, a state court’s decision that an

earlier ruling by that court would be deemed law of the case

would not affect the supervisory jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court to re-examine the earlier state court rulings. Hathorn v.

Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1982)(Supreme Court has jurisdic-

tion to consider all substantial federal questions determined in

the stages of earlier state proceedings; whether such a federal

claim is untimely under state procedural rules is not generally

an independent and adequate state basis upon which further

federal review is barred). See also Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.

545 (1967)(holding that denial of defendant's claim that grand

jury was selected in a discriminatory manner was reviewable

after final judgment of conviction, but not after interlocutory

appeal permitted under state law). Contrast California v. Stew-

art, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(state court’s reversal of conviction on

federal constitutional ground and remand for a new trial did

not bar federal review because an acquittal would possibly

preclude such review).

The State is cognizant of this Court’s decision in Radio Sta-

tion WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945), where Mr. Justice

Frankfurter, in writing for the Court, acknowledged a

“penumbral area” for the general rule that only final judg-

ments are reviewable by this Honorable Court. The State

urges that to grant review in the instant petition could possi-

bly result in piecemeal resolution of federal questions of law

involving the same petitioner. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:

“...Of course, where the remaining litigation may raise other

federal questions that may later come here, to allow review of

12

an intermediary adjudication would offend the decisive objec-

tion to fragmentary reviews.” Id., 326 U.S. at 127.

For the foregoing reasons, the State of Louisiana respect-

fully requests the petition for certiorari be dismissed for lack

of a final judgment unless the petitioner establishes to this

Court’s satisfaction why an exception under Cox Broadcasting

Corp., supra, should apply.

II. Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in State of

Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), is

consistent with decisions of this Honorable Court.

In the petition for writ of certiorari, petitioner claims that

Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision is flatly inconsistent with

this Honorable Court’s decisions in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493

(1972) and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Pet. at 4. More-

over, petitioner claims that the Louisiana Supreme Court “has

decided important questions of federal law that have not been,

but should be, settled by this Court.” Ibid.

The State of Louisiana counters that these claims defy a

plain reading of the decisions in question. The Louisiana

Supreme Court expressly declined petitioner’s invitation to

expand Powers beyond the context of an equal protection at-

tack to race-based exclusions of prospective petit jurors

through the use of peremptory challenges. State of Louisiana v.

Campbell, 661 So. 2d at 1324. In Powers this Honorable Court

held that a defendant, regardless of his or her race, had stand-

ing under the equal protection clause to object to the race-

based exclusion of any prospective petit juror whether or not

that defendant and the excluded juror shared the same race.

Moreover, in Peters v. Kiff, supra, this Honorable Court held

that a white defendant had standing to object on the basis of

the due process clause to the racial composition of a grand and

petit juries even though the claim centered on allegations that

13

blacks had been systematically excluded.

Given the fact that this Honorable Court has not decided

whether a white defendant has standing under Rose v. Mitchell,

supra, to bring an equal protection challenge to alleged racial

discrimination against blacks in the context of a state grand jury

foreman, the Louisiana Supreme Court was correct not to ex-

tend Powers beyond its equal protection holding. This is espe-

cially true in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's dicta that

“[t]he role of the grand jury foreman in Louisiana appears to be

similarly ministerial’, which was the same conclusion es-

poused by this Honorable Court in Hobby concerning the role of

a federal grand jury foreman. See State of Louisiana v. Campbell,

661 So. 2d at 1324; and Hobby, 468 U.S. at 344. See also State of

Louisiana ex rel. Williams v. Whitley, 629 So. 2d 343 (La. 1993)(Mar-

cus, J., dissenting, “[t]he role of the foreman of the grand jury in

Louisiana also appears to be ministerial in nature.”)

Given the holdings of Powers and Peters, the Louisiana

Supreme Court was without express binding authority from

this Honorable Court to grant petitioner the relief he was seek-

ing. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision is

also consistent with Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494

(1977)(Mexican-American defendant had standing under the

equal protection clause to object to the exclusion of Mexican-

Americans as state grand jurors) and Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.

at 565,(black defendants had standing under the equal protec-

tion clause to challenge exclusion of blacks as state grand jury

foremen)’ in requiring that petitioner establish under the equal

protection clause that the “procedures employed resulted in

* Whether or not the duties of a Louisiana grand jury foreman are minis-

terial would, in the first instance, be a question of state law best left for reso-

lution by Louisiana courts. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 436.

* Petitioner misconstrues the Rose holding by stating that in Rose this

Honorable Court “held that racial discrimination in the selection of grand

id

substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifi-

able group to which he belongs.” Accordingly, the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s decision is consistent with decisions of this

Honorable Court. Petitioner’s claim otherwise is without

merit.

III. A perceived conflict of the Louisiana Supreme Court's

decision in State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d

1321 (La. 1995), with United States v. Sneed, 729 FE. 2d 1333

(11th Cir. 1984), does not, ipso facto, mean that petitioner

is entitled to this Honorable’s supervisory review, espe-

cially where the state court decision is consistent with

prior Supreme Court decisions.‘

Petitioner claims that the Louisiana Supreme Court deci-

sion in question here conflicts with United States v. Sneed,729 F.

2d 1333 (11th 1984), and thereby, this Court should invoke su-

pervisory review. Pet. at 4, 11, and 23. The United States Court

jury foremen violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution and requires reversal of a state conviction.” (Emphasis added.) While it

is clear from the Rose decision that discrimination against blacks in the selec-

tion of grand jury foremen violates the equal protection clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment, it is not clear that such discrimination warrants reversal

of a subsequent conviction. In Rose, this Honorable Court “assumed, with-

out deciding, that invidious discrimination in the selection of only the fore-

man requires that a subsequent conviction be set aside, just as if the discrim-

ination proved had tainted the selection of the entire grand jury venire.” Id.,

443 U.S. at 551 n. 4 (Citations omitted.)

‘ Petitioner cites Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F. 2d 672 (11th Cir. 1985) as a federal

appeals decision that conflicts both with State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell,

661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995) and United States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (1983). The

State of Louisiana fails to comprehend this argument given that in Bowen, the

issue before the federal court revolved around an equal protection claim con-

cerning the exclusion of women from petit jury service. The instant claim be-

fore this Honorable Court deals only with an equal protection claim based

upon a state’s grand jury foreman selection process. Petitioner has not ever

claimed discrimination in the selection processes of either state grand juries

15

of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, in Sneed did not distinguish be-

tween discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury fore-

man and discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury it-

self. Rather, the 11th Circuit in Sneed dealt only with a federal

defendant's claim against the federal grand jury foreman se-

lection process, and subsequently extended holdings of

Supreme Court cases dealing with discrimination in the selec-

tion of grand juries to consider a claim of discrimination in the

selection of grand jury feremen. Moreover, the Sneed court

was bound by clear precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, United

States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982) and United

States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982). As ar-

gued below, all of these federal decisions were issued prior to

Hobby v. United States, supra. Furthermore, there is no indica-

tion in Sneed that an issue before the court was whether a white

defendant could bring a claim of racial exclusion of blacks in a

state grand jury foreman selection process. The decision

clearly centered upon a federal defendant attacking his federal

conviction due to alleged discrimination in the selection of

federal grand jury foremen. Most importantly, the Eleventh

Circuit today may possibly retreat from this line of prior deci-

sions given this Court’s binding precedent in the Hobby case.

See Sneed, 729 F. 2d at 1335 n. 3 (finding federal grand jury fore-

man to be constitutionally significant). Accordingly, given this

Court’s decision in Hobby on a due process claim concerning

federal grand jury foremen, and this Court's decisions under

the equal protection clause of Castaneda and Rose, there is no

outstanding conflict that has not been resolved.

The State of Louisiana further contends that a conflict alone

is insufficient in and of itself to grant supervisory relief. See

or state petit juries. Accordingly, a federal decision not on point with the in-

stant claim could not possibly create the necessary “conflict” by which this

Honorable Court invokes supervisory review pursuant to Sup.Ct. Rule 10.

16

Ramirez v. California, 476 U.S. 1152 (1986)(J. White, dissenting,

joined by J. J. Brennan and Powell), wherein the Supreme Court

denied a petition for writ of certiorari despite the opinion of

dissenting Justices that a conflict existed between a Fifth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals decision and a California Supreme Court

decision, and between the latter decision and a Supreme Court

decision. See also Green Bay Packaging, Inc., v. Adams Extract

Company, 473 U.S. 911 (1985)J. White, dissenting in the denial

of a petition for writ of certiorari because of a conflict between

decisions of the Fourth Circuit and Fifth Circuit of the United

States Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate —

that relief is warranted on the basis that the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s decision is in direct conflict with Eleventh

Circuit decisions.

IV. Any perceived conflict between United States v.

Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983) and other decisions of

the United States Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, disap-

pears when one considers that the latter decisions pre-

dated Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984).

Finally, petitioner claims review by this Honorable Court

is warranted given that United States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th

Cir. 1983) conflicts with the following decisions of the United

States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit: United States v.

Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982)(per curiam);

United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982); and

United States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1984.) Pet. at 11

and 24.

While these decisions at first glance may appear to be in

conflict with Cronn, all these decisions cited by the petitioner

were issued without the benefit of Hobby v. United States,

supra, and dealt with the issue of a federal grand jury foreman,

17

not a state grand jury foreman. Accordingly, those same fed-

eral courts could decide the same issue differently today given

the holding of this Honorable Court in Hobby. As such, inter-

vention by this Honorable Court to resolve what the petitioner

claims is an apparent conflict is clearly not warranted. An ex-

amination of the cited federal case law by the instant petitioner

shows that the petitioner’s claim of a conflict is clearly illusory.

In United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380 (11th Cir.

1982)(per curiam), decided on April 15, 1982, the 11th Circuit

held that a hispanic defendant had standing under the equal

protection clause to object to the exclusion of blacks and

women from service as federal grand jury foremen. It is also

noteworthy that the 11th Circuit in Perez-Hernandez also re-

jected the government's argument that the role of a federal

grand jury person is “constitutionally insignificant.” Id. at

1386. Contrast Hobby, supra, decided on July 2, 1984. The 11th

Circuit also placed heavy reliance on Peters v. Kiff, supra, even

though that decision was based upon the due process clause as

opposed to the equal protection clause.

In United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982),

decided on July 22, 1982, the 11th Circuit obviously felt bound

by United States v. Perez-Hernandez, supra, when it held that a

white defendant had standing to complain about the exclusion

of blacks and women from service as federal grand jury fore-

men. That Court stated: ”... The panel [in United States v. Perez-

Hernandez] reached that conclusion [of standing] despite its ac-

knowledgement of prevailing Supreme Court precedent

which would appear to deny standing to sucha defendant:...In

accord with our existing precedent, we find standing on the

part of the instant appellants.” Id., 680 F. 2d at 1355-1356.

Likewise, United States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333 (11th Cir.

1984), decided on April 16, 1984, cites the binding precedent of

United States v. Holman and United States v. Perez-Hernandez for

18

its decision.

The State of Louisiana contends that petitioner had plainly

failed to establish to this Court any viable conflict in the lower

federal circuits. Given the holdings of Hobby, Castenda and

Rose, supra, the federal cases cited by the petitioner fail to

prove a jurisdictional basis by which a petition for writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

V. If this Honorable Court should invoke its supervisory

jurisdiction and review the Louisiana Supreme Court's

decision below, such review should be limited to only the

equal protection claim. z

Petitioner claims that the questions presented for review

include three federal bases for relief: the equal protection

clause, the due process clause and the fair cross-section re-

quirement of the Sixth Amendment. Pet. at i. The State coun-

ters that the only possible federal question left unresolved for

this Honorable Court is whether a white defendant has stand-

ing under Rose to bring an equal protection claim based upon

the exclusion of blacks from a state’s selection process for

grand jury foremen.

Petitioner’s claim that a white defendant has standing to

bring a due process attack is foreclosed by this Court’s deci-

sion in Hobby, supra. Considering the Louisiana Supreme

Court's dicta that a Louisiana grand jury foreman’s role is min-

isterial, petitioner’s request for relief squarely runs counter to

the Hobby decision. For the petitioner to distinguish Hobby

based upon a claimed difference in the selection of a grand

jury foreman in the federal system as opposed to the selection

of a grand jury foreman in the Louisiana system, clearly rings

hollow when the petitioner himself has deliberately chosen

not to attack the Louisiana grand jury venire from which his

Louisiana grand jury was chosen. Moreover, the Louisiana

19

Supreme Court in State of Louisiana v. Mouton, 395 So. 2d 1337

(La. 1981), upheld the state statutes governing the selection of

grand juries in Orleans Parish, whereby the district judge

picks each of the 12 grand jurors from the grand jury venire. In

Mouton, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed that La.C.CrP.

arts. 412, 413 and 414 and La.R.S. 15:114 did not violate the fed-

eral due process or equal protection clauses because the defen-

dant had failed to establish an affirmative showing that the

system was discriminatory. In the petitioner’s case, applicable

Louisiana statutes allow district judges of parishes other than

Orleans Parish to chose only the grand jury foreman from the

grand jury venire; the remaining 11 grand jurors and two alter-

nates are picked randomly and by lot. In light of Mouton, peti-

tioner’s claim that allowing a district judge to select the grand

jury foreman necessarily taints the grand jury itself has no

merit. Moreover, the argument fails to account for the peti-

tioner’s own decision to forego an attack on Louisiana’s sys-

tem of selecting the grand jury itself. Accordingly, review on

the due process claim should be denied.

Finally, petitioner claims he is entitled to federal review on

a fair cross-claim analysis under the Sixth Amendment. The

State of Louisiana counters that this federal claim has not been

heretofore addressed by the state courts in question. A review

of the record herein demonstrates that the state courts did not

rule on petitioner’s Sixth Amendment fair-cross section claim,

given the fact the focus was on petitioner’s standing to bring

either an equal protection attack or a due process attack upon

the grand jury foreman selection process itself. Further, the

record before this Court does not demonstrate that the peti-

tioner adequately represented a Sixth Amendment fair-cross

claim as an adequate basis for relief before the state courts.

Given this Honorable Court's policy considerations that state

courts should be given the first opportunity to consider the ap-

plication of state statutes in light of federal constitutional chal-

20

lenges, this Court’s review on this basis is not warranted.

Supreme Court Practice at 117.

Moreover, authority which petitioner himself cites to this

Honorable Court notes in dicta that a grand jury foreman at-

tack is not by its nature subject to the Sixth Amendment'’s re-

quirement of a fair cross-section. See Sneed, supra, 729 F. 2d at

1335 n. 2:“[a]lthough the composition of a grand jury or petit

jury venire may be challenged under the sixth amendment’s

guarantee of a right to be tried by a group drawn from a source

representing a fair cross-section of the community,...this re-

quirement does not extend to the office of grand jury foreper-

son because ‘[o]ne person alone cannot represent the divergent

views, experience, and ideas of the distinct groups which form

a community.” (Citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court’s

review under the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section is not

warranted.

21

+

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State of Louisiana

would respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny the

petitioner’s application for writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB

Attorney General

KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN*

Assistant Attorney General

State of Louisiana

Department of Justice

P.O. Box 94095

Baton Rouge, La. 70804-9095

(504) 342-7552

J. WILLIAM PUCHEU

District Attorney

RICHARD W. VIDRINE

Assistant District Attorney

Thirteenth Judicial District

Parish of Evangeline

P.O. Drawer 780

Ville Platte, La. 70586-0780

(318) 363-3438

Counsel for Respondent

* Counsel of Record

la

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

2a

APPENDIXES

Bill of Indictment, State of Louisiana v. Terry

Campbell.

Letter to Clerk William Suter from Kath-

leen Petersen, Assistant Attorney General.

Letter to Kathleen E. Petersen, Assistant

Attorney General, from Dmitrc I. Burnes,

Esquire.

Letter to Kathleen E. Petersen, Assistant

Attorney General, from Francis J. Lorson,

Chief Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of the

United States.

3a

APPENDIX A

BILL OF INDICTMENT

STATE OF LOUISIANA PARISH

OF OF

LOUISIANA EVANGELINE

45,690F

In the name and by the authority of the State of

Louisiana, the Grand Jurors of the State of Louisiana, duly

impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire within and for

the body of Evangeline Parish, State aforesaid, upon their

oath do present:

That on or about the 11th day of January, 1992, at the Parish of

Evangeline, State of Louisiana, TERRY D. CAMPBELL com-

mitted second degree murder of James L. Sharp

contrary to the form of the Statute of the State of Louisiana in

such cases made and provided in contempt of the authority of

said State and against the peace and dignity of the same.

/s/ J. William Pucheu

District Attorney, 13th Judicial

District of Louisiana

4a

APPENDIX B

LETTER TO CLERK SUTER FROM

KATHLEEN PETERSEN,

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

State of Louisiana

Department of Justice

Criminal Division

Baton Rouge

Richard P. Ileyoub P. O. Box 94095

Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095

Telephone:

(504) 342-7552

Fax:

(504) 342-7893

SENT BY FEDERAL EXPRESS

Honorable William Suter

Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States

1 First Street Northeast

Washington, D.C. 20543

RE: No. 95-1240, October Term, 1995

Terry Campbell v. State of Louisiana

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to Rule 30.4, the respondent herewith requests

that the time within which to respond to the petition for cer-

tiorari be extended 30 days, to and including April 5, 1996.

The petition for certiorari was served on and received by re-

spondent, the Honorable J. William Pucheu, District Attorney,

Parish of Evangeline, on February 14, 1996, and the brief in

opposition is now due, unless extended, on March 6, 1996.

This request is made necessary by the fact that on Febru-

ary 14, 1996, Mr. Pucheu contacted Tim Screen, Director,

Louisiana Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen-

eral, Criminal Division, and requested assistance in respond-

ing to the petition. Pursuant to that request, Mr. Screen has as-

signed the undersigned counsel to prepare a brief in

5a

opposition in the above-captioned matter. The undersigned is

scheduled to begin trial in State of Louisiana vs. Catherine A.

Doucet, Docket No. 9-93-1, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th

Judicial District Court, on three felony counts of theft of

$500.00 or more beginning on Monday, February 26, 1996, be-

fore the Honorable Bonnie Jackson, Judge, presiding, in Baton

Rouge, Louisiana. In order to adequately research legal issues

and to review relevant court documents and transcripts, the

undersigned hereby requests the extended period herein.

Petitioner’s counsel, Dmitrc I. Burnes, contacted this date

by telephone, has consented to this request for an extension.

Sincerely yours,

/s/Kathleen E. Petersen

KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN

Assistant Attorney General

Louisiana Department of Justice

Criminal Division

P.O. Box 94095

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095

(504) 342-7552

cc/ Mr. Dmitrc I. Burnes, Esq.

Hon. J. William Pucheu, D.A.

Mr. Richard W. Vidrine, Asst. D.A.

6a

APPENDIX C

LETTER TO KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN,

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL, FROM DMITRC I. BURNES

‘Burnes & Burnes

Attorneys at Law

Post Office Box 650

Alexandria, LA 71309-0650

Telephone (318)448-0482

Facsimile (318) 442-8600

Richard V. Burnes Street Address:

Dmitre Ian Burnes 711 Washington Street

E. Grey Talley Alexandria, LA 71301-8030

February 26, 1996

SENT VIA FACSIMILE (504) 342-7893

AND BY FIRST CLASS MAIL

Ms. Kathleen E. Petersen

Assistant Attorney General

Louisiana Department of Justice

Criminal Division

Post Office Box 94095

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095

Re: State of Louisiana v. Terry D. Campbell

Supreme Court of the United States

Docket Number 95-1240

Dear Ms. Petersen:

This letter confirms our telephone conversation of Friday,

February 23, 1996, wherein you advised me that you would be

handling the Terry Campbell case for the office of the Attor-

ney General. This letter also further confirms my agreement

to your request to include a statement of my lack of opposi-

tion to your planned request for an extension of time within

which to file your response to our Petition for a Writ of Certio-

rari to be filed with the United States Supreme Court.

7a

With best regards, I am

Very truly yours,

/s/Dmitre I. Burnes

DMITRC I. BURNES

DIB/ mal

cc: Mr. Terry Campbell 4

Mrs. Clara Campbell

8a

APPENDIX D

LETTER TO KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN,

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL FROM FRANCIS J. LORSON, CHIEF DEPUTY

CLERK, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543

William K. Suter Area Code 202

Clerk of the Court 479-3011

March 4, 1996

Kathleen E. Peterson

Assistant Attorney General

P. O. Box 94095

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095

Re: Terry Campbell v. Louisiana

No. 95-1240

Dear Ms. Peterson:

Your request for an extension of time within which to file

a response to the petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-

entitled case has been granted; the time has been extended to

and including April 5, 1996.

No further request for an extension of time will be enter-

tained by the Clerk.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk

By /s/ Francis J. Lorson

Francis J. Lorson

Chief Deputy Clerk

cc: Richard V. Burnes