Opinion — Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd.

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ROBERTSON v. RAILROAD LABOR BOARD.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

No. 739. Argued March 17, 18, 1925.—Decided June 8, 1925.

1. Section 310, par. b, of the Transportation Act, 1920, which provides

that the Railroad Labor Board, in case of failure to comply with

its subpoena to testify, may invoke the aid of “ any United States

District Court,” and that such court may thereupon order the

witness to comply with the subpoena, etc., is to be construed con-

sistently with the general rule limiting jurisdiction of a district

court im personam (as distinguished from venue) to the district

of which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he ean be

- found. P. 622.

_ 2. Hence a district court, in a suit brought by the Board to compel

attendance of a witness, does not acquire jurisdiction over his

F person by service of its process in another district even though

that of the witness’ residence. Jd.

33 Fed. (2d) 488, reversed.

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620 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S.

JURISDICTIONAL APPEAL from a decree of the District

Court overruling a motion to quash service of original

process in a suit brought by the Railroad Labor Board to

require the defendant to appear before it as a witness,

and ordering him so to appear and to testify.

Mr. Donald R. Richberg, with whom Mr. David E.

Lilienthal was on the brief, for the appellant.

Mr. Robert N. Golding, Special Assistant to the At-

torney General, with whom the Solicitor General and Mr.

Weymouth Kirkland, Special Assistant to the Attorney

General, were on the brief, for the appellee.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the

Court.

Transportation Act, 1920, February 28, 1920, c. 91,

§ 310, par. a, 41 Stat. 456, 472, authorizes the Railroad

Labor Board, “for the efficient administration of the

functions vested in” it, to require by subpoena “the

attendance of any witness . . from any place in the

United States at any designated place of hearing, and

the taking of a deposition before any person having

power to administer oaths.” Paragraph ‘b’ provides:

“Tn case of failure to comply with any subpoena [to

testify] or in case of the conitumacy of any witness

appearing before the Labor Board, the Board may invoke

the aid of any United States district court. Such court

may thereupon order the witness to comply with the

requirements of such subpoena, or to give evidence touch-

ing the matter in question, as the case may be.”

Pursuant to paragraph ‘ a’, the Board issued a subpoena

to Robertson, a citizen and inhabitant of Cleveland, Ohio,

commanding him to appear at its offices in Chicago, Illi-

nois, on a day named, to testify concerning a dispute then

being enquired into. The subpoena was served upon

ROBERTSON v. LABOR BOARD. §21

619 Opinion of the Court,

Robertson at Cleveland by the United States marshal for

the Northern District of Ohio. Robertson did not per-

sonally attend as commanded. But on the day named

he appeared specially by his attorney, and challenging the

jurisdiction of the Board over him, declined to appear and

testify. Thereupon this suit was begun by the Board in

the federal court for northern Illinois, Eastern Division,

pursuant to paragraph ‘b’.

The bill prayed that Robertson, the sole defendant, be

ordered to appear before the Labor Board “at a time and

place to be fixed by” it and make “full answer to any

and all pertinent questions relating” to the matter under

investigation, and for any other proper relief. The court

issued, in the form customary in equity, a summons,

directing the defendant to appear and answer. This

summons was likewise served upon Robertson personally

at Cleveland by the United States marshal for the North-

ern District of Ohio. By his attorney he again appeared

specially and moved to quash the service on the ground

that, being an inhabitant of Ohio and served there, he

was not subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court for

Illinois. The motion was overruled; Robertson then

moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction over

the subject-matter of the suit; this motion was also over-

ruled; Robertson declined to plead further; and a final

decree was entered directing him “to appear before the

Railroad Labor Board, upon due notice by said board,

at a time and place to be designated therein, there to

testify, to give evidence, and to give full, true and com-

plete answer and response to any and all pertinent and

relevant questions then and there propounded to him”

concerning the subject matter of the enquiry. 3 Fed.

(2d) 488. The case is here on appeal under § 238 of the

Judicial Code, the questions of jurisdiction having been

duly certified. Whether the court acquired jurisdiction

over Robertson is the only question requiring decision.

622 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S.

Robertson contends that by the term “any United

States district court” Congress meant any such court

-“of competent jurisdiction” ; and that, under the appli-

cable law, no district court is of competent jurisdiction to

compel a defendant to obey its decree except that of the

district of which he is an inhabitant or of one in which he

is found. The Board contends that Congress intended by

the phrase to confer not only liberty to invoke the aid of

the court for any district, but power to compel the person

named as defendant to litigate in the district selected by

the Board, although he is not a citizen or inhabitant of it

and is not found therein. The question presented is one

of statutory construction. Congress clearly has the power

to authorize a suit under a federal law to be brought in

any inferior federal court. Congress has power, likewise,

to provide that the process of every district court shall

run into every part of the United States. Toland v.

Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 328; United States v. Union Pacific

R. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 604. But it has not done so

either by any general law or in terms by § 310 of Trans-

portation Act, 1920. The precise question is whether it

has impliedly done so by that provision.

In a civil suit in personam jurisdiction over the defend-

ant, as distinguished from venue, implies, among other

things, either voluntary appearance by him or service of

process upon him at a place where the officer serving it has

authority to execute a writ of summons. Under the gen-

eral provisions of law, a United States district court can-

not issue process beyond the limits of the district, Hark-

ness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476; Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash.

456; and a defendant in a civil suit can be subjected to its

jurisdiction in personam only by service within the dis-

trict. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 330. Such was

the general rule established by the Judiciary Act of Sep-

tember 24, 1789, c. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79, in accordance

with the practice at the common law. Piquet v. Swan,

ROBERTSON v. LABOR BOARD. 623

619 Opinion of the Court,

5 Mason 35, 39 et seg. And such has been the general rule

ever since. Munter v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276, 279.

No distinction has been drawn between the case where

the plaintiff is the Government and where he is a private

citizen."

Section 51 of the Judicial Code is a general provision

regulating venue. The part pertinent here is that, with

certain inapplicable exceptions, “no civil suit shall be

brought in any district court against any person by any

original process or proceeding in any other district than

that whereof he is an inhabitant.” * It is obvious that

jurisdiction, in the sense of personal service within a dis-

trict where suit has been brought, does not dispense with

the necessity of proper venue. It is equally obvious that

proper venue does not eliminate the requisite of personal

jurisdiction over the defendant. The general provision

as to venue contained in Judicial Code, § 51, has been de-

parted from in various specific provisions which allow

the plaintiff, in actions not local in their nature, some

liberty in the selection of venue.’ Unrestricted choice was

conferred upon the Labor Board by the section of Trans-

1 United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 601;

United States v. Crawford, 47 Fed. 561.

2See Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496; Macon

Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 215 U.S. 501; Male v.

Atchison, etc. Ry. Co., 240 U. 8. 97. Compare In re Hohorst, 150

U. S. 653; Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 182; Barrow S. S.

Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100. The rule applies even where it may

result in barring the jurisdiction of every federal court because all

the defendants are indispensable parties. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How.

130, 140-142; Barney v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 280; Swan Land &

Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. 8. 603. Compare Clearwater v. Meredith,

21 How. 489; Camp v. Gress, 250 U. 8. 308, 311, 314. Judicial Code,

§§ 50, 52.

’ See, for example, Judicial Code, §§ 43, 44, 45, 48; Acts of March

4, 1909, c. 320, § 35, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084; October 15, 1914, c. 323,

§ 12, 38 Stat. 730, 736; June 5, 1920, c. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007;

September 7, 1916, c. 451, § 31, 39 Stat. 728, 738.

624 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S.

portation Act, 1920, here involved (§ 310). So far as

venue is concerned, there is no ambiguity in the words

“any United States district court.”

Congress has also made a few clearly expressed and

carefully guarded exceptions to the general rule of juris-

diction in personam stated above. In one instance, the

Credit Mobilier Act, March 3, 1873, c. 226, § 4, 17 Stat.

485, 509, it was provided that writs of subpoena to bring

in parties defendant should run into any district. This

broad power was to be exercised at the instance of the

Attorney General in a single case in which, in order to

give complete relief, it was necessary to join in one suit

defendants living in different States. United States v.

Union Pacific Railroad, 98 U. 8. 569. Under similar

circumstances, but only for the period of three years,

authority was granted generally by Act of September 19,

1922, c. 345, 42 Stat. 849, to institute a civil suit by, or on

behalf of, the United States, either in the district of the

residence of one of the necessary defendants or in that in

which the cause of action arose; and to serve the process

upon a defendant in any district. The Sherman Act, July

2, 1890, c. 647, § 5, 26 Stat. 209, 210, provides that when

“it shall appear to the court” in which a proceeding to

restrain violations of the Act is pending “ that the ends

of justice require that other parties should be brought be-

fore the court ” it may cause them to be summoned al-

though they reside in some other district. The Clayton

Act, October 15, 1914, ec. 323, § 15, 38 Stat. 730, 737, con-

tains a like provision. But no act has come to our atten-

tion in which such power has been conferred in a proceed-

ing in a circuit or district court * where a private citizen is

4 Even the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is subject to the

territorial limitation. Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 517. Although

the adjudication in one district brings the property of the bankrupt

wherever situated into custodia legis (Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U. S.

263), that court cannot issue an order upon a person in another

ROBERTSON v. LABOR BOARD. 625

619 Opinion of the Court,

the sole defendant and where the plaintiff is at liberty to

commence the suit in the district of which the defendant is

an inhabitant or in which he can be found.®

As the Railroad Labor Board is charged generally with

the adjustment of disputes between carriers and their

employees, it may prove desirable to hold hearings at any

place within the United States; and power to do so was

expressly conferred. The Board may demand answers or

the production of documentary evidence from one who

attends such a hearing. The contumacy of a witness

district, not a party to the proceeding, to deliver it up. See Acme

Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. 8. 300, 311-312; In re

Geller, 216 Fed. 558; Progressive Building & Loan Co. v. Hall, 220

Fed. 45; In re United States Chrysotile Asbestos Co., 253 Fed. 294.

Ancillary proceedings are brought in the other district. Babbit v.

Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102. Resort is likewise had to ancillary proceed-

ings to secure the evidence of a person living in another district.

Elkus, Petitioner, 216 U. S. 115.

The Commerce Court created by Act of June 18, 1910, ¢. 309, 36

Stat. 539, could issue process through the United States. P. 541.

Upon its repeal by Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219,

220, it was provided that the process of the applicable district court

might “run, be served, and be returnable anywhere in the United

States”; but the venue of suits in the district courts was narrowly

limited. See Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,

245 U.S. 493; Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557,

563; Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 528,

535. Compare Vicksburg, etc. Ry. Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co., 236

U.S. 408; Graustein v. Rutland R. Co., 256 Fed. 409.

-> Under the Materialmen’s Act, August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat.

278, as amended February 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811, the action

on the bond in the name of the United States must be brought in

the district in which the contract was to be performed. This Court

has held that jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants may be

secured by service of process upon them in whatever district they

may be found. United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222

U.S. 199, 203. Compare suits by a national bank against the Comp-

troller of the Currency. Judicial Code, § 49; First National Bank v.

Williams, 252 U. 8. 504, 509.

55627°—25——40

626 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court 268 U.S.

appearing before the Board in any designated place of

hearing was thus one contingency for which it was neces-

sary to make provision. Congress also granted to the

Labor Board in explicit language the broad power of

compelling a person to come from any place in the United

States to any designated place of hearing to furnish evi-

dence. The refusal of such person, who might be in any

district in the United States, to comply with such a sub-

poena was obviously a second contingency to be provided

for. Unrestricted liberty of venue in invoking the aid

of a district court, referred to before, was clearly essential

to the complete exercise of the Board’s powers and the

effective performance of its functions. Moreover, this

unrestricted choice cannot subject to undue hardship any

defendant actually found within the district in which the

suit is brought. But no reason is suggested why Congress

should have wished to compel every person summoned

either to obey the Board’s administrative order without

question, or to litigate his right to refuse to do so in such

district, however remote from his home or temporary

residence, as the Board might select. The Interstate

Commerce Commission which, throughout thirty-eight

years, has dealt in many different ways with most of the

railroads of the United States has never exercised, or

asserted, or sought to secure for itself, such broad powers.

® Compare Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22, § 6, 1 Stat. 333, 335; Rev.

Stat. § 876, as amended by Act of September 19, 1922, c. 344, 42

Stat. 848: also Acts of February 10, 1891, c. 128, 26 Stat. 743; July

15, 1913, c. 6, § 5, 38 Stat. 103, 106; September 26, 1914, c. 311, § 9,

38 Stat. 717, 722; October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 13, 38 Stat. 730, 736;

September 8, 1916, c. 463, § 706, 39 Stat. 756, 797; February 5, 1917,

c. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886; October 6, 1917, c. 105, 40 Stat. 398,

399; October 22, 1919, c. 80, § 105, 41 Stat. 297, 300; June 10, 1920,

c. 285, § 4(g), 41 Stat. 1063, 1067; November 23, 1921, c. 136, § 1308,

42 Stat. 227, 310; September 21, 1922, c. 389, § 6 (b), 42 Stat. 998,

1002; June 2, 1924, c. 234, § 1004, 43 Stat. 258, 340; June 7, 1924,

c. 320, § 8, 43 Stat. 607, 609.

ROBERTSON v. LABOR BOARD. 627

619 Opinion of the Court,

We are of opinion that by the phrase “any District

Court of the United States” Congress meant any such

court “of competent jurisdiction.” The phrase “any

court” is frequently used in the federal statutes and has

been interpreted under similar circumstances as meaning

“any court of competent jurisdiction.”* By the general

rule the jurisdiction of a district court in personam has

been limited to the district of which the defendant is an

inhabitant or in which he can be found. It would be an

extraordinary thing if, while guarding so carefully all

departure from the general rule, Congress had conferred

the exceptional power here invoked upon a board whose

functions are purely advisory (Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v.

Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72; Pennsylvania R. R. System

Federation No. 99 v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 267 U. S.

203) and which enters the district court, not to enforce

a substantive right, but in an auxiliary proceeding to

secure evidence from one who may be a stranger to the

matter with which the Board is dealing. We think it has

made no such extension by § 310 of Transportation Act,

1920. It is not lightly to be assumed that Congress in-

tended to depart from a long established policy. Panama

Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 384; In re East

River Towing Co., 266 U. 8. 355, 367.

Reversed.

T Rev. Stat. § 4284; Ex parte Slayton, 105 U. S. 451; In re Louis-

ville & Cincinnati Packet Co., 223 Fed. 185; Rev. Stat. § 2103;

United States v. Crawford, 47 Fed. 561. Compare Rev. Stat. § 1042;

United States v. Mills, 11 App. D. C. 500, 504-507. The phrase has

been used in other statutes in conferring the right to invoke judicial

aid in compelling attendance as a witness. See statutes in note 6,

supra,