Opinion — Pearson v. United States

ad. = - be. 41 ee

PEARSON ET VIR v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 264. Argued January 28, 1925.—Decided March 2, 1925.

Where the Government erected and used buldings on leased land

with the oral permission of the lessee, and subsequently removed

them, although the lessors contended that the right to do so had

expired by the terms of the lease, held; (a) That, in the absence

of proof that the Government had knowledge of the terms of

the lease or of the lessors’ acquiescence in the user, no relation

424 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 267 U.S.

of landlord and tenant existed between the lessors and the United

States under the lease from which an agreement of the latter

to pay for the property could be implied. P. 426. (b) The Gov-

ernment having removed the buildings under claim of right, no

agreement to pay as for property taken for public use could be

implied. P. 427.

58 Ct. Cls. 485, affirmed.

AppeaL from a judgment of the Court of Claims dis-

missing the petition on demurrer

Mr. George F. Williams, with whom Mr. Henry C.

Clark was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Alfred A. Wheat,

Special Assistant to the Attorney General, were on the

brief for the United States.

Mr. Justice SAnrorp delivered the opinion of the

Court.

This action was brought under the Tucker Act* by

Margaret W. Pearson and her husband to recover the

value of buildings and improvements erected by the

War Department on leased premises and removed after

the expiration of the lease. The United States demurred

to the petition on the ground that it did not state a

cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court. The

demurrer was sustained, and the petition dismissed. 58

Ct. Cls. 485.

The petition shows the following facts: On September

11, 1917, the claimants leased to the Chamber of Com-

merce of Jacksonville, Florida, a tract of land, to be used

solely for federal cxmp purposes, for the maximum term

of three years. The lease provided that all buildings

and improvements placed upon the land during said

term by the lessee, its successors or assigns, should re-

* Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, ¢. 359; Jud. Code, § 145.

Sects enn eS

PEARSON v. UNITED STATES. 425

423 Opinion of the Court.

main “ the exclusive property of the lessee, its successors

or assigns,” and might be removed within the period

of three months after the expiration of the lease.

Shortly after the execution of the lease the Chamber of

Commerce agreed “ verbally ” with the War Department

that the land might be used and occupied as a portion of

a training camp for United States troops; and the

claimants acquiesced in and consented to its use and oc-

cupancy by the United States under and subject to the

terms, conditions and provisions of the lease. The land

was thereafter included in Camp Joseph E. Johnston.

The War Department erected thereon a base hospital,

homes for nurses and other buildings, and placed exten-

sive improvements thereon. By a general provision in

an Act of March 3, 1919,” this and other Camp hospitals

were “ permanently transferred to the Treasury Depart-

ment for the use of the Public Health Service,” with so

much of their equipment, sites and leases, and such other

buildings and land as might be required. The lease to

the Chamber of Commerce expired on September 11,

1920. On December 9, 1920, the plaintiff's attorney

wrote the Commanding Officer of Camp Johnston that

by the terms of the lease all right of occupation and of

entry and removal of buildings would cease on Decem-

ber 11, and that on that date the property should be

finally surrendered to the plaintiffs without further re-

moval or molestation of any of the property remaining

thereon; and suggesting a conference in reference to the

matter. The Commanding Officer replied to him that

the hospital had been transferred to the Public Health

Service, to which his letter had been referred, and with

which the matter should be taken up. After some fur-

ther correspondence, the Surgeon General of the Public

Health Service, on March 28, 1921, wrote the claimants’

* 40 Stat. 1302, ¢. 98, § 2.

OER we en “ EO SATIN 5 BEM

424 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 267 U.S.

of landlord and tenant existed between the lessors and the United

States under the lease from which an agreement of the latter

to pay for the property could be implied. P. 426. (b) The Gov-

ernment having removed the buildings under claim of right, no

agreement to pay as for property taken for public use could be

implied. P. 427.

58 Ct. Cls. 485, affirmed.

AppgaL from a judgment of the Court of Claims dis-

missing the petition on demurrer

Mr. George F. Williams, with whom Mr. Henry C.

Clark was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Alfred A. Wheat,

Special Assistant to the Attorney General, were on the

brief for the United States.

Mr. Justice SANForp delivered the opinion of the

Court.

This action was brought under the Tucker Act* by

Margaret W. Pearson and her husband to recover the

value of buildings and improvements erected by the

War Department on leased premises and removed after

the expiration of the lease. The United States demurred

to the petition on the ground that it did not state a

cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court. The

demurrer was sustained, and the petition dismissed. 58

Ct. Cls. 485.

The petition shows the following facts: On September

11, 1917, the claimants leased to the Chamber of Com-

merce of Jacksonville, Florida, a tract of land, to be used

solely for federal camp purposes, for the maximum term

of three years. The lease provided that all buildings

and improvements placed upon the land during said

term by the lessee, its successors or assigns, should re-

* Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, ¢. 359; Jud. Code, $ 145.

PEARSON v. UNITED STATES. 425

423 Opinion of the Court.

main “ the exclusive property of the lessee, its successors

or assigns,” and might be removed within the period

of three months after the expiration of the lease.

Shortly after the execution of the lease the Chamber of

Commerce agreed “ verbally ” with the War Department

that the land might be used and occupied as a portion of

a training camp for United States troops; and the

claimants acquiesced in and consented to its use and oc-

cupancy by the United States under and subject to the

terms, conditions and provisions of the lease. The land

was thereafter included in Camp Joseph E. Johnston.

The War Department erected thereon a base hospital,

homes for nurses and other buildings, and placed exten-

sive improvements thereon. By a general provision in

an Act of March 3, 1919,’ this and other Camp hospitals

were “ permanently transferred to the Treasury Depart-

ment for the use of the Public Health Service,” with so

much of their equipment, sites and leases, and such other

buildings and land as might be required. The lease to

the Chamber of Commerce expired on September 11,

1920. On December 9, 1920, the plaintiff's attorney

wrote the Commanding Officer of Camp Johnston that

by the terms of the lease all right of occupation and of

entry and removal of buildings would cease on Decem-

ber 11, and that on that date the property should be

finally surrendered to the plaintiffs without further re-

moval or molestation of any of the property remaining

thereon; and suggesting a conference in reference to the

matter. The Commanding Officer replied to him that

the hospital had been transferred to the Public Health

Service, to which his letter had been referred, and with

which the matter should be taken up. After some fur-

ther correspondence, the Surgeon General of the Public

Health Service, on March 28, 1921, wrote the claimants’

740 Stat. 1302, c. 98, § 2.

426 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of, the Court. 267 U.S.

attorney, describing the land as the Pearson Tract “ oc-

cupied by the United States,” and stating that: “ Owing

to the necessity of salvaging certain materials placed

upon the property by the Government and now needed

elsewhere for hospital purposes, the use of the premises

will be required until about May 1, 1921.” On April 6

the claimants’ attorney replied reiterating the claim that

under the terms of the lease all buildings, etc., were then

part of the property and legally were no longer subject

to removal; and suggesting a conference and proper

adjustment of the matter. Without replying to this

letter the Public Health Service continued to tear down

and remove all the buildings and improvements that had

been placed upon the land, and completed such removal

by the end of June, 1921.

The petition alleges that the value of the buildings and

improvements thus removed exceeds $100,000, and prays

judgment against the United States for the full value

of the property “removed as aforesaid from said lands

in violation of the rights of petitioners.”

1. The petition does not allege any contract by the

United States, either express or implied in fact, to pay

the claimants the value of the buildings and improve-

ments removed by it. Nor does it set forth facts on

which such a contract will be implied. It does not ap-

pear from the petition that the United States stood in

any contractual relation with the claimants, as an as-

signee of the lease or otherwise. On the contrary it

appears that it merely used the land under the oral per-

mission of the Chamber of Commerce. And while the

claimants allege, in general terms, that they acquiesced

in and consented to such use and occupancy subject to

the terms of the lease, it is not shown that the War De-

partment either knew this fact or had any knowledge of

the terms of the lease. Therefore, whatever may be the

construction and effect of the lease as to the right of

LANCASTER v. McCARTY. 427

423 Syllabus.

removing buildings and improvements, or the implied

obligation of the lessee or its assigns in regard thereto,

the petition fails to show that as between the claimants

and the United States there existed any relationship of

landlord and tenant under the lease from which an

agreement to pay for the property can be implied.

2. The petition shows no ground of recovery on an

implied agreement upon the part of the Government to

pay the claimants for property taken for public use. No

recognition of the plaintiffs’ title is alleged in the peti-

tion. On the contrary the facts shown plainly indicate

that the buildings and improvements were removed by

the Government as its own property under the claim of

right. Under these circumstances no agreement to pay

for them can be implied. Whether the Government’s

claim was well or ill founded, is immaterial. If it was

unfounded, and the claimants’ property rights violated,

the cause of action therefor would be one sounding in

tort, for which the Tucker Act affords no remedy. Klebe

v. United States, 263 U.S. 188, 191, and cases cited.

The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the judg-

ment is

Affirmed.