Petition for Writ of Certiorari — California v. Binda

95-16 95e.

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

and

DANIEL E. LUNGREN,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,,

Petitioner,

BRET CRAIG BINDA, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Attorney General

GEORGE WILLIAMSON

Chief Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT R. ANDERSON

Senior Assistant Attorney General

HARRY JOSEPH COLOMBO

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

ALAN ASHBY

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

1300 I St., Suite 125

P.O. Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Telephone: (916) 324-5183

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Can the Fourth Amendment tolerate a double

standard for the search or seizure of an operable vehicle

depending on whether the search or seizure is based on

probable cause to believe the vehicle contains criminal

evidence or probable cause to believe the vehicle is a

forfeitable asset?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OPINION OR JUDGMENT BELOW 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 2

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES OR

REGULATIONS 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

ARGUMENT 5

A SINGLE FOURTH AMENDMENT

STANDARD MUST APPLY TO THE

WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF AN

OPERABLE VEHICLE REGARDLESS OF

WHETHER THE VEHICLE IS SEIZED TO

SEAP.CH FOR CRIMINAL EVIDENCE OR

AS A FORFEITABLE ASSET b)

INTRODUCTION a

DISCUSSION 6

CONCLUSION 14

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Cady v. Dombrowski

413 U.S. 433 (1973)

California v. Carney

471 U.S. 386 (1985)

California v. Greenwood

486 U.S. 325 (1988)

Carroll v. United States

267 U.S. 132 (1925)

Chambers v. Maroney

399 U.S. 42 (1970)

Davis v. State

813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991)

Florida v. Meyers

466 U.S. 380 (1984)

Fuqua v. Armor

543 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1976)

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States

429 U.S. 338 (1977)

In Re 1972 Porsche

307 So.2d 451 (Fla.App.1975)

12

6; 7, 1% ia

1]

a Fi, iz

~~]

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT'D

In re Lance W.

37 Cal.3d 873 (1985)

Michigan v. Thomas

458 U.S. 259 (1982)

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co.

18 How 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856)

O’Reilly v. United States

486 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1973)

One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania

380 U.S. 693 (1965)

One 1975 Pontiac LeMans

621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980)

People v. Alvarado

181 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 (1986)

People v. Franco

183 Cal.App.3d 1089 (1986)

People v. Neer

177 Cal.App.3d 991 (1986)

State Conservation Dept. v. Seaman

396 Mich. 299, 240 N.W.2d 206 (1976)

State v. Brickhouse

890 P.2d 353 (Kan.App. 1995)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT’D

State v. McFadden

63 Wash.App. 441, 820 P.2d 53 (1991)

State v. Peacher

167 W.V. 566, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981)

Texas v. White

423 U.S. 67 (1975)

United States v. $29,000--U.S. Currency

745 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1984)

United States v. Daccarett

6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993)

United States v. Francolino

367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966)

United States v. Hamilton

792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986)

United States v. Hatley

15 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1994)

United States v. Karp

508 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974)

United States v. Lasanta

978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992)

United States v. Linn

880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989)

6

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT’D

United States v. McCormick

502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) 4,8

United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe

643 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984) 8

United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz

711 F.2d 1297 (Sth Cir. 1983) 8

United States v. One 1980 Red Ferran

875 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1989) 7

United States v. Pace

898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990) 1 Ag

United States v. Ross

456 U.S. 798 (1982) 6, 7, 10, 11, 13

United States v. Seifuddin

820 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1987) 7

United States v. Spetz

721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983) 9, 11

United States v. Stout

434 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1970) 8

United States v. Valdes

876 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1989) 8

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT’D

Constitutional Provisions

Fourth Amendment

Statutes

California Penal Code Sections

995

1538.5

11377

11379

United States Code

tit. 28, §1257, subd.(a)

Court Rules

passim

WW Ww WH

Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States

rule 10

Other Authorities

3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d ed. 1987)

8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

No.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

and

DANIEL E. LUNGREN,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,,

Petitioner,

. -

BRET CRAIG BINDA, Respondent.

OPINION OR JUDGMENT BELOW

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the order of the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirming the trial court

judgment of dismissal of criminal charges against Bret

Craig Binda, defendant and respondent (hereinafter

"defendant"), for transportation and possession of

methamphetamine following defendant’s successful

motion to suppress evidence. (See Appendix, item 1.)

The decision, which was unpubiished, was designated

case number F021529 by the Court of Appeal.

Defendant was originally charged in information number

263845 of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County,

California.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under section 1257,

subdivision (a), of Title 28 of the United States Code

and Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States.

The opinion by the Fifth Appellate District of

the California Court of Appeal concerning which a writ

of certiorari is sought by petitioner was filed on

September 28, 1995. A modification of this opinion was

filed on October 25, 1995.

The California Supreme Court denied a petition

for review on December 21, 1995.

In a letter dated March 20, 1996, referencing

Application No. A-781, Assistant Clerk Melissa A.

Blalock informed petitioner that the Honorable Justice

Sandra Day O’Connor had granted an extension of time

within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in

this matter to and including April 19, 1996.

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES OR REGULATIONS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 21, 1992, officers of the Modesto,

California, Police Department seized a van being driven

on a public street by defendant because they had

probable cause to believe the van was a forfeitable asset

in that it was the fruit of narcotics transactions. The

officers lacked a warrant. The sufficiency of the

probable cause was not questioned at any stage of the

subsequent proceedings. Methamphetamine was found

inside the van during an inventory search.

Defendant was charged with violation of

California Penal Code sections 11377 and 11379,

possession and transportation of methamphetamine

respectively.

After a hearing, the trial court granted

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence (Cal. Pen. Code,

§ 1538.5) based on the claim that the van was

improperly seized. Defendant’s argument included the

contention that the seizure violated the Fourth

Amendment. See Appendix No. 1, slip opinion of Court

of Appeal, p. 7, last 2 sentences. The trial court

thereupon ordered the matter dismissed for insufficient

evidence on March 3, 1994, pursuant to California Penal

Code section 995.

Petitioner sought relief in an appeal filed with

the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District.

The constitutionality of the seizure was fully addressed by

both parties in the briefing before the Court of Appeal.

In an unpublished opinion filed on September

28, 1995, the Court of Appeal denied the appeal and

affirmed the judgment below. A modification was filed

to the opinion on October 25, 1995, in response to the

People’s Petition for Rehearing”

The decision by the Court of Appeal addressed

and was based upon the federal constitutional question;

the court first rejected a theory proposed by petitioner

to the effect that state law permitted the seizure, found

that there were no exigent circumstances present when

the van was stopped, and adopted the reasoning and

1. The thrust of the modification was to delete all language

pertaining to a possible alternate theory justifying suppression,

namely that the asset forfeiture theory was a pretext masking an

intent to search for criminal evidence.

holding of United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th

Cir. 1974)2 The finding regarding the absence of

exigent circumstances was based on evidence that the

officers had been aware of the facts supporting probable

cause for three months before the van was seized.

~The California Supreme Court denied

petitioner’s Petition for Review on December 21, 1995.

This petition follows.

2. Under California law, motions to suppress evidence may

only be based on a claim that the search and/or seizure violated the

Federal Constitution. Jn re Lance W., 37 Cal.3d 873, 882, 886-887

(1985). This Court has acknowledged this rule and implicitly

approved its implications. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 325,

337-338 (1988). The rule holds even where evidence has been

seized by officers who act in excess of their authority and in

violation of state law, so long as the defendant’s rights under the

Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution are not violated.

People v. Franco, 183 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1095 (1986); People v.

Alvarado, 181 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5 (1986); People v. Neer, 177

Cal.App.3d 991, 997-999 (1986).

California voters, in short, have rejected use of the

exclusionary rule as a remedy for official "misconduct" unless

compelled by the federal Constitution.

Thus the finding by the Court of Appeal that the officers’

conduct was not authorized by state law may not be the basis of a

suppression order; the only question is whether the officers’ conduct

violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeal properly,

and necessarily, reached this question, but resolved it incorrectly.

It should be noted that this case does not involve the

question of whether the state may lawfully take permanent

possession of a vehicle seized in violation of state law, but only

whether evidence found therein is admissible.

ARGUMENT

A SINGLE FOURTH AMENDMENT

STANDARD MUST APPLY TO THE

WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF AN

OPERABLE VEHICLE REGARDLESS OF

WHETHER THE VEHICLE IS SEIZED TO

SEARCH FOR CRIMINAL EVIDENCE OR

AS A FORFEITABLE ASSET

INTRODUCTION

Where police have probable cause to search an

operable motor vehicle for criminal evidence, no showing

of exigency is required to justify a warrantless search. A

split has emerged among the federal courts of appeals,

however, over whether a specific showing of exigency is

required before the warrant requirement will be excused

where police have probable cause to seize the vehicle as

a forfeitable asset.

Petitioner submits that this case presents in

unusually pristine form the question of whether the

federal Constitution is disturbed where officers, without

exigent circumstances, make a warrantless seizure of an

operable vehicle on probable cause to believe the vehicle

is a forfeitable asset. While the Ninth and Second

circuits have so held, eight others have taken a contrary

position. State Courts are similarly divided.

Petitioner submits that this irreconcilable split

has existed for more than 20 years, is ripe for resolution,

and involves a fundamental question of constitutional

doctrine which is compelling.

DISCUSSION

A series of cases by this Court has established

that no showing of exigent circumstances need be made

where officers search an operable vehicle without a

warrant based on probable cause to believe that criminal

evidence may be found in the vehicle. See, ¢.g.,

California v. Carey, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) [motor

home on public parking lot}; Florida v. Meyers, 466 US.

380, 381, 383 (1984) [impounded vehicle]; Michigan v.

Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) [impounded vehicle]; United

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) [closed compartment

of impounded vehicle}; Texas v. White, 423 US. 67

(1975) [impounded vehicle]; Chambers v. Maroney, 399

U.S. 42 (1970) [impounded vehicle]; these cases will be

hereinafter referred to as the Camey-Ross line.

While the multiplicity of cases in this line

demonstrates that this doctrine is well established, it also

demonstrates that this Court has perceived an ongoing

uncertainty about the application of the Fourth

Amendment to warrantless searches and seizures of

automobiles. The split among the circuits on the

question presented by this petition demonstrates that that

uncertainty is not yet completely resolved; petitioner

submits that resolution by this Court is required.

The Ninth Circuit, like all circuits, has embraced

the Camney-Ross doctrine. United States v. Hatley, 15

F.3d 856, 858-859 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 842-843 (9th Cir. 1986).

Where there is a seizure of a forfeitable asset,

as distinguished from a seizure for purposes of a search

for criminal evidence, this Court has held that Fourth

Amendment protections and a probable cause test are

applicable. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,

380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965)*; see also United States v. One

1980 Red Ferrari, 875 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1989);

United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

1987); see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429

U.S. 338, 352 (1977); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land

& Improv. Co., 18 How 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856).

It would follow, therefore, that where the same

constitutional protection is involved, the same standard

of exigency (or lack thereof) should apply. Thus where

there is to be a seizure of an operable vehicle as a

forfeitable asset, no further showing of exigency need be

made and the only question on review is the sufficiency

of the probable cause to believe that the vehicle is

actually subject to forfeiture.

However, notwithstanding the Camey-Ross line

of cases, a split has arisen among the federal circuit

courts as to the nature of the exigency which must be

shown. The majority of the circuits have adopted the

Camey-Ross test -- that the exigency requirement is

satisfied once officers determine that the item to be

seized for asset forfeiture purposes is an operable motor

vehicle. The strongest recent case in this line is probably

United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1241 (7th Cir.

1990). The Seventh Circuit has been joined by the First,

3. The facts of 1958 Plymouth somewhat parallel those of this

petition. A low-riding vehicle suspected of containing unlicensed

liquor was stopped by officers of the state Liquor Control Board

acting on probable cause without a warrant. A proceeding was

initiated to forfeit the car based on the discovery of the unlicensed

liquor. The lower courts rejected the claim of the vehicle’s owner

that the exclusionary rule must be applied appropriate to evidence

supporting probable cause. This Court held that the Fourth

Amendment applied to the seizure and that the exclusionary rule

could be applied, and remanded for consideration of the sufficiency

of the probable cause.

Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits,

a total of eight circuits. Representative cases from those

circuits, identified in numerical order of the circuits, are

One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir.

1980}, United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V

Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v.

$29,000--U.S. Currency, 745 F.2d 853, 856 (4th Cir. 1984);

United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297,

1302 (Sth Cir. 1983); O'Reilly v. United States, 486 F.2d

208 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264

(10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554,

1558-60 (11th Cir. 1989)*

"It is difficult to ignore this general acceptance,"

the Pace court noted. United States v. Pace, supra, 898

F.2d at p. 1242; see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and

Seizure, § 7.3(b), at p. 83 (2d ed. 1987).

An alternate line has developed in the Ninth

and Second Circuits, however, which imposes a higher

standard of exigency -- not only must the People show

that the item to be seized is an operable vehicle, but

they must make some further showing of exigency to the

effect that the vehicle is likely to disappear or be

concealed if officers delay the seizure to obtain a

warrant. The seminal case in this line is United States v.

McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285-287 (9th Cir. 1974).

McCormick was followed in order in the Ninth Circuit by

4. The First Circuit’s position may be clouded. See U.S. v.

Pace, supra, 898 F.2d at p. 1241, fn. 10.

5. Petitioner is aware of no cases addressing this question in

the Sixth, Seventh, or Ninth circuits.

Bees yell de

United States v. Karp, 508 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974)°;

United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1471 (9th Cir.

1983); and United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 215 (9th

Cir. 1989).

The Second Circuit joined the Ninth in the

strident language of United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d

1300 (2d Cir. 1992), a case which fails to acknowledge

that it departs from well-established precedent in that

circuit. See United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013

(2d Cir. 1966). Lasanta was recently followed by United

States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1993).

The same split may be found in the state

courts. See generally the discussion in State v.

Brickhouse, 890 P.2d 353, 360-364 (Kan.App. 1995).

Some, like Brickhouse, are in accord with Pace and do

not require exigent circumstances. See, e.g., State v.

McFadden, 63 Wash.App. 441, 449, 820 P.2d 53 (1991).

Others, by various avenues of reasoning, are in accord

with McCormick. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178,

1181-1184 (Utah 1991); State v. Peacher, 167 W.V. 566,

280 S.E.2d 559, 576-579 (1981) [exigent circumstances

sufficient]; Fuqua v. Armor, 543 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1976)

[absence of exigent circumstances invalidated seizure};

State Conservation Dept. v. Seaman, 396 Mich. 299, 321,

240 N.W.2d 206, 213, 216 (1976) [same; moored fishing

boat]; Jn Re 1972 Porsche, 307 So.2d 451 (Fla.App.1975)

[seizure invalidated; exigent circumstances and probable

cause both lacking].

There exists, therefore, a well-established split

among the circuits and states on this question. Petitioner

submits there is a compelling need for uniform

6. Karp expressly acknowledged that the court has established

a new rule departing from precedent in other circuits, identifying

several cases with which it was in disagreement. Jd., at p. 1125.

10

application of fundamental constitutional doctrine in this

area.

Petitioner submits that there can be only one

Fourth Amendment standard for a search or seizure

based on probable cause, and there can accordingly be

only one standard for the showing of exigency required

to excuse the general warrant requirement. It defies

reason to hold that there can coexist two Fourth

Amendment constitutional standards, one applicable to

probable cause vehicle seizures and searches for criminal!

evidence and one applicable to probable cause seizures

of a vehicle which is a forfeitable asset.

Nonetheless the two lines have gone their

separate ways; when an opportunity came for them to

join, in fact, the Ninth Circuit took a wrong turn, as

demonstrated by this quotation from United States v.

Spetz, supra, 721 F.2d 1457, written after Ross was filed:

"Although automobiles are inherently mobile,

‘(t]he word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose

presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and

disappears.’ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US.

[443] at 471-62, 91 S.Ct. at 2035 [1971]. The

existence of probable cause standing alone is not

sufficient to justify a warrantless search or seizure of

an automobile. A warrantless search or seizure is

permissible only if probable cause exists and the

facts or circumstances surrounding the particular

search of an automobile are sufficient to bring that

search within the automobile exception. It is an

understatement to observe that the contours of the

automobile exception are not clearly defined.

[Footnote omitted.] In fact, we have previously

noted the impossibility of reconciling the Supreme

Court’s decisions in this area. United States v.

McClain, 531 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir., cert. denied,

1]

429 U.S. 835, 97 S.Ct. 102, 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976).”

United States v. Spetz, supra, 721 F.2d at p. 1471,

emphasis in original.”

The reasons for this uncertainty by the Ninth

Circuit appear to be historical. The emergence of the

Carney-Ross line caused lower courts to reconsider their

positions on searches of vehicles for criminal evidence.

There had already been in place, however, a venerable

line permitting forfeiture seizures of vehicles which began

when the Supreme Court authorized the warrantless

seizure of bootleggers’ vehicles based on probable cause:

"On reason and authority the true rule is

that if the search and seizure without a warrant

are made upon probable cause . . . [to believe]

that an automobile or other vehicle contains

that which by law is subject to seizure and

destruction [alcoholic beverages], the search and

seizure are valid." Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

However, as noted in California v. Camey,

supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 390-391, the mobility of an

automobile was "clearly the basis of the holding in

Carroll" and some subsequent cases supporting the

automobile exception appeared to hold that if there were

no specific exigent circumstances associated with the

automobile a warrant may be required.

Thus, in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S.

42, this language may be found:

7. In fairness to the authors of Spetz, others have

acknowledged that automobile searches have been "a troubled area."

See Concurring opinion by Blackmun, J., United States v. Ross,

supra, 456 U.S. at p. 825.

12

"Neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this

Court require or suggest that in every conceivable

circumstances the search of an auto even with

probable cause may be made without the extra

protection for privacy that a warrant affords. But

the circumstances that furnish probable cause to

search a particular auto for particular articles are

most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity

to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.

Where this is true, as in Carroll and the case before

us now, if an effective search is to be made at any

time, either the search must be made immediately

without a warrant or the car itself must be seized

and held without a warrant for whatever period is

necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.

[footnote citing Chimel v. California 395 U.S. 752,

794 n. 9 (1969)]." (Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399

U.S. at pp. 50-51.

It subsequently came to be recognized, however,

that the automobile exception was supported not only by

the mobility of a vehicle but the fact that one’s

expectation of privacy in a vehicle is "significantly less"

than that in a home or office. California v. Carney,

supra, 471 U.S. at p. 391, principally citing South Dakota

v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, and Cady v.

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973).

As expressed by this Court:

"In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation,

which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of

8. In Chambers, the court affirmed the warrantless search of

a vehicle taken to the station house after its occupants had been

arrested for robbery because a field search would have been

"impractical.". Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at p. 52, n. 10.

> tet day aebonnibeall

13

privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready

mobility justify searches without prior recourse to

the authority of a magistrate so long as the

overriding standard of probable cause is met.”

California v. Carey, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 391.

Thus the Camey-Ross line _ effectively

extinguished the possibility that a warrant might be

required before an operable vehicle could be subject to

a probable cause search for criminal evidence.

Petitioner submits that this Court must do the

same for the probable cause seizure of an operable

vehicle which is a forfeitable asset.

14

CONCLUSION

An irreconcilable conflict exists among the

federal courts of appeal and many state courts on an

issue of fundamental constitutional law. Petitioner

respectfully submits that this Court must resolve the

conflict by holding that no showing of exigency is

required where an operable vehicle is seized without a

warrant on probable cause to believe that it is a

forfeitable asset.

Dated: April 16, 1996.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Attorney General

GEORGE WILLIAMSON

Chief Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT R. ANDERSON

Senior Assistant Attorney General

HARRY JOSEPH COLOMBO

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

(Ni Ast Or

ALAN ASHBY /

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioner

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SA96US0001