Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ben Yahweh v. United States
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Supreme Court, U.c
ny FILED
96 101 JUL 17 19%
No. office OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1995
¢
YAHWEH BEN YAHWEH, a/k/a,
ROBERT LOUIS BEASLEY, JR., a/k/a DAN ISRAEL,
RUFUS PACE, a/k/a AHAZ ISRAEL,
ERNEST LEE JAMES, a/k/a AHINADAB ISRAEL,
RICHARD INGRAHAM, a/k/a JOB ISRAEL,
LINDA GAINES, a/k/a JUDITH ISRAEL,
WALTER LIGHTBURN, a/k/a AMRI ISRAEL,
Petitioners,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
¢
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
7
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¢
Benepict P. KUEHNE
Counsel of Record
SALE & KUEHNE, P.A.
NationsBank Tower, Suite 2100
100 S.E. 2d Street
Miami, Florida 33131-2154
Telephone: 305/789-5989
Fax: 305/789-5987
Email: ben.kuehne@counsel.com
Counsel for Petitioners
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
sd Bie ns thy dota Da i Neh Ps tatoo Band
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does the prosecution of a legitimate religious
organization as an enterprise for purposes of a racketeer-
ing conspiracy violate fundamental notions of religious
freedom and extend beyond the ambit of the RICO stat-
ute?
2. Can trial courts be permitted to utilize a supple-
mental jury instruction to encourage the jury to reach a
verdict, even after the jury several times announced its
inability to reach a verdict and after the court was aware
of the jury’s numerical division?
ii
LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to the proceedings in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed are:
Robert Louis Beasley, Jr.
Linda Gaines, a/k/a Judith Israel
Richard Ingraham, a/k/a Job Israel
Ernest Lee James, a/k/a Ahinadab Israel
Walter Lightburn, a/k/a Amri Israel
Rufus Pace, a/k/a Ahaz Israel
United States of America
Yahweh Ben Yahweh
No corporate entities are parties to this proceeding.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........... i
ee enV a. yeh aah Ves eeeehdeedvsce ci ii
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A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.. 2
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 7
I.
IDENTIFYING A LEGITIMATE RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION AS AN ENTERPRISE FOR PUR-
POSES OF PROSECUTION OF A RACKETEERING
CONSPIRACY IS NOT WITHIN THE AMBIT OF
THE RICO STATUTE AND VIOLATES FUNDA-
MENTAL NOTIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8
II.
THE USE OF A SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUC-
TION COMING AFTER THE JURY SEVERAL
TIMES ANNOUNCED ITS INABILITY TO REACH
A VERDICT AND AFTER THE COURT WAS
AWARE OF THE JURY’S NUMERICAL DIVISION,
MUST BE PROHIBITED AS AN UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL COERCION OF THE RESULTING VER-
Ca aah cose bhp kee e ee ee hesnanceeevioees 12
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) ....4, 12, 13
Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926)...
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1905)......
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).........
H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492
US: CO 040 ee cee
Jimenez v. Myers, 40 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, __, U.S. __, 115 Si Ct. 60 (1994)......
Lawson v. Dugger, 844 FSupp. 1538 (S.D. Fla.
ROPE e ctv < FUN shies chee HesStR ie et arndeeees
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510
LS. SO 000 SS Boos sk ee ee
United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 640.(1963) .... . 0 cccisercvcsces
United States v. Beasley, 73 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir.
i ESP ER ELST REE STEP Ee Fed LUE EER See EVIE NE
United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 1092 (1983)........
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).....
United States v. Webb, 816 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir.
i SEMPER TPE Oke ORE Pee he PPro ET Lee ae
United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985)........
Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995) ....
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ..........
eR
Page
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
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So ais og akg hue GLa ES ELE Wk 2
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STATUTES
18 U.S.C
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| RR ree rer ty meme rer ope oe SS CPt Re
28 U.S.C
MRL G CUCM ahs Peed PoE RRR OLE ORs W TORE OEE A 1
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C.
DES Sine Wh 4CCKs bees 0 ad SA oe oa ae 2
DE a evccpedekustheenes sea becca oes 2, 9, 10
OTHER AUTHORITY
Melton, G.J., The Encyclopedia of American Reli-
po eo A. . RRR err me pen ere 8
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners in this case are Yahweh Ben Yahweh,
Robert Lewis Beasley, Jr., a/k/a Dan Israel, Rufus Pace,
a/k/a Ahaz Israel, Ernest Lee James, a/k/a Ahinadad
Israel, Richard Ingraham, a/k/a Job Israel, Linda Gaines,
a/k/a Judith Israel, and Walter Lightburn, a/k/a Amri
Israel. Petitioners request that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
+
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit affirming peti-
tioner’s convictions is reported as United States v. Beasley,
73 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir. 1996).
4
JURISDICTION
On January 5, 1996, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
petitioners’ convictions and sentences imposed by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing and
rehearing en banc on April 18, 1996. Petitioners invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254
and Supreme Court Rule 13.1.
¢
PROVISIONS OF LAW
U.S. Constitution, First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
No persons shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law...
U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
5 a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
Reproduced in the Appendix.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 and §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4.
Reproduced in the Appendix.
¢
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
This is an extraordinary case. Petitioner Yahweh Ben
Yahweh is the religious leader of the Nation of Yahweh, a
recognized religion which has its historical roots in the
Hebrew Israelite movement. From the Miami headquar-
ters at the Temple of Love, Yahweh Ben Yahweh led the
many followers of the Nation of Yahweh in the course of
their religious practices, preaching a message of spiritu-
ality, community, belief in God, and self-sufficiency. The
Yahweh religion attracted adherents throughout the
United States and the world, with followers in more than
40 United States cities and more than 1,000 locales world-
wide. The membership of the Nation of Yahweh included
many dedicated practitioners who lived a communal life-
style in Miami, shunned civilian clothing in favor of the
religiously significant white robes, and rejected their
birth names by acquiring biblical names marking them as
God’s chosen people. Although the majority of Yahweh
members were Black, the religion attracted Hispanic,
White, Jewish, and Caribbean members.
The government, however, saw the Nation of Yahweh
in a different light, accusing Yahweh Ben Yahweh of
presiding over a racketeering enterprise in the form of
the Nation of Yahweh. In a superseding indictment
returned by a federal grand jury in the Southern District
of Florida, the government claimed the religious organi-
zation, through Yahweh Ben Yahweh and 18 of its mem-
bers, engaged in a pattern of racketeering consisting of
murders, arson, and acts of extortion. The superseding
indictment charged petitioners and 12 codefendants with
a RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d) & 1963), a sub-
stantive RICO count (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)), and extortion
(18 U.S.C. § 1951). The indictment alleged 19 acts of
racketeering, including murders, attempted murders,
arson and extortion.!
At the conclusion of a five-month trial, petitioners
were found guilty only of the RICO conspiracy. The jury
was troubled during deliberations, announcing it could
not “unanimously agree on any defendant in” the RICO
conspiracy (R87-14245). The district court instructed the
jury to continue deliberations (R87-14272), after which
the jury persisted in its inability to reach a unanimous
verdict (R87-14277). The court gave the jury a modified
Allen charge? (R87-14291-14300) which did not assist the
jury (R87-14316). Subsequent jury notes expressed confu-
sion about the instructions (R88-14347, 14389), resulting
in the giving of modifications to those instructions
(R88-14382-14383; R9-1126-16) after the court became
aware of the jury’s numerical division (R87-14304).
The district court imposed non-guideline sentences
on all defendants, with Yahweh Ben Yahweh receiving a
sentence of 18 years incarceration. Gaines and Ingraham
received sentences of 16 years imprisonment. Beasley
received a sentence of 15 years. Pace received a 15'/2 year
sentence. Lightburn and James received identical 16'/2
year prison sentences.
Petitioners appealed their convictions and sentences
to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. There, they
raised a number of evidentiary and procedural issues.
1 Prior to trial, the government dismissed one murder as a
racketeering act, and the district court dismissed the extortion
count and the extortion racketeering predicate act during trial.
2 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
iii
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sen-
tences. United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir.
1996). The court found the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the RICO conspiracy convictions and that “the
government’s naming of the Yahweh Nation as the RICO
enterprise was proper.” Id. at 1525. The appellate court
also ruled that evidence of the religious beliefs and prac-
tices of the National of Yahweh “was highly relevant to
the jury’s understanding of the existence, motives, and
objectives of the RICO conspiracy and the means by
which it was conducted.” Id. at 1527. The court further
declared that the trial was not unfairly tainted by pros-
ecutorial misconduct and due process violations, and that
because the supplemental jury instruction “preceded the
note indicating the division of the jurors,” the instruction
was not inherently coercive. Id. at 1529.
B. Factual Recitation.
The lengthy trial in this case was essentially a cru-
sade against the tenets of the Nation of Yahweh. The
religious beliefs and practices of the Nation were chal-
lenged and often ridiculed by the prosecution. Referring
to the Nation as a “so-called religion” (R23-34), the pros-
ecution constantly belittled the Nation of Yahweh’s claim
to the ancient heritage of the Hebrew Israelite.
The Nation of Yahweh is a recognized religious orga-
nization throughout the world (R56-7550; R52-10383).9
3 The courts have recognized the religious legitimacy of the
Nation of Yahweh. Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla.
1994).
Yahweh Ben Yahweh, the spiritual leader of the Nation of
Yahweh, preached the message of Yahweh through his
sermons and writings.
The religious headquarters in Miami, the Temple of
Love (R70-10400-10402), was a vibrant, self-sustaining
community, with legitimate businesses and other activ-
ities used by members. Although not required to do so,
Yahweh adherents were an identifiable group, often
wearing distinctive white robes as a symbol of purity
(R70-10345). Yahweh teachings encouraged both spiritual
and physical well-being, and advanced a healthy kosher
diet consisting primarily of vegetables (R70-10343). Mem-
bers practiced abstinence by limiting sexual activity to
procreation purposes (R70-10343-10344). The Nation of
Yahweh had a generally positive reputation in the com-
munity (R65-9429; R75-11503).
According to the prosecution evidence, the Nation of
Yahweh had a dark side, which the government claimed
represented a racketeering enterprise (R5-427-1-2). From
1981 through 1987, members of the Nation of Yahweh -
“enterprise” — allegedly engaged in multiple acts of mur-
der, arson, and extortion (R5-427-2-3). According to the
prosecution’s witnesses, Yahweh Ben Yahweh directed
followers in these misdeeds, although there was no sug-
gestion that Yahweh Ben Yahweh himself engaged in any
of the predicate acts.
Through three former members of the Nation of Yah-
weh, the government presented evidence about admitted
homicides which these witnesses claimed were directed
by Yahweh Ben Yahweh. Rozier contended he was a
member of a secret sect within the Nation of Yahweh
known as the “Brotherhood,” established for the purpose
of defending the Nation from enemies (R37-3540).
According to Rozier, members of the Brotherhood, espe-
cially Rozier, committed the racketeering predicate acts.
Among the alleged racketeering acts were the “white
devil” killings in which Yahweh purportedly directed
that “death angels” were to kill a white person. Other
murders included the execution of dissidents or enemies
of the Nation of Yaheh.4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in this case so far departs from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and
approves such a grievous departure from the law by the
district court as to call for the exercise of this court’s
certiorari jurisdiction.
4 After the federal RICO trial, Yahweh Ben Yahweh and
other federal defendants proceeded to trial to defend against
charges brought by the State of Florida involving the very
murders which had formed the predicate acts in the federal
RICO counts. The jury acquitted all defendants of the
substantive homicide offenses. State v. Yahweh Ben Yahweh,
Circuit Case No. 92-21518 (Dade County, Florida).
I.
IDENTIFYING A LEGITIMATE RELIGIOUS ORGANI-
ZATION AS AN ENTERPRISE FOR PURPOSES OF
PROSECUTION OF A RACKETEERING CONSPIRACY
IS NOT WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE RICO STATUTE
AND VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.
The RICO conspiracy alleged in this case described the
Nation of Yahweh as the racketeering enterprise. The appel-
late court upheld that unprecedented use of the RICO stat-
ute, notwithstanding that the Nation of Yahweh is a
recognized, established, legitimate religion.> The govern-
ment, however, made that religion out to be a criminal
organization, notwithstanding its firm roots in the universal
principles of faith, hope, and charity that bind together most
organized religions. While this Court and other courts have
permitted a wide range of legitimate enterprises to be named
as the vehicle through which racketeering acts are commit-
ted, never before has organized religion been put on trial in
such a manner. Compare United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580 & 587 (1981); United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1463
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); United States
v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840
(1983). The appellate court’s first-time approval of this
assault on organized religion as the basis for a racketeering
prosecution not only departs from the purpose of the rack-
eteering law, but also raises a serious conflict with our
constitutional concept of religious freedom in this country.
> The Yahweh religion has been recognized in serious
reference and research publications. Melton, G.J., The
Encyclopedia of American Religions 147 (1989).
,
While courts have frowned on efforts to place artifi-
cial limits on what constitutes a pattern of racketeering
activity, H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492
U.S. 229, 239 (1989), the application of the racketeering
enterprise and pattern elements to an admittedly legiti-
mate religion is far beyond the contours of the RICO
statute. In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510
U.S. 249 (1994), this Court recognized that a RICO enter-
prise is “the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern
of racketeering is committed ...” As the Scheidler court
mandated, it is the enterprise itself “that engages in a
pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. That very purposeful
limitation cannot and does not, as a matter of law, apply
to a legitimate, organized religion. Until the Eleventh
Circuit decision, no court had so far extended the reach of
RICO.
The appellate court ruling also conflicts with the
fundamental principle respecting the free exercise of reli-
gion as set out in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993. Pub.L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (42 U.S.C.
§§ 1988 & 2000bb-2000bb-4). In enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Congress expressly found that
“governments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification{.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a)(3). Under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, limitations on the free exercise of religion are gener-
ally prohibited:
Government may substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demon-
strates that application of the burden to the
person —
10
(1) is the furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. While members of a religious orga-
nization are not immune from prosecution under RICO,
defining an enterprise as an organized religion is not only
an attack on religious freedoms, but a substantial burden
to an individual’s exercise of religion. Consider the
obvious implications of the appellate court ruling that
permits a religion itself to be put on trial: RICO conspir-
acy prosecutions brought against the entire Islamic faith
because clerics and followers are believed to be involved
in domestic terrorism; RICO allegations brought to bear
on mainstream Christian religious ministries because pro-
ponents of the faith engaged in a campaign to prevent
freedom of choice by illicit means. The dangers arising
from this judicial expansion of the RICO statute are both
tangibly and constitutionally troublesome.
This is a case which merits serious review and which
should be of substantial concern to this Court. RICO may
well extend to a subset of actors within an organized
religion, as was the case in United States v. Dickens, 695
F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 1092 (1983),
involving a group of militant Muslims who practiced
armed robbery. That is certainly allowable. But where the
religion itself is made the racketeering enterprise, it is as
though God’s laws have been challenged as subservient
to the laws of man. That is, after all, what is so apparent
in this case.
11
Because the government did not charge a particular
group of Yahweh members, but branded the entire reli-
gion as a racketeering enterprise, there is little doubt that
the government's intention was to destroy an entire reli-
gion, marking its membership as people following a cor-
rupt path. This is more than a “substantial burden” on
the exercise of religion in that the government’s approach
significantly inhibited or constrained conduct manifest-
ing a central tenet of the Nation of Yahweh's religious
beliefs and denied its membership the reasonable oppor-
tunity to pursue the chosen faith. See Werner v. McCotter,
49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, _ __: U.S. __, 115
S. Ct. 2625 (1995). “[OJnly those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion” Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). The appellate court’s
treatment of the Nation of Yahweh essentially relegates
the previously vibrant, respected religion to the garbage
heap of history.
That result is why consideration by this Court is so
important and especially significant. By fairly limiting the
expansive reach or RICO, the Court does not in any way
undercut the government's ability to prosecute racketeer-
ing violations. The Court will, however, define the clear
line between organized religion and those members of a
religious group who chose to follow a path inconsistent
with the law. Certiorari review will enable this Court to
clarify this apparent conflict and to resolve the important
question presented.
12
II.
THE USE OF A SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUC-
TION, COMING AFTER THE JURY SEVERAL TIMES
ANNOUNCED ITS INABILITY TO REACH A VER-
DICT AND AFTER THE COURT WAS AWARE OF THE
JURY’S NUMERICAL DIVISION, MUST BE PROHIB-
ITED AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL COERCION OF
THE RESULTING VERDICT.
This case was unique in so many respects. Among the
most unusual occurrences was the extent to which the
district court attempted to salvage a complicated five-
month criminal trial by constantly persuading the jury to
reach a verdict. Not satisfied with the jury’s multiple
confessions of being deadlocked and hung, the district
court persisted in manipulating the jury into concluding
the case at a substantial cost to the petitioners’ right to a
fundamentally fair trial.
The district court gave a modified Allen charge.® Soon
after receiving the Allen charge, the jury foreperson
requested to speak with the court. The court, in response,
sent a note to the jury asking for an explanation in
writing. The next note from the jury revealed the jurors’
numerical division.” The district court announced to the
parties that the court had become aware of the numerical
division, but did not reveal the division to the jury.
6 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). This occurred
after 12 hours of deliberations, when the jury advised the court
of its inability to reach a verdict.
7 In total, the jury presented six notes to the court
pertaining to their inability to reach a verdict. The note
identifying the numerical division has vanished and was not a
part of the record on appeal.
13
Instead of merely allowing the jury to deliberate
further or declaring a mistrial, the trial court opted to
further instruct the jury, first by explaining the jury
should continue its deliberations, and then modifying the
RICO conspiracy instruction by deleting a portion of the
original charge. The trial court by this time knew the
jury’s division, knew that further instructions could move
the fragile minority, and opted to use forbidden informa-
tion to prevail upon the jury to reach a verdict, which
occurred the very next day.
Although it is legally unprecedented for a court to
reinstruct the jury after knowing the jury was hopelessly
deadlocked and knowing the jury’s numerical division,
the appellate court in this case concluded that the multi-
ple jury notes, the Allen charge, and the supplemental
instructions were not “inherently coercive.” 73 F.2d at
1529. The court stated that it could reverse the convic-
tions “only if we find under the totality of the circum-
stances that either the district court’s learning of the
numerical division or the giving of the Allen charge, or a
combination of the two, was inherently coercive.” Id. By
approving the jury manipulation, the appellate court
effectively enabled the district court to become the 13th
juror who participated in bringing about a verdict. That is
inconsistent with controlling precedent.
A trial by jury is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice and is an essential element of due
process. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). This
court has prohibited courts from inquiring about a jury’s
numerical division during deliberations. Brasfield v.
United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926). In this case, after the
court was aware of the jury’s inability to reach a verdict
14
and the numerical division of that jury, the trial court
continued to instruct the jury in ways which manipulated
the jury. This was the same type of post-division
instruction found to be coercive by the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Webb, 816 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987).
In recent years, courts have come to frown on Allen
jury instructions designed to persuade minority jurors.
See generally Jimenez v. Myers, 40 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, _ _ U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 60 (1994). When a court
is aware of particular difficulties of jury deliberations,
“the most extreme care and caution [are] necessary in
order that the legal rights of the defendant should be
preserved.” Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 307
(1905). The trial court’s failure to remain neutral, instead
instructing the jury in a manner intended to persuade
them to reach a verdict, was mischief of the worst sort.
The appellate court’s acceptance of this situation causes
8 The court’s supplemental instruction stated:
We have used some standard jury instructions
and one sentence in these instructions seems to be
creating confusion. Therefore, let me suggest that you
delete the following sentence in the first paragraph of
page 16: So, if a defendant has an understanding of
the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and
willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is
sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though
he did not participate before, and even though he
played only a minor part.
As to the second area of confusion which you
indicate, let me answer you as follows:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
You must, if you can, reach a decision as to each count
in the indictment as it pertains to each defendant.
15
constitutional conflict with the defendant's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury.
The issue posed for evaluation by this court is the
extent to which trial courts are permitted to go when
attempting to lead the jury to a verdict. This case is laden
with indications that the district court, in an effort to
salvage a five-month complex racketeering conspiracy
trial, wanted the jury to reach a unanimous verdict, not-
withstanding the jury’s persistent refusal to do so. The
district court’s use of deliberation information is the type
of manipulation that moves the court from the role of an
impartial jurist to a partisan “super juror.” The appellate
court’s approval of a situation which flies in thé face of
controlling precedent warrants serious examination by
this court. The rule established by the appellate court is
that trial judges can overreach in persuading a jury to
return a verdict, particularly if the case is complex or
lengthy. That is an intolerable situation, justifying this
court’s prompt attention. Certiorari review is the only
effective way of resolving what is an apparent and
obvious conflict with existing precedent. The appellate
court’s decision departed from the rationale of the
“numerical division” cases and has set that court on an
especially troublesome precedential path. The case pre-
sents a question of exceptional importance, especially
given the rise of complex criminal mega-trials in which
the courts face enormous pressures to resolve cases. For
all these reasons, certiorari review is a proper and neces-
sary course in this case.
16
CONCLUSION
The decision of the appellate court threatens funda-
mental notions of religious freedom and fairness. Pros-
ecutions of organized religion have no place in our
criminal justice system absent the most extraordinary
circumstances. A full frontal assault on an organized
religion jeopardizes the religious principles of the entire
Nation. The conflict between the application of the RICO
law and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in this
case is palpable. Because this case presents questions of
national importance, this Court should exercise its discre-
tion to issue the writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Benepict P. KUEHNE
SALE & KUEHNE P.A.
NationsBank Tower, #2100
100 S.E. 2nd Street
Miami, Florida 33131-2154
Telephone: 305/789-5989
Fax: 305/789-5987
EMail: ben.kuehne@counsel.com
Counsel for Petitioners
CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
Page
United States v. Beasley, 73 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir.
ER aN OEE Ds AE EAD Spe epee Fee ae eee App. 1
Re EE cain ous a cat ade bd wen und ask App. 30
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
PO ee Re A BI cil bad ses wdersad covers App. 33
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Me Ra RUT Rahal hee ke ce ek soe shee es App. 35
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 ................ App.
35
App. 1
UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Robert Louis BEASLEY, Jr., a/k/a “Dan Israel,” Rufus
Pace, Sr., a/k/a “Ahaz Israel,” Ernest Lee James,
a/k/a “Ahinadad Israel,” Richard Ingraham, a/k/a
“Job Israel,” Linda Gaines, a/k/a “Judith Israel,”
Walter Lightburn, a/k/a “Amri Israel,” Yahweh, Ben
Yahweh, f/k/a “Hulon Mitchell, Jr.,” a/k/a “Hulon
Shah,” & “Moses Israel,” Defendants-Appellants.
No. 92-4773.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 5, 1996.
Defendants were convicted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida, No.
90-868-CR-Roettger, Norman C. Roettger, Jr., Chief Judge,
of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) conspiracy, and they appealed. The Court of
Appeals held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to prove
RICO conspiracy; (2) evidence of defendant’s religious
practices and beliefs was properly admitted; (3) evidence
that defendant was racist was admissible; (4) defendants
were not prejudiced by alleged prosecutorial misconduct;
(5) any Brady violations were harmless; (6) defendants
were not prejudiced by court’s exclusion of testimony
that witness was a psychopath who had no conception of
the truth; (7) modified Allen instruction could not have
had coercive effect upon jury; (8) coconspirator statement
was admissible; and (9) trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding defendant from trial.
Affirmed.
App. 2
Michael G. Smith, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Pace.
Clayton Kaeiser, Miami, FL, for James.
Mark Graham Hanson, Miami, FL, for Ingraham.
Paul A. McKenna, Coconut Grove, FL, for Gaines.
Steven H. Kassner, Coral Gables, FL, for Lightburn.
Benedict Kuehne, Miami, FL, for Yahweh.
Kendall Coffey, U.S. Attorney, Lisa Rubio, Linda Col-
lins Hertz, Albert Jordan, Miami, FL, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.
Before EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges,
and CUDAHY*, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
In a superseding indictment, a federal grand jury in
the Southern District of Florida charged appellants
Robert Louis Beasley, Jr. (“Beasley”), Rufus Pace, Sr.
(“Pace”), Ernest Lee James (“James”), Richard Ingraham
(“Ingraham”), Linda Gaines (“Gaines”), Walter Lightburn
(“Lightburn”), Yahweh Ben Yahweh (“Yahweh”),! and 12
codefendants with a RICO conspiracy, under 18 U.S.C.
* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 The record shows that Yahweh Ben Yahweh has been
called by a number of names throughout his lifetime. Although
his birth name is Hulon Mitchell, Jr., he rejects that name as a
slave name. For clarity’s sake, we follow the practice in the
district court and refer to this defendant as “Yahweh.”
:
5
Ee
App. 3
§ 1962(d) (count I). Count I listed 19? racketeering acts of
murder, extortion, and arson. Appellants Yahweh, Gaines,
Lightburn, Beasley, James, Pace, and five codefendants
were also charged with a substantive RICO count under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (count II). Count III charged appel-
lants Yahweh and Gaines with extortion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951.
After a trial that lasted approximately five months,
appellants were found guilty of the RICO conspiracy
(count I). The jury acquitted Pace, James, and Beasley of
count Il. Yahweh, Gaines, Lightburn and Ingraham
received mistrials as to count II. Appellants filed various
opposed post-trial motions which were all denied.
The appellants were all sentenced pre-guidelines.*
Gaines and Ingraham were each sentenced to 16 years’
imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Beasley was sen-
tenced to 15 years’ imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.
Pace received a 15'/2 year sentence and a $5,000.00 fine.
Lightburn and James were each sentenced to 16'/2 years
in prison and a $5,000.00 fine. Yahweh was sentenced to
18 years’ imprisonment and a $20,000.00 fine. Appellants
then perfected this appeal.
2 Count I originally contained 19 racketeering acts;
however, the government dismissed racketeering act 6 prior to
trial, and the aistrict court dismissed racketeering act 19 and
count III pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.
3 The United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)
became effective November 1, 1987.
App. 4
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
In 1979, Yahweh and Gaines moved to Miami, Flor-
ida, and laid the foundations for a religious cult later to
be known as the “Yahwehs” or “Black Hebrew Israelites.”
Yahweh taught that blacks are the true Jews, that God
and Jesus are black, and that he had been chosen by “the
Terrible Black God, Yahweh” to lead blacks from years of
oppression to the promised land of Israel.
Yahweh’s followers were required to give up their
legal or slave names and to adopt Hebrew names, all of
which had a last name of Israel. Societal norms were
discarded as Yahweh established his own laws, which
were purportedly based upon the Bible. Yahweh's fol-
lowers grew, and by late 1980, he had the financial means
to buy a building in Miami known as the “Temple of
Love.” Many of Yahweh’s followers chose to be full-time
workers who were required to give all of their posses-
sions to the Temple. Businesses were established inside
the Temple, including a printery, a grocery store, and a
beauty salon.
Between late 1981 and 1982, Yahweh instituted pro-
found changes in the administration of the Yahweh reli-
gion. First, Yahweh announced that he was the son of
God and renamed himself Yahweh Ben Yahweh (God, the
son of God). He encouraged his followers to break from
the “immoral world” and to give up their outside jobs
and move into the Temple. Clothing changed from street
clothes to African apparel and then to white robes and
turbans. Yahweh taught his followers to avoid their birth
families, because they were not “true” families.
App. 5
When Yahweh's followers moved into the Temple,
families were often separated. Tight security was estab-
lished at the Temple; all who entered were searched.
Yahweh established a trusted group of male bodyguards
called the “Circle of Ten” who protected Yahweh and
stood guard at all Temple entrances with 5 to 5 foot
wooden staffs, swords, or machetes. Yahweh taught that
uninvited entrants to the Circle would lose their lives.
Gaines became Yahweh’s companion and “right hand
man.” Among her duties, Gaines collected money and
possessions from full-time workers and handled the Tem-
ple’s finances. Gaines had special privileges, including a
bodyguard. Yahweh sought to spread his influence
nationally by sending out specially trained and trusted
elders to establish satellite temples, distribute Yahweh
literature, and spread his teachings. Between 1982 and
1985, temples were established by a group of 40 or so
elders in several large metropolitan areas in the United
States.
Between 1981 and 1984, Yahweh’s power and influ-
ence grew, as did the Temple’s finances. Yahweh
demanded total loyalty and almost total control of the
members’ lives, which he achieved by “teaching against”
members who disagreed with or failed to fo!low his spiri-
tual teachings. Yahweh forced dissidents to stand at
meetings and openly face his ridicule. He directed cult
members to administer severe beatings to those who vio-
lated his rules. Followers feared for their lives if they did
something wrong, spoke out against Yahweh, or left the
Temple. In an effort to totally control his followers, Yah-
weh carefully regulated their food, sleep, and medical
care. All members were required to work long hours to
App. 6
further the Temple’s financial interests. Although Yahweh
preached brotherly love, he also directed members to
commit murder. Yahweh required that his followers pub-
licly state that they would die and kill for God Yahweh,
two requirements that he routinely propounded in teach-
ing sessions, during which the members literally shouted
in unison their willingness to do so.
As Yahweh’s power and influence continued to grow,
his teachings became black supremacist and violently
racist. Yahweh prophesied war between the black and
white races and called “white America” a country cursed
by God Yahweh and harboring God’s enemies. Yahweh
taught that one day, his group would chase white men,
whom he referred to as “white devils,” from the face of
the earth by killing them. Yahweh referred to God Yah-
weh as a “Terrible Black God” of war and violence and
taught that death to his enemies would be at the hand of
his “death angels.”
At Yahweh's direction, many murders and attempted
murders in the Miami area occurred. One of the most
violent members of the group, Robert Rozier (“Rozier”),4
testified at trial that an ultra-secret group called the
“Brotherhood” was established within the cult. This
group was to perform any task that Yahweh directed,
including murder. Yahweh conducted separate meetings
for Brotherhood members, which were to be kept secret
* Rozier was the key witness for the government. The
record demonstrates that he attended college at Berkeley in
California, but did not complete his education there because he
was drafted by the St. Louis Cardinals to play professional
football in the National Football League.
App. 7
under penalty of death. Among those present at Brother-
hood meetings were Rozier and defendants Dexter Grant,
Pace, Beasley, Ingraham, Maurice Woodside, James, Yah-
weh, and sometimes Gaines. To become a member of the
Brotherhood, one had to kill a white person and bring
proof of the kill to Yahweh in the form of a head, an ear,
or some other body part. Between April and October
1986, Yahweh sent his death angels into the Miami com-
munity on multiple occasions to kill white people ran-
domly and to commit acts of retribution against blacks
who interfered with the Yahwehs’ sales of products and
collection of donations. Yahweh also directed the killings
of white people as retribution for 400 years of oppression
and for specific acts of alleged police brutality against
blacks occurring at the time.
At the trial of this case, Yahweh took the stand and
testified in his own behalf. Additionally, Ingraham called
Paul George (“George”), a historian, as an expert witness
to testify that the Yahweh religion is a true religion.
We now briefly summarize each racketeering act.
Racketeering Act 1: Attempted Homicide of Eric
Burke.
When Burke broke away from the group, Yahweh
preached that he should be killed. The plan failed, how-
ever, notwithstanding Yahweh’s directions to his fol-
lowers to get machetes and “roll Burke’s head.”
Racketeering Act 2: Homicide of Aston Green.
Green was a member of the cult who attempted to
leave. Green returned to the Temple to retrieve his Bible,
at which time he was taken to a back room where 10 or so
App. 8
members beat him almost to the point of death. Semi-
conscious, Green was taken to a remote construction area
by Ingraham, John Foster, and Ricardo Woodside, where
Green, still alive, was decapitated with a machete. Upon
learning of the murder, Yahweh was delighted and
worked the crowd in the Temple into a frenzy where they
all stood and clapped.
Racketeering Acts 3 and 4: Homicide of Carlton
Carey; Attempted Homicide of Mildred Banks.
Carey was shot several times and died at the scene.
Banks was also shot, and she sustained a deep gash in her
neck during an attempt to decapitate her with a machete.
She survived but was unable to identify her assailants.
Racketeering Act 5: Homicide of Leonard Dupree.
Because Dupree was known to be a karate expert,
Yahweh openly challenged him to fight Lightburn, the
Yahwehs’ resident martial arts expert. The two men
squared off in front of about 30-60 Yahweh onlookers.
Dupree quickly knocked Lightburn down, at which point
Yahweh ordered all present, including Ingraham and
Maurice, to attack Dupree. Ingraham struck Dupree in
the face with a tire jack. Dupree was literally beaten to
death. During the struggle, Gaines locked the doors of
the Temple at Yahweh’s request. Yahweh allowed no one
to leave and made everyone, including children, strike
and kick Dupree’s lifeless body. Dupree’s body has never
been found.
App. 9
Racketeering Acts 7 and 8: Homicides of Glendell
Fowler and Kurt Doerr.
Yahweh told Rozier (who murdered six people at
Yahweh’s direction) to kill a white devil, cut his head off,
and become a son of God Yahweh. Rozier walked around
the Coconut Grove area of Miami, spotted an intoxicated
white man, followed him into an apartment, told the man
he was an angel of Yahweh, and then stabbed him to
death. Upon leaving the apartment, Rozier noticed a sec-
ond white man inside the apartment. Rozier also stabbed
him to death.
Racketeering Act 9: Delray Beach Arson.
The people in the Delray Beach neighborhood of
Miami had attacked several of the Yahweh members.
Yahweh selected 15-20 people to firebomb the area so that
similar incidents would not occur in the future. An alter-
cation occurred between the residents of the area and the
Yahwehs. Notwithstanding the fact that the police
arrived, the Yahwehs threw dozens of firebombs. Yahweh
ordered the arsonists to stand in front of the residences
and use their swords and machetes to murder anyone
who tried to exit the burning houses. The residents were
too terrified to come out and face Yahweh’s “death
angels.”
Racketeering Act 10: Homicide of Clair Walters.
Walters was found in an abandoned hotel with his
throat cut and his left ear removed. Yahweh member
Ardmore Canton later showed Rozier the ear that he had
cut from Walters’s lifeless body.
App. 10
Racketeering Act 11: Homicide of James Myers.
James M. Littlejohn (“Littlejohn”) told Rozier about
killing a white man. Littlejohn said that he had been
taught by Yahweh to stab the victim in the kidney area to
cause the victim to go into shock. When police found
Myers, he had been stabbed in the back and kidney area,
and although both ears had been cut, neither had been
severed from his body.
Racketeering Act 12: Homicide of Lyle Austin
Bellinger.
Carl Douglas Perry (“Perry”) told Rozier that he had
killed a white man who had been wearing a Star of David
tee shirt sold by the Yahwehs. Perry stabbed the victim
several times after which the victim fled and fell near a
canal. The police found the body of a white man,
Bellinger, lying near a canal.
Racketeering Act 13: Homicide of Raymond Kelly.
Yahweh ordered Rozier and Perry to kill several
white devils during a single night in September 1986.
They rode the metrorail south and followed potential
victims in Coconut Grove before walking south to the
University of Miami in Coral Gables. Rozier and Perry
later found two white victims whom they stabbed to
death, severing both ears from one of the victims.
Racketeering Act 14: Homicide of Cecil Branch.
Branch was stabbed over two dozen times, and one
of his ears was severed. The police found Branch face
down on the floor of his house; he was bound and gagged
with strips of bed sheets. A latent fingerprint on the
frame of Branch’s front door matched Rozier’s prints.
App. 11
Racketeering Act 15: Homicide of Harry Byers.
| Anthony Murphy (“Murphy”) had never killed a
white devil and decided that he would look for a white
child, thinking a child would be easier to kill than an
' adult. Instead, he found Byers, whom he stabbed several
times in the abdomen before cutting off his left ear.
Racketeering Act 16: Homicide of Reinaldo Echevar-
ria.
Brian K. Lewis (“Lewis”) stabbed and killed Echevar-
ria, a white Cuban male, but sustained severe injuries
himself when his hand slid down the knife blade during
the stabbing. Lewis almost lost his fingers, but they were
saved through surgery. Echevarria had been stabbed so
severely that medical experts described the murder as
“overkill.”
ae ~~ crete ese ne:
Racketeering Acts 17 and 18: Homicides of Anthony
Brown and Rudy Broussard.
In October 1986, the Yahwehs tried to buy an apart-
ment complex located in Opa Locka, Florida, which con-
sisted of five buildings occupied by drug dealers and
families with several children. Brown and Broussard
stood up to the Yahwehs, at which time Yahweh ordered
Rozier and Perry to kill them. Both were later shot in the
head at point-blank range.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented by the appellants
on appeal:
App. 12
(1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove a
RICO conspiracy;
(2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support
Yahweh’s conviction;
(3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support
Gaines’s conviction;
(4) whether the district court properly admitted evi-
dence of Yahweh beliefs and practices;
(5) whether the district court improperly allowed
the injection of racism at trial;
(6) whether the appellants are entitled to have their
convictions reversed based on alleged prosecutorial mis-
conduct;
(7) whether alleged Brady® violations deprived the
appellants of a fair trial;
(8) whether expert testimony of Rozier’s psycho-
pathic tendencies was properly excluded;
(9) whether the district court erred in its supple-
mental instructions to the jury;
(10) whether the district court properly admitted a
co-conspirator statement incriminating Pace; and
(11) whether the district court abused its discretion
in excluding James from the trial.
5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215 (1963). 3
5 mel Olt ed Am Bit
App. 13
Ill. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law sub-
ject to de novo review. This court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, with all reason-
able inferences and credibility choices made in the gov-
ernment’s favor. We need only find “that a reasonable
fact-finder could conclude that the evidence establishes
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Keller, 916 F.2d! 628, 632 (1ith Cir.1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 978, 111 S.Ct. 1628, 113 L.Ed.2d 724
(1991).
The district court’s evidentiary rulings are not subject
to reversal absent a clear abuse of discretion. The court's
discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is limited; relevant evidence
may be excluded only when its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
“Even where an abuse of discretion is shown, non-consti-
tutional evidentiary errors are not grounds for reversal
absent a reasonable likelihood that the defendant’s sub-
stantial rights were affected.” United States v. Sellers, 906
F.2d 597, 601 (11th Cir.1990).
Prosecutorial misconduct is a basis for reversal only
if, in the context of the entire trial and in light of any
curative instruction, the misconduct may have prejudiced
the substantial rights of the accused. United States v.
Obregon, 893 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1833, 108 L.Ed.2d 961 (1990). The
district court’s conclusion that no Brady violation
occurred is subject to de novo review by this court. See
Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285, 298-99 (11th Cir.1989), cert.
App. 14
denied, 496 U.S. 929, 110 S.Ct. 2628, 110 L.Ed.2d 648
(1990). The exclusion of expert testimony is subject to the
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Cameron, 907
F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir.1990). Appellate review of a
district court’s decision to give an Allen’ charge is limited
to evaluating the coercive impact of the charge. United
States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 783 (11th Cir.1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 1300, 108 L.Ed.2d 477
(1990).
When the jury instructions, taken together, accurately
express the law applicable to the case without confusing
or prejudicing the jury, there is no reason for reversal
even though isolated clauses may, in fact, be confusing,
technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism.
An erroneous instruction does not require reversal unless
this court is left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt
as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliber-
ations. United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114 n. 1
(11th Cir.1990). In addition, this court gives deference to
the district court’s exclusion of a defendant from the
courtroom pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 43. United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504, 506-07 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976, 98 S.Ct. 1626, 56 L.Ed.2d 71
(1978); see also Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1388
(11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1213, 103 S.Ct. 1209,
75 L.Ed.2d 449 (1983) (when considering constitutional
claim of denial of right to be present at trial, appeilate
court gives great deference to a district court decision
excluding defendant).
7 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed.
528 (1896).
App. 15
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove RICO Con-
spiracy.
r
Appellants were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1962(d), which makes it unlawful for any person to
conspire to violate a substantive RICO provision. Appel-
lants challenge the required elements of (1) an enterprise,
(2) a pattern of racketeering activity, and (3) an effect on
interstate commerce.
First, we are persuaded that the government’s nam-
ing of the Yahweh Nation as the RICO enterprise was
proper. Substantial legal precedent permits a wide range
of legitimate enterprises to be named as the vehicle
through which racketeering acts are committed. See
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 587, 101 S.Ct.
2524, 2527, 2530, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); United States v.
Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1463 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1189, 105 S.Ct. 957, 83 L.Ed.2d 964, and cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1216, 105 S.Ct. 1192, 84 L.Ed.2d 338 (1985). A
variety of entities can be enterprises, including benevo-
lent and nonprofit organizations such as unions and ben-
efit funds, governmental units, courts and judicial offices,
police departments, and motorcycle clubs to name a few.
Second, we are convinced that the government prop-
erly proved a pattern of racketeering by showing the
required relatedness and continuity of the criminal acts as
well as the required relationship between the racketeer-
ing acts and the enterprise. In order to prove the required
two predicate acts, the government must show that the
racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount
to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc.
App. 16
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109
S.Ct. 2893, 2900-01, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). The acts were
related in that they all revolved around the simple pur-
poses of silencing dissention, retaliating for community
resistance, and making the “death angels” a reality. The
acts showed the required continuity, because they contin-
ued over an approximately five-year period. The acts also
affected the enterprise and/or the enterprise facilitated
the racketeering activities. The racketeering acts affected
the Temple by eradicating dissention, eliminating opposi-
tion from the community, and confirming the members’
belief in “death angels” and Yahweh’s prophecies. The
acts bolstered members’ morale and commitment to the
group and reinforced the members’ hostility to the out-
side community.§
Third, the appellants assert that the government did
not prove that the predicate acts affected interstate com-
merce. To satisfy the interstate commerce requirement,
only a slight effect on interstate commerce is sequired.
See, e.g., United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1359 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d
8 Not all of the members of the Temple supported or were
engaged in the homicidal activities that are the subject of this
case. Indeed, not all of the members took Yahweh's fierce
injunctions literally. As the hub of the conspiracy, the
Brotherhood did follow those injunctions sometimes to the
letter; and so did some others. But there is a distinction between
the conspirators in this case and the general population of the
Temple. We recognize and stress this difference. This case
involves a prosecution of specific people for their unlawful
conduct. The case is not the prosecution of a religion. The
religion had adherents who never became involved in illegal
activity and who were not implicated in this conspiracy.
App. 17
701, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 200, 107
L.Ed.2d 154 (1989). The testimony at trial was undisputed
that the Yahweh Nation reached out to other states and
indeed to other countries in an attempt to spread its
influence. Yahweh publications and tapes were distrib-
uted throughout the United States in Yahweh trucks or by
mail and were sent to foreign countries. Given this con-
certed effort to establish national and international influ-
ence and the Yahweh membership’s extensive travel in
interstate commerce, the effect of the Nation on interstate
commerce is more than “slight.”
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Yahweh's
Conviction.
Our review of the record convinces us that the evi-
dence presented at trial was more than sufficient to sup-
port Yahweh’s conviction for RICO conspiracy. The
government proved that Yahweh agreed to the commis-
sion of two or more predicate acts. While he did not
commit the acts personally, he ordered his followers to
commit numerous acts of murder, secure in the knowl-
edge that his orders would be carried out. The jury prop-
erly rejected his argument that the government merely
showed his innocent association with the enterprise.
It is well settled that in order to establish a defen-
dant’s involvement in a RICO conspiracy, the government
need only prove that a defendant, by his words or
actions, objectively manifested an agreement to partici-
pate directly or indirectly in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, i.e., the com-
mission of at least two racketeering acts. United States v.
App. 18
Fernandez, 797 F.2d 943, 950 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 3230, 97 L.Ed.2d 736 (1987); 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A). The government met its burden.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Gaines’s
Conviction.
The government overwhelmingly proved Gaines’s
involvement in the conspiracy. The government offered
proof that she was aware of the basic structure and pur-
pose of the enterprise, agreed to the commission of the
predicate acts, and, by her actions, nurtured to fruition
the acts of the other co-conspirators. Gaines not only was
privy to the ultra-secret workings of the Brotherhood, but
also sought to facilitate the ruthless crimes.
Though Gaines was not involved in many of the
racketeering acts, taken in the light most favorable to the
government, the government proved, and the testimony
was undisputed, that Gaines was Yahweh's “right hand
man” and administrator. In addition to a general involve-
ment in the affairs of the Yahwehs, Gaines was speci-
fically involved in several racketeering acts. For example,
concerning the beating to death of Dupree at the Temple,
Gaines was not only present but, at Yahweh’s direction,
locked the door so that no one could leave the scene. She
was also involved in the Delray Beach arson. Yahweh
specifically told the arson team that if they needed any-
thing to go to Gaines. Moreover, Gaines was involved in
the Opa Locka incident and the coverup after the Delray
firebombing, and she was the head of public relations for
the Temple. Given this wealth of evidence, it is apparent
App. 19
that Gaines was not only privy to the ultra-secret work-
ings of the Brotherhood, but also was aware of numerous
other vioient activities. By her actions, she sought to
facilitate these ruthless crimes and actively worked to
dispel any suspicions cast on the Yahwehs.
D. Admission of Yahweh Beliefs and Practices.
Appellants argue that the government obtained the
convictions in this case by condemning a religion. The
district court ruled that evidence of Yahweh teachings
was admissible when relevant to the charges in the indict-
ment, but that testimony regarding general teachings of
the Yahweh faith was not relevant. The evidence admit-
ted was highly relevant to the jury’s understanding of the
existence, motives, and objectives of the RICO conspiracy
and the means by which it was conducted. Yahweh used
the religion as a means of exhorting followers to commit
the racketeering acts, and appellants cannot hide behind
the general principle that religion is normally inadmiss-
ible in court under both the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the First Amendment. Although evidence of Yahweh
beliefs and practices was damaging to the defense, it was
not unfairly prejudicial.
A person’s beliefs, superstitions, or affiliation with a
religious group is properly admissible where probative of
an issue in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Sun
Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1233 (2d Cir.1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984);
see also United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (11th
Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1104, 105 S.Ct. 2334, 85
L.Ed.2d 850 (1985); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553
App. 20
(11th Cir.19%3), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243, 104 S.Ct. 3517,
82 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984).
It seerns clear from the record that the Yahweh reli-
gion was not on trial. The evidence regarding the religion
was relevant, because religious teachings were used to
justify, rationalize, and promote crime. Appellants argue
strenuously that the contested evidence violated Federal
Rule of Evidence 610, which prohibits using religion to
impeach a witness’s credibility. The appellants’ argument
is misguided. The government agrees that it would have
been improper to attack witnesses’ credibility with their
religious beliefs by suggesting that, because of those
beliefs, their testimony was untrustworthy. See United
States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 666 (D.C.Cir.1980). How-
ever, in this case, the government inquired into Yahweh
practices and beliefs in an effort to show the background
of the RICO enterprise, which the defendants used to
carry out acts of murder and arson. The evidence was
relevant to show how Yahweh exerted influence and con-
trol over the members and how he used his preachings to
justify heinous crimes. It is also important to our analysis
that Yahweh himself sought to interject religion into his
cross-examination by responding to numerous questions
with a religious/ Biblical response. On direct examination,
defense counsel asked Yahweh about his practices and
life style, as well as about general Yahweh beliefs. For
those reasons, the admission of all of this evidence was
not unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence
403. Relevant evidence is properly excluded only by a
finding that “its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues or misleading the jury. .. . ” Fed.R.Evid. 403; see
App. 21
also United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117,
1119 (11th Cir.1990).
Finally, it is apparent to us that the Yahweh religion
was not on trial, in violation of the First Amendment. The
government did not indict the Yahweh religion, but only
named it as the racketeering enterprise. The First Amend-
ment’s protection of beliefs and associations does not
preclude such evidence where relevant to a trial issue. See
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-53 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 465,
469 n. 2, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). See also Dawson v. Dela-
ware, 503 U.S. 159, 165, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1097-98, 117
L.Ed.2d 309 (1992).
E. Injection of Racism at Trial.
Appellants argue that the district court erred in per-
mitting the government to introduce evidence that Yah-
weh was racist. As previously discussed, however,
evidence of Yahweh’s racist views not only demonstrated
the context, motive, and setup of the crime, but was
necessary to complete the story of the charged offenses.
See United States v. Collins, 779 F.2d 1520, 1532 (11th
Cir.1986); United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499
(11th Cir.1985). At the very least, Yahweh’s racist views
and preachings were directly and highly relevant to
explain the motive for the “white devil” killings. See
Smalley v. United States, 798 F.2d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir.1986).
App. 22
F. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Appellants argue that they are entitled to have their
convictions reversed based on alleged prejudice they suf-
fered at trial due to supposedly improper prosecutorial
comments and inadmissible evidence. These arguments
are meritless. Taken in context, the majority of the alleged
instances were not improper. Even in the instances of
improper comments, however, appellants have failed to
show that they were prejudiced in light of the district
court’s rulings and the weight of the evidence. The com-
ments were isolated, not emphasized, and, in the context
of the lengthy trial, could not have been prejudicial.
G. Alleged Brady Violations.
Appellants argue generally that they were routinely
denied Brady disclosures in a timely fashion. Specifically,
they challenge the prosecution’s failure to disclose (1) a
proffer written by government witness Rozier; (2) a
police report revealing the time of the discovery of Aston
Green’s body; and (3) latent prints from crime scenes that
did not match the defendants’ prints. In most of these
alleged instances, the information was not Brady mate-
rial. Even where appellants have shown that exculpatory
or impeachment information was withheld until trial,
however, they have failed to show that, had the informa-
tion been timely disclosed, a reasonable probability exists
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. Given this failure, any error would be harmless.
App. 23
H. Exclusion of Testimony of Rozier’s Psychopathic
Tendencies.
Appellants contend that the district court abused its
discretion by not permitting Dr. Barry Crown to testify
that Rozier was a psychopath who had no conception of
the truth. A district court “has wide discretion in its
determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is
particularly true in the case of expert testimony.” Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2903, 41
L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). Absent unusual circumstances, expert
medical testimony concerning the truthfulness or cred-
ibility of a witness is inadmissible. See United States v.
Wertis, 505 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir.1974) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1045, 95 S.Ct. 2662, 45 L.Ed.2d 697 (1975).
Expert medical testimony concerning the truthfulness or
credibility of a witness is generally inadmissible because
it invades the jury’s province to make credibility deter-
minations. In any event, in the present case, given the
extensive cross-examination of Rozier, appellants suf-
fered no prejudice even if we assume the district court’s
ruling was incorrect.
I. Supplemental Jury Instructions.
In this case, the district court gave a modified Allen
instruction. After only 12 hours of deliberations, the jury
advised the court that they were hung. Defense counsel
asked the district court to give the pattern modified Allen
instruction right away, but the district court found it was
“a little early” to give an Allen charge and told the jury to
continue deliberations on counts I and II and to consider
and apply all of the court’s instructions as a whole. The
- =>
App. 24
district court later modified its ruling and gave an Allen
charge, which amounted to a “toothless tiger.” We have
reviewed the charge and fail to see how it could have had
any coercive effect upon the jury. The record also demon-
strates that after giving the redacted and modified Allen
instruction, the district court learned of the jury’s numer-
ical division. Appellants argue that the Allen-type charge
given to the jury, combined with the district court’s
knowledge of the jurors’ numerical division, coerced the
jury’s verdicts. We can reverse only if we find under the
totality of the circumstances that either the district court’s
learning of the numerical division or the giving of the
Allen charge, or a combination of the two, was inherently
coercive. United States v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 545 (11th
Cir.1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 92, 133
L.Ed.2d 48 (1995).
Importantly, the district court did not poll the jurors
but learned of the numerical division through an
unsolicited note from the jury. Second, the district court
gave the redacted and modified Allen instruction before it
learned of the jury’s division. In Sanders v. United States,
415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.1969)9, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976, 90
S.Ct. 1096, 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970), the district court gave a
modified Allen instruction after learning the numerical
division of the jurors. The former Fifth Circuit approved
the language of the instruction and rejected the defen-
dant’s claim that the instruction had been improper
9 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981)
(en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as
binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
issued before October 1, 1981.
App. 25
merely because the district court had known the jury’s
numerical division. Id. at 631-32. The situation here is
easier to decide because the district court’s redacted
Allen charge preceded the note indicating the division of
the jurors. In United States v. Brokemond, 959 F.2d 206 (11th
Cir.1992), we held: “we have ruled that even where the
judge undertakes the inquiry into numerical split and
thereafter follows it with an Allen charge, reversal is
unnecessary absent a showing that either action, or a
combination of the two actions, was inherently coercive.”
Id. at 210.10
J. Admission of Co-Conspirator Statement Incrimi-
nating Pace.
Pace moved in limine to exclude the testimony of his
former girlfriend, Sharon Saunders (“Saunders”), on the
ground that it was hearsay. The government responded
that the testimony was admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).
After hearing argument, the district court overruled
Pace’s objection to Saunders’s testimony. During the
course of Saunders’s cross-examination, the district court
gave the jury a Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)
instruction. In our view, Saunders’s testimony was prop-
erly admitted. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); United States v.
10 We are also persuaded that the appellants have failed to
show prejudicial error from the district court’s redaction of the
original RICO instructions. The modification was made at the
government's expense and made acquittals more likely. Thus,
appellants have shown no grounds for reversal.
App. 26
James, 510 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 855, 96 S.Ct. 105, 46 L.Ed.2d 81 (1975).
Beasley’s statement to Saunders implicating himself
and Pace in the Carey/Banks incident was in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Beasley had used Saunders’s gun?!
during the crime and sought to induce her secrecy by
telling her that the murder was God Yahweh’s will. As
such, the statement furthered the conspiratorial objec-
tives. Even if the statement was erroneously admitted,
however, Pace’s conviction is not entitled to reversal
because the alleged error was harmless. See Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674
(1986).
K. Exclusion of James From the Courtroom.
James contends that the district court violated his
Sixth Amendment right to be present at all stages of the
trial by excluding him from the courtroom. Specifically,
he argues that the district court’s only warning was
issued to his lawyer at a time when James was not pre-
sent, a warning he claims was insufficient as a matter of
law. It is undisputed that under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 43(b)(2), before excluding a defendant from the
courtroom, a district court must warn the defendant to
stop misbehaving and inform him that he will be
11 Carey was shot to death with a .32-caliber revolver.
Based on the circumstantial evidence, the jury could properly
have inferred that the gun used to kill Carey belonged to
Saunders.
App. 27
removed if he continues his disruptive conduct. See Illi-
nois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060-61, 25
L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). But the factual premise of James’s
argument — that the district court failed to personally
warn him — is contradicted by the record. As evidenced
by the comments of counsel and the court, James was
present at the competency hearing held on February 24,
1992, (R46:5474, 5476, 5534-37, 5548), at the end of which
the court found that James was competent and was
“malingering.” (R46:5548). With James still in the court-
room, the district court stated:
And I’m certainly going to accept the offer by
[Yahweh] to ask defendant James to straighten
up his conduct and assist his counsel if he can.
And if he does not do that, I will have little
alternative but to invoke the provision of Rule
43(b) and exclude him from the courtroom and
the trial and proceed on.
Now, the amazing thing is that a camera was
installed in this courtroom as they will be in all
the federal courtrooms. .. . [I]t was installed the
weekend before this outburst by Mr. James.
So I have the capability now of having Mr.
James simply remain in his . . . holding cell
downstairs and he can see and observe the
trial. . . in case I have to exclude him from the
courtroom and he can make notes to his lawyer
and we’d have to take perhaps an additional
recess .. . before you would make cross exam-
ination, and I’m hopeful that . . . these two extra
matters .. . will help him.
(R46:5549-50.)
App. 28
After a recess, the district court, with James again in
the courtroom, repeated that it hoped Yahweh could per-
suade James to behave because it would “hate to exclude
him but [didn’t] have much choice.” (R46:5556.) When
James again became disruptive, the district court
excluded him with instructions that he be placed “in his
cell where he can best see and hear the proceedings” and
that James be provided “a pen and pencil [to] permit him
to make any notes necessary to furnish to his law-
yer ... at the next recess.” (R46:5556-58).
As the record makes clear, the district court told
James, or at the very least stated in James’s presence, that
he would be removed under Rule 43(b) if he continued
his disruptive behavior. In our view, this warning was
sufficient to put James on notice of what might happen if
he did not behave. See United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281,
287 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959, 110 S.Ct. 377, 107
L.Ed.2d 362 (1989); Scurr v. Moore, 647 F.2d 854, 858 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098, 102 S.Ct. 670, 70 L.Ed.2d
638 (1981).
James’s related contention that the district court
failed to explore possible alternatives to exciusion is also
misplaced. There is no statutory or constitutional require-
ment that a court try its luck with other sanctions before
excluding a disruptive defendant, and we give great def-
erence to the district court’s decision that exclusion was
necessary. See Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1388
(11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1213, 103 S.Ct. 1209,
75 L.Ed.2d 449 (1983).
James’s remaining arguments concerning this issue
are specious and warrant no further discussion.
App. 29
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments appellants present in this appeal are
all meritless. We affirm their convictions in all respects.
AFFIRMED.
“ne
App. 30
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-4773
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT LOUIS BEASELY, JR.,
a/k/a “Dan Israel”,
RUFUS PACE, SR.,
a/k/a “Ahaz Israel”,
ERNEST LEE JAMES,
a/k/a “Ahinadad Israel”,
RICHARD INGRAHAM,
a/k/a “Job Israel”,
LINDA GAINES a/k/a,
“Judith Israel”,
WALTER LIGHTBURN, a/k/a
“Amri Israel”,
YAHWEH BEN YAHWEH f/k/a “Hulon Mitchell, Jr.”,
a/k/a “Hulon Shah” & “Moses Israel”,
Defendants-Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
BEFORE: EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges,
and CUDAHY’, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The petition(s) for rehearing filed by ROBERT LOUIS
BEASLEY, JR., RUFUS PACE, SR., ERNEST LEE JAMES,
RICHARD INGRAHAM, LINDA GAINES, WALTER
LIGHTBURN and YAHWEH BEN YAHWEH is denied.
App. 31
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-4773
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT LOUIS BEASELY, JR.,
a/k/a “Dan Israel”,
RUFUS PACE, SR.,
a/k/a “Ahaz Israel”,
ERNEST LEE JAMES,
a/k/a “Ahinadad Israel”,
RICHARD INGRAHAM,
a/k/a “Job Israel”,
LINDA GAINES a/k/a,
“Judith Israel”,
WALTER LIGHTBURN, a/k/a
“Amri Israel”,
YAHWEH BEN YAHWEH f/k/a “Hulon Mitchell, Jr.”,
a/k/a “Hulon Shah” & “Moses Israel”,
Defendants-Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND SUGGES-
TION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC (Opinion
pace, Fd).
Before: EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and
CUDAHY", Senior Circuit Judge.
App. 32
PER CURIAM:
The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no mem-
ber of this panel nor other Judge in regular active service
on the Court having requested that the court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestion(s)
of Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.
App. 33
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated
as a principal within the meaning of Section 2, Title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income,
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
A purchase of securities on the open market for the
purposes of investment, and without the intention of
controlling or participating in the control of the issuer or
of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under
this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the
purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his
or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activ-
ity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such pur-
chase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not
confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
App. 34
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of this section.
App. 35
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of
purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that -
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its
protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden reli-
gious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden
religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on reli-
gious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion;
and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensi-
ble balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are -
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application
App. 36
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by govern-
ment.
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that applica-
tion of the burden to the person -
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened
in violation of this section may assert that violation as a
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to
assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under article
III of the Constitution.
ks fee DATO ea ee) ene
App. 37
§ 2000bb-2. Definitions
As used in this chapter -
(1) the term “government” includes a branch,
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other
person acting under color of law) of the United States, a
State, or a subdivision of a State;
(2) the term “State” includes the District of Colum-
bia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory
and possession of the United States;
(3) the term “demonstrates” means meets the bur-
dens of going forward with the evidence and of persua-
sion; and
(4) the term “exercise of religion” means the exer-
cise of religion under the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution.
§ 2000bb-3. Applicability
(a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal and State law, and
the implementation of that law, whether statutory or
otherwise, and whether adopted before or after Novem-
ber 16, 1993.
(b) Rule of construction
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16,
1993 is subject to this chapter unless such a law explicitly
excludes such application by reference to this chapter.
App. 38
(c) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to autho-
rize any government to burden any religious belief.
§ 2000bb-4. Establishment clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect,
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First
Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establish-
ment of religion (referred to in this section as the “Estab-
lishment Clause”). Granting government funding,
benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under
the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation
of this chapter. As used in this section, the term “grant-
ing”, used with respect to government funding, benefits,
or exemptions, does not include the denial of government
funding, benefits, or exemptions.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.