Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jones v. Caterpillar Inc.
Supreme Court brief1993
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
| | SEP 1 1993
93 ” 35 2 | nreice on wa CLs
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1993
C. MICHAEL JONES, et al.,
Petitioners,
VS.
CATERPILLAR INC.,
Respondent.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
STEPHEN M. TILLERY
Counsel of Record
MARK M. SILVERMINTZ
CARR, KOREIN, TILLERY, KUNIN,
Montroy & GLAss
412 Missouri Avenue
East St. Louis, Illinois 62201
(618) 274-0434
and
GarrY W. BRYAN
Ray Moss & AssociaTEs, P.C. au
122 Wamer Court
P.O. Box 655
Clinton, Illinois 61727-0655
(217) 935-8341
Counsel for Petitioners
St. Louis Law Printing,Inc. 13307ManchesterRd. St Louis,MO 63131 314-231-4477
snes Hens aaa
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Appellate Court of Illinois erred in determining
that plaintiffs’ state-law claims, based upon apprenticeship
agreements, were, because of Caterpillar’s affirmative defenses,
substantially dependent upon interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, and therefore preempted under §301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a).
Plaintiffs:
ase
LISTING OF ALL PARTIES
C. Michael Jones, Floyd Allsop, Randall
Carbonneau, Michael Carr, Jared Carroll, Roger
Damery, Larry Day, Gerald Dunaway, David
Ellington, Donald Fliegle, Michael Flemming,
Mablean Fullenwider, John Gepford, Darrell
Hartnell, Stephen Hartwig, Douglas Hays, Brian
Hoff, Rodney Karr, J. Michael Killam, Michael
Lingenfelter, Gary Mackling, Anthony Mense, Dana
Miller, Stephen Morgan, Larry Oltmann, Michael
Oxby, Michael Patton, Nathaniel Pigee, Leonard D.
Pryczynski, Danny Ragan, Ivan Roe, Jr., Dennis
Ross, Michael Short, Ronald Sifford, Donald Smith,
Marion Smith, Nelson Snow, Kenneth Snyder, Terry
Sphar, Darrell Thompson, Darrell Virden, Michael
Wisdon, Robert Yard, Daniel Boomer, Dale Elvers,
Stanten A. Adcock, Douglas Albright, Robert L.
Albright, Steven M. Aldus, Edward S. Allmon,
Scott L. Barnes, Paul E. Bishop, Karen S. Boker,
John A. Bonwell, William S. Brannan, Jackie D.
Brasher, Donald T. Bratt, Ronald D. Bray, Allen
Callahan, Ricky Capelle, Patrick A. Cebuhar, Wil-
liam R. Chapman, Daniel Christianson, Denis E.
Cole, John D. Cole, Jerry W. Cornelison, Dennis W.
Davison, James Derry, David B. Diveley, Ray H.
Eddy, Steven E. Engstrom, Bret Epkins, James N.
Fagerburg, Roger A. Fardel, Michael A. Fletcher,
Kim Fluegel, Howard W. Fowler, Margaret A.
Freeman, Judd P. Gaffney, David Good, Wendell
Good, Alan Gray, Gregory A. Gruber, John A.
Grider, Gary Guth, William D. Hancock, Karen E.
Harlan, Michael E. Hasty, Jeffrey S. Heaton, Gary
L. Hendryx, Thomas W. Herrick, Terry Joe Hierman,
Calvin Hightower, Keith C. Hollaway, Lance
— lli—
Horwedel, Danny L. Hulva, Larry A. Janssen, Bruce
E. Johansen, Ronald K. Jones, Walter J. Kasal,
Joseph C. Kipling, Randy Y. Kreite, Scott W.
Lipka, Ronald A. Mahrt, Randall L. Maloney, Max
A. Martin, Gary M. Martern, Michael D. Mayo,
Richard M. McCann, David W. McFarland, Ethe!
McGrane, John Medlin, Paul Meinders, Daniel F.
M. Miller, Briam Miller, Donald E. Miller, David F.
Mullen, Scott D. Munge, Oyd Stanley Nichols,
Steven A. Norvill, James L. Omer, Andrew L.
Oysket, Dean Parris, Daniel L. Peak, Patrick
Pemberton, Leo C. Potts, Steve K. Powell, Gail L.
Probyn, David T. Prosser, Kevin T. Prouty, Eldon
C. Pulfer, Robert Pullman, Linda L. Renfro, Dennis
Ricky, Raymond E. Robinson,-Ronald S.
Ruebensam, Randy R. Ruestman, Marjorie C.
Runyan, Lillie I. Rushing, Demetrio N. Salazar,
William A. Schramm, Sigmund Self, Robin L.
Shively, Ronald K. Short, Thomas E. Shullaw,
Michael Smith, Robert D. Smith, Paul S. Smith,
Floyd J. Smith, Gail M. Smith, Michael A. Soukey,
Calvin J. Stidman, Mary E. Stodgel, Steven L.
Stratman, Gerald W. Sutton, Gregory K. Tomkins,
Sandra K. Tostovarsnik, Michael T. Underwood,
Ralph M. Wiley, Daniel L. Wilson, Edwin R. Win-
ter, Walter A. Wood, Michael J. Wozniak and
Lloyd D. Yocum
Defendant: Caterpillar Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Question Presented for Review ............cccccccecssecssescseeeee i
Re UN cciibssaicistnnstntmicovesnisionsitncaiosenipasesasigetiaeiissibisilelstibe li
TOME OF PMEOUNNGS ocscscecwicsacessesccnservesssxsnescesvecsvoncenssence vi
Ree I ic ccixscassnnsonrtnsoandinsd aradpalibeaeeadaibn |
INI FI I iiliii ccssivntiacnricathitinreerseaderet. 1
NT Br IO rine on ole ey ee 2
SOMOIMNDINE OE TRG CRE assis caiesenssccivosnevcesnaceperveseesevaceneee y
Reasons for Allowance of WTit ............ccccscsccssecssessesesees 5
Fe TE OM AE EN er te 10
CIE ccrraisivcavictesictsinntgaiesoniintcenesmeemacmmbameaadniands A-1
Appendix A — Opinion in the Case (2/4/93) ....... A-1
Appendix B — Denial of Leave to Appeal
PN ievsiasincintibinddcnbuneueiiaionta hie AS A-15
Appendix C — Trial Court Judgment (4/16/92)... A-16
Appendix D — District Court Order on Remand
Sn | MOR eR le) SOOO RETA. SAOLNU Rate Rea A-17
Appendix E — Denial of Summary Judgment
Gre NITED cectaicshatscetitnivhiussdoseelbtgbiiclaciinctatsbesensasas A-22
Appendix F — Opinion in Schacht v. Caterpillar
STD cates dasccpeacdiansicntaiascebcanemelesasmbestanesses A-23
Appendix G — Cert. Denial in Schacht, with dis-
SE Pe ER itincitncsentsiacencaatiten teats. A-32
Appendix H — Apprenticeship Agreement.......... A-34
—*
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S. Ct.
PG, BS LKB Be (UDG GD seisncscanssrsssnsninccetionsens
Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1062, 110 S. Ct. 879, 107 L.Ed.2d
BS CID snnvkancevnnsnsstiexunseseascehcpancaaanes daa
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S. Ct.
eas OO kA SU CIF GTE nercieccctedinn
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399,
108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) .............
Lopez v. Continental Can Company, 961 F.2d 147 (9th
RR BPO nxcsxeccawsesssestesnianveiunioncuouaauueie namie
Schacht v. Caterpillar Inc., 213 Mll.App.3d 169, 571
N.E.2d 1215 (3d Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141
I11.2d 560, 580 N.E.2d 134 (1991), cert.denied,___
US... 112 5. Ce. ES06, Ti? L.Bae S27
Oi, FED nissaccnscesncsonssneskceanseniienssiueeasinetiananaiaiaaa
White v. National Steel Corp., 938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied,—___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 454,
1 L.BG62 471 GBD ccccccmacaneeennn
Page(s)
4,5
No.
IN THE ,
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1993
C. MICHAEL JonEs, et eR
Petitioners,
VS.
CATERPILLAR INC.,
Respondent.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OPINION IN THE CASE
Jones, et al. v. Caterpillar Tractor C ompany,
241 Ill.App.3d 129, 607
N.E.2d 1348 (4th Dist. 1993)
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
i) The opinion sought to be reviewed was issued by the
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, on February 4, 1993.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on June 3,
1993.
ii) Norehearing was sought. No extension of time was sought
for filing this Petition.
iii) Jurisdiction for review by this Court is conferred by 28
U.S.C. §1257(a). -
STATUTE INVOLVED
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Section 301(a), 29
U.S.C. Sec. 185(a):
“(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual Background
Plaintiffs are 165 individuals who enrolled in Caterpillar’s
apprentice training program, generally during the period 1978-
1982, and who were terminated from the program during subse-
quent company layoffs. Caterpillar and each plaintiff entered
into an Apprenticeship Agreement (AA) for either a two or four-
year term. An example of an AA is appended to this Petition
(App. H, A-34). The training program covered a range of
occupations, such as toolmaker, electrician, welder, machinist,
and called for several thousand hours of classroom and shop
instruction. After teaching a trade, Caterpillar would award a
diploma and, to the extent of available openings, offer job
placement. In paragraph 9 of the AA, Caterpillar agreed to
instruct each apprentice “in the trade during the entire training
period” (A-36).
a, ya
The AAs were prepared by Caterpillar (R.C 1814). They make
no reference to any collective bargaining or other agreement,
other than to set “wages according to the current applicable
schedule of rates” (A-35).
Paragraph 7 of the AA provides for separation from the
training program “for failure to maintain the standards of the
course,” and lists examples of such failures (A-36). No other
reasons for separation are stated. The AA makes no mention of
layoffs. Apprentices were told that they could be separated only
for poor attitude or performance (R.C 4292-94), Apprentices
were not told that they could be dropped from the program as part
of a company layoff (R.C 4273, 4255-56). That plaintiffs were
terminated for economic reasons, and not for unsatisfactory
performance, is not disputed (R.C 896, 942).
Procedural Background, and
Appearance of Federal Question
Suit herein was filed on January 6, 1986, setting forth the
parties’ executions of the AAs, the subsequent terminations by
Caterpillar, and plaintiffs’ prayers for damages (R.C 1). On 2/Il/
86, Caterpillar filed a petition to remove the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of Illinois (R.C 224), and,
on 2/18/86, filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judg-
ment alleging preemption of plaintiffs’ state-law claims by
federal labor law, specifically Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (R.C 234). On 3/4/86,
plaintiffs moved to remand, taking issue with Caterpillar’s claim
of preemption (R.C 345). In view of this Court’s decision in
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96
L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), the District Court, on 8/6/87, ordered the
cause remanded to state court (App. D, A-17). In the trial court,
Caterpillar filed its Answer on 8/20/87, including an affirmative
defense of preemption (R.C 779, 884).
On 10/19/87, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment (R.C
914). Caterpillar cross-moved on 4/3/89, again asserting preemp-
tion (R.C 971-2). On 7/18/89, the trial court entered an order
denying both motions, and stating:
“The apprenticeship agreements were not ‘subsumed’ into
the collective bargaining agreements, and therefore were
not preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act.” (App. E, A-22)
On 7/25/89, the trial court granted plaintiffs leave to file their
First Amended Complaint, which included causes of action for
both breach of contract (the AA) and misrepresentation (R.C
1891, 1892). On 9/22/89, Caterpillar answered (R.C 2182), reiter-
ating its previously asserted preemption defense (R.C 2406). On
10/30/89, the trial court ordered joinder of additional plaintiffs
(bringing the total to 165) and the filing of plainuffs’ Supplement
to Amended Complaint (R.C 2436, 2438). In its further Answer
and defenses, Caterpillar again asserted preemption (R.C 3362,
3384).
On 12/9/91, Caterpillar filed a renewed motion for summary
judgment, again asserting preemption, and citing Schacht v.
Caterpillar Inc., 213 Ill.App.3d 169, 571 N.E.2d 1215 (3d Dist.
1991), appeal denied, 141 I1l.2d 560, 580 N.E.2d 134 (1991),
cert. denied, __ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1396, 117 L.Ed.2d 527
(1992) (Apps. F and G, A-23 and A-32), another Illinois action
involving claims of Caterpillar apprentices premised upon AAs
similar to those at bar. On 4/16/92, the trial court herein entered
summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar, citing the Schacht
holding (App. C, A- 16). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed
on 2/4/93, and the Illinois Supreme Court declined review
(Apps. A and B, A-1 and A-15). Plaintiffs now seek review by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
a ak,
REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT
THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS ERRED IN
BASING PREEMPTION UPON CATERPILLAR’S DE-
FENSES WHEN THE RIGHTS ASSERTED BY PLAIN-
TIFFS AROSE INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
This Court is again asked to address the question of whether
federal preemption, under §301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, can be found to arise from defenses raised in an
employer’s pleadings, where the plaintiffs’ claims are premised
solely upon state law. This question is reflected in opposing
views as to the applicability of this Court’s opinion in Caterpil-
lar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318
(1987). As noted previously by members of this Court, the Circuit
Courts of Appeal are in conflict. Schacht v. Caterpillar Inc., cert.
denied,__U.S.___, 112 S.Ct. 1306, 117 L.Ed.2d 527 (1992)(dis-
sent from denial of cert.) (App. G, A-32).
Section 301(a) covers only “contracts between an employer
and a labor organization” and, as observed by this Court, “says
nothing about the content or validity of individual employment
contracts.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107
S. Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), reiterated in Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1884n.10,
100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). “The preemption of state law engen-
dered by section 301 is only occasioned when the claim raised
‘on the face of the complaint’ substantially depends on interpre-
tation of a collective bargaining agreement for its resolution.”
Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1062, 110 S. Ct. 879, 107 L.Ed.2d 962 (1990). See also
Williams, supra, 482 U.S. at 394. That the plaintiffs in the case
at bar were union members and covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement in certain aspects of their employment is not in
dispute. Rather, the question is whether the apprenticeship
oe me
agreements created separately compensable rights and enforce-
able obligations in addition to and apart from any rights and
obligations set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the petitioners’
claims required interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and were therefore preempted under Sec. 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act. 607 N.E.2d at 1352. The
Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement was not
asserted by plaintiffs in support of their claims. 607 N.E.2d at
1353. The Court held, however, that because Caterpillar had
raised the layoff provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment as a defense to petitioners’ claims, interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement was required, thereby preempt-
ing those claims. 607 N.E.2d at 1354. We submit that the
Appellate Court of Illinois erroneously applied the rules of
preemption, having placed undue focus upon Caterpillar’s pur-
ported defenses.
Although acknowledging the test of substantial dependence,
the Appellate Court did not, in either Schacht or the present case,
identify any specific provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment upon which the AA depended’. The Appellate Court agreed
that this action was not premised upon any right conferred by a
collective bargaining agreement. The Court concluded, how-
'For example, the Court stated:
“Yet, in determining whether plaintiffs’ termination from the appren-
ticeship program was in violation of the terms of the apprenticeship
agreement, the nature of the relationship between the apprenticeship
agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement must necessarily
be examined. This will require an interpretation of the collective-
bargaining agreement which is governed by Federal law and preempted
by section 301(a)”. 607 N.E.2d at 1354 (A-10).
The Court, though, never explained the need to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement to determine whether Caterpillar breached its appren-
ticeship contracts with petitioners.
~s Sn
ever, that the claims were preempted as a result of Caterpillar’s
assertion of the layoff provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement as an affirmative defense, and thus the need to
interpret those provisions. Arguably, though, under this view, a
defendant in any action, brought by a plaintiff who happens to be
a union member, could simply raise the specter of a collective
bargaining agreement and thereby claim preemption.
In Williams, this Court observed that a state-law claim to
enforce a collective bargaining agreement would be preempted
by Section 301(a). 482 U.S. at 394. The Court held, though, that
the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of separate employment agree-
ments were neither claims to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement, nor claims that were substantially dependent upon
interpretation of any collective bargaining agreement. This was
despite the fact that as hourly workers the plaintiffs had had
certain rights under a collective bargainin g agreement. 482 U.S.
at 394-95. The Court observed:
“Section 301 does not, as Caterpillar suggests, require that
all ‘employment-related matters involving unionized em-
ployees’ be resolved through collective bargaining and thus
be governed by a federal common law created by [Sec.]
301... The Court has stated that ‘not every dispute concern-
ing employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement is preempted by [Sec.] 301
or other provisions of the federal labor law.’ ”
482 U.S. at 396 n.10, citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985).
The Appellate Court of Illinois has, we submit, erroneously
relegated Williams to a discussion of removal jurisdiction,
despite the clear statement by this Court that the Williams
contract claims were not dependent upon interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement. As noted in the dissent to the
denial of certiorari in Schacht, the interpretation and scope of
—_
Williams is a matter of dispute among the Circuit Courts of
Appeal. E.g., Berdav. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1062, 110 S. Ct. 879, 107 L.Ed.2d 962 (1990)
(citing Williams as to merits of employer’s preemption defense)
and Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 943 F.2d 764 (7th
Cir. 1991)(distinguishing Williams as removal case). Subse-
quent to the Illinois holding in Schacht, at least two other U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeal have cited Williams on the merits of
preemption arguments. Lopez v. Continental Can Company, 961
F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1992)(fraud claim against employer not pre-
empted), and White v. National Steel Corp., 938 F.2d 474 (4th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied,__U.S.__, 112 S. Ct. 454, 116 L.Ed.2d
471 (claims on contracts with individual employees did not arise
from or require interpretation of collective bargaining agree-
ment).
In White, the plainuffs had been promoted to management
positions from jobs covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, all with oral assurances of job security and continued
seniority. Despite the alleged oral promises, plaintiffs were laid
off. 938 F.2d at 478. Plaintiffs brought suit and National Steel
asserted preemption under Section 30l(a). The District Court
ruled generally in favor of the plaintiffs. Noting the similarity
between the facts before it and those in Williams, and the
principles of preemption as discussed in Williams, the Court of
Appeals in White held that the plaintiffs’ state-law contract and
fraud claims were not preempted by Section 30l(a) or other
provisions of federal labor law. Said the Court:
“It is clear that plaintiffs are not relying on duties or
promises contained in any collective bargaining agree-
ments .. . The promises plaintiffs seek to enforce are those
that National made to them in negotiations over the terms
of employment in management positions...Plaintiffs’ indi-
vidual employment contracts are the foundation of their
asserted rights . . . ‘Section 30] says nothing about the
psa ee
content or validity of individual employment contracts.’
[citing Williams] It is those contracts, not the collective
bargaining agreements, that must be interpreted.”
938 F.2d 483. The Court went on to state that even if a collective
bargaining agreement would preclude specific enforcement,
such as job reinstatement, the plaintiffs were “still free to bring
damages claims against their employer for breach of contract.”
938 F.2d at 485.
Itis under the preemption principles set forth in Williams, and
applied in White, that the petitioners at bar seek damages from
Caterpillar for breach of their apprenticeship agreements. The
erroneous application of federal preemption by the Illinois
Courts, despite the principles announced by this Court in cases
such as Williams, has curtailed these petitioners’ pursuit of
purely state-law rights and remedies. We submit that this Court
should now step in to clarify both the scope of Williams and the
limitations, if any, on federal preemption in cases such as this,
i.e., where the matter of a collective bargaining agreement is
raised solely as a defense to an otherwise purely state-law claim.
ae
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to grant a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the Appellate Court of
Illinois. This Court’s review, and clarification of preemption
principles, are not only crucial to the present litigants, but are of
importance as well to others affected by collective bargaining
and to the various federal and state courts faced with preemption
defenses.
Respectfully submitted,
Stephen M. Tillery
Counsel of Record
Mark M. Silvermintz~—
Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin,
Montroy & Glass
412 Missouri Ave.
E. St. Louis, IL 62201
618/274-0434
and
Garry W. Bryan
Ray Moss & Associates, P.C.
122 Warner Court
P.O. Box 655
Clinton, IL 61727-0655
217/935-8341
Counsel for Petitioners
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
NO. 4-92-0408
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
C. MICHAEL JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs- Appellants,
v.
CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY,
a California Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from Circuit Court of Sangamon County
No. 86L4
Honorable Jeanne E. Scott,
Judge Presiding.
[Filed: Feb. 4, 1993]
JUSTICE LUND delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs filed acomplaintagainst defendant Caterpillar Tractor
Company (defendant), for allegedly violating certain terms of
their apprenticeship agreements and for misrepresentation. The
trial court granted summary judgment for defendant on the basis
of Schacht v. Caterpillar, Inc. (1991), 213 Il. App. 3d 169, 571
N.E.2d 1215, appeal denied (1991), 141 Ill. 2d 560, 580 N.E.2d
134, cert. denied (1992),__ U.S. __, 117 L. Ed. 2d 644, 112S.
Ct. 1506. Plaintiffs appeal this award of summary judgment. We
affirm.
Plaintiffs are former and present employees of defendant. At
various times between 1978 and 1982, each plaintiff entered into
defendant’s apprentice training prograin. The terms of the ap-
prenticeships were set forth in a standardized apprenticeship
ae ©. eos
agreement entered into between each individual employee and
defendant. Among its provisions, the agreements provided that
ti.» trainee would receive wages according to the current appli-
cable schedule of rates contained in the collective-bargaining
agreement, and defendant would teach and instruct plaintiffs for
the entire training period specified in the agreement. Of particu-
lar importance to this case was an additional provision which
provided:
“[Defendant] reserves the right to separate the TRAINEE
from the Training Course for failure to maintain the stan-
dards of the course including but not limited to: unsatisfac-
tory work, inability to acquire the necessary knowledge for
graduation, improper conduct, indifferences to factory rules
and regulations, insubordination, or any other justifiable
reason.”
Upon completion of the training program, the agreement speci-
fied that defendant intended to offer the trainee job placement.
The type of placement would depend upon the openings avail-
able, the ability and progress displayed during training, and the
graduate’s desires.
In the early 1980’s, defendant experienced economic difficul-
ties and in response laid off employees pursuant to the layoff and
seniority provisions in the central collective-bargaining agree-
ment and related provisions of the local agreements. Plaintiffs
were terminated at various times from the training program
during these layoffs.
During the layoffs, defendant and the union had two collec-
tive-bargaining agreements in effect. The first was effective
December 15, 1979, and its successor was effective April 19,
1983. Each plaintiff during their employment was a member of
a collective-bargaining unit represented by the International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Work-
ers of America, Local 751 (Union). While serving as appren-
cniiemieiel
pay, an
tices, plaintiffs continued to hold membership in the union and
to pay union dues.
In response to the layoffs, 45 of the laid-off apprentices filed
an action in State court against defendant for common law
breach of contract. The complaint consisted of 45 counts, one for
each plaintiff, alleging defendant breached their apprenticeship
agreements by failing and refusing to employ them as appren-
tices and by failing and refusing to provide them training or allow =
them to complete the training program. Defendant subsequently
petitioned to remove the action to the United States District
Court. It contended that plaintiffs’ terms and conditions of
employment, including removal and termination from the ap-
prenticeship program, were governed by the collective-bargain-
ing agreement and that the apprenticeship agreements were
subsumed by it. Therefore, the action was preempted under
section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA) (29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1988)) and was within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Federal courts.
Plaintiffs moved to remand the action. They argued that their
apprenticeship agreements were separate and independent of
any collective-bargaining agreement, and, therefore, their claims
were not preempted. The Federal district court ordered the action
remanded to the State court based on the authority of Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams (1987), 482 U.S. 386, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318, 107 S.
Ct. 2425. It found that plaintiffs’ State-law claims for breach of
the individual apprenticeship contracts did not implicate the
applicable collective-bargaining agreement nor were they com-
pletely preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. Plaintiffs’
motion for remand, therefore, was allowed. Jones v. Caterpillar,
Inc. (Aug. 7, 1987, C.D. Ill. No. 86-3047 (order allowing motion
for remand)).
Defendant then filed an answer to the complaint and raised as
an affirmative defense that plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by
ae
section 301(a) of the LMRA and that plaintiffs failed to allege the
prerequisites to suit under that section. Plaintiffs later filed a
motion for summary judgment, and defendant filed a cross-
-—motion for summary judgment, again arguing that plaintiffs’
claims for breach of the apprenticeship agreements were pre-
empted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. The trial court denied
both motions for summary judgment. In so ruling, it found that
the apprenticeship agreements were not “subsumed” into the
collective-bargaining agreement, and the claims, therefore, were
not preempted.
On July 25, 1989, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Each
of the 45 plaintiffs alleged one count of misrepresentation and
one count of breach of contract. Defendant subsequently filed a
motion requesting the court to reconsider the order denying its
motion for summary judgment and in the alternative asking it to
certify the issue for appeal. The trial court certified the issue of
“{ whether the resolution of this case requires the interpretation
ofacollective[-]bargaining agreement and, accordingly, whether
the suit is preempted by Section 301 of the [LMRA]” for
interlocutory appeal. On October 23, 1989, this court denied
defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. (Jones v. Caterpillar,
Inc. (Oct. 23, 1989, 4th Dist. No. 4-89-0792 (order of clerk
denying petition for leave to appeal)).) Defendant then answered
the amended complaint and again asserted the affirmative de-
fense of preemption.
On October 30, 1989, the trial court granted plaintiff’ s motion
to join 120 additional persons and to supplement its amended
complaint. Each new plaintiff filed one count of misrepresenta-
tion and one count of breach of his or her apprenticeship
agreement. Defendant answered the supplement to the amended
complaint and reiterated its affirmative defense of preemption.
On December 9, 1991, defendant filed a renewed motion for
summary judgment, asserting that plaintiffs’ claims were pre-
empted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. To support its conten-
, |
aoe tt ee
i r
~
tion, it cited the recent Schacht decision and filed volumes of
materials from the Schacht record. The trial court granted
defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment on the basis
of the Schacht decision, and this appeal followed.
Summary judgment is properly granted when “the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c); see also
Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871;
Wright v. St. John’s Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third
Order of St. Francis (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 680, 682, 593
N.E.2d 1070, 1072.) Because it is a drastic means of disposing
of litigation, summary judgment should only be granted “when
the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.”
(Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240, 489 N.E.2d at 871; Loyola Academy
v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 263, 271, 586
N.E.2d 1211, 1215; Logan v. Old Enterprise Farms, Ltd.(1990),
139 Ill. 2d 229, 233, 564 N.E.2d 778, 780.) The proper standard
of review for evaluating the propriety of the trial court’s entry of
summary judgment is de novo. (See Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Dec. 4, 1992, Nos. 71753, 71761
cons., slip op. at 4),__ Il. 2d __ __N.E.2d __, __; Illinois
Municipal League Risk Management Association v. Seibert
(1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 585 N.E.2d 1130, 1134; Shull
v. Harristown Township (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 819, 824, 585
N.E.2d 1164, 1167.) A reviewing court will reverse an order
granting summary judgment when it finds the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Department of Revenue v. Heart-
land Investments, Inc. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 19, 31,476 N.E.2d 413,
419.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the third district in Schacht and
the trial court in the present case erred in determining that State-
law claims based on the apprenticeship agreements are pre-
a yeu
empted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. Obstensibly [sic],
plaintiffs claim that their layoffs violated their individual ap-
prenticeship agreements because the agreements did not state
that they could be terminated from the program for economic
reasons. Rather, they could only be terminated from the program
for failure to meet the standards of the course. Their claims,
therefore, are based solely on the alleged breach of the appren-
ticeship agreements which are completely separate and indepen-
dent from the collective-bargaining agreement. Since the resolu-
tion of their claims are not substantially dependent upon the
applicable collective-bargaining agreement nor do they require
an interpretation of the agreement, plaintiffs contend their claims
are not preempted.
Conversely, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ claims cannot be
resolved without the trial court interpreting the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. It contends the collective-bargaining agree-
ment continued to apply to the plaintiffs after they entered the
apprenticeship program and that plaintiffs were laid off accord-
ing to its layoff and seniority provisions. Since resolution of
plaintiffs’ claims would invoive an analysis and interpretation of
the collective-bargaining agreement, defendant maintains the
trial court correctly determined the claims were preempted by
section 301(a) of the LMRA.
Schacht and the present case are factually identical. In Schacht,
17 laid-off employees filed an action against Caterpillar for
failing to continue their employment and training pursuant to
their apprenticeship agreements. The issue on appeal was whether
the trial court properly determined that plaintiffs’ State-law
contract claims were preempted under section 301(a) of the
LMRA. Schacht, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 171-72, 571 N.E.2d at 1216-
17.
The third district held that resolution of plaintiffs’ State-law
based claims required interpretation of the collective-bargaining
— *,
agreement and were therefore preempted by section 301(a) of the
LMRA. In so holding, it stated:
“The plaintiffs argue that the apprenticeship agreements
are separate employment contracts which do not require
interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. We
cannot agree. The plaintiffs availed themselves of many of
the benefits available under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Many of the terms of their employment were derived
from the collective-bargaining agreement. The nature of
the relationship between the apprenticeship agreements
and the collective-bargaining agreements of necessity re-
quires an interpretation of those collective-bargaining agree-
ments. That interpretation is governed by Federal labor law
and any State-law action in such circumstances is pre-
empted by section 301(a). We cannot resolve this issue
under State-law contract principles.” Schacht, 113 Ill. App.
3d at 175, 571 N.E.2d at 1218.
As an aside, the court asserted that it agreed with the trial
court’s finding “that the apprenticeship agreements were made
within the context of the collective-bargaining agreements, and
that plaintiffs’ employment remained subject to the terms and
conditions of the collective-bargaining agreements.” (Schacht,
213 Ill. App. 3d at 175, 571 N.E.2d at 1218.) It also agreed that
the apprenticeship agreements were not completely separate and
independent agreements. Accordingly, the appellate court found
the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was appropriate.
Schacht, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 175, 571 N.E.2d at 1218.
We agree with the decision in Schacht and hold that plaintiffs’
claims are preempted under section 301 (a) of the LMRA. Plain-
tiffs, contend, however, that the Schacht court wrongly decided
the case because it misapplied the “substantially dependent” test
delineated in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S.
202, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 105 S. Ct. 1904, failed to identify specific
a es
contract provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement needed
to resolve their claims, and failed to specify how the apprentice-
ship agreement was dependent upon the collective-bargaining
agreement for interpretation. Further, they contend Schacht
overlooks the fact that the apprenticeship agreements are sepa-
rate and complete contracts from the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. We do not believe the Schacht court misapplied the test
delineated in Lueck and in applying the test to the present case,
we find, as did the Schacht court, plaintiffs’ claims are pre-
empted.
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” (29 U.S.C.
§185(a) (1988).)
The supreme court has held that this section not only confers
jurisdiction on Federal courts to hear controversies involving
collective-bargaining agreements but also authorizes Federal
courts to fashion a body of Federal law for the enforcement of
these collective-bargaining agreements. Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills (1957), 353 U.S. 448, 450-51, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972,
977-78, 77 S. Ct. 912, 914-15.
The preemptive effect of section 301(a) of the LMRA was first
analyzed in Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962), 369 U.S. 95, 7 L. Ed. 2d
593, 82S. Ct. 571. In that case, the Court held that suits involving
a violation of a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement
must be brought under section 301(a) and resolved by reference
to Federal law to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-
—
bargaining agreements and to promote the peaceable, consistent
resolution of labor-management disputes. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S.
at 103-04, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 598-99, 82 S. Ct. at 576-77.
Following Lucas Flour, the Supreme Court held that the
preemptive effect of section 301(a) extended beyond suits alleg-
ing contract violations and reached certain claims sounding in
tort. “Any other result would elevate form over substance and
allow parties to evade the requirements of [section] 301 by
relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of
contract.” (Lueck, 471 U.S. at211, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 215, 105 S. Ct.
at 1911.) Thus, the Court adopted the following rule: “when
resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties
in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a [section]
301 claim, [citation omitted], or dismissed as preempted by
Federal labor-contract law.” (Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 85 L. Ed.
2d at 221, 105 S. Ct. at 1916; see also Williams, 482 U.S. at 396,
96 L. Ed. 2d at 328, 107 S. Ct. at 2431; International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers v. Hechier (1987), 481 U.S. 851, 859
n.3, 95 L. Ed. 2d 791, 801 n.3, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2167 n.3; Lingle
v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 486 U.S. 399, 405-
06, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 418-19, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1881.) The Court
has made it clear, however, that not every dispute concerning
employment, or tangentially involving a provision of the collec-
tive-bargaining, is preempted by section 301. (Lueck, 471 U.S.
at 211-13, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 215-16, 105 S. Ct. at 1911-12.) “[A]s
long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting
the agreement itself, the claim is independent of the agreement
for [section] 301 preemption purposes.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410,
100 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 108 S. Ct. at 1883.
In determining whether plaintiffs’ claims are “substantially
dependent” upon an analysis of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, an examination of the claims is necessary. The misrepre-
sentation count in the present case alleged defendant represented
— A-10 —
that if plaintiffs entered into the apprenticeship training program
defendant would instruct plaintiffs for the entire training period
subject to defendant’s right to separate them from the course
only for failure to maintain its standards. Plaintiffs assert defen-
dant made these representations knowing them to be false and
that it would separate plaintiff from the program for reasons
other than plaintiffs’ failure to maintain the standards of the
course. The breach of contract count alleged that plaintiffs and
defendant entered into an agreement in which defendant prom-
ised to instruct plaintiffs for the entire training period set forth in
the contract subject to defendant’s right to separate plaintiffs
from the program only for failure to maintain the standards of the
course. After entering into the agreement, defendant breached
the contract by terminating plaintiffs from the program for
reasons other than failure to maintain the standards of the course.
At first blush, it might appear from the language of the
complaint that plaintiffs’ claims fall outside section 301 of the
LMRA, and that resolution of those claims does not involve an
interpretation or construction of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. It is true that plaintiffs base their claims solely on State law,
and that neither claim relies upon the collective-bargaining
agreement nor do they address the relationship between the
apprenticeship agreements and the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Further, the individual apprenticeship agreements make
no reference to the collective-bargaining agreement except for
the wage scale. Yet, in determining whether plaintiffs’ termina-
tion from the apprenticeship program was in violation of the
terms of the apprenticeship agreement, the nature of the relation-
ship between the apprenticeship agreement and the collective-
bargaining agreement must necessarily be examined. This will
require an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement )
which is governed by Federal law and preempted by section
301(a). This is not the sort of tangential relationship to the
collective-bargaining agreement referred to by the Court in
Lingle.
Sea
a Cees
— A-11 —
Moreover, the allegations of the complaint alone will not
always resolve the preemption issue. The defenses, as well as the
claims, must be considered in determining whether resolution of
the State-law claim requires construing the collective-bargain-
ing agreement. See Hanks v. General Motors Corp. (8th Cir.
1988), 859 F.2d 67, 70; Smith v. Colgate Palmolive Co. (7th Cir.
1991), 943 F.2d 764, 769-771; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-07, 100
L. Ed. 2d at 418-19, 108 S. Ct. at 1881-82 (finding that neither
the elements of the tort nor the defense to the tort required an
interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement); Williams,
482 U.S. at 398, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 331, 107 S. Ct. at 2433 (when a
defense to a State-law claim is based on the terms of acollective-
bargaining agreement, the State court will have to interpret the
agreement to determine if the State-law claim survives); but see
Berda v. CBS Inc. (3d Cir. 1989), 881 F.2d 20, 25; McCormick
v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (4th Cir. 1991), 934 F.2d 531, 545
(en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
Defendant contends that plaintiffs were laid off pursuant to
the layoff and seniority provisions of the applicable collective-
bargaining agreement. This defense clearly implicates the col-
lective-bargaining agreement so that its interpretation is re-
quired to resolve the dispute at hand. Moreover, there is no
provision in the apprenticeship agreements or the collective-
bargaining agreements specifically exempting apprentices from
the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. There-
fore, resolution of plaintiffs’ claims would be substantially
dependent upon the collective-bargaining agreement so that the
claim would be preempted. Summary judgment, therefore, was
appropriate.
As to the fraudulent misrepresentation count, one of the
elements of fraudulent misrepresentation is that the injured party
justifiably relied on the false statement. (Seefeldt v. Millikin
National Bank (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 715, 719, 506 N.E.2d
1052, 1055.) In determining whether reliance is reasonable,
— A-12 —
courts must look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding
the alleged misrepresentation. (Seefeldt, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 719,
506 N.E.2d at 1055.) Since defendant alleges plaintiffs were still
covered by the collective-bargaining agreement which con-
tained a provision for layoffs, it would seem necessary that to
properly review plaintiffs’ claims the court would need to
evaluate the collective-bargaining agreement to determine
whether it was reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that they could
not be terminated from the apprenticeship program for economic
reasons. This claim therefore is also preempted.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Schacht court applied an errone-
ously restrictive view of Williams. They argue that the supreme
court in Williams determined that contract claims based on
agreements separate from the collective-bargaining agreement
were not dependent upon an interpretation of the collective-
bargaining agreement and therefore not preempted.
In Williams, former employees brought suit against Caterpil-
lar in State court alleging it breached their individual employ-
ment contracts. Caterpillar sought to remove the action to
Federal court arguing that removal was proper because the action
was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Williams, 482 US.
at 390-91, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 325-26, 107 S. Ct. at 2428.
In determining that the case should be remanded, the Supreme
Court focused on whether the complaint standing alone fell
within the scope of section 301(a). The Court noted that, absent
diversity, the presence or absence of Federal question jurisdic-
tion was governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” This
rule provides that Federal jurisdiction exists only when a Federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint. The Court further stated “it is now settled law |
that a case may not be removed to Federal court on the basis of |
a Federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if
the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even
eC
— A-13 —
if both parties concede that the Federal defense is the only
question truly at issue.” (Emphasis in original.) Williams, 482
U.S. at 393, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 327, 107 S. Ct. at 2430.
The Court distinguished a corollary to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule — the “complete preemption” doctrine. Under this
doctrine, the Court has concluded that the preemptive force of a
statute is so extraordinary that it converts a State-law complaint
into One stating a Federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. “Once an area of state law has been completely
preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state
law is considered, from its inception, a Federal claim, and
therefore arises under Federal law.” Williams, 482 U.S. at 393,
96 L. Ed. 2d at 328, 107 S. Ct. at 2430.
The Court held respondents’ State-law contract claims were
not “completely preempted” by section 301(a) of the LMRA.
Section 301(a) governs claims founded directly on rights created
by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims “‘substan-
tially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment.” (Williams, 482 U.S. at 394, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 328, 107 S. Ct.
at 2431.) Since respondents’ claims were based solely on indi-
vidual contracts, distinct from the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and their complaint was not “substantially dependent”
upon an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement,
the Court found the claims fell outside the complete preemption
doctrine. Williams, 482 U.S. at 394, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 328, 107 S.
Ct. at 2431.
Having disposed of the complete preemption doctrine, the
Supreme Court returned to the question of whether, under the
well-pleaded complaint rule, respondents’ suit had a Federal
jurisdictional basis. It concluded that because the respondents’
well-pleaded complaint sounded entirely on State law their suit
did not arise under section 301(a) and could not be removed to
Federal court. Williams, 482 U.S. at 399, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 331, 107
S. Ct. at 2433.
"oe
The Schacht court distinguished Williams by noting that it
dealt with removal jurisdiction and did not reach the substantive
merits of a preemption defense. Moreover, it found that while a
cause of action may not be removable based on a section 301(a)
preemption defense, that did not mean that the cause of action
was ultimately preempted under section 301(a). Because the
issue before Williams was removal jurisdiction, any discussion
of the merits of the preemption defense was dictum. (Schacht,
213 Ill. App. 3d at 173-75, 571 N.E.2d at 1217-18.) We agree that
Williams does not address the merits of this case for the reasons
cited by the Schacht court.
Moreover, we note that Williams specifically stated that it did
not intimate a view on the merits of Caterpillar’s defense that
section 301 preempts a State-law claim when the employer
raises a defense that requires the interpretation or application of
the collective-bargaining agreement or any of the other preemp-
tion arguments discussed. Rather, it asserted that these questions
should be addressed by the State court in the first instance.
(Williams, 482 U.S. at 398 n.13, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 331 n.13, 107 S.
Ct. at 2433 n.13.) It accordingly recognized that when a defense
to a State-law claim is based on the collective-bargaining agree-
ment courts will have to interpret that agreement to decide
whether the State claim survives. Williams, 482 U.S. at 398, 96
L. Ed. 2d at 331, 107 S. Ct. at 2433.
Defendant also asserts various other reasons why the trial
court’s decision should be affirmed. Because we agree plain-
tiffs’ claims were preempted under section 301(a) of the LMRA,
we need not address these other issues.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed. -
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.
a
— A-15 —
APPENDIX B
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
SPRINGFIELD, ILL. 62706
(217) 782-2035
June 3, 1993
Mr. Mark M. Silvermintz
Carr, Korein, Schlichter, Kunin & Montroy
412 Missouri Ave.
E. St. Louis, IL 62201
No. 75171 — C. Michael Jones, etal., petitioners, v. Caterpillar
Tractor Company, etc., respondent. Leave to
appeal, Appellate Court, Fourth District.
The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for leave to
appeal in the above entitled cause.
The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate Court on
June 25, 1993.
— A-16—
APPENDIX C
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
No. 86-L-4
C. MICHAEL JONES, et al.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
CATERPILLAR INC.,
Defendant.
(JONES VS CATERPILLAR) 4-16-92 JES/LKB-h
Present the Plaintiff by Attorney Silvermintz; the Defendant by
Attorney Warner. Cause called for hearing on Defendant’s
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Arguments heard.
Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment allowed
on the basis of the authority cited in the Schacht decision.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike argued and denied. Copy of this
docket entry sent by Court to Attorneys Silvermintz and Warner.
Cause stricken.
(Docket Entry)
pom
APPENDIX D
IN THE UNITED STATES-DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS —
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
No 86-3047
C. MICHAEL JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
wi
CATERPILLAR, INC.,
Defendant.
- ORDER
[Filed: Aug. 6, 1987]
MILLS, District Judge:
On July 7, 1987, this Court ordered Defendant Caterpillar Inc.
to show cause why this action should not be remanded to state
court based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987). The question presented
there is identical to the one posed by this case: whether Plaintiffs’
state law complaint for breach of individual employment con-
tracts is completely pre-empted by §301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §185, and
therefore removable to federal court. Williams ruled in the
negative, thus prompting this Court’s order to show cause.
Caterpillar’s response argues that Williams is legally distin-
guishable from the case at hand. We are unable to agree with that
conclusion; ergo, this action is remanded to the tribunal origi-
nally selected by Plaintiffs.
I
Before proceeding to our analysis of the question presented,
a short review of the procedural history of this cause is in order.
— A-18 —
The 45 Plaintiffs in this action are former employees of
Caterpillar’s Decatur plant and were hired as apprentices at
various times between 1979 and 1986. As apprentices, each
signed a written employment contract with Caterpillar. Both
apprentice and nonapprentice Caterpillar employees were cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) (either the
contract signed December 15, 1979, or its successor effective
April 19, 1983). The individual apprenticeship agreements,
however, made no reference to the CBA; and apprentices were
only briefly mentioned in a letter of agreement made part of the
CBA. The most important component of the individual appren-
ticeship contracts provides for discharge only upon a showing of
unsatisfactory performance.
In their state court complaint, Plaintiffs allege their discharges
breached that provision. Subsequently, Caterpillar removed the
action to this federal court, arguing that removal is proper
because the individual employment contracts made with Plain-
tiffs are superceded [sic] by the CBA and thus preempted by
§301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §185. Plaintiffs deny that their
state claims are preempted, and seek remand of this action to its
proper destination. In a written report and recommendation,
United States Magistrate Charles H. Evans, relying heavily on
the district court opinion Binkley v. Caterpillar, No. 85-1201
(C.D. Ill., Oct. 6, 1985) (involving essentially this situation),
recommended that 44 of the 45 Plaintiffs be remanded to state
court.
In Binkley, the Court ruled that 14 of 17 Decatur plant
apprentices who were laid off prior to the execution of the 1983
CBA were subject to remand. In so holding, the Court deter-
mined that Plaintiffs’ state law claims were not grounded, either
directly or indirectly, upon rights or liabilities created by the
1979 CBA. Thus, since Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not require
interpretation or application of the CBA, the Court concluded
that it did not arise under §301 and was not removable to federal
— A-19 —
court. Binkley also held, however, that the claims of three
apprentices discharged after the effective date of the 1983 CBA
were preempted by §301 due to the expanded treatment of the
apprenticeship program in that agreement.
The Magistrate found Binkley “persuasive and controlling
authority under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and stare
decisis.” Further, based upon his independent analysis of the
question, the Magistrate concluded that the Court’s decision was
correct. The case is now before this tribunal upon Caterpillar’s
objections to that conclusion, as well as the additional authority
provided by the Supreme Court in Williams. We adopt the
majority of the Magistrate’s recommendation, but hold that all
Plaintiffs must be remanded to the state court.
II
Contrary to Caterpillar’s assertions, we believe that Williams
controls the outcome of this case. There, the Supreme Court
ruled, inter alia, that state law breach of contract claims pre-
mised upon the reported breach of a contract other than a CBA
are not necessarily “completely preempted” by §301 claims.
Instead, the well pleaded complaint rule (which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is pre-
sented on the face of Plaintiffs’ properly pleaded complaint)
makes “the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid
federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Wil-
liams, 107 S. Ct. at 2429. Thus, Williams concluded that where
an employee alleges breach of contract under state law, and the
issue does not require the interpretation of the CBA, he or she
may choose the state forum by so pleading.
Caterpillar asserts, however, that Williams is distinguishable
because the independent agreements in that case were executed
while the employees were not also covered by a CBA; here, the
Plaintiffs executed their contracts while they were within the
bargaining unit. This factual distinction is not persuasive. Wil-
— A-20 —
liams is grounded not upon the time period during which inde-
pendent agreements were executed, but rather upon whether
Plaintiffs’ action is founded on rights created by a CBA. See
Williams, 107 S. Ct. at 2432 n.12. This is because §301 governs
only those claims “substantially dependent on analysis of a
CBA. ... Section 301 says nothing about the content or validity
of individual employment contracts.” Williams, 107 S. Ct. at
2425 (1987). As was the case in Williams, Plaintiffs, as members
of the bargaining unit, did possess substantial rights under the
CBA, and could have brought suit under §301. But as masters of
their complaint, they chose not to do so.
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint — a state law breach of contract
claim--is not substantially dependent upon an interpretation of
the CBA. It does not rely upon the agreement indirectly, nordoes
it address the relationship between the individual contracts and
the CBA. Moreover, this conclusion holds as true for the one
Plaintiff discharged after the 1983 contract was executed as it
does for the remaining 44. The existence of a CBA is simply not
the governing factor; instead, as the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
(1985), teaches, the crux of the inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s
claims, as he or she pleads them, substantially depend upon an
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. See Williams,
107 S. Ct. at 2432 n.10. Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case do
not; therefore, they are not preempted by §301 and were improp-
erly removed to federal court.
Caterpillar additionally maintains that the Seventh Circuit’s
recent en banc decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Slip op. Nos. 85-2971 and 86-1763 (7th Cir., June 23,
1987), rendered fourteen days after Williams, supports removal
of this case. In Lingle, the Court held that §301 preempted the
plaintiff’ s purported state law tort claims (based upon retaliatory
discharge, intentional interference with employment contracts,
and the defectiveness of certain discharge procedures) where the
— A-21 —
only contract controlling her employment rights was the CBA.
The case is inapposite to the present scenario. Unlike Lingle,
there clearly is a separate contract controlling the Plaintiffs’
employment rights in this case, and they chose to allege only a
breach of those contracts. As Williams holds, Plaintiffs have the
right to so proceed, and Caterpillar has no basis for removal;
Finally, Plaintiffs correctly note that Lingle itself distinguished
claims based upon individual contracts. And to the extent any of
the language in Lingle is inconsistent with Williams, the latter —
being the law of this nation — must of course prevail.
In sum, we hold that Plaintiffs’ state law claims for breach of
their individual apprenticeship contracts do not implicate the
CBA and are not preempted by §301. Therefore, removal was
improper.
Plaintiffs’ motion for remand is ALLOWED.
This action is hereby REMANDED to the state court for the
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois.
ENTER: 6 August, 1987.
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
RICHARD MILLS
United States District Judge
aay poe
APPENDIX E
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
No. 86-L-4
C. MICHAEL JONES, et al.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
CATERPILLAR INC.,
Defendant.
7/18/89 Cause called on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Motion denied, there being genuine issues of fact
remaining in the case. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment called for hearing. Motion denied. The apprenticeship
agreements were not “subsumed” into the collective bargaining
agreements, and therefore, were not preempted by Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act.”
CJC/nek
(Docket Entry)
a,
APPENDIX F
213 Tl.App.3d 169
571 N.E.2d 1215
Robert D. SCHACHT, Jr., Barry W. Hansis, Roger D.
Hoffman, and Patty Mikels, on their own behalf and as
representatives of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
CATERPILLAR INC., Defendant.
Jimmey D. GARRY, Plaintiff,
v.
CATERPILLAR INC., Defendant.
Charles E. BINKLEY, et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
CATERPILLAR INC., Defendant.
Charles E. BINKLEY, Candace Tolley,
and William Trotter, Plaintiffs,
Vv.
CATERPILLAR INC. Defendant.
William WARDEN and Bruce Osgood, Plaintiffs,
v.
CATERPILLAR INC., Defendant.
Nos. 3-90-0431, 3-90-0466, 3-90-0659, 3-90-0668 and
3-90-0669.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
Third District
May 20, 1991.
Laid-off employees sued their employer for alleged violations
of the terms of certain “Apprenticeship Agreements.” The
he
Circuit Court, Peoria County, Joe B. McDade, J., granted
employer’s motion for summary judgment, and employees ap-
pealed. The Appellate Court, Stouder, P.J., held that employees’
actions were preempted by § 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947.
Affirmed.
Labor Relations key 773
States key 18.45
Laid-off employees’ state court actions against their employer
for breach of “Apprenticeship Agreements” were preempted
under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act; nature
of relationship between Apprenticeship Agreements and collec-
tive-bargaining agreements of necessity required interpretation
of those collective-bargaining agreements, and Apprenticeship
Agreements were notcompletely separate and independent from
collective-bargaining agreements. Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).
Alexandra de Saint Phalle (argued), Gary L. Cline, Londrigan,
Potter & Randle, P.C., Springfield, for Robert D. Schacht, Jr.,
Barry W. Hansis, Roger D. Hoffman, and Patty Mikels.
Diane E. Greanias (argued), Andrew J. Kleczek, Kelley &
Kleczek, Peoria, for Charles E. Binkley, William Warden, Bruce
Osgood, Candace Tolley, and William Trotter.
Michael D. Gifford (argued), Rochford & Associates, Peoria,
for Jimmey D. Garry.
J. Stephen Poor, Michael A. Warner (argued), Seyfarth, Shaw,
Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Theodore R. Johnson, Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, for Caterpillar, Inc.
— A-25 —
OPINION
Presiding Justice STOUDER.
These consolidated appeals involve five separate actions
brought against the defendant, Caterpillar, Inc., for alleged
violations of the terms of certain “Apprenticeship Agreements.”
The plaintiffs are former and present employees of Caterpillar.
In each of the actions, the trial court granted summary judgment
for Caterpillar, finding inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ claims were
pre-empted under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)). The
plaintiffs appeal from those judgments, and we affirm.
Although the procedural history of these cases are rather
complex, they present this court with a single issue, whether the
trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs’ state law
contract claims were pre-empted under § 301(a) of the LMRA.
At various times in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the
plaintiffs held positions as apprentices with Caterpillar. The
terms of these apprenticeships were set forth in a standardized
apprenticeship agreement entered into between each individual
employee and Caterpillar. Among the provisions, the agree-
ments provided for the grounds upon which the apprenticeships
would be terminated. At all times relevant, the plaintiffs were
members of one of three unions which represent employees at
Caterpillar facilities. Because of the economic difficulties
experienced by Caterpillar in the early 1980’s, Caterpillar laid
off the plaintiffs pursuant to the layoff and seniority provisions
of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement covering each
plaintiff.
On March 20, 1985, seventeen laid off employees of Caterpil-
lar filed an action in the circuit court of Peoria County. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged breach of contract on the part of
Caterpillar for its failure to continue their employment and
es ee
training pursuant to the written apprenticeship agreements. This
action was designated Binkley etal. v. Caterpillar and is referred
to as Binkley I by the parties.
Caterpillar attempted to remove the action to the U.S. District
Court, contending the plaintiffs’ actions were pre-empted by §
301(a). Caterpillar also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
claims. On September 26, 1985, the Federal District Court
denied Caterpillar’s request for removal, and remanded the
actions of fourteen of the plaintiffs to the Illinois circuit court.
The Court found that those plaintiffs who left the apprenticeship
program prior to the effective date of the 1983 collective-
bargaining agreement had individual employment contracts, and
thus state causes of action. The court held that their claims were
not pre-empted by § 301(a).
The District Court dismissed the claims of three of the plain-
tiffs, including plaintiff Charles Binkley. The court found that
these plaintiffs’ apprenticeship agreements were merged into the
1983 collective-bargaining agreement. These three plaintiffs
later refiled their action in the circuit court alleging the same
breach of contract claims. This action is referred to as Binkley
II.
Plaintiffs William Warden and Bruce Osgood filed com-
plaints against Caterpillar on August 9, 1986. This action is
referred to as Warden. Binkley I, Binkley II and Warden were
consolidated for discovery purposes by the trial court.
Meanwhile, four plaintiffs filed a complaint against Caterpil-
lar on February 26, 1986. Eventually, this action was certified
as a Class action, and will be referred to as Schacht.
Plaintiff Jimmey Garry filed a complaint against Caterpillar
on December 11, 1989, and this case will be referred to as Garry.
On January 19, 1990, the Schacht plaintiffs filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. On April 30, 1990, the plaintiffs in
— A-27 —
Binkley I, Binkley II and Warden filed motions for summary
judgment. Caterpillar filed motions for summary judgmentin all
five causes of action, including Garry. In the motions for
summary judgment, Caterpillar argued that the plaintiffs’ causes
of action were pre-empted under Section 301(a) of the LMRA.
In addition, Caterpillar maintained that the actions were also pre-
empted under the National Labor Relations Act.
On May 30, 1990, without comment Judge Courson granted
Caterpillar’s motion for summary judgment in the Garry case.
On June 6, 1990, Judge McDade entered an order denying the
Schacht plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and
granting Caterpillar’s motion for summary judgment. The trial
court found inter alia that because resolution of the plaintiffs’
claims depended on interpretation of the applicable collective-
bargaining agreement’s provisions for lay off and seniority,
plaintiffs’ claims were pre-empted by Section 301(a). Based on
his findings and decision in the Schacht case, Judge McDade
granted Caterpillar’s motions for summary judgment in Binkley
I, Binkley II and Warden on August 31, 1990. As initially
indicated these five cases were consolidated for purposes of this
appeal.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding
that their claims were pre-empted under Section 301(a).
Sections 301(a) provides: “Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court succinctly stated
its § 301 jurisprudence.
=
— A-28 —
“Over 30 years ago, this Court held that § 301 not only
provides the federal courts with jurisdiction over controversies
involving collective-bargaining agreements but also authorizes
the courts to fashion ‘a body of federal law for the enforcement
of these collective bargaining agreements.’ (Citation omitted)
Since then, the Court has made clear that § 301 is a potent source
of federal labor law, for though state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over controversies involving collective-bargaining
agreements, (citation omitted), state courts must apply federal
law in deciding those claims, (citation omitted), and indeed any
state-law cause of action for violation of collective-bargaining
agreements is entirely displaced by federal law under § 301
(citation omitted). State law is thus ‘pre-empted’ by § 301 in that
only the federal law fashioned by the courts under § 301 governs
the interpretation and application of collective-bargaining agree-
ments.” United Steelworkers v. Rawson (1990), 495 U.S. __, __
___, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 109 L.Ed.2d 362, 372-373.
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 105
S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206, the Supreme Court held that when
resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, that
claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-
empted by federal labor-contract law.
The plaintiffs contend that their breach of contract actions are
based solely on the alleged breach of the apprenticeship agree-
ments, and that resolution of their claims does not require
interpretation of the applicable collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The plaintiffs assert that the apprenticeship agreements
did not provide for the termination of the apprenticeships based
on economic reasons.
The plaintiffs cite Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams (1987), 482
U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318, and the earlier
decision of the District Court in Binkley I to support their
— A-29 —
argument that Caterpillar’s pre-emption defense has been re-
jected. We note however, that the issue in both cases was
removal jurisdiction, not the substantive merits of a pre-emption
defense. We also note that the District Court’s decision was
issued prior to Williams.
The plaintiffs also cite as support for their assertion, the
decision of another Federal District Court in collateral proceed-
ings arising out of the same controversy. (Order entered August
6, 1987 in Jones et al. v. Caterpillar No. 86-3047.) The District
Court in that case also held that the action was not properly
removable.
The plaintiffs misconstrue the scope of the decision in Wil-
liams. In Williams, the plaintiffs alleged that Caterpillar had
breached individual contracts, and filed a complaint in state
court. Caterpillar attempted to remove the action to the federal
court by alleging the cause of action was pre-empted by § 301.
The Supreme Court found that the action could not be removed
because the plaintiffs’ claims standing alone, did not arise under
federal law. The Court reiterated “that a case may not be
removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense,
including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is
anticipated in the plaintiffs’ complaint, and even if both parties
concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at
issue.” (Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430, 96
L.Ed.2d 318, 327.) Absent diversity, the determination that
jurisdiction is based on a federal question is governed by the
well-pleaded complaint rule, under which the federal question
must be presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d
318.
After finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not state a
federal claim on its face the Williams court stated, “It is true that
when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of a
— A-30 —
collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to
interpret that agreement to decide whether the state claim sur-
vives. But the presence of a federal question, even a § 301
question, in a defensive argument does not overcome the para-
mount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule —
that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal
question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the
plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose
to have the cause heard in state court.” Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
398-399, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2432-2433, 96 L.Ed.2d 318, 331.
While a cause of action may not be removable based on a §
301(a) pre-emption defense, that does not mean that the cause of
action is not pre-empted under § 301(a). Thus the only question
before the Court in Williams, and before District Court in
Binkley I, was whether removal jurisdiction existed. Any
discussion of the merits of Caterpillar’s pre-emption defense by
the District Court is dicta. On the other hand, in the instant cases,
we are now presented with the substantive merits of Caterpillar’s
pre-emption defense. We must determine whether the trial
courts below correcily found that the resolution of the plaintiffs’
state-law contractclaims are substantially dependent upon analy-
sis of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement.
The plaintiffs allege that the termination of their participation
in the Caterpillar apprenticeship program was in violation of the
terms of the apprenticeship agreements. They contend their
action is based solely on breach of this agreement. However,
Caterpillar responds that they were laid off from employment
with Caterpillar under the lay off and seniority provisions of the
applicable collective-bargaining agreemeni.
The plaintiffs argue that the apprenticeship agreements are
separate employment contracts which do not require interpreta-
tion of the collective-bargaining agreement. We cannot agree.
The plaintiffs availed themselves of many of the benefits avail-
— A-31 —
able under the collective-bargaining agreement. Many of the
terms of their employment were derived from the collective-
bargaining agreement. The nature of the relationship between
the apprenticeship agreements and the collective-bargaining
agreements of necessity requires an interpretation of those
collective-bargaining agreements. That interpretation is gov-
erned by federal labor law and any state-law action in such
circumstances is pre-empted by § 301(a). We cannot resolve this
issue under state-law contract principles.
As an aside, we agree with Judge McDade’s finding that the
apprenticeship agreements were made within the context of the
collective-bargaining agreements, and that the plaintiffs’ em-
ployment remained subject to the terms and conditions of the
collective-bargaining agreements. We agree that the apprentice-
ship agreements were not completely separate and independent
agreements. The plaintiffs’ reliance on Belknap v. Hale (1983),
463 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 77 L.Ed.2d 798, is misplaced.
Belknap concemed the issue of pre-emption under the National
Labor Relations Act, not § 301(a). Nordo we find Berda v. CBS,
Inc. (1989), 881 F.2d 20, persuasive. The Berda court relies on
the reasoning of Williams without distinguishing the fact that
Williams was a removal action, while the Berda court was
presented with the substantive issue of the pre-emption defense.
Because we find the trial courts below correctly granted
Caterpillar’s motions for summary judgment, in that plaintiffs’
claims were pre-empted by § 301(a), we need not address the
other issues and arguments raised by the parties.
For the foregoing reasons the judgments of the circuit court of
Peoria County are affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCUSKEY and HAASE, JJ., concur.
oa
APPENDIX G
Robert D. SCHACHT, Jr., et al., petitioners,
v.
CATERPILLAR, INC.
No. 91-1090.
Charles E. BINKLEY, et al., petitioners,
v.
CATERPILLAR, INC.
No. 91-1095.
Case below, 213 Ill. App.3d 169, 157 Ill.Dec. 196,571 N.E.2d
1215; 141 Ill.2d 560, 162 Ill. Dec. 508, 580 N.E.2d 134.
On petitions for writs of certiorari to the Appellate Court of
Illinois, Third District.
March 9, 1992. The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
Justice WHITE, joined by Justice BLACKMUN, dissenting.
These cases present the question whether, foilowing our
decision in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct.
2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), a state-law cause of action is pre-
empted under § 301 of the LMRA by a defense based on a
collective bargaining agreement. A state-law cause of action is
pre-empted under § 301 if its resolution is “substantially depen-
dent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.” Electri-
cal Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161,
2167, n. 3, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987). See also Allis-Chalmers v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915, 85 L.Ed.2d 206
(1985).
In the decision below, petitioners based their claims solely on
State law, but respondent’s defense invoked the provisions of a
— A-33 —
collective bargaining agreement. The Illinois court held that
petitioners’ state-law claims were pre-empted under § 301
because their resolution was substantially dependent on inter-
pretation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. 213
Ill. App.3d 169, 157 Ill.Dec. 196, 199, 571 N.E.2d 1215, 1218.
Several federal Courts of Appeals similarly have held that acourt
must look to defenses to determine whether a claim requires
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764, 769-771 (CA7
1991); Hanks v. General Motors Co., 859 F.2d 67, 70 (CA8
1988).
By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying
on our decision in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, has held that “in
order for there to be section 301 pre-emption, the plaintiff, in its
well-pleaded complaint, must plead an action that requires
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” That
Court accordingly examined the claims presented in the com-
plaint and found no § 301 pre-emption. Berdav.C.B.S. Inc., 881
F.2d 20, 25 (CA3 1989). See also McCormick v. A.T. & T.
Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 545 (CA4 1991) (en banc)
(Phillips, J., dissenting). The Illinois Court below expressly
rejected the reasoning of Berda.
I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.
aay” pes
APPENDIX H
AGREEMENT
CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.
THIS AGREEMENT made in duplicate this 28th day of Septem-
ber, 1981.
FOR THE Two-Year Machine Shop Trainee
between the CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., hereinafter re-
ferred to as COMPANY, and
Mike Jones
of 2090 Solar Ave., Decatur, IL. 62526
hereinafter referred to as TRAINEE.
WITNESSETH that the COMPANY and the TRAINEE
desire to enter into an agreement for Training. In consider-
ation of the premises and of the covenants herein contained,
the parties do hereby mutually agree as follows:
The COMPANY agrees to employ the TRAINEE for the
purpose of enabling said TRAINEE to learn and acquire
general skill and experience upon the terms and conditions
contained in the “Terms of Agreement,’’ hereto attached
and made a part hereof.
The TRAINEE agrees to diligently and faithfully perform
the work of the training program during the training period,
complying with the terms and conditions contained in the
“Terms of Agreement.”
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused
this agreement to be signed.
CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.
By: /s/ Kenneth A. Harm /s/ Claude Michael Jones
TRAINEE
— A-35 —
TERMS OF AGREEMENT
This agreement is to be dated and issued the day the
applicant is enrolled in training. It shall be signed by the
TRAINEE and a Company representative.
The training course will cover a period of 4000 hours and
will include the work stations and classroom instruction
necessary to develop a proficient craftsman in the trade.
Wages will be increased each 1,000 training hours and the
TRAINEE shall graduate after completing the specified
number of hours.
The TRAINEE shall receive wages according to the current
applicable schedule of rates.
The TRAINEE shall be issued personal tools and classroom
study material required in the training schedule. The cost
of these tools will be paid by the TRAINEE through
monthly payroll deductions.
Upon completing the course, the Trainee shall be reim-
bursed the cost of personal tools received, less withholding
taxes. The tools then become the personal property of the
TRAINEE.
In the event the TRAINEE is separated from the training
course, the balance due on these tools must be paid by the
TRAINEE. The tools then become the personal property of
the TRAINEE.
The TRAINEE shall complete a prescribed course of class-
room study to develop technical skills. Classes shall be
attended on Company time with subsequent study and
homework done on TRAINEE’S own time.
The TRAINEE shall be under the general supervision of a
Training Instructor throughout the training period. When
10.
— A-36 —
the work performed on a work station is not the direct
responsibility of the Training Instructor, the TRAINEE
shail also be subject to the direction of that area supervisor.
The Company reserves the right to separate the TRAINEE
from the Training course for failure to maintain the stan-
dards of the course including but not limited to: unsatisfac-
tory work, inability to acquire the necessary knowledge for
graduation, improper conduct, indifferences to factory rules
and regulations, insubordination, or any other justifiable
reason. In the event of such separation, there shall be no
liability of any kind on the part of the Company to said
TRAINEE.
The TRAINEE shall have the right to terminate the Train-
ing Agreement at any time.
The Company will teach and instruct the TRAINEE in the
trade during the entire training period. The TRAINEE shall
graduate and receive a diploma after fulfilling the “Terms
of Agreement.”
The Company intends to offer the TRAINEE job placement
after training is completed. The type of placement will
depend upon the openings available, the ability and progress
displayed during training, and the graduate’s desires.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.