Opinion — Spiller v. Atchison, T. & SFR Co.

a —_—oe ” * ean ae ee

RA IEE ES SR VAAL LE AS He LSAT EN RAID. EVO EEO RRS fete tee 6 on pe tae. Ae ee ee

BS : eee RE RN AE RENT poo SLATS NR SAREE ORT Fi ee

SPILLER ». ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE

RAILWAY COMPANY.

SPILLER v. CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS

RAILROAD COMPANY.

SPILLER ». CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD

COMPANY.

SPILLER v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY

COMPANY.

SPILLER »v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN &

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

SPILLER »v. ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAIL-

ROAD COMPANY.

SPILLER v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC

RAILWAY COMPANY.

SPILLER v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD

COMPANY.

SPILLER ». MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAIL-

WAY COMPANY.

ERROR AND CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

Nos. 137-145. Argued January 15, 1920.—Decided May 17, 1920.

In cases of a class which may ultimately reach this court by writ of

error under Jud. Code, §§ 128 and 241, this court has jurisdiction

to review by certiorari judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals

She dat eae ea

118 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Syllabus. 253 U.S.

which are not final in the sense of concluding the litigation, such juris-

diction arising under § 262 when the jurisdictional amount pre-

scribed by § 241 is in controversy and under § 240 when it is not.

P. 120.

This jurisdiction will be exercised in proper cases to avoid protraction

of the litigation. P. 121.

The courts cannot refuse to enforce a reparation order upon the ground

that the evidence before the Interstate Commerce Commission was

insufficient to sustain it when substantial documentary evidence

that was before the Commission is not produced at the trial.

P. 125.

The Act to Regulate Commerce allows the Commission wide latitude

in the investigation of claims for reparation, and its finding and order

may not be rejected as evidence because of errors in its procedure

not amounting to a denial of a fair hearing, so long as the essential

facts found are based on substantial evidence. P. 126.

In a proceeding in which the Commission awarded reparation for ex-

cessive freight charges on many shipments of cattle consigned to

commission companies by many shippers over many railroads, a

witness who had gathered the details of the shipments in some cases

from shippers but mainly from the commission companies, presented

them at the hearings and further testified that the shippers rarely

kept books, relying on the commission companies to do so, and that

the practice of the latter was to pay the freight, sell the cattle and

remit the proceeds to their owners minus the freight paid and other

charges; the evidence was received without objection and summaries

showing the details of the shipments, rate paid, overcharge claimed,

etc., were submitted to the carriers and “O.K.’d” after comparison

with their books. Held, that this evidence, including the admissions

that might be implied from the carriers’ approval of the summaries,

was sufficient to justify the Commission in finding that the shipments

were made as claimed and the overcharges paid ultimately by the

shippers. P. 127.

A decision by the Commission that a witness before it is qualified as an

expert must be accepted by the courts unless clearly unfounded.

P. 130.

An order of the Commission is not to be rejected because based in part

on hearsay evidence, if the evidence was received without objection

and was substantially corroborated by other evidence original and

admissible against the parties affected. Id.

In view of the character of its functions and the fact that its reparation

orders are at most prima facie evidence, the Commission should not

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 119

117. Counsel for Parties.

be narrowly constrained as to the evidence it may receive in the con-

duct of reparation hearings. P. 131.

If only part of the claims for which reparation was awarded were

sustained by evidence, objection should be directed to the others and

not to the order as a whole. Id.

In a hearing for reparation, payment of a published rate afterwards

decided to have been excessive is evidence that the party who paid

the freight sustained damage to the extent of the excess. P. 132.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U. 8.

531.

In a reparation hearing, assignments of claims to the secretary of a

cattle raisers’ association were offered and their filing waived, and

there was evidence that they had been made for nominal considera-

tions because the association was prosecuting the claims for their

owners. Held, that formal proof of the handwriting of the assignors

was unnecessary. P. 133.

An assignment of the legal title only will confer on the assignee the

right to claim an award of reparation and enable him to sue upon

it in his own name, but for the benefit of the equitable owner.

P. 134.

A claim for damages sustained through the exaction of unreasonable

freight charges is assignable at law, if no statute prevents; and there

is nothing in the letter or spirit of the Commerce Act inconsistent

with such assignability. P. 135.

The ruling of the Commission declaring that an assignment to a stranger

to the transportation records will not be recognized is erroneous as a

construction of the act, and, treated as an administrative regula-

tion, did not limit the Commission’s jurisdiction to recognize such

assignments. P. 136.

246 Fed. Rep. 1; 249 id. 677, reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Buckner F. Deatherage, with whom Mr. Samuel H.

Cowan, Mr. I. H. Burney and Mr. Goodwin Creason were

on the briefs, for plaintiff in error and petitioner.

Mr. T. J. Norton, with whom Mr. Gardiner Lathrop,

Mr. C. S. Burg and Mr. James L. Coleman were on the

brief, for defendants in error and respondents.

P MSA EAL

120 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U.S.

Mr. Justice Prrney delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error commenced an action against defend-

ants in error jointly in the District Court of the United

States for the Western District of Missouri under § 16 of

the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended (Act of

February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 384; June 29, 1906,

c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 590; June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat.

539, 554), to recover certain amounts awarded to him

against them respectively in a reparation order made by

the Interstate Commerce Commission January 12, 1914.

His petition contained also a count setting up a conspiracy

between defendants for the restraint of interstate com-

merce, and claiming treble damages under §7 of the

Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat.

209, 210; but this was abandoned at the trial. Defend-

ants having filed separate answers, a jury was waived by

stipulation, and a test case tried before the court—all

defendants participating—with the result that a decision

was rendered in favor of plaintiff, pursuant to which a

combined judgment was entered, amounting in effect to as

many judgments as there were defendants, each for the

amount of the Commission’s award against the particular

defendant with interest and attorneys’ fees. Defendants

sued out separate writs of error from the Circuit Court of

Appeals, where, by stipulation, the cases were heard

together upon a single record. That court reversed the

judgments, ordered the cause remanded to the District

Court with directions to grant a new trial (246 Fed. Rep.

1), and refused an application for a rehearing (249 Fed.

Rep. 677). Writs of error were prayed for and allowed for

the review of the judgments of reversal in this court; and

afterwards but in due season a petition for the allowance of

a writ of certiorari was filed, the consideration of which

was postponed to the hearing under the writs of error.

The jurisdiction of the District Court having been in-

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 121

117. Opinion of the Court.

voked not because of diversity of citizenship but because

the suit was one arising under laws of the United States

other than those particularly mentioned in § 128, Judicial

Code, as amended (Act of January 28, 1915, c. 22, § 2, 38

Stat. 803), it follows that the judgments were not made

“final” by the section referred to, and, if final in the sense

of concluding the litigation, would be reviewable in this

court by writ of error pursuant to § 241, Judicial Code, in

each case where the matter in controversy exceeds one thou-

sand dollars besides costs. In the cases of the Chicago &

Alton and the Missouri Pacific Companies, the respective

judgments with interest up to the issuance of the writs of

error from this court were materially less than one thousand

dollars; in each of the other cases substantially in excess of

that amount; the aggregate of the judgments being more

than $150,000. For want of a sufficient amount in con-

troversy the two smaller judgments would not be review-

able here by writ of error even were they final in effect ; but

all the writs of error must be dismissed because the judg-

ments call for further proceedings in the trial court; it

being elementary that this writ will lie to review final

judgments only. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665; Luzx-

ton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337, 341; Heike

v. United States, 217 U. 8. 423, 429.

However, upon consideration of the particular circum-

stances of the case, we have concluded that a writ of

certiorari ought to be allowed, without further protracting

the litigation to the extent that would be necessary in

order to reach final judgments; the transcript of the record

and proceeding’ returned in obedience to the writs of error

to stand as the return to the writ of certiorari. This writ

is allowable by virtue of § 240, Judicial Code, (derived

from § 6 of the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826,

828) in the case of the two smaller judgments, because the

decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final by

the combined effect of §§ 128 and 241; and in the case oi

122 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U. 8.

the larger judgments it is allowable under § 262 of the

Code (§ 716, Rev. Stats.), in aid of the ultimate jurisdic-

tion of this court to review those cases by writs of error.

Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 58; In re Chet-

wood, 165 U. S. 443, 462; Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132,

135; McClellan vy. Carland, 217 U. 8. 268, 277, et seq.;

United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463, 467; Meeker v.

Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 234 U. 8. 749; 236 U.S. 412, 417.

Coming to the merits: The ground upon which the

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgments, and the

ground principally relied upon to sustain its decision, was

the refusal by the trial court of a motion made by defend-

ants to hold: (a) That upon all the evidence plaintiff was

not entitled to recover against any or all of the defendants;

and (b) that there was not sufficient evidence before the

Commission to sustain its order of reparation. The latter

is the substantial question actually presented.

The course of proceedings at the trial, as appears from

the bill of exceptions, was as follows: Plaintiff introduced

the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (un-

reported opinion No. A-583 in case No. 732, Cattle Raisers’

Association of Texas v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co.,

dated January 12, 1914), and the order of reparation made

pursuant to it and upon which the action was based.

Defendants having admitted the service of the order, and

that the money awarded had not been paid, plaintiff

rested. The report makes an award in favor of Spiller,

plaintiff in error, as assignee of a large number of claims

for reparation by reason of excessive rates charged by the

respective carriers on interstate shipments of cattle from

points of origin in Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Colo-

rado, and Kansas, to destinations at Kansas City, St.

Louis, Chicago, St. Joseph, and New Orleans, on various

dates between August 29, 1906, and November 17, 1908;

and a further award to named shippers in the case of cer-

tain unassigned claims pertaining to similar shipments; the

PETE NEY Sg OPIS LET TUT Se ea Por oh Paar s

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 123

117. Opinion of the Court.

several claims, assigned and unassigned, with distinguish-

ing marks, being set forth in Appendix A, showing the

delivering carriers against which the claims were allowed

and, in each case, the consignor, points of origin and des-

tination, number of cars shipped, weight, rate paid, the

lower rate sanctioned by the Commission, amount of

refund required, and the interest thereon. The report

contains appropriate findings adequate to support the

award, among them the following: That the persons

named in Appendix A as consignors shipped from the

points of origin to the points of destination specified, by

the line of road named as the “delivering road,’”’ the

number of cars and of the aggregate net weight stated;

that the shippers paid to the delivering carriers freight

upon the shipments at certain rates named; that in each

instance this rate was unreasonable and excessive, and a

reasonable rate to have been charged would have been the

lower rate specified as having been subsequently estab-

lished by the Commission, and that therefore the deliver-

ing carriers collected from the shippers unreasonable

charges on account of the shipments in amounts named in

the column headed ‘Amount of Refund’’; that the ship-

ments of live stock were in all cases consigned to some

person at the delivering market, usually a commission

firm; that the freight was paid in the first instance by the

“‘consignor”’ (evidently a misprint for ‘‘ consignee”) to the

delivering carrier, and subsequently the cattle were sold

upon the market and the amount of the freight deducted

from the purchase price, remittance being made for the

balance, so that in all cases the owner and shipper of the

cattle finally paid the transportation charges; and that by

the unreasonable exactions of the carriers the shippers were

damaged in the amounts stated in the appropriate column

of Appendix A, since they received for the cattle less by

those amounts than they would have received had the

rate found reasonable been charged; that in the case of

124 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U.S.

some of the claims the shippers made assignments to

H. E. Crowley, then being secretary of the Cattle Raisers’

Association, in a form set forth in the report; that sub-

sequently Crowley ceased to be such secretary, and was

succeeded by Spiller, the plaintiff, to whom Crowley

assigned all claims previously assigned to him; and that

other specified claims were assigned by the shippers to

Spiller after he became secretary, the form of assignment

being the same as that previously employed.

Defendants, endeavoring to show the insufficiency of the

evidence upon which the findings and order of the Com-

mission were based, introduced a transcript of the stenog-

rapher’s + ies of the testimony taken upon the hearing

of the repai.tion claims; following this by introducing a

sample page taken from one of the exhibits introduced

before the Commission as illustrative of the form of

exhibits there introduced. After other evidence not

necessary to be mentioned, and a request for judgment in

favor of defendants, and for certain rulings on points of

law that would have produced that result, all of which

were refused, the case was closed.

It appears that in February, 1904, the Cattle Raisers’

Association of Texas, in behalf of its members and of others

interested, petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commis-

sion under § 13 of the Commerce Act, alleging the rates in

force in the territory in question to be unjust and unrea-

sonable, they having been advanced some time before to

the extent (in most cases) of 3 cents per hundred pounds.

On August 16, 1905, the Commission held (Cattle Raisers’

Association of Texas v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co.,

11 I. C. C. 296, 352) that the then existing rates were

unjust and unreasonable by the amount of the advance.

At this time the Commission was not empowered to fix

rates for the future. This power having been conferred by

the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat 584, 589,

which, by Joint Resolution of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 838,

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 125

117. Opinion of the Court.

took effect sixty days after its approval by the President,

or on August 28, 1906, the Cattle Raisers’ Association

immediately thereafter applied for and obtained a re-

opening of the matter, to the end that reasonable rates

might be established; and on April 14, 1908, the Commis-

sion decided that the former rates should be restored, but

that reparation would not be allowed upon claims accruing

prior to August 29, 1906 (date of the application). 13 I.

C. C. 418, 435. The reduced rates finally were put into

effect November 17, 1908.

The reparation claims in controversy appear to have

been filed in due season by the Cattle Raisers’ Association

in behaif of its members and other shippers interested, and

in the names of the alleged owners of the cattle shipped.

The transcript of the testimony taken by the Commis-

sion, as introduced in evidence in the District Court, forms

the basis of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals that

the reparation order was unsupported by evidence. But

the transcript shows that important documentary evidence

was introduced, and furnished the principal foundation for

the findings made. This documentary evidence (except

the single sheet offered for purposes of illustration) was not

introduced in the District Court, in order, as stated by

counsel, to ‘‘avoid introducing a number of papers that

would almost fill a farm wagon.”’ But obviously we hardly

could sustain a decision rejecting the reparation order upon

the ground that there was not sufficient evidence before

the Commission to support it when the whole of the evi-

dence that was before the Commission was not produced.

That this is a matter of substance will appear from a

review of the course of the proceeding as disclosed by the

stenographer’s transcript. The evidence was taken by Mr.

Commissioner Prouty at Chicago; there being three ses-

sions, the first on September 19 and 20, 1912, the second on

January 24 and the third en October 17 in the following

year. They were held in the presence of counsel for the

126 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U. 8.

Cattle Raisers’ Association, who appeared for the claim-

ants, and counsel for the several carriers interested. If we

were called upon to review the proceeding as upon a writ

of error or appeal it might be difficult to say that no im-

proper evidence was admitted, that production of the best

available was insisted upon, or that a different conclusion

might not have been reached upon that which was ad-

mitted. But the scope of the judicial review is not so

extensive. Section 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce

(Act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 383;

amended June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 550) requires

the Commission on receipt of a claim for reparation to

proceed on notice to the carrier to ‘investigate the matters

complained of in such manner and by such means as it

shall deem proper”’; and by § 16 (24 Stat. 590; 36 Stat.

554), if, after such hearing, the Commission shall deter-

mine that any party complainant is entitled to an award of

damages, the Commission is to make an order of reparation

accordingly, and in a suit based thereon “the findings and

order of the commission shall be prima facie evidence of

the facts therein stated.”’ The same section contemplates

that numerous parties may unite in a claim for reparation,

and that numerous carriers may be joined as defendants;

and similarly that in a suit brought upon such award there

may be a joinder of parties plaintiff and defendant. And,

by § 17 (24 Stat. 385; 25 Stat. 851), ‘‘the Commission may

conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best con-

duce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of

justice. ”’

These provisions allow a large degree of latitude in the

investigation of claims for reparation, and the resulting

findings and order of the Commission may not be rejected

as evidence because of any errors in its procedure not

amounting to a denial of the right to a fair hearing, so long

as the essential facts found are based upon substantial

evidence.

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 127

117. Opinion of the Court.

In the present case, the hearing was informal, but not to

the extent of sacrificing essential rights of parties; and it

cannot be characterized as arbitrary or unfair. Many

carriers were interested, and they were represented by

counsel. Thousands of carload shipments were in ques-

tion, but the points in real controversy were few, and there

was a natural desire on all sides to expedite the hearing.

In the main, counsel for the carriers codperated in facili-

tating the investigation. It was not in dispute that all

shipments under inquiry were made during a period when

the tariff rates were under investigation, and that after-

wards those rates were determined by the Commission to

have been excessive. It appeared that itemized claims for

reparation had been made out in duplicate (one copy of

each being filed), in the names of the parties alleged to

have made shipments of cattle as owners during the period

in question, that these were based in most cases upon data

furnished by the commission houses at the several points

of destination, as taken from their books, in other cases by

the shippers themselves, and that they were computed by

applying the excess charges, as determined, to the actual

weights of the shipments where known, in other cases to

the minimum carload weights. There was evidence that

few of the cattle shippers kept books, they relying upon

the commission companies to do this, and that such

companies were the consignees of the cattle, and made it a

practice on receiving a shipment to pay the freight, sell

the cattle, and remit the proceeds to the owner after

deducting the freight paid and other charges. During the

hearing, there was drawn off from the claims as made up

and filed a summary for each carrier, purporting to show

the consignor, consignee, originating road, point of origin,

destination, date of delivery, number of cars moved, rate

paid, rate established by the Commission, and the over-

charge claimed. These were submitted to the several

carriers for investigation by their accounting officers, and

128 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U.S.

some months later were reported back to Commissioner

Prouty by their counsel with the results of such investi-

gation, which in a majority of instances verified the state-

ments said to have been deduced from the records of the

commission houses. In some cases, in addition to check-

marks, ‘‘O. K.” and other marks indicating that the items

had been found correct, waybill references, car numbers,

initials, ete., had been inserted; and where it had been

found impossible to locate a shipment there were comments

tending to add support to the verification of those that

were located. No reparation was awarded by the Com-

mission except with respect to such shipments as were ac-

knowledged in the reports of the defendants to have

moved as stated. These reports were introduced in

evidence before Commissioner Prouty, but, as already

shown, were not in evidence before the District Court.

What we have said as to their contents is gathered from

the stenographer’s transcript; what else may have ap-

peared upon their face, in the nature of admissions, is left

to be inferred. Counsel for some of the carriers undertook

to qualify the effect of admissions contained in them, as by

saying that the checking meant no more than that a

particular car moved as stated, and that the carrier

collected the amount of freight specified; that it was not

intended to admit that remittance was made to the person

named as claimant; that the statements were subject to

confirmation by the books of the commission merchants,

or the like. But the Commission was justified in according

to the reports of the checking an evidential effect, not

limited by the qualifying statements, treating the latter

as merely argumentative. It might regard the fact that

the shipments could be and were identified from the

records of the carriers, in the manner described, as evi-

dence that the details respecting the shippers of the cattle

and the particulars of the shipments were true; might

take the movement and delivery of the freight thus

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & 8S. F. RY. CO. 129

117. Opinion of the Court.

acknowledged as evidence that the delivering carrier

collected the freight charges according to the published

tariffs, which of course included the overcharges; and

might take this, in connection with the evidence as to the

course of business, as showing that the shippers whose

names were mentioned in the statements sustained

damages to the extent of the excessive charge as deter-

mined by the Commission. The minutes show that until

near the conclusion of the hearing it was the intention to

appoint an examiner to investigate the books of the

commission merchants at the various points of destination

in order to verify the details of the several shipments, and

that this purpose was abandoned in view of the admissions

made by the carriers. Perhaps it ought to have been

carried out; but the court was not justified in treating the

report of the Commission as a nullity for this reason, if

there was substantial evidence of the essential facts with-

out such verification. We think that what we have

detailed of the course of the hearing, taken in connection

with what we know and what may be presumed as to the

contents of the unproduced documentary evidence, shows

there was substantial evidence that the owners specified

in the claims had been subjected to the excessive charges

with respect to the shipments acknowledged by the

carriers; and, as already remarked, the award of reparation

was confined to these shipments.

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals severely

criticizes the evidence on which these conclusions were

based, characterizing it as hearsay. It is not to be dis-

puted that much of the evidence—including essential

parts of it—is properly so characterized. The only wit-

ness sworn was Mr. Williams, assistant secretary of the

Cattle Raisers’ Association, who had gathered the data

upon which the claims were based, mostly from com-

mission merchants, in some instances from the cattle

shippers. He had prepared the claims, had spent much

130 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U. S.

time and pains in investigating them, and in the course of

his duties had visited several of the points of destination

and examined the books and records of the commission

merchants to ascertain the method in which their business

was conducted and records kept. It was he who testified

as to the customary course of business of cattle shippers

and commission merchants. He had been connected with

the Cattle Raisers’ Association for about eight years, and

might be presumed to have some general familiarity with

the business in addition to that gained in the special study

he had made of it while investigating the claims. His

explanation of the method of business and the details of the

claims was accepted, and accepted without objection,

very much as the testimony of an expert witness might

have been accepted. Whether he had shown such special

knowledge as to qualify him to testify as an expert was for

the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine; and

its decision thereon is not to be set aside by the courts

unless clearly shown to have been unfounded, which

cannot be said in this case. Stillwell Mfg. Co. v. Phelps,

130 U. S. 520, 527; Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U. S.

348, 353.

The evidence was not objected to as hearsay when

introduced, nor, indeed, at any time during the hearing

before the Commission. Counsel did in some instances

assert that there was a failure of proof and suggest that the

proceeding ought to be dismissed. But the objections

came too late, and were too general in character, to be

equivalent to an objection to the reception of the eyidence

because hearsay. Even in a court of law, if evidence of this

kind is admitted without objection, it is to be considered,

and accorded its natural probative effect, as if it were in

law admissible. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450;

Rowland v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co., 244 U.S.

106, 108; Damon v. Carrol, 163 Massachusetts, 404, 408.

And it is clear that the verification of the details of the

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 131

117. Opinion of the Court.

claims by the carriers after full investigation by their audit-

ing departments constituted primary evidence against

them, and went far towards showing that the facts as dis-

closed by the hearsay evidence might be depended upon.

We are not here called upon to consider whether the

Commission may receive and act upon hearsay evidence

seasonably objected to as hearsay; but we do hold that in

this case, where such evidence was introduced without

objection and was substantially corroborated by original

evidence clearly admissible against the parties to be

affected, the Commission is not to be regarded as having

acted arbitrarily, nor may its findings and order be re-

jected as wanting in support, simply because the hearsay

evidence was considered with the rest.

In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S.

25, 44, it was said: “‘The inquiry of a board of the charac-

ter of the Interstate Commerce Commission should not be

too narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the

admissibility of proof. Its function is largely one of

investigation and it should not be hampered in making

inquiry pertaining to interstate commerce by those narrow

rules which prevail in trials at common law where a strict

correspondence is required between allegation and proof.”

In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nash-

ville R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93, the court recognized

that “The Commission is an administrative body and,

even where it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, is not

limited by the strict rules, as to the admissibility of evi-

dence, which prevail in suits between private parties.”

And the fact that a reparation order has at most only the

effect of prima facie evidence (Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh

Valley R. R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 480; Meeker v. Lehigh

Valley R. R., 236 U. S. 434, 489; Mulls v. Lehigh Valley

R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 473, 482), being open to contradiction

by the carrier when sued for recovery of the amount

awarded, is an added reason for not binding down the

132 OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U. 8.

Commission too closely in respect of the character of the

evidence it may receive or the manner in which its hearings

shall be conducted.

In this case the Commission did not act upon evidence

of which the carriers were not cognizant and to which they

had no opportunity to reply, as in the case supposed in

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville

R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91, 93. All the carriers participated

in the hearing, and had full opportunity to object, to

cross examine, and to introduce evidence on their own

part.

It is objected that the evidence failed to show who

owned the cattle shipped or who paid the freight. This

cannot be sustained. True, it appeared that the cattle

were not in all instances billed in the name of the owner,

but sometimes in the name of a caretaker, his name being

inserted in the bill as evidence of his right to free transpor-

tation. But it is probable that in the latter cases there was

a want of correspondence between the claims as presented

and the carriers’ books, and that for want of checking by

the carriers they were omitted from the award. The

evidence upon the whole was sufficient to sustain a finding,

so far as the claims were allowed, that the parties in whose

behalf they were allowed were consignors of the shipments

and presumably owners of the cattle shipped.

If there be doubt whether it was sufficient to sustain

each and every claim that was allowed, we are not now

concerned with this; the ruling in question being the refu-

sal of the trial court to treat the award as void in toto.

This was not erroneous if to any substantial extent the

award was legally valid. If a part only of the claims was

unsupported by evidence, the request for an adverse ruling

should have been directed to these.

The principal defense before the Commission was that

the payment of a published rate afterwards decided to have

been excessive was not evidence that the party who paid

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 133

117. Opinion of the Court.

the freight sustained damage to the extent of the excess.

The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this contention at

the first hearing, 246 Fed. Rep. 1, 23. But it has since

been ruled otherwise by this court, Southern Pacific Co. v.

Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U. S. 531, 534; and, in

view of this, upon the rehearing the Circuit Court of

Appeals withdrew this part of its former opinion, 249 Fed.

Rep. 677.

That court held, further, that upon the undisputed

evidence the legal title to the claims for reparation never

vested in Spiller, and hence that the Commission was

wholly without authority to order reparation to be made

to him. The minutes show that of the claims in favor of

Spiller a number had been assigned to Crowley when he

was secretary of the Cattle Raisers’ Association, and

afterwards assigned by him to Spiller when Crowley

retired and Spiller succeeded him; that other claims were

assigned by the consignors to Spiller direct; and that still

others had not been assigned. The assignments were

produced before Commissioner Prouty, and an offer made

to file them, but as we interpret the minutes this was

waived, a copy of one of the assignments (they were said

to be alike in form) being inserted in the stenographer’s

notes instead. There was evidence that the assignments

were made for nominal considerations because the Cattle

Raisers’ Association was prosecuting the claims for the

benefit of the owners thereof. In the schedule of the

claims as submitted to the Commission those assigned

were suitably identified, and the Commission awarded

reparation to Spiller upon these, and in other cases made

the order in favor of the parties named as owners. There

was substantial evidence to support the finding that the

claims had been assigned. Formal proof of the hand-

writing of the assignors by subscribing witnesses or other-

wise was not necessary in so summary a hearing, in the

absence of objection or contradiction. What was shown as

Dai aioe sas RAS Mla ABE at ae

%

a

134 YCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Opinion of the Court. 253 U. 8.

to the relation of the shippers to the Association and the

possession of the instruments of assignment by the repre-

sentative of the Association who was prosecuting the

claims gave a reasonable assurance of the genuineness of

the instruments.

The Circuit Court of Appeals held further, however,

that, supposing there was sufficient evidence to support

the finding that the claims had been legally assigned to

Spiller, it showed that the purpose of the assignment was

not such as to vest the legal title to the claims in him so as

authorize the Commission to make the award of damages

in his name. To this we cannot assent. The assignments

were absolute in form, and plainly their effect—supposing

the claims to be assignable—was to vest the legal title in

Spiller. What they did not pass to him was the beneficial

or equitable title. But this was not necessary to support

the right of the assignee to claim an award of reparation

and enable him to recover it by action at law brought in his

own name but for the benefit of the equitable owners of

the claims; especially since it appeared that such was the

real purpose of the assignments.

We have said enough to show that the reversal of the

judgments of the District Court cannot be sustained on

the grounds upon which the Circuit Court of Appeals

based it. It is insisted, however, that, failing this, the

same result ought to have been reached upon the ground

that the provisions of the Commerce Act do not permit

an assignment of a claim for reparation to a third party

and hence the Interstate Commerce Commission was

without jurisdiction to award reparation to Spiller.

This is based upon the language of §§ 8 and 9, which

remain in their original form, of § 13, as amended

June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 550, and of § 16 as amended

June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584. Section 8 (24 Stat. 382)

makes the common carrier, for anything done contrary

to the prohibition of the act, ‘“‘liable to the person cr

SPILLER v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. 135

117. Opinion of the Court.

persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages

sustained in consequence of any such violation of the pro-

visions of this act.”” Section 9 entitles any person claim-

ing to be damaged either to make complaint to the Com-

mission or to “‘bring suit in his or their own behalf for the

recovery of the damages for which such common carrier

may be liable.”’ Section 13 contains nothing that need be

quoted. Section 16 as amended (34 Stat. 590) provides

that where an award of damages is made by the Commis-

sion and the carrier does not comply with the order, “the

complainant, or any person for whose benefit such order

was made” may bring suit. Stress is laid upon the ab-

sence of language expressly extending the remedy to the

representatives or assigns of the person aggrieved; but we

attribute no controlling significance to this. The provi-

sions of the act giving redress, compensatory in its nature,

to persons sustaining pecuniary injury through the viola-

tion of public duty by the carrier must receive a reasonably

liberal and not a narrow interpretation. A claim for

damages sustained through the exaction of unreasonable

charges for the carriage of freight is a claim not for a

penalty but for compensation, is a property right assign-

able in its nature (Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 213;

Erwin v. United States, 97 U.S. 392, 395-396), and must be

regarded as assignable at law, in the absence of any

expression of a legislative intent to the contrary. We find

nothing in the letter or spirit of the act inconsistent with

such assignability. We are referred to certain expressions

in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204

U.S. 426, 442, and Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer

Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 583-534; but they do not bear

upon the present question, and are not inconsistent with

the view that reparation claims are assignable.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, by Conference

Ruling No. 362 (June 4, 1912), declared: ‘In awarding

reparation the Commission will recognize an assignment

OCTOBER TERM, 1919.

Syllabus. 253 U. 8.

by a consignor to a consignee or by a consignee to a con-

signor, but will not recognize an assignment to a stranger

to the transportation records.’’ See Robinson Co. v.

American Express Co., 38 1. C. C. 735, 735. So far as this

involves a construction of the act, we are unable to accept

it, for reasons that have been indicated. Treating it as

an administrative regulation, it of course constituted no

limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Commission, even

were it consistent with a correct construction of the act,

which we hold it was not. In any event, the Commission

had power to disregard the regulation, as in effect it did

by recognizing the assignments in this case.

Other points discussed in the argument require no

special comment.

It results that the judgments of the Circuit Court of

Appeals must be reversed, and those of the District Court

affirmed.

Writs of error dismissed.

Writs of certiorari allowed.

Judgments of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and

judgments of District Court affirmed.