Opposition Brief — Haas v. Wisconsin

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No. 04-0625

In The

GERARD N. HAAS, JR.,

Plaintiff- Petitioner,

STATE OF WISCONSIN, et al.,

Defendants-Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RAYMOND J. POLLEN

Counsel of Record

RYAN G. BRAITHWAITE

CRIVELLO, CARLSON &

MENTKOWSKI, S.C.

710 N. Plankinton Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

Phone: (414) 271-7722

Email: rpollen@milwlaw.com

Counsel for Defendants-Respondents

Racine County, Racine County

Sheriff's Department,

Sheriff William McReynolds and

Jane and John Does 1-?

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TT tele dasekteslenicasielics dies bitpeiaadiaainahe echeasbiabinhoiensioiaen

II.

III.

The Seventh Circuit Properly Affirmed the

District Court’s Dismissal Of Haas’ Claims On

Their Merits For Failure To Allege A Constitu-

RESET HOLT AOR NEGATE EE

A. All Actions In Racine Municipal Court Were

Properly Commenced Against Haas.............

B. Upon Filing And Service Of A Citation,

The Wisconsin Statutes Explicitly Confer

Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Personal

Jurisdiction Over Haas In The Racine

MN NING i iisicrcsreddssanantasaianedhececebacns

Judge Michelson Is Protected By Absolute

Judicial Immunity That Extends To Officers

Executing Judicial Process...............ccccccseseeeeees

Haas Was Not Incarcerated For Failure To Pay

A Debt And His Incarceration Did Not Violate

Wisconsin Law, The 13th Amendment Or 42

Re I sachs atch vecn ceRatsa tenuate

A. Haas Cannot Show A Violation Of Wiscon-

ERE NSE REED aI Pe EN

B. Haas Cannot Show A Violation Of The

Thirteenth Amendment Or 42 U.S.C.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Deprived The

Federal Court Of Jurisdiction ..............ccccccceeeeee

A. The Presence Of Subject Matter Jurisdic-

tion Eliminates The Duty Of A Federal

Court To Collaterally Review The Actions

Of The Municipal Court......................000000+.

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

B. Haas’ Claims Are Inextricably Intertwined

With The Municipal Court and State

Cot FR sansicstnnsracicensmekecnivnmaiionss 22

CONCLUBIONE ..c: occ oe 27

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Baker v. McCollan

443 UB. 167, GO S.Ce. BEBO (IGTS) ..cccccccsccressescscccesccescresee 10

Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Sves., Inc. v.-Leean

A GRE FR CONE CEs RUD cnncececccncecsccnescnsnnsenssccnnstenee 11-12

Briscoe v. La Hue

PE Fe CPOE GIS BIE Doscscnssccacionescsnsosecenssescsenessenecnceion 7

Brokaw v. Weaver

ee Be COIN CIE BUND hiceccccscsccccccsssnseresssssccccsonconcsecen 26

Chruscicki v. Hinrichs

BEE WeMe Fely AEE Bee Wee Oe CLR ccvescnccccesssccccescenccessers 12-13

City of Chicago v. Coleman

264 Til. 338, 96 NE. S31 (HL. 1912).........cccccrrcccccccecsorcessces 19

City of Kenosha v. Jensen

184 Wis. 2d 91, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994) ......... ee. 2

City of West Allis v. State ex rel. Tochalauski

67 Wis. 2d 26, 226 N.W.2d 424 (1975).............ccceceseeeeeeeeees 17

Cooper v. Parrish

EE EE EE SEITE P ncncseissnsdincausaneunessonnenneenensescénsece 7

Crenshaw v. Dywan

ee MILE SUPE CHULA. EID, DOO Peccerccsccssccsssescconnssessnnnacsonses 7

Ford v. Kenosha County

160 Wis. 2d 485, 466 N.W.2d 646 (1991)... 13, 15

Foster v. Walsh

864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988).................ccenssssssssccccseseees 14-15

Gary v. Geils

ee Ee Re CORI CER BTID vxccesccscerecesosnsovcenecesecocconsones 24-25

_iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Heck v. Humphrey

512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994).......0...... sseridusainabiabiined 22-23

Henry v. Farmer City State Bank

Re ee Ne Oe GE i cittectsecentansnndcettensncscsnes 9, 13, 14

Homola v. McNamara

Oe a ee Ge Ge Be nese ciiddnisccsiitindanccnanenendaiinnmise 25-26

In re Johnson

71 Wash. 2d 245, 427 P.2d 968 (1967)...................cssceseeeees 19

Jacobsen v. Village of Northbrook

ee ae ee COU Ie NE Petinciicenenieiicnsanenetenictnnentitnsiunia 23

John v. Barron

re ee OU GN BI inicictnansiaininhcéssaccsdineneceneimnnsinniingn 7

Kalb v. Feuerstein

308 U.S. 433, 60 S.Ct. 343 (1940) ...............sesesecccsscossscnsees 21

Maltby v. Winston

ee ee Ce i i ichccnstcthcasctaniepactoctanccakenarcisasesens 9-10

Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden

State Bar Ass’n m

457 US. 423, 102 S.Ct. 25615 (1962) ..................cccccsecroseess 23

Milwaukee v. Wroten

160 Wis. 2d 207, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991)... eee 1-2

Nesses v. Shepard

OD FG Bae Ce es ii cacrtssctincacercticintetasnitentoniien 26-27

Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian

Schools, Inc.

ETF Ceres ey Se ee Ee COE sitinnenticncatrnnscnpniantiantcn 23

Pavlik v. Kinsey

81 Wis. 2d 42, 259 N.W.2d 709 (19777).................sscse0ees 12-13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati

475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986) ..................csssssccrecssee 11

Rascon v. Hardiman

BOB F.Bil BOO (Ta Chee 12GB) .naerrrsssessscocsronsssocssssesccassstesdoson 10

Richman v. Sheahan

DIO Fe Bae CI, BG D nsiecse sctesasscecnsvsnsinessotansniatonci 8,9

Rogers v. Bruntrager :

Bhi FBG BES CO Cae, TAGE) once cctisisnivescsesasersesqeassntilinsonteians 14

Sell v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd.

163 Wis. 2d 765, 472 N.W.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1991) ....... 13-14

Slotnick v. Garfinkle

GBR F.3d 168 Ciat Cie. 1GBG) .nccoccccscrecsccscsscsssasstssoccsasnnntannss 14

Smith v. Rowe

TEA FBG BOO C7eie Car BB acetacsesssncscssncenscarasassascanstanssanicn 10

State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege

251 Wis. 79, 29 N.W.2d 345 (19477)..................sessssessessesess 17

State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger

66 Wis. 24 266 N.W.2d 778 (1972) .occsccccccsscsssassessssssscsoosess 17

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Gerald Haas v. William

McReynolds

2002 WI 43, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 643 N.W.2d 771........... 23, 26

Stern v. Masico

263 B.3d GOO (Oth, Cie. BOG1)...ncnccccsesiivesessossnasssanedsssisbiiiaiasscas 7

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of

USS., Inc.

446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (1980) .................cccceceeee 15, 16

Thompson v. Duke

GOB P:Bd 11BO (7th Che, TOG) .nncvcavescnccrscorscsesnsncasanrasantansnsnce 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Waits v. McGowan

GCEG F.BG BOS GOS CA, ROT coveccscccscctnsnssscnsecsnisvsianintinciiadian 14

West v. Waymire

TAG FG GES CPEs GI, BBG ED cncascesnsnsicsesienssnsscicnientaueneannn 12

Williams v. Wood

GUD FT GE CEE Ce, BOP ccccccccccsnsstesncssossascncccnennsinsdninnhs 14

Wollin v. Gondert

BOD FOE Sa CRG Ga, BE sec csccccesesscrecencetctnsenntia 13-14, 22

Younger v. Harris

461 UD. ST, SE BAR, FOB CROCE) ccccctncsesessetsecscmnnabesesoniads 23

STATUTES

BB UW EBIC. & BIBS wsceapessessessnscneccssssissenneenestnnsasaaaaaae 23

4B UBC. § TEED cersssnscsnncsscmnnnenmamanamee passim

4B UBS. TES cccnserssienteenstnitisiniieaamane 16, 19

Wie. Beate. F GEBEIG ...nccssssssssenentissiniinnapeiniaameamenane 5

Wren, Bae. F GB vcsccccsscesiicesinticadsescenianiaacaaeee 17,18

Wie. BOGRS. F BOIS cscocssrensctiniwnscetiimesntnaanaaaaae 10

WUE. Tana, B SIE ascnssncscnsnessisessnsscienissansiebaieeniaanna 10

Wa. Beate. S FID ceciccscesscnsccinseemnensiansemaman passim

ee passim

Wee, Bhaibe. B QB cccsrcsscccsencetcesseciiicsticncssniensaibnaell 4-5, 26

Wie, Beaks. § GAG ccniticsnincenienaee passim

Weed. babe, B GG cxsecsccccnasenccsntccensvetesennssuannaauaaineee 5

Wie, Beate. G GGG snsncsncsccsinunsshiisnceideeanaiannee passim

Wie. Beate. §. GRD TE cccccescsccsessasvcsteninctioieniaahasanianaaae 26

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

8 ea LS TE RS I 26

a Neel AIT IIE nctonsierscisnictniectinssedinapneciincaitedstatidsiltasbiisstacieaaes 4

Oa SUING PUTTIN ssieiiintesieeiihsiteeeahlenaatlcebeda acai osetia 17

OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIII.............00...00... passim

FE, § RR eee aan aes 4

ARGUMENT

I. The Seventh Circuit Properly Affirmed the

District Court’s Dismissal Of Haas’ Claims On

Their Merits For Failure To Allege A Consti-

tutional Violation

Gerard N. Haas (“Haas”) desires to change the rela-

tionship between a municipal court and the defendants

that appear before it. In that pursuit, his prior arguments

have focused on the provisions of the Wisconsin Statutes

relating to municipal courts, arguing that service of a

municipal citation does not constitute commencement of

an action.

Haas’ petition before this Court does not raise the

argument that is the very heart of his case. The omission

of a discussion of the municipal court’s statutory authority

is not an accident. For Haas to acknowledge the authority

of the municipal court over municipal court matters is

contrary to his argument that the municipal court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction.

A. All Actions In Racine Municipal Court

Were Properly Commenced Against Haas

The jurisdiction of Wisconsin municipal courts is

substantial within the framework of municipal ordinance

violations and other municipal law matters.

We conclude that, once a court, including a mu-

nicipal court, appropriately invokes its jurisdic-

tion, it has the power to exercise all of its

constitutional powers within the framework of

that conferred jurisdiction. Thus, in the exercise

of its jurisdiction in the instant case in respect to

the municipal ordinance, which is unquestioned,

it could, in fulfillment of its jurisdictional mis-

sion, invoke all judicial powers that are not spe-

cifically denied.

Therefore, municipal courts, once created by the

legislature and by appropriate municipal action,

are courts endowed with all judicial powers not

expressly denied them, which powers may be ex-

ercised in all cases that fall within their jurisdic-

tion. We hold that the municipal court has the

authority to determine the constitutionality of an

ordinance that is the basis of an action brought

before it.

Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 222-23, 466 N.W.2d

861 (1991).

The power of a municipal court is not limited to those

specific instances where the action is authorized by stat-

ute. Rather, within the confines of municipal ordinance

violations, a municipal court has significant authority. City

of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d 91, 98, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct.

App. 1994) (“We conclude that a municipal court has the

inherent authority to vacate a void judgment irrespective

of statutory requirements for reopening judgments.”).

B. Upon Filing And Service Of A Citation,

The Wisconsin Statutes Explicitly Confer

Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Personal

Jurisdiction Over Haas In The Racine

City Court

Wis. Stat. § 800.01 governs the “Commencement of

action” in municipal court.

In municipal court, personal jurisdiction in mu-

nicipal ordinance violation cases and cases in-

volving a violation of a resolution or bylaw if the

resolution or bylaw is authorized by statute is

obtained over a defendant when the defendant:

(a) Is served with a summons and complaint or

citation and such documents are filed with or

transmitted to the court;

(b) Is arrested and brought before the court

personally, or in the municipal court of a Ist

class city, personally or through interactive video

and audio transmission conducted in accordance

with the rules of the 1st judicial administrative

district; or

judge.

§ 800.01 Wis. Stats.

Per the express language of the statute, the Racine

City court acquired personal jurisdiction when Haas was

served with the citation and the documents were filed with

or transmitted to the court. This unequivocal statement of

personal jurisdiction completely disposes of Haas’ argu-

ments regarding a lack of jurisdiction. Haas does not

contend that the citations were never served -on him;

service is not an issue.

Haas offers no authority to support his lack of subject

matter jurisdiction argument. He does not contend that he

was charged with a crime, such that Racine County circuit

courts would properly have jurisdiction. Indeed, he has

previously emphasized the violations with which he was

charged were all non-criminal in nature. He does not

contend that the Racine municipal court lacked the power

to try cases involving violations of Racine municipal

ordinances or impose forfeitures for violating Racine

municipal ordinances. Wis. Stat. § 755.045(1).

As noted by the District Court, Wisconsin municipal

court judges

have jurisdiction over municipal ordinance viola-

tions. Wis. Const. art. VII, sec. 14; Wis. Stat. sec.

755.045(1). State law empowers them to enter

default judgments under Wis. Stat. sec.

800.04(2m), issue warrants and summonses un-

der sections 800.04.(2m) and 800.095(b)1, and, in

some cases, order incarceration for failure to

comply under sec. 800.095(b)1.

(Pet. App. B, 23a). Throughout his petition, Haas repeat-

edly confuses personal jurisdiction with ‘subject matter

jurisdiction.

§ 800.04(2m) Wis. Stats. provides: |

If the defendant does not appear at the initial

appearance, the court may issue a warrant to

bring the defendant before the court. Upon proof

of personal service of the ... citation under s.

800.01(1), or upon proof of service of the . . . cita-

tion under s. 801.11(1)(b), the court may enter a

default judgment by reason of the failure of the

defendant to respond to a citation under

§ 800.02(2)(a). .. . If a warrant is issued for a de-

fendant under this subsection, the defendant

may be detained in jail prior to the initial ap-

pearance.

Haas concedes that he deliberately failed to appear in

court or make a cash deposit. Judge Michelson properly

found that Haas had entered a plea of no contest and

entered judgment against Haas.

If Haas read the citations he received, he would have

known that a default judgment could be entered against

a Meena

him if he failed to appear. § 800.02(2)(a) reads, in salient

part:

The citation shall contain substantially the fol-

lowing information: [ ... ] 9. Notice that if the

defendant does not make a deposit and fails to

appear in court at the time fixed in the citation,

the court may issue a summons or a warrant for

the defendant’s arrest or may enter a default

judgment against the defendant.

(Emphasis added.)

Under § 66.0114(1)(a) Wis. Stats., “[a]n action for

violation of an ordinance ... enacted by acity... is a civil

action. All forfeitures and penalties imposed by an ordi-

nance ... of the city ... may be collected in an action in

the name of the city.... ” Significantly, § 66.0114(1)(a)

states: “If the action is in municipal court, the procedures

under ch. 800 apply and the procedures under this section

do not apply.” (Emphasis added.)

§ 800.095(1) states:

If the defendant does not comply with the judg-

ment of the court under s. 800.09(1), the court shall

issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring

him before the court or a summons ordering the de-

fendant to appear in court, or both. The defendant

may be incarcerated prior to the court appearance.

Haas could lawfully have been jailed under a warrant even

before the commitment against him was issued. Instead,

Judge Michelson issued a summons to Haas to appear in

court for an indigency hearing under § 800.095(4). As with

the citation, service of the summons is proper under

§ 800.01(2) per § 800.095(3). Service under § 800.01(2) can

be personal service, substitute service, service by publica-

tion, or service by mail.

§ 800.095(4)(b) provides:

If the defendant fails to appear before the court |

for a hearing under par. (a) [the indigency hear-

ing] .. . the court shall order one of the following: |

1. That the defendant be imprisoned until the

forfeiture, assessments, surcharge and costs are

paid, except that the defendant reduces the

amount owed at a rate of at least $ 25 for each

day of imprisonment, including imprisonment

following arrest but prior to the findings under

this subsection, and the maximum period of im- |

prisonment is 90 days.

Michelson lawfully issued a commitment upon Haas’

failure to appear at his indigency hearing. Under

§ 800.095(6), when Michelson ordered Haas’ imprisonment

under § 800.095(4)(b)1, “the defendant shall be committed

to a jail ... in the county in which the cause of action

arose.... ” Not only was the commitment of Haas legal,

his commitment had to be to the Racine county jail.

II. Judge Michelson Is Protected By Absolute

Judicial Immunity That Extends To Officers

Executing Judicial Process.

Haas’ focus is primarily on the actions of the munici-

pal court, with virtually no reference to the County Defen-

dants or the State Defendants. Haas does not raise issues

unique to these parties, but rather apparently contends

that their liability flows from their attenuated involve-

ment in the actions of the municipal court.

The existence of jurisdiction over Haas having been

established, Haas’ arguments relating to per se liability of

Judge Michelson and all of those who acted subsequently

are without merit. The so-called “judicial jurisdiction”

iia aii

exception is not implicated. Haas does not contend that

the officers are unable to assert judicial immunity based

on their enforcement of the municipal court’s orders, but

rather that judicial immunity does not apply to Judge

Michelson and thus there is nothing to extend to the

Officers. Although not developed in the petition, Haas’

prior arguments have asserted these officers should have

refused to comply with otherwise valid judicial orders as a

result of the Constitutional violations he alleges.

Judges enjoy absolute immunity for their judicial acts.

Stern v. Masico, 262 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2001). The same

immunity rationale applies to sheriff’s deputies, state

troopers, and municipal law enforcement officers alike

who are executing judicial process. Cooper v. Parrish, 203

F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 2001)

Personal jurisdiction over the complaining party

is not considered when determining judicial im-

munity. [Citations omitted.] ‘Where not clearly

lacking subject matter jurisdiction, a judge is en-

titled to immunity even if there was no personal

jurisdiction over the complaining party.’

Crenshaw v. Dywan, 34 F.Supp.2d 707 (N.D. In. 1999)

accord, John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir.

1990). Personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdic-

tion are distinct concepts.

The Crenshaw court used this example from Briscoe v.

La Hue, 663 F.2d 713, 722, n. 5 (7th Cir. 1981), to demon-

strate the difference between acting in the clear absence of

jurisdiction and acting in excess of jurisdiction:

[I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only

wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he

would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdic-

tion and could not be immune from liability for

his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a

criminal court should convict a defendant of a

nonexistent crime, he would be merely acting in

excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.

Crenshaw, 34 F. Supp.2d at 712. This refutes Haas’ conten-

tion that Judge Michelson is liable for issuing the com-

mitments. Even if Haas’ contentions had merit, Judge

Michelson’s actions in issuing the commitments would

only be in excess of — not outside — the court’s jurisdiction.

a — a

The Seventh Circuit has called the principle

fundamental .. . that judges are entitled to abso-

lute immunity from damages for their judicial

conduct. [Citations omitted.] Judicial immunity |

was recognized at common law ‘as a device for

discouraging collateral attacks and thereby help-

ing to establish appellate procedures as the

standard system for correcting judicial error’ and

to ‘protect[] judicial independence by insulating

judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by dis- |

gruntled litigants.’

Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 434-435 (7th Cir.

2001). |

The Richman court also noted that “quasi-judicial”

immunity extends to law enforcement officers who are

doing no more than is commanded by the judicial process

with which they are presented.

For example, we have recognized absolute im-

munity for law enforcement officials when the

challenged conduct (the mere act of enforcing a

foreclosure judgment) was specifically ordered by

the judge. ... The source of the plaintiffs’ wrong

in Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d

1228 (7th Cir. 1986) was the judge’s order itself,

and we reasoned that a suit against the officers

was not the appropriate vehicle for challenging

the validity of that order.... Under those cir-

cumstances, extension of absolute immunity is

not primarily to protect the enforcement action

performed by the deputies, but rather to protect

the judicial decision-making function by discour-

aging collateral attacks and encouraging appeals.

270 F.3d at 436-437. Haas does not allege unreasonable-

ness, such as excessive force under the Fourth Amend-

ment, in executing the Racine municipal commitments.

Rather, he alleges that the judgment and the enforcement

thereof was per se unlawful.

Haas cannot show the City or County Officers had an

independent duty to inquire into the validity of his incar-

ceration. Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1989)

(county’s incarceration of parolee without making inde-

pendent finding as to validity of incarceration could not

serve as basis for Section 1983 liability where the jail staff

acted according to their duties under state law and had no

duty or authority to determine the validity of the confine-

ment). Seventh Circuit precedent unambiguously precludes

recovery against the Officers for their role as temporary

custodian of Haas:

Mr. Maltby’s claim against Sheriff Bond fails be-

cause there is no evidence that Sheriff Bond was

personally involved in the alleged violation. We

have stated that “[tlo recover from damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish

defendant’s personal responsibility for the

claimed deprivation of the constitutional right.

However, a defendant’s direct participation in

the deprivation is not required. An official satis-

fies the personal responsibility requirement of

section 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a de-

liberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s con-

stitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the

constitutional deprivation occurs at her direc-

tion or with her knowledge and consent.” Ras-

con v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir.

1986) (quoting Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360 (7th

Cir.1985) (citations omitted)). There are no facts

presented, however, that evidence any kind of

personal involvement by Sheriff Bond in the al-

leged constitutional violation. Sheriff Bond did

not participate in the transaction, in the arrest,

the preliminary hearing, or any part of the

prosecution of Mr. Maltby. Sheriff Bond was Mr.

Maltby’s custodian and nothing else. Conse-

quently, there is not sufficient evidence for a jury

to hold Sheriff Bond liable for any of Mr. Maltby’s

alleged constitutional violations.

Sheriff Bond’s continued detention of Mr. Maltby

after his claim of innocence does not constitute a

constitutional violation. Cf. Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 187, 145-46, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61

L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (stating that official charged

with custody of accused has no independent duty

to investigate even repeated claims of innocence |

by the accused).

Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 559 (7th Cir. 1994). Haas

cannot show a Constitutional violation. -

Once the City of Racine Officers presented the plain-

tiff for incarceration, the jail staff was authorized to take

him into custody. §§ 302.30 and 302.31, Wis. Stats. Section

; 11

1983 does not impose liability for mere enforcement of

state laws.

The plaintiff who wants a judgment against the

municipality under [section 1983] must be able to

trace the action of the employees who actually in-

jured him to a policy or other action of the mu-

nicipality itself. When the municipality is acting

under compulsion of state or federal law, it is the

policy contained in that state or federal law,

rather than anything devised or adopted by the

municipality, that is responsible for the injury.

Apart from this rather formalistic point, our po-

sition has the virtue of minimizing the occasions

on which federal constitutional law, enforced

through section 1983, puts local government at

war with state government.

Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Sucs., Inc. v. Leean, 154

F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 1998).

The primacy of state law in this dispute eliminates

the relevance of the state of mind of the individual defen-

dants.

[T]he state of mind of local officials who enforce

or comply with state or federal regulations is

immaterial to whether the local government is

violating the Constitution if the local officials

could not act otherwise without violating state or

federal law. The spirit, the mindset, the joy or

grief of local officials has no consequences for the

plaintiffs if these officials have no discretion that

they could exercise in the plaintiffs’ favor.

“[MJunicipal liability under § 1983 attaches

where — and only where — a deliberate choice to

follow a course of action is made from among

various alternatives.” Pembaur v. City of Cincin-

nati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89

L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also

West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 651 (7th

Cir.1997). That was the case in Garner, but not

here. The injury of which the plaintiffs are com-

plaining would have occurred regardless of the

state of mind of the officials of Jefferson County,

unless they had decided to disobey state and fed-

eral law that forbade the granting of Wisconsin

residency to the individual plaintiffs — and it is

the denial of Wisconsin residency that is the

source of injury.

Bethesda Lutheran, 154 F.3d at 718-19.

Further, the requirement that local officials must

have “a deliberate choice” precludes the imposition of

liability on the individual defendants for actions in per-

forming their duties at the direction of a judge.

The county also is immune because the sheriff,

although a non-judicial officer, is performing a

ministerial function at the direction of a judge. A

ministerial act is one which is ‘absolute, certain,

and imperative, involving merely the perform-

ance of a specific task where the law imposes,

prescribes and defines the time, mode and occa-

sion for its performance with such certainty that

nothing remains for judgment or discretion.’

Id. at 499, 466 N.W.2d at 651 (quoting Pavlik v.

Kinsey, 81 Wis. 2d 42, 50, 259 N.W.2d 709, 712

(1977)). “{E]ven when a nonjudicial officer per-

forms a ministerial function, but at the direction

of a judge who is acting in a judicial capacity,

that officer is cloaked with absolute immunity

from civil liability.” Jd. (emphasis in original). An

officer to whom a facially valid warrant is given

is not charged with the duty of passing upon its

underlying sufficiency. Chruscicki v. Hinrichs,

197 Wis. 78, 82, 221 N.W. 394, 395 (1928). On the

contrary, when an arrest warrant is delivered to

an officer, it becomes his duty to execute it. Jd. It

is beyond the scope of a nonjudicial officer’s du-

ties to second-guess a judge’s order. See Ford,

160 Wis. 2d at 501, 466 N.W.2d at 652. As a re-

sult, the sheriff had no discretion to question the

writ, as [plaintiff] asserts, but instead had a duty

to execute it.

Sell v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 765, 773-74,

472 N.W.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1991). Haas cannot show the

officers had discretion to refuse to accept custody of the

plaintiff. As a result, there is no basis for liability under

§ 1983.

The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly recognized a

sheriff is immune from suit under § 1983 when acting

pursuant to a court order:

As we stated in Henry v. Farmer City State Bank,

808 F.2d 1228, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1986), a Sheriff

was immune from suit under § 1983 because he

“was at all times acting pursuant to an official

court order to enforce a validly entered judgment

when he performed the allegedly wrongful acts of

which [the defendants] now complain.” We con-

cluded that “[t]o allow [the plaintiff] to attack the

order collaterally by bringing a § 1983 suit

against the Sheriff for damages would require

sheriffs . . . who enforce properly entered judg-

ments pursuant to facially valid court orders to _

act as appellate courts, reviewing the validity of

both the enforcement orders and the underlying

judgments before proceeding to collect on them.”

Id. at 1239. Such a result is untenable. Jd. The

same rationale applies in Wollin’s case. Deputies

Gondert and Seidel were acting pursuant to an

hiicieneeeeieimeiiemieaiiiiiall

order, issued by a duly appointed officer of the

court, to take Wollin into custody if he failed to

surrender his firearms and ammunition to the of-

ficers upon demand on November 28, 1995, and

the deputies could not be expected to review or

reject the Commissioner’s unequivocal order to

arrest Wollin if he failed to surrender his weap-

ons and ammunition upon demand. Accordingly,

we refuse to hold, as Wollin wishes, that the

deputies should be subject to civil liability for en-

forcing the Court Commissioner’s order.

Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1999).

The officers are entitled to absolute judicial immunity

when acting pursuant to a judicial order. Sell, 163 Wis. 2d

at 772 (“... we conclude that the county is immune from

liability because a sheriff has absolute immunity when

executing judicial orders”).

We hold that even when a non-judicial officer

performs a ministerial function, but at the di-

rection of a judge who is acting in a judicial

capacity, that officer is cloaked with absolute

immunity from civil liability. We note that this

holding has also been reached in the majority of

the United States Circuit Courts. Foster v.

Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988); Rogers v.

Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1988); Henry

v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th

Cir. 1986); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163

(1st Cir. 1980); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982

(5th Cir. 1980); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203

(3d Cir. 1975).

By following the judge’s order, the non-judicial of-

ficer is acting as a hand of the court. The nature

of the function performed is ‘judicial.’ Therefore,

the act is a quasi-judicial act, even though it may

1 Oe ee ET ae

be non-discretionary. See Foster v. Walsh, 864

F.2d at 418.

Ford v. Kenosha County, 160 Wis. 2d 485, 499-500, 466

N.W.2d 646 (1991).

Haas’ attempts to recast the nature of the judge’s

actions are wholly without focus, let alone merit. At page

20 of the petition he states, without any evidentiary or

legal basis, that the orders of the municipal court could

have “just as easily have been assigned to a court

clerk....” This transparent attempt to portray the order

as an administrative function is flatly contradicted by the

petitioner’ claims against the State Defendants. These

claims are based on manuals and seminars that instruct

municipal judges, not court clerks, to issue commitment

orders.

The State Defendants produced training manu-

als and held training seminars instructing Wis-

consin municipal judges to order the arrest and

incarceration of persons defaulting on payment

of civil forfeiture debts to a particular municipal-

ity.

Petition, p. 3.

Hass then invokes Supreme Court of Virginia v.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct.

1967 (1980), a case involving judicial rulemaking in a

legislative capacity.

“Disciplinary rules are rules of general applica-

tion and are statutory in character. They act not

on parties litigant but on all those who practice

law in Virginia. They do not arise out of a contro-

versy which must be adjudicated, but instead out

of a need to regulate conduct for the protection of

all citizens. It is evident that, in enacting disci-

plinary rules, the Supreme Court of Virginia is

constituted a legislature.” 470 F.'Supp., at 1064.

We agree with this analysis and hence must in-

quire whether the Virginia Court and its chief

justice are immune from suit for acts performed

in their legislative capacity.

Id. at 1974. Although he is confident the actions of the

municipal court were not taken in a judicial capacity, Haas

apparently cannot decide whether the actions were taken

in a legislative or an administrative capacity.

III. Haas Was Not Incarcerated For Failure To Pay

A Debt And His Incarceration Did Not Violate

Wisconsin Law, The 13th Amendment Or 42

U.S.C. § 1994.

A. Haas Cannot Show A Violation Of Wiscon-

sin Law

As the district court correctly observed, “plaintiff

[Haas] was not incarcerated because he owed a debt; he

was incarcerated because he ignored the direct orders of a

court.” (Pet. App. B, 38a.) The district court also noted that

Haas could have appeared before Judge Michelson, and —

if Haas demonstrated his inability to pay the forfeitures —

the judge could not have ordered Haas committed to the

Racine county jail. (Pet. App. B, 39a.) See also Wis. Stat.

§ 800.095(4).

Haas’ arguments related to peonage are based on a

premise that is not contained within the confines of Haas’

petition, let alone established in law. Haas has previously

argued a civil forfeiture is “in the nature of a debt founded

on express or implied contract”, referring to the loose

conception of a “social contract” that forms the basis of

‘society and governmental power in an abstract and phi-

losophical sense. Haas equates imprisonment for the

contumacious refusal to pay forfeitures as imprisonment

for debt arising out of implied contract.

It is far from clear that the “implied social contract” of

Blackstone is the same “implied contract” referenced in

the Wisconsin Constitution. A far more reasonable inter-

pretation, particularly in light of the equally axiomatic

principles that an individual may be arrested for violating

a municipal ordinance and imprisoned for failure to paya

municipal forfeiture, is that the Wisconsin Constitution

was not referencing the esoteric concept of a social con-

tract, but rather a commercial contract.

In State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286,

201 N.W.2d 778 (1972), the Wisconsin Supreme Court

considered the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 973.07,

which allowed commitment to the county jail upon non-

payment of fines for a criminal violation. The court upheld

the statute on equal protection grounds, provided the

person convicted and fined was given an indigency hearing

prior to incarceration. Wis. Stat. § 800.095(4), in turn,

provided for such an indigency hearing in municipal court

prior to commitment to the jail for nonpayment of the civil

forfeiture. ;

Former Wis. Stat. § 66.12(1)(c) read very similar to

§ 800.095(4)(b) in that a defendant convicted of a munici-

pal ordinance violation could be imprisoned for up to 90

days for nonpayment of a forfeiture. In City of West Allis v.

State ex rel. Tochalauski, 67 Wis. 2d 26, 30, 226 N.W.2d

424, 427 (1975), the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed:

In the present case the defendant does not assert

that sec. 66.12(1)(c), Stats., is unconstitutional.

Indeed, it is recognized by the defendant that the

statute vests in the municipal court the discre-

tion to order confinement and withholds any

power to order imprisonment in lieu of the forfei-

ture as distinguished from the power to order

imprisonment as a means of collection. See: State

ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege (1947), 251 Wis. 79, 29

N.W.2d 345 (The legislature cannot grant mu-

nicipalities power to impose imprisonment for

violation of ordinances other than as a means of

enforcing forfeitures assessed.)

Haas’ incarceration was not ordered as a penalty per

se, but because he refused to pay the forfeiture. In light of

City of West Allis, it was reasonable for Judge Michelson

(and all other municipal judges in this state) to assume

that the commitment procedure in § 800.095 was reason-

able and constitutional. It was also reasonable for the City

and County law enforcement to rely on the validity of the

commitment orders issued pursuant to § 800.095.

Haas extends his incredible chain of liability to the

Racine police officers who arrested Haas upon Michelson’s

commitment, in essence stating that, if Michelson was not

aware of Haas’ theories of liability, then surely the City

Officers should have been aware. And, if they were not

aware, then surely the Racine county sheriff’s deputies

who accepted Haas for incarceration pursuant to the

committment should have been aware. Throughout this

exercise, Haas overlooks quasi-judicial immunity and

qualified immunity for the officers.

B. Haas Cannot Show A Violation Of The Thir-

teenth Amendment Or 42 U.S.C. § 1994

The Thirteenth Amendment has been interpreted in

the municipal ordinance context as follows:

As a matter of history, it is well known that the

amendment was adopted with the object of pro-

hibiting slavery in the states, and not to prohibit

such forms of service as had always been treated

as lawful and proper elsewhere.... The word

‘crime’ was used in its most comprehensive sense,

as prohibiting such involuntary servitude as is

not inflicted as a punishment for an offense

against the law;...

City of Chicago v. Coleman, 254 Ill. 338, 341-342, 98 N.E.

521, 523 (1912) (citation omitted).

(Pet. App. B, 40a) Haas was not incarcerated due to any

indebtedness such that he was in a state of “peonage.” As

the Washington Supreme Court observed in Jn re Johnson,

71 Wash. 2d 245, 253, 427 P.2d 968, 973 (1967):

Haas was “jailed only because of his own obstinance.”

[t]he legislative purpose of the Anti-Peonage Act

was to implement the Thirteenth Amendment by

striking down all laws and usages in the states

and territories which attempted to maintain and

enforce involuntary service of any person as a

peon, in liquidation of any debt.

The district court and Seventh Circuit carefully

distinguished Haas’ involuntary servitude and peonage

cases. Haas’ repeated “hard labor” rhetoric is a conven-

ient red herring. Even Haas does not contend that his

short stay in police custody resulted in his forced perform-

ance of actual physical labor, arduous or otherwise. Prior

Tree

decisions involving mentally retarded men forced to work

and live in squalor without pay or men captured and

forced to work “are a far cry from the facts of the case

before [the District Court].” (Pet. App. B, 39a.)

Haas maintains that these other cases are indistin-

guishable from his situation because money used to pay a

debt represents a certain quantum of his labor. This

argument is apparently so obvious that he supplies no

authority to support it. If the payment of money is legally

equivalent to imprisonment at hard labor, then the pay-

ment of money is a remedy available only as a criminal

sanction. To accept Haas’ logic would mean the end of the

civil justice system.

IV. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Deprived The

Federal Court Of Jurisdiction.

A. The Presence Of Subject Matter Jurisdic-

tion Eliminates The Duty Of A Federal

Court To Collaterally Review The Actions

Of The Municipal Court

Haas’ arguments are based on the assumption that the

municipal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

That assumption is completely erroneous. The decisions

cited by Haas in support of collateral review are simply

inapplicable, as there is no basis to conclude that subject

matter jurisdiction was lacking in the municipal court.

Haas states:

Thus, challenging the enforcement action of the

state — or any other action by a judge that does

not implicate the policies behind judicial immu-

nity —is not barred by Rooker-Feldman.

MiEreereecemere ne:

Petition, page 5 (emphasis added.) Even within the context

of Rooker-Feldman, Haas is unable to acknowledge the

municipal court has subject matter jurisdiction over

municipal actions. .

The discussion of federal power in Kalb v. Feuerstein,

308 U.S. 433, 60 S.Ct. 343 (1940), illustrates the absence

of support for Haas’ position.

It is generally true that a judgment by a court of

competent jurisdiction bears a presumption of

regularity and is not thereafter subject to collat-

eral attack. But Congress, because its power over

the subject of bankruptcy is plenary, may by spe-

cific bankruptcy legislation create an exception to

that principle and render judicial acts taken with

respect to the person or property of a debtor

whom the bankruptcy law protects nullities and

vulnerable collaterally.

Id. at 346.

As with his arguments regarding the absence of

judicial immunity, Haas’ complaints involve personal

jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. He denies that

judgment was properly entered because he contends he did

not have to appear before the Municipal Court, thereby

alleging a lack of personal jurisdiction. That he admits his

guilt before this Court is of no consequence. Judgment was

entered based on failure to appear, not a plea of guilty.

Federal courts do not have original jurisdiction over

municipal court proceedings.

It is disingenuous rhetoric to suggest the Seventh

Circuit’s decision has immunized state actors who violate

the civil rights of citizens. It is Haas that seeks to have

this court shield him from the payment of civil forfeitures

and codify his world view as determinative of municipal

court jurisdiction.

B. Haas’ Claims Are Inextricably Intertwined

With The Municipal Court and State

Court Judgments

As discussed in Wollin, supra, challenges to a convic-

tion or a sentence are not cognizable under § 1983. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). In Heck,

the Supreme Court determined that because § 1983

creates a “species of tort liability” it was not possible to

attack the lawfulness of a conviction through § 1983, as a

tort action was not a proper vehicle for challenging a

conviction.

We hold that, in order to recover damages for al-

legedly unconstitutional conviction or imprison-

ment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

-unlawfulness would render a conviction or sen-

tence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, de-

clared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question

by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sen-

tence that has not been so invalidated is not cog-

nizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner

seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his conviction or sentence; if it would, the com-

plaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated.

Id. at 2372-73 (emphasis added).

On April 30, 2002, the Wisconsin Supreme Court

ended the plaintiff’s habeas corpus challenge to his

convictions and sentences. State of Wisconsin ex rel.

Gerald Haas v. William McReynolds, 2002 WI 43, 252

Wis. 2d 133, 643 N.W.2d 771. Having failed to reverse his

convictions and sentences, Haas is unable to prove that his

convictions or sentences have been reversed. The relief

sought here “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction[s] or sentence[s]” and thus cannot be granted.

The Younger doctrine commands that federal courts

should refrain from enjoining state criminal prosecutions.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971). This

doctrine is not limited to criminal convictions.

The doctrine has been extended to apply to

quasi-criminal proceedings of the sort involved

here [involving municipal ordinances] and to civil

proceedings which implicate certain important

state interests. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v.

Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106

S.Ct. 2718, 2722-23, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); Mid-

dlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State

Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515,

2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Brunken, 807 F.2d

at 1330.

Jacobsen v. Village of Northbrook, 824 F.2d 567, 569 (7th

Cir. 1987).

The District Court and the Seventh Circuit applied

the related doctrine known as Rooker-Feldman

In Rooker, the Supreme Court acknowledged that

the plaintiff claimed to be injured by the state

court’s treatment of her case, not simply by the

defendant: “The grounds advanced for resorting

to the [federal] District Court are that the [state]

judgment was rendered and affirmed in contra-

vention of the contract clause of the Constitution

of the United States ... and the due process of

law and equal protection clauses of the Four-

teenth Amendment. . . .” 263 U.S. at 414-15, 44

S.Ct. at 150 (emphasis added). The Rooker Court

held, however, that no matter how wrongful a

state court decision may have been, a federal dis-

trict court had no jurisdiction to reverse or mod-

ify it. Id. at 415-16, 44 S.Ct. at 150. The Feldman

Court similarly held that federal district courts

“do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to

state-court decisions in particular cases arising

out of judicial proceedings even if those chal-

lenges allege that the state court’s action was un-

constitutional.” 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. at

1317 (emphasis added). Thus Rooker and

Feldman both proclaimed that if a federal plain-

tiff claims injury at the hands of a state court,

due to its decision in a civil case, federal district

courts have no jurisdiction to hear the case; and

the only appeal is to the Supreme Court after a

final judgment by the highest state court.

Gary v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996). Although

often phrased in terms of the “judgment” of the state court,

Rooker-Feldman is not limited to the single action of

entering judgment. Rather, the doctrine applies to any

actions taken within a judicial capacity in a civil case.

In Leaf, 979 F.2d at 596, we noted the signifi-

cance of this language from Feldman. We elabo-

rated that if the injury alleged by the federal

plaintiff was due to the “nonjudicial” actions of a

state court, i.e., if the injury did not “arise out of

judicial proceedings,” lower federal courts could

have jurisdiction: “A district court. . . may have

jurisdiction when the litigant’s challenge is not

directed at a state court’s judicial proceedings

but rather involves a state court’s administra-

tive, legislative, or ministerial actions.” Jd.

Gary, 82 F.3d at 1366, FN 6.

As correctly noted by both the District Court and the

Seventh Circuit, Haas’ claims are on all fours with Homola

v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1995). Haas does not

mention Homola in his petition, nor did he mention the

case before the Seventh Circuit, an omission that was

noted by the Appellate Court. (Pet. App. A, 9a.) As with his

decision to avoid discussion of the municipal court’s

statutory authority, Haas’ Rooker-Feldman arguments are

symptomatic of blind advocacy and demonstrate the lack

of merit in his claims.

Haas attempts to compartmentalize the actions of the

Municipal Court into three self-serving categories: The

initial decisions regarding citation procedure, the judg-

ment that he violated the municipal ordinance (which

Haas does not contest), and the issuance of the commit-

ments. Haas believes these events are sufficiently con-

nected such that the initial jurisdictional defects taints the

entire process, thus giving rise to his constitutional claims,

but does not believe this connection is sufficient to pre-

clude relief under Rooker-Feldman.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar fed-

eral review if, during the state court proceedings,

plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to raise

the claims that he now raises. Brokaw v. Weaver,

305 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir.2002). However, plain-

tiff could have raised the claims he raises here in

municipal court, see Wis. Stat. §§ 800.02(1),

800.04, 800.095, 800.115(2), or he could have ap-

pealed the municipal court judgments, id.

§ 800.14. Indeed, in at least one instance plaintiff

did, in fact, raise some of his present claims in

state court. State of Wis. ex rel. Haas v.

McReynolds, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 136-39, 142-44,

643 N.W.2d 771 (2002) (recounting history of

prior proceedings and declining to reach the mer-

its of plaintiff’s claims).

(Pet. App. B, 20a-21a.)

The irony of Haas’ claims should not be lost on this

court. He contends he was denied due process as a result

of his own conscious decision not to participate in the

process.

Orders issued without an opportunity for litiga-

tion are understood as open to limited collateral

attack. The order to hale Homola into court in

the contempt proceedings, by contrast, was is-

sued after an opportunity to be heard. Homola

spurned that opportunity - that is why he had to

be dragged into court — but one who turns his

back on the original tribunal does not help him-

self to the opportunity to litigate elsewhere.

Homola, 59 F.3d at 651 (emphasis added).

In Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1995), the

Seventh Circuit noted that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

“ought to be confined to cases in which the defendant in

the state court is seeking to undo a remedial order of some

sort (ordinarily a criminal conviction or an injunction). Id.

at 1004. This statement eviscerates Haas’ attempts to

parcel out the issuance of commitments, which is properly

categorized as a remedial action and thus precisely the

type of action to which Rooker-Feldman applies. Sanctions

imposed under § 800.095 are remedial.

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner’s claims are based on a distortion of

state and federal law. The constitutional prohibitions

against peonage and involuntary servitude are not impli-

cated by the issuance and enforcement of a default judg-

ment in municipal court for the failure to appear. The

Seventh Circuit’s decision did not create additional gov-

ernmental authority or sanction improper practices. The

petition seeks a radical restructuring of governmental

authority in line with the Petitioner’s view of the role of

government. Based on the above argument and authori-

ties, it is respectfully requested that this Court deny the

petition.

Respectfully submitted on the 9th day of December,

2004.

CRIVELLO, CARLSON & MENTKOWSKI, S.C.

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents,

Racine County, Racine County

Sheriff’s Department,

Sheriff William McReynolds and

Jane and John Does 1-?

RAYMOND J. POLLEN

State Bar No. 1000036

RYAN G. BRAITHWAITE

State Bar No. 1037232

POST OFFICE ADDRESS:

The Empire Building

710 North Plankinton Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

Phone: (414) 271-7722

Email: rpollen@milwlaw.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.