Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Simmons v. Wetherall
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
98 769 NOV128
—rrict UF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1998
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS,
Petitioner,
HORACE B. WETHERALL, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court
Of The State of Connecticut
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Aucustus J. SIMMONS,
Petitioner
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
QUESTION PRESENTED
Question presented for review is the validity of extra-
judicial proceedings of private parties acting “entirely
without jurisdiction and without color of authority” and
a decree of transmogrification from a tort act into an
eminent domain decree by the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut where there was no eminent domain case or
controversy before the court within the meaning of § 2 of
Article III of the Constitution for the “taking” of federal-
aid/federal project/federal grant agreement/federal gov-
ernmental (F.A.A.) physical invasion (airport navigational
servitude allowing public right of access); that is repug-
nant to the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United
States; that resulted in destruction of the use and enjoy-
ment of private property; the federal question remains
whether a governmental entity may constitutionally deny
payment of just compensation to the property owner by
destroying his remedy (Special Act #170 (1969), Simmons
v. Wetherall, #163875 (1970)) to mere invalidation of the
legislative supplement to Connecticut general statutes,
48-17a, b, c; 49 C.FR. part 24 of federal regulations; and
the due process and just compensation clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Consti-
tution.
ii
PARTIES TO PROCEEDING
Petitioner:
Augustus J. Simmons, Landowner
Respondents:
Connecticut Department of Transportation
Aviation & Ports
Alan N. Ponanski, Asst. Atty. General
Office of Attorney General
55 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Rogin, Lassman, Hirtle, Esq’s
Cityplace
Hartford, CT 06106
Robert S. Bartanowicz
Regional Director
Federal Aviation Administration
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
James F. Sullivan, Commissioner
Connecticut Department of Transportation
2800 Berlin Turnpike
P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED. .............ccceeeceecess i
PARTIES TO PROCEEDING. ...............+0eeees ii
sy) B Ge Mee |) |) > rere rrr ere iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............ccceesccceees Vv
OPINION BELOW 1 cc ciscccccccccccccvccccsccscees 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..............++5:: 1
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............00-seeeee: 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 6
1. Where the command of the Constitution and all
laws of the United States and regulations promul-
gated thereto, mandatory on all states no later
than July 1, 1972 (P.L. 91-646, sec. 221) shall have
the same force and effect in every organized terri-
tory within the United States, may not be set at
naught, or its benefits (compensation) denied by
state statutes or common law rules or by private
parties acting as “the court” engaging in fraud,
duress, deceit, coercion, collusion, bad faith,
harassment, contemptuous disregard for the
mandates of federal grant agreements, acting as
court officers after discharge and withdrawal
from representation are extremely serious consti-
tutional and federal question violations for
review by this court .................-eeeeeeees 6
2. The opportunity to be heard is an essential requi-
site of due process of law in judicial proceedings
and as a state may not, consistently with the
fourteenth amendment, enforce a judgment
against a party without a hearing or an oppor-
tunity to be heard, a fundamental federal ques-
BE WE ME POE, oc cw ccc acccsncducccccuscccenens 10
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
‘3. Where it is exceedingly clear the extra-judicial
proceedings of private parties were acting
“entirely without ju
of authority” and the
which it was mistaken
pellant/owner had the right to ask that
that had never been submitted to or
heard by the Superior Court of competent juris-
stricken from court and land
records as an impediment to a proper disposition
of the suit. Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334, 14
L.Ed. 444.....---
ing, the ap
the decree
diction should be
4. Under the constitution,
sion of 42 U.S.C. § 4655(2) of the Uniform Act,
Connecticut general statute 48-17a, b, c, and, Spe-
risdiction and without color
“damages” suit, #163875, in
ly entered was still pend-
ture, the United States and the Connecticut
Department of Trans
port, are not entitled to possession of the land
until the damages have been assessed and actu-
ally paid ....----
REO eT PTT y Tht te ee 12
and by the express provi-
cial Act #170 (1969) of the Connecticut legisla- ,
portation, sponsor of the air-
nice gid ly Bae BES HA REA PTE ON 15
Ree PPO LETS ETT LT re id oe 18
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. Rep. 384 (1822)........... 12
Banca Trust v. Westchester, Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 142
Bi I LONG i 6. 4 engine 5 Ka ane an ketene CASA Dake 15
Baltimore & Susquehanna Railroad v. Nasbit, 10 How.
Sy EE soc Saosin seks Vax ene 8A 08s ARSE OHA 15
Ranmen &. Roos, 167 U.S. S99 11897) ann cccesccscccicss 15
Case v. Humphrey, 6 Conn. 130 (1826) .............-- 13
Chicago, Bur. & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
SE hens so 6+. scan pas 64 seknee 2k arn sha ie ees 16
City of Columbia, S.C. v. Costle, 710 F.2d 1009 (1983) ..... 7
Coe v. American Fertlizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915) .... 10
Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 US. 148 (1913) ...... ccc cecncens 11
Green v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S.
BI SIA 6 we Xkrns dpkaencneh 46h 06 ees ee Aen eae 11
Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196 (1874)............ 16
Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334, 14 L.Ed. 444
Pins Lenk ia was enhscihde da dannas Cave ee ah nea ee 12
Harris v. L.P. & H. Constr. Co., 441 S.W. 2d 377
NEE 5.6. 5h co wasn cep RWhe hedsh VER SNARE) ORCA ba saee kes 7
Hoberman v. Lake of Isles, 138 Conn. 573, 87 A.2d
eS, |) rn eA Sarge erry ee rm yey Pree 14
Howarth v. Northcott, 152 Conn. 460, 208 A.2d 540
CRE oa Kix 5s re Sa Vek oh 5 bles spk ehh cement eee 14
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 54 S.Ct. 26, 78
ie FOF CAO ia a ies in aos baa a Bahar ed Com gages 16
i i i
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S.
FT PET PT oy en mea mn 10
Mapco Inc. v. Williams, 581 S.W. 2d 402 (1979)........ 8
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 13 S.Ct. 622, 37 L.Ed. 463 (1893) ........ 16
Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 128 (1946) .... 17
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)...............4.. 10
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464
(ROBE ic od vs dbus caneddéwen che eiaeeee 11
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894) .................. 10
Seaboard Airline RY. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923).................. 16
Simmons v. Wetherall, #163875 (1970) .... 1, 5, 8, 11, 15, 18
Simmons v. Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980) ..... 1, 6, 14
Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901) .................. 10
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441
CADEBD « » < aise ate ciple ids Ghd haera an eeeeeneiees 11
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 243 (1969) .... 12
Tough v. Ives, 159 Conn. 605, 268 A 2d 371 (1970) .... 14
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).......... 17
United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Indians, 304 U.S.
119, 58 S.Ct. 799, 82 L.Ed. 1219 (1938) ............ 16 |
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87
Lill, SED CER no 06 c06n bb smdeve phased Aaa 16 )
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876) ........... 10, 13 .
eT |
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
STATUTES
IS ode dc tee ce ook St ee 8
Re arte eee ee ee 4
MENG dlins 6o00006dc00 tee cccc en. te 1, 12
| _ERa aE en anR R C Ne 7
SE SIs ban 0 od 0 6 bcbbkscke’senewnnn:, 2, 3, 6 15
pn NE MOE is ob oss cue cad do vad owaddngcwen, 15
Sie oe cok a A Pe 15 a ae aa ee ae 4
et ET Gh odin fd bis bin dewaws Axdales sis Jeet i
PE SEENSICL GC Claas ster ese. Sac ce ene Os 14
LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL
SSRN CREE aes aan aaa a 15, 16
§ 2 of Art. III U.S. Constitution....................... i
Art. I § 11 Conn. Constitution ....................... 2
Amendment V Constitution of United States ......... 2
Amendment XIV Constitution of United States .. 2, 11, 16
MR GES bot a SE bees cd eccsnnscoccect.c... 3 6, 8
PL. 100-17 Title IV, 417, 418 ............ccescoceee... 3
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1656, 91st tach hcnieaaweas 7
OTHER
Lease No. DOT FA74NE-0368........................
Federal Grant Agreement, 9-06-009-5708 so ae 17
27 Am. Jur. 2d 53, eminent domain See 16
OPINION BELOW
The ORDER of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in
Simmons v. Wetherall, et al. #163875, dated September 15,
1998 reads:
The motion of the plaintiff, filed August 5, 1998, “for
permission to file motion to dismiss decrees of private
counsel acting as ‘the court,’ denied by the court below
due to previous rulings by the Supreme Court in Simmons
v. Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587,” having been presented to the
court is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Said order is printed at Appendix A.
The motion of the plaintiff, dated August 5, 1998, to
the Supreme Court for permission to file motion to dis-
miss, decrees of private counsel acting as “the court,”
denied by the court below due to previous rulings by the
Supreme Court in Simmons v. Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 — is
printed at Appendix B.
The motion of plaintiff, dated May 8, 1998, to dis-
qualify, dismiss, “pack the bags” of the state attorney’s
office who are — or represent — the world record tres-
passers of thirty-five (35) years - and counting, from
executing void warrants upon additional trespassing — is
printed at Appendix C.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to
review and correct the error of a state Supreme Court
where facts averred in the motion filed shows extensive
extrinsic fraud, by private parties acting as “the court,”
where no mesne process was initiated, argued, or tran-
spired before the court of competent jurisdiction and the
Supreme Court transgressed the due process clause to
render a decree taking private property for public use by
transmogrification of a private tort action, that did not
confer constitutional, statutory or ordinance authority for
the exercise of eminent domain, to deprive a person of a
substantive federal right.
¢
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Constitution of Connecticut provides that - “no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law.” Art. I § 11.
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States
a“
.. nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” :
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States
4
_..nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.” 42 U.S.C. § 4655 (P.L.
91-646-January 2, 1971)
Requirements for uniform land acquisition policies; pay-
ments or expenses incidental to transfer of real property to
state; payment of litigation expenses in certain cases.
Notwithstanding any other law, the head of a federal
agency shall not approve any program OF project which
will result in the acquisition of real property on and after
lh a il lal iain
wiles bait uk aia
(
the effective date of this title, unless he receives satisfac-
tory assurances from such agency that -
(1) In acquiring real property it will be guided, to
the greatest extent practicable under state law, by the
land acquisition policies in Section 301 and the provisions
of Section 302, and
(2) Property owners will be paid or reimbursed for
necessary expenses as specified in Sections 303 and 304.
Amendment of Section 4655
Public law 100-17, Title IV §§ 417, 418, April 2, 1987,
101 Stat. 256, provided that, to take effect on the effective
date provided in regulations promulgated under Section
4633 of this title (as amended by Section 412 of Pub. L.
100-17), but not later than two years after April 2, 1987,
this section is amended by designating existing provi-
sions as Subsec. (a), in Subsec. (a) as so designated strik-
ing out “a state agency” the first place it appears and
inserting in lieu thereof “an acquiring agency” and strik-
ing out “state agency” the second place it appears and
inserting in lieu thereof “acquiring agency,” and by
adding at the end thereof the following new Subsec. (b):
“(b) For purposes of this section, the ‘acquiring
agency’ means -
“(1) a state agency (as defined in Section 4601(3) of
this title, which has the authority to acquire property by
eminent domain under state law,” and
“(2) a state agency or person which does not have
such authority, to the extent provided by the head of the
lead agency by regulation.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an AIRPORT-related case that transcends
back to a 1955 Federal-Aid Grant Agreement between
federal and state agencies wherein the state agency (Con-
necticut Dept. of Transportation) was obligated under the
grant agreement to acquire “satisfactory property inter-
ests” as defined in 14 C.F.R. § 152.3 for what would
ultimately become a navigational servitude imposed
upon the owner by the federal agency (F.A.A.) with the
invasion, appropriation, installation on the surface of the
real property, sophisticated navigational instrumentation
controlling ingress and egress of air traffic at Bradley
Airport, Connecticut’s premier airport in the summer of
1962.
Starting on February 28, 1962 with a tortious course
of conduct, the state agency initiated the first condemna-
tion that was negated by the courts as arbitrary, uncon-
stitutional with procedural problems (153 Conn. 351
(1966)) and was remanded. —
In January, 1968 the state instituted condemnation
proceedings a second time under Conn. general statute
§ 48-12, in lieu of C.G.S. § 15-79 and again the court ruled
the proceeding “null and void”. (160 Conn. 492 (1971))
During the 1969 session of the Connecticut Legisla-
ture, a special act was passed by the general assembly
Ce eee
allowing Augustus Simmons to sue the state for DAM-
AGES over “loss of use of land” arising out of the bum-
bling condemnation proceedings. On January 5, 1970
Plaintiff /Owner Simmons brought such a suit Simmons v.
Wetherall, Docket #163875 which had several hearing
dates scheduled that were all aborted. To date, damages
have not been addressed and the action is still pending.
During the summer of 1974 the federal agency,
F.A.A., without having paid any compensation, intended
to upgrade the navigational servitude with the addition
of a “middle marker” on private property and in lieu of
negotiating a lease with the owner, enters into a lease
with the sponsor of the airport, notwithstanding they had
full knowledge that title reverted back to the owner on
the land records on March 24, 1972 after the second
condemnation was ruled null and void.
In December, 1977, plaintiff retained the firm of
Rogin-Hirtle, Esq’s to represent him upon scheduled days
for hearings in damages before referee Shapiro and the
very first act of private counsel was an attempt to give
the state (and the F.A.A.) “complete insulation from and
absolution from all of its sins” by invalidating the hear-
ings in damages and for which a dismissal, discharge, in
writing, was hand delivered on December 23, 1977. The
discharge of 12/23/1977 was not sufficient to curb the
tortious course of conduct.
Where the matter of subject matter jurisdiction and of
indispensable parties was ARGUED before the court of
competent jurisdiction, Hon. Dupont, A., on June 7, 1982
and the STATE vigorously and vehemently challenged the
superior court with lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
the court, so recognizing, denied compensation from the
slush fund to indispensable parties (VALENTE-
ALLAIRE), yet, did not, would not set aside the void
decree due to a supreme court ruling under Simmons v.
Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980).
Where the “Slush Fund” monies were allowed to
remain before the court from 1978 to 1991 before return-
ing said monies to the state treasury, signifies FEDERAL
QUESTION VIOLATIONS of the most severe nature,
extending indefinitely the original unlawful, unconstitu-
tional entry by the F.A.A. and the State of Connecticut.
.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. Where the command of the Constitution and all
laws of the United States and regulations promulgated
thereto, mandatory on all states no later than July 1,
1972 (P.L. 91-646, sec. 221) shall have the same force and
effect in every organized territory within the United
States, may not be set at naught, or its benefits (com-
pensation) denied by state statutes or common law rules
or by private parties acting as “the court” engaging in
fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, collusion, bad faith,
harassment, contemptuous disregard for the mandates
of federal grant agreements, acting as court officers
after discharge and withdrawal from representation are
extremely serious constitutional and federal question
violations for review by this court.
It is unmistakable from the plain language of 42
U.S.C. § 4655 that the states (and the federal agencies)
PL Mite t CREE AS iy,
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must comply with the land acquisition procedures speci-
fied in 42 U.S.C. § 4651 that will “result in” the acquisi-
tion of real property.
The legislative history of the act makes very clear
that it is immaterial whether . . . federal funds contribute
to the cost of the property. The controlling point is that
the real property must be acquired for a federal or federal
financially assisted program or project. H.R. Rep. No.
91-1656, 91st Cong. 2d sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
code Cong. & Ad. News 5853. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in City of Columbia, S.C. v. Costle, 710
F.2d 1009 (1983) found in relevant part those provisions
require the grant recipient to attempt to acquire the real
property interest through negotiations with the land-
owner, during which the grant recipient must offer the
landowner the full appraised value of the interest.
Where the record is ultra clear the plaintiff /owner
rejected a fraudulent offer by DISCHARGING the attor-
neys representing both plaintiff and defendants on
December 23, 1977, refused to tender any deeds on April
19, 1978, where the INTENT was to force upon plaintiff
an unsavory offer so that ESTOPPEL would preclude
plaintiff from pursuit of damages for DECADES of tres-
Passing ~— or — contest the validity of the taking, no matter
how fundamental the defect in the proceedings, that
upon rejection, the governing principle as ruled by Harris
v. L.P. & H. Constr. Co., 441 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. App. 1969) is
analoguous and applicable to the case at bar. The Harris,
supra ruling: . . . the trespasser, having no right to remain
on the land is required to cease his trespass and until he
does so is liable for damages on a continuing basis. If the
trespasser is, however, a public utility an additional fac-
tor enters the picture, the welfare of the public. In that
case if the trespassing structure is permanent, and if it is
needed to serve the public or some portion thereof, then
the landowner loses the right to force the removal of the
structure and is entitled and required to recover his dam-
ages, past, present and future for the appropriation, in
one action (but not necessarily in one count). Upon pay-
ment of those damages the public utility acquires an
easement for the continued maintenance of the structure.
See also Mapco Inc. v. Williams, 581 S.W. 2d 402.
That “the court” of private parties was acting entirely
without jurisdiction or color of authority and with delib-
erate malevolence pursuing a course of conduct repug-
nant to the Constitution and Laws of the United States is
in the record to wit: no assessment of damages; no
appraisals as mandated by federal and state law; no
negotiations; no written statements of compensation as
mandated by federal and state law; no notice to necessary
and indispensable parties; no service of process that
would give the Superior Court jurisdiction; no judgment
file, mandatory under practice book where title to prop-
erty is involved; transmogrification of private tort action
Simmons v. Wetherall #163875 does not confer subject mat-
ter jurisdiction; contemptuous disregard for C.G.S.
§ 13b-50, sec. (d) which mandates compliance with rele-
vant federal statutes where federal-aid/federal projects
are at issue; ex parte decree rendered prior to return day of
first Tuesday of July 1978; illegal and malicious backdat-
ing to November 12, 1964 to circumvent the regulations
promulgated pursuant to P.L. 91-646: the submission of
the rejected “slush fund,” after discharge and with-
drawal, to the Superior Court —- that was returned to the
state treasury on December 23, 1991 for reasons the Supe-
rior Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and
indispensable parties; “private parties” were not acting
under color of or authority of any state statute or federal
regulation; in bad faith, spite, ill-will and in retaliation
for discharging counsel the owner/plaintiff was not lis-
ted as a necessary party for service; with deliberate
malevolence, after discharge and withdrawal, placed
encumbrances on the property to “freeze” the property
without any proceedings before the court for resolution;
engaged in a conspiracy and collusion against the owner
with the concealment of land leases of Parcel “C” to the
F.A.A. by the Connecticut Department of Transportation
without notice or compensation was outright fraud;
where deceit, duress, intimidation were exerted to stipu-
late to — violate the law - was fraud; where the MAJOR
FEDERAL ACTION by a federal agency was never men-
tioned or included, never made a party to any of the
proceedings, is fraud by concealment; where, after dis-
charge and withdrawal, a devious scheme is employed to
have the town of East Granby, who were never made a
party to any action before the court, obtain monies from
the “slush fund” for TAXES against the parcel invaded
and appropriated by the F.A.A., forcing the owner to
subsidize the navigational servitude against him; where
the federal agency (F.A.A.) acknowledged putting the
federal funds allocated under the grant-agreement — back
into their general fund, yet, by collusion, conspiracy, bad
faith enter into land-lease agreements with the sponsor
10
(Lease no. DOT-FA74NE-0368) with supplements is inten-
tional and deliberate fraud.
Airport related federal questions affecting a multi-
tude of people warrants review by this court.
2. The opportunity to be heard is an essential req-
uisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings and
as a state may not, consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party with-
out a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, a funda-
mental federal question is at issue.
The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite
of due process in judicial proceedings. Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236; Simon v. Craft, 182 US. 427,
436.
And a state may not enforce a judgment against a
party without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S.
34, 46; Coe v. American Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423.
And where, in the case at bar, plaintiff/owner was
not listed or named in the citation, and, where the indis-
pensable parties that were listed in the citation (Vol. 59, p.
661-2) were never served or had notice of a purported
return day of the first Tuesday of July, 1978 at 10:00
o’clock in the forenoon, so it cannot, without disregard-
ing the requirement of due process, give a conclusive
effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party therein.
11
It is plain that the practical effect of the judgment,
decree, (waste paper) was to deprive the plaintiff of prop-
erty without affording it at any time an opportunity to be
heard in its defense. The plaintiff asserted an invasion of
its substantive right under the federal Constitution to
equality of treatment with the termination (discharge) of
private negotiators. Green v. Louisville & Interurban R.R.
Co., 244 U.S. 499; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
260 U.S. 441.
Where the above scenario was attained by an exercise
of police power, in lieu of any state statute or federal
regulation, the transgression of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment would be obvious. Ettor v.
Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148. The violation is none the less clear
when that result is accomplished by the state judiciary, in
the course of construing an otherwise valid (Simmons v.
Wetherall #163875) legislative enactment, transgresses the
due process clause.
Whether acting through its judiciary or through its
legislature, a state may not deprive a person of all exis-
ting remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the
State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was,
afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it. Postal
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 475-6.
The mere discretionary refusal of the highest state
court to grant review of an extrajudicial decree, that was
never submitted to or acted upon by the court of compe-
tent jurisdiction (Superior Court) does not provide an
adequate state ground. In such circumstances, the deci-
sion of the lower (private parties) court, rather than the
order of the highest court refusing review, becomes the
12
judgment of the “highest court of a state in which a
decision could be had” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
our jurisdictional statute. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
396 U.S. at page 243. (Emphasis added.)
3. Where it is exceedingly clear the extra-judicial
proceedings of private parties were acting “entirely
without jurisdiction and without color of authority”
and the “damages” suit, #163875, in which it was mis-
takenly entered was still pending, the appellant/owner
had the right to ask that the decree that had never been
submitted to or heard by the Superior Court of compe-
tent jurisdiction should be stricken from court and land
records as an impediment to a proper disposition of the
suit. Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334, 14 L.Ed. 444.
Where a FEDERAL QUESTION is present involving
the validity of the extra-judicial act by terminated, dis-
charged, withdrawn private parties acting in bad faith
and harassment of the owner as an extra-judicial court
upon the “total and absolute absence of notice, construc-
tive or implied, within any decent limits of law or rea-
son” who knew or should have known that their
malicious conduct violated the constitutional norm under
the private #163875 tort action, “takes the federal grant/
federal project property of one and gives it to another by
mere force, without right or authority,” without just com-
pensation “made and secured,” deserves NOT the name
of a judgment.
Speaking of determinations, without personal sum-
mons or arrest, it was said by Livingston, J. (Aldrich v.
Kinney), 4 Conn. Rep. at 384 “Perhaps we possess the
power, and I think we do, in extraordinary cases, and
EEE
13
where it is manifest the proceedings have been ex parte, of
considering them as ex ceptions to the general law, and as
not contemplated by the Constitution. Now, no violence
is done to my understanding of this article (in the Consti-
tution) in saying, that it does not embrace a judgment,
which has been rendered against a party, to whom no
Opportunity was offered of contesting his adversary’s
demand, and who, instead of being defended by himself
or by counsel of his own choice, had no other representa-
tive than an old blanket, or a log of wood. A sentence
thus determined, in defiance of the maxim “audi alteram
partem” deserves not the name of a judgment.
From Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876): “A pro-
ceeding” continued the court, “professing to determine
the right of property, where no notice, written or con-
structive, is given, whatever else it might be called,
would not be entitled to be dignified with the name of a
judicial proceeding. it would be a mere arbitrary edict,
not to be regarded anywhere as the judgment of a court.”
From Case v. Humphrey, 6 Conn. 130, 139 (1826): “The
deficiency of service in Case v. Humphrey, supra arose
from an inadequate affidavit relative to the deportation of
an indifferent person who left Purported process with the
defendant. Since there was no actual service of process,
the ensuing judgment was “extra-judicial and void.” 6
Conn. at 139. Because of this no determination by the
court of the respective rights of the parties was entitled to
legal validity, regardless of when the defendant appeared
to apprise the court of lack of jurisdiction. Where a writ is
a nullity, so that judgment thereon would be incurably
erroneous, it is de facto abated, and even the explicit
14
admission of its validity by the party, never concludes the
court.”
Where the Supreme Court of Connecticut released a
decision on May 13, 1980 under Simmons v. Wetherall, 180
Conn. 587 approving the transfer of the subject property
to the state of Connecticut and the private parties (Rogin-
Hirtle, Esq.) filed a motion with referee Shapiro for dis-
bursement of (slush) funds with a letter dated July 16,
1980, that was received and answered by referee Shapiro
on July 18, 1980, the last two paragraphs ILLUMINATE,
ACKNOWLEDGE the lack of notice to indispensable par-
ties, no return to the Superior Court and the obvious fact
there was no referee submission to the Superior Court
from which a proper appeal could be taken and where the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, by statute, will only
review FINAL JUDGMENTS, this court has the power to
correct such glaring error with a reversal. Ex. # Appendix
D.
Final judgment — 180 Conn. 587 (May 13, 1980)!!!
An appeal to this court may be taken only from 4
final judgment. General statutes § 52-263; Practice Book
§ 600; Tough v. Ives, 159 Conn. 605, 606, 268 A.2d 371;
Howarth v. Northcott, 152 Conn. 460, 462, 208 A.2d 540.
The absence of a final judgment goes to the jurisdiction of
the court. Any appeal which is not from a final judgment
must be rejected even though that issue has not been
raised by the parties. Hoberman v. Lake of Isles, 138 Conn.
573, 574, 87 A.2d 137.
The test whether a judgment is “final” in the sense
that an appeal may be taken from it, lies not in its nature,
15
for the case may still remain in the trial court for further
proceedings, but in its effect as concluding the rights of
some or all of the parties. Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust
Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 307,
142 A. 838.
4. Under the Constitution, and by the express pro-
vision of 42 U.S.C. § 4655(2) of the Uniform Act, Con-
necticut general statute 48-17a, b, c, and, Special Act
#170 (1969) of the Connecticut legislature, the United
States and the Connecticut Department of Transporta-
tion, sponsor of the airport, are not entitled to posses-
sion of the land until the damages have been assessed
and actually paid.
In this 1970 tort suit (Simmons v. Wetherall, #163875)
brought for damages, the question is (was) — “WHAT
WAS COMPENSATION?” It is in the power of the court
and always has been to have the compensation settled
once for all, and to get any benefit which the law attaches
to such a method of ascertainment. Until this is done the
possession is a “continual wrong” — a denial of due
process which is required by the federal Constitution.
From Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. at page 599 reads: The
phrase “and the land shall revert to the owners” is not
happily chosen, for, the damages not having been paid,
the title in the land has never passed out of them; but the
clear meaning is that the title to the land shall be held to
have remained in the owner as if no proceedings for
condemnation had been had. This provision secures the
owners from being compelled to part with their lands
without receiving just compensation, and is within the
constitutional authority of the legislature. Baltimore &
16
Susquehanna Railroad v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Garrison v.
New York, 21 Wall. 196.
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241 it was held that “a judgment of a state
court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private
property is taken for the state or under its direction for
public use, without compensation made or secured to the
owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the
due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the UNITED STATES, and the
affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the
state is a denial by that state of a right secured to the
owner by that instrument.
Just compensation means the full, perfect and exact
equivalent, in money, for the property taken, Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 3° 5, 13.8. Ct.
622, 37 L.Ed. 463; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.
Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336, rehearing denied, 318 U.S. 798, 63 S.
Ct. 557, 87 L.Ed. 1162; 27 Am. Jur. 2d 53, eminent domain
§ 266. The United States Supreme Court to avoid use of
the term “interest” has stated that where p-operty is
taken before payment is made just compensation includes
an additional sum which is “an amount sufficient to
produce the full equivalent of that value paid contempo-
raneously with the taking.” United States v. Klamath &
Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123, 58 S. Ct. 799, 82
L.Ed. 1219; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 17, 54S. Ct.
26, 78 L.Ed. 142; Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664.
Where Special Act #170 was enacted by the legisla-
ture in 1969, specifically for damages, for several years of
17
private property utilization unconstitutionally, without
compensation, and the hiring out, retaining of private
counsel (Rogin-Hirtle) on a restructured contingency
basis was for specific hearing dates, already scheduled,
which upon filing an appearance on December 13, 1977
were immediately INVALIDATED, DESTROYED and the
only weapon at plaintiffs’ command was a DISCHARGE,
DISMISSAL on December 23, 1977, in writing, to destroy,
remove from the arena corrupt and malevolent counsel
that attempted to date a taking back to November 12,
1964, while simultaneously destroying the scheduled
hearing dates for damages. The notice of discharge was
an obvious rejection of the “PICK A NUMBER OUT OF
THE SKY OFFER.”
The invasion, appropriation and installation on the
surface of plaintiff's Parcel “C” of federal navigational
instrumentation by federal agency personnel is analogous
to the appropriation of the use of private property in
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). There the
court found a “taking” in the government’s use of air-
space above the claimant’s land as part of the flight
pattern for military aircraft, thus destroying the use of
the land as a chicken farm. “Causby emphasized that
government had not ‘merely destroyed property [but
was] using a part of it for the flight of its planes.’ ” Penn
Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 128 (1946) quoting from
Causby, 328 U.S. at 262-263, n.7. The F.A.A., through its
Northeast Director of Airport Operations, Charles Water-
man, acknowledged to plaintiff in 1980 that F.A.A. funds
appropriated under the 9-06-009-5708 (1955) grant agree-
ment were put back into their general fund.
18
The return to the state treasury, on or about Decem-
ber 23, 1991 of “slush funds” by the court of competent
jurisdiction, Hon. Arnold Aronson, due to jurisdictional
difficulties was tantamount to a repudiation, reversal of
the Supreme Court edict which can only be reversed by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Ex. # Appendix E.
¢
CONCLUSION
Where it is readily apparent the Simmons v. Wetherall,
#163875 Legislative Enactment is not a statute authoriz-
ing a valid exercise of eminent domain, and the Uniform
Real Property Acquisition Act, and regulations promul-
gated thereto, apply to the necessary legal acquisition for
the servitude imposed upon the owner by the federal
agency, who hides behind unconstitutional leases from
the state, and the controversy is of such broad and special
importance to the public, and, where this unresolved
controversy has had several previous petitions for cer-
tiorari submitted, a review by this court is again being
appealed to.
Previous petitions to the supreme court include:
96-1349; 96-257; 94-1651; 92-1762.
Respectfully submittec,
Aucustus J. SIMMONS,
Petitioner
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
App. 1
APPENDIX “A”
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
SUPREME COURT
NO. HHD CV70-0163875
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
v.
HORACE B. WETHERALL ET AL.: SEPTEMBER 15, 1998
ORDER
THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, FILED AUGUST
5, 1998, “FOR PERMISSION TO FILE MOTION TO DIS-
MISS DECREE’S OF PRIVATE COUNSEL ACTING AS
“THE COURT,” DENIED BY THE COURT BELOW DUE
TO PREVIOUS RULINGS BY THE SUPREME COURT IN
SIMMONS v. WETHERELL, 180 CONN. 587”, HAVING
BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT, IS HEREBY
ORDERED DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Francis J. Drumm
NOTICE SENT: SEPTEMBER 15, 1998
oe SIMMONS, WALTER E. BASS, JR.
LEWIS, LEWIS & FERRARO RICHARD B. LASCHEVER
KATZ & SELIGMAN
Be M. SCHINDELMAN, RONALD A. STONE
PEARL & GWOREK
ALAN N. PONANSKI,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
OTTO P. WITT :
CLERK, HARTFORD J.D. (CV70-0163875S)
App. 2
APPENDIX “B”
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT
DOCKET #163875
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS. (AUGUST 5, 1998)
HORACE B. WETHERALL, et al
PLAINTIFF, AUGUSTUS SIMMONS, RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITS:
MOTION TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR PERMISSION
TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS, DECREE’S OF PRIVATE
COUNSEL ACTING AS “THE COURT,” DENIED BY THE
COURT BELOW DUE TO PREVIOUS RULINGS BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN SIMMONS V WETHERALL, 180
CONN 587.
THE UNDERSIGNED RESPECTFULLY REPRESENTS:
1. He is a plaintiff in the above entitled action.
2. Plaintiff has filed motions to dismiss the decree’s
of private counsel with the Superior Court, Civil Side, on
October 28, 1996; July 31, 1997; July 18, 1998 and with the
Criminal Court on May 8, 1998 and all have been denied
for reason to wit: “In light of the previous rulings in this
matter no further hearings will be scheduled as requested
in your letter.” (Letter to Judge Berger and answer of
Hon. John Langenbach - Ex. #1 & 1a).
App. 3
3. Plaintiff submits five (5) copies of the most recent
Motion to Dismiss dated July 17, 1998 for which permis-
sion is sought, in prayer, of this court for the court below
to act upon. (Ex. #2)
4. Plaintiff submits five (5) copies of the most recent
Motion to Dismiss, with exhibits, dated May 8, 1998, on
the Criminal Side relative to Parcel “A” upon which no
federal-aid is designated and no federal navigational
instrumentation is located, specifically addressing TRES-
PASSING for which permission is sought, in prayer, of
this court for the court below to act upon. (Ex. #3) NOTE
- LISTED AS APPENDIX “C”
5. Plaintiff submits five (5) copies of order of Appel-
late Court order dated April 3, 1992, that is in direct
conflict with State of Connecticut representations to the
Superior Court on June 7, 1982, (Hon. Dupont, A.)
wherein the Superior Court was challenged with lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, consequently, compensation
was DENIED to “indispensable parties” Valente and
Allaire. Where ALL funds (legal or illegal) were subse-
quently returned to the state treasury on or about Decem-
ber 23, 1991, the order of the Appellate Court dated April
3, 1992 denying just compensation, ENJOINING PLAIN-
TIFF FROM CLAIMS FOR JUST CONDENSATION, for
thirty five (35) years of trespassing by state and federal
agencies is absolute, unequivocal unconstitutional justice.
(Ex. #4)
6. Where there was deliberate malevolence associ-
ated with the citation required by § 16-37 to summon the
necessary parties to appear in court, and the owner was
intentionally and maliciously omitted from the citation
App. 4
and the citation is the legal fact upon which the decree by
discharged parties rest, a proper citation is essential to
the validity of the appeal and the jurisdiction of the court.
Where NO HEARINGS were ever scheduled or held by
the Superior Court FOR THE TAKING OF REAL PROP-
ERTY - FOR FEDERAL PROJECTS and the Supreme
Court can only consider appeals from final judgments,
the ruling under 180 Conn 587 is subject to collateral
attack under the Windsor v McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 LEd.
914 theory that: “The fundamental conception of a court
of justice is condemnation only after hearing. To say that
courts have an inherent power to deny all right to defend
an action and to render decrees without any hearing
whatever is in the very nature of things to convert the
court exercising such authority into an instrument of
wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attrib-
ute of justice upon which the exercise of judicial power
necessarily depends.”
Wherefcure, the undersigned requests, in good faith, the
Supreme Court grant permission to file the Motions to
Dismiss, be heard by the court below
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
App. 5
CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff, Augustus J. Simmons, hereby certifies a copy
and exhibits of this Motion for Permission to File has
been sent to:
Alan N. Ponanski, Asst. Atty. General
Office of Attorney General
55 Elm St.
Hartford, CT 06106
John Malone, Asst. State’s Atty.
GA 13 111 Phoenix Ave.
Enfield, CT 06082
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
—_—_——____
January 3, 1997
Hon. Marshall K. Berger, Jr.
95 Washington Street EXHIBIT #1
Hartford, CT 06106
Re: Simmons v Wetherall, #163875
Dear Judge Berger,
Pursuant to the recommendation v. your assistant that a
letter be submitted to your attention that the Hon. Julia
Aurigemma — REFUSED - to hear plaintiffs “MOTION TO
DISMISS, DISSOLVE, SET ASIDE REAL PROPERTY
App. 6
ATTACHMENTS UNDER DOCKET #163875” at short cal-
endar #7 (#19) on December 2, 1996, a copy of transcript
is attached to that effect.
Under the due process and just compensation clauses of
the Constitution, plaintiff is entitled to the rational
administration of justice and this letter is in pursuit of the —
denial of such rational administration of justice.
The Simmons v Wetherall, #163875 file has become exceed-
ingly voluminous, for several reasons, primarily because
it is a 1970 “damages” action AGAINST the state that has
never been addressed and the attempt to transform the
private tort action into a substitute for federal regulations
that the state (Department of Transportation) is obligated
to proceed under pursuant to grant agreement
9-06-009-5708 (1955) and C.G.S. 13 b-50, sec. (d) for fed-
eral project real property acquisition.
Plaintiff, Augustus J. Simmons, delayed this letter of
request until the holiday period of Christmas and New
Years has passed, however, the urgency of acting on this
matter needs no further explanations or submissions
beyond the contents of the motion,
The court’s attention is called to the submissions to the
clerk’s office on December 2, 1996 of DISSOLUTION OF
ATTACHMENTS PURSUANT to C.G.S. § 52-327 to be
made a part of The #163875 file, in addition to a MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PETITION TO ANNUL ALL
SANCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THREE (3) DECADES
OF EMINENT DOMAIN MALFEASANCE, in federal
court, submitted for the #163875 file on December 20,
1996, copies of which are in the possession of A.A.G.
Arnold Shimelman and Otto Witt, Esq. whose appearance
App. 7
in this matter was put “IN QUESTION” by Shimelman
shenanigans.
Plaintiff Simmons requests the presence of Atty. Otto Witt
at all hearings, for continuity purposes, for damages that
plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to (6, Nichols, emi-
nent domain, section 26, 42 [1]; Trumbull v Ehrsam, 148
Conn. 47, 55-56; Simmons v Wetherall #163875), the most
recent motion filed on April 18, 1996 for referral to three
(3) referees and “REFILED” in June 1996, per recommen-
dation of the Office for Appeals.
Without question, just compensation must be applied to
each and every lien-holder on the land records (C.G.S.
§ 48-21), FIRST, and the actions of the court has been and
continues to impose cruel, unusual, extraordinary hard-
ship, in total disregard of the provisions of the Uniform
Real Property Acquisition Act (P.L. 91-646-(1971)), man-
datory on all states no later than July 1, 1972.
In as much as Hon. Aurigemma, J., “passed the buck” on
this matter to the presiding judge (Hon. Berger, M.), a
scheduling for a hearing and decision, as promptly as the
schedule will permit, will be appreciated.
Yours truly,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
App. 8
CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff, Augustus J. Simmons, hereby certifies that a
copy of this letter to presiding Judge Berger, M., with a
copy of transcript (12/2/96), Docket #163875, has been
sent, parcel post, first class, this 3rd day of January, 1997
to:
Arnold Shimelman, A.A.G.
2800 Berlin Turnpike
P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131
Otto P. Witt, Esq. & Associates
185 Silas Deane Highway
Wethersfield, CT 06109
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
App. 9
EXHIBIT 1a
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
CHAMBERS OF 95 WASHINGTON STREET
JOHN J. LANGENBACH HARTFORD,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CONNECTICUT 06106
January 31, 1997
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box 1
Windsor, CT 06095
Dear Mr. Simmons:
Judge Berger referred your letter of January 3, 1997 to
me.
In light of the previous rulings in this matter no
further hearings will be scheduled as requested in your
letter.
Very truly yours,
/s/ John J. Langenbach
John J. Langenbach
Administrative Judge
App. 10
EXHIBIT #2
No. CV-70-163875 : SUPERIOR COURT
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
: HARTFORD/NEW
VS. BRITAIN AT HARTFORD
HORACE B. :
WETHERALL, ET AL. _: JULY 17, 1998
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FRAUD, DURESS, DECEIT
COERCION, AND CONTEMPTUOUS DISREGARD OF
PRACTICE BOOK RULE 1.16 RE DISMISSALS/DIS-
CHARGES.
FEDERAL STATUTE AND
CONSTITUTION VIOLATION
All of plaintiffs motions, actions, claims derive from
a “common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine
Workers v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 LEd. 2d 218
(1966). They all arise from the same transaction or occur-
rence — i.e., the invasion of the surface and construction
of navigational aids under federal-aid project
9-06-009-5708 (1955) on plaintiffs Parcel “C” wherein the
state and federal agency (F.A.A.) entered into agreement
to acquire, in fee simple, certain real property interests,
pursuant to federal regulations that imposed upon state
defendants a duty, no later than July 1, 1972, to comply
with the regulations promulgated pursuant to the provi-
sions of Title III of the Uniform Real Property Acquisition
Act. P.L. 91-646 (1971). 42 USC §§ 4601-4655.
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
The first question which will arrest the attention of
the court, on the face of this record, is that of jurisdiction.
App. 11
It requires no argument to show that the original
complaint (Docket #163875) could not possibly be sus-
tained for want of indispensable parties.
Where the proceedings are, were, so completely at
war with all the rules of law and all the principles which
guide courts of justice in the discharge of their duties, the
want of jurisdiction over parties, in whose absence no
decree could be pronounced, must of necessity cause the
reversal of the decree and dismissal.
In this case, the indispensable parties are so essential
to the merits of the question, and may be so much
affected by the decree, that the court cannot proceed to a
final decision of the cause till they are parties. In truth,
indispensable parties were not parties to the original
complaint. They had no right to answer the original com-
plaint, or make defence against it, and of course no
decree could be made against them upon that complaint.
Indispensable parties are “[p]ersons who not only
have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such
a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such
a condition that its final termination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience.” Shields v
Barrow, 58 US (17 HOW.) 130,146. In Mallow v Hinde, 12
Wheat 198 the court observed when speaking of a case
where an indispensable party was not before the court,
“we do not put this case upon the ground of jurisdiction,
but upon a much broader ground, which must equally
apply to all courts of equity, whatever may be their
structure as to jurisdiction; we put it on the ground that
no court can adjudicate directly upon a person’s right,
App. 12
without the party being either actually or constructively
before the court.”
This court has repeatedly had occasion to determine
that, where necessary parties to complaints could not be
brought into court, by reason of the constitutional limita-
tion on their jurisdiction, the action, not the suit, must be
dismissed.
Court records show a transfer of funds back to the
state treasury on or about December 23, 1991 that should
dispel any validity claims by defendant.
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK RULE 1.16
A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time,
with or without cause and the first of two, handwritten,
hand delivered discharges was made on the “Rogin-Hir-
tle” law firm, acting as “the court” on December 23, 1977,
citing several reasons, which, in the normal case would
have terminated the attorney/client relationship.
The extra-judicial court of Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s were
replaced on January 4, 1978 with Robert King, esq., who
was not permitted to represent plaintiff.
A second dismissal/discharge was submitted to the
Rogin-Hirtle law firm on April 12, 1978 with copies of
notice also to referee Shapiro and A.A.G. Fred Neusner.
When the Rogin-Hirtle firm was rebuffed on tender-
ing any deeds on April 19, 1978, a WITHDRAWAL was
submitted to plaintiff and on April 20, 1978 plaintiff was
made defendant in a lawsuit for counsel fees with the
filing on the public land records at Vol. 59, p. 419 of an
P.J.R. attachment.
App. 13
To strike out, disregard the entire substance and
prayer of a tort action (Docket #163875), and, insert a
new case by way of transmogrification, leaves the record
unnecessarily incumbered with the original proceedings,
increases expenses and complicates the suit. To insert a
wholly different case is not properly an amendment, and
should not be considered within the rules on that subject.
SPECIFIC ACTS of FRAUD, DURESS, DECEIT,
COERCION relied on to support motion to dismiss:
Where, because of the FRAUD and DECEPTION
practiced against owner, he has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by reason of which there has
never been a real contest, no adversary trial or decision
before the court of the subject matter of the suit.
Where, Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s were representing both
plaintiff and defendant, it was extremely harmful error in
permitting the defendant to bring an entirely new and
different action against the defendant under pretext of
amending (combining) two (2) ejectment actions of plain-
tiff, one of which went to judgment 12 months earlier;
two injunction actions by defendant; and one tort action
(Docket #163875) into an eminent domain exercise.
Where, fraud, duress, deceit, corrupt practices were
engaged in by the Rogin-Hirtle law firm to coerce plain-
tiff to sign WITHDRAWAL forms on December 12, 1977,
prior to filing an appearance on December 13, 1977 for
two (2) Federal Court Actions, Docket #H 74-148 and
#14806, a civil rights action remanded by the second
circuit under the pretense no offer could or would be
made until withdrawals are signed was acting in bad
faith and a pre-determined calculated exercise designed
App. 14
to deprive plaintiff of just compensation under federal
statutes and the Constitution.
Where, Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s are retained specifically
for scheduled hearing dates in damages on a restructured
contingency basis and intentionally, maliciously disre-
gard the purpose for which the firm was retained, depriv-
ing plaintiff of constitutionally mandated just
compensation, justified discharge.
Where, appraisals are mandatory under federal and
state law to establish fair market value, the failure to
comply with such pre-requisite, before negotiations, was
a proper reason (listed) in the discharge notice of
12/23/1977.
Where, written statements of compensation are man-
datory under federal and state law, must be submitted to
the court, town clerk and indispensible parties, before
title can be acquired (Stocker v Waterbury, 154 Conn. 446,
451, 226 A2d 514), was sufficient cause in the discharge
notice of 12/23/1977.
Where, after two (2) discharges, a withdrawal on
4/19/78 from all proceedings, a lawsuit against plaintiff
for counsel fees on 4/20/78, the Rogin-Hirtle law firm,
without any authority, standing, right to represent, sub-
mit monies to the court, file supplemental, detrimental
encumberances [sic] on the land records that was “waste
paper,” not having nctified or served indispensable par-
ties; with deliberate malevolence and malice, inten-
tionally do not list the owner for notice or service; who
impose upon the court clerk (Thomas Abraham) to affix a
signature to documents dated June 2nd & 5th, 1978 that
aii aii
App. 15
had a return day of the first Tuesday of July, 1978 is
willful, intentional, deliberate fraud.
Where, not only federal-aid, but, a federal project of
major high-profile importance to the airport determines
the procedures and the law to be applied to the case at
bar, and, the Rogin-Hirtle law firm, also acting as agent
for the state, knowingly, intentionally, with malice, delib-
erately ignore and violate the controlling federal laws,
plaintiff, in order to protect his federally protected rights,
had no alternative but to reject the fraudulent offer,
refuse to tender any deeds, and were told - go pound
sand — on the beach - without a paddle.
The determination of the proper rate of interest,
being a part of just compensation, never discussed, no
record of it even being considered, does not meet or
satisfy the constitutional requirement of just compensa-
tion, was knowingly, intentionally, with malice, bypassed.
The submission of a highway taking map Vol. 17, p.
854 for Parcel “D” of 1. 12 acres for Route #20, on the
public land records of East Granby, CT, after discharges
and withdrawal by the Rogin-Hirtle law firm, without
any assessment filed with the court as required by CGS
§ 13A-73(b) is what the term implies “highway robbery.”
SUPREME COURT - HARMFUL - ERROR
Where, under repeated construction of laws of a
state, consistently acted upon in administrative practice,
a suit in tort (Docket #163875) was the appropriate and
only remedy against two (2) unconstitutional condemna-
tions, violative of the just compensation clauses of the 5th
App. 16
and 14th Amendments of the Constitution, in addition to
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Supreme Court overruling its earlier deci-
sion (160 Conn. 492 (1971)), denies this remedy without
any record before the court that it was even heard or
considered, the purported judgment, decree, piece of
paper, violates due process of law in its primary sense of
an opportunity to be heard and to defend one’s substan-
tive right. Brinkerhoff-Faris 2o. v Hill, 281 WS 673.
Where, on the face of the record there was no assess-
ments of land value, where federal grant agreements are
in existence and controlling; where, there are no written
statements of compensation, that are mandatory under
federal regulations and state statutes; where, no assess-
ment of damages, for which Docket #163875 remains
before the court; where, there is no judgment file for the
reviewing court to examine in such a high profile case; -
such noncompliance, such discrimination violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v Hill, 281 US 673.
Where, under the due process clause - “the use to be
made of the land taken is necessarily a factor to be
considered in the application of the rule” under 42 USC
§ 4655, the controlling point is that where the intended
use is for a federal or federally assisted program that will
“result in” the acquisition of real property, compliance
with the plain language of § 4655 of the Uniform Real
Property Acquisition Act is required whether or not-
... federal funds contribute to the cost of the real prop-
erty. City of Columbia, S.C. v Costle, 710 F2d 1009 (1983).
App. 17
RELIEF REQUESTED
Because the decree of private parties in this case
(Docket #163875) was void, the encumberance [sic] in
which it was mistakenly entered was still pending, and
the appellant had the right to ask that the entry of such a
decree as had been rendered should be stricken from the
records of the court and the town clerk, as an impediment
to a proper disposition of the suit.
While such an impediment existed, the continued
refusal of the court to vacate the void decree was a final
order determining the rights of the parties in that suit.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
Plaintiff, Augustus Simmons, hereby certifies service
by first class mail, postage prepaid, this 17th day of July,
1998 to:
Alan N. Ponanski, Asst. Atty. General
Office of Attorney General
55 Elm St.
Hartford, CT 06106
John Malone, Asst. State’s Atty.
- GA 13 111 Phoenix Ave.
Enfield, CT 06082
App. 18
Rogin, Lassman, Hirtle, esq’s
City Place
Hartford, CT 06106
James F. Sullivan, Commissioner
2800 Berlin Turnpike
P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
Robert S. Bartanowicz
Regional Director
Federai Aviation Administration
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
NO. A.C. 10918
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS: APPELLATE COURT
Vv - STATE OF CONNECTICUT
HORACE B. WETHERELL :
ET AL. : APRIL 3, 1992
ORDER
THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, FILED JANUARY 31, 1992,
FOR SANCTIONS, HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE
COURT, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
App. 19
PER ORDER OF THE APPELLATE COURT, THE
PLAINTIFF, AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS, IS HEREBY
ENJOINED FROM FILING ANY APPEALS OR OTHER
PLEADINGS IN THIS COURT CONCERNING THE
SAME CLAIMS AS THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN LITI-
GATED OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN LITIGATED, IN THE
CONNECTICUT SUPERIOR COURT CASES REFERRED
TO AS SIMMONS V. WETHERELL, DOCKET NO. 163875
(SUPERIOR COURT AT HARTFORD, JAN. 4, 1978, AS
MODIFIED JUNE 2, 1978), AFF’D 180 CONN. 587 (1980),
AND ALL THE CASES CONSOLIDATED THEREWITH,
INCLUDING ANY CLAIMS OF ALLEGED HARM
RELATING TO THE PLAINTIFF’S OWNERSHIP, AT ONE
TIME, OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN THE TOWN OF
EAST GRANBY AS DESCRIBED IN THE ORIGINAL
AND SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENTS IN SIMMONS V.
WETHERELL, DOCKET NO. 163875, SUPRA, AND ALL
CASES CONSOLIDATED THEREWITH.
NOTHING IN THIS ORDER SHALL BE CON-
STRUED TO DENY PLAINTIFF ACCESS TO THE CON-
NECTICUT SUPREME COURT OR TO THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT REGARDING THIS COURT’S
ACTIONS CONCERNING THIS MATTER.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ ANN M. GANNUSCIO
ASSISTANT CLERK —- APPELLATE
NOTICE SENT: 4/3/92
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS, PRO SE
ARNOLD SHIMELMAN, ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT, HARTFORD, CV70 163875
HON. MARY R. HENNESSEY
App. 20
APPENDIX “C”
No. CR97-106221 SUPERIOR COURT
No. CR97-0104930
No. CR97-0105048
A
pete eae OF HARTFORD /
NEW BRITAIN
VS. AT ENFIELD
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS _ MAY 8,1998
Attn.: Chief Clerk
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, DISMISS, “PACK THE
BAGS” OF THE STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WHO ARE
~ OR REPRESENT - THE WORLD RECORD TRES-
PASSERS OF THIRTY-FIVE (35) YEARS - AND COUNT-
ING, FROM EXECUTING VOID WARRANTS UPON
ADDITIONAL TRESPASSING.
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
It follows that where the court has no jurisdiction of
the real property, or the person(s), trespass will lie
against the officer for a seizure of the owner under the
pretense of a purported judgment that is not voidable,
not void, but NON-EXISTENT on the court records.
The court and the officer are all trespassers. Wise v
Withers, 7 U.S. 331, 2 L.Ed 457.
RECORD
1. A quarter of a century ago, the courts, federal
and state, the Connecticut legislature, the land records
clearly established trespassing (failure to pay compensa-
tion) had transpired the previous ten (10) years.
App. 21
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals (federal)
472 F2d 509 (1973).
The Connecticut Supreme Court (state) 160
Conn. 492 (1971).
The Connecticut legislature enactment of Special
Act # 170 (1969).
The public land records of the town of East Granby,
CT wherein all previously condemned real property
revert and pass to and vest in plaintiff at Vol. 52, page
242-243 (March 24, 1972) (Defendant Ex. #1).
2. The actor’s failure to remove from land in the
possession of another a structure, chattel, or other thing
which he has tortiously erected or placed on the land
constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time dur-
ing which the thing is wrongfully on the land and confers
on the possessor of the land an option to maintain a
succession of actions based on the theory of continuing
trespass or to treat the continuance of the thing on the
land as an AGGRAVATION of the ORIGINAL TRESPASS.
3. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is
illuminated by the twice (2) discharged private counsel
(Rogin-Hirtle), acting as judicial officers, UNSUCCESS-
FUL exploit to acquire title to the property, with a court
reporter making a record of proceedings (Defendant Ex.
#2).
4. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is
extended with the submission of a WITHDRAWAL to the
owner on April 19, 1978 (Defendant Ex. #3).
5. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is
further extended with the private counsel sending sheriff
App. 22
after owner for counsel fees, recording same on East
Granby, CT public land records at Vol. 59, page 419
(Defendant Ex. #4).
NO MESNE PROCESS -—- NON-EXISTENT JUDGMENT
6. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is
manifest from the submission by the (honest) Chief Clerk
of the Superior Court in Hartford in August, 1979 of the
citation Shelton v Wolthausen, 80 c 599 to the Hon. John
Daly making evident there were NO purported judg-
ments or proceedings, of any nature, before the court.
(Defendant Ex. #5 & #5a). Linda (Cohen) was first assis-
tant in 1979 to Chief Clerk Lucian (Jachomovitz). As the
“undated” note indicates, NO monies was paid to
“Rogin-Hirtle-Salzman” esquires. This notice preceded
Simmons v Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980).
7. The Superior Court record shows Hon. Judge
Arnold Aronson returning the funds before the court
back to the state treasury on December 23, 1991 for rea-
sons the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and no
notice or service was ever made on the SEVERAL neces-
sary parties.
NO NOTICE — NO SERVICE
8. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is
manifest from a letter to Jason Pearl, Esq. (representing
Rogin-Hirtle-Salzman) from referee Shapiro, dated July
18, 1980, calling attention to the fact “SEVERAL” encum-
berances [sic] are on the land records prior to the date of
the Salzman attachment, acknowledging the fact the
App. 23
Superior Court had no proceedings before it, acknowl-
edging that notice to the various creditors may be (IS)
necessary. This letter was post Simmons v Wetherall, 180
Conn. 587. (Defendant Ex. #6)
LAND RECORDS - EAST GRANBY, CT 1996
9. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is
manifest from the recording on the public land records
that NO compensation has been paid to one of several
lien-holders (Thomas P. Byrne, Esq.) whose lien dates
back to 1974, a full quarter of a century, and evidenced at
Vol. 112, page 001-008 (Defendant Ex. #7). Connecticut
eminent domain statute C. G. S. § 48-21 mandates all lien
holders must be paid first, BEFORE the owner.
COMPENSATION
10. Failure to pay compensation is TRESPASSING.
“Adequate provision for obtaining compensation” must
exist prior to any seizure, condemnation, physical intru-
sion, constitutional deprivation, Cherokee Nation v South-
ern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 659, 10 S. Ct. 965, 34 L.Ed 295
(1890); see Bragg, v Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 62, 40 S. Ct. 62, 64
L.Ed. 135 (1919); Pumpelly v Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall) 166, 175, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1871).
11. Damages, a vested property right (see Ettor v
Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148), having accrued over the past thirty-
five years, and CONTINUING, were cast in complaint in
tort (Docket #163 875), on file with the Superior Court in
Hartford, cannot be destroyed or ignored by the state
attorney's office, or any other judicial officer, without a
App. 24
violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
CONCLUSION
12. The allegations and exhibits do set forth an
undeniable, unquestionable, TRESPASS.
NOTICE
13. On April 11, 1998 correspondence was
addressed to Robert Juliano, Director, Airports and Ports
concerning this trespassing with copies to several neces-
sary parties and ERROR was made at the very top of the
page with a date of April 11, 1997. Copies of this motion
are being sent to the same parties requesting a CORREC-
TION of the date to April 11, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
cc: Exhibits
Copies to:
David R. Hinson, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave. S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
App. 25 in
Vincent A. Scarano, Director of Airports, N.E.
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
William Sullivan, Commissioner
Connecticut Department of Transportation
2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
Alan N. Ponanski, Asst. Atty. Gen.
55 Elm St., Third Floor Annex
Hartford, CT 06106
Otto Witt, Esq. & Associates
185 Silas Deane Highway
Wethersfield, CT 06109
Chief Clerk, Superior Court
Michael DiDonato (to be made part
85 Washington St. #163875 file)
Hartford, CT 06106
State Attorney’s Office
State of Connecticut Court House
Enfield, CT 06082
Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle
1 CityPlace
Hartford, CT 06103
App. 26
EXHIBIT #1
VOL 52 - PAGE 242
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
No. 156899
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS, OF : SUPERIOR
WINDSOR | COURT
VS.
FRANK C. PARIZEK, OF
WILLINGTON; and EDWARD J.
COADY, OF WEST HARTFORD;
and KINGSLEY GILLESPIE, OF : COUNTY OF
STAMFORD; and HUGH C. HARTFORD
CURRAN, OF BRIDGEPORT; and
ARTHUR S. SACHS, OF ORANGE;
and E. DONALD WALSH, OF
WATERTOWN, all duly appointed
members of the Aeronautics
Commision of the State of : APRIL 16, 1971
Connecticut
a JUDGMENT
PRESENT HON. JOHN CLARK FITZGERALD,
JUDGE:
This action, by Writ and Complaint, dated July 15,
1968, as amended December 11, 1968 and December 20,
1968, and by a Substituted Complaint, dated June 4, 1969,
claiming a temporary and permanent injunction and
other relief, as on file, came to this Court on the first
Tuesday of August, 1968, when the parties appeared, and
thence to September 18, 1969 when the plaintiff filed his
Reply to the defendants’ Answer and Special Defense,
and the parties were at issue as on file.
App. 27
Said cause thence came to the present time when the
Court entered Judgment in accordance with paragraphs 2
and 5 of the plaintiff's Substituted Complaint.
Whereupon, it is adjudged that the Certificate of
Taking filed in the Land Records of the Town of East
Granby in Volume 46, Page 113, is null and void, and that
It is further adjudged that title to the premises
described in the aforesaid Certificate of Taking, as owned
by the plaintiff, revert and pass to and vest in the plain-
tiff.
/s/ Fitzgerald
Judge
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
SS
Hartford County,
I, Thomas H. Abraham, Clerk of
the Superior Court of said State
within and for said County.
HEREBY CERTIFY the forgo-
ing to be a true copy of and
record, of record, of the Judgment
in No. 156899, Augustus J. Sim-
mons vs Frank C. Parizek, et al.
[SEAL]
IN Testimony Wuereor, I have illeg-
ible my hand and the seal of said
Supreme Court at Hartford, in
oo eee eee
App. 28
said County, this 7th day of Sep-
tember, 1971
/s/ Thomas H. Abraham
Clerk
JD 3049 REV 7-71
Received March 24, 1972 at 2:35 P. M.
By /s/ Mariam W. Viets
Town Clerk
Vol. 52 — Page 243
EXHIBIT #2
CLOSING REMARKS of proceedings held on April
19, 1978, at the offices of ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN,
LASSMAN and BORDEN, ESQUIRES, 111 Pearl Street,
Hartford, Connecticut.
APPEARANCES:
Augustus (Ozzie) Simmons
John Kataja
David Salzman, Esq.
Stephen Silverman, Esq.
Ned Rogin, Esq.
Phillip Robbins, Esq.
F. D. Neusner, Esq.
Dennis Cemeriva, Esq.
Robert L. Hirtle, Esq.
App. 29
Reported by:
William G. Crampton
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Notary Public
* * *
[p. 8] delivery of the deeds, of course.
MR. HIRTLE: Mr. Simmons, as I understand it
you don’t want to proceed further with the closing, is that
correct?
MR. SIMMONS: Bob Hirtle, I have the highest
respect for you just like I sent you the letter, I have the
highest and utmost respect for Referee Shapiro and I
further qualified it by saying that I am not going to be a
party to any deal which is going to be coming out and
being made public whereby the Rogin firm and my good
friends here, Dave Salzman and Steve, who I have been
very prone to pick on. It is just not fair to everybody to
have this kind of an arrangement and I am not going to
be a party to it. What the State is attempting to do here is
to say okay let’s date this thing back so their skirts are
clean. They want me to go back and do battle with the
Town over the taxes and I say bullshit to that. We are
going to clear that matter up before there will be any
Goddamned Closing. We are going to get that cleared up
and they are going to be open and above board. I don’t
care if it is Referee Shapiro. Hell, it is everybody and I’m
telling you, everyone at the table, everything is going to
be above board and no dealing is going back to Novem-
ber of ’64.
MR. HIRTLE: You will not sign a deed today to
consummate the closing, is that what I understand?
App. 30
MR. SIMMONS: Because the agreement states
and [p. 9] I have to say if any portion of it is a nullity then
it is a nullity and I am not going to be a party to anything
that is a nullity.
MR. NUESNER: Is that a definite negative
answer? /
MR. HIRTLE: You are instructing counsel not to
proceed with the closing because you consider it to be a
nullity?
MR. SIMMONS: I am going to answer you Bob
by saying that I sent you a certified letter expressing my
position and when I talked to you on the phone, I said to
myself, at least I am going to give them the courtesy of
putting in an appearance today. I think that is a sufficient
answer.
MR. HIRTLE: So I am not to proceed to closing
and you will not sign the deeds today?
MR. SIMMONS: That is correct.
MR. HIRTLE: And the meeting is adjourned.
(Whereupon at 11:44 o’clock a. m. the closing was
adjourned).
App. 31
EXHIBIT #3
NO. 202121-8 : SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF aoeeonal HARTFORD COUNTY
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS __: APRIL 19, 1978
NO. 199230-9
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
SAMUEL KANELL, ET AL
NO. 140965
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
VS.
ANASTASIA SIMMONS
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
and
CHARLES SIMMONS
NO. 162923
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
FRANK C. PARIZEK, ET
AL
NO. 163875
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
HORACE B. WETHERELL,
ET AL
App. 32
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
The undersigned respectfully move for the permis-
sion of the Court to withdraw as counsel for Augustus J.
Simmons in the above-captioned matters.
/s/ Robert L. Hirtle, Jr.
ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN,
LASSMAN AND HIRTLE
/s/ David B. Salzman
DAVID B. SALZMAN,
ESQUIRE
/s/ Stephen Silverman
STEPHEN SILVERMAN,
ESQUIRE
ORDER
The foregoing motion is granted /denied.
BY THE COURT
Clerk
This is to certify that the foregoing has been mailed this
day to counsel of record and to the plaintiff.
/s/ Robert L. Hirtle, Jr.
Robert L. Hirtle, Ji.
App. 33
EXHIBIT #4
EX PARTE
DAVID B. SALZMAN, : SUPERIOR COURT
ET AL _ * HARTFORD COUNTY
: APRIL 20, 1978
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS :
ORDER GRANTING PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY
(WITHOUT HEARING)
The Application and Affidavit of Plaintiff(s) for Pre-
judgment Remedy pursuant to C.G.S. Section 52-278a et
seq. as amended, having been presented to the Court and
there being probable cause to sustain the validity of the
Claim of the Plaintiff(s), it is hereby ORDERED that the
Plaintiff(s) may
(a) attach to the sum of $105,000.00 the real estate stand-
ing in the name of the Defendant(s) Augustus J. Simmons
toeated-at as described in Schedule A attached hereto.
Dated at Hartford, CT this 20th day of April 1978
JUDGE
ee
App. 34
EX PARTE
P.J.R. NO.
TO THE SUPERIOR
THE COUNTY OF
APPLICATION FOR PRE-TUDGMENT REMEDY
COURT TO BE HELD IN HARTFORD, IN AND FOR
The undersigned represents:
1. That DAVID B. SALZMAN, STEPHEN SILVER-
MAN and ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN, LASSMAN &
HIRTLE is about to commence an action against
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS of 580 Park Avenue, Windsor,
CT pursuant to the attached proposed unsigned Writ,
Summons, Complaint and Affidavit.
2. That there is probable cause that a judgment will
be rendered in such matter in favor of the applicant and
to secure such judgment the applicant seeks an order
from this court directing that the following prejudgment
remedy be issued to secure the sum of $105,000.00
a. To attach the following described real prop-
erty of the Defendant(s) to Wit:
See attached description (Schedule A)
b. To garnishee , as he is the agent, trustee,
debtor of said Defendant and has concealed in
his hands the goods, effects and estate of said
Defendant and is indebted to him.
c. To replevy property described in Exhibit
d. To enjoin the said
App. 35
his/her/their agents, servants or employees
from selling, transferring or encumbering any
interest in and to the above-described real prop-
erty pending further order of this court.
PLAINTIFFS
By /s/ Jason E. Pearl
Jason E. Pearl Attorney
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF P.J.R. APPLICATION
I, the undersigned, do make affidavit and say that there is
probable cause to sustain the validity of the Plaintiff’s
claim and
1. That the prejudgment remedy requested is for an
attachment of real property; or
2. That there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant:
[ Ja.
Neither resides in nor maintains an office or
place of business in this state and is not other-
wise subject to jurisdiction over his person by the
Court;
Has hidden or will hide himself so that process
cannot be served on him;
Is about to remove himself or his property from
this state;
Is about to fraudulently dispose of or has fraudu-
lently disposed of any of his property with intent
to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors;
Has fraudulently hidden or withheld money,
Property or effects which should be liable to the
Satisfaction of his debts;
Has stated he is insolvent or has stated he is
unable to pay his debts as they mature.
App. 36
I base this upon the following Statement of Facts:
ffiant [sic] is an attorney at law who rendered legal
services together with the ther [sic] plaintiffs for the
defendant totaling $104,505.00. Defendant has not aid
[sic] the same, despite demand.
/s/ Mlegible
Plaintiff-Competent Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of April,
ify...
/s/ Illegible
Commissioner of The
Supericr Court
EXHIBIT 5
Law Offices
jason E. Pearl
19 SOUTH HIGH STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 183
New Britain; Connecticut 06050
Jason E. Pearl Telephone
Kenneth J. Spreyer (203) 229-4603
August 30, 1979
The Honorable John Daly
Superior Court
95 Washington Street
Hartford, CT
App. 37
Re: David Salzman
Vs: Augustus Simmons
Docket No. 218559 8
Dear Judge:
First of all, welcome back from vacation.
While you were away on August 13 I received a
telephone call from one of the assistant clerks advising
me that if I wished to reargue my Motion For Turnover
dated July 25, 1979, I would have to claim it for the Short
Calendar. I was rather taken back by this announcement
inasmuch as my file indicates that you granted the
motion in open court on July 27, 1979. I recall you speak-
ing to me briefly subsequent to that time indicating that
you were going to meet with Mr. Abraham with respect
to the order, but you did not indicate to me that you had
vacated your prior decision. I would assume that for me
to be put into the position of having to “reargue” your
prior decision would have to be revoked. Until that hap-
pens, I really do not know what there is for me to argue.
I would be most.appreciative of your guidance in this
matter.
Yours very truly,
/s/ Jason E. Pearl
Jason E. Pearl, Esq.
JEP/ck
1888
Hearing set up for
9/12/79 at 2:00 p.m.
App. 38
EXHIBIT #5a
Linda
Based on SHELTON v WOLTHAULEN, 80 C 599
(furnished by Lucian) I would have no authority to grant
this motion. Will you kindly notify Jason Pearl regarding
this & if he wishes to argue the matter put it down.
Thanks
EXHIBIT #6
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
LOUIS SHAPIRO SUPREME COURT BUILDING
STATE REFEREE P.O. DRAWER N. STATION A
HARTFORD, CONN. 06106
July 18, 1980
Jason E. Pearl, Esquire
19 South High Street
P.O. Box 183
New Britain, CT 06050
Re: No. 16 38 75
Augustus J. Simmons v. Horace B. Wetherell, et al
Dear Mr. Pearl:
This will acknowledge receipt of your Motion For Dis-
bursement of Funds by Clerk dated July 16, 1980 and
received by me this morning.
Since your phone call to me, I am not certain as to what
steps should be taken in order to make disbursement as
requested by you. Since the amount attached by Atty.
Corer} pene
App. 39
Salzman et als was accomplished by bringing suit, it
would seem to me that before distribution could be made,
that this claim be reduced to a judgment. If there is a
more expeditious way to proceed, I would appreciate
hearing from you as soon as possible.
I'm also concerned about the order of distribution since
the land records, according to your memorandum
attached to your letter, show a list of encumbrances prior
to the date of the Salzman attachment.
Also, in view of the many complications which I antici-
pate, would it not be better to have this issue handled by
the Superior Court? I am not equipped, as a referee to
give notice to the various creditors which I believe may
be necessary. It would seem that your motion could be
handled properly by the Superior Court.
Very truly yours,
Louis Shapiro
State Referee
LS:mcd
cc: Ronald Cassidento, Esquire
William A. McQueeney, Esquire
App. 40
EXHIBIT #7
December 1, 1996
VOL. 112 PAGE 001
Town Clerk
Town Hall
9 Center Street
East Granby, CT 06026
Dear Clerk,
The subject matter of this letter pertains to: DISSOLU-
TION OF ATTACHMENTS PURSUANT TO C.G:.S.
§ 52-327. -
1. Plaintiff-owner-interested person Augustus J.
Simmons requests the following listed encumberances
[sic] be endorsed on the record of such attachment with
the words “DISCHARGED BY OPERATION OF LAW”
pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-327.
2. The attachments on the public land records under
the caption of Augustus J. Simmons v Horace B. Wetherall,
CV-70-163875 by private counsel, without any eminent
domain proceedings in existence-or-initiated for attach-
ment purposes, without any notice or service of process
on interested parties, without any return of service to the
court of competent jurisdiction (Superior Court) prior to
or after the attachment, and, without appraisals to estab-
lish fair-market value that are mandatory, including a
transfer of title under plaintiff’s private tort action,
Docket #163875 are:
Vol. 59, p. 657-668
Vol. 59, p. 654-656
Vol. 59, p. 623-626
Map Book 17, page 853
Map Book 17, page 854
App. 41
3. Included in Vol. 59, P. 657-668 is a citation at page
661-662 of names of parties and institutions to be served
with notice with a return day of the first Tuesday of July,
1978.
4. Vol. 59, p. 661-662 DOES NOT list Augustus J.
Simmons for notice and service, however, he is still an
“interested person,” — he just happens to be the owner.
5. That there was NO officer’s service on any par-
ties, NO written return of his (officer’s) precept to the
court of competent iurisdiction (Superior Court) and NO
compensation paid is evident in a letter from Atty. Tom
Byrne, a copy being submitted as an exhibit showing an
encumberance [sic] at Vol. 55, page 731 (1974) of East
Granby land records (also listed in the citation at Vol. 59,
P- 661-2) that is still outstanding.
The listed attachmerits in item #2 were recorded on
June 2nd and 5th of 1978 which is a much longer period
than FIFTEEN YEARS fiom date of attachment.
6. The interested person (owner) submits a sworn
testimonial from Atty. Walter Bass before Hon. Dupont,
A. on June 7, 1982 representing “Valente’s” and
4 “Allaire’s” with outstanding liens at Vol. 58, Pp. 95; Vol. 58,
P. 221; 59/253; 59/263; 59/266 (trans. p. 26) tirat states.
“Your Honor, in Mr. Feingold’s recitation that he
gave Your Honor this morning, I forget which paragraph
he referred to in Judge Shapiro’s decision, there was to be
a citation issued so that all people would come forth and
present their claims. I have a right to inform the court
that in the citation, my two clients were listed under the
care of my office. I will state to the court that I have never
App. 42
been served any citation nor has my clients even been
served with any kind of citation to give us any notice to
come in to determine what our priorities are in this
matter.”
The above citations of Valente and Allaire are (also
listed in the citation at Vol. 59, p. 661-2).
7. The caption Simmons v Wetherall, #163875, a tort
action AGAINST the state, a result of special Act #170 of
the 1969 legislature. CANNOT be TRANSMOGRIFIED
into an eminent domain action by superimposing the
Connecticut Department of Transportation as plaintiff_
(Vol. 59, p. 662), by private counsel, for land acquisition
for federal navigational instrumentation projects, per fed-
eral grant agreement 9-06-009-5708 (1955), that must be
acquired pursuant to federal regulations, constituting a
fraudulent encumberance. [sic]
8. Under the law of Connecticut, any lien created by
attachment continues for 60 days after judgment and no
longer. If no execution is taken out before that time, the
lien perishes. Sanford v Pond, (1871) 37 Conn. 588.
9. Where it is unambiguously clear there was no
notice, no service, or, return to the court of competent
jurisdiction, no judgment file or record of any kind before
the court of competent jurisdiction under Docket
#163875, and, the listed return day was the first Tuesday
of July, 1978 (Vol. 59, p. 661) and the attachments were
submitted on June 2nd and 5th of 1978, some of which
contained a court stamp of the Court Clerk (Thomas H.
Abraham) of Superior Court to give the appearance of
authenticity to the public is FRAUD upon the court, the
App 43
public, and the “interested persons” named in the cita-
tion.
Court records show the succeeding Chief Clerk,
(Lucian Jachomovitz) informing Hon. Judge John Daly in
August, 1979 there were NO Proceedings before the Supe-
rior court, consequently the Superior Court was without
jurisdiction to act, referencing the citation of Shelton v
Wolthausen, 80 c 599.
10. Court records show a motion filed with Judge
Aronson by plaintiff-owner-interested person (Simmons)
that jurisdiction could not be created “sua sponte” in
December, 1991 relative to the notice from the court to
Atty. Tom Byrne, and others, and as a result of said
motion the “slush fund” monies being held under the
direction of the court were ABANDONED.
11. Unquestionably, there is years, not months or
days beyond the statutory fifteen (15) years referenced
and “DISCHARGED BY OPERATION OF LAW” is the
purpose and request of this letter.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
cc: Exhibits
f PP: 44
CIVIL ACTIONS
Title 52
§ 52-327. Duration and release of attachment liens on
real estate
No attachment of real estate shall continue in force as
a lien for a longer period than fifteen years after the date
thereof unless within said period the action in which such
attachment was made has been prosecuted to effect and a
judgment lien filed according to law. All attachments of
real estate which have expired as a lien by the provisions
of this section shall be deemed dissolved and the real
estate shall be free from any lien or encumbrance by
reason of the same and the town clerk of the town in
which such real estate is situated shall, upon the request
of any person interested, endorse on the record of such
attachment the words “discharged by operation of law.”
(1949 Rev., § 8026.)
CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff-owner-interested person hereby certifies that a
copy of this Request of Dissolution Pursuant to C.GS.
§ 52-327 will be —- hand delivered to:
Chief Clerk
Superior Court (To be put in Simmons v
95 Washington St. Wetherall, #163875 file)
Hartford, CT 06106
oe
IE AI Nc 8 nas Ee RO elm - “
Bo ht AIC OER Nitin, CARI tt
App. 45
Will be mailed, postage prepaid, first class to:
J. William Burns, Commissioner
Connecticut Department of Transportation
2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
Atty. Tom vrne
2-E Farming on Commons
790 Farming:on Ave.
Farmington, CT 06032
Otto P. Witt, Esq. & Associates
185 Silas Deane Highway
Wethersfield, CT 06109
Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director
Federal Aviation Administration
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
App. 46
December 1, 1996
Chief Clerk
Superior Court
95 Washington St.
Hartford, CT 06106
Dear Michael,
The attached “Dissolution of Attachments Pursuant to
C.G.S. § 52-327” filed under the caption of Simmons v
Wetherall, #163875 is being submitted to be made part of
the #163875 “damages” file.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
eee ate ee Ore e Oe eae
App. 47
LAW OFFICES
BYRNE & BYRNE
2-E FARMINGTON COMMONS
790 FARMINGTON AVENUE
FARMINGTON, CONNECTICUT 06032
THOMAS P. BYRNE TELEPHONE
STEVEN E. BYRNE (203) 677-7355
25 November 1996
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box 1
Windsor, CT 06095
Dear Ozzie,
The only activity of which I am aware with respect to a
mortgage dated July 3, 1974 as recorded in Volume 55
Page 731 of the East Granby Land Records is notice of a
hearing to be held before Arnold Aronson, Judge of the
Superior Court, on December 23, 1991 to determine the
disposition of funds.
Enclosed herewith is a copy of the notice which I received
from the court as wel! as a copy of a letter to me dated
December 19, 1991 from Attorney Walter E. Bass, Jr. I did
not attend the hearing of December 23, 1991.
No payments have been received by me on this mortgage.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Thomas P. Byrne
Thomas P. Byrne
TPB: pwb
Encl
App. 48
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS VS.
WETHERALL, [sic] DEP COMR CV-70-0163875-S
ALL COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTIES ARE ORDERED
TO APPEAR BEFORE THE HONORABLE ARNOLD
ARONSON ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1991 AT 9 30
A.M. IN ROOM 111 AT HARTFORD SUPERIOR COURT,
95 WASHINGTON ST., HARTFORD, CT. A MOTION BY
THE COURT TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS WILL BE HEARD.
A COPY OF SAID MOTION WILL BE SENT TO ALL
COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTIES UNDER SEPARATE
COVER.
KAREN PICKER
ASSISTANT CLERK
WALTER E BASS JR
P. O. BOX 289
EAST WINDSOR CT 06088
SUPERIOR COURT
95 WASHINGTON STREET
P.O. DRAWER D, STATION A
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106
DATED DEC 05, 1991
Illegible
App. 49
Law Office of
Walter E. Bass, Jr.
P.O. Box 289
Warehouse Point, Conn. 06088
Tel. 623-8688 Juris Number 02450
December 19, 1991
Attorney Thomas Byrnes [sic]
790 Farmington Avenue
Farmington, CT 06032
RE: Augustus J. Simmons
vs.
Horace Wetherell, et al
Dear Attorney Byrnes [sic]:
Please be informed that my office represents several cred-
itors of Mr. Augustus J. Simmons. Please be informed that
Judge Arnold Arsonson is holding a hearing on Decem-
ber 23, 1991 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 111 at Hartford
Superior Court. Enclosed please find a copy of a Notice
which my office has received concerning this hearing. I
would like to inform you, that I do believe that you have
an interest in this case. I request that you be present at
this hearing.
App. 50
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact my
office.
Respectfully,
/s/ Walter E. Bass, Jr.
Walter E. Bass, Jr.
WEBJr. /mf
RECEIVED DECEMBER 2, 1996 AT 8:30 A.M.
BY /s/ Laura B. LaFond
ASS’T. FOWN CLERK
Received 12/2, 1996
at 8:30A.M.
Recorded in EAST GRANBY LAND
RECORDS
Volume 112 Page 001
By /s/ Laura B. LaFond
Ass’t. Town Clerk
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box 1
Windsor, CT 06095
|
|
.
App. 51
APPENDIX “D”
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
LOUIS SHAPIRO SUPREME COURT BUILDING
STATE REFEREE P.O. DRAWER N. STATION A
HARTFORD, CONN. 06106
July 18, 1980
Jason E. Pearl, Esquire
19 South High Street
P.O. Box 183
New Britain, CT 06050
Re: No. 16 38 75
Augustus J. Simmons v. Horace B. Wetherell, et al
Dear Mr. Pearl:
This will acknowledge receipt of your Motion for Dis-
bursement of Funds by Clerk dated July 16, 1980 and
received by me this morning.
Since your phone call to me, I am not certain as to what
steps should be taken in order to make disbursement as
requested by you. Since the amount attached by Atty.
Salzman et als was accomplished by bringing suit, it
would seem to me that before distribution could be made,
that this claim be reduced to a judgment. If there is a
more expeditious way to proceed, I would appreciate
hearing from you as soon as possible.
I’m also concerned about the order of distribution since
the land records, according to your memorandum
attached to your letter, show a list of encumbrances prior
to the date of the Salzman attachment.
App. 52
Also, in view of the many complications which I antici-
pate, would it not be better to have this issue handled by
the Superior Court? I am not equipped, as a referee to
give notice to the various creditors which I believe may
be necessary. It would seem that your motion could be
handled properly by the Superior Court.
Very truly yours,
Louis Shapiro
State Referee
LS: med
cc: Ronald Cassidento, Esquire
William A. McQueeney, Esquire
App. 53
APPENDIX “E”
CV-70
CASE NO. 16 38 75
AUGUSTUS SIMMONS : SUPERIOR COURT
vs. ‘ HARTFORD JUDICIAL
HORACE WETHERALL, . DISTRICT
ET AL - OCTOBER 15, 1991
MOTION TO TRANSFER FUNDS
Since 1978 the Clerk’s Office has been the Custodian
of moneys deposited in the above case. The money was to
be paid out upon consumation [sic] of a transfer of cer- ©
tain real estate by the named plaintiff. Such a transfer has
not yet occured. [sic]
Attached to this motion are memos from the Trea-
_surer of the State of Connecticut and from the Court
Operations Unit of the Judicial Branch in explanation of
this motion. The Clerk’s Office requests the granting of
this motion to transfer.
/s/ Lucian J. Jachimowicz
LUCIAN J. JACHIMOWICZ
CHIEF CLERK
[Off - parties have met 11/8/91 and will work out a
stipulation to be presented to the court for the with-
drawal of all funds and closing of file.
/s/ Aronson, J.J. 11/8/91]
HANDWRITTEN NOTE OF 11/8/91
App. 54
The court, having heard ther [sic] parties, grants the
motion.
Judge
ROTA ALOR PEON a
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.