Opposition Brief — Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.

No. 93-825 \ecaas oh Bie

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1993

GREATER ROCKFORD ENERGY

AND TECHNOLOGY CORP., et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

SHELL OIL CO., et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RONALD C. ReEepcay Puitie H. Curtis

DonaLp A. BRIGHT (Counsel of Record)

DEAN M. Harris RosBert C. MAson

Atlantic Richfield Company Pauw D. FiLack

515 South Flower Street ARNOLD & PORTER

Los Angeles, CA 90071 399 Park Avenue

(213) 486-1997 New York, NY 10022

(212) 715-1000

Attorneys for Respondent Atlantic Richfield Company

(Additional Counsel Appear Inside Front Cover)

THomas A. GorTsCHALK

J. ANDREW LANGAN

Davip A. RAMMELT

KIRKLAND & ELLIs

200 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 861-2000

James J. NEATH

Amoco Corporation

200 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 856-4836

Attorneys for Respondent

Amoco Oil Company

JosePH T. DatTiILo

BP America Inc.

200 Public Square

39-B-5300

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-2375

(216) 586-5691

Attorneys for Respondent

BP America Inc.

Davip L. REAM

Joun T. Lewis

Mark A. CERVENKA

Chevron Services Company

1301 McKinney

Houston, Texas 77010

(713) 754-3312

Attorneys for Respondent

Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

A. MICHAEL MINOTTI

ANN SPIEGEL

Shell Oil Company

P.O. Box 2463

Houston, Texas 77252-2463

(713) 241-5886

Attorneys for Respondent

Shell Oil Company

Rosert G. ABRAMS

JOANNE E. Caruso

Howrey & SIMON

1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 383-6935

RENE J. MouLEDOUXx

Exxon Company, U.S.A.

800 Bell Street

Houston, Texas 77001

(713) 656-5187

Attorneys for Respondent

Exxon Corporation

RONALD W. TEEPLE

Joun L. LEONARD

SAMUEL G. KRAM

DEFREES & FISKE

200 South Michigan Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 372-4000

Joun H. Strow

Marathon Oil Company

539 Main Street

Findlay, Ohio 45840

(419) 422-2121

Attorneys for Respondent

Marathon Oil Company

Jerrery M. Cross

PaTRICK J. AHERN

Mary CLareE BoNnaccorsi

Ross & HARDIES

150 North Michigan Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60601-7567

(312) 558-1000

Epwarp H. Beck

Mobil Oil Corporation

3225 Gallows Road

Fairfax, Virginia 22037-0001

(703) 846-5877

Attorneys for Respondent

Mobil Oil Corporation

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether an antitrust claim is properly dismissed on summary

judgment where, in the face of unrebutted evidence negating

causation, a plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that an alleged

violation was a material cause of the claimed injury?

RULE 29.1 LISTING

Respondents listing pursuant to Rule 29.] appears in Appen-

dix A, at pages A-] to A-9 below.

base

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................. ]

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 6

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY

APPLIED THE SETTLED RULE FOR

PROOF OF CAUSATION-IN-FACT IN

ANITERUST CAGES .n 6c acca ccscns, 6

A. The Settled Material Cause Rule Of

Antitrust Causation Requires The

Plaintiff To Prove That The Violation

Was A “But For” Cause Of His Injury . . 6

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Is A

Straightforward And Correct

Application Of The Settled Causation

PO ETT mre Pyrite 10

II. THE PETITION OFFERS NO REASON TO

DEPART IN THIS CASE FROM THE

SETTLED CAUSATION RULE............ 1]

A. The Petition Incorrectly Argues Both

That “But For” Cause Is The Same As

Sole Cause And That The Court of

Appeals Applied A Sole Cause

on ee 1]

B. The Petition Ignores Plaintiffs’ Failure

To Proffer Any Evidence Sufficient To

Meet Their Burden Of Proving

Causation Under Any Standard........ 13

C. The Petition Cites No Policy Supporting

Abandonment Of The Settled Causation

ME 6G. erie eek eee ee 15

8 PE OT te Mn iy 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments. Inc., 628

F.2d 753 (ist Cir. 1080) ..................... 4

Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atlantic

Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 690 F.2d 411 (4th Cir.

PE ehaciserceds geese clan. )

Allied Accessories & Auto Parts Co. v. General

Motors Corp., 901 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1990) ... 10 n.10

Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483 (8th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993) . 8, 15

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242

Pere ee rer er erry eee 14

Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38

(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088

EE eee aan Nail ah 8, 15

Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.

v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459

US. 519 (1983) ........0000000 00... 4,6

Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) .... 7

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat. Inc., 429

i MET TED a ca cteaca ee 4n.6

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479

U.S. 104 (1986)............ ip e 5 n.7

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US. 317 (1986). .... 14 n.13,

15

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,

Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).................. 14 n.14

Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American

Pharmaceutical Association, 663 F.2d 253 (D.C.

Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982) ... 15 n.15

Cases: Page

Gregory Marketing Corp. v. Wakefern Food

Corp., 787 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479

OO WE os ee 8

Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co.,

523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423

OS ee Fe rere ee reer e er 9

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,

ee se I eae us cae rea es o, 7,

7 n.8, 12

Irvin Industries, Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace

Corp., 974 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1992) ........... 8 n.9

Jayco Systems, Inc. v. Savin Business Machines

Corp., 777 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) .................. 15

J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704

fo we og fe er ee 15 n.15

J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451

SE MS restr Po rae te ya twee ee eos 6, 12n.11,

14

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio

eo Oe Bk ee a ae 14

Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc.,

734 F.2d 705 (lith Cir. 1984) ................ 9

Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355 (8th Cir. 1989) . 15 n.15

Southwestern Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Semco

Mfg., Inc., 788 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987) .................. fe)

Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland

Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) ............ )

—————————E—————

vi

Cases: Page

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

395 U.S. 100 (1969) ......................... 6, 8, 13,

14 n.13

Statutes and Rules:

Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 | re passim

Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1968) ......... 16

Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 ee 17 n.16

Gasohol Competition Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 26a

a. aE N aw 9 gh oe et aa eer 2

Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 Sere 2

Other Authorities:

Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,

Antitrust Law (Supp. 1991)...............___ 4n.6

W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the

Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) .........._. ee 16

7 : ; Roe 34 2 i : . 7

wl 7 : P a hal iar . : 7 i - oe

1 _ — - o 7 i ae 2,

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No. 93-825

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1993

GREATER ROCKFORD ENERGY

AND TECHNOLOGY CORP, et al..

Petitioners,

VS.

SHELL OIL CO., et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny the Peti-

tion For Writ Of Certiorari seeking review of the decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in

this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this antitrust action, petitioners, plaintiffs below, are eleven

manufacturers of ethanol, a type of alcohol made from grain

or molasses, and two manufacturers of gasohol, an automobile

motor fuel manufactured from gasoline and ethanol. Petition

at 4. Respondents, defendants below, are eight oil companies

engaged, inter alia, in the refining and marketing of automotive

fuel. Id.

Plaintiffs charged defendants with conspiring in violation of

Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990), to discourage, by

advertisements, public statements and otherwise, consumers

from making retail purchases of gasohol. The Court of Appeals,

in a unanimous opinion by Judge Cudahy, held that plaintiffs

failed to tender evidence of any such conspiracy in opposition

to summary judgment; and plaintiffs have now abandoned the

Sherman Act § 1 claim: Petition at 3. Plaintiffs also alleged that

defendants individually restrained the retail motor fuel market

in violation of the Gasohol Competition Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.

§ 26a (1988) (the “GCA”), by discouraging their branded fran-

chise dealers from selling gasohol and consumers from buying

it. Petition at 5-6.

Plaintiffs did not participate in the allegedly restrained retail

motor fuel market. Indeed, the ethanol manufacturer plaintiffs

were suppliers of a raw material to gasohol manufacturers, who

in turn sold to distributors. Nonetheless, plaintiffs claimed to

have suffered their business failures “by reason of” the defen-

dants’ alleged unilateral violations of the GCA.

After extensive discovery, defendants amassed a substantial

record to support summary judgment. The record included un-

disputed admissions by plaintiffs and their experts that plain-

tiffs’ ethanol and gasohol sales were devastated by numerous

‘ The Court of Appeals held that “there is no evidence of concerted action.”

Petition, Appendix A at 9a. Plaintiffs do not challenge that holding. Accord-

ingly, plaintiffs’ continued assertion that the record shows that defendants acted

in concert (Petition at 5) should be ignored.

: Plaintiffs baldly misstate the record by asserting that the Court of Appeals

found that the defendants had committed per se violations of the GCA. See

Petition at 7. The court merely concluded that there was a genuine issue of

fact as to whether any such violation had occurred. Petition, Appendix A at

l3a-l4a.

economic and market factors unrelated to any alleged antitrust

violation. Those undisputed factors included:

¢ the many automobile owner's manuals that warned

consumers against the use of motor fuels contain-

ing alcohol;'

¢ media reports that discouraged the use of alcohol-

blended motor fuels;

¢ state pump labeling laws that hurt ethanol and

gasohol sales, which one of plaintiffs’ experts

testified “*killed ethanol in the marketplace;’”

¢ the elimination or reduction in state tax exemptions

for gasohol sales, which reduced the prices paid to

plaintiffs for gasohol and ethanol:

© a drop in gasoline prices, which led to a correspond-

ing drop in gasohol and ethanol prices (from $1.56

to $0.97 per gallon according to one plaintiff):

* a federal subsidy that effectively reduced the raw

material costs of some plaintiffs’ competitors by

forty percent;

* the elimination of a $1.40 per gallon incentive for

ethanol production in the state where four of the

ethanol producer plaintiffs were located: and

* the admitted ability of plaintiffs’ much larger com-

petitors to produce better quality ethanol at a lower

price than any of the plaintiffs.

Petition, Appendix A at 19a-23a.

It was also undisputed that only approximately one-half of

the roughly 150,000 retail automotive fuel outlets in the United

States were branded outlets supplied by defendants, and thus

’ Plaintiffs’ assertion that “[a]utomobile manufacturers have indicated that

using gasohol will not affect new car warranties” (Petition at 4) is according-

ly misleading.

could have been affected by defendants’ alleged dealer restric-

tions.* Moreover, plaintiffs did not proffer in opposition to sum-

mary judgment any evidence that they ever attempted to sell

ethanol or gasohol to any defendant's dealer or jobber, but were

unable to do so, due to any practices of the defendant. Indeed,

in response to requests to admit served by some defendants,

plaintiffs admitted that they could not identify any lost sales

to defendants’ dealers or jobbers.‘

The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing under

Clayton Act § 4, applying the multi-factor analysis announced

in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Califor-

nia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). Petition,

Appendix B at 57a-63a. In a thorough opinion, the Court of

Appeals unanimously affirmed summary judgment dismissing

plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to raise

any genuine issue that they could prove the essential causation-

in-fact element of a claim for treble damages under Clayton

Act §4.° The court held that plaintiffs could not prove that any

* See Defendants-Appellees’ Appendix, filed in the Seventh Circuit on

September 11, 1992, at Al47-154. Plaintiffs misstate that defendants’ alleged

conduct “excluded gasohol from the existing motor fuels network.” Petition

at 6. The undisputed record established that four of the eight defendants

marketed alcohol-blended fuel, another owned an ethanol production plant,

and nationwide sales of ethanol for fuel increased from 20 million gallons per

year to 825 million gallons per year over the decade ending in 1987, a 4000

percent increase. Petition, Appendix A at 7a-8a and Qa.

‘ Defendants-Appellees’ Appendix at Al01-104 and A106-107.

¢ The court treated the causation-in-fact requirement as a sub-element of plain-

tiffs’ need to prove “antitrust injury.” Petition, Appendix A at 6a and 18a. Plain-

tiffs concede that this is an appropriate way to view the requirement. Peti-

tion at 16 (“the notion of causation is implicit in the antitrust injury stan-

dard, which requires that the injury ‘flow[] from’ that which makes defen-

dant’s acts unlawful,” quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,

429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Similarly, as plaintiffs note, distinguished antitrust

commentators have observed that it is often pointless to attempt to distinguish

causation-in-fact from antitrust injury. Petition at 16-17 (citing Phillip E.

Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 4 334.3a (Supp. 1991)). But

. (Footnote continued)

alleged violation was a “material and substantial factor caus-

ing their alleged injuries.” Petition, Appendix A at 19a. Having

concluded that plaintiffs could not even show causation-in-fact,

the court found it unnecessary to reach the question whether,

assuming an injury caused in fact by an alleged violation, plain-

tiffs had standing to sue.’ Petition, Appendix A at 23a. Plain-

tiffs’ suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied with no judge

having called for a vote.

The Court of Appeals’ decision does not merit review by this

Court. The decision is a straightforward application of the well-

settled rule for proof of causation in antitrust cases. The Court

of Appeals held that plaintiffs failed to show that the alleged

violation was a material element of, and a substantial factor

in producing, the alleged injury. Petition, Appendix A at 18a-19a.

In so holding, the court noted that plaintiffs had failed to show

that “‘but for’ the alleged antitrust violation [they] would not

have suffered the injuries of which they complain.” Petition, Ap-

pendix A at 23a. The court’s statement is fully in accord with

the decisions of this Court and not in conflict with the other

circuits. This Court recently has reaffirmed that an antitrust

plaintiff must show that “the defendant's violation was a ‘but

for’ cause of his injury.” Holmes v. Securities Investor Protec-

tion Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1317 (1992).

Plaintiffs’ attempt to manufacture a conflict is based upon

a mischaracterization of the rule for proof of causation and the

Court of Appeals’ application of it. Indeed, the Court of Ap-

peals applied the very same legal standard that plaintiffs argue

for and that was applied in cases that plaintiffs offer in sup-

port of their claim of circuit conflict — namely, whether the

whether the need to prove causation-in-fact is so viewed or viewed as a distinct

element of proof separate from “antitrust injury,” plaintiffs’ failure to prove

causation-in-fact is equally fatal to their claims.

” Relying on Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 US. 104, 113 (1986),

the Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims

for injunctive relief because of their failure to show that any conduct by defen-

dants was the cause-in-fact of any actual or threatened injury. See Petition,

Appendix A at 23a.

antitrust plaintiff established “that the violation was a material

element of, and substantial factor in producing, the injury.” Peti-

tion, Appendix A at 18a. Accordingly, the Petition should be

denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

F

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED

THE SETTLED RULE FOR PROOF OF CAUSATION.

IN-FACT IN ANTITRUST CASES

A. The Settled Material Cause Rule Of Antitrust Causation

Requires The Plaintiff To Prove That The Violation Was

A “But For” Cause Of His Injury

Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits a plaintiff to sue for

damages only when he has suffered injury to his business or prop-

erty “by reason of” a violation of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C.

§ 15(a) (1988). The “by reason of” language of Section 4 im-

poses two distinct causation requirements. First, a plaintiff must

prove that his injury was caused in fact by the antitrust viola-

tion. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S.

557, 562 (1981). Second, a plaintiff must prove that the rela-

tionship between the violation and the injury is of a type, and

sufficiently direct and non-speculative, to make the plaintiff a

proper party to sue. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors

of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,

459 U.S. 519, 535-46 (1983).

The Petition involves only the first of these requirements —

cause-in-fact. To satisfy this requirement, as the Court said in

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,

114 n.9 (1969), a plaintiff must show that the illegality is “***

a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff need not exhaust all

possible alternative sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of

proving compensable injury under § 4.”

More recently, this Court explained that this material cause

test requires an antitrust plaintiff to show that the violation was

a

a “but for” cause of his injury. Interpreting the analogous causa-

tion requirement of the private treble damage remedy under

RICO, the Court stated that it had held in Associated General

Contractors

“ses

that a plaintiff's right to sue under § 4 required

a showing not only that the defendant's violation was

a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate

Cause as well.”

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311.

1317 (1992) (emphasis added).*

Likewise, in Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982),

the Court used the words “but for” to describe the cause-in-fact

requirement that an antitrust plaintiff must Satisfy even before

the court addresses the plaintiff's standing. The Court said: “We

therefore assume, as McCready has alleged, that but for the

alleged conspiracy to deny payment, she would have been reim-

bursed by Blue Shield for the cost of her psychologist’s services.”

457 U.S. at 468 n.2.

While the Court did not use the words “but for” in Zenith,

its analysis implicitly recognized that “but for” causation was

necessary to establish that a violation was a material cause of

injury compensable under Clayton Act § 4. The Court first con-

cluded that Zenith had created a triable issue as to injury with

evidence tending to show that it would not have suffered its in-

jury but for defendants’ illegal Canadian patent pool:

* The Holmes Court elsewhere reiterated, by citation to Associated General

Contractors, that proof of causation-in-fact in an antitrust case requires proof

of “but for” causation. The Court said of the RICO counterpart to § 4:

“This language can of course be read to mean that a plaintiff is

injured ‘by reason of a RICO violation, and therefore may recover,

simply on showing that the defendant violated § 1962, the plain-

tiff was injured, and the defendant's violation was a ‘but for’ cause

of plaintiff's injury. Cf. Associated General Contractors of Cal.,

Inc. v. Carpenters [citation omitted]. ***”

Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316 (footnote omitted).

“Here, Zenith was denied a valuable license and

submitted testimony that without the license it had

encountered distribution difficulties which prevented

its securing a share of the market comparable to that

which it enjoyed in the United States, and which its

business proficiency, demonstrated in the United

States, dictated it should have obtained in Canada.

*** The trial court was entitled to infer from this cir-

cumstantial evidence that the necessary causal rela-

tion between the pool’s conduct and the claimed

damage existed. ***”

395 U.S. at 124-25. The Court then affirmed a directed verdict

for defendants on Zenith’s claim of injury from defendants’

British and Australian patent pools. The Court reasoned that

there was inadequate evidence that Zenith ever intended or was

prepared to enter the British and Australian markets and

therefore that Zenith could not prove an injury it would not

have suffered but for the British and Australian patent pools.

See 395 U.S. at 125-29.

The Seventh Circuit in this case and other Courts of Appeals

have recognized that the material cause standard requires a

plaintiff to prove that the harm would not have occurred “but

for” the alleged violation. See, e.g., Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox

Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1494 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[t]he case law is

clear, moreover, that the treble-damage plaintiff may not recover

for losses due to factors other than the defendant’s an-

ticompetitive violations”), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993);

Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986)

(“an essential element in plaintiffs’ claim is that the injuries alleged

would not have occurred but for [defendant]’s antitrust viola-

tion”) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987);°

Gregory Marketing Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92,

* Argus was not superseded by Irvin Industries, Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace

Corp., 974 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1992), as plaintiffs suggest. See Petition at 12.

In Irvin Industries, the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff, unlike

the Argus plaintiff, did create a genuine issue that it would not have lost a

contract bid but for the defendant's unlawfully low bid. 974 F.2d at 245-46.

95 (3d Cir.) (recognizing that Associated General Contractors

requires proof of “causation in this but-for sense,” as well as anti-

trust standing), cert. denied, 479 US. 82] (1986); Southwestern

Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Semco Mfg., Inc., 788 F.2d 1144,

1147 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting directed verdict on claim that

plaintiff lost bids due to defendants’ conspiracy to restrain labor

wages because “[n]ot one instance is presented where, but for

[defendant]'s wage advantage, [plaintiff] would have won or

was likely to have won” a bid), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987):

Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705,

719 (llth Cir. 1984) (affirming summary judgment because

“[p]laintiff has not shown that alternative sources of comparable

products would have been available but for the alleged [tying

agreement]”); Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atlantic

Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 690 F.2d 41], 412 and 415 n.4 (4th Cir.

1982) (affirming judgment for defendants and noting that

directed verdict would have been proper because plaintiff failed

to show its “profits would have been even greater but for the

anticompetitive conduct”); A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments.

Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal «here

plaintiff conceded that absent Sherman Act violations it would

still have been out of business); Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal

Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that

on remand “[p]laintiff, of course, must prove that it would have

purchased the mill but for the contract” which plaintiff claimed

excluded it from the market), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976);

Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463

F.2d 1002, 1016 (5th Cir.) (at trial after remand plaintiffs “must

sustain the burden of proving that but for the allegedly unlawful

practices of [defendant] vis-a-vis [defendant]’s franchisees, the

plaintiffs would have done a certain amount of business with

the franchisees”), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) .”

” These circuit court decisions articulating the causation requirement in terms

of “but for” cause are not in conflict with decisions of the same courts, cited

by plaintiffs, articulating the causation requirement in terms of material cause.

See Petition at 11-12. As the antitrust causation decisions of this Court teach,

the “but for” and material cause standards are not at odds with one another.

See pages 6-8, above.

(Footnote continued)

10

Hence, under the settled rule for proof of causation-in-fact

in antitrust cases under Clayton Act § 4, a plaintiff must prove

that an alleged violation is a material cause of his injury. He

need not show that the violation was the sole cause of injury.

However, a plaintiff cannot establish that an alleged violation

is a material cause unless he can show that the injury would

not have occurred “but for” the alleged violation. As

demonstrated below, the Court of Appeals’ decision is a

straightforward and correct application of this rule.

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Is A Straightforward And

Correct Application Of The Settled Causation Rule

Relying expressly on this Court's decision in Zenith, the Court

of Appeals correctly stated the rule for proof of causation-in-

fact. It said that

“* * * a § 4 plaintiff must show that its injury ‘flows

from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful, ***

— that ‘but for’ the alleged violation, the injuries

would not have occurred. *** An antitrust violation

need not be the sole cause of the alleged injuries, but

the plaintiff must establish, with a fair degree of cer-

tainty, that the violation was a material element of,

and substantial factor in producing, the injury. * * *”

Petition, Appendix A at 18a (citations omitted, emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals then applied that rule to affirm sum-

mary judgment for defendants. The Court held:

“Defendants identify numerous intervening eco-

nomic and market factors which they argue may

have been the actual cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.

The only anomalous circuit court case is Allied Accessories & Auto Parts Co

v. General Motors Corp., 901 F.2d 1322, 1325-26 (6th Cir. 1990). There, the

Sixth Circuit erroneously equated a “but for” cause test with a sole cause test.

See pages 11-13, below. That error by that court is at odds with this Court's

analysis and cannot provide any support for reviewing the Seventh Circuit's

decision correctly applying this Court's analysis.

ll

They contend that the alleged antitrust violations

played an insignificant role (or none at all) in the

plaintiffs’ economic woes, and that therefore no

reasonable trier of fact could find that the violation

caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. We agree and find that

as a matter of law, plaintiffs have failed to show with

a fair degree of certainty that the antitrust violation

was a material and substantial factor causing their

alleged injuries. Hence, the plaintiffs did not suffer

antitrust injury.”

Petition, Appendix A at 19a (latter emphasis added). This

holding represents a straightforward, case-specific evaluation

of the voluminous record in this case Based on its careful

analysis, the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show

that “but for” the alleged violation, plaintiffs would not have

suffered the injuries claimed. Id. at 23a. This straightforward

application of a settled rule of law does not provide any ground

for granting the Petition.

Il.

THE PETITION OFFERS NO REASON TO DEPART

IN THIS CASE FROM THE SETTLED CAUSATION

RULE

A. The Petition Incorrectly Argues Both That “But For”

Cause Is The Same As Sole Cause And That The Court

Of Appeals Applied A Sole Cause Requirement

In an effort to portray the Seventh Circuit's decision as out

of line with the decisions of this Court and other Courts of Ap-

peals, the Petition mischaracterizes both the settled rule for proof

of causation-in-fact and the Seventh Circuit's application of that

rule. Plaintiffs’ mischaracterization of the causation rule centers

on their treatment of “but for” cause Once the mischaracteriza-

tion is laid bare of its rhetorical trappings, it plainly provides

no basis for review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision.

Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that the material cause rule, which

they concede controls in antitrust Cases, is entirely distinct from

va

12

“but for” cause. Petition at 9, 10-12 and 14. In unrestrained rhet-

oric, plaintiffs repeatedly refer to the “but for” cause require-

ment as a novelty created for the first time in the Seventh Cir-

cuit’s decision. E.g., Petition at 3-4 (“entirely unprecedented re-

quirement”), 8 (“radically rewrites the standards for proving

causation”), 9 (“[t]his new standard”), 18 (“radically new stan-

dard”). Having rhetorically separated “but for” cause from

material cause, plaintiffs then equate “but for” cause with sole

cause, and conclude that any reliance on a “but for” standard

would be at odds with the unquestioned proposition that a plain-

tiff need not prove that a violation is the sole cause of an in-

jury. See Petition at 13-14.

Plaintiffs are wrong on both counts. This Court, followed by

the Courts of Appeals, clearly has used the concept of “but for”

cause to define the material cause standard, and has not equated

“but for” with sole cause. As shown above, this Court said in

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S.Ct. 131],

1317 (1992), explaining its earlier holding in Associated General

Contractors: “we held that a plaintiffs right to sue under § 4

required a showing *** that the defendant’s violation was a ‘but

for’ cause of his injury ***.”"

Nor, contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, did the Court of Ap-

peals hold in this case that plaintiffs had to show the alleged

violation to be the sole cause of their business failure. On the

contrary, the Court of Appeals expressly stated that plaintiffs

did not have such a burden. Petition, Appendix A at 18a (“[a]n

antitrust violation need not be the sole cause of the alleged

“ The Court did not find “but for” causation analysis inapplicable to antitrust

cases in J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981),

as plaintiffs suggest. See Petition at 20. In that case, the Court explained that

some latitude is allowed antitrust plaintiffs in proving the amount of damages

because “[t]he vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge

of what plaintiff's situation would have been in the absence of the defendant's

antitrust violation.” 45] U.S. at 566. But to be permitted such latitude in prov-

ing the amount of damages, the Court held that the plaintiff first “must make

some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws

were designed to prevent.” 451 U.S. at 562.

ee

13

injuries***”)” Relying expressly on Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 US. 100 (1969), the Court of Ap-

peals concluded that plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue

that any alleged violation was a material cause of plaintiffs’

business failures. Petition, Appendix A at 18a-19a. Indeed, the

causation rule applied by the Court of Appeals in this case in

substance tracks the language of cases that plaintiffs offer in

support of an alleged circuit conflict — namely, that the alleged

antitrust violation must be a material element of, and substan-

tial factor in producing, plaintiffs’ injury. See Petition at 11-12

(quoting cases).

B. The Petition Ignores Plaintiffs’ Failure To Proffer Any

Evidence Sufficient To Meet Their Burden Of Proving

Causation Under Any Standard

Plaintiffs misleadingly assert that the Court of Appeals held

that “a defendant can win summary judgment by filling the

record with sufficient evidence hypothetically favorable to its

defenses, whatever showing plaintiff makes.” Petition at 21. The

Court of Appeals did no such thing. Instead, the court explicit-

ly ruled that the plaintiffs failed to make any showing that would

Satisfy the material cause test: “We *** find that as a matter

of law, plaintiffs have failed to show with a fair degree of cer-

tainty that the antitrust violation was a material and substan-

tial factor causing their alleged injuries.” Petition, Appendix A

at 19a. The Court of Appeals so ruled because plaintiffs failed

to make any showing that an alleged violation even contributed

to their business failures.

The record before the court contained repeated admissions

by plaintiffs and their experts, and other uncontroverted proof,

that plaintiffs’ ethanol and gasohol sales were severely dimin-

ished, and their failures caused, by eight factors unrelated to

* Plaintiffs’ assertion that the courts have “regularly rebuffed the type of

analysis adopted by the Seventh Circuit” (Petition at 13) rests on the

mischaracterization of the decision as applying a sole cause analysis. None

of the cases cited by plaintiffs in any way rejects the application of the material

and “but for” cause analysis applied in this case.

14

any alleged antitrust violation, described in the court's opinion.

Petition, Appendix A at 19a-23a. The proof of the impact on

plaintiffs’ businesses of the market factors upon which the court

relied was not merely “hypothetically favorable” to defendants:

it was admitted by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs therefore were required

to proffer evidence, in addition to proof of a violation of law,

sufficient to create a genuine issue that they suffered some in-

jury from an antitrust violation as opposed to the other admit-

ted factors.” Plaintiffs could not merely rest on proof of an al-

leged violation without additional evidence of causation. See

]. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562

(1981). Plaintiffs proffered no such evidence* They were afforded

every opportunity to marshal whatever facts they believed would

support their claims. Because the summary judgment record was

so one-sided, the Seventh Circuit properly concluded that the

plaintiffs had not created a genuine issue that an alleged an-

titrust violation as opposed to other factors was a material or

“but for” cause of their diminished sales. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (summary judgment ap-

propriate where evidence “is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law”); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (plaintiff “must

do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts”).

None of the cases plaintiffs cite holds that summary judgment

is inappropriate where the defendants have proffered such a

compelling record of other explanations for the plaintiffs’ in-

juries. To the contrary, courts repeatedly have granted summary

® A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it suffered some material in-

jury from an antitrust violation. E.g., Zenith, 395 U.S. at 114 n.9. To survive

summary judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to create

a genuine issue on such elements on which it bears the burden of proof. See,

e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

“ Plaintiffs assert that the court’s decision conflicts with Eastman Kodak Co.

v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). Petition at 21. But

that case did not even discuss causation-in-fact. There, the Court simply found

that plaintiffs provided evidence of a tying arrangement and monopolization

sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

seaeeereeneneeeeeemmeneeneassaeaseeaeammeeenmm el

15

judgment based on such a record. E.g., Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox

Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1495-97 (8th Cir. 1992) (deposition

testimony plaintiffs presented failed to create genuine issue suf-

ficient to rebut admissions by plaintiffs and their experts that

plaintiffs’ decline resulted from other factors), cert. denied, 113

S. Ct. 1048 (1993); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d

38, 41-46 (2d Cir. 1986) (testimony proffered by plaintiffs failed

to create genuine issue adequate to rebut evidence showing alter-

native causes for plaintiffs’ alleged injuries), cert. denied, 479

U.S. 1088 (1987); Jayco Systems, Inc. v. Savin Business Machines

Corp., 777 F.2d 306, 313-16 (5th Cir. 1985) (affidavit submitted

by plaintiff did not create genuine issue sufficient to rebut

substantial evidence that plaintiff was not injured by antitrust

violations), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) !'s

Thus, when one strips away plaintiffs’ mischaracterization

of the Court of Appeals’ decision and their manufactured cir-

cuit conflict, this case involves nothing more exceptional than

a case-specific application of the well-settled rule that summary

judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party sits back

silent and idle in the face of uncontroverted proof that negates,

as a matter of law, an essential element of the cause of action.

See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Such an issue is not worthy of review by writ of certiorari.

C. The Petition Cites No Policy Supporting Abandonment

Of The Settled Causation Rule

Plaintiffs finally suggest that this Court should abandon “but

for” cause as a standard giving content to the material cause

“ Courts similarly have directed verdicts for the defendant based on evidence

of other explanations for the plaintiff's alleged injuries. E.g., Morgan v. Ponder,

892 F.2d 1355, 1361-63 (8th Cir. 1989) ‘cited at Petition 13) (reversing denial

of directed verdict because plaintiffs’ evidence of injury from alleged predatory

pricing was inadequate as a matter of iaw to rebut evidence that plaintiffs

failed for other reasons); J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704 F.2d

787, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming directed verdict against plaintiff because

plaintiff's proffered testimony was inadequate to rebut defendants’ demonstra-

tion that plaintiff's decline was caused by other factors); Federal Prescription

(Footnote continued)

A

16

rule in antitrust cases, for two reasons. Neither of these

arguments is supported by policy considerations.

First, plaintiffs claim that the Court of Appeals’ decision

makes the GCA unenforceable. Petition at 9-10. But the Court

of Appeals’ decision does not impair enforcement of the GCA

or any other antitrust law. Any private plaintiff with standing

who, unlike these plaintiffs, can raise a genuine issue of fact

that he suffered harm “by reason of” a violation can sue. The

Government also may “institute proceedings in equity to pre-

vent and restrain such violations.” 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988).

Second, plaintiffs assert that the issue of antitrust causation

in markets is more complicated than the issue of causation of

injury by other torts, to which plaintiffs concede a “but for”

cause test generally applies, because “there is typically more than

one cause for any market event.” Petition at 20. But the same

holds true for injury attributable to other torts. As the leading

commentator observes: “[t]he event without millions of causes

is simply inconceivable.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 266 (5th ed. 1984). Plain-

tiffs’ reliance on the section of Prosser and Keeton dealing with

the “one type of situation” where either of two causes, operating

alone, is sufficient to cause the identical result, is misplaced.

Petition at 19. First, as discussed above, plaintiffs offered no

evidence on causation, much less evidence sufficient to show

that an alleged violation operating alone was sufficient to cause

their injury. There thus is no basis to determine that this is such

a situation. Second, even assuming that this were such a situa-

tion, Prosser and Keeton merely argue that a court should re-

quire that the violation be “a material element and a substan-

tial factor in bringing” about plaintiff's injury. Prosser and

Keeton § 41, at 267. As also discussed above, this is the very test

that the Court of Appeals applied here.

Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Association, 663 F.2d 253, 269 (D.C.

Cir. 1981) (dismissing award of damages because “[o]}n the basis of this evidence

we think it too speculative to find that [defendant] was responsible for [ plain-

tiff]'s extraordinary forgery checking expenses, given the availability of alter-

native explanations for those expenses”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).

17

Plaintiffs’ mischaracterizations do not provide any basis for

review of the Court of Appeals’ decision that they could not,

as a matter of law, satisfy the causation requirement of Clayton

Act § 4."

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. the Petition should be denied.

Dated: January 14, 1994.

Respectfully submitted.

Puiuip H. Curtis

(Counsel of Record)

RoBert C. Mason

Pau. D. FLack

ARNOLD & PorTER

399 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

(212) 715-1000

RONALD C. Repcay

DoNnaALp A. Bricut

DEAN M. Hararts

Atlantic Richfield Company

915 South Flower Street

Los Angeles, California 9007]

(213) 486-1997

Attorneys for Respondent Atlantic

Richfield Company

* Plaintiffs also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing plaintiffs’

claims for injunctive relief under Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988). Peti-

tion at 21-22. But because plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue that they

were injured by any alleged antitrust violation, and proffered no evidence sug-

gesting that they might be so injured in the future, they could not Satisfy the

requirement of “threatened loss or damage” necessary for relief under Clayton

Act § 16. See Petition, Appendix A at 23a.

18

- THOMAS A. GOTTSCHALK

J. ANDREW LANGAN

Davip A. RAMMELT

KIRKLAND & ELLIS

200 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 861-2000

JAMES J. NEATH

Amoco Corporation

200 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 856-4836

Attorneys for Respondent Amoco Oil

Company

JosePH T. DatTILo

BP America Inc.

200 Public Square

39-B-5300

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-2375

(216) 586-5691

Attorneys for Respondent BP

America Inc.

Davip L. REAM

JoHN T. Lewis

Mark A. CERVENKA

Chevron Services Company

1301 McKinney

Houston, Texas 77010

(713) 754-3312

Attorneys for Respondent Chevron

U.S.A. Inc.

hicnceaaieniiiaesinieaiitn inate iaemaiiaaaimmauall

19

RoBert G. ABRAMS

JOANNE E. Caruso

Howrey & SIMON

1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 383-6935

RENE J. MouLepoux

Exxon Company, U.S.A.

800 Bell Street

Houston, Texas 77001

(713) 656-5187

Attorneys for Respondent Exxon

Corporation

RONALD W. TEEPLE

JouHN L. Leonarp

SAMUEL G. KrRAM

DEFREES & FISKE

200 South Michigan Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 372-4000

JouN H. Stron

Marathon Oil Company

539 Main Street

Findlay, Ohio 45840

(419) 422-212]

Attorneys for Respondent Marathon

Oil Company

20

Jerrery M. Cross

PATRICK J. AHERN

Mary CLARE BONACCORSI

Ross & HARDIES

150 North Michigan Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60601-7567

(312) 558-1000

Epwarp H. Beck

Mobil Oil Corporation

3225 Gallows Road

Fairfax, Virginia 22037-0001

(703) 846-5877

Attorneys for Respondent Mobil Oil

Corporation

A. MICHAEL MINOTTI

ANN SPIEGEL

Shell Oil Company

P.O. Box 2463

Houston, Texas 77252-2463

(713) 241-5886

Attorneys for Respondent Shell Oil

Company

APPENDIX

A-]

APPENDIX A

RULE 29.1 LISTING

The defendant-appellees below. who are respondents herein.

have the following parent companies and subsidiaries (except

wholly owned subsidiaries).

Respondent Atlantic Richfield Company has no parent com-

pany. Atlantic Richfield Company has the following subsidiaries

(except wholly owned subsidiaries): 85819 Canada Limited;

A.C.E. Insurance Company (Bermuda), Ltd.: AGRO Interna-

tional, S. de R.L. de C.V.: Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.: AM/PM

Comestiveis Ltda.: AM/PM Japan; ARCO Algeria, Inc.: ARCO

Chemical (Malaysia) SDN, BHD.: ARCO Chemical Bahamas,

Ltd.; ARCO Chemical Company; ARCO Chemical Taiwan Co.,

Ltd.; ARCO Solar Nigeria Ltd.: ARCO/JSP de Mexico: Atlan-

tic Richfield Kalosi Ltd.: Badger Pipe Line Co.; Black Lake Pipe

Line Co.; Blair Athol Coal Pty., Ltd.; Cia S. Paulo Distrib.: Colo-

nial Pipeline Co.; Compania de Petroleo Ganso Axul, Ltda.;

Cook Inlet Pipe Line Co.: Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pty.,

Ltd.; Dixie Pipeline Co.: East Heidelberg Salt Water Disposal

Co.; East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.; Empresa de Transportes

Jober Ltda.; Empresas Lanzagorta, S.A. de C.V.: Greater Pacific

Ltd.; International Tanker Indemnity Association, Ltd.: Iricon

Agency Ltd.; Kenai Pipe Line Co.: Kuparuk Transportation

Capital Corp.; Logan Aluminum, Inc.; Lyondell Petrochemical

Corp.; MTC ARCO, Inc.: New Cure, Inc.; Nihon Oxirane Co..

Ltd.; Oil Casualty Insurance Ltd.; Oil Insurance Ltd.: Olym-

pic Pipe Line Co.; Platte Pipe Line Co.; PT Gema Polytama

Kimia; Steamelee B.V.; Tecumseh Pipe Line Co.; Texas-New Mex-

ico Pipe Line Co.; Transac S.A.-Transporte Rodoviario: Transbase

S/A; Transcola S.A.: Transcom-Transporte Combustivel S/A; Tran-

ska S.A-Transportes; Translini S.A.; Transportadora Andrade S/A:

Transportadora Aparecida do Norte S/A; Transportes Brios S/A.

The parent corporations of respondent Amoco Oi] Company

are Amoco Corporation and Amoco Company. Amoco Oil Com-

pany has no subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.

The parent corporations of respondent BP America Inc. are

BP America Holdings Limited, BP International Limited and

A-2

British Petroleum Company p.l.c. BP America Inc. has no sub-

sidiaries that are not wholly owned.

The parent corporation of respondent Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

is Chevron Corporation. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. has the following

subsidiaries (except wholly owned subsidiaries): Atlas Supply

Company; Chevron do Brasil Ltda.; Compania Minera Chevron

Dominicana, S.A.; Felix Oil Company; Horizon Resources Cor-

poration; and Pembroke Capital Company Inc.

Respondent Exxon Company, U.S.A. is a division of Exxon

Corporation. Exxon Corporation has the following subsidiaries

(except wholly owned subsidiaries and subsidiaries in which

Exxon Corporation has less than a five percent interest): 151742

Canada Inc.; 165550 Canada Limited; 172965 Canada I imited;

177003 Canada Inc.; 2849518 Canada Limited; 571269 Alber-

ta Limited; 571270 Alberta Limited; AGA Progas a.s.; AT&S

Exploration Ltd.; Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited; Ace

Polymer Co., Ltd.; Acquifund Resources Limited; Aditivos

Orinoco, C. A.; Adria-Wien Pipeline Gesellschaft mit beschrank-

ter Haftung; Advanced Elastomer Systems Do Brasil Ltda.; Ad-

vanced Elastomer Systems Japan Limited; Advanced Elastomer

Systems Limited; Advanced Elastomer Systems Marketing Pte.

Ltd.; Advanced Elastomer Systems NV/SA; Advanced Elastomer

Systems Singapore Pte. Ltd.; Advanced Elastomer Systems,

Canada, Inc.; Advanced Elastomer Systems, Inc.; Advanced

Elastomer Systems, L.P.; Air Tankdienst Koeln GbR; Aircraft

Fuel Supply B. V.; Aishin Sekiyu K. K.; Al-Jubail Petrochemical

Company, Alberta Products Pipe Line Ltd.; Alyeska Pipeline

Service Company; AquaAir Environmental, Inc.; Aramco Ser-

vices Company; Asakawa Sekiyu K.K.; Awaji Gas Nenryo

Kabushiki Kaisha; Azuma Sekiyu K.K.; B.W.O.C., Inc.; BEB Erd-

gas und Erdoel GmbH, Hannover; BRIGITTA Erdgas und Er-

doel GmbH, Hannover; Bangkok Aviation Fuel Services Limited;

Banshu Ekika Gas K.K.; Bayerische Erdoelleitung G.m.b.H.;

Beaverhill Resources Limited; Brickwood Holdings Pty. Ltd.;

Bryan Austin Chalk Operating Committee, Inc.; Bryan Wood-

bine Gathering, Inc.; Canadian Reserve Oil & Gas Ltd.; Cascade

Fertilizers (1990) Limited; Castle Peak Power Company Limited;

Changi Airport Fuel Hydrant Installation Pte. Ltd.; Changi

ee

A3

Into-Plane Services (Pte) Ltd.; Chuo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.;

Clermont Coal Mines Limited: Comcor Chemicals Limited:

Compagnie Industrielle des Polyethylenes de Normandie.

GIE(CIPEN); Compania Minera Disputada de Las Condes S.A.:

Comptoir Auxiliaire du Petrole; Comptoir Oyonnaixien des

Combustibles (C.O.C.): Computer Centrum Groningen B.V.:

Copim St. Lawrence Ltd.: Crandon Mining Company, a

Winsconsin partnership; Cynthia Gas Gathering Company

Limited; DFTG Deutsche Fluessigerdgas Terminal GmbH;

Daihatsu Sekiyu K.K.; Daito Gas K.K.; Depot Petrolier du

Gresivaudan; Depots Petroliers de la Corse; Depots de Petrole

Cotiers; Deudan-Holding GmbH: Deutsche Advanced

Elastomer Systems GmbH: Deutsche Erdgas Transport

G.m.b.H.; Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung G.m.b.H.: Devon

Estates Limited; Dexco Polymers (General Partnership); Disma

S.r.1.; Dixie Pipeline Company; Dunbar Oil Ltd.: ES F Limited;

ESSO OIL Tankstellen Gesellschaft m.b.H.; ETD Tankdienst

Gesellschaft Duesseldorf GbR: Eagle Kenso K.K.; Eable Rein-

surance Co. Ltd.; East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company; Eiko

Sekiyu K.K.; Elwerath Erdgas und Erdoel GmbH. Hannover;

E]werath Erdoel und Erdgas AG; Emirates National Chemicals

Company Ltd.; Emori Sekiyu K.K.; Emsland-Erdoelleitung

G.m.b.H.; Emulsions de Feyzin; Emulsions du Dauphine;

Energie Marketing Service GmbH; Entrepot Petrolier de

Mulhouse (E.P.M.): Entrepot Petrolier de L’Aveyron (E.P.A.):

Erdgas-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.; Erdoel-Raffinerie Deurag-

Nerag GmbH; Esso (Overseas) Pension Trust Limited; Esso

Energie G.I.E.; Esso Exploration and Production Angola Inc.;

Esso Exploration and Production Ireland Limited: Esso

Lub’Services; Esso Malaysia Berhad; Esso Raffinage S.A.F.; Esso

Resources Properties Inc.; Esso Societe Anonyme Francaise: Esso

Standard Thailand Ltd.; Esso Standard Tunisie S. A.; Esso

Technologies et Services (E.T.S.); Etablissements Cloarec: Exxon

Asset Funding Company; Exxon Asset Management Company;

Exxon Cheinical Asset Management Company; Exxon Chemical

France; Exxon Chemical Paraffins Limited; Exxon Chemical

Polymeres SNC; Exxon Mobile Bay Partnership; Exxon de

Colombia S.A.; FT. Giken Kabushiki Kaisha; Federated Pipe

Lines Ltd.; Ferngas Nordbayern G.m.b.H.: Ferngas Salzgitter

A-4

GmbH: Fernkaelte Geschaeftsstadt Nord G.b.R.; Flughafen

Schwechat Hydranten-Gesellschaft; Fuji Kogyo K.K.; Full Cycle

Plastics Pty. Ltd.; Gl6a (Groep) B.V.; Gasunie Engineering B.V.;

General Bussan K.K.; General Highway K.K.; General

Petrochemical Industries; General Sekiyu K.K.; General Sekiyu

Okinawa Hanbai K.K.; General Sekiyu Overseas, Ltd.; General

Shipping Co. Ltd.; General Unyu Kabushiki Kaisha; Geobutane

- Lavera; Gewerkschaft Brassert Erdoel und Erdgas GmbH:

Gewerkschaft Gute Hoffnung Erdgas und Erdoel GmbH;

Gewerkschaft Kuechenberg Erdgas und Erdoel GmbH; Glen

Park Gas Pipe Line Company Limited; Grande Ecaille Land

Company, Inc.; Groupement Immobilier Petrolier, Groupemert

Liants Routiers du Gard Esso-Viafrance (G.L.R.G.E.V.); Groupe-

ment Petrolier Aviation; Groupement Petrolier de Nantes

(G.P.N.); Groupement Petrolier de Saint-Pierre des Corps

(G.P.S.P.C.); Groupement Petrolier de la Cote d'Azur; Groupe-

ment Petrolier du Finistere G.I.E.; Groupement Petrolier du Val-

de-Marne (G.P-V.M.); Groupement d’Exploitation du Depot de

Reception de Chennevieres (G.E.D.R.C.); Hambrecht & Quist

Environmental Technology; Hamburger Gaswerke GmbH; Han-

noversche Erdoelleitungs-G.m.b.H.; Hanshin Kyowa Sekiyu

K.K.; Hayakawa Sekiyu K.K.; Heinrich Schneider Spedition

GmbH: Hiroshima General Gas Juten Kabushiki Kaisha; Hoei

Sekiyu K.K.; Hokkai Sanshi Co., Ltd. (Chemical); Hokushin

Bussan K.K.; Hokuyu Sekiyu K.K.; Hong Kong Pumped Storage

Development Company, Limited; Houston Regional Monitor-

ing Corporation; Hydrant Refuelling System, S.A.; Hydranten-

Betriebs-Gesellschaft, G.b.R.; Hydrierwerke Poelitz Aktien-

gesellschaft; Imperial Oil (an Ontario Partnership); Imperial

Oil Limited; Imperial Oil Resources Limited; Imperial Oil

Resources N.W.T. Limited; Imperial Oil Resources Ventures

Limited; Imperial Oil Resources an Alberta limited partnership;

Imperial Pipe Line Company, Limited, The; Inada Ekka Gas

Kabushiki Kaisha; Industria Acqua Siracusana S.p.A.; Industry

Promotion Enterprises Limited; Intoplane Services Company

Limited; Iranian Oil Participants Limited (iranian Consortium);

Iranian Oil Services (Holdings) Limited; Iranian Oil Services

Limited; Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited; Iraq Petroleum

Pensions, Limited; Japan Butyl Company Limited; Japan Coal

A-5

Liquefaction Development Company, Ltd.; Jaymo SNC; Jersey

Nuclear-Avco Isotopes, Inc.; K. K. Momose Shiojiri Stand; K.

K. Toresen; K. K. Aizu General; K. K. Auto; K. K. Daimaru:

K. K. Eastern Gas Terminal; K. K. General Sekiyu Hanbaisho;

K. K. Genet; K. K. Genetech; K. K. Heian Sekiyu; K. K. Kyoei

Shosha; K. K. Marugo Izumasa Shoten; K. K. Marutaka Sekiyu;

K. K. Momose Sekiyu; K. K. Saidaiji Gas; K. K. Standard Sekyu

Osaka Hatsubaisho; K. K. Toko; K. K. Uwano Sekiyu Shokai;

K/S Statfjord Transport A/S & Co.; KX Industries, L.P:;

Kabushiki Kaisha Sankyo Plastics; Kabushiki Kaisha Serubisu:

Kai Tak Refuellers Company Limited; Kanto Kygnus K.K.;

Karisruhe-Stuttgart Rohrleitung Gesellschaft mbH; Kawasaki

Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha; Keihan Sekiyu K.K.;

Keiyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.; Kemcor Australia Pty. Ltd.; Kem-

cor Elastomers Ltd.; Kemcor Olefins Ltd.; Kemcor Plastics Pty.

Ltd.; Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited; Kibo Sekiyu Han-

bai K.K.; Kimura Sekiyu Kabushiki «aisha; Kinwa Sekiyu K.K.;

Kobe Standard Sekiyu K.K.; Korea Perchem Company Limited;

Kosxon Chemical Company Limited; Kowa Sekiyu K.K.;

Kowloon Electricity Supply Company Limited; Kumho E.P.

Rubber Co., Ltd.; Kygnus Ekika Gas Kabushiki Kaisha; Kygmnus

Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha; Kygnus Marketing Service K.K.;

Kygnus Sekiyu K.K.; Kygnus Sekiyu Seisei Kabushiki Kaisha;

Kygnus Trading Kabushiki Kaisha; Kyushu Eagle K.K.; L-Net

East K.K.; L-Net West K.K.; L12A (Groep) B.V.; L14 (Groep)

B.V., LISA (Groep) B.V.; L2 (Groep) B.V.; L5a (Groep) B.V.;

LEAG Aktiengesellschaft fuer luzernisches Erdoel; Les Docks

des Petroles d’Ambes; Liants Routiers de la Vallee de la Loir

(LRVL); Lilac Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha; Lily Sekiyu K.K.;

Lithcon Petroleum International (Bahamas) Inc.; Lithcon

Petroleum Taiwan Inc.; Long Beach Oil Development Company;

Lithcon Petroleum Taiway Inc.; Long Beach Oil Development

Company; MEGAL FINCO; MEGAL Gmblt.; MESBIC Finan-

cial Corporation of Houston; Maasvlakte Olie Terminal N.V.;

Magota Sekiyu K.K.; Mainline Pipelines Limited; Malaysian

Energy Chemical & Services Sdn Bhd; Manchester Airport

Storage and Hydrant Company Limited; McCann Plastics Inc.

(Chemical); McColl-Frentenac Inc.; McColl-Frontenac

Petroleum Inc./Petroliere McColl-Frontenac Inc.; Meiji Sekiyu

A-6

K.K.: Metro Fuel Co. Ltd.; Mikawa Bussan K.K.; Mitake Unso

K.K.; Mittelrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit

beschrankter Haftung; Mode Wheel Property Limited; Mon-

treal Pipe Line Limited/Les Pipe-Lines Montreal Limitee;

Mount Thorley Coal Loading Limited; Mr. Lube Canada Inc.;

Multi Tank Card B.V.; Mytex Polymers (General Partnership);

N. V. Nedeerlandse Gasunie; Nam - K 14 B.V.; Nam - K 15 B.V.;

Nam - K 7 B.V.; Nam - K 17 B.V.; NAM/CLOMS - K 8/K 11

B.V.; NAM/CLOMS - L 13 B.V.; NAM/dMOBIL MQa B.V.; NPC

Services, Inc.; Nakabayashi Sekiyu K.K.; Nansei Oil Terminal

K.K.; Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha; Nanseki Kaihatsu K.K.;

Native Venture Capital Co. Ltd.; Near East Development Cor-

poration; Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V.; Neptune Bulk

Terminals (Canada) Ltd.; New Cure, Inc.; Newcastle Coal Ship-

pers Pty. Limited; Nichiei Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha; Nichimo

Oil (Bermuda) Co., Ltd.; Nikko Sangyo K.K.; Nippon Unicar

K.K.; Nisku Products Pipe Line Company Limited; Nissei Sekiyu

Kabushiki Kaisha; Nogat B.V.; Norddeutsche Erdgas-

Aufbereitungs G.m.b.H.; Norddeutsche Mineraloelwerke Stettin

G.m.b.H.; Nordrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit

beschrankter Haftung; Noroxo; Northward Developments Ltd.;

OSLO Alberta Limited; Office Prive d’Assurances et de Cour-

tages; Oil Field Chemicals Company (Saudi Arabia) Ltd.; Oil

Service Company of Iran (Private Company); Oil Spill Response

Limited; Oldenburgische Erdoel Gesellschaft m.b.H.; Oleoducto

de Colombia S.A.; Oleoductos Canarios, $.A.; Osaka General

Gas K.K.; Osaka Kygnus K.K.; P. T. Stanvac Indonesia; P.A.C.

S.A.R.L. (Pinson-Allegret-Causse); PIMEC Inc.; Pacesetter

Enterprises Limited; Pars Investment Corporation; Paxon

Polymer Company, L.P.; Peninsula Electric Power Company

Limited; Petroleum Services (Middle East) Limited; Petrosvibri

S.A.; Pier Atlantic Limited; Pipe Line Services, Inc.; Plantation

Pipe Line Company; Portland Pipe Line Corporation;

Primaeroel GmbH; Primus a.s.; Prince William Sound Oil Spill

Response Corporation; Progas Limited; Projectbureau W/K B.V.;

Quadrant Gas Limited; Raffinerie du Midi S.A.R.L.; Rainbow

Pipe Line Company, Ltd.; Redwater Water Disposal Company

Limited; Refineria Petrolera Acajutla, S.A.; Regulus Holding

A-7

(Singapore) Pte. Ltd.; Rheingas Erdgasleitungs-Gesellschaft

m.b.H.; Rotterdam Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Belgie) N.V.:

Rotterday-Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Nederland) N.V.; Rubiatec

Sendirian Berhard; Ruhrgas Aktiengesellschaft; S.A. du Pipeline

a Produits Petroliers sur Terriroire Geneve (SAPPRO):; SEAG Ak-

tiengesellschaft fuer schweizerisches Erdoel; SERAM S.p.A.;

SOVEXOIL Oil Field; Saitama Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.: Sanyo

Sekiyu K.K.; Saraco S.A.; Saudi Arabian Lube Additives Com-

pany Limited; Schubert KG; Seismic Industries A/S: Senboku

Oil Kikoh K.K.; Senpoku Oil Service K.K.; Servacar Ltd.:

Shehtah Drilling Limited; Shimoyama Sekiyu K.K.; Shin-Nihon

Yukagaku Kogyo K.K.; Shinohara Oil K.K.: Sigel Corporation;

Smiley Gas Conservation Limited; Sociedad Nacional de

Oleoductos Ltda.; Sociedad de Inversiones de Aviacion: Societa

Italiana per |’Oleodotto Transalpino S.p.A.; Societa per Azioni

Raffineria Padana Olii Minerali-SARPOM; Societe “Geomines-

Caen”; Societe Anonyme “Produits Lubrifiants de Madagascar”

- PROLUMA S.A.; Societe Anonyme de Gestion de Stocks de

Securite (SAGESS); Societe Anonyme de la Raffinerie des

Antilles; Societe Anonyme des Hydrocarbures; Societe Civile de

Mustapha Algerie; Societe Civile de Participation pour la

Destruction des Dechets Industriels (SOCDI); Societe Esso de

Recherches et d’Exploitation Petrolieres Esso Rep; Societe

Francaise EXXON CHEMICAL; Societe Havraise d2 Manuten-

tion de Produits Petroliers; Societe Ivoirienne d’Operations

Petroliers S.A.; Societe Malgache de Raffinage; Societe Paris-

Manche; Societe Paris-Niel; Societe Reunionnaise d’Entreposage:

Societe d'Etude et d’Exploitation de la Raffinerie du Tehad -

S.E.E.R.A.T.; Societe d’Exploitation & de Developpement

d’Operations Commerciales; Societe d’Exploitation des Garages

les Stations Tour Eiffel; Societe de Manutention de Carburants

Aviation (S.M.C.A.); Societe de Promotion et de Financement

Touristique (CARTHAGO); Societe de la Raffinerie d’Alger;

Societe des Pipe-Lines de Strasbourg; Societe des Transports

Petroliers par Pipe Line; Societe du Caoutchouc Butyl

(SOCABU); Societe du Pipe Line de la Raffinerie de Lorraine:

Societe du Pipe-Line Mediterranee-Rhone:; Societe du Pipeline

Sud-Europeen; Socony-Standard-Vacuum Oil Company

(Petroleum Maatschappij); Southern Natural Gas Development

A-8

Pty. Ltd.; Spintek Systems, L.P.; Standard Kaihatsu K.K.; Stan-

dard Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha; Standard Service K.K.; Stansted

Fuelling Company Limited; Statfjord Transport A/S; Stockage

Geologique de Gaz de Lavera: Sueddeutsche Erdgas Transport

Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung; Sun East (Dublin) Com-

pany, Ltd.; Sun East Company Ltd; Superior Disk Corporation;

Synecrude Canada Ltd.; Synergistics Industries (NJ) Inc.;

Synergistics Industries (TX) Inc.; Synergistics Industries Limited;

TAR-Tankanlage Ruemlang AG; TBN Tanklager-Betriebsgesell-

schaft Nuernberg mbH; TCA Plastics Inc.; TFS Turbo Fuel

Services GmbH, Hamburg; TGF Tankdienst Gesellschaft

Frankfurt G.b.R.. TGM Tankdienst-Gesellschaft Muenchen

GbR; TIBA Speditions GmbH; TLS Tanklager Stuttgart GmbH;

Taihei Bussan K.K.; Taisei Kogyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.; Taket-

suru Yugo K.K.; Tankanlage A.G., Mellingen; Tanklager

Altishausen A.G.; Tanklager Taegerschen AG; Tanklager-Gesell-

schaft Tegel G.b.R.; Tanklagergesellschaft, Koeln-Bonn G.b.R.;

Tecnica Quimica Petrolera, S.A. de C.F.; Terminal Petrolier de

Bordeaux (T.P.B.); Thai Aliphatics Company Limited; Thai C-

Center Company Limited; Thai Petroleum Pipeline Co., Ltd.;

Thyssengas G.m.b.H.; Tohpren Co., Ltd. (Chemical); Tojo Gas

K.K.; Toko Sekiyu K.K.; Tonen Chemical Nasu Co., Ltd.; Tonen

Energy International Corp.; Tonen Energy and Marine

(Singapore) Pte. Ltd.; Tonen Filare Co. Ltd.; Tonen Film Com-

pany Limited; Tonen Kabushiki Kaisha; Tonen Kagaku K.K.;

Tonen Properties Inc.; Tonen Sogo Service Co., Ltd.; Tonen

System Plaza Kabushiki Kaisha; Tonen System Service Kabushiki

Kaisha; Tonen Tanker Kabushiki Kaisha; Tonen Tapyrus Com-

pany Limited; Tonen Technology K.K.; Tonex Company

Limited; Towa Compounding Co., Ltd.; Towa Sekiyu K.K.; ‘Toyo

Gas K.K.; Toyoshina Film Company, Ltd.; Trans-Northern

Pipelines Inc.; Transalpine Oelleitung in Oesterreich Gesellschaft

m.b.H.; Transgaz Lavera; Tsurumaru Unyu K.K.; Turkish

Petroleum Company, Limited; UBAG - Unterflurbetankung-

sanlage Flughafen Zurich; Ulan Coal Mines Limited; United

Industry Development Co., Ltd.; Van Salt Water Disposal

Company; Verbundnetz Gas AG; Wako Jushi Kabushiki Kaisha;

Warmtepomp Nederland B.V.; Westdeutsche Erdoelleitungs-

G.m.b.H.; Westgas G.m.b.H.; Winnipeg Pipe Line Company

ee

A-9

Limited; Woodbine Marketing Co., Inc.; Worex S.N.C.; Yasaka

Sekiyu K.K.; Yellowstone Pipe Line Company; Yoshimi Gas

Kabushiki Kaisha; Yuai Sekiyu K.K.; Zenon Environmental

Systems Inc. (ZESI).

The parent company of respondent Marathon Oil Company

is USX Corporation. Marathon Oil Company has the following

subsidiaries (except wholly owned subsidiaries): Arctic LNG

Transportation Company; Badger Pipe Line Company; Colonial

Pipeline Company; Cook Inlet Pipe Line Company; Eagle Sun

Company Limited; Explorer Pipeline Company; Gravcap, Inc.;

Green Bay Terminal Corporation; Kenai LNG Corporation;

Locap Inc.; Loop Inc.; Oil Insurance Limited; Old Main Assur-

ance Ltd.; Platte Pipe Line Company; Polar LNG Shipping Cor-

poration; Tops Insurance Limited; Triad Terminal Company of

Selma; Wake Up Oil Co., Inc.; West Shore Pipe Line Company.

The parent of respondent Mobil Oil Corporation is Mobil Cor-

poration. Mobil Oil Corporation has the following subsidiaries

(except wholly owned subsidiaries): Atas Anadolu Tasfiyehanesi

A.S.; Canner’s Steam Company, Inc.; Collins Pipeline Company;

Felix Oil Company; Mobil Oil de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.; Mobil

Oil Guinee; Mobil Oil Nigeria Public Limited Company; Mobil

Tunise; Near East Development Corporation; and T&M Ter-

minal Company.

The parent corporations of Shell Oil Company are Shell

Petroleum, Inc.; Royal Dutch Petroleum Company; and the

“Shell” Transport and Trading Company. Shell Oil Company

has the following subsidiaries (except wholly owned subisdiaries):

Agripro Biosciences Inc.; Pecten Middle East Services Company;

Saudi Petrochemical Company; CRI International, Inc.; CRI

Far East Trading Company Limited; CRI Europe S.A.; Catalyst

Recovery Europe S.A.; Catalyst Technology Europe S.A.; CRI-

SAM, Ltd.; Nippon CRI, LTD.; Pecten Angola Ltd.; Pecten

Angola Exploration Ltd.; Pecten Bolivia Ltd.; Pecten Cameroon

Company; Pecten Indonesia Misool Ltd.; Pecten Portugal Com-

pany S.A.R.L.; Pecten Suriname Ltd.; Taranaki Offshore

Petroleum Company Limited; Cortez Capital Corporation, Shell

Frontier Services Inc., Butte Pipe Line Company and

Premix/E.M.S. Inc.