Opinion — Cardona v. Quinones

CARDONA ». QUINONES. — 83

240 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

CARDOWA v. QUINONES.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PORTO RICO.

No. 185. Submitted January 18, 1916.—Decided February 21, 1916.

Where the appeal is prayed within the statutory time, the mere date

of its allowance by the court is not controlling. United States v.

Vigil, 10 Wall. 423.

Where the record in an appeal from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico

. contains a statement. of fact prepared by the court below, and there

is an entire absence of evidence, except as contained in such state-

ment and the opinion, this court can only dispose of the legal prop-

ositions in the light of the facts as so shown and elucidated.

It is the settled doctrine of the court not to disturb but, in the absence

of clear error, to uphold, the action of the court. below as to matters

concerning purely local law.

Both courts below having, in an action to recover real estate in Porto

Rico, upheld the ten year prescription under the eode, and also

having found that appellant was not a third person entitled as such

to the benefits of the recording provisions of the Mortgage Law,

this court affirms the judgment.

20 Porto Rico, 421, affirmed.

Tue facts, which involve the jurisdiction and practice

of this court in appeals from judgments of the Supreme

Court of Porto Rico and the validity of a judgment of

that court, are stated in the opinion. :

Mr. Jose R. F. Savage for appellant,

Mr. Francis H. Dexter for appellee.

Mr. Cuter Justice Wuire delivered the opinion of the

court.

Both courts below rejected the claim of title made by

the appellant to a tract of land of 40 cuerdas. As the

Qi ieece see Pig aee: SEP IE SRI OT SPANOS EABLET ORE EES GALLE LIRIAS UII ATT SES IOI % ELIMI TRE FES SEE a, HOPE EES a a —

pei nesa tal) ah AS la a ;

15 gp SPEAR LNT FORE OT SANE OES,

Cee ns

ea REPRE

Bertces

84 OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

Opinion of the Court. 240 U.S.

appeal was prayed within the statutory time, the mere

date of its allowance by the court is not controlling

and the motion to dismiss which proceeds upon a con-

trary assumption is therefore without foundation and

is overruled. United States v. Vigil, 10 Wall. 423,

427.

Obviously upon the theory that our power to review

was controlled by the rule obtaining as to territorial

courts of the United States this record, as was the case

in Elzaburu v. Chavez, 239 U.S. 283, contains a statement

of facts prepared by the lower court for the purposes of

this appeal. As there is an entire absence from the record

of the oral and documentary evidence upon which the

court below acted except so far as the same may be shown

by the opinion of the court or may be contained in the

statement of facts, it follows that the record does not

enable us to review the facts and we proceed to dispose

of the legal propositions urged for reversal in the light of

the facts as stated and as elucidated in the opinion of

the court. Abbreviating and somewhat changing the

order in which they are stated below, we recapitulate the

essential facts as follows:

Two brothers, José Salvador Suris and Ramén Maria

Suris, having acquired by various acts of purchase seventy

cuerdas of land in the ward of Sabana Eneas of San Ger-

man, in November, 1870, executed a mortgage on 40

cuerdas of the land thus aequired, being the 40 euerdas

here in controversy, in favor of the Charity Hospital at

San German. In 1879 the Charity Hospital commenced

proceedings to foreclose this mortgage, but such proceed-

ings were stayed until 1882 in consequence of an appeal

taken to the Territorial Audiencia. After the cessation

of the stay, in that year an attachment against 100 cuerdas

of land belonging to the two brothers was levied and the

property thus attached was placed (sequestered) in the

hands of one Pablo Maria Stefani. On the same day,

CARDONA v. QUINONES. 85

240 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

February 9, 1882, by a contract under private signature

the two Suris brothers sold to Stefani the 40 cuerdas here

in controversy which had been mortgaged to the hospital,

the purchaser obligating himself to pay the hospital debt

and, if a surplus remained, to pay certain attorney’s fees

which had been incurred. The agreement also contained

a conveyance to Stefani of another and distinct tract of

land for another and distinct price. This agreement

under private signature was never inscribed upon the

publie records. A few days after it was made and pre-

sumably before the contract of sale had been carried out,

the Suris brothers executed before a notary an act of

consolidation of the various properties which they had

acquired which they described as ‘‘ Perseguida”’ and this

act was put upon the public records. Under the private

agreement Stefani the purchaser went into possession

and discharged the obligations of the private contract of

sale.

In 1888 a cemmercial firm, Schulze & Company, as

creditors of the Succession of Stefani, who had in the

meanwhile died, brought suit against his Succession to

enforce its debt, and for the purpose of getting upon the

records the possessory title of Stefani to enable an attach-

ment to be levied, instituted and carried out the necessary

proceedings. When the order for record was obtained the

property was levied upon and sold at a judicial sale and

was bought in by Schulze & Company. After thus be-

coming the purchasers of the land in controversy, the

firm in 1899 executed before a notary and put of record a

deed consolidating into a plantation called Imisa various

tracts of land containing 192.30 cuerdas, the deed reciting

that one of the parcels of land included in the plantation

was 2 tract of 40 cuerdas called ‘‘ Hospital” or “ Perse-

guida.””, Ramon Marta Suris, one of the original vendors,

died in the meanwhile, and in 1900 his heirs put upon

record a declaratory deed asserting their undivided owner-

We IO Ne

86 OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

Opinion of the Court. 240 U. S.

ship as the successors of their father to a tract of 40 cuerdas

known as Perseguida.

The Bank of Porto Rico as the holder of a mortgage

put upon the Imisa plantation by Schulze & Company,

foreclosed the same and bought in the property in August,

1905, and in November of the following year (1906) the

bank sold the plantation thus acquired to Francisco P.

Quinones, the defendam, his title as purchaser having

been inscribed upon the public records.

In 1907 José Salvador Suris, one of the original vendors

under the act of private sale, as well as the widow and

heirs of his deceased brother, Ramén Maria Suris, the

other original veudor, each executed deeds of sale of an

undivided half interest in the property called “‘ Perseguida”’

to Juan Suris Cardona, a son of José, and these acts of

sale were put upon the public registry. A few days later

the parties vendor to the acts above stated executed an-

other notarial act in which they declared that the property

had not been in their possession, but in the possession of

the defendant Quinones and the Bank of Porto Rico and

therefore they had not collected revenues, and they ceded

to the purchaser the right to collect such revenues. Under

the ownership alleged to result from these acts this suit

was commenced by Cardona to recover the property.

The findings in express terms establish that “From

1882 the property sued for ceased to belong to the brothers

José Salvador and Ramon Maria Suris by reason of the

sale set out in the private contract, and since then it has

been in the quiet, peaceful and public possession, as

owners, in good faith and by title of purchase of Stefani,

later of Schluze & Company, then of the Banco de Puerto

Rico, and finally of Quinones, residents of Porto Rico.”

As to the purchase by Cardona, the plaintiff, from his

father and the representatives o° his deceased uncle,

the findings expressly state: ‘‘When the plaintiff pur-

chased the property sought to be recovered he knew the

CARDONA v. QUINONES. 87

240 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

history of it as here related and knew that his father and

cousins had not possessed the same since the year 1882.”

And the conclusion reached as to the ultimate facts on

this subject is thus expressed in the opinion of the court

below: ‘In view of the manner in which the facts have

occurred, we have no doubt whatever that the deeds of

sale of the property in question executed in favor of

Juan Suris Cardona have had no other purpose than that

he should institute this suit to avail himself of and assert

his rights as a third party and thus save his father and

the heirs of his uncle from the consequences of the private

document executed in favor of Stefani; and we are like-

wise convinced that the plaintiff knew the history of the

said property before he made his purchase, and that his

father and his cousins had not possessed the same since

1882, as stated in the complaint.”

Applying the law to the facts stated, the court con-

cluded: (a) “‘Under such conditions the plaintiff cannot

claim the benefits which the law grants to third parties,

beeause nobody can be a third party who, although he

had not intervened in the first contract of sale, purchased,

however, knowing that his vendors were not the owners

and had no possession of the property sold. The same

doctrine has already been established by this court in the

case of Voight v. Rivas (1 Decisiones de Puerto Rico, 60),

decided May 10, 1900.” (b) From the possession which,

as we have seen, the court found to have existed from ISS2

in Stefani and his successors, Schulze & Company, the

Bank of Porto Rico and Quinones, and the various titles

which were put upon the record in the transfers as made,

especially the inclusion of the property in the plantation

‘“Tmisa,” it was held that between the parties there was

a sufficient basis laid for a just title and possession as

owner in good faith adequate to sustain a prescription of

ten years which was upheld.

The contentions for reversal are numerous and are

PARC gr PF

arate crc

Bpereteeseeiesers

came |

88 OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

Opinion of the Court. 240 U.S.

greatly multiplied by their reiteration in samewhat

changed form of statement under the very many prop-

ositions and subdivisions of propositions embraced in the

elaborate printed argument, but we dispose of them as

follows:

First. Giving effect to the settled doctrine by which

we do not disturb, but on the contrary, uphold, the action

of the court below as to matters concerning purely local

law except upon conviction on our part of clear error

committed (Nadal v. May, 233 U.S. 447, 454; Villanueva

v. Villanueva, 239 U. 8. 293, 299), we at onee dismiss

from view the various contentions concerning the form

of the pleadings, the question whether a default should

not have been allowed as to the issues presented by certain

amendments of the pleadings, the admissibility as between

the parties or their successors or assigns of the act under

private signature either because of the asserted ambiguity

of its terms or the inadequacy of the number of witnesses

to its execution, and many other subjects of a kindred

nature too numerous to be recapitulated.

Second. We also at once put out of view the various

contentions iterated and reiterated under every proposi-

tion which, while apparently accepting the findings, vir-

tually dispute them, such as the contentions that the

private instrument did not amount to a sale to Stefani

because certain alleged bankruptcy proceedings referred

to in the opinion of the court excluded the right of the

Suris brothers at that time to sell the property, that no

possession followed in Stefani from the making of the

private sale because that instrument was one not import-

ing possession in and of itself without proof of nanual

tradition, and also numerous other contentions of a kin-

dred character concerning the judicial proceedings taken

by Schulze & Company to acquire title and the deed of

consolidation by them recorded which we further do not

stop to specifically point out.

CARDONA v. QUINONES. 89

240 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

With these things disposed of, the remaining contentions

come to this: That the decision of the court below was

plainly violative of the local law known as the mortgage

law and the general provisions of the code concerning the

necessity of the public record of title to real estate and

the protection afforded by the same, and that moreover

an obvious disregard of the mortgage law and the provi-

sions of the code resulted from giving to the sale under

private signature and the proceedings and subsequent

transmutations of title based upon it the character of a

just title sufficient on its face to be the basis of the ten

years’ prescription under the code which the court below

upheld. But when stripped of the confusion in the mode

in which they are stated and reduced to their ultimate

significance, all the contentions on these subjects are ex-

clusively based upon the assumption that the plaintiff

below was entitled to the protection afforded by the mort-

gage law to third persons and to the assumed inadequacy

of the title relied upon by the defendant to sustain the

ten years’ prescription as against a third person. The

propositions therefore in their essence when correctly un-

derstood but ignore or dispute the findings of the court

below upon which its conclusion was expressly based that

the plaintiff was not a third person either because he was

merely a person interposed as a means of enabling, him

apparently to assert in his own name for the benefit of

his authors in title, rights which they were incapable them-

selves of asserting, indeed could not without fraud on

their part enjoy, or because if not in a strict sense a person

interposed, he was nevertheless not a third person within

the intendment of the local law because he acquired with

full knowledge of the want of title in his vendors and of

the absence of possession on their part and also with

knowledge not only of an outstanding title, but of pos-

session as owner which was then and had been enjoyed

by the defendant and his predecessors in right. Thus to

HER RA IER PLL a YY

aol ds ty

CE AE ITIL PLINY

BALE SRIF ELT

arene ene ceercamame

ORT RS Pe Te ee ate PE

ee eee

90 OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

Statement of the Case. 240 U. 8.°

bring the propositions to the true basis upon which they

rest serves at once without more to establish their absolute

want of foundation and to demonstrate the correctness

of the judgment below and the duty to affirm it.

Affirmed.