Opposition Brief — County of Kern v. Anderson

No. 95-294 ar »

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In The am

Supreme Court of the United_States————

October Term, 1995

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COUNTY OF KERN and CARL SPARKS, Sheriff,

Petitioners

JERRY ANDERSON, GLENNA BLAIR, TERRY DAVID,

JOHN WARDWELL, JESSE VASQUEZ

and IRENE JUAREZ,

Respondents

auedenininmeeen @ ioeettintnianimeenemenn

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

oe a

SANFORD JAY ROSEN

Counsel of Record

Rosen, Bien & ASARO

155 Montgomery Street, 8th Floo:

San Francisco, California 94104

(415) 433-6830

RicHARD A. DEREVAN, Esq.

SNELL & Witmer L.L.P.

1920 Main Street, Suite 1200

Irvine, California 92714

(714) 253-2700

RicHARD P. HERMAN, Esq.

P.O. Box 4108

Laguna Beach, California 92652

(714) 494-9411

Attorneys for Respondents

Questions Presented

Did the court of appeals err when it applied delib-

erate indifference standards in passing on medical

conditions of confinement of Kern County jail

inmates?

Should the Supreme Court review findings that may

create attorney fees liability for defendants, or

consider whether plaintiff may secure fees for being

the catalyst for a jail procedure change, before the

district court and the court of appeals make a final

decision as to the fee to be awarded, where the

court of appeals has vacated the district court’s fee

award and remanded all fees issues to the district

court for consideration in light of the court of

appeals decision affirming in part, reversing in part,

vacating in part and remanding in part the district

court’s order on the merits of the case?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . 1... csc tveseswseses i

TABLE OF CONTENTS <0 0k ews oy ee eee eee li

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 66.2 ¢eSs Owe ee ee ees iv

OPINIONS BELOW 6 an gn ce es eee l

RRS I ws 6 eke ee eee 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............ 3

STATEMENT OF THe CAG 6 soe eee ee ee 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............. 7

eroietion Se 8 aes ee eee 7

1. There is no significant and recurring issue

raised here as to whether the "deliberate

indifference" standard is different for eighth

and fourteenth amendment medical condi-

tions claims brought by convicted prisoners

and pre-trial detainees; nor is there any

conflict among the circuits evident here. .... 8

: No issue pertaining to attorneys’ fees in this

Case is ripe or otherwise suitable for review

at this time by this Court. ............ 11

CAPR AAIOEE oo ale kien 6 aw ee Oe ees 13

- iil -

APPENDIX

District Court Order filed January 28, 1994 .. App 1

proumee OF Appeal... . 1. ee eae. App 3

Ninth Circuit Order filed May 22, 1995 ...... App 5

Ninth Circuit Order filed June 28, 1995 .. . . App 6

Ninth Circuit Order filed July 31, 1995 .. .. App 7

Ninth Circuit Order filed August 31, 1995 .... App8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Estelle v. Gamble,

ee ee ee Oe ee ee ore ae ls eae ean 4,9

Farmer v. Brennan,

$11 U.S. _, 126 L.Ed.2d S11 (1994) ......... 8

Farrar v. Hobby,

_ US. _, 123 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) ...... 11, 12

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. ,

ee ee a a's Gg ae ine ewe ae 11

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v.

Linde Air Products Co.,

Sa ae ee eS So a! a ood wk ee eas 11

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

ae ae Ge Cee i Ss ie eee ee 11, 12

Jones v. Johnson,

Fae Cee ee Cee Gs Se Ss sec eee eae ees 9

Redman v. County of San Diego,

ee ae Pee CG SPE? cs Se se ew we 6

S-] and S-2 v. State Board of Educ. of N.C..,

Sh Poe Oe CR, TO ics 6 oe Ks ees 12

Texas State Teachers Ass’n v.

Garland Independent School Dist. ,

489 U.S. 782 (1989) ...... PUL ee pone are:

United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. .,

Sit U.S. Fer (ISTO) sw we ee ee , ae >

Wellman v. Faulkner,

715 F.zd 269 (7th Cir. 1983).

cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984) .... oe

Wilson v. Seiter.

501 U.S. 294 (1991) .... 3 } eres

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . | ea 2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... | Pehes ) a

o.)

WA

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b)

No. 95-294

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1995

COUNTY OF KERN and CARL SPARKS, Sheriff,

Petitioners

v.

JERRY ANDERSON, GLENNA BLAIR

TERRY DAVID, JOHN WARDWELL

JESSE VASQUEZ and IRENE JUAREZ,

Respondents

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit is reported at 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995). It is

reprinted in the Petition as Appendix A. The decision was

amended by addition of footnote, in an Order filed July 7, 1995,

that is reprinted in the Petition as Appendix B. Each set of

parties’ Petition for Rehearing/Suggestion of Rehearing en banc

was denied, by Orders reprinted in the Petition as Appendix C

(May 19, 1995 Order denying Petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing)

and Petition Appendix B at B 3-4 (July 7, 1995 Order denying

Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing).

The district court filed an Order and Permanent Injunction

on October 8, 1992. It is reprinted in the Petition as Appendix E.

The Order and Permanent Injunction was based on the magistrate

judge’s Findings and Recommendations, filed March 20, 1992,

which are reprinted in the Petition as Appendix D.

The district court also issued an attorneys’ fees Order on

January 28, 1994, which is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at

App 1-2. The Petitioners appealed. The Notice of Appeal is

reprinted in the Appendix hereto at App 3-4. The appeal was

docketed in the Ninth Circuit separately from the appeal involved

in the instant proceedings as Appeal No. 94-15414. At Petition-

ers’ request, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the district

court’s fee award for reconsideration. A copy of that Order filed

May 22, 1995, is included in the Appendix hereto at App 5.

Respondents’ Motion to Vacate that Order was denied. A copy of

that Order, filed June 28, 1995, is in the Appendix hereto at

App 6.

The court of appeals also transferred Respondents’

application for attorneys fees for appellate work to the district

court. That Order, filed July 31, 1995, is included in the Ap-

pendix hereto at App 7. A copy of the court of appeal’s Order,

filed August 31, 1995, denying Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate the

July 31, 1995 Order is in the Appendix hereto at App 8.

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the court of appeals was entered

January 13, 1995, and amended on July 19, 1995. It is reprinted

in the Petitipn as Appendix B at B 1-2. Petitioners’ motion for

rehearing was denied by an Order filed May 19, 1995, which is

reprinted in the Petition as Appendix C. Respondents’ Petition for

Rehearing was denied by an Order filed July 7, 1995, which is

reprinted in the Petition as Appendix B at B 3-4. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

l. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil Action for deprivation of

rights. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-

ing for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of

Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall

be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

(R.S. § 1979; Dec. 29, 1979, P.L. 96-170; § 1, 93 Stat. 1284).

z 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Proceeding in vindication of

civil rights; attorneys’ fees. In any action or proceeding to enforce

a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986

of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason-

able attorney’s fee as part of the costs.

(As amended Nov. 21, 1991, P.L. 102-166, Title I, §§ 103-

113(a), 105 Stat. 1074, 1079; Nov. 16, 1993, P.L. 103-141, §

4(a), 107 Stat. 1489, Sept. 13, 1993, P.L. 103-322, Title IV.

Subtitle C, § 40303, 108 Stat. 1941.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction. This is a jail conditions case. Petitioners,

who were defendants in the district court, are the County of Kern

and Sheriff Carl Sparks. They operate a county jail facility that

houses both pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners. The

Respondent inmates, who were plaintiffs in the district court,

brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging numerous

unconstitutional jail conditions. Some issues were resolved by

motion or stipulated settlement. The remainder of the case was

tried by a magistrate judge who issued findings and recommenda-

tions. Petition Appendix D. The District Court modified and

adopted these findings and recommendations, and issued a

permanent injunction. Petition Appendix E. Both parties ap-

pealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

affirmed in part and revised in part and remanded in part. 45 F.3d

1310, Petition Appendix A. See also Petition Appendix B at B 3-4

(July 7, 1995 Order modifying opinion).

Spanish Language Interpreters. One of many issues in the

case was whether Petitioners were constitutionally required "to

provide a Kern County employee, preferably a member of medical

staff, to translate for Spanish speaking inmates who request a

translator during medical and mental health interviews"? Petition

Appendix A at A 11 (court of appeals Opinion); Appendix E at

E 3 (district court Order). In addressing that issue, the Ninth

Circuit applied this Court’s deliberate indifference liability

standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976),

to both the Eighth Amendment rights of convicted inmates and the

Fourteenth Amendment rights of pretrial detainees, Petition

Appendix A at A 11. It upheld the district court’s decision, see

Petition Appendix E at E 3 (Order) and Petition Appendix D at

D 47-48 (Findings and Recommendations), ordering Petitioners to

provide such interpreters. Petition Appendix A at A 11-12.

Dental _and Vision Care. The magistrate judge made

extensive findings about Petitioners’ provision of dental and vision

care. Petitioner Appendix D at D 13-21. He also expressly found

that Petitioners had changed their prior policies; their new policies

conformed to constitutional requirements; and there was no basis

in the record for finding that Petitioners would fail to honor their

new constitutional policies. Hence the magistrate judge recom-

mended that injunctive relief be denied. Petition Appendix D at

D 16-18, 19-21. The district court agreed, Petition Appendix E

at E 4; as did the court of appeals, Petitioner Appendix A at A 12-

13.

On appeal (and here) Petitioners argued that the issue was

not moot because the district court had "found that during the

course of the proceedings the County had increased the level of

services to constitutionally adequate standards," and made these

findings "the basis for an award of attorneys fees as a ‘catalyst’ for

change under 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Petitioner at 4. The Ninth

Circuit, however, held that the "catalyst" issue "is not ripe", and

"should be considered by the district court in the ancillary

proceedings regarding attorneys’ fees." Petition Appendix A at

A 13.

Petitions for Rehearing/Suggestions of Rehearing En Banc.

In the merits appeal that is the subject of the pending Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, both Petitioners and Respondents petitioned the

Ninth Circuit for Rehearing and Suggested Rehearing en banc.

Petitioners’ Ninth Circuit Petition for Rehearing/Suggestion

of Rehearing en banc addressed only issues concerning Spanish

language interpreters. The Ninth Circuit denied that Petition. See

Petition Appendix C.

The Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing/ Suggestion of

Rehearing en banc addressed the "deliberate indifference" standard

of liability to be applied to the “safety cell" and "joint exercise"

claims of pretrial detainees. See Petition Appendix A at A 3-11

(Ninth Circuit Opinion). After ordering Petitioners’ to respond to

Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing, the court of appeals denied

Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing/Suggestion of Rehearing en

banc. Petition Appendix B at B 3-4. The court of appeals,

however, amended its Opinion as follows:

The opinion filed January 13, 1995 is

amended to include the following footnote at the

end of the second paragraph of Section I, at page

505 of the slip opinion [see Petition Appendix A at

A 3] and 45 F.3d 1310, 1313:

We need not decide here whether, under

some circumstances, the "deliberate indif-

ference" standards under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments diverge. See Red-

man v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d

1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

The plaintiffs did not differentiate between

the two standards in their briefs, and empha-

sized the Eighth Amendment formulation,

which we apply in this opinion. We are

convinced that any possible divergence

would not have affected the outcome of our

decision.

Petition Appendix B at B 3-4

Ancillary Fees Proceedings. There have been numerous

ancillary fees proceedings in this case. First, in the district court

the magistrate judge filed Findings and Recommendations on

December 30, 1993, which were adopted by the district court in

an Order filed January 28, 1994. Appendix hereto at App 1-2.

Petitioners appealed on or about February 24, 1994. Appendix

hereto at App 3-4. The appeal was docketed, separately from the

instant appeal, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit as No. 94-15414.

Subsequent fee proceedings occurred in the district court,

pursuant to which the district court stayed enforcement, pending

appeal, of the vast majority of the fees previously awarded.

Findings and Recommendations were filed on January 17, 1995;

Amended Findings and Recommendations were filed on January

23, 1995 and the district court’s order was filed on March 24,

1995.

The Petitioners here moved in the separate Ninth Circuit’s

fees appeal (No. 94-15414), that the court of appeals vacate the

district court’s January 28, 1994 original fees order (Appendix

hereto at App 1-2) and remand the fees issues to the district court

for reconsideration, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s January 13,

1995 decision that is the subject of the instant Petition. On May

22, 1995, the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioners’ Motion. Appendix

hereto at App 5. Respondents’ motion to set that Order aside was

denied on June 28, 1995. Appendix hereto at App 6.

At Respondents’ request, on July 31, 1995, the court of

appeals also transferred to the district court Respondents’ appli-

cation for attorneys’ fees for appellate work. Appendix hereto at

App 7. On August 31, 1995, the court of appeals denied Petition-

ers’ motion to vacate the July 31, 1995 transfer Order. Appendix

hereto at App 8. On or about September 5, 1995, Respondents

filed the transferred motion for appellate work fees in the district

court.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Introduction

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari essentially is frivolous.

First, Petitioners ignore the actual findings made in the

district court and the court of appeals, in order to argue without

basis that the court of appeals failed correctly to apply this Court’s

teachings concerning Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners. In

fact, the court of appeals applied this Court’s Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference standard properly to affirm the district

court’s decision that Petitioners’ failure to provide employee

Spanish interpreters for medical/mental health interviews to

Spanish monolingual inmates on request, constituted knowing

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of such inmates.

Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, there is no conflict here with

this Court’s controlling decisions or with decisions of other

circuits.

Second, Petitioners ask this Court to review attorneys’ fees

issues that the court of appeals correctly held are unripe. Petition-

ers failed, moreover, to inform this Court that the court of appeals

had in fact remanded the fees issues, which were the subject of a

separate appeal, for consideration by the district court in light of

the decision entered in the instant appeal.

1. There is no significant and recurring issue raised here

as to whether the "deliberate indifference" standard is

different for eighth and fourteenth amendment medical

conditions claims brought by convicted prisoners and

pre-trial detainees; nor is there any conflict among the

circuits evident here.

Petitioners argue that the court of appeals decision below,

concerning provision of Spanish language interpreters to prisoners

in medical/mental health interviews, conflicts with this Court’s

decisions in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) and Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. __, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), and conflicts

with post-Wilson decisions of other circuits. Petition at 4-6. It

does neither.

Contrary to Petitioners’ implications, nothing in the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion even suggests that the correct standard for

liability under the Fourteenth Amendment is less than rigorous, or

is as relaxed as "mere negligence." Compare Petition at 5 with

Petition Appendix A (Ninth Circuit opinion).

In this case, the court of appeals stated the liability standard

as follows:

Jail officials violate a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment rights if they are deliberately indif-

ferent to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Jones v. John-

son, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (same

standard applies to pretrial detainees). The indif-

ference to medical needs must be substantial; a

constitutional violation is not established by negli-

gence or ‘an inadvertent failure to provide adequate

medical care.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.

Appendix A to Petition at A-11 (emphasis added).

The court of appeals also held that the same standard of

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs applies to both

convicted and the pretrial inmates. Petition Appendix A at A 11,

citing Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) for the

proposition that the "same [Eighth Amendment deliberate indiffer-

ence] standard applies to pretrial detainees." See also July 7, 1995

Order, Petition Appendix B at B 4 (stating that the court of appeal

applied only the Eighth Amendment formulation in its opinion and

that "we are convinced that any possible divergence [between

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference

standards] would not have affected the outcome of our decision.").

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals somehow

improperly did not include within its analysis, "a deliberately

indifferent state of mind" inquiry or analysis. See Petition at 4

and 5. In particular, Petitioners contend that the court of appeals

ignored this Court’s Wilson and Farmer decisions, under the

Eighth Amendment, which they assert render cruel and unusual

only those conditions of confinement that constitute "an objective

~ iis

deprivation so serious as to rise to the level of a constitutional

violation and a subjective ‘deliberately indifferent’ state of mind."

Petition at 5.

However, based upon the record made in the district court,

e.g., Petition Appendix D at D 47-48, compare id. at D 21-47, the

court of appeals properly rendered its decision on the basis of

evidence that a failure to provide a staff interpreter can lead to

serious medical problems and that through their policies and

supervisory personnel Petitioners subjectively and obviously knew

of this risk. Petition Appendix A at A 12; id. at A 12-13.

Petitioners are also entirely wrong in arguing that the Ninth

Circuit’s approach to the issue somehow is inconsistent with other

Circuits in applying "a state of mind requirement to Fourteenth

Amendment challenges." Petition at 5. Indeed, as to the precise

issue before it, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the instant case

relied upon and was totally consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s

decision in Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984). See Petition Appen-

dix A at A 12-13.

Petitioners’ contentions amount to little more than a dispute

with the court of appeals (and the district court) as to its applica-

tion of the deliberate indifference standard to the specific facts in

this case. That is not a matter appropriate for this Court’s review.

Resolution of factual disputes is the province of the district courts

and courts of appeals. As this Court has stated:

A court of law, such as this Court is, rather than a

court for correction of errors in fact finding, cannot

undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by

two courts below in the absence of a very obvious

and exceptional showing of error.

a

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336

U.S. 271, 275 (1949). The "two-court rule" is fully applicable in

this case. See, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665

(1987); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397

(1975).

2. No issue pertaining to attorneys’ fees in this case is ripe

or otherwise suitable for review at this time by this

Court.

At the Petitioners’ request, the court of appeals vacated the

district court’s attorneys’ fee award in this case and remanded it

for reconsideration in light of the court of appeal’ decision that is

the subject of the instant Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Appendix

hereto at App 5. The remand Order specifically states that the

district court is to conduct "further proceedings consistent with

Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995)[,]"

Petition Appendix A at A 13. In fact, that decision specifically

identifies for district court consideration the very issues that

Petitioner contends should now be reviewed by this Court. See

Appendix A at A 13.

Nothing in this Court’s decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983) even hints that this Court should review an

attorneys’ fee decision before it has been finally decided by a

district court and reviewed by a court of appeals. Compare

Petition at 7. Nothing in this Court’s decision in Farrar v. Hobby,

___ U.S. __, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) suggests such an extraordi-

nary approach to review of attorneys’ fees issues either.

Consistent with Farrar, in this case the Ninth Circuit, in its

remand Orders (Petition Appendix A at A 13 and Appendix hereto

at App 5), has provided the district court with direction and

opportunity to award the appropriate attorneys’ fee in light of "the

degree of the plaintiff's overall success" in the litigation. See

Farrar, 121 L.Ed.2d at 505, quoting Texas State Teachers Ass’n

v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989)

and Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.

Unlike the situation in Farrar, 121 L.Ed.2d at 506-511

(O’Connor, J concurring), Respondents’ overall victory here

certainly was neither pyrrhic nor de minimus. Farrar involved a

purely damages case in which plaintiff who sought $17,000,000

secured $1 as nominal damages. By contrast with Farrar, the

instant case is an injunctive and declaratory relief case in which

Respondents have secured significant relief. Respondents believe

their substantial success iustifies a full fee, see, e.g., Hensley, 461

U.S. at 434-437. Initially, however, that will be for the district

court to decide, subject to the Ninth Circuit’s appellate oversight.

Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, Petition at 7-8, the Ninth

Circuit’s decision here also is not in conflict with the Fourth

Circuit’s en banc decision in S-] and S-2 v. State Board of Educ.

of N.C., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994). First, the Ninth Circuit has

vacated and remanded the fee award for reconsideration by the

district court in light of the Ninth Circuit decision rendered here

on the merits. Appendix hereto at App 5; see also, S-1 and S-2,

21 F.3d at 50-51 (describing the similar process that had brought

the fees issue back before the Fourth Circuit). Second, unlike in

S-1 and S-2, the instant appeal and case are not entirely moot as

to a given party; only certain elements of the case and appeal are

deemed moot due to Petitioners’ current compliance with constitu-

tional minima. Respondents secured substantial additional relief

from Petitioners through settlement and judgment. Third, unlike

in S-] and S-2, the district court here actually found that at least

Petitioners’ prior vision care policy was constitutionally infirm.

Petition Appendix D at D 21.

Suffice it to say, until an evidentiary record is made and

considered in the district court, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s

Jaa.

remand of fees issues, the attorneys’ fees issues are not ripe for

review by either the court of appeals or this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Dated September 18, 1995

Respectfully submitted,

Sanford Jay Rosen

Counsel of Record

Rosen, Bien & Asaro

155 Montgomery Street,

8th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 433-6830

Richard A. Derevan, Esq.

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

1920 Main Street,

Suite 1200

Irvine, CA 92714

(714) 253-2700

Richard P. Herman, Esq.

P.O. Box 4108

Laguna Beach, CA 92652

(714) 494-9411

Attorneys for Respondents