Amicus Curiae Brief — City of Boerne v. Flores

No. 95-2074

In The CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States ——

October Term, 1995

*

CITY fF BOERNE, TEXAS,

Petitioner,

vs.

P.F. FLORES, ARCHBISHOP OF SAN ANTONIO,

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents.

+

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

¢

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE COALITION

FORK THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION, AMICUS

CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT FLORES

€

EpwaRD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.

Valparaiso University School of Law

Wesemann Hall

Valparaiso, IN 46383

219-465-7834 FAX: 219-465-7872

* Counsel of Record

STEVEN T. McFARLAND

Christian Legal Society

4208 Evergreen Lane, Suite 222

Annandale, VA 22003

703-642-1070 FAX: 703-642-1075

Marc STERN

American Jewish Congress

15 E. 84th Street

New York, NY 10028

212-360-1545 FAX: 212-249-3672

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 O ' .

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 \ \

Of Counsel:

RICHARD FOLTIN

Counsel, American Jewish Committee

1156 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

202-785-4200

Evutiot MINCBERG

Legal Director, People for the American Way

2000 M Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

202-467-4999

Forest MONTGOMERY

National Association of Evangelicals

1023 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

202-789-1011

Davip SAPERSTEIN

Counsel, Union of American Hebrew Congregations

2027 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

202-387-2800

OLIveR THOMAS

Special Counsel, National Council of Churches

of Christ in the U.S.A.

110 Maryland Avenue, NE

Washineton, DC 20002

§~3-977 -9046

}. Brent WALKER

General Counsel, vaptist Joint Committee

on Public Affairs

200 Maryland Avenue, NE

Washington, DC 20002

202-544-4226

:

ee eT

TABLE OF COM ‘NTS

Page(s)

NN I i id oon on ck bneebnnn 1

EL Pee OEE CEST CEE ET TT ere Det ee 2

I. Religious Communities Cannot Maintain their

Beliefs and Practices Free from Governmental

Interference as Long as the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act Remains Under a Constitutional

Re a a gh eg Cie Ce a one ae 2

Il. This Court Has Acted Promptly in the Past to

Resolve any Doubt about the Authority of Congress

to Protect Important Civil Rights, and the Court

Should Take this Case to Clarify that the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act is a Valid Exercise of Con-

gressional Power to Secure the First of our Civil

Liberties, Religious Freedom................. ae

Appendix A — Members of the Coalition for the

wree Hxercise Of Religion ........25200cceccess App. 1

|

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES CITED:

Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)............000. 6

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of

Siiasean, SUB UB. FEO CGE fs ek ckivisacseadsases 3, 12

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ................. 12

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872

bi PoE ere EEE cog ros peer ee fom 4,24 > 22,

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 231 F. Supp.

S9S CD. Ga. TRO oo okhcwiccdsvieeriwedoeieaeeyss 10 |

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 |

(ROGGE occ crncnatedse keen eeee eee ieee 11

Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F. 3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996) ........ 6

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. B96 (19GB) .. cc ccccccseses 3

Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,

12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P. 2d 909 (1996), cert.

parsing, Mit. FOGi sss vecdnineeasdsusveeraesisieens 6

Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874

P. 2d 274 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.

GOO CEPR «0 5.n 0 bienxndiesadsaseceeelee eel 6, 12

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1965) 2. ccc sccccceces 3

Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).......... 4

United States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29 |

CIDGS) . veo cecnvund Vanesa kee) Oo eae ee eee eee 6

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,

S19 US. Gl6 (FOGG cc He iieaeicernaiev ees cea eess 7

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)................ 3

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page(s)

STATUTES CITED:

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat.

MCI CUChCLCCAGy dh abbey essed douses cee couasds es 10

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.

PE Si oe eswh beste chanebe cece pode seneee passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

“Apology For Taping Inmate’s Talk,” New York

Bey PPR GUE By BOGE occ vccceccviccvcceacvecs 4

John C. Bush and William Harold Tiemann, The

Right to Silence: Privileged Clergy Communication

ee Be ee 4

Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical

Understanding of Free Exercise, 103 Harv. L. Rev.

tL Rae Venn 6 bas cle sead Gp 08 bak ypaay axe 4

John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?, 42

ie, Ce ie cn weneeeedusdwacenes 1

Michael Plantamura, “Clergyman-Penitent Privi-

lege,” in Scott Stone and Ronald Liebman eds.,

Sestemenmems Prietiewes (IFES). «oon ccccccsccccecvecscs 4

James A. Serritella, “Confidentiality, the Church,

and the Clergy,” Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth

Annual Convention of the Canon Law Society of

ee ns cane bucaacneudt bud) vabeeeve 4

The Williamsburg Charter, 8 J. Law & Retic. 5 (1990) ..... 1

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion

(“Coalition”) is a group of over sixty religious and civil

liberties organizations. The religious organizations in the

Coalition represent the spectrum of religious diversity in

America — Christians, Jews, Moslems, Native Americans,

and Sikhs. The beliefs and practices of the religious com-

munities in the Coalition are as diverse as the population

of the Nation. The Coalition includes liberals and conser-

vatives, and groups with world views as disparate as

People for the American Way and Traditional Values

Coalition. We disagree profoundly with one another

about many of our most cherished traditions and beliefs.

But one of the things that unifies all of us even more

profoundly is our commitment to the protection of reli-

gious freedom as the first of our civil liberties.1 We are

united by the conviction that the protection of religious

freedom is essential for the well-being of American soci-

ety. The members of the Coalition participating in this

brief are listed in Appendix A.

After this Court’s decision in Employment Division v.

Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Coalition sought from

Congress remedial legislation that would secure religious

freedom more adequately than under the standard

' For an elegant statement of the primacy of the Religion

Clauses of the First Amendment in our constitutional values, see

The Williamsburg Charter, 8 J. Law & Rew. 5-22 (1990); for a

study of the fragility of this constitutional value, see John T.

Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?, 42 DePaut L. Rev. 567

(1992).

announced in Smith. We vigorously advocated the pas-

sage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),

and we act now in unison with the United States to

support the constitutionality of RFRA whenever it is chal-

lenged by state and local authorities. The Coalition takes

no position whatever on the merits or on any disputes

between or among the parties. This brief addresses only

the question whether RFRA is a legitimate exercise of

congressional power.

The letters from the parties consenting to the filing of

this brief have been filed with the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to Rule 37.3.

ARGUMENT

I. Religious Communities Cannot Maintain their

Beliefs and Practices Free from Governmental Inter-

ference as Long as the Religious Freedom Restora-

tion Act Remains Under a Constitutional Cloud.

This case comes to this Court in an unusual posture.

Both petitioner and respondent urge the Court to grant

certiorari, notwithstanding the fact the respondent pre-

vailed in the court of appeals. By the same token, the

Coalition fully supports the decision of the court of

appeals, but also urges that the Court take this case. A

prompt decision by this Court on the constitutionality of

RFRA is crucial to protecting the religious freedom of all

Americans and is fully warranted under the Court's stan-

dards for reviewing the constitutionality of acts of Con-

gress.

eGVOOO

On the day the Court decided to alter its free exercise

jurisprudence in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.

872 (1990), it was immediately apparent to the members

of this Coalition that we need greater protection for reli-

gious freedom than is provided by the rational basis

standard announced by the Court in Smith. For one thing,

Smith escalated the level of proof that we would have to

demonstrate before receiving meaningful judicial protec-

tion from oppressive governmental regulation. Before

Smith the government was required to demonstrate that

its interest in a case involving deeply held religious

beliefs and practices was truly compelling. As the Court

announced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963): “It is

basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to

some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly

sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest abuses [by

religious claimants], endangering paramount interests,

give occasion for permissible limitation [on the free exer-

cise of religion].’” 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v.

Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)); see also Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). After Smith and before

RFRA, religious claimants were required to demonstrate

intentional or purposeful discrimination against a reli-

gious body before they could avail themselves of the

compelling interest standard.

We appreciate the value of neutrality that the Court

announced as central to free exercise jurisprudence in

Smith; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City

of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). But whether subtle or

overt, inadvertent or intentional, violations of free exer-

cise of religion can be masked under the category of

facially neutral, generally applicable norms about public

health, welfare, or safety. For example, the general rule

about availability of evidence in a criminal prosecution

can be stated in a facially neutral way: the government is

entitled to relevant and probative evidence. But since the

earliest days of the Republic this broad rule has - for

profound reasons of constitutional dimensions — admitted

of a very important exception that protects against the

use of the clergy as agents of the government. See, e.g.,

Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (dictum);

Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-

standing of Free Exercise, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1410-12

(1990); Michael Plantamura, “Clergyman-Penitent Privi-

lege,” in Scott Stone and Ronald Liebman eds., Testimonial

Privileges 359-76 (1983); James A. Serritella, “Confiden-

tiality, the Church, and the Clergy,” Proceedings of the

Forty-Eighth Annual Convention of the Canon Law Society of

America 83-93 (1986); and John C. Bush and William

Harold Tiemann, The Right to Silence: Privileged Clergy

Communication and the Law (3d ed. 1989). Rejecting this

long-standing and virtually universal practice of the

states, the District Attorney of Lane County, Oregon - a

jurisdiction that does not currently have a statute

expressly protecting the confidentiality of communica-

tions between clergy and penitents — recently ordered the

surreptitious recording of a sacramental confession by a

penitent to a priest while the penitent was in custody.

After vigorous protest by church leaders and civil liber-

tarians, the prosecutor announced that he would not use

the tape in court and that he would support legislation

prohibiting the use of such evidence in his state. “Apol-

ogy For Taping Inmate’s Talk,” New York Times, A-16, May

24, 1996. In the Oregon case the government yielded to

political pressure, but more frequently religious groups

have little or no influence over elected officials accus-

tomed to granting no exceptions to the uniform enforce-

ment of the law.2 Without RFRA, ancient religious

practices long revered in this country can easily be

eroded under the rubric of a generally applicable, facially

neutral rule; and the level of generality of the govern-

mental interest can easily be manipulated by an attorney

for the government. The statutory safeguard afforded by

RFRA is necessary, then, to avoid outrageous violations

of free exercise such as that contemplated by the District

Attorney in Oregon.

We struggle with the issue of the constitutionality of

RFRA continuously. Because attorneys for state and local

governments have subjected RFRA to relentless attack,

we must litigate the constitutionality of this act of Con-

gress over and over again. Every time we advise a client,

whether a church or an individual believer, prudence

dictates that we warn the client that the government may

claim that RFRA is unconstitutional and that this claim

has not yet been definitively resolved. The cloud that

continues to hover over the constitutionality of RFRA

thus impedes the effectiveness of an act of Congress that

2 The City of Boerne did not try to accommodate the

religious needs of the Roman Catholic parishioners here, but

forced Archbishop Flores into court to seek a judgment

enforcing rights secured under RFRA. This governmental

refusal to accommodate religious interests is reflected by

governmental units in most of the cases litigated under RFRA,

as well as in countless unreported cases in which members of

the Coalition have given counsel to believers and their

communities.

is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, United

States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963).

Unless this cloud of unconstitutionality is removed from

RFRA, the statute will not have the full operational effect

designed by Congress, for the lower courts will follow

the doctrine of Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (to

avoid a holding of unconstitutionality, an act of Congress

may be construed narrowly), and will continue to pro-

duce cases such as Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing

Commission, 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P. 2d 909 (1996), cert.

pending, No. 96-31, and Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights

Commission, 874 P. 2d 274 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 115

S. Ct. 460 (1995), where the statute has been mangled into

unrecognizable forms.* Only this Court can resolve the

lingering doubt about the constitutionality of RFRA and

enable its full implementation to proceed. For these rea-

sons we urge the Court to take this case and to sustain

RFRA.

Both in our legislative efforts and in our current

posture of litigation, we have remained united in a strong

coalition to protect religious freedom. Our solidarity on

3 In Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the

California Supreme Court did not invalidate RFRA. Cnly one

Justice was of that view, Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1189 (Mosk, J.,

concurring). Similarly, in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights

Commission, the Alaska Supreme Court did not invalidate

RFRA. But in both cases, the lower courts trivialized the

religious interest and dramatically escalated the statutory

threshold requirement of a showing of “burden” that a religious

claimant must make in a RFRA case. Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1176;

Swanner, 874 P. 2d at 283. For an extensive discussion of burden

analysis in RFRA cases, see Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F. 3d 1175 (7th

Cir. 1996).

this issue is firm because it is our collective experience

that our religious beliefs and practices are increasingly

vulnerable to the insensitivity of governmental bodies

who insist upon the application of burdensome govern-

mental regulations to religious organizations, without

regard for the fundamental significance of religious free-

dom in our constitutio al order. See West Virginia State

Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

In this environment, all religious communities suffer

equally. In our national imagery the bell is typically a

symbol of human freedom. It rings to proclaim justice in

the land. But it can also toll slowly to signalize communal

grief at a loss or a death. As John Donne taught us

centuries ago, “Ask not for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for

thee.”

When a religious belief is stifled by bureaucracy, that

is a kind of dying that affects us all. When, as here, a

Roman Catholic Archbishop is told by a municipality that

he and his community may not build a church sufficiently

large to afford his fellow Catholics an opportunity to

worship as the canons of their church require, that is a

kind of dying that causes concern and even grief for us

all. And when a federal district court tells this Arch-

bishop that Congress and the Chief Executive exceeded

their constitutional authority when they enacted RFRA,

that too is a death knell for religious freedom. By con-

trast, when the court of appeals reverses that district

court and sustains RFRA, the bell of freedom peals

crisply for all of us, who are free to worship God accord-

ing to the dictates of conscience. What troubles us most in

this long interim between the enactment of RFRA and the

present moment is the uncertainty about the ringing of

the bell. We know the difference between peals of joy and

a death knell, and we never know whether a court is

going to order the one or the other. Respondent Flores

notes that no appellate court has yet invalidated RFRA,

but lower courts have frequently held that RFRA is con-

stitutionally infirm. 'n this atmosphere of uncertainty, the

time is ripe for this Court to resolve this issue

definitively.

As suggested both by the facts in this record and by

the story referred to above about the intention of a pros-

ecutor to use a sacramental confession in a homicide case,

the kinds of harms we have experienced in this period

after the enactment of RFRA go to the very heart and soul

of our identity and mission as religious communities.

Nothing symbolizes the current state of hostility toward

religious communities more virulently than the rash of

burnings of churches, principally of African-Americans,

that has recently scarred our nation’s history. Along with

right-thinking persons of all faiths and of no religious

faith, the Coalition emphatically rejects this violence.

Although we acknowledge that this case is in no way

causally related to these church bombings, the sad effect

of both the bombings and the application of historical

preservation ordinances to churches is the same, to |

deprive the faithful of a house of prayer according to the |

dictates of conscience. There can be no violation of free

exercise of religion more obvious than governmental

interference with the ability of a religious community to

worship in the manner that God has enjoined. As such,

this case serves as an excellent vehicle for this Court to

signal its own concern for the independence of religious

communities from stifling governmental control.

ne TT TC

II. This Court Has Acted Promptly in the Past to

Resolve any Doubt about the Authority of Congress

to Protect Important Civil Rights, and the Court

Should Take this Case to Clarify that the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act is a Valid Exercise of Con-

gressional Power to Secure the First of our Civil

Liberties, Religious Freedom.

One of the prudential rules that guide the discretion

of the Court as it shapes its docket is to wait for a clear

conflict in authority among the courts of appeals, or

between a federal court of appeals and the highest tribu-

nal of one of the several states. Rule 10, Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States. This rule is not,

however, inflexible. Respondent Flores has noted in his

statement in response to the Petition for certiorari that

the Court frequently reviews the constitutionality of fed-

eral statutes without waiting for a split in circuit author-

ity. Statement of Flores at 5-6.

The Coalition notes that the Court has acted

promptly to dispel doubts about important civil rights

legislation in the past. For example, the Court acted with

remarkable speed to sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1964

against constitutional challenges. Perhaps the most sig-

nificant federal statute of this century, this legislation was

not enacted swiftly or without struggle. On the contrary,

the opponents of this legislation conducted the longest

filibuster in the history of the United States Senate, last-

ing 82 working days and comprising over ten million

words spread out on over 63,000 pages of the Congres-

sional Record. On June 17, the Senate voted 76-18 to close

off further debate. Two days later the Senate voted 73-27

10

to pass a compromise version of the bill that had biparti-

san support from the Majority Leader and the Minority

Leader. When the bill returned to the House, many mem-

bers of the House were dissatisfied with the Senate ver-

sion of this landmark legislation, which they viewed as

weaker on key provisions. To avoid any further delay that

would come from attempting to reconcile the House ver-

sion and the Senate version in a conference committee,

however, the House approved the Senate version of the

bill on July 2, 1964. On the same day President Lyndon

Johnson signed the bill into law. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat.

241.

Legislative conflict and delay were met with judicial

unanimity and expedition in this Court. Within days, a

motel in Atlanta, Georgia, challenged the constitu-

tionality of Title Il of the new act, prohibiting racial

discrimination in public accommodations. Acting Attor-

ney General Katzenbach immediately filed a counter-

claim, seeking an injunction against future violations of

the act by the plaintiff. The three-judge district court

empaneled to hear the constitutional challenge to the act

promptly held a hearing on the requests for injunctive

relief. On July 22, less than three weeks after the enact-

ment of the legislation, the district court sustained the

act, issued a permanent injunction against the motel to

commence on August 11, and refused to stay the injunc-

tion. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 231 F. Supp.

393 (N.D. Ga. 1964).

On August 10, Justice Black, acting in his capacity as |

Circuit Justice, denied an application from the motel and )

an adjacent restaurant operated by Lester Maddox for a

stay of the injunction, on the view that “a temporary

WRN WA ne SAN ee

iii aa

11

injunction against enforcement is in reality a suspension

of an act, delaying the date selected by Congress to put

its chosen policies into effect.” Justice Black also noted

that “the constitutionally chosen policies of the Act chal-

lenged in these cases are not the result of sudden, impul-

sive legislative action, but represent the culmination of

one of the most thorough debates in the history of Con-

gress.” And he agreed with the appellants and with the

Solicitor General “as to the wisdom of having the specific

constitutional issues here involved decided at as early a

date as orderly procedure will permit.” Heart of Atlanta

Motel v. United States, 85 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1964) (Black, J.,

Circuit Justice).

On the first Monday of its October Term, the Court

not only noted probable jurisdiction in the case, but also

granted a joint motion for acceleration of oral argument

and heard the case on the very same day. Heart of Atlanta

Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 803 (1964). On December

14, barely five months after the legislation had been

enacted, the Court issued an unanimous opinion sustain-

ing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Heart of Atlanta Motel v.

United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

There are important differences between RFRA and

Title Il of the Civil Rights Act. The one protects the free

exercise of religion against excessive regulation by the

government; the other is aimed at the evil of discrimina-

tion on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin,

principally by private parties. But these differences are

not as important as the profound similarities between

these two acts of Congress. Both are instances of land-

mark legislation in which Congress acted affirmatively

and by an overwhelming bipartisan majority to create a

12

statutory remedy directly aimed at securing civil liberties

and civil rights more adequately than under a leading

precedent of this Court, whether Smith or the infamous

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

We know that we will not prevail in every skirmish

with state and local government over the application of

RFRA to our various beliefs and practices, any more than

the NAACP Legal Defense Fund is guaranteed victory in

all of the litigation it has brought under federal civil

rights statutes. But we urge the Court to affirm the crucial

protection that religious believers and their communities

now enjoy under RFRA.

We note that the rule announced in Smith com-

manded only a bare majority of the Court. See, e.g., Smith,

494 U.S. at 890 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judg-

ment). Some members of the Court may be prepared to

revisit Smith, with a view to overruling it as a departure

from sound constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Church

of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.

520, 559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concur-

ring in the judgment) (“in a case presenting the issue, the

Court should re-examine the rule Smith declared”); see

also Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 115 S.

Ct. 460 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cer-

tiorari) (urging adherence to compelling interest standard

in RFRA).

In our view the Court should reverse Smith. The

sooner, the better. But as long as the Court is not pre-

pared to do so, it should at least act promptly to remove

any lingering doubt that Congress acted well within its

powers when it responded to Smith with appropriate

remedial legislation to safeguard religious freedom. This

13

case affords the Court a clean record and a clear oppor-

tunity to signal to the Nation that it meant what it said

when it sent the religious communities to the legislative

branch to secure our most cherished religious beliefs and

practices. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 890 (“Values that are

protected against government interference through

enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby ban-

ished from the political process.”).

¢

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the amicus respectfully

requests that the petition for a writ of certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit be

granted, and that the judgment of that court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Epwarp McG Lynn GAFFNEY, JR.

Valparaiso University School

of Law

Wesemann Hall

Valparaiso, IN 46383

219-465-7834 FAX: 219-465-7872

* Counsel of Record

STEVEN T. McFARLAND

Christian Legal Society

4208 Evergreen Lane, Suite 222

Annandale, VA 22003

703-642-1070 FAX: 703-642-1075

Marc STERN

American Jewish Congress

15 E. 84th

New York, NY 10028

212-360-1545 FAX: 212-249-3672

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

App. 1

APPENDIX A

Members of the Coalition for the

Free Exercise of Religion

The members of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of

Religion include: Agudath Israel of America, The Aleph

Institute, American Association of Christian Schools,

American Baptist Churches USA, American Civil Liber-

ties Union, American Conference on Religious Move-

ments, American Ethical Union - Washington Ethical

Action Office, American Humanist Association, American

Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, American

Muslim Council, Americans for Democratic Action,

Americans for Religious Liberty, Americans United for

Separation of Church & State, Anti-Defamation League,

Association of Christian Schools International, Associa-

tion of American Indian Affairs, Baptist Joint Committee

on Public Affairs, B’nai B’rith, Central Conference of

American Rabbis, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ),

Christian Legal Society, Christian Life Commission,

Southern Baptist Convention, Christian Science Commit-

tee on Publication, Church of the Brethren, Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Church of Scientology

International, Coalition for Christian Colleges and Uni-

versities, Coalitions for America, Concerned Women for

America, Council of Jewish Federations, Council on Reli-

gious Freedom, Council on Spiritual Practices, Criminal

Justice Policy Foundation, Episcopal Church, Evangelical

Lutheran Church in America, Friends Committee on

National Legislation, General Conference on Seventh-day

Adventists, Guru Gobind Singh Foundation, Hadassah —

the Women’s Zionist Organization of America, Inc.,

Home School Legal Defense Association, International

App. 2

Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, International

Institute for Religious Freedom, Japanese American Citi-

zens League, The Jewish Reconstructionist Federation,

Justice Fellowship, Mennonite Central Committee U.S.,

Muslim Prison Federation, National Association of Evan-

gelicals, National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund,

National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA,

National Council of Jewish Women, National Council on

Islamic Affairs, National Jewish Commission on Law and

Public Affairs, National Jewish Community Relations

Advisory Council, National Sikh Center, Native Ameri-

can Church of North America, Native American Rights

Fund, North American Council For Muslim Women,

People For the American Way Action Fund, Peyote

Way Church of God, Rabbinical Council of America,

Soka-Gakkai International-USA, Traditional Values Coali-

tion, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Union

of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Unitarian

Universalist Association of Congregations, United

Church of Christ - Office for Church in Society, United

Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, Women of Reform

Judaism — Federation of Temple Sisterhoods.