Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Banks

Supreme Court, U.S.

ae ee Pa ae

932088 AUC 1 81995

re

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

DR. SIMON BANKS, J.D. T/A JOB PROTECTORS

FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

Petitioner

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dr. Simon Banks, J.D.

Job Protectors

Former Administrative Law Judges

468 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20024

[202] 554-5627

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QUESTION PUT FORTH

Whether federal courts, in a removed case under 42

U.S.C. § 1443, [where petitioner allege and shows

inability to enforce federal rights in the state courts

notwithstanding the doctrine(s) set forth ‘n District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,]

have jurisdictional authority to protect federal rights, to

vacate, alter, enjoin continued enforcement of a final

judgment issued by a State Court of Appeals resulting in

an injunction arising out of a state law that conflict with

federal laws and where continued enforcement of the

State Court of Appeals injunction unwarrantly violate

clearly established rights arising under federal laws

providing for equal civil rights, and where changed

conditions, newly established staie/muscipal policy,

custom, practice and laws, reflect that continued

4h

Oe CORRAL yf BR Fee eh SPD a RN ge Nae Pay

enforcement of the injunction unwarrantly perpetuate

discrimination and violate clearly established federal and

constitutional rights.

UEP PD aN VR EES AL ROA 9 SRE ok Be a

UST OF PARTIES

The following parties appeared below.

PARTY PETITIONER:

Dr. Simon Banks, J.D.

468 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20024

[202] 554-5627

PARTY RESPONDENT:

Stuart Pierson, Esq.

Chairman,

District of Columbia

Court of Appeals

Committee on Unauthorized

Practice of Law

500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

; a vy ie” a ue Mii tghe! jf #) J ~~ = * 4 * ca" 7 2 ‘ a fhe ‘4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CSRS FOIE POU ccccccscsiesstensdcoccnentens ii

Rae GF PURNE Ee cetrvscscscscessccidadeceteul iiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Fs BI asaccccencscicsresceminel ixiv

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTES

LEGLISLATIVE MATERIALS

iv

SS ie “5 z .* _ . "% -. =a. Ya Ss; * ¥ 7 *@ ene

We BEE Betccccceccescccsovcascestocesoovssooess ixxiv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............0csscccccseees 1

RPP etsisecevecvccccccccescctscccsescocceses 1-7

CET A Rccncdndoveccorcccsvecessctsteceovestes 65

Banks v. Dixon, et al No. 91-3099,

Banks v. District of Columbia Government, et al 89-

CBF) ..cccccossoses 3,16,18,32,63

Banks v. Edwards [DCRAI], et al, USCA No.

96-GOGB, CMiccsecesestattinnn 3,16,32,62

Banks v. Teitelman, et al, 93-0152,

scccceccseseseocseccsaqseues 3,16,18,32,63

B v. j thori ice Of

Law, 538 A.2d 1120 (D.C. 1988)

eeneitistas 2,..21,33,48,55

Committee _of U.S. Citizens Living In Nicaragua vy.

Reagan, 859 F.2d 929....... 4l

Council vy. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465

U.S. 209, 104 S.Ct. 1020.......... 12,29,43

Dedd v. Rue, D.C. Ohio 1979, 478 F. Supp.

EST ne eee 58

of A v. F , 460

Be I i iceccscscscsact iv

Family Divison Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie,

72S F.2d 695, 701, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Firestone Co. v. &

Co., C.A. Md. 1970, 431 F.2d 1199, cert denied, 91 s.-t.

Friedman v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 822

F.29 423, U.S.C.A. Comst. Art. 4, § 2, d.

Georgia v. Rachel, et al, 384 U.S. at 782):

Gotkin v. Miller (1957, CA N.Y.) SM F.2d

CO Beidicicwediiiicntd 10

i r. et al v. District of ia, et al

U.S.C.A. D.C., No. 91-7164, decided June

BI99B...coccoscsceces 54

Melton _v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 f.2d

TOE. .ccccccccccccccccsocecoccscsocecees a

Meritor Savings Banks v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66

Monell vy. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436

Nat. Treasury Employees U. v. U.S. Merit Systems, 743

New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 234.

Ie ne EO EN TS 1,29,42

New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) 403 U.S. 713

Pembour vy. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct.

oo eer 45

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

Phillip Waqne, Inc. vy. Leser, 239 U.S. 207

AD iececccccccseveccecccovesvocseoees 42 Piper, supra, 470 U.S.

at 284, 105 S.Ct. a 12,29,43

Prentis_v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 2I1 U.S. at

affirmed 309 F.2d 634.

Republic steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 85 S.

Ct. 614 (1964).

Simon vy. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (1980)

ixi

Thermtron u Inc. v. H rfer, 423 U.S.

ni ion T . x

Goodwin v. Karnuth, D.c. N.Y. 1947, 74 F. Supp.

Wallace _v. District of Columbia Unemployment

Compensation Board, D.C. App., 289 A.2d 885

| 31

United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Assr:.. 322

7

U.S. 533 (1944).

Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 84] F.2d U.S.C.A.

Ss MEE Dkdccécccesodceed 4]

Virginia v. Rivers, 100 U.S. 313 p. 794-

Pi ssuhshevactonctcbindsncnsees 38

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37.......... 46

THE COURT BELOW

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals

For The District of Columbia Circuit denied rehearing en

banc on May 20, 1993.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on

August 18, 1993, accordingly, the appeal is timely.

This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (certiorari) and (c) (important and

unsettled questions) of this court.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTES

District of Columbia Human Rights Act, Title 34,

2-38,

District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit

Personnel Act, [CMPA], D. C. Code Ann., Sec. 1-606 et.

Seq.

DCRA’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act,

[CPPA] D.C. Code §28-3901(a)(6), §28-3903(c)(2)(C), §

28-390 4(a),(CbD ) and (d)

5. | ae 8,9,11,13,17,19,37,45,54,58,62

District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.D.C.

Code § 11-2501, 11-2501(a), et. seq., (1981).......... 31,34

D.C. Code § 1-1509(b) DCAPA........... 34

14 DCMR § 3201.1 *1986),.............. 34

District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as amended, 31

DCR 56, D.C. Law 2-38, D.C. Code §§ 1-2501-1-2557.

District of Columbia Register, Commission On Human

Rights Guidelines, a ree aa s

Fee Dncivsnaiiieuidiielisiibiiaicbiiaeibabtias 27

District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals Form,

Page 2, Part V 431, Designation of

AS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES & HEARING

BE rciccinicinnccscensinsindsens 28

MEMO OF WARREN CRUISE, DIRECTOR

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE

APPEALS CHANGING THE TITLE “HEARING

EXAMINER" TO “ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE" ....28

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT RULES:

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 49 on

Unauthorized Practice of Law, previously, D.C. Ct. App.

R. 46 II (b)(1) (1984).

oneauieavacenseune 2,5,7,8,12,14,19,20,21,25,30,33,37,43,45,4

9,37,40,54,55,61,62,63

[Effective January 1, 1985, Rule 46-11 was renumbered

as Rule 49.]

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 101 (a) (3), D.C. App. Pro Hac Vice

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT RULES

District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals Rules,

District of Columbia Commission On Human Rights

14 DCMR § 3292,1 (1986).

ixvii

FEDERAL STATUTES:

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act), 5

U.S.C. § 7501-7543, Pub. L. No.

95-454, 92 Stat. 111 (Codified as amended) by 5 U.S.C.

§§ 1101-8913

EN iiiciersaneveees 21

i rirccsicsveses 22,27,55

5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. IV 1980), 37

PASTE aE 27

5 U.S.C. § 3105.......... 36,53

5 U.S.C. § 2302

28 U.S.C. § 1443

..+.8,10,37,38,44,58

28 U.S.C. § 1446 ........000- 10

28 U.S.C. § 1981

. 28 U.S.C. § 1983.........064 45,47

; 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(b), 217, 261, 605 and

Be | ORE 22,26,36,55

| 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605..........00000 26,55

29 C.F.R. § 1614.106............006 26,36

29 C.F.R. § 1614.214(b).........000000. 55

29 C.F.R. § 1601.70,......:000000- 26,36

42 U.S.C. § 1981,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4,

Pte

42 U.S.C. 2000¢-12

42 U.S.C. § 2000¢,........000006. 19,26,36

42 U.S.C. § 2000, Section 706,

42 U.S.C. § 12101,

Pub. L. 89-554 § 79-554

$706, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1985)

Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act,

Civil Rights Act, 1964

BOTs 22,36,38,44

37 Fed. Reg. 16787, Aug. 19, 1972

Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989

(Public Law No. 101-12)

Civil Rights Act of 1964........ 38,44

Section 717 of 1964 Civil Rights Act,

Public Law No. 102-166, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.

26 Stat. 209, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1.

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1964

soccocnsessoocoseseessescoessoseoooes 32

Executive Orders:

Executive Order 11246. Executive Order 11246

precludes discrimination in the use of federal funds by

recipients of federal funds.,

Executive Order 11222,

Manual For Administrative Judges....... 27

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

Senator Kastenmeier, 110 Cong. Rec. 6551;

Senator Kuchel, 110 Cong. Rec. 6564; Senator

Dodd, 110 Cong. Rec. 6955-6956,

S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978),

124 Cong. Rec. S14267 (daily ed. Aug. 24,

1978)(Statement of Sen.Ribicoff). See also Carducci y.

Regan, 714 F.2d 171.

Federal Personnel Manual, ch. 771 (Oct. 1981);

OMB Manual § 355 (April 1982),

Legislative History of the Civil Service Reform Act of

1978, at 636, 639 (Comm. Print 1979)

Legislative History of D.C. Code, Pub. L. No. 90-614, §

10, 82 Stat. 1208 (Oct. 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 202, 90th

Cong. Ist Sess. (1967); S. Rep. No. 1581, 90th Cong. 2d.

Sess. (1968)

37 Fed. Register/1687, Aug. 19, 1992..27

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED:

First Amendment to the United States

Commitee, .ccccscccccccccsees 11,19,29

Fifth Amendment to the United States

Comsthtthets.<ccccccccccccccccccces 11,29

Thirteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.........cccccccccccceees 11,58

Due Process Clause.........:+-+ssesseees 41

Equal Protection Clause............0sssssseeeeeeees 19,41,58

Privileges and Immunities

CIRC. cscccccccccccccsccccccceccees 11,42

Supremacy Clause...........0ceseereseees 25

Article 4, § 2, Cl. 1......seeeeeeees 11,29

OPINIONS

41 Op. Atty. Gen., February 23, 1951;

1964 Op. Atty. Gen., Nov. 24. Nash v. ICC. 1955, 225

F.2d 42, cert den. 76 S.Ct. 343,

Mem. Op. at 10, JA 27; citing S. Rep. No. 969, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978), and S. Rep. No. 969, 95th

Cong. , 2d Sess. 8 (1978)

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A reason for granting the writ is to protect the

federal rights of government and private sector employees

nationwide to have lay representatives bring and

prosecute discrimination complaints on their behalf

alleging violation of civil rights and equal employment

rights, against the United States Government and Private

Sector Employers, before administrative agencies of the

United States and State Agencies contracted by the United

States to Prosecute, Investigate and conciliate violations of

Civil Rights and Equal Employment Laws providing for

equal civil rights, without having the lay representative

being prohibited or subjected to prosecution under

conflicting state local bar rules, and other state laws

requiring local bar membership as a prerequisite for

exercising federal rights. This Court should Grant a Writ

of Certiorari to Review the Court’s Decision in District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 3,

for purposes of determining the scope and limit of

jurisdictional authority that district courts have in

protecting federal rights and rights arising out of federal

law against a state court whom allows its employees

unbridled discretion to continuously ignore, nullify, chill,

rights arising under federal laws while enforcing state

laws that conflict with federal laws and rights arising

thereunder.

a

STATEMENT OF CASE

On June 25, 1992, Simon Banks, Petitioner, a former

administrative law judge with the District of Columbia

Government, ' filed a petition for removal of the case In

re Simon Banks 92-652, to the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia Circuit, alleging that

he could not enforce his federal rights providing for equal

civil rights in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

on the basis that the District of Columbia Court of

appeals has continually subjected him to selective and

' Banks was appointed administrative law judge

and hearing examiner by the District of Columbia

Commission on Human Rights, the judicial arm of the

District of Columbia Office of Human Rights,

pursuant to federal grant funds provided by the

United States Department of Labor and the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in

1975-1976, and during the period 1977-1978 Banks

served as an Administrative Law Judge with the

District of Columbia Rental Accommodation Office

[Rent Control], mow a subagency of District of

Columbia Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Agency.

[DCRA] Although Banks has a Juris Doctor Law

Degree Banks is not licensed to practice law in the

District of Columbia.

fa ap sin

Se ee ee EN cee Ee necmen

ee dane Rb ld ab tet AA Mtoe BaD or

Bvt td ee 0 a ath Meer bs

Pe eee eer

selective and discriminatory prosecution

under the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals Rule 49 on Unauthorized Practice

of Law [DCCA CUPL]* which conflicts with

local statutory laws and federal laws and

rights arising under federal laws when

Banks attempts to exercise his federal and

statutory right to represent parties

before administrative agencies.

Moreover, the conduct of the state

court prior to removal as well as conduct

of the state court subsequent to remand,

while the case has been on appeal, shows

that Banks cannot enforce his

constitutional rights, federal rights, and

rights under laws providing for equal

2

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 49 On

Unauthorized Practice of Law prohibits lay

representation of parties in any proceeding

involving matters of law notwithstanding the D.c.

Court Appeals Ruling in Brookens v. Committee On

Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120 (D.C.

1988)

civil rights where State court employees

have been continuously involved § in

retroactive rulemaking, intentional

misrepresentation of fact and law,

prosecutorial misconduct, selective

enforcement of unauthorized practice of

law provisions, interference with Banks

contractual relations; facilitating

boycott(s) against Banks by the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, the Fairfax County Human

Rights Commission, the Alexandria Office

of Human Rights, state contract agencies

of the EEOC,* and the D.C.C.A. CUPL's

employees have been engaged in acts of

continued stimatization of Banks’ by

deliberately mischaracterizing Banks

See Banks v. Edwards [DCRA], et al, USCA No. 94-

$058, C.A. Banks v. Dixon, et al No. 91-3099,

Banks v. Teitelman, et al, 93-0152, Banks v.

District of Columbia Government, et al 89-08971

3

Siecle :

tb Sinha

ER BIE IG eect a site

ewer Caria eter LN pico’

ere See Re ee

ee ye

conduct of providing and advertising his

availability to represent clients before

administrative agencies, as "unauthorized

practice of law".

The D.C.C.A. Committee On

Unauthorized Practice of Law [D.C.C.A.

CUPL] has with impugnity, continuously,

falsely and fraudulently stigmatized

Banks' authorized representation of

clients before federal and state

administrative agencies, in the press

nationwide, as constituting unauthorized

practice of law, thereby creating a

hostile work atmosphere for Banks and

disbelief amongst Banks' clients and

members of the public and legal profession

concerning Banks' legal right to represent

parties before federal and state

administrative agencies that provide for

lay representation.

The D.C.C.A. CUPL, have stigmatized

and falsely published to each of Banks'

that Banks' lay representation of clients

before administrative agencies constitute

unauthorized practice of law, under the

smokescreen and pretext of enforcing

D.C.C.A. Rule 49. The D.C.C.A. CUPL, has

on an on-going and continuous basis, from

1986 to the present date, disseminated

these intentional misrepresentation of law

and fact to Banks clients with impugnity,

for purposes of influencing complaints

against Banks based on subornation of

perjury. These acts of D.C.C.A. CUPL,

have been taking place with the knowledge

of the D.C. Court of Appeals. These acts

of D.C.C.A. CUPL have caused _ Banks

continuous irreparable harm and breach of

contracts by Banks clients, some of whom

have brought complaints, in detrimental

23 Np SD PRBS 00

reliance upon the good-faith and the

perceived integrity, legal validity, and

good faith of the DCCA CUPL, acting under

the seal of the D.C. Court of Appeais.

These deceptive attempts by the D.C.C.A.

CUPL are pursuant to an on-going

conspiracy set in motion by volunteer

attorneys, James Schaller and Stuart

Pierson, whom serve as parttime employees

of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals and whom are otherwise are

principal members of law firms whom

discriminate in employment and are law

firms that are engaged in representing

clients and business interest that are

targets of Banks and Banks’ advocacy

against discrimination in employment by

employers that violate civil rights and

discrimination laws.

The DCCA-CUPL has been joined by other

federal and state employees whom have

detrimentally relied upon the legal

validity and authenticity of the D.C.C.A.

CUPL's conduct of selective enforcment

D.C.C.A. Rule 49 against Banks, and have

thereby aided, abetted the impeding,

boycotting and otherwise chilling Banks'

attempt to exercise his federal

constitutional rights to represent parties

before administrative agencies that

provide for lay representation of parties.

This case presents questions

concerning the scope of a century-old

federal law that permits a defendant in a

state court proceedings to transfer his

case to a federal trial court under

certain condition where a defendant cannot

enforce federal rights under laws

Bont ae idaho ek

providing for equal civil rights.‘

Banks alleged in his Petition that

D.C.C.A. Committee on Unauthorized

Practice of law' [CUPL] prosecution of him

is racially motivated, and that its

enforcement of D.C.C.A.'s Rule 49 is

impermissibly irrational, unreasonable,

discriminatory, selective and denies him

equal protection of laws. The terms and

conditions placed upon Banks pursuant to

D.C.C.A.'s Rule 49 and DCRA‘'s Consumer

7

That law, now 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964 ed.)

provides: [citing Georgia v. Rachel, et al, 384

U.S. at 782):

"s 1443. Civil Rights Cases,

‘Any of the following civil actions or

criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court

may be removed by the defendant to the district

court of the United states for the district and

division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

*(1) Against any person who is denied or

cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right

under any law providing for the equal civil rights

of citizens of the United states, or of all persons

within the jurisdiction thereof;

"(2) For any act under color of authority

derived from any law providing for equal rights, or

for refusing to do any act on the ground that it

would be inconsistent with such law.”

Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA] D.C.

Code § 28-3904 (1991).°

The D.C. Court of Appeals has

utilized Banks for its rulemaking

activities.

Subsequent to removal of the case,

and while the case was on appeal of the

remand order pursuant to petitioner's

motion for Mandamus filed with the United

States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit, the D.C.C.A., acting

outside of its jurisdictional authority,

changed the docket number from 92-652 to

92-SP-652, added new complainants whom

complained through an affidavit authored

5

This law recently upheld by the D.c. court of

Appeals on December 6, 1993, after the filing of

the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Banks v.

District of Columbia Department of Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs, No.91-AA-883 (DCCA, Dec. 6,

1993) excludes lawyers from its provision whom

regularly practice before administrative agencies

that provide for lay representation, with no pro

hac vice requirement.

0 ALIA RA DY MG

CAB 5D ORT Dan Rea a Bh

Pena DO cer

by Stuart Pierson, Chairman of D.C.C.A.

CUPL, and thereafter the D.C.C.A.

proceeded to make rulings in violation of

the removal jurisdiction of the United States

District court. © The D.C. Court of Appeals

thereafter and in connection with

proceedings that took place after removal,

granted a motion to DCCA. CUPL for

injunctive relief, and has established a

hearing upon the CUPL's motion for

contempt to be convened on May 10, 1994,

in violation of Banks' due process rights,

federal rights and right to equal

protection of the laws. See Appendix No. 3

Lich alae eR Sane

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), which precludes state

court proceedings after removal. See In Matter of

Meyerland Co., 910 F.2d 1257, at 1263, (5th Cir.

1990; See also Royal v. State Farm Fire and Cas.

Co., 685 F.2d 124, n2 (1982), See also Thermtron

Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-

53. The Supreme Court provided for the right of

appeal of a remand issued in a removed case under

28 U.S.C. § 1443. See Georgia V. Rachel, 384 U.S.

at 787.

10

The D.C.C.A. further prejudiced

Banks' right to receive a fair trial and

enforce his federal rights under laws

providing for equal civil rights by

upholding a decision and new retroactive

law of the District of Columbia Consumer

and Regulatory, Affairs Agency [DCRA]

Consumer Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA]

D.C. Code § 28-3904, which excludes

lawyers but includes non-members of the

Bar.’ The D.C.C.A. has not’ shown any

legitimate interest for its classification

The District of Columbia Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs, Consumer Protection Procedures Act

excludes lawyers from its coverage and prohibits

non attorneys from indicating that they are the

“functional equivalent of a lawyer", a prior

restraint upon the First Amendment, operates as an

unreasonable restraint on the liberty of contract

in violation of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 5/14, See

Careleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, C.C.A.

Minn. (1974), 126 F.2d 537; See Friedman v. Supreme

Court of Virginia, 822 F.2d 423, U.S.C.A. Const.

Art. 4, § 2, Cl. 1., the law violates Article lv,

§ 2 of the constitution which provides:

“Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all

privileges and immunities of Citizens of the

several states." See New Hampshire v. Piper, 470

U.S. 284.

11

"tS

°c Pe ae I ee ee ”

action. As such the classification and

enforcement is unconstitutional and

violative of law.®

Banks alleged in a second removal of

the case brought by Banks while the

D.C.C.A. was proceeding with the contempt

proceedings and injunctive proceedings

under a new case number, after Banks had

petitioned the Supreme Court for Writ of

Certiorari, alleging that D.C.C.A.'s

enforcement of D.C.C.A.'s Rule 49

impermissibly and irrationaly continues to

discriminates against him because of his

race, Black, in violation of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, and alleging that the

D.C.C.A. CUPL conspired with DCRA to

The D.C.C.A.'s classification and discriminatory

enforcement of D.C.C.A. Rule 49, does not bear a

substantial relationship to the District of

Columbia Government's ligitimate/rational

objectives. Piper, supra, 470 U.S. at 284, 105

S.Ct. at 1279; United Building & Construction

Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465

U.S. 209, 104 S.Ct. 1020.

12

promulgate retroactive laws, DCRA CPPA,

D.C. Code § 28-3904 (1991), and Banks

alleged in the second removal petition

that while the case was pending before

designated Superior Court Judge Richard

Levie, the D.C.C.A. issued its ruling on

December 6, 1993, arbitrarily opining in

In Re Simon Banks v. District of Columbia

Department of Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs, No. 91-AA-883, that Banks could

be held liable for indicating that he is

the functional equivalent of a lawyer, and

further upholding the exclusion of lawyers

whom regularly practice before

administrative agencies from DCRA-CPPA's

coverage. BANKS HAS PETITIONED THE SUPREME

COURT FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, APRIL 29,

1994 in connection with the decision of

Banks v. DCRA supra. Banks contends that

the D.C.C.A.'s decision in Banks v. DCRA,

13

ee

Se ae

ee aan et AD are th Ee toe FM OR EE IT OT Re te te Rn

No. 91-AA-883, provides guidance to the

designated Superior Court Judge, and to

prospective witnesses, that Banks conduct

of stating, indicating, implying that he

is the equivalent of a licensed member of

the Bar or that his services has some

approval, that Banks may thereby be deemed

violative of provisions prohibiting the

unauthorized practice of law under

D.C.C.A. Rule 49 and of DCRA-CPPA's

regulations, even if it is perceived by

any client that Banks indicated he is the

functional equivalent of a lawyer, absent

any cognitive test or impirical data.

While the instant case was pending

disposition of Banks' petition for Writ of

Certiorari, the D.C. Court of Appeals,

waited one year and several months to rule

upon Banks discovery request, denying

Banks the right to question its Committee

14

on Unauthorized Practice of Law upon its

prosecutorial misconduct, and D.C. Court

f=. Appeals teeriiet Banks' ethics complaint

against its chairman, Stuart Pierson

alleging ssubornation of perjury, and

ethical misconduct and judicial

misconduct. The D.C.C.A. limited the

issues to be decided to whether Banks

violated the injunction and the DCCA

limited Banks discovery to former client

witnesses, identified as complainants by

CUPL, thereby shielding its committee and

all other witnesses from Banks and any

motion of Banks to strike evidence based

on unlawful taint, and for purposes of

steering the outcome of the contempt

proceedings, and for protecting the court,

Stuart Pierson, the Committee and persons

operating with it, from the civil suits

Banks filed against the D.C.C.A. CUPL and

15

* iw vias *

9

other co-conspirators.

The D.C.C.A., on December 6, 1993,

arbitrarily and capriciously, determined

that Banks violated DCRA's CPPA's

retroactive law, when he advised Hodges [a

client] that he would file a

discrimination complaint before the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission as an "administrative

advocate": [at p.5 43 Banks v. DCRA, No.

91-AA-883. ]

"DCRA, in joint complicity with DCCA

CUPL, structured CPPA to shore up defects

in D.C.C.A. Rule 49] concluded that Banks

had committed six unlawful trade

practices. Specifically: "[Banks'] use of

the title ‘administrative advocate’ and

rendering of legal advice misrepresented

ee

tiers

See Banks v. District of Columbia, et al, 89-0871,

Edwards al 91-3099; Banks

Banks v. Edwards, et _as

Teitelman, et al, 93-0152

16

that his services had a_ sponsorship,

approval, certification, characteristic,

and were of a particular standard, or

quality when it did not in violation of

D.C. Code § 28-3904 (a), (b) and (d)."

Code § 28-3904(u).” See Banks v. DCRA, supra.

Immediately subsequent to the

promulgation of DCRA-CPPA new law, D.C.

Code § 28-3904 (1991), DCRA utilized the

new law to retroactively hold Banks in

violation of the law for conduct that

occured on May 31, 1989. See opinion of

D.C.C.A. in Simon Banks v. District of

Columbia Department of Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs, No. 91-AA-883, decided

December 6, 1991, at p.3 42.

Banks further alleged that’ the

Chairman of CUPL, Stuart Pierson, and his

predecessor James Schaller and CUPL acted

as lobbiest, investigators, prosecutors

17

and, conspirators and co-authors of a

retroactive regulation promulgated by the

District of Columbia Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs Office, which is also a

co-defendant in the RICO-Conspiracy,

deprivation of civil rights cases 10

brought by Petitioner in 1989 and 1990,

and 1992 against the D.C.C.A, inter alia,

and that this legislation, rule,

regulations was promulgated to facilitate

reprisal actions against Petitioner and to

enhance, embellish and discriminatorily

chill and otherwise impose requirements of

Rule 49 against Banks" exercise of federal

rights under laws affording for equal

civil rights. These rights include, but

are not limited to rights afforded under

10

See Banks v. District of Columbia Government, et

1, C.A. No. 89-0871 ’ Banks Vv. edwards t [ DCRA l y

C.A. No. 91-3099 and Banks v. Teitelman, et al, 93-

152

18

1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42

0.3.C. § 2000e.

Banks allege that the DCRA

retroactive regulation!}

is retaliatory,

constitute a regulatory taking, that it is

unconstitutional on its face, that it was

designed to bolster the defects of

D.C.C.A' Rule 49, to facilitate the

abridgement of his rights under the 1964

Civil Rights Act, the Equal Protection

Clause, the First Amendment and that it

was further promulgated as ae prior

restraint, to restrain, restrict,

protected expressions, and protected

speech. The court has held such conduct

unlawful. See Arkansas Writer's Project,

Inc. v. Ragland (1987), 105 S Ct. 1722;

Schenck v. United States (1919) 249 U.S.

11

District of Columbia Consumer Protection

Procedures Act [1991] D.C. Code § 28-3904

19

ooo o_O

47., Schaumburg v Citizens For Better

Environment (1980) 444 U.S. 620, Cohen v.

California (1971) 403 U.S. 15, Near v.

Minnesota (1931) 283 U.s. 697; New rk

Times Co. v. United States (1971) 403 U.S.

713. And it has been selectively and

unconstitionally applied to Banks while it

on the other hand arbitrarily immunized

whites not licensed to practice law in the

District of Columbia as a perferred class

absent any rational, legitimate

governmental interest.

The DCRA retroactive Regulation

operate as a prior restraint upon speech

and has a chilling affect upon Banks’

federal constitutional rights providing

for equal civil rights under federal law

that a reasonable person would know.

D.C. App. Ct. Rule 49 conflicts with

specific federal and local statutes,

20

municipal policy, custom, practice and

procedures, that provide through their

practice rules that authorize lay

representation of parties before

administrative agencies. This practice is

not covered by D.C. App. R. 49,42

Notwithstanding the D.C. App. Ct.'s

ruling in Brookings, supra. the D.C.

Appeals Court's enforcement of Rule 49

against Banks' authorized representation

of clients before administrative agencies,

is discriminatory, selective and conflicts

with federal laws and rights arising under

federal laws.}3 The DCCA-CUPL's

12 see Brookens v. Committee On Unauthorized

Practice Of Law, 538 A.2d 1120 (D.C. 1988)

13 CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or

Act), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92

Stat. 111 (codified as amended by 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-

8913) See Legislative History of the Civil Service

Reform Act of 1978, at 636, 639 (Comm. Print 1979)

provide that federal employees are entitled to be

represented by any person of their choosing and

that person does not have to be an attorney, 29

21

prosecution of Banks for violating D.C.

App. Ct. R. 49, when Banks exercise

federal xights by xepresenting clients

befaze federal administratiwe agencies,

diseriminetesily viper Prive

CONS ei He Pidhitd aid datike fdddrai

righy grotected by the 1964 Civil Rights

Act seawiding for equal civil righte.

Banke cannot enforce hie federal

Civil, vigtte groviding for equal righte,

befqws tHe Mistirict i Columbia donrt of

Appeals, At) Sela Sip tH ARE ho HELE te

for May 10, A994, or any other proceeding

convened by the 0D-C-C-A- for the

additional reason that the D.C. Court of

Appeals has allowed its Chairman of the

D.C. Court of Appeals Committee On

Unauthorized Practice of Law, Stuart

C.F.R. § 1614.214(b), 29 C.F-R. § 1614.605, 5

C.F.R. 1201.31. See D.C. Code s 1-1509(b)

22

Pierson, [D.C.C.A. CUPL] to taint and

otherwise influence the testimony of each

witness by stating to each witness that

debe fplhetebeth oho abel h at fab ale A ehh ott art

AGBROLES / GONPLAC AEE INANE NOTiZEs Bracticd

Of law, and that Bake statement that he

it a4 former administrative law judge,

Constitate unauthorized practice of law,

notwithstanding the truth of each of these

assertions and dorndact .

S tt te whe epee the baad bee

On December £, 1993, Stuart Pierson, Chaizman of

"On Decmeber 6, 1993, the District of Columbia

fount of Sepsene hanced eo & Gevioien wich may

be of tional interest to you concerning your

complaint against Simon Banks. This does not

relate to the contempt proceeding against Mr. Banks

that is scheduled for hearing January 18, 1994.

91-AA-883 (DCCA, December 6, 1993), the Court held

that members of the public like you may recover

money paid to people like Banks who solicit the

23

never been charged with representing any

party before any court.*

@he DCCA- has determined, mith

CRE & CRMALEEE GH ONE Bai that it is

Hedda the dope Hf the proceedings, and

the cowrt hae dewied inclasion of Banke

sthics complaint against Stuart Pierson

(Chairman of CUPL), thereby limiting the

if the sexy

on March 11, 1994, Stuart Pierson Chairman DCCA

additional letter to ¢. Roger Cooper

and ell of Banks’ clients from list prov it by

proceedings strictly to whether Banks

violated the injunction. The D.C.C.A. has

denied Banks’ motion to vacate and/or

elter “he <Apjepetion based upon the

bet ape Ghe geet that the District of

CS © Gove phas adopted the title

‘Adminiatrative taw Tage", changing the

». 1

title “tearing txamin®™ -

The 6.¢.¢. a e~cQUPL's prosecution of

Barike for violating -D.C.C.A's Rule 49 is

APRA A Sh Sepkeemacy Clause and the

>

Fiche hibiip AA © cfdaiige = ©

4

In 1991, the District of Columbia Office of

leyee Appeals spanged the title “Hearing

Geeetnoes to "Administrative Judge”, although their

position of record is “Hearing Examiner”.

Subsequently, the District of Columbia Consumer and

Regulatory Affaire changed the title “Hearing

Examiner” to “Administrative Judge", and some of

ite employees utilized the title "Administrative

Law Judge” although their position of record is

"Bearing Examiner.”

*S These actions by the D.C.C.A., the CUPL,

the DCRA, violates the Supremacy Clause. The Court

has stated: “States have oblgation, under supremacy

clause, to protect federally guaranteed civil

rights as zealously as would federal courts. Rachel

v. State of Ga., 86 S.Ct. 1783.

25

The actions of the DCCA of enforcing

conflicting provisions of DCCA Rule 49

against Banks by adjudicating Banks’

representation of clients before

administrative agencies pursuant to D.C.

App. Ct. R. 49 as constituting

unauthorized practice of law, is

discriminatory and the enforcement of Rule

49 conflict with federal laws and rights

arising under federal laws that a

reasonable person would know. ?°

“when federal law is passed under authority

of Constitution, it is supreme, and state law in

conflict therewith must yeild. Pritchard v. Downie,

D.c. Ark. 1962, 201 F. Supp. 893, affirmed 309 F.2d

634.

16 pitle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213, 29 C.F.R. §

214.(b)-217, 261, 605 and 606, 29 C.F.R. §

1614.605, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106, 29 C.F.R. §

1601.70, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.61 [precluding reprisal

against complainant's representative; EEOC

Directive Transmittal and Order 570.001, dated

26

Sept. 1987, EEOC Order 572, dated March 12, 1979,

"Definitions, fh., provides: “Employee

Representative. "An attorney or other person

designated by the employee, in writing, who is

willing to act on the employee's behalf in matters

involving a proposed or actual suspension.." ; 5

C.F.R. § 1201.31(b), provides: "A party may choose

any representative so long as the person is willing

and available to serve"; 5 U.S.C. § 1201.31;

Federal Register, Thursday July 10, 1986, Part II

Merit Systems Protection Board 5 CFR Part 1201

Practice and Procedure, Final Regulation, at §

1201.31, Representation provides:

"(a) A party to an appeal may be represented

in any matter relating to the appeal. The parties

shall designate their representative. (b) A party

may choose any representative so long as the person

is willing and available to serve.”

The Merit Systems Protection Board Appeals

Form Page 2, Part V 431, Designation of

Representative, provides:

“You may represent yourself in this appeal, or you

may choose Bag -rmy to represent you.

Vv ttorne

District of Columbia Register, souuteetens on

Human Rights Guidelines, Page 3, at 3202.3

provides:

"The representative of a party before the

Commission does not have to be an attorney”

District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals

“Appeals Form", Part III, Hearing 47; specifically

provide that employee representative(s) do not have

to be an attorney.

5 U.S.C. § 3105.5372. and 7521 (Supp. lv

1980) provides: - The Title “Hearing Examiner” was

changed to “Administrative Law Judge” by United

States Civil Service Commission regulation on Aug.

19, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 1687, and by statute on

March 27, 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. lv 1980).

See Manual For Administrative Law Judges Prepared

for the Admiistrative Conference of the United

States, Published in 1972, Revised Edition 1982, by

Merritt Ruhlen Administrative Law Judge, Retired;

Circular of Maria Lucia Johnson, confirmed by

the United States Senate as Vice-Chair of U.S.

Merit Systems Protection Board, 1983, upon her

27

The enforcement policy of DCCA

violate Petitioner's federal

constitutional rights under the Const.

Amend. 1, right to speak of his former

employment title “Administrative Law

Judge" with the District of Columbia

Senate testimony that she was a "former

Administrative Law Judge with the District of

Columbia Rental Accommodations Office, and formerly

Chief Administrative Judge, D.C. Temporary Appeals

Panel, at 43 provides: *...She has also been...an

Administrative Judge with the District of Columbia

Rental Accommodations Office (RAO);

Certification of Simon Banks & Associates by

the Government of the District of Columbia Minority

Business Opportunity Commission, Charlotte G.

Chapman, chairperson, certified and registering

Simon Banks & Associates as “Administrative Law

Judge & Hearing Examiners, Legal Consultants”,

Certification Number 3495, dated February 21, 1980;

Memorandum of Warren M. Cruise, Esq.

Executive Director of District of Columbia Office

of Employee Appeals, dated November 8, 1991,

provides:

“Re: Title Change of Hearing

examiners. Beginning November 12,

1991, the title of “Hearing Examiner”

is to change to “Administrative

“. This change should be made on

all outgoing documents which now

contain the title “Hearing Examiner".

Decisions written on or after November

12, 1991 should reflect this title

change.”

28

Government .?? The speech restriction

constitute prior restraint and is

17 These unwarranted speech restrictions have

been held unconstitutional by the Courts.

D.C.C.A.'s continuing injunction precluding Banks

from using his former title “Administrative Law

Judge", while it permits the employees of the

District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals and

the District of Columbia Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs Agency, to change the name of its “Hearing

Examiners” to “Administrative Law Judge”, without

punishment or similar prohibition, operates as an

unreasonable restraint on the liberty of contract

in violation of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 5. See

Careleton Scryw Products Co. v. Fleming, C.C.A.

Minn. (1974), 126 F.2d 537, and D.C.C.A.'s action

violates Banks rights under the Privileges and

Immunities Clause. See Friedman v. Supreme Court of

yirajala, 822 F.2d 423, U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, §

2, Ci. I.

D.C.C.A.'s discriminatory enforcement of Rule

49 against Banks violates Article IV, § 2 of the

Constitution which provides:

"Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all

privileges and immunities of Citizens of the

several states.” See New Hampshire v. Piper, 470

U.S.284."

Further, D.C.C.A.'s discriminatory

enforcement of D.C.C.A. Rule 49, does not bear a

substantial relationship to the District of

Columbia Government's ligitimate/rational

objectives. Piper, supra, 470 U.S. at 284, 105

S.Ct. at 1279; United Building & Construction

ad Vv. ° i , 465

U.S. 209, 104 S.Ct. 1020.

"Congress intended doctrines of federal law

uniformly to prevail over inconsisgtent local

rules," Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.

650, 653, 85 S.Ct. 614 (1964).

“Federal regulations preempt state law or

municipal ordinance. U.S. ex - Goodwi

Karnuth, D.C. N.Y. 1947, 74 F. Supp. 660.

29

arbitrary, capricious, and prejudicial to

Petitioner's rights and, constitute an

abuse of discretion and is further in

violation of the District of columbia

Administrative Procedures Act, ([DCAPA]}.

D.C. Code, §1-1501, in that it deprives

Petitioner of due process of law and

substantive procedural rights. The

D.C.C.A.-CUPL in its enforcement of D.C.

App. Ct. Rule 49 arbitrarily, irrationally

ignored, failed to credit or follow the

rules of the administrative agencies

providing for lay representation of

parties before the D.C. Office of Employee

Appeals [D.C. OEA], and the D.C. Office of

Human Rights, the EEOC and the Merit

Systems Protection Board and

Administrative Agencies of the United

30

States, in violation of law.?® The

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

opined, in Wallace v. District of Columbia

Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.

App., 289 A.2d 885 (1972), District of

Columbia Agencies must comply with the

DCAPA -- specifically, D.C. Code, §1l-

509(d), when enforcing conflicting rules

and grant the parties their appropriate

procedural rights -- that any conflicting

practices were superseded by the DCAPA.

Banks alleged in his removal

pleadings that the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized

18

COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRED TO FOLLOW

AGENCY'S CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE IF

THAT On I SIBLE

The Court of Appeals was obliged to follow

construction of statute by agency charged with its

administration if that construction was “reasonably

See Nat. Treasury Employees U. v. U.S. Merit

Systems, 743 F.2d 895, at 898 (1984).

31

”

Practice of Law discriminatorily and

selectively perceives and unlawfully

maintains that his representation of

clients before administrative agencies of

the District of Columbia and of the United

States constitute unauthorized practice of

19 and that this

perception/misconception which governs

19 stuart Pierson, Chairman of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals, with the consent and

knowledge of the D.C. Court of Appeals, has

repeatedly stated to virtually all clients of Banks

that Banks’ representation of parties before

administrative agencies that permit lay

representation, constitute unauthorized practice of

law for purposes of creating a hostile work

atmosphere for Banks and to influence complaints

and breach of contracts against Banks. This false

and malicious representation of fact has been aided

and abeted by the actions of cooperating defendants

Banks sued in related cases for for facilitating

boycotts against Banks and for engaging in

restraint on trade and RICO conspiracies against

Banks. Banks’ client list have been turned over to

the D.c. Court of Appeals and Stuart Pierson by

RICO participants and co-conspirators which include

state and federal employees of the District of

Columbia Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, the

District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeal, and

the United states Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, in Banks v. D.C. Government, et al, 89-

0871, Banks v. Dixon, Civil Action 91-3099 {a/k/a

Banks v. Aubrey H. Edwards, et al, No. 94-5058 -

USCA DC] Banks v. Teitelman, et al 93-152 [a/k/a

n s tv el Teitelman, et al,

No. 94-557 -- USCA DC]

32

perception/misconception which governs

DCCA-CUPL's prosecution and persecution of

Banks has been condoned by the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals in violation of

clearly established law that a reasonable

person would know. See Brookens v.

Committee On Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538

A.2da 1120 (1988)

20 In Brookens the Court opined, "Lay

Practice Before D.C. Agencies," holding:

"Since 1979, Brookens has appeared on

behalf of clients at hearings before the

Rental Accommoations Office. The

Committee urges that these appearances

constitute the practice of law, and

because Brookens is not a member of the

District of Columbia Bar, these

appearances constitute the unauthorized

practice of law as defined in D.C. App. R.

49 (b). Following a hearing on the issue,

the court held:

"Respondent's activities before the Rental

Accommodations Office must be considered

in a different light. Because Rule 49

does not deal with representation of

others before administrative agencies, and

because in this instance respondent's

activities before the Rental

Accommodations Office were authorized

33

under the rules of that agency, the Court

concludes that respondent has not engaged

in the unauthorized practice of law, and

has not violated Rule 49, by representing

persons other than himself before the

Rental Accommodations Office." Mem. Op. at

9.

"The Committee advances two main arguments

designed to establish that the court's

ruling is erroneous. First, the Committee

argues that any District of Columbia

agency regulation that purports to permit

anyone other than an attorney licensed to

practice law in the District of Columbia

to appear on behalf of clients is invalid

because it exceeds the scope of the

Distict of Columbia Administrative

Procedure Act. D.C. Code §§ 1-1501 et seq.

(1981). D.C. Code § 1-1509 (b) provides

in part that "[e]very party [in a

contested case] shall have the right to

present in person or by counsel his case

or defense.." The Committee argues that

D.C. Code § 11-1509 (b) should be

interpreted to limit a litigant in an

agency proceeding to one of two choices:

representing himself or hiring an active

membe of the District of Columbia Bar to

act as counsel. Accordingly, the

Committee asks this court to find that the

agency rule at issue in this case, 14 DCMR

§3202.1 (1986), is ultra vires this part

of the D.C. Administrative Procedure

Act....--

",.,...The Committee urges that the agency

rule, 14 DCMR 3202.1 is ultra vires D.C.

34

Code § 1-1509 (b) which provides that

"l[e]very party in a contested case] shall

have the right to present in person or by

counsel his case or defense." The

Committee argues that because the

regulation is ultra vires the District of

Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, it

is invalid. We disagree.

"On its face, D.C. Code § 1-1509 (b)

articulates the rights of a party to

representation in contested cases before

administrative agencies of the District of

Columbia. Since the provision lists a

party's minimum entitlements - pro se

appearance or representation by counsel -

it leaves open the possibility that a

gency might wish to expand those in the

legislative history of this right to

include, perhaps, lay representation. ..."

",.....-Nothing in the legislative history

of this D.C. Code provision suggests

otherwise. Pub. L. No. 90-614, § 10, 82

Stat. 1208 (Oct. 21, 1986); H.R. Rep. No.

202, 90th Cong., list Sess. (1967); S. Rep.

No. 1581, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1968)..Indeed, the only reference to the

stutorily provided breadth of

representation due parties in contested

cases is to be found in Senat's summary of

the Bill's provisions..".." We hold,

therefore, that the regulations of the

Rental Accommodations Office authorizing

lay representation of a party not ultra

vires D.C Code § 1-1509 (b)."

35

Petitioner alleged that he hae been

deni.g and cannot enforce in the state

cour. of the District of Columbia his

righ, under federal law. The federal law

inVO.ed providing Petitioner with federal

righ, yHdet iaws, ules, regilatione

afforging Hae B4uai Givil #ighte.?!

Thesg fadatad #ighhd HEAVIER HAELELAHAE, A

non-yemee ft the Hiaheteh BF FAtHnte

Bar, with the Fight te Fepreaent partier

before administrative agencies of the

United States and before 706 state

agencies that contract with the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission for the right to investigate

These rights include but are not limited to:

Title VIE of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, Section Pi? of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,

Executive Order 11246, § U.S.C, § BLOB, 29 C.F.R,

s 3623,320¢0) 29 S LEL3 DLP, BEL, OE and €O46, and

29 C.BLR, $ LOLA, 106, 29 C.FLR, § 1619, 608, and 29

C.F.R, § 18901, 79,

46

and econeiliate diserimination ecomplainte,

D.C.C.A. Rule 49 and DCRA's Consumer

Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA] D.C.

Code § 28-3904 (1991), unreasonably,

impermissibly and irrationally

discriminates against Petitioner atid

peOHibite the eeeteiee oF these federal

biqlita;, AHA ANTE 49 Ane Lhe Bi heeeaHeHe

LHaFARY FHFLNAE Aepeivee Hanke At bheee

federat Fighke by making +h HAlawhut for

Banks to exercise these federal rights,

The Court has authorized removal in

cases setting forth deprivation of federal

rights under state law. See 28 U.S.C. §

1443. See Georgia v. Rachel, et al, 384

U.S. 780, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379

U.S. 306.2?

The D.C. Court of Appeale, hae selectively

authorized Stuart Pierson and DC CUPL to

create a hostile work environment, ?°

in the removal petition were true, prosecution in

ae etate court, under a peeeeee similar to the

sane etatues is famm, denied ma fist)

al "tat : st

Trae

7

ay

if -

rr °

i rit +

leave so eit for racial renqens,

(a4) ... @ basis for peer! = the equivalent of

a state statute 7. > pretieres

a requirement Becy pry one Seaee fl

Lapreials “eas 9) Sata eh

, 100 u.s. 303; ’ 00

u.s. p. 794-604.

Banks allege that the D.C.C.A. by and through ites

— ees, 0.C.C.A. CUPL, particularly James

Schaller and Stuart Pierson, Chairman and former

Chairman of 0.C.C.A. CUPL, respectively, and others

peo ae in concert with them influenced Banke’

ients to relinquish their contractual obligation

with Banks, influenced Banks’ clients to falsely

etate that they believed Banks is a licensed member

ef the Dietrict of Columbia Bar notwithstanding

their having executed disclosure statements to the

te eat \3 B.. a renee on Pan

privacy protec personnel information about Banks

and Banke’ cliente te be published ia violation of

the privacy act and in violation ef 5 08,0,

38

frustrate and oth ey wise interfere with

Banks! ability to enforce his federal

rights and contracts arising out of Banks’

exercise of federal rights by allowing

Stuart Pierson te “SC ‘the power and

infiuenee of the B.65 COUFt Of Appeals to

waste the ddentitie® Of Banks’ clients

aid theteathae taéiyence Banks' clients to

fits Samptatnke agaénst Banks and these

compleinpte heave keep utilized by Stuart

Pierson [Chairman 0D.C.C.A. CUPL] to

selectively prosecute Banks and influence

552(a), that CUPL stigmatized and interferred with

Banks’ contracts, contractual relations, and

ability to make and enforce contracts, caused self-

serving false, adverse, stigmatizing information to

be published in the Legal Times, a co-defendant of

D.C.C.A. CUPL, in @ case brought by Banks, and that

these actions were done with impugnity, condoned by

D.C.C.A., When CUPL substantially relied upon

absolute immunity of D.C.C.A. and its employees

bes carrying out these malicious, wrongful attacks

By, and van abus ereating a hostile work

sive work environment for

gr violation law. The Supreme Court

banks the contents ea an abusive and hostile

werk environment. See

Qeresa Harris v. Forklift

®2~168, decided Nov. 9, 1993, citing

Sector Savihsa Banks s,Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66

(1d88)

49

others to prosecute Banks for exercising

rights under federal laws providing for

equal civil rights under the pretext of

prosecuting D.C. Ct. App. Rule 49.

Notwithstanding Banks’ restricted

representation of parties before federal

administrative agencies and administrative

agencies of the District of Columbia that

do not require a license to practice law,

Banks has been denied and cannot enforce

these statutory and federal rights in the

courts of the District of Columbia.

D.C.C.A. and its Committee "CUPL" and

the District of Columbia Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs Agency has selectively

interpreted and enforced D.C. App. R. 49

against Banks as_ precluding the

representation of parties before

administrative agencies by persons whom

are not licensed to practice law in the

District of Columbia and whom purport to

be the functional equivalent of a member

of the District of Columbia Bar. See Op.

of D.C.C.A. in In re Simon Banks, No. 91-

AA-883 (Decided December 6, 1993) thereby

violating Banks' rights protected by the

First Amendment, the Due Process Clause,

24 the Equal Protection Clause and the

24 The actions of the DCCA-CUPL, DCCA and

District of Columbia Consumer & Regulatory Affair

are irrational and effectively denies Banks due

process rights. The Courts have held that an

irrational decision denys substantive due process,

See Shelton v. Station, 780 F.2d 475. The actions

are arbitrary and unreasonable. See Unity Ventures

v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend

5S. In

. , 859 F.2d 929, the court held:

“Substantive due process prevents governmental

power from being used for purposes of oppression or

abuse of government power tht shocks the

conscience, or action that is legally irrational in

that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate

state interest.

The Courts have opined: “Due process includes

an impartial tribunal. See Melton v. City of

Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706. See further, Board of

, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.

Regents v. Roth

Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

The courts have granted mandamus against

judge where there was clear usurpation of power

and/or where the court has acted arbitrarily and in

disregard of appropriate safeguards, i.e. in

violation of established procedural rights. See

F e Ti 4 Ve e &

41

25

Privileges and Immunities Clause.

-, CA. Md. 1970, 431 F.2d 1199, cert

er 91 s.ct. 1196.

The Courts have held that: "Citizens of the

United States are afforded Constitutional

protection against deprivation of property without

due process of law. Such protection is available

to persons arbitrarily deprived of their rights by

state and federal action whether under guise of

legislative authority or otherwise. See

Wagne, Inc. v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207 (1915); Gotkin

v. Miller (1957, CA N.Y.) 514 F.2d 125;

(1972), 408 U.S. 564 (1972);

F v. ev 72), 407 U.S. 167; Perry v.

Sinderman (1972) 408 U.S. 593, and 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

The D.C. Code [DCAPA] § 1-1509 sets forth the

procedures required of District of Columbia

Agencies, and the rights of parties in contested

cases -- and the legal rights, duties, or

privileges of specific parties and _ their

representatives as required by law. Chevy Chas

‘ Vv P

D.C. App., 327 A.2d 310 (1974), and agency actions

may be set aside when the agency's action does not

accord a party the procedural rights provided by

the D.C. Code, 1-1509(b) See Carey v. District

t Comp. Bd., D.C. App. 304 A.2d 18

U

(1973).

The Courts have opined: "The concept of

Substantive Due Process invest judges with

uncanalized discretion to invalidate federal and

state action that violates the constitution. See

| | ‘n_v. Falk, 818 F.2d

1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987).

25~The Privileges and Immunities Clause

provide that:

“Citizens of each state shall be

entitled to all privileges and

immunities of citizens of the serval

states." See New Hampshire v. Piper,

42

D.C.C.A. Rule 49 conflicts with

constitutionally proteded federal laws and

are preempted pursuant to the Supremacy

Clause.*® Banks further alleged that the

D.C.C.A. Rule 49 has been selectively

applied to him, by custom, policy and

practice of D.C.C.A. in a dissimilar and

discriminatory manner, because of his

race, Black, and because Banks filed civil

complaints against the D.C. Court of

470 U.S. 284.

Further, D.C.C.A.'s discriminatory

enforcement of D.C. App. R. 49 against Banks does

not bear a substantial or rational relationship to

the District of Columbia Government’s ligitimate

objectives. Piper, supra, 470 U.S. at 284, United

Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 209.

The Court has stated: “States have an obligation,

under the supremacy clause, to protect federally

guaranteed civil rights as zealously as would

federal courts. Rachel v. State of Ga., 86 S.Ct.

1783.

“When federal law is passed under authority

of Constitution, it is supreme, and state law in

conflict therewith must yeild. Pritchard v. Downie,

D.C. Ark. 1962, 201 F. Supp. 893, affirmed 309 F.2d

634.

43

Appeals for condoning the unlawful

activities of James Schaller, Stuart

Pierson and CUPL.

Banks alleged in his removal petition

that from 1984 to the present he has been

and is being prosecuted in connection with

his attempt to exercise federally

guaranteed rights conferred pursuant to

the civil rights act of 1964,*’ because

he is Black and because he is an advocate

against discrimination in the workplace,

27

The Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. at

792, stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964

---"is clearly a law conferring a specific right of

racial equality, for in § 201 (a) it guarantees to

all the “full and equal enjoyment" of the

facilities of any place of public accommodation

without discrimination on the ground of race. By

that language the Act plainly qualifies as a "law

providing for ...equal civil rights" within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1). ... The Civil

Rights Act of 1964 endows the defendants with a

right not to be prosecuted for such conduct.

" As noted, § 201 (a) guarantees to the

defendants the equal access they sought. section

203 then provides that, "No person shall...(c)

punish or attempt to punish any person for

exercising or attempting to exercise any right or

privilege secured by section 201 or 202.”

(Emphasis supplied.) 78 Stat. 244.

44

and because he regularly brings

discrimination complaints against

employers represented by members of the

District of Columbia Bar. Banks allege

that the actions of DCCA-CUPL and DCRA in

its enforcement of D.C. App. Ct. R. 49 is

violative of rights protected by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. *8 Banks further allege that he

- SECTION 1983

In 1979 Congress extended Section 1983 to

make it available as a remedy for deprivations of

federal rights by officials acting under color of

the laws of the District of Columbia. Pub. L. No-

170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979). In amending

Section 1983 Congress intended to put citizens of

the District of Columbia on the same footing as

citizens of the states. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.

96-548, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 1 (1979) (purpose of

legislation is “to give citizens of the District of

Columbia rights equal to those of citizens in the

states and territories of the United States”).

Congress thus intended that federal jurisdiction

should extend to vindicate the federal rights of

citizens of the District of Columbia in the same

way it extends to citizens of the states.

In a case such as the instant case where the

official policy is to selectively and

discriminatorily enforce D.C.C.A. Rule, 49, DCRA-

CPPA and other laws against Banks, the court has

held such official policy unlawful. See Monell v.

New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978), See also Pembour v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.s. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).

Federal intervention is warranted because

45

also represented a former’ secretary

employee of Stuart Pierson and the law

firm of Davis Wright Tremaine, for sexual

harassment. Davis Wright Tremaine employs

Stuart Pierson, Chairman of the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on

Unauthorized Practice of law. Banks has

filed suit against DCCA, DCCA-CUPL, James

Schaller, [former Chairman of DCCA-CUPL]

Jackson & Campbell [Schaller's law firm],

Stuart Pierson, and Davis Wright Tremaine

ee ee) ee Cd te. Aan el

eee eee

Petitioner cannot receive a fair and full day in

court on his federal constitutional claims by

raising them as a defense in the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals, or the District of

Columbia Courts based upon the consistent apparent

boycott of these federal rights. This case consist

of the extraordinary circumstances that Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 envision that provide that

federal courts may not enjoin on-going state

criminal proceedings. The United states District

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit

has not determined whether the Younger doctrine is

applicable to the federal courts in the District of

Columbia. See Family Division Trial Lawyers v.

Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 701, n.7 (D.C. Cir.1984).

The predicate for Younger abstension is simply

absent in this case.

46

{[Pierson's law firm]. Because Banks civil

suits, DCCA-CUPL has been subjecting Banks

to retaliation and reprisal through their

government positions, for purposes of

manufacturing defenses to the civil suits

and for purposes of oppressing Banks and

depriving Banks [a Black Male] of Civil

Rights, in violation of law. 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

‘ D.C.C.A. in In Re Simon Banks, 561

A.2d 158 (D.C. Appeals, 1987), CUPL

initially charged Banks with leading

untutored public members into believing

that he is a licensed member of the D.C.

Bar merely by holding out that he is

authorized to represent parties before

administrative agencies. Banks countered

with disclosure statements executed by

each client acknowledging that they were

advised that Banks and Job Protectors are

47

not licensed to practice law, that Banks

is a former administratrive law judge,

that Banks has a law degree, and that

Banks is an administrative trial advocate

whom is authorized to represent clients

before federal administrative agencies.

D.C.C.A. nullified Banks’ disclosure

statements opining that statements about

Banks experience as an administrative law

judge and trial advocate and J.D. misleads

the lay public, without the benefit of any

empirical data or survey of clients. The

court substantially based its decision

upon inferences against the evidence on

the record. D.C.C.A. then cited in its

opinion In In re Banks, 561 A.2d 158 (D.C.

1987, 1989) that the defense Banks raised,

regarding his federal rights and the pre-

emption clause, was an issue before the

court in another case. See Brookens v.

48

Committee On Unauthorized Practice of Law,

D.C. 538 A.2d 1120. (1989) Banks

previously [1975-1976] was employed with

the District of Columbia Commission on

Human Rights [DC COHR] as the Chief

Administrative Law Judge. The DC OHR and

the DC COHR's rules, regulations,

specifically provide in its regulatons and

rules that a license to practice law is

not required.?? After Banks advised

D.C.C.A. that he had in excess of 500

disclosures statements, where clients

acknowledge that they were aware that

Banks is not licensed to practice law, but

authorized to represent them pursuant to

statutory law, D.C.C.A. then arbitrarily

determined that Banks' disclosure

statments confused the entire general

29 section 106.8/10 of DCR 56, District of

Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, D.C.

Law 2-38, D.C. Code §§1-2501-1-2557

49

PUDIJSR, withns t acy etetietine) steady ar

any reasonable survey of Banks‘

clients.?°

Banks alleged in the removal of the

Case, that the D.C.C.A. Committee On

Unauthorized Practice of Law and the

D.C.C.A. has seized regulatory authority

Over Banks pursuant to an injunction for

purposes of forcing him out of business,

and thereafter the D.C.C.A. subjected

Banks to discriminatory boycotts and prior

restraint of bBanks' First Amendment

Rights, when it arbitrarily precluded

Banks from stating he is a _ former

administrative law judge or otherwise

using his employment history or describing

his representation of clients as an

“administrative trial advocate” as a

competitive tool to compete against white

30 gee In re Simon Banks, 561 A.2d 158, and

memorandum of Opinion.

50

members of the Rar. in wiolation of the

First Amendment, and in violation of the

Sherman Antitrust Act. The failure of

D.C.C.A. to declare Banks' federal rights

and failure of D.C.C.A. to determine the

constitutionality of D.C.C.A. Rule 49,

resulted in the implementation of a series

of conspiracies in violation of § 1 of the

Sherman Act.

Banks alleged that the D.C.C.A.

boycotted review of his appeal of the case

per curiam and en banc, and that D.C.C.A.

boycotted his motion to vacate, amend or

alter the injunction because of the

pending civil actions and because Banks

filed a complaint against D.C.C.A. Appeals

and Judge Gallagher of D.C.C.A., through

subtle coordinated actions. The Supreme

51

Comrt Aefines boerctts 3) me beyeets

initiated by D.C.C.A. continues and has

been linked to other boycotts influenced

by the D.C.C.A., the D.C. Bar Association,

attorneys employed with the U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, and

other entities controlled by members of

the District of Columbia Bar, whom

boycotted complaints filed by Banks and

boycotted Banks as the representative of

EEO complainants from 1987 to the present

date.

These participants in the boycotts

initiated by the 0D.C.C.A. thru its

Committee CUPL, further boycotted Banks'

31 The Supreme Court has defined a boycott,

at, St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,

438 U.S. 531 (1978, Vv

+, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), as:

"...refusals to deal involving the

coordinated action of multiple actors

++" "...TO boycott means to combine in

refusing to hold relations. See Family

Vv Vv.

725 F.2d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

52

heranse of his us€ Cf his former title

"Aaministrative Law Judge” and

participated in the interference with

Banks contractual relations, prosecution

and persecution of Banks although the

District of Columbia Consumer & Regulatory

Affairs and the District of Columbia

Office of Employee Appeals have changed

the title of “Hearing Examiner" to

"Administrative Judge”, in 1991, sua

sponte by a simple memo. This changed

circumstance warrants and merits

alteration of the injunction precluding

Banks from using or referring to the title

on the basis that the District of Columbia

Government had not adopted the change

affected by the United Civil Service

Commission.?* Thereafter Banks has been

32

37 Fed/ Reg/ 1687, August 19, 1972, and by statute

on March 27, 1978. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. lV)

53

{ |

systematically deprived of a declaration

of the constitutionality of D.C.C.A. Rule

49 pursuant to the judicial boycott and

continuous deprivation of equal protection

of the laws and subjected to retroactive

rulemaking by D.C.C.A and DCRA.??

Because of the D.C.C.A.'s failure to

declare and articulate the scope of Banks'

federal rights under federal law to

represent parties before administrative

agencies coupled with the ambiguity,

33

Petitioner allege that, In In Re Simon Banks

, No. 91-AA-883, decided December

6, 1993, the D.C.C.A. did loo[k] to the future and

co-authored and otherwise chang{ed}) existing

conditions by making a new rule. DCRA Consumer

Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA], D.C. Code § 28-

3904 (1991) to be applied thereafter to all or some

part of those subject to its power. See Prentis v.

, 211 U.S. at 226, and John

Vv

al U.S.C.A. D.C., No. 91-7164, decided June l,

1993.

See Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,

488 U.S. 204 (1988) where the Court held that such

a change in law constitute invalid retroactive

rulemaking.

54

conflicting signals and public

pronouncements of the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized

Practice of Law pursuant in its

enforcement and interpretation of

D.C.C.A.'s Rule 49, Banks has continuously

been a victim of the boycotts engaged in

and endorsed by the D.C.C.A. under the

pretext of enforcing D.C.C.A. Rule 49,

although clearly established law and

reason reflect that D.C.C.A. Rule 49 is in

conflict with the federal rights Banks

seek to exercise under clearly established

federal laws and District of Columbia

Administrative Law.** D.C.C.A. Ct. Rule 49

essentially maintain that any

34

29 C.F.R. §1614.214(b), 29 C.F.R. §1614.605, 29

C.F.R. § 1201.31. See also

Brookens v. Committee

Qn Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120

(1988).

55

representative capacity by a non-licensed

member of the Bar, that involves

interpreting, assessing and prosecuting

issues of law, constitute unauthorized

practice of law under D.C. Law, when said

actor is not a member of the District of

Columbia Bar. This provision has been

selectively and discriminatorily enforced

against Banks. As a result of the

selective prosecutorial conduct of DCCA

CUPL, Banks has suffered a continuing

violation of his constitutional and

federal rights under federal laws that

afford such right without the requirement.

This interpretation, however, is only

applied to Banks because he is Black,

while out-of-state white attorneys not

licensed to practice law in the District

of Columbia are not subjected to any

sanction or scrutiny with respect to their

56

regular practice before administrative

agencies. There are no pro hac vice

requirements for attorneys practing

before District of Columbia and Federal

Administrative agencies that are enforced

against attorneys, whom primarily are

white. In fact these white attorneys not

licensed to practice law in the District

of Columbia are given a “constructive

waiver" and are arbitrarily excluded from

the purview of D.C.C.A. Rule 49 and the

District of Columbia Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs Consumer Protection

Procedures Act [CPPA],°° while Banks is

35

See Opinion of D.C. Ct. of App. in In re Simon

Banks, No. 91-AA-883, at p."A" 43, [Decided Dec.

6, 1993] [See Dr. Simon Banks’ Petition For Writ of

Certiorari, - Banks v. DCRA] - where the court

provides:

“This court also exercises some

authority over the unauthorized

practice of law by nonlawyers, see

D.C. App. R. 49, but there is no

statutory or other authority to the

effect that our power over the

unauthorized practice of law is

57

vigorously singled out for’ selective

prosecution for his enjoyment and exercise

of the same benefits and privileges

afforded by federal law, in violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of U.S.C.A.

Const. Amend 14 §1.°°.

The D.C.C.A. has systematically and

historically not prosecuted white members

of the District of Columbia Bar and white

members of other state bars’~ that

represented parties before federal

administrative agencies located in the

District of Columbia. See D.C. Ct. App.R.

46 II (b)(1), the predecessor of D.C.C.A.

Rule 49. The Rule provides specific

exclusive. Although the Consumer

Protection Procedures Act excludes

from its purview the “professional

services of...lawyers,” D.C. Code §

28-3903 (c)(2)(C) (1991)."

36 The Equal Protection Clause of U.S.C.A.

Const. Amend 14 §1, is a “Law Providing Equal

Rights" within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1443. See

Dedd v. Rue, D.C. Ohio 1979, 478 F. Supp. 975.

58

details regarding the import of the phrase

"practice of law,' R.46 II (b)(2) & (3),

and it also excludes from its scope

attorneys who are ‘participating...

before any court of the United States' or

‘before any department, commission or

agency of the United States." See also

Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (1980),

and Simon Banks v. District of Columbia

Department of Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs, No. 91-AA-883, decided December

6, 1993.

The Court's Committee treated the

Simones, whom are white, in a different

manner. See § ns v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d

774 (1980) [The District of Columbia Court

of Appeals withdrew its prosecutorial

actions against Morton L. Simons and

Barbara M. Simons when it was determined

that these New York attorneys, [not

59

licensed to practice law in the District

of Columbia, restricted their practice to

federal administrative agencies. ] [EMPHASIS

ADDED]

Although Banks stands on the same if

not greater footing as the Simonses, in

addition to the fact that Banks does

reflect in his stationary, business card

and business advertisements, that he

limits his representation before

administrative agencies, Stuart Pierson,

James Schaller, the CUPL and persons and

entities acting in concert with them have

sought to treat Banks in a dissimilar

manner from the way D.C.C.A. treats the

Simonses and other whites.

There is no dispute that the CUPL

have never presented or prosecuted any

case against Banks connected with any

representation on behalf of clients by

60

Banks before any court in the District of

Columbia.

D.C.C.A. on November, 1987 issued an

injunction based upon the preclusions set

forth in D.C.C.A. Rule 49 notwithstanding

the fact that Banks consistently required

his clients to execute a disclosure

statement acknowledging that they were

aware that Banks is not licensed to

practice law and that Job Protectors is

not licensed to practice law, but that

Banks is licensed thru the regulatory

rules of various administrative agencies

to represent parties before federal and

state administrative agencies whom afford

lay representation of parties. See In re

Simon Banks, 561 A.2d 158.

The District of Columbia Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs Agency [DCRA] in

conspiracy with’ the D.C.C.A. CUPL

61

promulgated new retroactive regulations in

1991 designed to subject Banks’ to

reprisal, on the basis of enforcing D.C.

App. Ct. Rule 49 and the injunction that

arose out of D.C.C.A.'s interpretation of

Rule 49, after Banks sued DCRA in 1989.

37 The New regulations, DCRA's Consumer

Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA] D.C.

Code § 28-3904 (1991) preclude non members

of the bar from even indicating that they

are the functional equivalent of a member

of the Bar, is overly broad and

unconstitutional.

The United States Government

Administrative Agencies established a

boycott operating in concert with

37

See simon Banks v. Aubrey H. Edwards, et al, USCA

DC No. 94-5058 [Aubrey H. Edwards was director of

DCRA. Banks sued DCRA for adopting new retroactive

rules in 1986, precluding Banks from representing

clients before the D.c. Rental Accommodations

office where Banks served as a Chief Hearing

Examiner and Administrative Law Judge}

62

employees of the D.C. Court of Appeals,

James Schaller and Stuart Pierson,

Chairmen of D.C.C.A. CUPL, and these

agencies that employed members of the D.C.

Bar interferred with Banks' ability to

make and enforce contracts in interstate

commerce, based upon Rule 49 and the

injunction that arose out of D.C.C.A.

CUPL's enforcement of D.C.C.A. Rule 49.

Banks sued D.C.C.A., EEOC, the Virginia

Bar, the D.C. Bar, and others’ for

establishing a Racketeering Conspiracy,

and for conspiring to deprive Banks of

civil rights, et cetera. Banks _v.

District of Columbia Government, 89-0871,

Banks v. Dixon, et al, 91-3099; Banks v.

Teitelman, et al, 93-0152.

D.C.C.A.' employees, James Schaller,

Stuart Pierson, CUPL, have initiated and

otherwise triggered retroactive

63

legislation and a boycott of Banks and Job

Protectors in the District of Columbia

DCRA, °° in the State of Virginia, in the

State of Maryland, and they are attempting

to establish a boycott of Banks/Job

Protections and retroactive legislation in

the State of Georgia for purposes of

discriminatorily depriving Banks of

federal rights in the 50 States throughout

the United States. See Pierson's letter

to Cooper, dated December 8, 1993 a

resident of the State of Georgia. °?

Thereby discriminatorily impairing

commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.

38 DCRA Consumer Protective Procedures Act,

Stuart Pierson, Chairman of District of Columbia

Court of Appeals, wrote to Banks’ client C. Roger

Cooper, whom resides in the State of Georgia, on

Decembr 8, 1993, urging Cooper, two days subsequent

to the D.C.C.A.'s decision dated December 6, 1993

in In Re Simon Banks v. DCRA, No. 91-AA-883, to

declare that he thought Banks was a licensed

attorney and the functional equivalent to a lawyer,

for prosecutorial reasons, prior to Banks being

afforded opportunity to appeal.

64

CONCLUSION

Banks request this Honorable Court to

remand the case to the United States

District Court for a hearing on the

merits, and direct the District Court to

determine the constitutionality of

D.C.C.A. Rule 49, and provide Banks with a

hearing on his motion to vacate the

injunction, and declare Banks' federal and

statutory rights to represent parties

before administrative agencies that

provide for lay representation of parties,

and to declare Banks' right to refer to

his former employment with the District of

Columbia Government as an Administrative

Law Judge as provided by the First

Amendment, and to determine Banks’ right

to refer to his service as provided by the

First Amendment, as that of an

“administrative trial advocate”

65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DR. SIMON BANKS, J.D.

a/b/a Job Protectors

Former Administrative Law Judges

Petitioner,

Vv.

Civil Action No. 92-1504

STUART F. PIERSON, Chairman,

District of Columbia Court of

Appeals Committee on Unauthorized

Practice of Law,

Respondent.

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on

the Petitioner's Petion for Removal.

After careful consideration of the

petition, and for the reasons set forth in

the accompanying Memorandum, the Court

concludes that this case must be remanded.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case is remanded.

Date: JUL 13, 1992

JOHN GARRETT PENN

CHIEF JUDGE

APP-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DR. SIMON BANKS, J.D.

a/b/a Job Protectors

Former Administrative Law Judges

Petitioner,

Vv.

Civil Action No. 92-1504

STUART F. PIERSON, Chairman,

District of Columbia Court of

Appeals Committee on Unauthorized

Practice of Law,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

This matter is before the Court on

Plaintiff's Petition for Removal. On June

25, 1992, petitioner filed the petition

for removal. The underlying action that

petitioner seeks to remove is In Re Simon

Banks,+ D.C.C.A. No. 92-562, a civil

contempt proceeding brought by the

Committe on Unauthorized Practice of Law

in the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals concerning enforcement of that

1 The Court notes that petitioner has titled

the action to be removed as

£. Pierson. The Court, however, notes that the

action pending in the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals is titled In Re Simon Banks. Therefore, it

appears that petitioner has not properly removed

the pending action.

AAP-2

court's rules.

In his petition for removal,

petitioner alleges that he cannot

effectively enforce his rights in the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

("Court of Appeals"). Petitioner alleges

that the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals Committee on Unauthorized Practice

of Law (the "Committee") is violating his

Civil Rights in the Committee's

enforcement of Rule 49 governing the

unauthorized practice of law. Petitioner

asserts that the that the Committee is

discriminating against petitioner based on

his race and that the Committee is

involved in a_ racketeering-conspiracy

against petitioner.

Upon consideration of the petition

for removal, the Court concludes that the

petition should be denied. The Court

cannot find a basis in law for

petitioner's petition for removal.

An appropriate Order accompanies this

Memorandum.

Date:_JUL 13, 1992

JOHN GARRETT PENN

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 92-8026

92cv01504

In re:

Simon Banks

dba

Job Protectors,

Petitioner

BEFORE: Silberman and

Henderson, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition

for a writ of mandamus and the

preleliminary reply, it is

ORDERED that the petition for a writ

of mandamus be denied. The district court

properly denied Banks' petition for

removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443

because Banks failed to demonstrate that

the proceedings in the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals ("DCCA")

deprives him of a right arising "under a

feder law ‘providing for specific civil

rights stated in terms of racial

equality,'" and that he "is ‘denied or

cannot enforce' the specified federal

rights" in that court. See Johnson v.

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Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1974),

quoting ia v , 384 U.S. 780,

792 (1966). Further, this court is

without jurisdiction to issue a writ of

mandamus to the DCCA, or to review an

order of that court. See District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 476 (1983). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the preliminary

reply be returned to the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on the

Unauthorized Practice of Law. See D.C.

Cir. Rule 7 (j) (1) (no responsive

pleading to a petition for a writ of

mandamus shall be permitted unless

requested by the court).

Per Curiam

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS

No. 92-SP-652

In the Matter of:

Simon Banks,

Respondent.

Before: King and Sullivan, Associate

Judges and Newman,

Senior Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the motions and

supporting affidavits of the Committee on

Unauthorized Practice of Law for a

temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction enjoining the

destruction of business record; an order

to show cause why the respondent should

not be held in contempt for violating this

Court's permanent injunction of November

23, a3e7) and an expansion of the

permanent injunction of November 23, 1987,

it is

ORDERED that the motion for an order

to show cause is granted, and that the

respondent shall show cause within 20 days

from the date of this order why he should

not be held in contempt for violating this

Court's injunction of November 23, 1987;

and it is

ORDERED that the motion for a

temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injuction is granted to the

extent that, prior to the final

disposition of this matter, the

respondent, the respondent's firm which is

doing business under the name "Job

Protector," and all persons, organizations

and affiliates in active concert or

participation with them are restrained

from destroying of otherwise disposing of

any books, records, computer media,

computer data, and any other tangible

objects of any kind in existence after

November 23, 1987 which relate, in any

manner to customers of respondent, the

respondent's firm "Job Protectors," or any

person, organization of affiliate. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for

an expanded permanent injunction is

premature, not ripe for disposition, and

hence is denied.

PER CURIAM

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