Reply Brief — Waite v. Carpenter

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Docket No. 95-798

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IN THE SUPREME COURT.OF

THE UNITED STATES

October 1995 term

GLENN R. WAITE,

Petitioner,

vs.

SCOTT CARPENTER, M.

Bt. Al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Nebraska Supreme Court and

The Nebraska Court of Appeals

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

Glenn R. Waite,

1202 West 28th St

Cheyenne, WY 82001

307-634-8712

Petitioner

Questions Presented

Petitioner rejects the Respondents

restatement of the Questions presented since

this Court always determines whether it has

jurisdiction. The Questions presented are:

(1) May the Nebraska Courts refuse to

determine the federal question of whether

the trial court violated the rights of Glenn

R. Waite, under the 14th amendment to the

U.S. Constitution, by claiming that the

trial court, under the law of the case

doctrine, lacked jurisdiction to consider

his motions when the federal question was

presented for the first time on this appeal?

(2) Can the Nebraska Courts deny Glenn

R. Waite, a resident of Wyoming, his

constitutional rights under Article IV,

section 2, clause 1, and Amendments 1 and 14

of the U.S. Constitution by holding that the

trial court,under law-of-the-case doctrine,

lacked jurisdiction to consider his motions

to vacate a judgment of dismissal alleged to

be void because a disqualified judge heard

arguments at the hearing which lead to

dismissal and the court failed to bring all

indispensable parties into court when the

Nebraska courts allow its own residents the

privilege of vacating a void judgment at any

time (even after decision is affirmed on

appeal ) and the privilege of admitting

newly discovered evidence as if no appeal

had been taken and the privilege of having

all indispensable parties whose rights will

be affected brought into court before a

final decision is rendered?

(3) Did the Nebraska trial court

violate the rights of Glenn R. Waite, under

the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution,

on September 3, 1991, when the court

provided him with a disqualified judge and,

on April 11, 1994, when the court had not

disposed of a Motion for Continuance and

Motion for Change of Judge and had not

provided him with an opportunity to show why

the judge should recuse himself?

ands

s 1 arti

The Respondents state [Brief Opp. ii]

that the petitioner’s list of parties is

acceptable with the exception that the

Petitioner in the underlying proceedings was

"Glenn R. Waite, Personal Representative for

the Estate of Harriet I. Waite, deceased"

not "Glenn R. Waite" as denominated in

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Certiorari". However,"Glenn R. Waite" is the

only real party in interest in the cases.

It was "Glenn R. Waite" who filed the

original cases on April 8, 1995 in the name

of "Glenn R. Waite, Personal Representative

of Harriet I. Waite, deceased". On or About

August 7, 1991, the Respondents filed a

motion for summary judgment against "Glenn

R. Waite, Personal Representative of Harriet

I. Waite, deceased", not against "Glenn R.

Waite". Thereafter, one of the Personal

Representative’s attorneys entered a general

appearance and appeared at the September 3,

1991 hearing. The judgment was only against

the personal representative and another of

his attorneys prosecuted the first appeal

[App. of Pet. 32] and represented only the

personal representative interests. Then, it

was "Glenn R. Waite" who prosecuted the

second appeal [Reply Brief App. 1].

"Glenn R. Waite, Personal

Representative of Harriet I. Waite,

deceas 2d" represents the beneficial

interests of "Glenn R. Waite" in the estate

because he the sole distributee [App. of

Reply Brief 2-4]. A personal representative

of a decedent only represents the benefical

interests of the successors to the estate

assets and the rights of the decedent, but

he cannot represent the individual

constitutional rights and property rights of

the heirs. Therefore, "Glenn R. Waite" is an

indispensabie party in this proceeding in

order to represent his own federal rights.

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TABLE

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in

Questions PreSented....--eee reece eeeeeeeees i

Pime OF PETELOBe cccccccccesseccesecccceces ij

Tahle Of CONTENTS... cccccccccccsscsccceves iii

Table of AuthoOritieS.... cee cceeceseeseses LV

Opinions BELOW... cess eeeeeerereseereceees ]

Summary of the Rebuttal Argument.......+++-- l

Reasons for Granting the Writ....--.-seeeeeed

I. Respondents concede that Petitioner

raised a federal question in his

objection to the Respondents’ motion for

summary affirmance, but fail to point out

that their Motion for Dismissal &

Affirmance and Memorandum Brief for the

first time raised the "law-of-the-case

doctrine" issue which addressed

Petitioner’s rights under Art.IV, sec. 2,

cl. 1 and amendments 1 and 14 of the U.S.

i eee eee eC eee rereeeneed

II. Respondents claim that any federal

question raised by the Petitioner was not

decided adversly to the Petitioner

because the Court of Appeals overruled

the Respondents’ Motion for Summary

Affirmance. However, the Respondents fail

to point out that the Court of Appeals

did in fact decide the "law-of-the-case

doctrine" issue (which was a central

issue raised in the Respondents’ Motion

for Dismissal & Summary Affirmance)

adversly to the Petitioner by finally

holding that, under the law-of-the-case

doctrine, trial court lacked jurisdiction

to consider plaintiff’s motion...........-- 6

Table of Contents ~-Continued

Page

III. Respondents simply state that even

if Petitioner had raised a federal

question below, the two underlying

decisions found at Waite I and Waite MII

are based on sound state law that has. no

bearing on any federal issue. However,

Respondents fail to cite any state cases

to support the fact that the decision in

fact rests on an adequate and independent

state substantive ground.......ccescsevvees 7

eg te ean re peas ea 4 as LO

Cases:

Page

Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 US 70>,

75 Led 690 LTSDE Dc cccncccccrrereresrrveres® 8

Chicago B. & O Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200

US 561, 50 L Ed 596, 26 S Ct 341 (1906).7, 9

Ford v. Georgia, 498 US 411, 112 L Ed2d

935, 111 5S Ct B50 (1991)--eeeeeererrrrrrre® 8

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32

L Ed 2d 556, 92 $ Ct 1983 (1972). eeeeeerrers 4

Goss _v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 42 L Ed 2d

7125, 95 S Ct 129 (1975) ccccccscercseeeree® 4

115 N.W.773 (1908), 73ALR2d 1286.cccccccseces 4

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S., 110 L Ed 2d

332, 110 S Ct 2430 (1990) --eeceereerrerrrr?’ 8

In re Wecker’s Estate, 123 Neb. 504,

P43 WW. 642 (1932) -cececccercseeererrsee’’ 9

Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212,

29 L Ed 2d 423, 91 S Ct 1778 (1971).-+eeee 5

193 NoWe 345 (1923) eccoccccccccccerrcrreess &

Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 99 L Ed 942,

75 S$ Ct 623 (4OGG) ic icdcveeresn cet Cte renee = 5

Security State Bank v- Gugelman, 230

a

Neb. 842, 434 N.W.2d 290 (1989)--++eeeeee%" 9

System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 190 Neb.

682, 211 m.W.26 902 (197s) eccccesoecere” 6, 9

Tank v. Peterson, 928 Neb. 491, 423

NW. 2d 752 (1988).--eeereerrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr® y)

SS

Oe

Table of Authorities - continued

United States v. United States Smelting, R.

& M. Co., 339 US 186, 94 L Ed 750 (1949).10

Waite v. Carpenter, et. al., 1 Neb.

App. 321, 496 N.W.2d 1 (1992)........ 1, 8, 9

Waite v. Carpenter, et. al., 3 Neb.

App. 879, 533 N.W.2d 917 (1992)..7, 8, 9, 10

Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 34

Ce Se S6t, SO © GG OO 42088 « c cccccecaces 5

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 US 470, 37

L Ed2d 82, fe ww Ge a2aee Laer eheoceceeces 2een

Watkins v. Dodson, 159 Neb. 745,

68 Y.W.2 Dae CBewer 6664s 66s toes bebe scesssé 4

Wicker v. Vogel, 246 Neb. 601, 521

& fe) Be yee). |} Pee ee ee ee eee 9

Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 13:

ee Oe Fe aaa eee

Wisconsin v. Constantinea 133,

27 L Ed 2 349, 93 8S Gt SreTTTrey 4

Statutes and Other Authorities:

Neb. Rev. Stat. section 30-24

Tre De) 6506056 6b e bee ees eat ee eee ees 4

U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec 2, cl. 1 and

rrr 2 Me Biles os os eoeeeeebeaceeseans a

Nebraska Constitution, Art. I, sec 13...... 3

Rule 14.1 of the New Rules of the Supreme

Court, 161 F.R.D. 483 (19958) ccccccccccccce ]

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To the Honorable Supreme Court:

Petitioner, Glenn R. Waite, most

respectively requests that this Court grant

his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Nebraska Court of Appeals because (1)

Petitioner set up and claimed a title,

right, privilege or immunity under the U.S.

Constitution, (2) the Nebraska Court of

Appeals decided the federal claims against

the petitioner, and (3) the decision of the

Nebraska Court of Appeals does not rest on

independent and adequate state grounds.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Respondents [Brief Opp. 1] fail to

cite the opinion of the Nebraska Probate

Court which is in the Petition [Pet. 6 and

49-58]. Apparently, the Respondents do not

want this Court to recognize the individual

rights of Petitioner 4s heir of decedent.

Rule 14.1 of the New Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States (161

F.R.D. 483 at 492 (1995) states that the

Petition must include "orders entered in the

case by courts or admininstrative agencies".

This would include any orders by the

Nebraska Probate Court.

SUMMARY OF THE REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

Respondents do concede that Petitioner

raised a title, right, privilege or immunity

under the U.S. Constitution in the

Petitioner’s Objection to Respondents’

Motion for Summary Affirmance [Brief Opp.

4], but Respondents fail to recognize that

(1) the Nebraska Court of Appeals decided

the federal claims against the petitioner,

and (2) the decision of the Nebraska Court

of Appeals does not rest on independent and

adequate state grounds. This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the petition.

ate

+

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

There are three reasons why this Court

should grant the Petition for writ of

Certiorari to the Nebraska Court of Appeals:

(1) Petitioner set up and claimed a title,

right, privilege or immunity under the U.S.

Constitution, (2) The Nebraska Court of

Appeals decided the federal claims against

the petitioner, and (3) the decision of the

Nebraska Court of Appeals does not rest on

independent and adequate state grounds.

I. Respondents concede that Petitioner

raised a federal question in his objection

to the Respondents’ motion for summary

affirmance, but fail to point out that their

Motion for Dismissal & Affirmance and

Memorandum Brief for the first time raised

the "law-of-the-case doctrine" issue which

addressed Petitioner’s rights under Art. IV,

sec 2, cl. 1 and amendments 1 and 14 of the

U.S. Constitution.

The Respondents, W. Scott Carpenter,

M.D. et. al., in their Memorandum Brief in

Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal and

Affirmance argue that Section I of

Appellant’s Brief raises only issues that

should have been raised in the previous

appeal. That Memorandum Brief states:

"Clearly these issues are issues that

should have been raised, and could have

been raised, and probably were raised, by

Appellant in his previous appeal and

fully adjudicated by this court in its

previous opinion. As such, this court’s

previous opinion and the Nebraska Supreme

Court’s overruling of appellant’s

Petition for Review becomes the law of

the case and Appellant is bound by those

decisions."

In opposition to this argument by

Respondents, the Petitioner, referring to

-2-

Section I of his Appellant Brief which

claimed a federal right ("Plaintiff has a4

right of access to the courts protected by

Art. 1 sec 13 of the Nebraska Constitution

and Art. 4, sec. 2, cl. 1 and amendments 1

and 14 of the U.S. Constitution." [Petition

9]}), argued that the federal claim was a new

fact issue not disposed by the previous

appeal and stated the following to support

his federal claim:

"THE TRIAL COURT’S VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT'S

OF GLENN R. WAITE UNDER THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT _TO_ THE UNITED _ STATES

CONSTITUTION IS A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION FOR

2FVIEW IN THIS APPELLATE COURT. In

cooperation with the Appellees, the trial

court as a judicial branch of the State of

Nebraska has twice violated my rights

under the fourteenth amendment to the

United States Constitution which states:

"All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny any person

within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws."

The trial court has twice deprived me of

life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law. First, in the trial court

on September 3, 1991 when 4a disqualifed

judge participated in the hearing and

Second, when the Honorable Judge Kortum

presided in the hearing on plaintiff’s

motion for new trial when a motion and

affidavit of disqualification appeared in

the court records and was not disposed of

prior to the hearing. An application for a

-3-

a

change of judge is timely if made upon the

disqualifying facts, even though this is

beyond the time normally allowed for the

application; Harrington v. Hayes County,

81 Neb.231,115 N.W.773(1908),73ALR2d 1286.

A chose in action is property of

intestate which devolves by statute of

descent upon the next of kin instantly at

death. Neb. Rev. Stat. section 30-2401

(Reissue 1989). Property acquired by

statutory entitlement is protected by the

fourteenth amendment; Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 32 L Ed 2d 556, 92 S$ Ct 1983

(1972). Where the judicial branch of the

State of Nebraska holds a hearing on

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment

raising the issue of unauthorized practice

of law of the personal representative, it

goes to matters of the personal

representative’s good name, reputation,

honor, or integrity. The requirements of

procedural due process are applicable

where a state attaches a badge of infamy

to a citizen. The due process clause

forbids a State from depriving a person of

his liberty without due process of law;

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,

27 L Ed 2d 515, 91 S Ct. 507 (1971) and

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 42 L Ed 2d

725, 95 S Ct 729 (1975). The indispensible

elements of due process are tribunal with

jurisdiction, notice of hearing to the

proper party, and an opportunity for a

fair hearing according to applicable

principles; "Due process of law" implies

the right of the person affected to be

present before the tribunal which

pronounces judgment upon the question of

life, liberty or property, to be heard by

testimony or otherwise and to have the

right of controverting by proof every

material fact which bears on the question

of right in the matter involved; Watkins

v. Dodson, 159 Neb. 745, 68 N.W.2d 508

-i-

(1955). On pages 30 through 34 of

Appellant’s brief, Appellant discusses his

right to be heard by testimony or

otherwise, and how trial court abused this

process.

A fair trial, as required by due

process, requires not only an absence of

actual bias on the part of the judge, but

also that no man be a judge in his own

case or try cases where he has an interest

in the outcome; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.

509, 71 L Ed 749 (1926); Re Murchison, 349

U.S. 133, 99 L Ed 942, 75 S$ Ct 623 (1954);

Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 29 L

Ed 2d 423, 91 S Ct 1778 (1971); and Ward

v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 34 L Ed 2d

267, 93 S Ct 80 (1972). The unfair trial

cannot be corrected upon appeal. See Ward

Ve Monroeville, supra. A financial

interest of a court in its decision

constitutes that an unfair and partial

tribunal within the prohibition of the

14th Amendment; Tumey v. Ohio, supra. In

Tumey v. Ohio, supra, the court stated:

"Every procedure which would offer a

possible temptation to the average man

as a judge to forget the burden of

proof required to convict the

defendant, or which might lead him not

to hold the balance nice, clear and

true between the state and the accused

denies the latter due process of law."

Where the trial court denies a

litigant’s request for a hearing on the

merits and for an opportunity to show why

a judge should recuse himself, it

violates due process under the 14th

amendment; Johnson v. Mississippi, supra.

Even if a litgant failed to move under a

state statute for the disqualification of

a judge to sit, he may urge in the U.S.

Supreme Court that his trial before the

judge violated his 14th amendement

rights; Ward v. Monroeville, supra."

e

—\

It is quite clear that Petitioner set _up

and claimed _a right unr the U, Ss.

C Lo ot lief and

in his obje cates and pte nt onl brief in

opposition to the Respondents’ Motion for

Dismis & Summa irmance.

II. Respondents claim that any federal

question raised by the Petitioner was not

decided adversly to the Petitioner because

the Court of Appeals overruled the

Respondents’ Motion for Summary Affirmance.

However, the Respondents fail to point out

that the Court of Appeals did in fact decide

the “law-of-the-case doctrine" issue (which

was a central issue raised in the

Respondents’ Motion for Dismissal & Summary

Affirmance) adversly to the Petitioner by

finally holding that, under the

law-of-the-case doctrine, trial court lacked

jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s motion.

Respondents state [Brief Opp. 8] that

the requirements that the federal question

was actually decided adversly to Petitioner

are clearly not met.

Respondents are correct that the Court of

Appeals overruled their motion for _ summary

affirmance. However, Respondents fail to

point out from the record that the Court of

Appeals did in fact rule adversly to

Petitioner on the law of the case doctrine

issue [App. of Pet. 22-25]. This issue

involved a federal question which was raised

in the Respondents’ Memorandum Brief in

Support of their Motion for Summary

Affirmance and in Petitioner’s Objection and

Memorandum Brief in Opposition to

Respondents’ Motion as set forth previously.

The law of the case doctrine does not apply

where the issues are different and the

parties are acting in different capacities;

System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 190 Neb. 682,

211 N.W.2d 902 (1973). Petitioner has

-§-

$< I ee

clearly shown that the issue in Waite II 1s

whether the trial court’s judgment in Waite

I is a valid judgment and the issue turns on

a federal question, whereas, in Waite I, the

issue was whether the pleadings were 4a

nullity and the validity of the judgment was

not raised or decided in Waite I. However,

in Waite II, the Court of Appeals decided

the validity of the first judgment which

decision turned on a federal question and

used a local rule or procedure to defeat

federal jurisdiction. In Chicago B. & 0 Ry-

Co. _ V- Illinois, 200 US 561, 50 L Ed 596, 26

S Ct 341 (1906), the court held that failure

to recognize 4 federal right or immunity,

and the decision of the case on some ground

of general or local law, necessarily has the

same effect as if the claim of Federal right

or immunity had been expressly denied.

It is quite clear that the federal

questions raised by the Petitioner were

necessary to the state court’s determination

of the law of the case doctrine issue and

were decided adversly to Petitioner by the

Nebraska Court of Appeals.

III. Respondents simply state that even if

Petitioner had raised 4a federal question

below, the two underlying decisions found at

Waite I and Waite II are based on sound

state law that has no bearing on any federal

issue. However, Respondents fail to cite any

state cases to support the fact that the

decision in fact rests on an adequate and

independent state substantive ground.

Respondents merely state [Brief Opp.

8-9] that the decisions in Waite I and Waite

II are based on sound state law without

citing any state cases to support their

position and without examining the decisions

in substance to see if the decisions do in

fact rest on independent and adequate state

-J-

substantive grounds. This Supreme Court

rejects any claims that an adequate state

ground exists where no state cases are cited

in support of this proposition; Wardius v.

Oregon, 412 US 470, 37 L Ed2d 82, 93 S Ct

2208 (1973). The Supreme Court has an

independent obligation to ascertain whether

an asserted non-federal ground independently

and adequately supports the judgment of a

state court and has a fair or substantial

basis; Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S., 110 L Ed

2a 332, 110 S Ct 2430 (1990). Where a

federal ground being present, it is

incumbent upon the Supreme Court of the

United States, when it is urged that the

decision of a state court rests upon a state

ground, to ascertain for itself, in order

that constitutional guarantees may

appropriately be enforced, whether the

asserted state ground independently and

adequately supports the judgment; Abie State

Bank v. Bryan, 282 US 765,75 Led 690 (1931).

Is the state ground substantially adequate?

In Ford v. Georgia, 498 US 411, 112 L Ed2d

935, 111 $8 Ct 850 (1991), this Court held

that only a state practice that is "firmly

established and regularly followed" at _ the

time at which it is applied may be

interposed to prevent subsequent review

by this Court.

In Waite II, the Court of Appeals held

that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine,

trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider

plaintiff’s motion. However, in Waite II the

issues and questions are different from the

questions in Waite I.

It is an established rule of law in

Nebraska that where the issues and questions

are different between the first appeal and

the second appeal, the "law of the case

doctrine" does not apply; Nedela _v. Mares

Auto Co., 110 Neb. 108, 193 N.W. 345 (1923);

~

-4-

In re Wecker’s Estate, 123 Neb. 504, 243

N.W. 642 (1932); System Meat Co. V. Stewart,

190 Neb. 682, 211 N.W.2d 902 (1973); Tank v.

Peterson, 228 Neb. 491, 423 N.W.2d 752

(1988); Security State Bank v. Gugelman, 230

Neb. 842, 434 N.W.2d 290 (1989); and Wicker

v. Vogel, 246 Neb. 601, 521 N.W.2d 907

(1994). I find no cases in Nebraska which

thange this rule of law.

The Court of Appeals did not strictly

and regularly follow this state procedural

rule in Waite II. In Waite II, the issue is

whether the former judgment is void and

whether the trial court violated the

petitioner’s rights under the 14th amendment

to the U.S. Constitution; whereas in Waite

I, the issue was only whether or not there

was any genuine issue as to any material

fact as to whether the personal

+

representative’s pleadings were a nuiilty.

Is the state ground independent?

The U.S. Supreme Court may review th

liecision of the highest court »f 1 State,

which affirms or denies the validity of the

judgment of an inferior court over which it

has authority if such decision invoives

federal question; Williams v. Bruffy, 10;

U.S. 135 (12 Otto 248) (1880). If the state

ground is so interwoven with the federal

yround as not to be an independent matter or!

is not of sufficient breath to sustain the

judgment without any decision on the federal

ground or is a mere device to prevent

review of the decision upon the federal

question, and if a federal right or immunity

was specially set up and claimed which, if

recognized enforced, would require a

different judgment, the Supreme Court’s

jurisdiction is plai licago B. . © Ry.

Co. v. Illinois, 200 US 561, 50 L Ed 596, 26

} Ct 341 (1906).

[If Waite I is sonstitutionally invalid

©

_

oF

because the trial court and court of appeals

violated Petitioner’s 14th amendment rights,

then it would require a different judgment

in Waite II because the "law-of-the-case"

doctrine like res judicata does not apply

where the former judgment is

constitutionally invalid or not final;

United States v. United States Smelting, R.

& M. Co., 339 U S 186, 94 L Ed 750 (1949).

Furthermore, cases 38269, 38270, and

38279 assigned to Judge Robert O. Hippe in

the Scotts Bluff District are still pending

and the federal case against Judge Robert O.

Hippe and Attorney James A. Snowden is still

pending on appeal (App. of Pet. 87-88).

It is clear that the Judgment in Waite

v. Carpenter, et. al., 3 Neb. App. 879, 533

N.W.2d 917 (1992) does not rest on adequate

and independent substantive state grounds.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner, Glenn R. Waite, prays’ that

this Court will grant his petition for writ

of certiorari to the Nebraska Court of

Appeals because (1) Petitioner set up and

claimed a title, right, privilege or

immunity under the U.S. Constitution, (2)

the Nebraska Court of Appeals decided the

federal claims against the petitioner, and

(3) the decision of the Nebraska Court of

Appeals does not rest on independent and

adequate substantive state grounds. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257.

Respectively Submitted,

Glenn R. Waite

Petitioner

1202 West 28th St.

Cheyenne, WY 82001

307-634-8712

-10-

REPLY BRIEF APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notice of Appeal rrr rer rye Peet sal cee

APPENDIX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTTS BLU!

COUNTY, NEBRASKA

GLENN R. WAITE, )

Plaintiff, NO.

W. SCOTT CARPENTER, M.D., NOTICE

REGIONAL WEST MEDICAL CENTER, ) OF

SCOTTSBLUFF INTERNAL APPEAL

MEDICINE GROUP,

Defendants.

TO: W. SCOTT CARPENTER, M.D.; REGIONAI WES

MEDICAL CENTER; AND SCOTTSBLUFF INTERNAI

MEDICINE GROUP AND THEIR ATTORNEYS )F

RECORD: Mark E. Novotny, 10306 Regency

Parkway Dr., Omaha, NE 68114; & James A.

Snowden, 1000 NBC Center, Lincoln, NE 68505;

Plaintiff, Glenn R. Waite,

individually, as the sole distributee and

sole beneficiary of the estate of Harriet

Waite hereby notifies you that he intends t

prosecute an appeal to the COURT OF APPEALS

/ SUPREME COURT for the State of Nebraska

from the decision of the honorable Judge

Alfred J. Kortum on April 18, 1994 in which

he overruled the Plaintiff’s Motion for New

Trial which was heard by Judge Kortum

chambers.

nated this the_2nd day yf May 1994.

GLENN R. WALI

Plaintiff

1202 West St t

ad <7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that

he caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Notice of Appeal to be served upon

Mark E. Novotny, 10306 Regency Parkway Dr.,

Omaha, NE 68114; and James A. Snowden, 1000

NBC Center, Lincoln, NE 68508 by regular U.

S. Mail this the_2d day of__May 1994.

Glenn R. Waite

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF SHERIDAN COUNTY,

NEBRASKA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ) NO. PRIO-78

ESTATE OF HARRIET ) DISTRIBUTION OF

I. WAITE, Deceased ) ESTATE ASSETS

COMES NOW, Glenn R. Waite, Personal

Representative of the above decedent, and

hereby, pursuant to section 30-24,105 of the

Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1989), assigns,

tranfers and releases all interests in the

foliowing estate asset:

the chose in action involving a claim

for negligence in the care and treatment of

the Decedent, Harriet I. Waite,

to himself, Glenn R. Waite,

individually, who is the sole heir at law

under intestate succession and the sole

beneficiary of the decedent’s estate.

Glenn R. Waite, Personal Representative

of the above decedent, being first duly

Sworn on oath, deposes and states the

following based on personal knowledge:

Harriet I. Waite died intestate on

April 17, 1989 and her only surviving spouse

was Peter A. Waite, and her only surviving

issue were Beverly E. Sipple, natural

daughter; Doris R. Butler, natural daughter;

and Glenn R. Waite, natural son. Peter A.

Waite, Beverly E. Sipple, Doris R. Butler,

and Glenn R. Waite are the sole and only

heirs at law of the above decedent. There

are no other natural or legal heirs.

-2=-

All heirs, excepting Glenn R. Waite,

have filed with the clerk of this court 4a

written instrument of Renunciation of

Succession, Affidavit, and Assignment. This

leaves Glenn R. Waite to be the sole

surviving heir at law under intestate

succession.

Glenn R. Waite

Personal Representative

1202 West 28th St.

Cheyenne, WY 82001

STATE OF WYOMING )} ss.

‘OUNTY OF LARAMIE )

ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

Before me personally appeared Glenn R.

waite and he acknowledged the above document

and signed the execution of the above in my

presence.

Notary Public

Dated this the 29th day of November 1995.

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF SHERIDAN COUNTY,

NEBRASKA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ) NO. PRIO-78

ESTATE OF HARRIET ) DISTRIBUTION OF

I. WAITE, Deceased ) ESTATE ASSETS

COMES NOW, Glenn R. Waite, Personal

Representative of the above decedent, and

hereby, pursuant to section 30-24,105 of the

Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1989), assigns,

tranfers and releases all interests in the

following estate assets:

Any and all property, real or personal,

wherever stituated; any and all causes of

action, and any other estate assets,

wherever situated,

to himself, Glenn R. Waite,

individually, who is the sole heir at law

under intestate succession and the _ sole

beneficiary of the decedent’s estate.

Glenn R. Waite, Personal Representative

of the above decedent, being first duly

Sworn on oath, deposes and states the

following based on personal knowledge:

Harriet I. Waite died intestate on

April 17, 1989 and her only surviving spouse

was Peter A. Waite, and her only surviving

issue were Beverly E. Sipple, natural

daughter; Doris R. Butler, natural daughter;

and Glenn R. Waite, natural son. Peter A.

Waite, Beverly E. Sipple, Doris R. Butler,

and Glenn R. Waite are the sole and only

heirs at law of the above decedent. There

are no other natural or legal heirs or

interested persons in the estate. The

decedent had no debts when she died and

there have never been any claims filed

against the personal representative.

All heirs, excepting Glenn R. Waite,

have filed with the clerk of this court a

written instrument of Renunciation of

Succession, Affidavit, and Assignment. This

leaves Glenn R. Waite to be the sole

Surviving heir at law under intestate

Succession and sole distributee.

Glenn R. Waite

Personal Representative

1202 West 28th St.

Cheyenne, WY 82001

STATE OF WYOMING ) Ss.

COUNTY OF LARAMIE )

ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

Before me personally appeared Glenn R.

Waite and he acknowledged the above document

and signed the execution of the above in my

presence.

Notary Public

Dated this the__lst. day of__November_ 1995.

—

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