Opinion — United States v. Freeman

UNITED STATES v. FREEMAN. 117

Argument for the United States.

UNITED STATES v. FREEMAN.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

No. 481. Argued October 21, 1915.—Decided November 15, 1915.

The act prohibited by § 240, Criminal Code, making it punishable to

ship or cause to be shipped from one State into another State or from

a foreign country into a State, a package of intoxicating liquor not

marked as required by the statute is essentially a continuing act the

performance whereof is begun when the package is delivered to the

carrier and completed when it reaches its destination.

The word “ship” as used in § 240, Criminal Code, is not used in the

sense of “deliver for shipment,”’ making the offense a completed one

upon delivery of the goods.

A criminal statute applicable alike to shipments in interstate and

foreign commerce will not be so construed as to render it obviously

futile as to foreign commerce; it should be so construed, if its words

permit, as to cause it to reach both classes of shipments and to

accomplish the object of its enactment.

Section 240, Criminal Code, refers to the continuing act of shipping

goods whereby the transportation into a State is accomplished, and

the District Court within the State into which the goods are shipped

has jurisdiction of the offense under § 42, Judicial Code, as well

as the District Court within the State from which the goods are

shipped.

Tue facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District

Court of the offense of shipping intoxicating liquor in

interstate and foreign commerce in violation of, and the

construction of § 240, Criminal Code, are stated in the

opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren for the United

States:

OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

Argument for the United States. 239 U.S.

The United States District Court for the District of

Kansas has jurisdiction of the prosecution of the de-

fendant in error for shipping the unlabeled packages

from Missouri into Kansas, inasmuch as the offense

‘ was not complete when the unlabeled packages were

delivered to the carrier, but continued throughout their

transportation.

The offense ‘‘causing” to be shipped constitutes a

separate crime from ‘“‘shipping” and is capable of per-

formance in a separate district.

In support of these contentions, see Adams Exp. Co. v.

Kentucky, 238 U. 8. 190; American Steel Co. v. Speed, 192

U. S. 500; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S.

56; Bates v. United States, 10 Fed. Rep. 92; Benson v.

Henkel, 198 U. S. 1; Bridgeman v. United States, 140 Fed.

Rep. 577; Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. Rep. 62;

Davis v. United States, 104 Fed. Rep. 136; Dealy v. United

States, 152 U. S. 5389; Demolli v. United States, 144 Fed.

Rep. 363; Fechteler v. Whitmore, 205 Massachusetts, 6;

2 Foster’s Fed. Prac. (5th ed.), p. 1706; Garfield Coal Co.

v. Penn Coal Co., 199 Massachusetts, 23; Haas v. Henkel,

216 U. S. 462; Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U. S. 57; Hyde v.

Shine, 199 U. 8S. 62; Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568;

Ledon v. Havermeyer, 121 N. Y. 179; In re Palliser, 136

U. S. 257; Perara v. United States, 221 Fed. Rep. 213;

Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 687; Rhodes v. Iowa,

170 U. S. 412; Simpson v. State, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75;

Southern Steel Co. v. Hickman, 190 Fed. Rep. 890; Still-

man v. White Rock Co., 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13446; United

States v. Bebout, 28 Fed. Rep. 522; United States v. Bick-

ford, 4 Blatchf. 337; United States v. Chavez, 228 U.S. 525;

' United States v. 87 Barrels, 180 Fed. Rep. 215; United

States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305; United States v. Hartwell,

6 Wall. 385; United States v. Hopkins Co., 199 Fed. Rep.

649; United States v. Murphy, 91 Fed. Rep. 120; United

States v. Smith, 115 Fed. Rep. 423; United States v.

UNITED STATES »v. FREEMAN. 119

239 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

Thayer, 209 U. S. 39; United States v. Union Supply Co.,

215 U. S. 50; United States v. White, 25 Fed. Rep. “16;

United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; U. S. Express Co.

v. Friedman, 191 Fed. Rep. 1673; Vance v. Vandercook

Co., 170 U.S. 438; West Virginia v. Adams Exp. Co., 219

Fed. Rep. 797; Wharton, Crim. Law (11th ed.), Vol. 1,

pp. 404, 423.

There was no appearance or brief for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Van Devanrer delivered the opinion of

the court.

This is an indictment under § 240 of the Criminal Code

making it a punishable offense knowingly to ‘‘ship or

cause to be shipped from one State, . - - into any

other State, . . . or from any foreign country into

any State, . . .” any package of or containing in-

toxicating liquor of any kind, “unless such package be

so labeled on the outside cover as to plainly show the name

of the consignee, the nature of its contents, and the quan-

tity contained therein.” The indictment was returned

in the District of Kansas and charges the defendant with

violating the statute by knowingly shipping and causing

to be shipped from Joplin, Missouri, into Cherokee County,

Kansas, six unlabeled trunks severally containing from

twelve to fifteen gallons of intoxicating liquor. By a

motion to quash and a demurrer it was objected that the

offense denounced by the statute is complete when the

package is delivered to the carrier for shipment, and

therefore that the offense charged was not cognizable

in the District of Kansas but only in the Western District

of Missouri. Acceding to this construction of the statute,

the District Court sustained the motion to quash and the

demurrer and entered a judgment discharging the defend-

ant. The Government brings the case here under the

120 OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

Opinion of the Court. 239 U. 8.

Criminal Appeals Act, of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat.

1246.

As usually understood, to ship a package from one State

. tnto another or from a foreign country into a State is to

accomplish its transportation from the one into the other

by a common carrier, and is essentially a continuing act

whose performance is begun when the package is delivered

to the carrier and is completed when it reaches its desti-

nation. We think it is to such an act that the statute

refers. To reach a different conclusion the word ‘‘ship”

must be read as if it were “deliver for shipment.” No

doubt it sometimes has that meaning, but it plainly is not

so used in this instance. The statute deals with shipping

liquor from a foreign country into a State as well as with

shipping it from one State into another State. It puts both

upon the same plane and makes them equally criminal.

Whatever marks the completion of the offense in one

likewise marks it in the other. If it be the delivery to

the carrier in the case of interstate shipments it equally is

this delivery in the case of shipments from a foreign coun-

try. And yet all will concede that Congress did not in-

tend to do anything so obviously futile as to denounce

as criminal an act wholly done in a foreign country, such

as is the delivery to the carrier where the shipment is

from a foreign country into a State. So, if its words

permit, as we think they do, the statute must be given a

construction which will cause it to reach both classes

of shipments, and thereby to accomplish the purpose of

its enactment. United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525.

This, we think, requires that it be construed as refer-

ring to the continuing act before indicated whereby the

transportation info a State is accomplished, whether the

package comes from another State or from a foreign

country. In this view the completion of the offense will

always be within a jurisdiction where the statute can be

’ enforced.

GLENWOOD LIGHT CO. ». MUTUAL LIGHT CO. 121

239 U. 8. Syllabus.

The District Court rightly recognized that, under Jud.

Code, § 42, formerly Rev. Stat., § 731, the offense charged

was cognizable in the District of Kansas, as well as in the

Western District of Missouri, if the place to which the

packages were transported was the place of the completion

of the offense.

Therefore nothing need be said upon that point.

Judgment reversed.