Opinion — Hendrick v. Maryland

eer

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612 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 235 U. 8.

The act is an illegal attempt to regulate interstate com-

merce.

Passing into or through States of the Union in auto-

mobiles is an act of interstate commerce.

The matter of interstate transportation of passengers

is one capable of uniform regulation and legislation, and

is thus exclusively within the domain of Congress and

wholly apart from regulation or interference on the part

of the States.

Where, in subjects requiring uniformity of legislation,

such as interstate transportation of passengers, the state

law comes into direct conflict with the commerce clause,

it is illegal, although a bena fide attempt to exercise the

police power of the State.

The exaction of license and registration fees as con-

ditional to the privilege of the use of the roads of the State

of Maryland is av attempt to regulate interstate com-

merce directly, and imposes a burden on such commerce.

The Maryland law is unconstitutional, as violative

of the rights of citizens of the United States to pass into

and through Maryland.

The Motor Vehicle Law discriminates unconstitutionally

against the residents of the District of Columbia.

The Motor Vehicle Law is further unconstitutional,

in that it is not a bona fide exercise of the police power of

the State, but an unlawful attempt to collect revenue for

the State.

The law is unconstitutional in that the registration

fees provided for and graded according to differing scales

of payment have no relation to the necessary expense of

identifieation or control of motor vehicles, and consti-

tutes arbitrary, unequal, unfair, and class legislation, and

does not insure to the citizens of the United States equal

protection of the laws.

The tax imposed is not laid as compensation for the

use of the roads.

HENDRICK « MARYLAND. 61s

235 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error,

In support of these contentions see Adams Express Co,

vy. The Auditor, 166 U.S. 976; Bowman vo Co & NOW. R.R.,

125 U. 8. 465; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289; Chy

Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97

U.S. 566; Covinglon Bridge v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204;

Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Farge v. Stierens, 121 U.S.

230: Fed. Cas., No. 18260; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1;

Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196; Hen-

derson Bridge Co. v. Mayor, 141 U. 8. 679; Hendrick v.

Maryland, 115 Maryland, 552; Int. Text Book Co. v.

Pigg, 217 U.S. 91; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S.

423; Leisy v. Hardin, 100 U.S. 135; Leloup v. Mobile,

127 U. 8. 640: License Cases, 5 How. 504, 592; Mobile

Co. v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691; Moran v. New Orleans, 112

U.S. 69; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 75; Pickard v. Pullman

Co., 117 U.S. 34; Pullman Co. v. Twombly, 29 Fed. Rep.

667: Railroad Co. v. Hasen, 95 U.S. 465; Robbins v.

Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall,

394: State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; United States v.

Col. & N. W. R. R., 157 Fed. Rep. 325; Welton v. Mis-

sourt, 91 U.S. 295; Williams v. Fears, 50 L. R.A.

685: Cooley on Const. Lim., Sth ed., p. 501; Cooley on

Taxation, 2d ed., p. 99; 8 Cye., p. 1042; Miller on

Const. Law, p. 260; Publie General Laws of Maryland,

1910, ch. 207, $$ 131, 182, 133, 1386, 187, 138, 140d, 1400,

140p, 140r.

Mr. Enos S. Stockbridge and Mr. Edgar Allan Poe,

Attorney General of the State of Maryland, for defendant

in error:

The act of 1910 is a valid exercise of police power by

the State of Maryland.

There are not any new or unusual principles involved

in this ease, but simply the application of doctrines long

recognized, and at this late date thoroughly crystallized.

Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 208, this court has ree-

+

Argument for Defendant in Error. 235 U.S.

bt OCTOBER ‘TERM, 1014.

ognized the right of the States to regulate and control

their highways under what is termed ‘‘the police power.”

Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205; Phillips v. Mobile,

208 U.S. 472; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. 8. 352, 411;

New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Barbier v. Connolly, 118

U.S. 27, 31; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana, 115 U. 5.

650, 661; Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180, 182; Glouccster

Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215; Slaughter

House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 63; Escanaba Trans. Co. vy.

Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; Lake Shore v. Ohio, 173 U.S.

285, 303; Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489.

Since the automobile came into more or less common

use, this precise question has not been before this court;

but see decisions in state courts, holding such regulations

to be a proper exercise of this power. Ruggles v. State,

120 Maryland, 553, 561; Ayres v. Chicago, 239 Illinois, 237;

Commonwealth vy. Kingsbury, 199 Massachusetts, 542,

544; State v. Mayo, 106 Maine, 62; Brazier v. Philadelphia,

215 Pa. St. 297; Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151; Unwen

v. New Jersey, 73 N. J. L. 529, aff'd 75 N. J. L. 500;

Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594.

Although regulation by the States may incidentally

affect interstate commerce, nevertheless, such regulation

is valid until Congress does act. Minnesota Rate Cases,

230 U.S. 352, 411; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,

148 U.S. 312, 333; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154

U.S. 204, 209; Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489; Huse

v. Glover, 119 U.S. 548.

Legislation having for its purpose the regulation of

highways and the protection of life and property against

those using the highways, is a matter of local concern

and not national in its character. Mobile Co. v. Kimball,

102 U.S. 691, 697.

In the absence of any light on the question from the

record, the court cannot pass on the question as to whether

the amount of the licenses prescribed by the act in ques-

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HENDRICK ¢ MARYLAND. ols

235 U. 3. Argument for Defendant in Error.

tion bears any relation to the necessary expense of iden-

tification or control of motor vehicles operated in the

State of Maryland. Red “C” Oil Co. y. North Carolina,

222 U.S. 380; Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190

U.S. 165; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U.S. 419;

Patapsco Guano Co. vy. North Carolina, 171 U. 8. 354;

Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. 8. 423, 429; Foote v. Mary-

land, 232 U.S. 494, 504.

The mere fact that the funds received by the Commis-

sioner of Motor Vehicles are to be turned over to the

State Treasurer for the benefit of a road fund, does not

render this law invalid as a tax under the guise of the

police power. Morgan vy. Louisiana, 18 U.S. 455; Huse

v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 549; Cleary v. Johnston, 79 N. J.

L. 49; Hardin Storage Co. v. Chicago, 235 Illinois, 58, 68.

The fact that the law operates only on motor vehicles

does not create an unreasonable classification of vehicles

using the roads, and is not an unlawful discrimination

against a particular class. Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180;

State v. Mayo, 106 Maine, 62; Christy v. Elliott, 216

Illinois, 31; State v. Swagerty, 203 Missouri, 517.

The Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to

abridge the police power of the State. If the act in

question is properly within the police power of the

State, this court will not inquire further. Lochner

vy. New York, 198 U. 8. 45, 538; Barbier v. Connolly, 118

U.S. 27; Minn. Rwy. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 33; L’Hote

y. New Orleans, 177 U. 8. 587, 596; Howse v. Mays, 219

U. S. 270, 282; Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285,

292; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691,

700.

Plaintiff in error was not engaged in interstate com-

merce. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. 8. 152, 161; Williams v.

Walsh, 222 U.S. 415, 422; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,

189: Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. 8. 691, 702; Covington

Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. 8. 204; Hoke v. United

SLB by ae FL SP ALE EA GEILE ALEC AT ITD

616 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Argument for Defendant in Error. 235 U.S.

States, 227 U. S. 308, 320; Wabash &c. Ry. v. Illinois,

LIS U.S. 556, 572

In order to say that a person or thing is moving in in-

terstate commerce, the movement must be meri

Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665.

The right of the citizens to go to and he the States

of the Union is not based upon the theory that by so

doing they are engaged in interstate commerce. It is

expressly put upon another ground in Crandall v. Nevada,

6 Wall. 35, 44.

The act is not in conflict with the commerce clause,

although commerce between a State and the District

of Columbia is ogre commerce. Stoutenburgh v.

Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; Hanley v. Kansas &c. Ry., 187

U.S. 617.

The States or their agents, municipal or private, may

make and collect a charge for facilities rendered, and such

a charge is not a tax or burden on or interference with

interstate commerce, although it may incidentally affect

interstate commerce. In return for the additional facili-

ties and improved conveniences provided, States are per-

mitted to charge and collect reasonable compensation.

As to toll charges for the use of improved navigable

streams see Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Connecticut, 7; Huse

v. Glover, 119 = S. 543, 548; Gloucester Ferry v. Pennsyl-

vania, 114 U.S. 196, 214: Sands v. Manistee River, 123

U. S. 288; ecieaihe Nav. Co. v. United States, 148

U.S. 312, 333; Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Connecticut,

As to bridges over navigable streams see Escanaba Co.

v. Chicago, 107 U. 8. 678, 683; The Binghamton Bridge,

3 Wall. 51; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S

204, 221.

As to use of wharves or docks see Cannon v. _ Orleans,

20 Wall. 577; Packet . v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Packet

Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. 8S. 423; Vick eos v. Tobin, 100

HENDRICK v. MARYLAND. 617

235 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error.

U.S. 430; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. 8. 559; Trans-

portation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. 8. 691; Packet Co.

v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 548;

All. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 190 U.S. 160, 163.

As to the use of roads or streets see Tomlinson vy. In-

dianapolis, 144 Indiana, 142; Monongahela Nav. Co. v.

United States, 148 U. 8. 312, 333; Cleary v. Johnston, 79

N. J. L. 49; Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594.

The police power is a very extensive one, and is fre-

quently exercised where it also results in raising a revenue.

Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. 8. 472, 478; Transportation

Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. 8. 691, 699; Packet Co. v. Aiken,

121 U.S. 444, 449; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 549.

Citizens of the States and United States have the

right to go into and leave any State of this Union without

hindrance. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Ward v.

Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430; Slaughter House Cases, 16

Wall. 36, 75.

A State may protect its own citizens and property,

although the exercise of this right by the State may in-

cidentally or remotely affect the right. Railroad Co. v.

Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473; Minnesota Rate Cases, 239 U.S.

352, 406.

A State is justified in requiring those, who elect to use

on its highways a mode of travel that is abnormally de-

structive to that road, to compensate it for such use.

Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594.

The act constitutes no unlawful discrimination against

residents of the District of Columbia. I[t is a proper exer-

cise by the State of its police power. The alleged dis-

crimination cannot be complained of under the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Act could only be invalid under the

privileges and immunities clause, or the equal protection

of the laws clause. These clauses go no further than to

prohibit the States from imposing greater restrictions or

burdens on citizens of other States or the United States

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O18 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S.

than it does on its own citizens. The act conforms to this.

Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 480; Slaughter House

Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77; Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239,

249, 256.

Residents of the District of Columbia are classified

differently from the residents of other States except

Maryland. This classification is a reasonable one, and

rests upon a well founded ground of distinction of which

the court will take judicial notice. The court will also

take judicial notice of the fact that there is no large city

in any other State so situated with respect to the borders

of Maryland. This is conclusive of the justness of the

classification. Heath v. Worst, 207 U.S. 388, 355; Patsone

v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144; Osan Lumber Co. v.

Bank, 207 U.S. 251; Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S.

618.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDs delivered the opinion of the

court.

Plaintiff in error was tried before a Justice of the Peace,

Prince George’s County, Maryland, upon a charge of

violating the Motor Vehicle Law. A written motion to

quash the warrant because of conflict between the statute

and the Constitution of the United States was denied; he

was found guilty and fined. Thereupon an appeal was

taken to the Circuit Court—the highest in the State

having jurisdiction—where the cause stood for trial de

novo upon the original papers. It was there submitted

for determination by the court upon an agreed statement

of facts grievously verbose but in substance as follows:

The cause was originally brought July 27, 1910, before

a Justice of the Peace for Prince George’s County by the

State against John T. Hendrick for violating § 133 of the

Motor Vehicle Law effective July 1, 1910. He is and then

was a citizen of the United States, resident and commorart

HENDRICK ve MARYLAND. G19

235 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

in the District of Columbia. On that day he left his office

in Washington in his own automobile and drove it into

Prince George’s County and while temporarily there was

arrested on the charge of operating it upon the highways

without having procured the certificate of registration

required by § 133 of the Motor Vehicle Law. He was

brought before a Justice of the Peace and fined fifteen

dollars after having been found guilty of the charge set

out in a warrant duly issued—a motion to quash having

been denied. Whereupon he filed his appeal. At the

time and place aforesaid he had not procured the certificate

of registration for his automobile required by § 133. Upon

the foregoing the court shall determine the questions and

differences between the parties and render judgment

according as their rights in law may appear in the same

manner as if the facts aforesaid were proven upon the

trial. Either party may appeal.

The Maryland legislature, by an act effective July 1,

1910 (ec. 207, Laws 1910, 168, at p. 177), prescribed a com-

prehensive scheme for licensing and regulating motor

vehicles. The following summary sufficiently indicates

its provisions:

The Governor shall appoint a commissioner of motor

vehicles, with power to designate assistants, who shall

secure enforcement of the statute. Before any motor

vehicle is operated upon the highways the owner shall

make a statement to the commissioner and procure a

certificate of registration; thereafter it shall bear a num-

bered plate. This certificate and plate shall be evidence

of authority for operating the machine during the current

year (§ 133). Registration fees are fixed according to

horse-power—six dollars when 20 or less; twelve dollars

when from 20 to 40; and eighteen dollars when in excess

of 40 (§ 136). No person shall drive a motor vehicle upon

the highway until he has obtained at a cost of two dollars

an operator’s license, subject to revocation for cause

Theo ae ae arb NAR Vip OT cee Ah OM SD RG ROS ONENESS

620 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S.

(§ 137). Any owner or operator of an automobile, non-

resident of Maryland, who has complied with the laws of

the State in which he resides requiring the registration

of motor vehicles, or licensing of operators thereof, ete.,

may under specified conditions obtain a distinguishing

tag and permission to operate such machine over the

highways for not exceeding two periods of seven consecu-

tive days in a calendar year without paying the ordinary

fees for registration and operator's license (§ 140a); but

residents of the Distriet of Columbia are not included

amongst those to whom this privilege is granted (§ 132).

Other sections relate to speed, rules of the road, acci-

dents, signals, penalties, arrests, trials, fines, ete. All

money collected under the provisions of the Act go to the

commissioner, and except so much as is necessary for

salaries and expenses must be paid into the state treasury

to be used in construction, maintaining, and repairing

the streets of Baltimore and roads built or aided by a

county or the State itself. Section 140a is copied in the

margin. !

1“ 1400. Any owner or operator not a resident of this State who shall

have complied with the laws of the State in which he resides, requiring

the registration of motor vehicles or licensing of operators thereof and

the display of identification or registration numbers on such vehicles,

and who shall cause the identification numbers of such State, in accord-

ance with the laws thereof, and none other, together with the initial

letter of said State, to be displayed on his motor vehicle, as in this

subtitle provided, while used or operated upon the public highways of

this State, may use such highways not exceeding two periods of seven

consecutive days in each calendar year, without complying with the

provisions of Sections 133 and 137 of this subtitle; if he obtains from

the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and displays on the rear of such

vehicle a tag or marker which the said Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

shall issue in such form and contain such distinguishing marks as he may

deem best; provided, that if any non-resident be convicted of violating

any provisions of Sections 140), 140c, 140d, 140e and 140/ of this sub-

title, he shall thereafter be subject to and required to comply with all

the provisions of said Sections 133 and 137 relating to the registration of

HENDRICK v. MARYLAND. 621

235 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error maintains that the act is void because

—It discriminates against residents of the District of

Columbia; attempts to regulate interstate commerce;

violates the rights of citizens of the United States to pass

into and through the State; exacts a tax for revenue—not

mere compensation for the use of facilities —according

to arbitrary classifications, and thereby deprives citizens

of the United States of the equal protection of the laws.

If the statute is otherwise valid, the alleged discrimina-

tion against residents of the District of C olumbia is not

adequate ground for us now to declare it altogether bad.

At most they are entitled to equality of treatment, and

in the absence of some definite and authoritative ruling

by the courts of the State we will not assume that upon

a proper showing this will be denied. The record fails

to disclose that Hendrick had complied with the laws

in force within the District of Columbia in respect of

registering motor vehicles and licensing operators, or that

he applied to the Maryland commissioner for an identi-

fying tag or marker—prerequisites to a limited use of

the highways without cost by residents of other States

under the plain terms of § 140a. He cannot therefore set

up a claim of discrimination in this particular. Only

those whose rights are directly affeeted can properly ques-

tion the constitutionality of a state statute and invoke

our jurisdiction in respect thereto. Hatch v. Reardon,

204 U. S. 152, 161; Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415,

423: Collins v. Texas, 223 U. 8. 288, 295, 296; Missouri,

motor vehicles and the licensing of operators thereof; and the Governor

of this State is hereby authorized and empowered to confer and advise

with the proper officers and legislative bodies of other States of the

Union and enter into reciprocal agreements under which the registra-

tion of motor vehicles owned by residents of this State will be recog-

nized by such other States, and he is further authorized and empowered,

from time to time, to grant to residents of other States the privilege

of using the roads of this State as in this section provided in return for

similar privileges granted residents of this State by such other States.”

22 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court: 235 U.S.

Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. 5. 642, 648, and

cases cited.

The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is

attended by constant and serious dangers to the public,

and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves.

Their success depends on good roads the construction and

maintenance of which are exceedingly expensive; and in

recent years insistent demands have been made upon the

States for better facilities, especially by the ever-increasing

number of those who own such vehicles. As is well known,

in order to meet this demand and accommodate the grow-

ing traffic the State of Maryland has built and is main-

taining a system of improved roadways. Primarily for

the enforcement of good order and the protection of those

within its own jurisdiction the State put into effect the

above-described general regulations, including require-

ments for registration and licenses. A further evident

purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of

facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose

needs they are essential and whose operations over them

are peculiarly injurious.

In the absence of national legislation covering the sub-

ject a State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations

necessary for public safety and order in respect to the

operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles—those

moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And

to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles

and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor rea-

sonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of

the engines—a practical measure of size, speed, and dif-

ficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police

power uniformly recognized as belonging to the States

and essential to the preservation of the health, safety

and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a

direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The

reasonableness of the State’s action is always subject to

a, BM STE 5 ARI ie EG DAM A dele CEN LN le ale) RAE SIN

HENDRICK v. MARYLAND. 623

935 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in

that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Con-

gress. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30, 31; Smith v.

Alabama, 124 U. 8. 465, 480; Lavwton v. Steele, 152 U.S.

133, 136; N. Y.,N. HW. & H.R. R. v. New York, 165 U.S.

628, 631; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. 8. 366, 392; Lake

Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Ohio, 173 U.S.

985, 298; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. MeGuire, 219 U.S.

549, 568; Allantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. 5. 280,

291.

In Smith v. Alabama, supra, consideration was given

to the validity of an Alabama statute forbidding any en-

gineer to operate a railroad train without first undergoing

an examination touching his fitness and obtaining a license

for which a fee was charged. The language of the court,

speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews, in reply to the

suggestion that the statute unduly burdened interstate

commerce and was therefore void, aptly declares the doc-

trine which is applicable here. He said (p. 480):

“But the provisions on the subject contained in the

statute of Alabama under consideration are not regula-

tions of interstate commerce. It is a misnomer to call

them such. Considered in themselves, they are parts of

that body of the local law wanich, as we have already seen,

properly governs the relation between carriers of pas-

sengers and merchandise and the public who employ them,

which are not displaced until they come in conflict with

express enactments of Congress in the exercise of its

power over commerce, and which, until so displaced,

according to the evident intention of Congress, remain

as the law governing carriers in the discharge of their

obligations, whether engaged in the purely internal com-

merce of the State or in commerce among the States.”

The prescribed regulations upon their face do not

appear to be either unnecessary or unreasonable.

In view of the many decisions of this court there can be

OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S.

no serious doubt that where a State at its own expense

furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in

commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact

compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and

the method of collection are primarily for determination

by the State itself; and so long as they are reasonable and

are fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical

standard they constitute no burden on interstate com-

merce. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691,

699; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548, 549; Monongahela

Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 329, 330;

Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. 8. 352, 405; and authorities

cited. The action of the State must be treated as correct

unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case

there is no evidence concerning the value of the facilities

supplied by the State, the cost of maintaining them, or

the fairness of the methods adopted for collecting the

charges imposed; and we cannot say from a mere inspec-

tion of the statute that its provisions are arbitrary or

unreasonable.

There is no solid foundation for the claim that the stat-

ute directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the

United States to pass through the State, and is eon-

sequently bad according to the doetrine announced in

Crandall y. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. In that case a direct tax

was laid upon the passenger for the privilege of leaving

the State; while here the statute at most attempts to

regulate the operation of dangerous machines on the

highways and to charge for the use of valuable facilities.

As the capacity of the machine owned by plaintiff in

error does not appear, he cannot complain of discrimina-

tion because fees are imposed according to engine power.

Distinctions amongst motor machines and between them

and other vehicles may be proper—essential indeed—and

those now challenged are not obviously arbitrary or

oppressive. The statute is not a mere revenue measure

NORFOLK & WESTERN RY. ¢. HOLBROOK, 625

935 U.S. Statement of the Case.

and a discussion of the classifications permissible under

such an act would not be pertinent.

There is no error in the judgment complained of and

it is accordingly

Affirmed.

NO.