Opinion — Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co.

%

in OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 231 U.S.

This rule is always applied where the result of a retro-

spective operation would be to injuriously affeet an

existing status. United States v. Heth, 3 Cr. 413; Black's

Const. Law, 2d ed., p. 627, $ 286; Reynolds v. McArthur,

2 Pet. 417, 484; Dash v. Van Kleech, 7 Johnson, 447, 503;

Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; 8S. C., 22 Fed. Cas. 756, 767;

Calder vy, Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Winfree v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co.,

227 U.S. 296, 301.

If construed as retroactive, the act operates imm, diately

and by virtue of itself alone, to take from the plaintiff its

vested right and title to the property in controversy and

transfer the same to the defendant without due process

of law, and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

Congress has not the power to accomplish this without

the consent of the present owner of the property. Sinking

Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718; United States v. Un. Pae.

R. R. Co., 160 U.S. 1, 33. See also Wallbridge v. Com-

misstoners, 74 Kansas, 341.

Titles vested under act of Congress could not, without

the consent of the grantee or its successor, be legislated

back to the United States, or legislated into the ownership

of anyone else; nor could the title or tenure created by the

grant of said lands or right of way be changed, without

such consent, by subsequent act of Congress. Proprietors

v. Laboree, 2 Maine (2 Greenleaf), 275, 288; Webster v.

Cooper, 14 How. 488; Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., 10

Maryland, 129, 144; Osborn v. Jaines, 17 Wisconsin, 592;

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87, 135; Sturges v. Crowninshield,

4 Wheat. 122, 206; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 599;

Herrick v. Boquillas Land Co., 200 U.S. 96, 102.

From the eases cited the statute under consideration

must be construed as prospective only, if that be reason-

ably possible. If the statute be found clearly retroactive,

then, under the same authorities, it must be held uncon-

stitutional, as taking from the plaintiff in error its property

without due process of law,

UN. PAC. R. R. r, LARAMIE STOCK YARDS. 193

231 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error.

Nor, Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ely, 197 U.S. 1, is not in point.

The statute in that case validated certain conveyances of

the railroad company, and was held to operate retro-

spectively because it contained a provision that it should

hive no validating foree until accepted in writing by the

company, 33 Stat, 538, ¢. 1782. The railroad company

did file written acceptance and could not claim that it wes

deprived of its property without due process of law, | c-

cause it had accepted and assented to every transfer

Within the terms of the act.

Mr. Roderick N. Matson and Mr. T. Blake Ken. Jy for

defendant in error:

The act in controversy is an alteration or an amendment

of the original grants to the Pacifie Railroad Companies,

and as such violates no constitutional provision.

Congress had the right to, and did take notice that

these railroad companies had silently assented for long

periods of time to the absolute and undisputed possession

of large portions of this right of way, had removed in many

instances their fences, making a right of way of fifty feet

on each side of their main track, and in other eases erecting

in the first instance their fences along a line fifty feet

distant from either side of said track.

The United States has by this act stated that those

persons who have held portions of this right of way outside

of a space fifty feet in width on either side of the main

track for a period of time, which in the State where said

controversy arises shall amount to adverse possession, that

the title by adverse possession may be invoked as against

such right of way.

Congress has taken notice of the fact that the railroad

companies to whom the original rights of way were

granted, and their suecessors, have consistently and con-

tinuously used but one hundred feet of that right of Way.

The right of Congress to alter. amend and repeal

VOL. OUCKAXI DT

194 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Argument for Defendant in Error. 231 U.S.

franchises where the power is reserved has been frequently

sustained, See Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478, 498; Holyoke

v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 519; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall.

454, 459; Railroad Company v. Maine, 96 U.S. 499, 510;

Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319, 324; Sinking Fund Cases,

99 U.S. 700; Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591; Looker v.

Maynard, 179 U.S. 46, 52.

In applying the law as laid down by this court no

vested right has been impaired, or contract obligation

Violated; nor has there been any attempt on the part of

Congress to pass a law, which would permit the taking

away from the railroad company any portion of its right of

way which had been put by it to its corporate uses.

Considered as a retrospective act it was intended by

Congress as such, and contravenes no constitutional

provision,

The construction contended for by counsel for plaintiff

in error, that it operates only prospectively, makes an

almost absurd situation. At any time within the next ten

to twenty years, depending upon the statutes governing

adverse possession in the various States, the railroad ecom-

pany may go into court and recover possession of the

original four hundred foot right of way, exclusive of the

one hundred feet now in use, and those interests which are

thereby affected are without standing in court, and have

no defense which may be maintained. Such a construc-

tion would clearly be against the public interest, and the

act itself would avail nothing, except a notice to the rail-

road that it must within the succeeding twenty years

proceed to take some action against those interests which

have been occupying certain portions of this right of way

unforbidden by the company or assented to by it.

A retrospective law is not in itself unconstitutional.

Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 413; Curtis v. Whitney,

13 Wall. 68, 70; Charles River Bridge Case, 11 Pet. 420,

o0; Watson vi. Mercer, S Pet. SS, 119: Balt. & Susq. ROR.

UN. PAC. R. R. vc. LARAMIE STOCK YARDS. 195

231 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error.

Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395, 401: Blount y. Windley, 95

U.S. 173, 180; Calder vy. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391.

Laws retrospective in their nature do not offend against

the Constitution, but have frequently been held to be

beneficial in their nature, and to operate for the general

good of the community. United States y. Un. Pac. R. R.

Co., 160 U.S. 1, 33; Munn vy. Illinois, 94 U.S. 118, 134.

The question of vested rights is closely associated with

the question of the enjoyment of contracts, which are

guaranteed by constitutional provision; and as to what

may be considered within the scope of legislative powers,

so far as impairing contract obligations under constitu-

tional restrietion is concerned, the field is very broad.

Spring Valley Water Works v. Schotth r, 110 U. S. 347;

Morley v. Lake Shore Ry. Co., 146 U.S, 162; Curtis v.

Whitney, supra,

It isevident that the act in controversy was passed by

Congress for the publie good, and while in a way it might

he said to enhance the difficulty of performance, in that

in the far distant future the railroad company might have

use for a right of way four hundred feet in width, and yet

the contract between the Government and the railroad in

the nature of its original charter and grant remains in full

foree by virtue of the terms of the act guaranteeing to the

railroad a right of way not less than one hundred feet in

width. Pearsall vy. Great Northern R. R. Co, 161 U. &,

646, 673.

The act of the legislature absolutely forbidding the

exercise of powers originally granted to the corporation,

Was sustained in the interest of the public, where those

powers remain unexecuted. In the ease at bar Congress

has enacted a law in the interest of the public diminishing

the grant to the Pacifie Railroad Companies from a right

of way as originally granted of four hundred feet toa

right of way as amended of one hundred feet, but only as

tu those portions of the original right of way outside of the

196 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 231 U.S.

one hundred foot width which have remained unused by

the companies for long periods of time. L. & N. R.R. Co.

v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 700.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the

court,

Ejectment to recover certain described lands alleged to

constitute part of the right of way of plaintiff (being such

in the court below, we will so call it).

The allegations of the complaint are that plaintiff and

defendant are corporations, and that plaintiff is engaged in

the operation of a railroad from Ogden, in Utah, easterly

through certain States to Council Bluffs, Towa, and over

the lands in controversy, they being portions of its right

of way made by the act of Congress of July 1, 1862,

¢. 120, 12 Stat. 489, of the width of 400 feet. The right of

way was acquired under said act of Congress, which is

entitled “An Act to aid in the construction of a railroad

and telegraph line from the Missouri River to the Pacific

Ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the

same for postal, military and other purposes.” Section 2

of the act provides as follows: “That the right of way

through the public lands be, and the same is hereby,

granted to said company [the Union Paeifie Railrend

Company] for the construction of said railroad and tel: -

graph line; and the right, power, and authority is hereby

given to said company to take from the publie lands

adjacent to the line of said road, earth, stone, timber,

and other materials for the construction thereof: said

right of way is granted to said railroad to the extent of

two hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad

where it may pass over the publie lands, including all

necessary grounds for stations, buildings, work-shops, and

depots, machine shops, switches, sidetracks, turntables,

and water stations.”

UN. PAC, R. R. +. LARAMIE STOCK YARDS. 197

wat U.S: Opinion of the Court.

By virtue of said act of Congress and amendatory acts,

certain railroad companies, which are enumerated, thereto-

fore organized and existing in pursuance of said acts and

subject to and enjoying the rights created thereby, were

consolidated into a new corporation known as “The Union

Pacific Railway Company,” and the corporation thus

created became vested with all the rights of the said con-

stituent corporations, and the plaintiff has become the

successor of the Union Pacific Railway Company and is

entitled to the possession of the land in controversy and

that defendant wrongfully keeps it out of the possession

thereof. The ground of the asserted right of defendant is

alleged to be an act of Congress entitled “An act legalizing

certain conveyances heretofore made by the Union Pacifie

Railroad Company,” approved June 24, 1912. e. IS], 37

Stat. 138, which act, it is alleged, is unconstitutional in

that it seeks to deprive plaintiff of its vested rights and

titles in and to the lands and to deprive it of its lands and

property without due process of law.

The answer of defendant admits all of the allegations of

the complaint except the possession of the legal title to the

lands in plaintiff and that they are unlawfully held from it

and alleges that defendant and its immediate grantors

have been for more than ten years prior to the filing of the

coinplaint in the adverse possession thereof under the act

of Congress of June 24, 1912, and that such possession

constitutes a bar to the action.

Plaintiff? demurred to the answer as not constituting a

defense. The demurrer was overruled and. plaintiff

declining to plead further, judgment was entered that it

* take nothing in said action’ and that the defendant have

and recover costs. This appeal was then prosecuted,

The crux of the controversy is the act of June 24. 1912

There is no question of the grant of the right of Way and

its extent or that the lands in suit are within it.

The act provides that all conveyances and agreements

198 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 231: U.S.

heretofore made by the enumerated railway or railroad

companies “of or concerning land forming part of the

right of way” under the act of Congress of July 1, 1862,

“‘and all conveyances or agreements confining the limits

of said right of way, or restricting the same, are hereby

legalized, validated, and confirmed to the extent that the

same would have been legal or valid if the land involved

therein had been held by the corporation making such

conveyance or agreement under absolute or fee simple

title.

“That in all instances in which title or ownership of any

part of said right of way heretofore mentioned is claimed

as against said corporations, or either of them, or the

successors or assigns of any of them, by or through adverse

possession of the character and duration prescribed by the

laws of the State in which the land is situated, such adverse

possession shall have the same effect as though the land

embraced within the lines of said right of way had been

granted by the United States absolutely or in fee instead of

being granted as a right of way.”

Two contentions are made by plaintiff, (1) The aet is

not retroactive; (2) If it be so construed, it is unconstitu-

tional because it takes plaintiff’s vested right and title

to the property and transfers the same to defendant

without due process of law..

It is established that the right of way to the several

railroads was a present absolute grant, subject to no con-

ditions except those necessarily implied, such as that the

roads should be constructed and used. And it has been

decided that the right of way was a very important aid

given to the roads, (Railroad Company v. Baldwin, 108

U.S. 426; Stuart v. Union Pacific Railread Co., 227 U. 3.

342), and that it could not be voluntarily transferred by

the companies nor acquired against them by adverse

possession. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Townsend,

190 U.S. 267; Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Smith, 171

UN. PAC. R. R. v. LARAMIE STOCK YARDS. 199

231 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

US. 260, 275; Northern Pacifie Railway Co. vy. Ely, 197

U.S. 1, 5. Of this defect of power in the companies and

the defect of right in the possessors of the right of way,

the act of June 24 was intended to be corrective. But

of what time was it intended to speak—to the past or

future?—to apply to that which was done, or that which

was to be done? There is no doubt as to the answer in the

case of agreements or conveyances by the company. The

act is explicit that they are those “ heretofore made” by the

enumerated companies. There is no such qualifying word

of the “title or ownership” ‘claimed as against” the cor-

poration by adverse possession. Construction, therefore,

becomes necessary, and the first rule of construction is that

legislation must be considered as addressed to the future,

not to the past. The rule is one of obvious justice and pre-

vents the assigning of a quality or effect to acts or conduct

which they did not have or did not contemplate when

they were performed. The rule has been expressed in

varying degrees of strength but always of one import,

that a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute

which interferes with antecedent rights or by which

human action is regulated, unless such be “the unequiv-

ocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest

intention of the legislature.” United States v. Heth. 3

Cranch, 399, 413; Reynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet. 417:

United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U. S.

963, 577; Winfree, Admr., v. Northern Pac. Railway Co.,

227 U.S. 296. Surely such imperative character cannot

be assigned to the words of the act of June 24: and the

intention is not so manifest as to strengthen the insuffi-

ciency of the words. Indeed, all reasonable considerations

determine the other way.

We have seen that the conveyances and agreements

which were legalized were those theretofore made, that

is, consummated acts of the company deliberately done

to transfer its right. Can it be said that the adverse

200 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 231 U.S.

possession which was to transfer the right was to be less

complete, not fully adverse in fact and law, at once

assertive of title and concessive of it? It is to be remem-

bered that there was no sanction of a right to the posses-

sion of the defendant or possibility of a right by the rail-

road company’s non-action. There was not a moment of

time in which the railroad was called upon to act or lose

its right; there was not a moment of time when the posses-

sion of defendant initiated an adverse right or constituted

an adverse right. This being the situation, it is difficult

to believe—or certainly a belief is not compelled—that

Congress intended to give to the past conduct of the rail-

road company a consequence it was not intended to have

and did not have. A statute having such a result may

incur the opposition of the Constitution. When such

may be the result a different construction of the statute is

determined. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,

213 U. 8. 366, 408; Harriman vy. Interstate Commerce

Commission, 211 U. 8. 407.

In Sokn vy. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, the questions we

are now discussing came up for consideration. We there

expressed, in considering a statute of limitations whose

literal interpretation would have had the effect of making

it applicable to actions which had accrued prior to its

passage, the rule against retrospective operation, the in-

justice and unconstitutionality of it. We said that a

statute of limitations may affect actions which have

aecrued as well as those to accrue, and “whether it does

or not will depend upon the language of the act and the

apparent intent of the legislature to be gathered there-

from.’ But it was said that, even against a literal inter-

pretation of the terms of the statute, ‘it will be presumed

that such was not the intention of the legislature. Such

an intent would be unconstitutional. To avoid such a

result, and to give the statute a construction that will

enable it to stand, courts have given it a prospective

UN. PAC. R. R. v. LARAMIE STOCK YARDS. 201

231 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

operation.” And three modes were pointed out as having

been adopted by the courts: (1) to make the statute

apply only to causes of action arising after its passage:

(2) to construe the statute as applying to such actions

only as have run out a portion of the time, but which still

have a reasonable time left for the prosecution of the action

before the statutory time expires—which reasonable time

is to be estimated by the court—leaving all other actions

accruing prior to the statute unaffected by it; and (3) the

rule announced in Ross vy. Duval, 13 Peters, 45, 62, and

Lewis v. Lewis, 7 Howard, 776, 778.

Of the first two modes there was condemnation. The

third was approved. It was said of the first that it left

“all actions existing at the passage of the act. without any

limitation.” Which would not be presumed as intended.

The second was said to be founded on no better principle

than the first, and was a more arbitrary rule than that,

as it left “a large class of actions entirely unprovided with

any limitation whatever, or, as to them. unconstitutional.”

Speaking of the rule announced in the cited cases, if

Was said: “Tn those cases certain statutes of limitation—

one in Virginia and the other in Ilinois—had originally

excepted from their operation non-residents of the State,

but this exception had been afterwards repealed; and this

court held that the non-resident parties had the full

statutory time to bring their actions after the repealing

acts were passed, although such actions may have accrued

at an earlier period. ‘The question is,’ says Chief Justice

Taney (speaking in the latter of the eases just cited),

‘From what time is this limitation to be calculated? Upon

principle, it would seem to be clear, that it must commence

when the cause of action is first subjected to the operation

of the statute, unless the legislature has otherwise pro-

vided.”

Sohn v. Waterson was cited and its principle applied in

Herrick v. Boquillas Cattle Co., 200 U.S. 96. 4 paragraph

Aa

Yo2 OCTOBER ‘TERM, 1915.

Opinion of the Court. 231 U.S.

in the statutes of Arizona prescribed a limitation «factions

as follows: “Any person who has a right of action for

recovery of any lands, tenements or hereditaments against

another having peaceable and adverse possession thereof,

cultivating, using and enjoying the same, shall institute

his suit therefor within ten years next after his cause of

action shall have accrued, and not afterward.” Rev.

Stats. of Arizona, 1901, par. 2938.

It will be observed that the language of the paragraph,

as of the statute passed on in Sohn vy. Waterson, or, it may

be, the act of June 24 under review, literally interpreted,

would apply to causes of action which have accrued. The

Supreme Court of the Territory refused to give that effect

to the provision, and “decided,” as this court said, “that

under no eanon of construction or rule giving a retroactive

effect to a new statute of limitations could paragraph 2938

be made to apply to this case.” And, after considering

all possible constructions of the statute expressed by the

Supreme Court of the Territory, among others, that if it

be construed as absolutely barring causes of action existing

at the time of its passage, it was unconstitutional, citing

Sohn v. Waterson, this court approved the views expressed

and said that the court committed no error in determining

that under no possible hypothesis could the limitation

prescribed operate to bar the plaintiff's action.

"> principle of these cases forbids a retrospective

operauon to be given to the statute under consideration.

To do so would cause in a high degree the evil and in-

justice of retroactive legislation. As said by plaintiff's

counsel, the possession of defendant prior to the statute

“had no effect on the title, and was not, as between the

parties, even a threat against it.” And we are loath to be-

lieve that Congress intended by an imperative declaration

of law, immediately operating, to give defendant’s posses-

sion another character—one hostile to the title.

Defendant does not combat plaintiff's contentions based

UN. PAC. R. R. c. LARAMIE STuChk YARDS. 203

2H UL S. Opinion of the Court.

on considering the act of June 24, 1912. as one of limitation.

Indeed, the admission is ‘that prior to the passage of the

Act in controversy, title by adverse possession could not

he acquired as against the plaintiff in error in its original

right of way grant, and it is further admitted that title

could not have been acquired by adverse possession sub-

sequent to the passage of the Act.” Defendant does not

regard the act as a limitation of the remedy but as amend-

atory of the charter of the company, an exercise of a right

reserved in the acts of July 1, 1862 ' and July 2, 1864.2

The argument is, disregarding its involutions, that the

right of way was not a right in fee but only a right to

use, Which was forfeited by non-use, and that the right

Which thereby reverted to the United States was. by the

act of June 24, conveyed to those in possession of the

land. And the exercise of the right reserved, it is con-

tended, neither impairs any contract with the railroad nor

divests its property. Nor does it come under the con-

demnation of being retroactive legislation, it is further

contended. We need not follow the discussion by which

these contentions are attempted to be supported. We

meet them all by the declaration that Congress by the

act of June 24 did not intend to exercise the power over

the charters of the companies reserved to it. The exercise

of such power would naturally only find an unpulse in

some large national purpose and would hardly be provoked

by a desire to legalize the encroachments here and there

on the right of way of a transcontinental railroad.

We are constrained to believe that when Congress in-

tends to forfeit or limit any of the rights conveyed to aid

that great enterprise, it will do so explicitly and directly

'“Congress may at any time, having due regard for the rights of

said companies named herein, add to, alter, amend. or repeal this act.”

12 Stat. 497.

*“And be it further enacted, That Congress may, at any time, al-

ter, amend, or repeal this vet." C216, 18 Stat. 356. 365.

204 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Syllabus. 231 U.S.

by a measure proportionate to the purpose and not leave

it to be accomplished ima ples e-taent and precarious way—

not by confirming a few conveyances which may have

been made or legalizing trespasses which may be made.

But if it could be conceded that the aet of June 24 was

intended as an amendment of the charters of the com-

panies, the question would still occur as to its effect —as to

What time it should be considered as applying, whether

to the past or the future. That question we have decided.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to

sustain the demurrer lo the answer.

Mr. Justice HuGHEs dissents.

Mr. Justick Hotmes, Mr. Justice Lurron, and Mr.

Justice Pirney, took no part in the decision.

~ Oe EN Are OarTAIT