Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sullivan v. United States

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/) 24breme Court,

| FILED

03-976 DEC 23 2003

No. OFFICE OF THE cy ERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

LTC DONALD SULLIVAN and

SP4 JEFFREY S. SULLIVAN,

Petitioners, Pro Se

Vv

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

HONORABLE GEORGE W. BUSH, President, HONORABLE

JOEL HEFLEY, Chairman, House Committee on Official

Conduct, HONORABLE HENRY HYDE, Chairman, House

Committee on International Affairs, JOHN BARGO, Chief-of-

Staff, House Committee on Official Conduct, and 535 John Does,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals For the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR- WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LTC Donald Sullivan and SP4 Jeffrey S. Sullivan

PO Box 3061

Wilmington, NC 28406

910-617-2559

Questions Presented For Review

Whether or not, under federal or State statute and law, the

Respondents have violated federal and/or State constitutional or

statutory law?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional law, the President can

become the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and the

militias of the several States," without the legislative act of

Congress?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional law, the Execut:ve has

authority to unilaterally engage a sovereign, foreign power on

foreign soil with no declaration of war by the Congress and while

not in the act of providing for the domestic defense (War Powers

Resolution)?

Whether or not, under federal or state constitutional law, the

United States may commit the states’ militias into service on foreign

soil, not in the act of repelling a "foreign vader", under the ruse of

the "National Guard of the United States" (National Defense Act of

1916, as amended in 1933)?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional or statutory law, there

is a "political question" in this matter which overrides constitutional

mandate?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional or statutory law, the

Petitioners’ have Standing?

Whether or not, under federai constitutional or statutory law, the

matters of Petitioners’ Complaint are moot?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional or Statutory law,

Petitioners’ Complaint was ripe for hearing by the Court of original

jurisdiction?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional law, this matter is one

of Article HI Original Jurisdiction for the Supreme Court of the

United. States because of the nature of the constitutional

adjudication required and the actions of the United States Court for

the Easter District of North Carolina and the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional or statutory law, a

citizen a1.y longer possesses that right for "petition for redress of

grievances” as guaranteed and protected by the First Amendment to

the Constitution? |

Whether or not the United States Constitution is applicable or has

become obsolete and anachronistic, as proposed by the

Respondents?

Whether or not, under federal constitutional and statutory law, the

Respondents should be held accountable for their individual and

professional violations of constitutional or statutory law.

List of Parties

All Parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover

page. A full list of the Parties in the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

Petitioners: Lieutenant.Colonel Donald Sullivan

Specialist Four Jeffrey S. Sullivan

Respondents: United States of America, Honorable George W.

Bush, President; Honorable Joel Hefley, Chairman, House

Committe on Official Conduct; Honorable Henry Hyde, Chairman,

House Committee on International Affairs; Mr. John Bargo, Chief-

of-Staff, House Committee on Intemational Affairs; Members of

Congress: Senators Allard, Allen, Baucus, Bayh, Bennett, Biden,

Bond, Breaux, Brownback, Bunning, Burns, Campbeil, Cantwell,

Carnahan, Carper, Cleland, Clinton, Cochran, Collins, Craig,

Crapo, Daschle, DeWine, Dodd, Domenici, Dorgan, Edwards,

Ensign, Enzi, Feinstein, Fitzgerald, Frist, Gramm, Grassley, Gregg,

Hagel, Harkin, Hatch, Helms, Hollings, Hutchinson, Hutchison,

Inhofe, Johnson, Kerry, Kohl, Kyl, Landrieu, Lieberman, Lincoln,

Lott, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, Miller, Murkowski, Nelson (FL),

Nelson (NE), Nickles, Reid, Roberts, Rockefeller, Santorum,

Schumer, Sessions, Shelby, Smith (NH), Smith (OR), Snowe,

Specter, Stevens, Thomas, Thompson, Thurmond, Torricelli,

Voinivich and Warner; Representatives Ackerman, Aderholt, Akin,

Andrews, Armey, Bachus, Baker, Ballenger, Barcia, Barr, Bartlett,

Barton, Bass, Bentsen, Bereuter, Berkley, Berman, Berry, Biggert,

Bilirakis, Bishop, Blagojevich, Blunt, Boehlert, Boehner, Bonilla,

Bono, Boozman, Borski, Boswell, Boucher, Boyd, Brady (TX),

Brown (SC), Bryant, Burr, Burton, Buyer, Callahan, Calvert,

Camp, Cannon, Cantor, Capito, Carson, Castle, Chabot, Chambliss,

ill

Clement, Coble, Collins, Combest, Cooksey, Cox, Cramer, Crane,

Crenshaw, Crowley, Cubin, Culberson, Cunningham, Davis (FL),

Davis (Jo Ann), Davis (Tom), Deal, DeLay, DeMint, Deutsch,

Diaz-Balart, Dicks, Dooley, Doolittle, Dreier, Dunn, Edwards,

Ehlers, Ehrlich, Emerson, Engel, English, Etheridge, Everett,

Ferguson, Flake, Fletcher, Foley, Forbes, Ford, Fossella,

Frelinghuysen, Frost, Gallegly, Ganske, Gekas, Gephardt, Gibbons,

Gilchrest, Gillmor, Gilman, Goode, Goodlatte, Gordon, Goss,

Graham, Granger, Graves, Green (TX), Green (WI), Greenwood,

Grucci, Gutknecht, Hall (TX), Hansen, Harman, Hart, Hastert,

Hastings (WA), Hayes, Hayworth, Herger, Hill, dilleary, Hobson,

Hoeffel, Hoekstra, Holden, Horn, Hoyer, Hulshof, Hunter, Isakson,

Israel, Issa, Istook, Jefferson, Jenkins, John, Johnson (CT), Johnson

(IL), Johnson (Sam), Jones (NC), Kanjorski, Keller, Kelly, Kennedy

(MN), Kennedy (RI), Kerns, Kind (WI), King (NY), Kingston,

Kirk, Knollenberg, Kolbe, LaHood, Lampson, Lantos, Latham,

LaTourette, Lewis (CA), Lewis (KY), Linder, LoBiondo, Lowey,

Lucas (KY), Lucas (OK, Luther, Lynch, Maloney (NY), Manzullo,

Markey, Mascara, Matheson, McCarthy (NY), McCrery, McHugh,

McInnis, McIntyre, McKeon, McNulty, Meehan, Mica, Miller

(Dan), Miller(Gary), Miller (Jeff), Moore, Moran (KS), Murtha,

Myrick, Nethercutt, Ney, Northrup, Norwood, Nussle, Osborne,

Ose, Otter, Oxley, Pascrell, Pence, Peterson (MN), Peterson (PA),

Petri, Phelps, Pickering, Pitts, Platts, Pombo, Pomeroy, Portman,

Pryce (OH), Putnam, Quinn, Radanovich, Ramstad, Regula,

Rehberg, Reynolds, Riley, Roemer, Rogers (KY), Rogers (MI),

Rohrabacher, Ros-Leitinen, Ross, Rothman, Royce, Ryan (WI),

Ryun (KS), Sandlin, Saxton, Schaffer, Schiff Schrock,

Sensenbrenner, Sessions, Shadegg, Shaw, Shays, Sherman,

Sherwood, Shimkus, Shows, Shuster, Simmons, Simpson, Skeen,

Skelton, Smith (MI), Smith (MI), Smith (TX), Smith (WA),

Souder, Spratt, Stearns, Stenholm, Sullivan, Sununu, Sweeney,

Tancredo, Tanner, Tauscher, Tauzin, Taylor (MS), Taylor (NC),

Terry, Thomas, Thornberry, Thune, Thurman, Tiahrt, Tiberi,

Toomey, Tumer, Upton, Vitter, Walden, Walsh, Wamp, Watkins

iv

(OK), Watts (OK), Waxman, Weiner, Weldon (FL), Weldon (PA),

Weller, Wexler, Whitfield, Wicker, Wilson (NM), Wilson (SC),

Wolf, Wynn, Young (AK), Young (FL).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX TO APPENDICES

TABLES OF AUHORHES CITED

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

CONCLUSION

aan

APPENDIX A:

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Dismissal Order and Judgment from Judge

James C. Fox, United States District Court,

Eastern District of North Carolina, dated

April 15, 2003

Judgment affirming decision of the District

Court from Judges Widener and Gregory,

and Senior Judge Hamilton, United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

dated September 25, 2003

Congressman Helen Chenoweth article

entitled, "Our legal War", dated April 26,

1999

Congressman Ron Paul article entitled,

"Violating the Constitution With an Illegal

War", dated October 3, 2002

Senator Mark Dayton entitled, "On the

Senate Giving Up _—iIts__— Constitutional

Responsibility to Declare War", dated March

13, 2003

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

United States v. SCRAP, 412 US 669,687-688

Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (1972)

Michel v. Anderson, 304 US App DC 324, 14F, 3d

623, 628 (1984)

Tiffany v. US, 931 F.2d 271 (1991)

Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d (2003)

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 216 F.3d 450 (2003)

Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F Supp 2d 34 (1999)

Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 US 366 (1918)

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962)

STATUTES AND RULES

OTHER

PL 107-243 (HJR 114) - Resolution to Authorize

the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq

(2003)

28 U.S.C. 1254€1) - Supreme Court of the United

States Jurisdiction

50 U.S.C. 1543(a) - War Powers Resolution of

1973

39 Stat. 166 - National Defense Act of 1916, as

amended in 1933

Congressman Ron Paul, "Violating the Constitution

with an [legal War", October 3, 2003, Address to

the House.

Fred Volday, "he Progress Report", June 23, 2003.

Senator Mark Dayton, "On the Senate Giving Up Its

Constitutional Responsibility to Declare War",

March 13, 2003, address to the Senate.

Congressman Jesse Jackson, SJr., "The President

Must Have Congressional War Resolution Before

Starting War", February 13, 2003.

Congressman Helen Chenoweth, "Our Illegal War",

April 26, 1999.

Holy Bible, King James Version, from Mathew Ch.

7, Verse 6.

United States Constitution: Article 1, Section 8, Cls.

11, 12, 15; Article II, Section 2; Article IV, Section

4- Article V; and Amendments, Article 1.

- IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petiticners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgments below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District appears at Appendix B to the petition and is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina appears at Appendix A and is

unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals rendered

judgment in this case was September 25, 2003. No Petition for

rehearing was timely filed in this case.

The jurisdiction of this Court is nvoked under 28 U.S.C., Section

1254(1) and Article II, United States Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

\

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, cl. 11:

Congress shall have Power...To declare war...;

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, cl. 12:

Congress shall have Power...To raise and support Armies, brt no

Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than

two years;

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, cl. 15:

Congress shall have Power...To provide for the calling forth the

Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections

and repel Invasions;

United States Constitution, Article I; Section 2: The President

shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United

States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the

actual Service of the United States;

United States Constitution, Article LIL, Section 2: The Judicial

Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under

this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,

or which shall be made, under their Authority;

United States Constitution, Article EV, Section 4: The United

States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican

Form of Government. and shall protect each of them against

Invasion; ~

United States Constitution, Article V: The Congress, whenever

two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose

xit

Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the

Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a

Convention for proposing Amendments, as Part of this

Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of

the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the

one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the

Congress;

Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Now come Petitioners, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Sullivan,

as a citizen and retired member of the United States Air Force

Reserve, and Specialist Four Jeffrey S. Sullivan, a citizen and

member of the North Carolina National Guard, before this

Honorable Court with their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to have

heard arguments in support of the reversal of an Order for dismissal

from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

North Carolina, CA-03-39-7-F, dated and filed April 15, 2003, by

the Honorable Judge James C. Fox, and affirmed by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, File No. 03-1611,

on September 25, 2003, by the Honorable Circuit Judges Widener

and Gregory, and Senior Judge Hamilton. It appears said pre-trial

order to allow Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, without oral

arguments, was executed on issues of justiciability: Political

question, standing, ripeness and mootness, not the constitutionality

of the President's actions or the merits of Petitioners’ complaint.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C., Section

1254(1), and United States Constitution, Art. III, Section 2.

As a practical matter, it appears this case, both for its having

been dismissed in a pre-trial ruling by the Federal District Court and

the Federal Court of Appeals and because it raises important

questions of federal law which have not been, but should be, settled

by this Court, may be viewed as in the Article III Original

Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, and original

arguments heard, thus do Petitioners so request.

Petitioners’ original complaint, though filed hours before the

actual "declaration" of war and commencement of hostilities by the

President on March 18, 2003, was filed pursuant to written and

telephonic entreaties by Petitioner Lt. Colonel Sullivan to

Respondents Hefley and Bargo, shown in Exhibit 4 of the Original

Complaint, in their official capacities as chairman and Chief-of-Staff

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of the House Committee on Official Conduct, using his First

Amendment right "to petition for redress of Grievances", to prevent

non-defensive and pre-emptive actions by the United States against

the sovereign nation of Iraq without proper representation by the

Congress as required by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution,.

Lt. Colonel Sullivan's petitions were directed at preserving the

integrity of the United States Constitution as required by his oath of

commissioning, and, by using the Iraqi question then developing

under the authority of House Joint Resolution 114 (PL 107-243),

"To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq”,

as a precedent example, to once and for all eliminate the United

States’ propensity for cavalierly entering into armed invasions of

sovereign governments without the representation of a direct issue

vote by the peoples’ representatives in the Congress, upon

information and belief an act repeated over 200 times since 1945.

As the Petitioners stated to the Court at the Hearing for a

TRO on March 20, 2003, "The Plaintiffs are disinterested in the

Iraq conflict, per se." Their interest was and is the prevention of

any further insertions of troops by the United States into any

foreign nation for any reason or policy, other than the repelling of a

foreign invasion, without a declaration of war by the Congress, and

the unquestioned support by the American people, via their

representation in that Congress, for War. (See Appendix D,

Violating the Constitution with an Illegal War, by Honorable Ron

Paul, October 3, 2002)

Further, the petitioners argued the intent of HJR 114 was to

tie any acts of war to appropriate sanctions of the United Nations,

maintaining, any participation in an invasion of Iraq would require a

congressional declaration of war, and to act unilaterally would have

the Executive in collision with the Legislative. The same argument

was raised by Doe, et al v Bush, et al, 323 F.3d (March 13, 2003),

but was disregarded by the Court stating, "For various reasons, this

issue is not fit now for judicial review. F or example, should there

be an attack, Congress may take some action immediately."

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Petitioners, unaware of the Doe case, filed their Complaint March

18, 2003, the very day the Respondent individually declared the

invasion of Iraq. At that time the Congress, though miffed, took no

action to prevent this offensive decision, having been caught in their

own trap with the very real and present need to "support our

troops” now before them,, thus proving their culpability and the

unconstitutional collusion between the Executive and the

Legislative to unconstitutionally invade Iraq.

The Petitioners were dismissed because of "justiciability”

issues and "mootness" on April 15,2003, after the hostilities were

prematurely declared over. The Defendants’ 33-page Motion to

Dismiss had been filed within 48 hours after Plaimtiffs’ original

Complaint. An argument can be appropriately made based upon

these events and others in this case, that there is not only collusion

between the Legislative and Executive branches, but also between

the Executive and Judicial. One might even conclude, given the

keen awareness and sensitivity of the Attorney General in the extant

case, as witnessed by the response time, Respondent Bush's

decision to move forward as suddenly as he did might have been

directly related to the timing of these matters. However, Defendant

Bush's announcement that hostilities were over was not "ripe",

since we have been involved in what television newscasterTom

Brokaw referred to in an interview with talk show host David

Letterman as "War IL, which is extremely dangerous for all those in

Iraq", and continue to lose our sons and daughters at an alarming

rate. One might well ask, "And for what?”

Petitioner Specialist Four Jeffrey S. Sullivan, a member of

the North Carolina National Guard, had been activated to the

National Guard of the United States in January, 2003, in support of

the intended invasion of Iraq and the "War on Terrorism” by the

President, and is currently serving in Bagram, Afghanistan, with the

1st/130th Aviation Battalion. The Court may recall, Afghanistan is

a "hostile" theater, where many of our troops are being killed and

wounded each week. The most notable recent loss being the

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downing of an Army helicopter from Specialist Four Sullivan's base

with six killed. Further, those National Guard Troops in

Afghanistan are merely place-holders such that other members of

the Armed Forces of the United States could be freed up to serve in

the Iraqi theater.

The "War" continues to this day, as occupation is not only a

part of war, but oftentimes even more dangerous. The ruling of

"mootness” by the lower court is baseless, and beyond the context

of plaintiffs’ action. The objectives of the Iraqi mission were

fraudulent from the beginning. We must accept that Respondent

Bush believed in what he was doing, for to think otherwise is

unthinkable; but, at the time of the invasion, the Congress most

likely did not. The requirement for a declaration of war would

most probably have prevented this debacle and the ensuing loss of

life, resources and national credibility. No one trusts the United

States any longer. Our record speaks for itself.

Prior to our intervention in Iraq in 1990, King Hussein, an

ally at the time, had asked the United States to define its response

should he invade Kuwait. He was informed officially there would

be no response as long as American interests were not threatened.

President Bush, the Elder, attacked Iraq anyway, without

Congressional approval. Again, onthe eve of this most recent

attack, the Executive was given assurances King Hussein would

absolutely comply with all United Nations resolutions and United

States requirements save the regime change. Respondent Bush, the

son, was not Satisfied and mvaded Iraq anyway. This apparent

result of the unconstitutional delegation of authority by the

Congress, whether intended or not, must be addressed by the

Judicial to prevent similar catastrophes from ever happening again

due to total power being transferred ta any one individual in the

Executive branch, including the President of the United States.

For this nation, and the federal Judiciary, to continue to

4

allow the office of the President of the United States to act without

the specific sanctions of the Congress in areas where only the

Congress has the authority to act, to sanction such acts even in the

face of there being no threat to the United States, no invasion of the

United States, and no vital national security or domestic defense

interests being served, where citizens of foreign nations are

needlessly and carelessly slaughtered in the name of peace, and

where the international and domestic credibility of the United States

is destroyed, is not only unconscionable, it is a shirking of their

responsibility as defined in the Constitution.

"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel

those made in Clinton [Clinton v. City of New York (524 U.S.

452)]: That the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch

as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that

Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to

the executive. See 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

("That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make

it innocuous....Abdication of responsibility is not part of the

congressional design.") cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S.

144, 182, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) ("The

Constitution's division of power among the three branches is

violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether

or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.")."

(Doe, et al, v. Bush, et al, supra)

Having proceeded with no declaration of war, and without

the requisite support of the United Nations, as referenced in HJR

114's preamble and by legislative history, Respondent Bush has

placed “all participants under the authority of the International

Criminal Court, recently seated but boycotted by the United States,

which stated purpose is the trial and punishment of tyrants and

other violators of international law, ie., the dictates of the United

Nations" (Count I, Original Complaint). Although the Executive,

through international bribes and concessions, is attempting to "buy-

off" member nations of the International Crime Commission (ICC)

5

to exempt Americans from the tribunals of that body, it is at the

same time establishing similar tribunals to bring to trial Iraqis and

others who may be guilty of the same "war crimes". While the

former action smacks of cover-up, the latter action most certainly is

disingenuous and will cause the "buy-off" attempts to suffer and

fail. It appears the United States would have been better served to

let the ICC investigate and bring to justice those who participated

in the 9/11 disaster, rather than attempting unilaterally to police the

world under the pretext of its "War on Terrorism”.

Of course, any discussion of this subject of "undeclared

war" begs the question of "What about the War Powers Resolution

of 1973 [50 U.S.C.S. 1543(a)}?" It must be, of course, repugnant

to the Constitutional Powers of Congress, which cannot be

delegated ta any other branch. The War Powers Resolution,

vetoed by President Nixon because it was repugnant to the

Constitution, is an overt attempt to. abrogate the legal authority of

the people, represented by that Constitution. "But this ‘act’ was

illegal because it was passed by ‘Joint Resolution’ rather than by the

individual chambers of Congress, and unconstitutionally delegates

(legislative) power to the (executive) President." Fred Foldvary,

supra) The Petitioners, therefore, include ‘it by association in this

pleading for certiorari, to have done with it once and for all, before

it "turns and rends us” (Matt. 7:6).

Although Petitioners’ original Complaint was primarily

about the Congress’ avowed disregard for the Constitution as stated

on the record in meetings pursuant to the vote on House Joint

Resolution (HJR) 114, the passage of time has illuminated even

more such fundamental issues. Each of these Respondents has

violated law. Respondents Hefley, Hyde and Bargo were culpable

by their denying Petitioner Sullivan his constitutionally guaranteed

right to petition for redress of grievance and to expect a responsible

answer, most certainly on an issue of the importance of a

declaration of war. Petitioner's extraordinary standing to expect

such an answer is explained herein. Respondent Members of

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‘a

;

Congress, who swore in their oaths of office to "support and defend

the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign

and domestic and bear true faith and allegiance to the same", have

individually violated the specific sections of the Constitution which

provide for only the Congress to have the power to declare war by

supporting and voting for HJR 114. Some, at the same time

acknowledging the resolution to be outside their constitutional

authority, were, upon information and belief, stating on the record

that the Constitution has been overwhelmed by events and by time,

and the declaration of war is no longer required. To wit,

"There are things in the Constitution that have been

overtaken by events and by time. Declaration of War is one

of them... There are things no longer relevant to a modern

society...Why declare War if you don't have to?...We are

saying to the President, use your judgment...So, to demand

that we declare War is to strengthen something to death.

You have got a hammerlock on this situation; and it is not

called for, imappropriate, anachronistic. It isn't done

anymore.” (Respondent Henry Hyde, elected defender of

the Constitution in his comments to the International Affairs

Committee, October 3, 2002). |

Ironically, some of these same congressmen voted down a

declaration of war resolution offered by Congressman Ron Paul in

the same House Committee on International Affairs meeting where

HJR 114 was approved; so this violation of constitutional law was

not done im ignorance (See Appendix D).

Due to that original act (HJR 114), which we have seen is

repugnant to the Constitution, and, apparently, due to peer pressure

and emotional uncertainty with regards to "supporting our troops”

once they were im harm's way, subsequently and unfortunately,

these same representatives of the people were drawn into unpopular

war finding allocations and took no actions to remedy their own

malfeasance. At that point, the ship had sailed, and the Congress

7

was unwilling to put on the brakes. These are career-threatening

and career-shattering times. They easily overlooked that their

solemn oath is not to a person, an institution, a country, a

government, nor to a president, but to the Constitution of the

United States, without which there can be no United States.

"The Constitution says simply, clearly, emphatically:

Congress shall declare war. Only Congress. No one else. Not the

President. Not the judiciary. Not the military. Only Congress.

100 Senators and 435 Representatives elected by, and acting for,

the people of the United States.” (Senator Mark Dayton, On the

Senate Giving Up Its Constitutional Responsibility to Declare War,

March 13, 2003, Appendix E) Yet, "A reporter recently stated to

President Bush that it appeared inevitable that the nation was

headed toward war with Iraq. The President responded, "That's not

for you to decide. That's for me to decide.” (Congressman Jesse

Jackson, Jr., The President Must Have Congressional War

Resolution Before Starting War, February 13, 2003)

This reluctance to actually stand up and protect the

Constitution by those who are entrusted with that awesome

responsibility to "support and defend” it, as demonstrated by the

Congress in this matter before the Court, is nowhere better

illustrated than in the recent experience of Petitioner Lt. Colonel

Sullivan himself, during a brief conversation with an experienced

member of the armed Forces of the United States, in uniform,

about a related subject at a National Guard Armory. In this

discussion, the issue of constitutionality came up as an aside. The

soldier asked for a constitutional reference for Petitioner Lt.

Colonel Sullivan's comment pertinent to foreign deployment of

troops, especially the National Guard of North Carolina. Petitioner

Lt. Colonel Sullivan offered him the very Constitution he had swom

to defend. Immediately after reading the applicable section, the

soldier informed Petitioner Lt. Colonel Sullivan the police would be

called, and he would be arrested, if he did not leave the premises

immediately. Our troops are so well trained, they fear any

8

knowledge of the reason for their profession, lest it interfere with

their objective, whether that objective be in keeping with their

solemn oath, or not. It seems the God and the Constitution of our

Founders is no longer welcomed by, and are being summarily

eliminated from, our government.

Petitioner President Bush, as chief executive officer for the

United States, did violate the intent of the Constitution by illegally

assuming the powers of Commander-in-Chief, by illegally calling

the militias of the several states into the service of the United

States, and by ordering the invasion of the sovereign states of Iraq

and Afghanistan, or "declaring" war, without such authority having

been allocated by the only branch of the government with legal

power to grant it. Or, as held in Hamdi v Rumsfeld (216 F.3d 450,

January 8, 2003), "The war powers thus. invest: 'the President, as

Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress

has declared,..."". In this matter before the Court, as in those

many similar matters herein referenced, Congress declared no war

which a President could legally wage.

"The War Powers Clause of the United States Constitution

provides Congress with the power to "declare war...." (U.S.

Constitution, Art. I, Section 8, cl.11). Congress’ power to declare

war works in conjunction with the authority granted to the

president under the Constitution to act as "Commander in Chief of

the Army and the Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of

the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United

States” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Section 2, cl. 1)” (Campbell, et

al, v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34). Unfortunately for the President

in this matter, and many others before it, this latter power is

contingent upon the Congress voting to call the "Militia of the

several States._into the actual Service of the United States". This

can only be done through a declaration of war, or other specific act

so doing, by the Congress, which has the power "To provide for

calling forth the Militia....", whether it be the "States Militia” or the

United States "Militia”.

9

"The role of the President as commander-in-chief is one of

the few executive powers enumerated by the Constitution" (Doe, et

al, v. Bush, et al, supra) is true as far as it goes. This power cannot

become effective unless and until the Congress validates this power

_ by law, or by declaration of war, even by the simplest interpretation

of the intent and punctuation of Art. Il, Section II, although some

interpretations would say different. Stated simply, the phrase, "and

the militia of the several States", is a parenthetical phrase the

deletion of which from the sentence does not change the intent of

that sentence one iota. Art. IL, Section 2, would then read, "The

President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

of the United States when called into the service of the United

States" (emphasis added). Only the Congress has the authority to

make war or wa!riors.

According to the Constitution, and until the Congress

declares war, by any reasonable interpretation of the words and the

careful punctuation of the above mentioned "Militia clause", the

President is merely the Chief Executive Officer unless and until the

Congress adds the awesome power of the United States armed

forces and the "Militias of the several States" to his authority by the

act of that Congress to declare war. The reason for this aspect of

the control of Congress, the peoples’ representative in government,

over the employment of the armed forces of the United States is

because the States knew at the founding of this nation, "standing

armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and

the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and

governed by, the civil. power" (Art. 1, Section 30, State

Constitution of North Carolina). Hence, the directive only the

Congress, representing "we the people”, may declare war and call

forth the militias of the several States.

Quoting Congressman Helen Chenoweth from her article,

"Our Illegal War", at Appendix C regarding Art. II Section 2, of the

United States Constitution,

10

"The text of the Constitution itself specifies, 'The President

shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the

United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when

called. into the actual Service of the United States....'_ In

other words, 'Commander in Chief describes a specific and

limited role played by the President. Rather than Congress

having a Commander in Chief before which it must prostrate

itself, it has in the President an executive it may entrust with

delegated war-making authority."

The. Founders of this nation knew best the intent of this

Constitution, stating as follows:

George Washington: "The Constitution vests the power of

declaring war in Congress; therefore, no offensive expedition of

importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated

upon the subject and authorized such a measure." (1793)

"If, m the opinion of the people, the distribution of Constitutional

powers be wrong, let it be corrected by Amendment in the way in

which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by

usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument

of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are

destroyed.” (Farewell address of 1796)

Thomas Jefferson: "We have already given in example one

effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of

letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body...”

(Letter to Madison, 1789)

"Considermg that Congress alone is constitutionally vested with the

power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought

it my duty to await their authority for using force in any degree

which could be avoided." (Message to Congress, 1805)

1]

"In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in

man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the

Constitution.” (1798) [Compare this context with Respondent

Bush's comment regarding discussions on HJR 114, "Don't tie my

hands." See Senator Mark Dayton March 13, 2003, speech to the

Senate, "On the Senate Giving Up Its Constitutional Responsibility

to Declare War" at Appendix E]

Alexander Hamilton: "The President is to be commander-in-chief

of the army and navy of the United States...while that of the British

king extends to the declaring of war and the raising and regulating

of fleets and armies, all of which by the Constitution under

consideration, would appertain to the legislature." (The Federalist,

69, 1788)

"It is the province and duty of the Executive to preserve to the

Nation the blessings of peace. The Legislature alone can interrupt

those blessings, by placing the Nation in a State of War.”

James Madison: "...The power to declare war, including the

power of judging the causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested

in the legislature...the executive has no right, in any case, to decide

the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war."

(1793)

"The Constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments

demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most

interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with

studied care vested the question of war to the Legislature." (Letter

to Jefferson, c. 1798)

[It is the]. "fundamental doctrine of the Constitution that the power

to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature."

(1793) fs

12

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William Patterson (Framer of the Constitution and Justice of the

United States Supreme Court): "...It is the exclusive province of

congress to change a state of peace into a state of war." (United

States v. Smith, 1806)

James Wilson (Framer of the Constitution and ratifier): "This

system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it.

It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men,

to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring

war is vested in the legislature at large..." (Address to the

Pennsylvania ratifying convention, 1787)

Fred Foldary, supra, asks, "May the President start a war

without a declaration of war?” He goes on to answer, generally,

that the authors of the Constitution wanted to avoid this

eventuality:

By requiring Congress, not the President, to initiate war,

the authors wanted to assure broad support for any war,

since Congress is more widely representative of the people

than the President. Yet, since World War II, the United

States has fought many wars, none having the luxury of a

declaration of war. The Excuse in Korea was that this was

a United Nations war, and the United States was

participating under the United Nations. But the power to

'declare war means the United States may not engage in a

war unless [and until] the Congress implicitly declares that

the United States is at war. If a power is allocated to the

Congress, it may not be legislated to the President."

"It may not be legislated to the President” without amending the

Constitution, and certainly cannot be delegated to a foreign power

such as the United Nations.

13

The excuse in Vietnam, another "undeclared war", was the

Gulf of Tonkin resolution which merely funded the "actions” m

country. This same "Gulf of Tonkin Incident" has, 30 years later,

been proven to have been merely a ruse to get public opinion

behind this mostly commercial enterprise. Not the first ruse to get

us into war by a long shot, and certainly not the last. Then there

were Cambodia, Laos, Grenada, Kosovo, Somalia, Panama,

Liberia, Libya, Afghanistan [, Iraq I, Afghanistan IL, now Iraq HU,

and many, many more, “all undeclared wars" which were

unconstitutional. Millions killed and wounded, and, in the final

analysis, for no good purpose whatsoever. The Petitioners’ intent is

that this mistake never be allowed to happen again.

Foldary, goes on to say,

"The declaration of war is important because a state of war

transforms the country. The entire country is at risk of

being, attacked, and the war becomes top priority for

everyone, whether they like it or not. Because this is so

serious, an explicit and specific declaration makes it very

clear that this is what the Congress, on behalf of the people,

intends. By merely passing a resolution and providing funds

[to support our troops], Congress is going along with a

Presidential war rather than taking responsibility for starting

a war.”

By contrast, Respondent Bush encoura ed the citizens of the

United States to continue with "busimess as usual”.

Likewise, the Congress is empowered "To raise and support

Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that use shall be for a

longer Term than two years” (Art. I, Section 12, United States

Constitution). Obviously, the Founders were opposed to a

"standing" Army for periods longer than two years, except in a

national emergency such as a War declared by the Congress,

precisely because of their fear of that Army being "destructive to

14

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liberty.” Hence, the undeniable fact the Executive, through

compliant congressional legislation, has kept the United States in a

continuous state of emergency for at least 155 years to justify

keeping a "standing Army", in obvious disregard of constitutional

authority.

However, even when War is declared, according to any

straightforward interpretation of the United States Constitution as

written, unabridged and unabrogated by law, the President cannot

employ said "Militia of the several States" in any missions other

than those which "...execute the Laws of the Union, suppress

insurrections, and repel invasions" (Art. I, Section 8, cl. 15).

Therefore, the fact Petitioner Specialist Four Sullivan is currently

serving in Bagram, Afghanistan, along with thousands of other

members of the "Militias of the several States” serving in either Iraq

or Afghanistan, flies in the face of not only the limited authority

granted the President by the United States Constitution, but also

that granted by many State constitutions, including that of North

Carolina, Specialist Four Sullivan's home State, which he has swom

to support and defend and which states, "The Governor shall be the

Commander in Chief of the military forces of the State and may call

out those forces to execute the law, suppress riots and

insurrections, and repel invasions." (Art. 12, State of North

Carolina Constitution) Again, we see the purpose of the Militia is

solely homeland domestic defense, not pre-emptive projection of

force to sovereign, foreign soil. This "projection" can only occur

legally when the Militia is pursuing an invading foreign enemy. ©

Thus, the very idea of the United States staging a pre-emptive

strike, especially using the "Militias of the several States”, is totally

repugnant to the Constitution.

The Congress, exercising its authority under the "implied

powers” of the "implementation clause" in Art. I, Section 8, "to

make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into

execution the foregoing powers", moved to circumvent the

authority of the States with regards to their militias through the

15

passage and subsequent interpretation of the National Defense Act

of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat.166, which provided, in part, "That the

Amny of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the

Volunteer Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve

Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United

States, and such other land forces aS are now or may hereafter be

authorized by law (emphasis added).” This law was used to

technically merge the several States’ militias into the Army such that

they lost all status as militiamen of the States, and therefore,

allegiance to same, so that they could be used in conflicts outside

the domain of the "militia clause”, a law we now sce is repugnant to

the Constitution.

Further, this abrogation of the power of the States to have

their own militia was strengthened by the Supreme Court in the

Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), and in Cox v.

Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918), holding "the plenary power to raise

armies was "not qualified or restricted by the provisions of the

militia clause”. Subsequently, to remedy certain "defects" in the

National Defense Act, the Congress amended it in 1933,

establishing the simultaneous enlistment of National Guard

members. the militia of the. several States, into what was called the

"National Guard of the United States’. The effect of this

amendment was for members to be "relieved from duty in the

National Guard of their respective States" so they could then be

projected overseas, effectively amending the Constitution by the fiat

of Congress and, thereby, denying the States any authority over

their own militias, an act not only repugnant to the Constitution,

but also one which disrespected what the Founders were trying to

accomplish by the "militia clause", a separation of the armed forces

of the States from that of the United States, except in matters of

domestic defense. This is much the same thing as has been

accomplished by the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, in its employment of aur troops in manners not

approved by our own Congress. One need only to connect the dots

to understand where we are headed if we do not return immediately

16

to the restrictions of the Constitution. Otherwise, we must see it

condemned by our own leaders (See again Chenoweth at Appendix

C). It would seem, in fact, that the United States Constitution is

indeed in great peril of being rewritten, whether intentionally or not,

either by the fiat of willing judicial and legislative branches, or by

being wholly replaced with an all new document in Convention by

its enemies due to its "anachronistic" imperatives.

While the need for a well-equipped and well-tramed

National Guard militia to provide domestic defense for the several

States and nation is self-evident, the msidious developmen: of that

force into an offensive, imperialistic instrument of war must be

reckoned with and controlled. Otherwise, it will be as President

Theodore Roosevelt stated in his First Annual Message to Congress

in. 1901, "Our militia law is obsolete and worthless", but for a

totally different reason than that espoused by him.

Further, by allowing Respondent Bush to unilaterally "call

the Militia", in this case the National Guards of the several states,

into service for an undeclared, unnecessary and nation-threatening

war, the United States has unwittingly placed itself in a position

where it cannot effectively comply with its duties under Art. 4,

Section 4, of the United States Constitution which states, in part,

"The United States shall guarantee the States...and protect each of

them against Invasion." It is obvious, both from news reports as

well as from comments from our military leaders, the United States

has overextended its ability to protect any State of the Union, or the

Union itself, from mvasion by a foreign power. One must

remember, when the Roman empire finally fell, two of the major

failures at cause were: Rome had been overwhelmed by an influx

of "strangers", and the Roman legions were far-flung and unable to

defend the homeland. Further, by illegally drawing upon the

Militias of the Several States to augment the missions he has given

the armed forces of the United States, Respondent Bush has made

it impossible for the State governors to protect their own

constituents from either from invasion or the most basic of local

17

emergencies, as noted by leaders of the North Carolina National

Guard in comments preceding the recent hurricane Isabel.

The fact is, this country has already been, and is being,

‘nvaded. There are millions of foreign nationals m this country

today. The BICE estimates there are over 500,000 Mexican and

Central and South American nationals in North Carolina right now,

of which the greatest portion can rightfully be assumed to be

illegally here. Should even a fraction of their number decide to rise

up against us, we would be easy prey. Knowing the stated position

of some of the more radical elements of this group to conduct /a

Reconquista, the reconquest of the southwestern States, to form

the mythical home of the Aztecs, Aztlan, one foresees a real and

present danger (See again Chenoweth at Appendix C). It would

appear the colonization of the United States is well under way and

should be complete within the next 20 years, given the rate of

illegal immigration and the sustained birthrate and interbreeding of

the colonists. While we wait, our future, our wealth, our jobs, our

culture, our heritage, our identity and our nation are being forfeited.

Even more cause for alarm is the fact the communist Chinese have

a very serious presence in and around the Isthmus of Panama since

they took over the Panama Canal from the Panamanians, in

violation of the treaty under which we returned the Canal Zone to

the citizens of Panama. This presence, in and of itself, constitutes a

foreign invasion, especially under the auspices of the Monroe

Doctrine; and, given the stated attitude of the Chinese government

to destroy the power of the United States, nominally over the

"Taiwan Question", this threat is very real, albeit mostly ignored by

our government "solely for the faculty of making money" (Thomas

Jefferson to the Virginia Assembly, 1794). All this, while our

President takes the bulk of our military and illegally projects it

overseas for his personal war without the authority of the people.

It is undoubtedly with the realm of judicial authority and

responsibility to address these issues before it is too late for all of

us. We have survived over fifty years of disregard for the

18

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I POST LES LO LIE RL NE AI ON BOAT

Constitution's restrictions on wat-making ability. We will not

survive fifty more.

Reviewed separately, as the Supreme Court has previously

done on certain of the above questions, these violations of law and

abrogations of the Constitution may not be wholly threatening to its

viability and, consequently, to the United States. However, taken

as cumulative, the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts,

and the powers created fit perfectly in the hands of a dictator, a

king or an oligarchy. This is where the United States stands today,

even as it pretends to export its form of socialist democracy,

something, our Founders feared and abhorred, above which they

chose one Constitutional Republic, Under God, and guaranteed "to

every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government” (Art.

IV, Section 4, United States Constitution).

The Congress has passed laws, inchiding, but not limited to,

HJR 114, the War Powers Resolution, the PATRIOT Act, aad

numerous funding measures in support of illegal wars, which serve

only to abrogate the safeguards of the United States Constitution,

under the guise of implementing the authority of that Constitution.

The matter now before this Honorable Court was commenced upon

the attitude of certam members of Congress, represented by the

Respondent Members, that "the Constitution has been

overwhelmed by events and by time.” Having this philosophy is

improper before the Constitution itself, which states it is only to be

altered by amendment (Art. V, United States Constitution).

We must all understand the Constitution is merely a binding

contract, a business arrangement, between and among the several

States meant only to establish a United States of America, Inc, and

to set for it rules of conduct and limits of authority, which

establishment, rules and limits are subject to the authority of the

stockholders of that corporation, the States. By the actions of the

Executive and ffats 6f the Legislative in the matter before this

Honorable Court, this contract has been disregarded, abrogated.

19

The only reasonable conclusion for these acts is that this

Constitution, and, thus, the United States it served to create, are no

longer viable creations, under law. This matter is being brought by

the Petitioners for the sole intent and purpose of bringing this

United States to order in this most critical realm of government, to

declare and wage war, and to force it to abide by the terms of its

contract, or, in the alternative, be dissolved due to its arrogance and

disrespect in the manner prescribed in Paragraph Two of our

Declaration of Independence. Our failure to perform in these

matters will leave us with a United States which is dismgenuous,

lacking even the credibility of its own law, and which can survive

only through the use of force, not only agaist any perceived

foreign threat, but also against its own citizens.

Petitioner will now address. the questions of justiciability

(political question doctrine, standing, ripeness and mootness) raised

by the Respondents im their Motion to Dismiss, by the District

Court in its Order, and referenced by the Court of Appeals.

The issue of political question doctrine must be rejected

explicitly since this Court has jurisdiction under Article III over all

"Cases under, Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution".

Courts have been traditionally "sparmg in their reliance on the

political question". This "Court has found a case nonjusticiable on

the basis of the political question doctrine only twice" in the past 40

years (Bush v. Doe, supra). Albeit there is prominent on the surface

of this case "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of

the issue to a coordinate political department", as provided for by

the United States Supreme Court, the heart of the issue is the illegal

delegation and abandonment of strict constitutional authority by

one branch and usurpation of that authority by another to the great

harm of all, which acts, if ignored by the Judicial, will only be

duplicated time and time again, based upon the already existing

precedents for those acts and the justifications developed herein.

Such duplication can only result in ultimate harm to this nation and

its people.

20

Obviously, the Respondents claim "an unusual need for

unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”

(Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186); however, the Fourth Circuit Court

of Appeals has rightly concluded, "We do not hold, of course, that

any time a branch of the military asserts a national defense interest

to justify its acts, the court must avert its eyes." (Tiffany v. United

States, 931 F.2d 271) It would not be constitutionally appropriate,

nor in the best interest of this nation, for the United States Supreme

Court to "avert its eyes" and be silent in this matter.

While Respondents have stated in their original Motion to

Dismiss in the Fourth District, "With regard to decisions to employ

military troops, ‘it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain

private litigation... which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the

propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces

abroad or to any particular region" (7iffany, supra), Petitioners —

contend not only was the President not empowered to be the

Commander-in Chief by the Congress or the Constitution, but also

the collisions and collusions identified herein show the interests of

the Petitioners, the public at large, and the Constitution were

subverted by certain individuals in the prosecution of these

conflicts. Further, the Supreme Court has also noted in Campbell,

et al, v. Clinton, supra, "the political question doctrine does not

apply to suits brought by individuals in their personal capacities

(emphasis added)." (Michel v. Anderson, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 325,

14 F.3d, 14 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

As "standing" is an affirmative defense, Petitioners’ do not

plead standing herein, but offer evidence of their standing to the

Court pertment to Respondents counter-claims in the lower courts.

Petitioners’ standing, although shared in some regards, have certain

sigmficant differences and will be defended separately herein.

Petitioner Lt. Colonel Sullivan certainly has the standing

“held m common by all members of the public, because of the

21

necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share”

(Schlesinger, et al, v. Reservists, 418 U.S. 208, 1974). He also

recognizes that "public" standing does not alone support his request

for constitutional adjudication in this Court. However, he also has

actual and threatened concrete individual injury. To wit: Petitioner

Lt. Colonel Sullivan was specifically denied his First Amendment

right to petition the United States, in the person of the

Respondents, for redress of grievances, in matters which most

certainly were timely and most properly filed, and, potentially,

pertinent to the survival of this nation as a constitutional republic.

Further, he is threatened by the loss of a close family member, the

only son of his only brother, in the person of Petitioner Specialist

Four Sullivan, who has been placed in harm's way by the

unconstitutional actions and inactions of the Respondents, and as a

direct result of the failure of the Respondents to react

constitutionally to Petitioner Lt. Colonel Sullivan's petitions for

redress. These are particular and concrete injuries for which this

Honorable Court has judicial remedy.

Petitioner Specialist Four Sullivan's standing is even more

undeniable. He stands today on the soils of a foreign nation, under

the orders of Respondent Bush in an "undeclared war", in absolute

violation of the precepts of that very "Constitution of the United

States and the State of North Carolina" which he has taken a

solemn oath to defend. His petition to this Court is based solely

upon that oath, which he takes very seriously. He is denied his

rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and stands in a hostile

theater, surrounded by his enemies, where even his right to life is

threatened. As the Ninth Circuit maintained in Mottola v. Nixon,

464 F.2d 178 (1972), "The legality of an order sending men to

participate in an ‘undeclared war’ should be raised by someone to

whom such an order has been directed.” Ji is within the power and

the authority of this Honorable Court to remedy said injuries to

Petitioner Specialist Four Sullivan by a favorable ruling in this

matter. For this Court "To deny standing to persons who are in

fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would

22

mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions

could be questioned by nobody” (United States v. SCRAP, 412

U.S. 669, 687-688, as quoted in Schlesinger, et al, v. Reservists,

supra). Even the Respondents, as quoted in Campbell v. Clinton,

supra, admit, "Counsel for the President appears to have

acknowledged that an individual alleging personal injury from the

President's alleged failure to comply with the War Powers Clause or

the War Powers Resolution, as for instance a service person who

has been sent to carry out the air strikes against the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, would have standing to raise these claims.”

The Respondents claim in their "informal Brief of the

Appellees” to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit that "Even if plaintiffs could establish standing, their claim is

now moot. During the course of this litigation, the United States

has invaded Iraq and defeated the Iraqi Army...and the President

has declared that major combat operations in Iraq have ended." Or,

put another way, "Why prosecute for murder. The man is dead.

He memorial has been held. He has been buried. The issue is

moot.” The simple truth is, violations of the spirit, mtent, origin

and letter of the Constitution have been committed once again

under the guise of military necessity and domestic defense; and the

Petitioners have personally suffered, and are personally suffering,

real and threatened injury therefrom. This case is not moot and the

injury continues. Petitioner Lt. Colonel Sullivan has received no

response to his petition for redress of grievance to the Congress,

and his nephew, Petitioner Specialist Four Sullivan remains with

other members of the North Carolina National Guard in

Afghanistan and Iraq, hostile theaters where our sons and daughters

are dying every day. While Respondent further states in his brief

"...a Judgment in this case could no longer provide any relief on

plaintiffs’ claims", there is no truth in that statement whatsoever,

based upon the facts in evidence and this Court's own knowledge of

events as they are occurring.

The "mootness” defense becomes even more disingenuous

23

when one considers the fact that Doe v. Bush, supra, was dismissed

first by the United States District Court for Massachusetts, and

subsequently affirmed with rehearing denied by the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on March 13, 2003, because

of ripeness, stating, "For various reasons... . For example, should

there be an attack, Congress may take some action immediately.

The purported conflict between the branches may disappear."

Petitioners filed five days later, on the same day Respondent Bush

declared "war", March 18, 2003. Now, because Respondent Bush

prematurely has claimed "major combat operations in Iraq have

ended", are we supposed to ignore the undeniable fact there have

been serious violations of constitutional law. If so, a very bad

precedent will have been set, which will undoubtedly be followed

by all future "Commanders-in-Chief", some who may not have our

best interests in mind.

Therefore, the Petitioners move this Honorable Court rule to

defend the United States Constitution from its inevitable

destruction and grant Petitioners’ Writ of Certiorari which seeks a

ruling to reverse the Order by the District Court and the

Affirmation of said Order by the Court of Appeals, and remand this

case. Or, in the alternative, this matter bemg in the realm of Article

{11 Original Jurisdiction, Petitioner prays this Honorable Court will

decide this matter for the Petitioners, ordering Respondent Hyde

expelled from Congress for his blatant disregard of the sanctity of

his oath; ordering Respondent Hefley reprimanded by this Court for

denying Petitioner his First Amendment rights and violating his

oath: ordering Respondent Members of Congress who supported

HJR 114, over the objections of the Constitution and in violation of

their oath to defend that Constitution, be censured by Congress;

ordering Respondent Bargo be reprimanded by this Court for

denying Petitioner his First Amendment rights, ordering Congress

to produce a declaration of war against Iraq and Afghanistan, or,

failing that, ordering the Executive to begin the orderly withdrawal

of all armed forces of the United States from the sovereign soil of

Iraq and Afghanistan, including Petitioner Specialist Four Sullivan

24

—

and all members of the National Guard, all the while holding said

Executive accountable for those actions taken in ignorant disregard

of its Constitutional authority, and admonishing both the Legislative

and Executive branches for having done so; or, failing that,

rendering in most very clear language the Power to declare war

rests solely with the Congress and shall nevermore be exercised by

the Executive without an Amendment to the Constitution

authorizing same; clarifying the interpretation of Art. I, Section 2,

as it regards the empowerment of the Commander in Chief only at

the order of Congress; declaring the War Powers Resolution of

1973, 50 U.S.C.S. 1543(a), to be repugnant to the Constitution

and, therefore, void; declaring the National Defense Act of 1916,

supra, as it has been interpreted regarding the employment of the

militias of the several States in a manner contrary to that proscribed

in the Constitution, repugnant to the Constitution and, therefore,

void, thus reinstating the original intent of the "militia clause"; and

reversing the opinion of the Court in the Selective Draft Law

Cases, supra, and in Cox v. Wood, supra, as regarding the

unconstitutional employment of the States’ militias, finding it to be

repugnant to the Constitution and, therefore, void, thus reinstating

the original intent of the "militia clause”.

25

AL DG BE IT ae YL 8 EATS

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The United States Government, represented by the Legislative and

the Executive branches, has departed so far from the stated imtent,

the origin, and the letter of the United States Constitution in the

area of War Powers as to call for an exercise of the Court's judicial

review authority.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District has

decided an important question of federal constitutional law, that of

War Powers, that should be settled by this Court.

The United States District Court for North Carolina, Southern

District, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District have erroneously dismissed Petitioners' Complaints against

the United States Government on contrived and unfounded issues

of justiciability, thereby having denied said Petitioners their

constitutional and civil rights.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted, the merits of

Petitioners’ Case should be reviewed by this Court, or, in the

alternative, oral arguments should be heard, and the case tried

before the Supreme Court of the United States.

Respectfully submitted by:

°

pulg- 4A av (Pee

fe S. Sullivan, Petitioner, Pro Se

SP4, US Army

D Co, 1/130th Avn Bn

North Carolina National Guard

c/o 2025 National Guard Drive

Morrisville, NC 27560-0506

aa -

eG N ,

Donald Sullivan, Petitioner, Pro Se |

Lt Col, USAEFR (Ret)

PO Box 3061

Wilmington, NC 28406

910-617-2559

Date: December 23, 2003

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT QF NORTH CAROLINA

FILED APR 15, 2003

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

E. DIST. NO. CAR.

LTC DONALD SULLIVAN and

SP4 JEFFREY S. SULLIVAN,

ee ae a ae

Plaintiffs,

V

) JUDGMENT IN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) A CIVIL CASE

HONORABLE GEORGE W. BUSH, ) CA. #: 7:03-39- F1

HONORABLE JOEL HEFLEY, Chairman,

House Committee on Official Conduct,

HONORABLE HENRY HYDE, Chairman,

House Committee on International Affairs,

JOHN BARGO, Chief-of-Staff, House

Committee on Official Conduct, and 535

John Does,

ee a ee ee

Defendants

__ Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial

by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered a

verdict.

X_ Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before

the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has

been rendered.

A-1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

pursuant to the court's order dated April 10, 2003, and the order

dated April 15, 2003, the defendant's motion to dismiss this action

is ALLOWED, and the plaintffs' motion for preliminary injunction

is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close

this vase and remove it from the undersigned's docket.

THE ABOVE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED TODAY, April 15,

2003, AND A COPY MAILED TO:

Donald Sullivan Vincent M. Garvey, Esq.

PO Box 3061 2Q Massachusetts Ave NW

Wilmington, NC 28406 Washington, DC 20530

Jeffrey S. Sullivan Matthew LePore, Esq.

North Carolina National Guard P.O. Box 883

c/o 2025 National Guard Drive Washington, DC 20044

Morrisville, NC 27560-0506

R. A. Renfer, Jr. Esq.

310 New Bern Ave., Ste 800

Raleigh, NC 27601-1461

April 15, 2003 DAVID W. DANIEL

Date Eastern District of North Carolina

Wilmington, North Carolina s/Susan K. Enyart

(By) Deputy Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

No. 7:03-CV-39-F(1)

LTC DONALD SULLIVAN and )

SP4 JEFFREY S. SULLIVAN, )

Plaintiffs, )

} MEMORANDUM

Vs ) AND ORDER

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )FILED

et al., )APRIL 15, 2003

Defendants YDAVID W. DANIEL,

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT,

COURT, E. DIST. NO. CAR

The pro se plaintiffs initiated this action on March 18, 2003,

seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary

ingunction to prevent President George W. Bush from entermg into

"any hostile action” in Iraq without a formal declaration of war

from Congress. Plaintiff LTC Donald Sullivan is a retired

Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force and his son,

Plaintiff SP4 Jeffrey S. Sullivan, is a member of the North Carolina

National Guard. The plaintiffs allege that Jeffrey is under an order

of deployment to the theater of hostilities in Iraq.

On March 20, the Government filed a motion to dismiss on

grounds that the plaintiffs’ claims fail to present a justiciable

controversy. During a hearing on March 21, the plaintiffs mdicated

they no longer seek to enjoin the war, but rather now seek to force

Congress to ratify the President's actions by passing a formal

declaration of war. By order dated March 26, 2003, the court

A-3-

denied the plaintiffs’ request for a TRO and granted the plaintiffs

additional time to respond to the Government's motion to dismigs,

The plaintiffs have since done so.

After carefully considering the parties’ respective briefs on

the motion to dismiss, the court allowed such motion on April 10

and advised that a written memorandum would be forthcoming,

This order memorializes the court's reasons for dismissing this

action.

First the court finds that Plaintiff LTC Donald Sullivan

("Donald") lacks standing to obtain the relief he seeks. He is

neither an active member of the military under deployment orders

nor a member of Congress, and the Supreme Court has long

dismissed the notion that "citizens standmg"” may be used to

challenge Government actions. See Schlesinger v. Reservists

Comm to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974). In addition, the

law is well settled that the doctrine of "taxpayer standing" is

inapplicable in cases in which an individual seeks to challenge the

President's authority to make war. See id. Harrington y.

Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 457-59 (4" Cir. 1975). Finally, when

the court finds that Plaintiff Donald Sullivan's status as a parent of

an active military member does not provide him with standing to

bring this action. Although the court has great empathy for Mr.

Sullivan's concems as a parent, the law is clear that injuries such as

those alleged by Mr. Sullivan are not sufficiently "distinct and

palpable" to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing.

Second, assuming that Plaintiff SPF Jeffrey Sullivan does

have standing, the court finds that his action is barred by the

political question doctrine.1 the question of if and when to enter

into war is a question committed to the sound discretion of the

political branches. Although Jeffrey has abandoned his effort to

enjoin the war, he still asks this court to step in and order Congress

1. The political question doctrine also would bar Plaintiff LTC Donald

Suttivan's claims. A-4

Se ae ee ee a en ee eee ee

. ee

De iad BRE

———— at

to declare war, That would be an extraordinary step and would

exceed far beyond the constitutional restraints of this court. The

court is simply not equipped to make the type of non-judicial policy

determinations that would be required to grant the relief Jeffrey

seeks.

In this end, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ only remedy

lies with their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, the

government's motion to dismiss is ALLOWED, and the plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot. The Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and remove it from the

_undersigned's desk.

SO ORDERED.

This the 14" day of April, 2003.

s/James C. Fox

Senior United States District Judge

APPENDIX B

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-1611

DONALD SULLIVAN; JEFFREY S. SULLIVAN

Plaintiffs - Appellants

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GEORGE W. BUSH;

JOEL HEFLEY, Chairman, House Committee on Official

Conduct; HENRY HYDE, Chairman, House Committee

on International Affairs; JOHN BARGO, Chief-of- Staff,

House Committee on Official Conduct; 535 John Does,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James

C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (CA-03-39-7-F)

Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: September 25,

2003.

B-L

Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior District Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donald Sullivan, Jeffrey S. Sullivan, Appellants, Pro Se.

Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,

Raleigh, North Carolina; Vincent Garvey, Scott Ramsey

McIntosh, Teal Elizabeth Luthy, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D. C., for

Apellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this

circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Donald Sullivan and Jeffrey S. Sullivan appeal the

district court's order dismissing their complaint and denying,

as moot, their motion for preliminary injunction. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the District

Court. See Sullivan v. United States, No., CA-03-39-7-F

(E.D.N.C. Apr. 15,2003). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

B-2

JUDGMENT

FILED: September 25, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-1611

CA-03-39-7-F

DONALD SULLIVAN; JEFFREY S. SULLIVAN

Plaintiffs - Appellants

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GEORGE W. BUSH;

JOEL HEFLEY, Chairman, House Committee on Official

Conduct; HENRY HYDE, Chairman, House Committee

on International Affairs; JOHN BARGO, Chief-of-Staff

House Committee on Official Conduct; 535 John Does,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.

In accordance with the written opinion of this Court filed

this day, the Court affirms the judgment of the District

Court.

APPENDIX C

OUR ILLEGAL WAR

By Congressman Helen Chenoweth

(Congress must reclaim its authority)

When the order was given for American military

personnel to attack Yugoslavia, it was not issued following

a declaration of war from Congress. Nor was the order

given by a President as a means of repelling a sudden attack

on America by a foreign aggressor, or aS a measure

intended to rescue Americans abroad from unexpected peril.

In fact, the order to attack Yugoslavia didn't even follow the

pattern set in Korea and Vietnam, in which our nation was

committed to protracted foreign wars through unilateral

presidential action. On March 23rd (1999), the order to

commence hostilities was given to an American general by a

Spanish Marxist, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana.

"I have just direeted the Supreme Allied Commander

of Europe, General [Wesley] Clark, to initiate air operations

in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", announce Solana,

who insisted that the attack "is intended to support the

political aims of the international community”. Congress

played no role in defining those political aims, which means

that the American people, in whose name Congress is

empowered to act, were not permitted to play any role m

the decision ta. commit our nation to war.

In the run-up to our war with Yugoslavia, Congress

was permitted by its leaders to carry out an impotent

charade of debate. On March 11th, the House approved a

non-binding resolution endorsing the use of American

C-1

'

\

'

troops to enforce a peace agreement between the

Yugoslavia regime of Slobodan Milosevic and secessionist

leaders in Yugoslavia's Kosovo province. On March 23rd,

just hours before Solana issued the order to begin the

bombing, the Senate approved a resolution supporting the

military campaign. But Clinton administration officials,

including the President, had by that time made it clear that

while they sought approval of the military action from

Congress, they did not consider it necessary for Congress to

authorize the military strike on Yugoslavia.

A few senators seemed to understand the

constitutional implications of these actions. Senator Don

Nickles (R-OK) pointed out, "If we start a massive bombing

campaign, we're going to war." Senator Ted Stevens (R-

AK) described the prospect of waging an undeclared

aggressive war upon Yugoslavia as "a precedent I don't

want to be involved in." Even more pointed were the

comments of Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), "I say shame

on the President,” declared Domenici, momentarily

forgetting that Bill Clinton has repeatedly demonstrated that

he is incapable of shame . "If this is such an important

matter, why couldn't (the President) trust the United States

Senate and United States House and ask us whether we

concur?” [Petitioner Note: This same Pete Domenici voted

for the resolution which evolved into President Bush's

invasion of Iraq in 2003.]}

In order to appreciate the depth of the

Administration's deception regarding the war over Kosovo,

it is necessary to understand that the war was "authorized"

by NATO long before the bombing on March 24th (1999).

The day after the war began, the London Telegraph

reported that General Clark, NATO's supreme military

commander, "received his activation order for hostilities last

October (1998), The order was the official moment when

C-2.

authority over the forces to be used was transferred to him

from the top brass of the member countries supplymg them.

The supreme commander does not need new permission

from politicians or diplomats whenever he wishes to change

tactics, or increase or scale back operations." (Emphasis

added)

At 1:43 P.M. EST on March 24th (1999), with

American bombers en route to Yugoslavia and just minutes

before the first explosions were reported on the ground in

Kosovo, White House spokesman Joe Lockhart explicitly

admitted that the power to take our nation into war had

been surrendered to a foreign official, namely, the NATO

Secretary-General. Lockhart was asked by correspondent

Helen Thomas, "Who gives the green light on this now? Is

it the President himself, or the Supreme Commander of

NATO...?" Lockhart replied, "The Supreme Commander of

NATO acts on the authority of the political leaders of the

NATO countries, and he has that authority."

In brief, the power to declare war in Kosovo was

exercised by NATO Secretary-General Solana; the power to

make war was given to NATO's Supreme Commander; the

President of the United States played the role of "selling"

the war to the public, and Congress was tacitly told that its

duty was to rubber-stamp the decision to take our nation

into war, and to authorize payment of the resultmg

expenses.

"No power but Congress can declare war,” observed

Daniel Webster in 1846, "but what is the value of this

constitutional provision, if the President of his own

authority may make such military movements as must bring

on war?" The Administration's actions in committing our

country to enforce, through military action, diplomatic

initiatives in Kosovo presented Congress with a fait

C-3

accompli. The only recourse left to Congress was to

defund military deployments to which the Administration

had previously committed our country, but the political will

for that is not evident. Unfortunately, the majority in both

houses of Congress have abdicated their responsibility and

have acquiesced in the usurpation of their powers. The

passivity of the House in allowing Bill Clinton to carry out

an illegal war is particularly galling in light of the fact that

the same body impeached him last December (1998) for

muc less serious crimes.

Under the Constitution, explamed Alexander

Hamilton, "It is the province and duty of the Executive to

preserve to the Nation the blessmgs of peace. The

Legislature alone can interrupt those blessings, by placing

the Nation in a state of War." By surrendering to a series of

executive usurpations (those of Bill Clinton being the most

brazen), Congress has abandoned the separation of powers

Principle", in which Congress meekly endorses the decisions

of an imperial "commander-in-chief".

Kings had always been involving and impoverishing

their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that

the good of the people was the object", wrote Abraham

Lincoln in 1848. The royal war-making prerogative, which

permitted one man to commit his country to way, was

regarded by our Founding Fathers, "to be the most

oppressive of all kindly oppressions”, Lincoln explained.

For this reason, the statesmen who gathered at the

Constitutional Convention of 1787 "resolved to so frame

the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of

bringing this oppression upon us.”

James Madison's notes on the Convention record the

care with which the Founders assigned the power to declare

war to the legjslative branch. This was done, as George

C-4.

Mason of Virginia noted, for the purpose of "clogging,

rather than facilitating, war." At the initiative of Madison

and Elbridge Gerry, the original language authorizing

Congress to "make" war was changed to the power to

"declare" war, thereby (in Madison's words) "leaving to the

Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”

In an April 2, 1798, letter to Thomas Jefferson,

Madison further elucidated the reasoning behind this careful

assignment of powers, "The Constitution supposes, what

the History of all [governments] demonstrates, that the

[executive] is the branch of power most interested in war,

and most prone to it. It has, accordingly, with studied care,

vested the question of war in the legislature."

Alexander Hamilton, who favored a_ strong

Executive Branch, observed in the Federalist, No. 69:

"The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and

navy of the United States. In this respect, his authority

would nominally be same with that of the king of Great

Britain, but in substance much inferior to it." (Emphasis

added) Where the power of the English king "extends to

- the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of

fleets and armies," Hamilton explained, the authority of the

U.S. President "amounts to nothing more than the supreme

command and direction ef the land and naval forces, as first

general and admiral" after the declaration of war has been

issued by Congress.

The text of the Constitution itself (Article II, Section

2) specifies, "The President shall be Commander in chief of

the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia

of the several States, when called into the actual Service of

the United States..." In other words, "Commander mn

Chief describes a specific and limited role played by the

President. Rather than the Congress having a Commander

C-5.

in Chief before which it must prostate itself, it has in the

President an executive it may entrust with delegated war-

making authority.

It bears repeating that i the Kosovo War, the role

of commander in chief, by the Administration's own

admission, has been assigned to NATO's Supreme

Commander, who exercises (in Hamilton's words) "the

supreme command and direction of the land and naval

forces" called into service by Secretary-General Solana.

Perhaps, given Mr. Clinton's own history of "loathing" for

the military, personal cowardice, and bottomless corruption,

it is of benefit to the morale of American servicemen

fighting in Yugoslavia to know that it is General Clark who

serves as their commander in chief. Nevertheless, this

arrangement gravely undermines the constitutional

mechanisms designed to protect our liberties and national

sovereignty.

In my remarks to the House of

Representatives, during the March 11th debate, I reminded

my colleagues that nothing in the laws or the Constitution

suggests that a determination by the United Nations

Security council or by the North Atlantic Council (NATO's

governing political body) is a substitute for a congressional

declaration of war. Furthermore, by making war on a

sovereign nation, NATO acted in violation of both its own

charter and that of the United Nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty states that NATO will

"refrain in [its} mternational relations from the threat or use

of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the

United Nations." The document specifies that NATO was

created to defend "the territorial integrity, political

independence or security" of is members in exercising the

right of "collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of

C-6 :

the Charter of the United Nations." Whatever one thinks of

the actions of the Milosevic regime in suppressing a

secessionist movement within its own borders, it must be

admitted that the Yugoslav regime did nothing to threaten

the "integrity, political independence or security" of NATO

members. Thus NATO's attack on that ae violated the

alliance's founding treaty.

Furthermore, NATO's commitment to act im

harmony with "the purposes of the United Nations” requires

that the alliance be bound by the United Nations Charter.

Article 2, Section 7, of the UN Charter states, "Nothing

contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United

Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within

the domestic jurisdiction of any state", the suppression of

Kosovo's ethnic Albanian secessionist movement is clearly

within Yugoslavia's domestic jurisdiction.

Under the precedent set in the Kosovo war, America

may find itself committed to military intervention in ethnic

conflicts around the world. Should we attack Turkey to

protect the Kurds, who chafe under Turkish rule? Should

we go to war with China in support of independence-

minded Tibet? Will U.S. planes attack Sn Lanka m defense

of Tamil separatists, or bomb targets in India on behalf of

Muslims in Kashmir? The logic of the Kosovo precedent

dictates that U.S. troops can be committed to war, without

congressional sanction, anywhere in the world where

atrocities are captured by the «amera lens.

The war on Yugoslavia, we must remember, was

brought about by NATO's demand that Milosevic consent

to the foreign occupation of his country by an mternational

army, which would enforce the terms of an agreement

intended to grant "autonomy" to ethnic Albanian rebels.

When Milosevic refused to permit the occupation, NATO

C-7

threatened to bomb his country, and ultimate'y carried out

that threat. Once again, the Clinton Administration has

been devastatingly candid about key facts. On February

10th, in testimony before the Committee on International

Relations, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Thomas Pickering confirmed that Kosovo is part of

Yugoslavia's sovereign territory, and that an attack upon

Yugoslavia waged because of Milosevic's refusal to allow

foreign intervention would be nothing less than an act of

war.

It is a remarkable spectacle to see the Clinton

Administration and NATO taking over from the Soviet

Union the role of sponsoring "wars of national liberation”.

More remarkable still, and even more unsettling, is the fact

that the beneficiary in the case of Kosovo, the so-called

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), is a collection of Maoist

drug-peddlers and terrorists who have been armed by Iran

and provided with training and support by Saudi terrorist

financier Osama bin Ladin, who is the world's most

notorious sponsor of international terrorism.

When Bill Clinton, in an earlier crime against the

Constitution, unilaterally launched missile strikes on

Afghanistan and Sudan, he claimed that his target was the

terrorist network operated by bin Ladin. However, in

Kosovo, Bill Clinton has committed America's military

might to the support of bin Ladin's Balkan allies, and the

policy of the Clinton Administration seeks the creation of a

Balkan outpost for bin Ladin's terrorist network.

THE NEW AMERICAN was the first national

publication in this country to document the KLA's narco-

terrorist background ("Diving into the Kosovo Quagmire",

March 15th [1999] issue), and I made this magazine's

findings available to many of my colleagues on Capitol Hill.

C-8

Although few U.S. publications have looked into the KLA's

role in international terrorism, the 7imes of London for

March 24th [1999], in a story published just before NATO

commenced airstrikes upon Yugoslavia, reported that the

KLA, in "the judgment of senior police officers across

Europe." Is "a Marxist-led force funded by dubious sources,

including drug money." Police forces in three Western

European countries, together with Europol, "are separately

investigating growing evidence that drug money is funding

the KLA's leap from obscurity to power," continued the

report.

A report filed on the same day by Steve Rodan of

the World Tribune described how an "autonomous" Kosovo

under KLA control could serve as a springboard for Iranian

sponsored terrorism throughout Europe and beyond.

According to Western European security experts, wrote

Rodan, "Iran, Saudi Arabia and some of their terrorist

beneficiaries have exploited the fighting to establish a sphere

of infludnce that spans from Greece to the Austrian border."

‘NATO's willingness to go to war on behalf of Muslim ethnic

Albanians in Kosovo could ignite insurrections across

Europe,\ to which the KLA's terrorist sponsors would

eagerly lend support. "The concern of European strategists

is that an Iranian sphere of influence would do greater

damage to such Western countries as Britain, France and

Germany," reported Rodan. "France has about two million

Muslims, most of them poor and alienated. Britain has

about 1.5 million." A European diplomat told Rodan,

"Once these minorities feel they can obtain the support of

NATO, we could see flare-ups everywhere."

We could see "flare-ups" within our own country as

well, and the Kosovo precedent would justify military

intervention by the "international community" to settle such

conflicts within our own borders. Consider the case of the

C-9

southwestern United States, a region referred to as

"Aztlan", the mythical homeland of the Aztecs, by such

militant groups as the "Brown Berets". Aztlan radicals have

announced their intention to conduct /a reconquista, the re-

conquest, of that region through unrestrained illegal

immigration, as well as subversion and violence. It is not

difficult to foresee a future scenario in which the

"international community" authorizes the use of military

force in support of "autonomy" for Aztlan, in the same way

that the war in Yugoslavia was launched in support of

"autonomy" for an Albanian Muslim-dominated Kosovo.

Had Congyess performed its constitutional duty, all

of these facts woud have been rigorously examined before

our nation found itself committed to an illegal war in

Yugoslavia. We would have demanded that the President

make his best case to the peoples’ representatives in a

formal request for a declaration of war. This would have

given us the opportunity to require that he defend an

alliance with drug-dealing Marxists bent upon promoting

terrorism throughout Europe. Had Congress been willing

to exercise a check on presidential ambitions by withholding

funds for the envisioned military deployment, we would

have learned, in a timely fashion, about the unconstitutional

arrangement through which the power to declare war was

delegated to a Spanish Marxist, and the power to make war

was assigned to NATO's military commander. Had we

acted with statesmanlike deliberation, we would have

soberly discussed and contemplated the implications of the

Kosovo precedent for our nation's future.

It was our duty to do all of this before deciding

whether or not to interrupt "the blessings of peace...by

placing the Nation in a State of War." Instead, Congress

submitted to the usurpations of a corrupt, impeached

C-10

President, and made itself complicit in his crimes against our

Constitution and our national sovereignty.

Congress can reclaim the powers it has surrendered.

Indeed it must, if our descent into tyranny and the erosion

of our sovereignty are to be arrested. But this will not

happen until a critical mass of public understanding is

reached, and informed pressure is brought to bear. The

actions of an imperial President can, as Lincoln warned,

"bring this oppression upon us”; but only if, through our

indifference, we allow those malign designs to flourish.

C-11

APPENDIX D

Violating the Constitution With an Illegal War

by Congressman Ron Paul, MD

Delivered to the House of Representatives, October 3, 2003

The last time Congress declared war was on December 11,

1941, against Germany in response to its formal declaration of war

against the United States. This was accomplished with wording

that took less than one-third of a page, without any nitpicking

arguments over precise language, yet is was a clear declaration of

who the enemy was and what had to be done. And in three-and-a-

half years, this was accomplished. A similar resolve came from the

declaration of war against Japan three days earlier. Likewise, a

clear-cut victory was achieved against Japan.

Many Americans have been forced into war since that time

on numerous occasions, with no congressional declaration of war

and with essentially no victories., Today's world political condition

is as chaotic as ever. We're still in Korea and we're still fighting the

Persian Gulf War that started in 1990.

The process by which we've entered wars over the past 57

years, and the inconclusive results of each war since that time, are

obviously related to Congress’ abdication of its responsibility

regarding war, given to it by Article 1, Section 8 of the

Constitution.

Congyess is about to circumvent the Constitution and avoid

the tough decision of whether war should be declared by

transferring this monumental decision-making power regarding war

to the President. Once again, the process is being abused. Odds

are. since a clear-cut decision and commitment by the people

through their representatives are not being made, the results will be

D-1

as murky as before. We will be required to follow the confusing

dictates of the UN, since that is where the ultimate authority to

invade Iraq is coming from, rather than from the American people

and the U.S. Constitution.

Controversial language is being hotly debated m an effort to

satisfy political constituencies and for Congress to avoid

responsibility of whether to go to war. So far the proposed

resolution never mentions war, only empowering the President to

use force at his will to bring about peace. Rather strange language

indeed!

A declaration of war limits the presidential powers, narrows

the focus, and implies a precise end point to the conflict. A

declaration of war makes Congress assume the responsibilities

directed by the Constitution for this very important decision, rather

than assume that if the major decision is left to the President and a

poor result occurs, it will be his fault, not that of Congress. Hiding

behind the transfer of the war power to the executive through the

War Powers Resolution of 1973 will hardly suffice.

However, the modern way we go to war is even more

complex and deceptive. We must also write language that satisfies

the UN and all our allies. Congress gladly transfers the legislative

prerogatives to declare war to the President, and the legislative and

the executive branch both acquiesce in transferrmg our sovereign

rights to the UN, an unelected imternational government. No

wonder the language of the resolution grows in length and

incorporates justification for starting this war by citing UN

Resolutions.

In order to get more of what we want from the United

Nations, we rejoined UNESCO, which Ronald Reagan had bravely

gotten us out of, and promised millions of dollars of U. S. taxpayer

support to run this international agency started by Sir Julian

Huxley. In addition, we read of promises by our administration that

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once we control Iraqi oil, it will be available for allies like France

and Russia, who have been reluctant to join our efforts.

What a difference from the days when a declaration of war

was clean and precise and accomplished by a responsible Congress

and an informed people!

A great irony of all this is that the United Nations Charter

doesn't permit declaring war, especially against a nation that has

been in a state of peace for 12 years. The UN can only declare

peace. Remember, it wasn't a war in Korea; it was only a police

action to bring about peace. But at least in Korea and Vietnam

there was a fighting going on, so it was a bit easier to stretch the

language than it is today regarding Iraq, Since Iraq doesn't even

have an Air Force or a Navy, is incapable of waging a war, and

remains defenseless against the overwhelming powers of the United

States and the British, it's difficult to claim that we're going into

Iraq to restore peace.

History will eventually show that if we launch this attack,

the real victims will be the innocent Iraqi civilians who despise

Saddam Hussein and are terrified of the coming bombs that will

destroy their cities.

The greatest beneficiaries of the attack may well be Osama

Bin Ladin and the al Qaeda. Some in the media have already

suggested that the al Qaeda may be encouraging the whole event.

Unintended consequences will occur, what will come from this

attack is still entirely unknown.

It's a well known fact that the al Qaeda are not allies of

Saddam Hussein and despise the secularization and partial

westernization of Iraqi culture. They would welcome the chaos

that's about to come. This will give them a chance to influence

post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The attack, many believe, will confirm

to the Arab world that indeed the Christian West has once again

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attacked the Muslim East, providing radical fundamentalists a

tremendous boost for recruitment.

An up or down vote on declaring war against Iraq would

not pass the Congress, and the President has no intention of asking

for it. This is unfortunate, because if the process were carried out

in a constitutional fashion, the American people and the U.S.

Congress would vote "No" on assuming responsibility for this war.

Transferring authority to wage war, calling it permission to

use force to fight for peace in order to satisfy the UN Charter,

which replaces the Article 1, Section 8 war power provision, is

about as close to 1984 "newspeak" that we will ever get in the real

world.

Not only is it sad that we have gone so far astray from our

Constitution, but it's also dangerous for world peace and threatens

qur liberties here at home.

APPENDIX E

Statement of Senator Mark Dayton

On the Senate Giving Up Its Constitutional Responsibility To

Declare War

March 13, 2003

In a few moments, we will vote to. consider the nomination

of Miguel Estrada to the Second Highest Court. We've spent over

100 hours on the Senate Floor on this nomination. Compare that

100 hours on one judicial appointment with the number of hours

we've spent this year discussing and debating a declaration of war

before commencing a war. Zero. Not one hour. Not one minute.

With this nation poised on the brink of war. A war which

the United States is instigating without direct provocation. Without

imminent threat to our national security.

The first war of preemption. We've claimed the right to

attack another country because they might become a future threat.

The first war in which the United States is perceived in the eyes of

the world as the provocateur, as the threat to world peace.

The Times of London recently commissioned a poll where

they asked who is the greatest threat to world peace. Forty-five

percent responded Saddam Hussein and forty-five percent

responded President Bush. Another poll in Dublin, Ireland, asked

the same question, and 31 percent said Saddam Hussein and 68

percent said George Bush. In the Arab world, most populations are

overwhelmingly against a U.S. invasion.

Osama bin Ladin is attempting to exploit those emotions,

exhorting his members of al Qaeda and followers to rise up against

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the invader, the Crusader. Those sentiments come as a great shock

to us. They are unwarranted and undeserved. However, to a few,

unfortunately at high levels in this Administration, this doesn't

matter. To them it is irrelevant.

18 months ago, the United States had the sympathy and the

support of the world. That has been needlessly squandered, and it

is not easily regained. At home, our citizens receive color-coded

warnings of greater or lesser unspecified threats. They're told to

stockpile water, food, plastic sheets, and duct tape...or told nothing

at all.

The Secretary of Defense recently said in a hearing: "We

are entering what may prove to be the most dangerous security

environment the world has ever known” In the midst of this

ominous, dangerous, fateful time, the 108th session of the United

States Senate devoted no time to debate or discussion [on this war

with Iraq].

Over the last three days, we've considered this spectacle of a

bill which purports to ban "Partial Birth Abortions", a matter of

importance, of great concern to some, but not one that required the

attention of the Senate at this moment.

This judge. Another judge. Another judge. Does it appear

that we are avoiding something? We are. We are avoiding our

Constitutional responsibility, perhaps the most important

responsibility placed upon us by the U.S. Constitution, whether or

not to declare war.

The Constitution says simply, clearly, emphatically:

Congress shall declare war (Emphasis added). Only Congress,

No-one else. Not the President. Not the judiciary. Not the

military. Only Congress. 100 Senators and 435 Representatives

elected by, and acting for, the people of the U.S.

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Last October, a majority of Members of the 107th

Congress, a majority in the House and Senate, voted to transfer that

authority to the President. Five months before he has made his final

decision regarding war or peace, Congress was asked to give him

that authority, that the Constitution assigns only to us, and

Congress did. The resolution gave the President the authority to

use whatever means necessary, including the use of force, against

Iraq.

We use such clever euphemisms here, words which disguise

the meaning of our intentions. Use whatever means necessary, and

oh, by the way, lest you forget, It's OK with us, if you use "force".

Not the lives of American men and women. Not their bodies, their

blood, their patriotism. Use force, not deadly, ear-splitting, earth-

shattering, people-maiming, death-dealing bombs. The most

devastating, overwhelming, terrifying, death-dealing "force" the

world has ever known. ["Shock and Awe"] Coming from us. The

good guys. The protectors. The preservers of world peace.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA! (Emphasis added)

What foresight the Founders of this great nation had in not

wanting a decision that enormous, that earth-shaping or earth-

shattering to be made by one person. Not by this President. Not by

any President. Instead this President asked for, and Congress

acquiesced to give complete, unrestricted authority, no conditions,

no restraints.

"Don't tie my hands", the President said. Don't tie the

President's hands. What did the Founders think of that? Thomas

Jefferson in 1798 said, "In questions of power, then, let no more be

heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by

the chains of the Constitution." Bind him down from mischief by

the chains of the Constitution. Tie his hands? That is not enough.

We should chain him to the Constitution. We m Congress are

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supposed to be chained to the Constitution.

We take an oath when swom in, we promise to "support

and defend the Constitution of the U.S. against all enemies, foreign

and domestic. Bear true faith and allegiance to that same

Constitution." Our oath and allegiance are not to country, or state,

or government. We swear allegiance to the Constitution of the

United States of America.

Our Founders had other admonitions for us regarding the

Constitution. Follow it or change it. Don't evade it or ignore it.

George Washington, in his farewell address in 1796 said, "If, m the

opinion of the people, the distribution of Constitutional powers be

wrong, let it be corrected by Amendment in the way which the

Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation;

for this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the

customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed."

Finally, from another perspective, author Edward Gibbon

wrote in the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,

"The principles of a free Constitution are irrevocably lost, when the

legislative power is taken over by the Executive.”

In this instance, the legislative power wasn't taken over by

the Executive. We gave it away. Here, Mr. President, you decide.

Decide. Hf you're right, we'll try to share the credit. If you are

wrong, you take the blame.

I respectfully urge the Majority Leader, and I respectfully

urge all of my colleagues, to tum our attention to this fateful

decision when we return next week. A decision on whether or not

to vote a declaration of war is the one that would be a very difficult

vote, one that would be a career-shapimg or career-shattering vote.

But it would be one that the Constitution requires of us, our fellow

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— |

citizens elected of us. And it's one that only we can or must do to

_ vote whether or not to declare war. I would urge the Senate to turn

its attention to that matter when it resumes next.

[Unfortunately, "next week" was too late to salvage our

Constitution or our dignity. March 13, 2003, the day of the

preceding speech to the Senate, was a Thursday. On Sunday,

March 16, 2003, Respondent Bush issued his 48-hour ultimatum to

King, Hussein. On Tuesday, March 18, 2003, Petitioners filed their

original complaint and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

at or about 12:00 noon. At or about 7:00 PM EST that same day,

Respondent Bush ordered the bombing of Baghdad. At that

moment the United States of America became a terrorist threat to

the entire world. ]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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