Opinion — Williams v. Walsh

WILLIAMS v. WALSH, SHERIFF OF CRAWFORD

COUNTY, KANSAS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COUKT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 79. Argued December 5, 1911.—Decided January 9, 1912.

A classification as to time that is not arbitrary is not repugnant to the

Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid statu-

tory changes to have a beginning and thus discriminate between

rights of an earlier and later time. Sperry & Hutchinson v. Rhodes,

220 U. S. 502.

A state police statute regulating sales, otherwise constitutional, is not

unconstitutional under the equal protection clause because it ex-

cepts from its operation sales made under existing contracts.

This court cannot take judicial knowledge of details of importations

and sales of a commodity even if it can take such knowledge of the

fact that such commodity is an article of interstate commerce.

The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the function of a

writ of error, nor can it be made the means of obtaining a new trial.

The term “original package” as used in a state statute does not nec-

essarily have the same meaning as when used in some of the de-

cisions of this court.

A law cannot be declared invalid at the instance of one not affected

by it.

An article, such as powder, which is dangerous to handle in proportion

to the quantity handled, is properly subject to police regulation in

416 OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

Argument for Defendant in Error. 222 U.S.

regard to quantity from which harmless articles of commerce are

exempt.

The Kansas statute regulating sales of black powder is not unconsti-

tutional as denying equal protection of the law because it excepts

from its operation sales made under existing contracts; but whether

it offends the commerce clause cannot be determined in a suit in

which it does not appear that the party raising the question was af-

fected in that respect.

79 Kansas, 212, affirmed.

TuE facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the

commerce clause of, and the Fourteenth Amendment to,

the Constitution of the United States, of the statute of

Kansas regulating the sale of black powder, are stated in

the opinion.

Mr. Charles Blood Smiih, with whom Mr. D. B. Holmes

was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The act is repugnant to the clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment which prohibits a State denying to any citizen

the equal protection of the laws. Connolly v. Union Sewer

Pipe Co., 184 U. 8. 540; Magoun v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 283;

Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79.

The act is in direct conflict with §8 of Art. I of the

Constitution of the United States, which declares that

Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the

several States. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; R. R.

v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Minn. v. Barber, 136 U. S. 315;

Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140

U. S. 545; Sawrie v. Tennessee, 82 Fed. Rep. 615; Schollen-

berger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170

U. 8S. 423; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Robbins v.

Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489.

Mr. John S. Lawson, Attorney General of the State

of Kansas, Mr. S. N. Hawkes, Mr. F. S. Jackson and

Mr. O. T. Boaz for defendant in error, submitted:

Petitioner was not denied the equal protection of the

LE EIEN ET LONE ENGL IEG WEN SAITO, EEE MUI NSIS Re Ge SHE gE ty

WILLIAMS v. WALSH. 417

222 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error.

laws. The act applies to all persons similarly situated.

It covers every sale and delivery made upon any contract

entered into after the law took effect. It applies to every

person engaging in making any such sale or delivery. It

simply does not count as a violation of the law the com-

pletion of a contract to deliver made prior to the passage

of the law. It does forbid all similar sales and deliveries

upon all contracts made by all persons after the law took

effect, whether such persons had their contracts or not,

or whether such persons had horses and cattle or not.

“arts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 615; Duncan v. State of Mis-

souri, 152 U. 8. 382; Eldredge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 469;

Lowe v. State of Kansas, 163 U. 8. 88. The case of Con-

nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, has no appli-

cation to the facts in this case.

Certainly black powder is a substance of such nature

that its careless handling under any circumstances is at-

tended with serious danger, and this is particularly so in a

coal mine where work is done in darkness. The exercise

of the police power of the State of Kansas by virtue of the

act in question applies not only to the use of black powder,

but also, and more intimately and directly, to the conduct

and management of coal mines, and we believe that the

courts have clearly and sufficiently accorded to the leg-

islatures the right, under the police power retained by

them, to regulate both the subject of the handling of black

powder and of carrying on the business of mining for coal.

Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 206; Consolidated Coal Co. v.

Illinois, 185 U. S. 203; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100.

The question as to the extent of regulation should be

determined by the legislature, and so far as the legislature

has acted reasonably in its regulation, its laws should be

upheld. Jamison v. United States Gas Co., 12 L. R. A. 652.

The act in controversy is not void as a regulation of

interstate commerce, nor is it in conflict with the com-

merce clause of the Federal Constitution.

VOL. CCXxlI—27

= Ts A TEARS FG Sig A RIE REY 2s

418 OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

Opinion of the Court. 222 U.S.

The chief purpose of the law is to make coal mining

as safe an occupation as can reasonably be expected, and

that is the direct and primary, and probably exclusive,

purpose of the law. The purpose is not to regulate the

handling of black powder as a trade or business or as a

matter of commerce. One of the dangers of coal mining

is the use of explosives, and this law simply deals with the

use of explosives in the coal mines, for the protection of the

mines and persons within them, and not for the purpose

of regulating the dealing in the explosives. Laws regu-

lating saloons are proper subjects of police regulation,

because saloons, if allowed to be run without regulation,

are dangerous; and coal mines have been found very

dangerous and destructive to human life when not prop-

erly regulated and supervised. The State of Kansas con-

siders this black-powder law one of very great importance

to the State and to thousands of miners who are daily

working under the ground in the coal mines, and it believes

that it has a right to so regulate the conduct of all persons

within those mines, or the property that goes into those

mines, so as to make them as safe as can reasonably be

expected without interfering with the proper manage-

ment of the mines.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the

court.

A statute of Kansas provides as follows (Laws 1907, c.

250):

“Tt shall be unlawful for any individual, firm or corpo-

ration to sell, offer for sale or deliver for use at any coal

mine or mines in the State of Kansas, black powder in any

manner except in original packages containing twelve and

one-half pounds of powder, said package to be securely

sealed; said powder to be delivered by the company to the

miner at its powder-house, not raore than three hundred

WILLIAMS v. WALSH. 419

222 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

feet from pit-head, unless hereafter otherwise provided by

contract; provided, however, this act shall not be con-

strued as in any manner conflicting with any existing con-

tract of sale of black powder.”

Plaintiff in error was convicted of violating the statute

by selling and delivering to one John Thomas black powder

which was not in an original package of 1214 pounds se-

| curely sealed, there being no existing contract to sell be-

| tween the parties. He was condemned to pay a fine of $50

| and the costs of the case, and stand committed to the

county jail until he should pay the fine or be discharged

| by law.

In a petition to the Supreme Court of the State in habeas

corpus to be discharged from custody he alleged the ille-

| gality of his conviction and that the statute was nu!] and

| void because in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment

| to the Constitution of the United States and the com-

merce clause, and also with the constitution of the State

of Kansas.

His contentions were not sustained, and he was re-

manded to custody. 79 Kansas, 212.

Some of the contentions which were made in the state

court are abandoned here. ‘‘We admit,’ counsel say,

“that the Kansas legislature had the right to determine

that the local conditions in the State required that black

powder should not be sold and delivered for use in any

coal mines in the State except in packages containing ex-

actly twelve and one-half pounds, no more nor less; that

precisely that amount of powder was required to be sold

to protect the miners that are employed in the coal mines

of the State, and that the mere fact that courts or judges

may differ as to the wisdom of such legislation would

afford no ground for judicial interference, unless the ques-

tion was in excess of legislative power.” It is, however,

insisted that there is a limitation of the power of the State,

and that the Jaw in question transcends the power of the

SOLEIL WNL LD PANELS BETES MALE FLATTER OILY STOR NE NONE SNRE DO A SALERNO IN SREP SE CEM LI

420 OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

Opinion of the Court. 222 U.S.

State in that (1) it denies to plaintiff in error and other

citizens the equal protection of the laws, and (2) is in con-

flict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the

United States.

We shall consider these objections in their order:

(1) The discriminatory effect of the statute comes, it is

urged, from its first section, which directs that it shall not

be construed to conflict with existing contracts. ‘‘The

act thus recognizes,” it is said, ‘“‘the fact at the time it

took effect, May 27, 1907, of the existence of contracts”

for the delivery of powder in other than the described

packages. ‘“‘It is thus made unlawful,” it is said, “‘for

some persons to sell or buy black powder otherwise than

in twelve and one-half pounds in original sealed packages,

while others may lawfully do the same thing.”

We might, indeed, hesitate to assume, as counsel does,

from the possibility of the existence of a fact, its actual ex-

istence; if by doing so we should have to regard a state

law as unconstitutional, but as we do not think the result

will follow, we shall assume the existence of the fact. The

purpose of the statute is to provide for the safety of coal

mining operations, and if it may be said that whatever

danger can come from packages of powder will come from

them regardless of the date of the contract under which

they may be delivered, there are nevertheless other con-

siderations to be taken into account. The statute is crim-

inal. A retrospective operation of it was to be avoided,

might indeed be illegal. At any rate, it was a matter prop-

erly to be considered by the legislature in distinguishing

between contracts made before the passage of the law and

those made after its passage. The former might not be

numerous, their evil would be temporary; and certainly

legislation which makes acts criminal which are done after

they are forbidden, and assigns no penalties to acts done

in pursuance of obligations legally incurred, is not arbi-

trary classification. It is not necessary to do more than

: —

a oi en , PELE» PRIME FRUIGY SAO, STREET

WILLIAMS v. WALSH. 421

222 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

repeat what we have said many times, that a classification

which is not arbitrary is not repugnant to the Constitution

of the United States. We may add that ‘‘the Fourteenth

Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes

to have a beginning, and thus discriminate between the

rights of an earlier and later time.” Sperry & Hutchinson

Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502, 505.

(2) To make good the contention that the statute of

Kansas offends the commerce clause of the Constitution,

plaintiff in error refers to an amendment to his petition

that the powder sold and delivered by him was enclosed

in an original unbroken package, containing twenty-five

pounds of powder, imported from the State of Missouri

by the Central Coal and Coke Company, of which com-

pany he was the agent and representative in selling and

delivering. And it is further alleged that black powder

has been and is put up by manufacturers thereof, and

sold and transported among the States in original pack-

ages containing twenty-five pounds.

It is, however, admitted that proof of such facts was

not attempted to be made in the justice’s court. The

case was submitted in that court upon a stipulation that

the powder, at the time of its sale and delivery, was not

‘“‘in an original package, containing twelve and one-half

pounds, securely sealed, and that then and there, there

was not an existing contract for the sale of black powder,

to be used in said mine.”

Plaintiff in error insists that the absence of proof of the

facts which he alleges is immaterial because, as he urges,

“this court will take judicial notice of the matter of com-

mon knowledge that black powder is a subject of inter-

state commerce.’ But plaintiff in error invokes a oroader

knowledge, or, rather, a broader knowledge is necessary

to sustain his allegations. We must not only take notice

that black powder is a subject of interstate commerce in

packages of twenty-five pounds, but of the more partic-

TI OE CP ot AE

422 OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

Opinion of the Court. 222 U.S.

ular facts that he was the agent and representative of the

Central Coal and Coke Company in selling and delivering

the powder, and that the company had imported it in the

package in which it was sold. What sources of knowledge

have we of such facts? It is true that the stipulation re-

cited that Thomas’ purchase of the powder was volun-

tary, and that it was sold to him “in the usual and or-

dinary course of business.”” Of what business, and whose?

It will be observed that the stipulation merely negatives

the requirements of the statute. It follows the complaint,

and states that the powder was not sold in an original

package containing twelve and one-half pounds, and that

there was not an existing contract. How it was sold is not

stated. It is true the Supreme Court supplied the omis-

sion as to quantity. In answering an objection (the ob-

jection is not made here) that the law was invalid on ac-

count of its rigid requirement that a package should

contain twelve and one-half pounds, neither more nor

less, the court stated that the sale in this case was of

twenty-five pounds. The court went no farther, and of

the contention that the statute was repugnant to the com-

merce clause of the Constitution said (p. 222): ‘The

final claim of the petitioner, that the act is in violation of

the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, may

not be presented in this record, since the fact of the im-

portation of the package from Missouri did not appear at

the trial before the justice.” It was certainly within the

competency of the court to refuse to eonsider the con-

tention. The validity of the judgment against plaintiff in

error could only be determined by the defense he made,

not by the defense he might have made, and which he did

not even offer to make. We have often said that the writ

of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of

a writ of error. It certainly cannot be made the means of

obtaining a new trial.

It may, however, be said that the Supreme Court ex-

WILLIAMS v. WALSH. 423

222 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

pressed its views of the validity of the Kansas statute un-

der the commerce clause of the Constitution and thereby

ruled on the contention of plaintiff in error based on that

clause. We do not so understand the opinion of the court.

It in no way, nor to any extent, modified its view that the

contention was not available to plaintiff in error or in-

timated that such view was not the basis of its decision.

Plaintiff in error, apprehending this, declares that it

is immaterial whether the package of powder sold by him

was imported, and insists that the act must be held to be

void because it must be consitlered “as applicable to im-

portations of black powder from other States.” The

words “original packages’ used in §1 of the statute

had, it is said, ‘‘a technical meaning well known to the

members of the Kansas legislature.”” In definition of the

meaning of those words plaintiff in error cites certain fa-

miliar decisions of this court, and, from the definition given

in them of “original packages,” deduces the conclusion

that the words were used in the same sense in the Kansas

statute, and hence that the statute must be held as de-

signed to prohibit importations of black powder in other

than 12)4-pound packages. We are not impressed by the

reasoning. The act does not deal with importations, spe-

cial or general, but only with sales within the State at a

specified place, and the delivery at such place of the pow-

der sold in other than a prescribed quantity and in a pre-

scribed package. It may be that powder is imported or

put up in the State in such packages. If so, it makes com-

pliance with the law all the easier. Or it may be that the

seller may compose the package, securing its integrity in

the manner provided by the statute. What the Supreme

Court of the State may decide in that regard we do not

know, for the point was not made in that court, and the

interpretation of the statute invoked.

There is another answer to the contention. A law can-

not be declared invalid at the instance of one not affected

PES ING, WEE, OETA BORAGE Ge Fran f, oi ANAS

424 OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

Syllabus. 222 U.S.

by it, and, as we have seen, there was no proof before the

justice of the peace that plaintiff in error was an importer

of powder. We do not wish to be understood as intimat-

ing that if such proof had been made it would have been a

defense. Powder is an explosive, dangerous to handle,

the degree of danger corresponding to its quantity. It is

subject, therefore, to a measure of regulation from which

harmless articles of commerce may be exempt. It is said

by this court in Nashville &c. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128

U. 8. 96, 100: ‘‘Indeed, it is a principle fully recognized

by decisions of state and Federal courts, that wherever

there is any business in which, either from the products

created or the instrumentalities used, there is danger

to life or property, it is not only within the power of the

States, but it is among their plain duties, to make pro-

vision against accidents likely to follow in such business,

so that the dangers attending it may be guarded against

so far as is practicable.’’ See further on the same prin-

ciple, Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201, 206; Plumly v. Mas-

sachusetts, 155 U. S. 461; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S.

343; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251.

Judgment affirmed.