Opposition Brief — Dickinson v. Porter
Supreme Court brief1949
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
rilteo COPY JUL 6 1949
CHARLES ELMORE CROP
SUPREME COURT OF THE unITED-STATES Cu
OCTOBER TERM, 1949
No. 174
LAURA DICKINSON,
Appellant,
vs.
C. FRED PORTER, Srare Comprro.ier or THE State oF
lowa, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA
STATEMENT OPPOSING JURISDICTION AND
MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
Rosert L. Larson,
Attorney General of lowa,
Vv Dow: Hisz,
First Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of lowa,
Earw F. Wispom,
Special Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of lowa,
Bert F. Wispom,
F. H. Becker,
County Attorney of Dubuque
County, Iowa,
Counsel for Appellees.
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
INDEX
Sussect Inpex
Page
Statement opposing jurisdiction ............ 1-3
Motion to dismiss or affirm ....................... 75-76
TasLp or Cases CITED
Aero Transit Co v. Georgia Pub. Ser. Com., 295
U. S. 285, 79 L. Ed. 1439, 55 8. Ct. 709... ... 9, 19, 22, 59
Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 Iowa 229, 283 N. W. 889 57, 61, 62
A, Magnamo Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 8. 40, 78 L. Ed.
ee We ys Mss Fos Ko wh 4 ar onew Aaa obo th 56, 59
American Sugar Ref. Co. v. State of Louisiana, 179
U. 8. 89, 45 L. Ed. 102, 218. Ct.43.. ....... 8, 18, 21, 59
Apartment Operators’ Assn. v. City, 254 N. W. 443,
Be RS MY Cc oon kop WA neblawa moet 20, 37, 50, 52, 57
Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 90 L.
ee en Ss is kp craduy ey vibAwe dee rre 57, 71
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 254 U.S. 315... 45
Baker v. Town of West Hartford, 89 Conn. 394, 94
PS RS Pe ee ey cay rate Rae 37, 41
Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. 8. 232,
pe © & { Xs 5 eer 8, 10, 24, 25
Blume v. Crawford Co., 217 Iowa 545, 250 N. W. 733. 20, 33
Board of Supervisors v. Stewart, 30 Iowa 9, 1 Am.
BR EN 2s vac risen ven sse ns bos kerceeeeeies ant 57
Booth 7. State of Indiana, 237 U. 8S. 391, 59 L. Ed.
"SE" ae aie 37, 43
Boston v. Jackson, 260 U. S. 309, 67 L. Ed. 274, 43 8.
See ns orca ert gar ae ne cee 75
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54
eo Ee EE errr ea 9
Campbell v. Olmey, 262 U. 8. 352, 67 L. Ed. 1021, 43
TE ie hs 5 punk ad an ke ule Gaia R ere us 6
Carman v. Hickman County, 215 S. W. 408........ 34
Carmichael v. So. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. 8. 495, 81
L, Ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868... 9, 16, 19, 25, 37, 48, 56, 59, 69
—3702
ii INDEX
Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls, 221 lowa 277, 261
BR I ee errr re 57
Chicago, R. I. d P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. 8. 52,
60 L. Ed. 140, 36 8. Ct. 27... 75
Citizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 57 L. Ed.
1206, 33 S. Ct. 833 9, 12
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. 8. 114, 44 L. Ed. 392, 20
S. Ct. 284...... 19, 27
Clear Lake Co-op. LSS. Assn. v. Weir, 200 lowa
1293, 206 N. W. 297.. 20, 34
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540... 26
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76
L. Ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595. ....
Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. 8S. 261, 49 L. Ed.
471, 25 S. Ct. 233... “ *
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 70 L. Ed. 969, 46
S. 0% Gi ...... ; 6,7
Dickinson vy. Porter, 35 N. W. (2d) 66,
4, 23, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 91 L. Ed.
711, 67 S. Ct. 504... 57,72
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
41 L. Ed. 388, 17S. Ct.56... 56, 66
Farwell v. Brick Mfg. Co., 97 lowa 286, 66 N. W.
UT es 20, 33
Great Northern Railway Co. v. , Whitfield, 272 N. W.
787,658.D.173 ..... ...... 19, 22, 30, 50, 52
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. 8. 233, 64 L. Ed. 378, 50 S.
Ct. 499 . .... 56,68
Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 192 N. W. 529. _. 57,63
Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U. 8.
598, 52 L. Ed. 637, 28 S. Ct. 331... 56, 66
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. 8S. 245, 67 L.
§ 4 ) tS See . £3
Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U.S.
592, 43 L. Ed. 823, 19 S. Ct. 553 19, 27, 37, 42
Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247. ...... 19
Hill v. Rae, 158 Pac. 826,52 Mont. 378... eee
——— Snyder, 261 U. 8. 600, 67 L. Ed. 819, 43 S.
See 76
BLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY
INDEX jii
Page
Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 33 L. Ed.
1025, 10 S. Ct. 593 7 8,11
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 62 L. Ed.
Oe cin adibuc siusveceymeven tae rt 56, 67
King v. Mullins, 171 U. 8. 404 at 435, 436, 43 L. Ed.
314 at 226, 18 S. Ct. 925 at 987............. 37, 39
Lake Superior Consolidated lron Mines v. Lord, 271
U. 8. 577, 70 L. Ed. 1093, 46 8. Ct. 627... 19, 27
Lawrence v. State Tax Com. of Mississippi, 286 U.S.
276, 76 L. Ed. 1102, 52S. Ct.556..........- 9, 15, 19, 21
Leicht v. City of Burlington, 73 Iowa 29, 34 N. W.
Y htee entre EES , 32, 37, 40, 41
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’
Cooperative, 276 U. 8. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 8. Ct.
Loftus v. Department of Agriculture, 211 Iowa 566,
232 N. W., 412, 283 U. 8S. 809, 75 L. Ed. 1427, 51 8.
Byerly gees BA, Be eee
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. 8S.
32, 72 L. Ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423......... 37, 45, 46, 56, 57
Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U. 8. 83,
82 L. Ed. 590,60 8. Ct.406.............. 9, 17, 35, 37, 48
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. 8. 245, 50
L. Ed. 744, 96 G. Ct. 450..........- eee ~
Milheim v. Moffat Tumnel Dist., 262 U. 8. 710, 67 L.
Wa. 1106, 48 B. Ct. OB4....... «eee cerns 56
Miller v. Childers, 107 Okla. 57, 238 Pac. 204 . _. §0,51
Metrepolitan Cas. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79
L. Ed. 1070, 56 &. Ct. S8B....................--.
Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 48 L. Ed. 133, 24
Oe ee ae ou gk aatie 4 seek ed es
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. 8. 541, 56
L, Ba 676, 9B GB. Ct. OOS... ...-. eee eee eens. 75, 76
Myers v. Board of Education, 48 Oh. App. 43, 192
OS is Se Lea cis we dab eee nee toe 50, 54
New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303
Ed. 1024, 58 8. Ct.721............ 9,17
=
Rn
on
~
¥
&
r
a
iv INDEX
Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 74 L. Ed. 775, ™—
508. Ct. 310... 9,14
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. 8. 557, 43 L. Ed.
552, 19 8. Ct. 281 8,11
Puget Sound Co. v. King County, 264 U. 8. 22, 68 L.
Ed. 541, 44 8. Ct. 261 9,14
Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. 8.
Pee eee 17
om, A v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 67
Pred omy Ad v. ‘Kansas, 323 U. 8. 32, 89 L. Ed. 25,
1 4} ee 57,71
Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. 8. 114, 54 L.
Ed. 688, 30 8. Ct. 496... i]
State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pac. 771 57
Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. 8S. 137, 69 L. Ed. 884, 45
S. Ct. 425, “ALR 1454
Strickley v. "Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. 8. 527,
50 L. Ed. 581, 26 8S. ct.4 301 56, 66
Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182, 63 L. Ed.
550, 39 S. Ct. 191 ....... 6,7
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. 8. 264, 42 L. Ed. 740, 18 S. Ct.
EA Py a ae 19, 56
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. 8. 141, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S.
<a Rot 9, 19, 26
Toyota v. Ter. of Hawaii, 296 U. S. 184, 57 L. Ed.
180, 53 8. Ct. 47...... . 9, 37, 42
Union Lime Co. v. C. d N. W. Ry. Co., 233 U. 8. 211,
58 L. Ed. 924, 348. Ct.522............ 56
United States v. Johnson, 327 U. 8. 106, 90 L. Ed. 562,
66 8. Ct. 464 6
Viles v. lowa State Board of Assesement and Re-
view, 233 Iowa 604, 273 N. W. 338, 302 U. S. 637, 82
L. Ed. 496, 58 8. Ct. 38 6
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co. 254 U. S. 300, 65 L. Ed.
276, 41 8. Ct. 118....... 37, 45
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
289 U. 8. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53S. Ct. 431... 9, 15, 56, 69
Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 67 L. Ed. 194, 43 S.
Ct. 24 6,7
BLEED THROU GH-POOR COPY
INDEX Vv
Statutes Crrep
Code of Iowa, 1946, Chapter 426, pages 1228, 1229,
as amended by Chapter 152, Laws of the 52nd Gen-
eral Assembly :
Section 161.2
Constitution of the United States, 14th Amendment,
: 2, 8, 10, 18, 36, 36, 38, 43, 71
Homestead Tax Credit Act, Chapter 325, Code of
Iowa, 1946 ........ Wexu thie es 4 61
Laws of the 17th General Assembly of Iowa, 1878,
Chapter 169 .......... ES ene ry 32
Military Service Tax Credit Fund (Ch. 231, Laws o
ER co ecg vane ius ape vine barmeseuyeoe’ 64
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States:
nr,;ecren THe c¥iIi CMO nrwnR COPY
oo
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1949
—_—_—_----sr-
No. 174
LAURA DICKINSON,
Appellant,
vs.
C. FRED PORTER, State Comrrroi.er or THE STaTr oF
low, ET Al.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA
STATEMENT IN RESISTANCE TO JURISDICTION
Appellees hereby resist the jurisdiction of this Court and
as grounds therefor state:
_ (1) The Appellant has not stated substantial grounds
meriting review by this Court;
(2) It is the duty of this Court to decline jurisdiction
whenever it appears that the alleged Federal Constitutional
question is not substantial in character ;
(3) Questions of violation of State Constitution will not
be reviewed by this Court;
pm WO OR EE OR, REET BIT eters a
2
(4) The Fourteenth Amendment invoked by Appellant
permits classification, and the Courts will not interfere
with a legislative classification unless it is arbitrary, capri-
cious, hostile, palpably erroneous, and very wide of any
reasonable mark;
(5) The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution does not require an ironclad rule of equal taxation
by states, and this Court will not interfere unless the clas.
sification adopted by the state is arbitrary, capricious, hos-
tile, and palpably erroneous;
(6) In the matter of classification, the states have a wide
discretion; and in the field of taxation the states have a
broader power of classification than in other fields of legis.
lation;
(7) The Legislative Enactment challenged by Appellant
merely classifies agricultural land for different tax treat-
ment from other real estate for school purposes, and such
classification is not arbitrary, capricious, hostile and pal-
pably erroneous, and is not prohibited by the First Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution;
(8) The classification of agricultural lands into tracts
of ten acres or more is not an arbitrary, hostile, nor capri-
cious classification, and is not prohibited by the First Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution;
(9) The classification of school districts into those hav-
ing a millage rate of more or less than 15 mills is not arbi-
trary, hostile, nor capricious and is not prohibited by the
First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution;
(10) The Record in the instant case shows on its face
that the legislative enactment here under attack is based
upon clear constitutional power of the State Legislature,
DLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
a —
3
and does not violate the First Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by
this Court; and
(11) This Court should deny the review sought by Appel-
lant.
ny
4
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE TO APPEL.
LANT’S STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Introduction
The legislative enactment, the constitutionality of which
is challenged herein by Appellant, is found in Chapter 426,
pages 1228, 1229, Code of Iowa, 1946, as amended by Chap-
ter 152, Laws of the 52nd General Assembly of Iowa. The
pertinent portions of said enactment are set forth cor.
rectly in paragraph ‘‘B’’ of Appellant’s ‘‘Statement As to
Jurisdiction’’ except that there should be added to Section
426.6 (P. 3 of Statement) the following enacted as a part of
Chapter 152, Section 13, Laws of 52nd General Assembly
of Iowa:
‘‘The owner may, within thirty days thereafter,
appeal to the board of supervisors of the county wherein
the land involved is situated by serving notice of said
appeal upon the chairman of said board. The board
shall hear such appeal promptly and shall determine
anew all questions involved in said appeal and shall
within ten (10) days after such hearing, mail to the
owner at his last known address, notice of its decision.
In the event of disallowance the owner may, within
ten (10) days from the date such notice is mailed,
appeal such disallowance by the board of supervisors
to the district court of that county by serving written
notice of appeal on the county auditor. The appeal
shall be tried de novo and may be heard in term time
or vacation. The decision of the district court thereon
shall be final.’’
Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of this leg-
islative enactment is based upon certain provisions of the
Constitution of Iowa. This challenge was denied by the
Supreme Court of Iowa in its opinion filed December 14,
1948, and reported in 35 N. W. (2d) 66. It is therefore ele-
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
—
5
mentary that this Court will not review the opinion of the
State Court on state constitutional questions.
Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the legis-
lative enactment under the Constitution of the United
States (and the only question pertinent to this appeal) is
that the classifications under the enactment are violative
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States in that Appellant alleges and
argues that said classifications grant to certain citizens and
taxpayers rights and privileges not equally granted to all
citizens and taxpayers.
The classifications complained of are:
(1) Classification of agricultural lands used for agricul-
tural or horticultural purposes in a class separate and apart
from other real estate for ‘‘eredits’’ upon taxes for gen-
eral school purposes;
(2) The further classification of agricultural lands upon
the basis of tracts of ten acres or more in order to be en-
titled to the credits; and
(3) The limitation of said agricultural lands to school
districts wherein the levy for general school (operational) j
purposes exceeds fifteen mills, and the application of the
moneys (credits) appropriated from the state treasury :
to those school districts wherein the said levy exceeds fifteen y
mills.
It is to be noted that the appropriation is made, and the
funds paid, to the school district wherein the ‘‘credits’’ are
effected and the actual operation amounts to legislative de-
termination that a ‘‘ceiling”’ of fifteen mills is placed upon
‘agricultural lands’’ as defined in the legislative enact-
ment, and the appropriation from the state treasiry merely
re-imburses the school district for the revenue lost by reason
of such ceiling.
——
6
I
Proposition
It is the duty of this Court to decline jurisdiction unless
the Federal constitutional question is substantial in charac.
ter.
AUTHORITIES
Sugarman v. United States of America, 249 U. 8. 199
at 185, 63 L. Ed. 550 at 551, 39 S. Ct. 191 at 192;
Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174 at 176, 177, 67° L. Ed. 194
at 198, 43 S. Ct. 24 at 25;
Campbell v. Olney, 262 U. S. 352, 67 L. Ed. 1021, 43
S. Ct. 559;
Corrigan et al v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 at 329, 70 L,
Ed. 969 at 972, 46 S. Ct. 521 at 523;
Loftus v. Department of Agriculture, 211 Iowa 566,
232 N. W. 412;
(Dismissed on appeal for want of a substantial Fed-
eral question), 283 U. S. 809, 75 L. Ed. 1427, 51 §.
Ct. 647;
Vilas v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review,
223 Iowa 604, 273 N. W. 338;
(Dismissed on appeal for want of a substantial Fed-
eral question), 302 U. S. 637, 82 L. Ed. 496, 58 §.
Ct. 38;
United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106 at 113, 90 L.
Ed. 562 at 566, 66 S. Ct. 464 at 467;
Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165 at 170, 171, 48 L.
Ed. 133 at 134, 24 S. Ct. 53 at 54.
Application of Cases Cited
The rule is elementary that a substantial Federal con-
stitutional question must be raised to justify review by
this Court.
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
—
7
In Sugarman v. United States, supra, (249 U.S. at 184)
this Court stated the rule as follows:
‘‘But mere reference to a provision of the Federal
Constitution, or the mere assertion of a claim under it,
does not authorize this court to review a criminal pro-
ceeding ; and it is our duty to decline jurisdiction unless
the writ of error presents a constitutional question
substantial in character and properly raised below.”’
This rule was applied by this Court in Zucht v. King,
supra, wherein this Court (260 U. S. at 176) said:
‘‘But, although the validity of a law was formally
drawn in question, it is our duty to decline jurisdiction
whenever it appears that the constitutional question
presented is not, and was not at the time of granting
the writ, substantial in character. Sugarman v. United
States, 249 U. S. 182, 184.”’
See also Corrigan v. Buckley, supra, wherein this Court
(271 U. S. at 329) stated the rule as follows:
‘The mere assertion that the case is one involving
the construction or application of the Constitution, and
in which the construction of federal laws is drawa in
question, does not, however, authorize this Court to
entertain the appeal; and it is our duty to decline
jurisdiction if the record does not present such a con-
stitutional or statutory question substantial in char-
acter and properly raised below. Sugarman v. United
States, 249 U. S. 182, 184; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S.
174, 176.”’
The Appellant states no substantial Federal question in
her ‘‘Statement as to Jurisdiction.’’ In Paragraph ‘‘G,”’
page 10 thereof she merely asserts that the legislative en-
actment constitutes arbitrary classification, appropriates
state funds for a private purpose, and is unconstitutional
in the amount, manner, and method by which the exemption
or tax credit and the allocation of the funds to the school
be BR ent
+
district is determined under the statute; that the legisla.
tive enactment appropriates five million dollars annually
to pay the tax credits provided therein; that the money
so appropriated is raised by general statewide taxation;
and that every taxpayer in Iowa, as well as Appellant herein
has a vital interest in the matter.
This is a ‘‘mere assertion that the case is one involving
the * * * application of the Constitution’ and ** does
not authorize this Court to entertain the appeal’’ in this
case, nor justify this Court in so doing. Sugarman v. U. S.,
249 U.S. at 184; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. at 176.
II
Proposition
The Fourteenth Amendment permits classification, and
does not prescribe any ironclad rule of equality in taxation,
and the Courts will not interfere unless the legislative
classification is arbitrary, capricious, hostile, palpably er-
roneous, and very wide of any reasonable mark
8
AUTHORITIES
Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. 8. 232 at
237, 33 L. Ed 892 at 895, 10 S. Ct. 533;
Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. 8. 594 at 606, 33
L. Ed. 1025 at 1032, 10 S. Ct 593 at 597 ; :
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. 8. 557 at 562, 43 L. Ed.
552 at 554, 19 8. Ct. 281 at 282;
American Sugar Ref. Co. v. State of Louisiana, 179
U. S. 89 at 92, 94, 95, 45 L. Ed. 102 at 104, 105, 21
S. Ct. 43 at 45, 46;
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245 at
293 and 302, 50 L. Ed. 744 at 761 and 765, 26 S, Ct.
459 at 462 and 466;
Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. 8. 114 at 123, 54
L. Ed. 688 at 692, 693, 30 S. Ct. 496 at 499;
re = BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
—,
9
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563 at 572,
54 L. Ed. 883 at 886, 887, 30 S. Ct. 578 at 579, 580;
Toyota v. Ter. of Hawaii, 226 U. S. 184 at 191, 192,
57 L. Ed. 180 at 184; 53 S. Ct. 47 at 48;
Citizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. 8. 322 at 329, 332,
57 L. Ed. 1206 at 1213, 1214, 33 8, Ct. 833 at 835, 836;
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. 8. 245 at 255,
67 L. Ed. 237 at 241, 25 S. Ct. 83 at 84, 85;
Puget Sound Co. v. King County, 264 U. S. 22 at 27, 28,
68 L. Ed. 541 at 546, 44 S. Ct. 261 at 263;
Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137 at 142, 143, 69 L. Ed.
884 at 888, 889, 45 S. Ct. 424 at 426, 44 A. L. R. 1454
at 1459, 1460;
Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146 at 159, 160, 74
L. Ed. 775 at 782, 50 S. Ct. 310 at 314;
Lawrence v. State Tax Com. of Mississippi, 286 U. 8.
276 at 284, 76 L. Ed. 1102 at 1108, 52 S. Ct. 556 at 559;
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289
U. S. 36 at 42 and 46, 77 L. Ed. 1015 at 1022 and 1024,
53 S. Ct. 431 at 433 and 434, 435;
Metropolitan Casualty Co. of New Y ork v. Brownell,
294 U. 8. 580 at 584, 79 L. Ed. 1070 at 1073, 55 S. Ct.
538 at 539, 540;
Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Service Com., 295
U. S. 285 at 290, 293, 79 L. Ed. 1439 at 1444, 1445,
55 8. Ct. 709 at 711, 712;
Carmichael v. So. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 at ‘
509, 510, 81 L. Ed. 1245 at 1253, 57 S. Ct. 868 at 872;
New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U. 8.
573 at 578, 579, 82 L. Ed. 1024 at 1030, 58 S. Ct. 721
at 724, 725;
Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U. 8. 83 at
87, 90, 82 L. Ed. 590 at 593, 60 S. Ct. 406 at 408;
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. 8. 141 at 145, 146, 84 L. Ed.
1124 at 1127, 60 S. Ct. 879 at 881.
The ‘‘parent’’ cases, among more recent authorities oy
the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment permits
classification, do not preseribe any ironclad rule of taxa.
tion, and that a classification determined upon by a legis-
lature will not be disturbed by the Courts unless it is clearly
arbitrary, capricious, hostile, and palpably erroneous are
Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, and Home
Ins. Co. v. New York, supra.
In Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, this Court, 134
U. S. at 237, stated the rule as follows:
‘‘The provision in the Fourteenth Amendment, that
no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdie-
tion the equal protection of the laws, was not intended
to prevent a State from adjusting its system of taxation
in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it
chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any
taxation at all, such as churches, libraries and the
property of charitable institutions. It may impose dif-
ferent specific taxes upon different trades and pro-
fessions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various
products ; it may tax real estate and personal property
in a different manner; it may tax visible property only,
and not tax securities for payment of money; it may
allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them.
All such regulations, and those of like character, so
long as they proceed within reasonable limits and gen-
eral usage, are within the discretion of the state leg-
islature, or the people of the State in framing their
Constitution. But clear and hostile discriminations
against particular persons and classes, especially such
as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice
of our governments, might be obnoxious to the consti-
tutional prohibition. It would, however, be impracti-
cable and unwise to attempt to lay down any general
rule or definition on the subject, that would include
all cases. They must be decided as they arise. We
10
Application of Cases Cited
DLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
11
think that we are safe in saying, that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to compel the State to
adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. If that were its
proper construction, it would not only supersede all
those constitutional provisions and laws of some of
the States, whose object is to secure equality of taxa-
tion, and which are usually accompanied with quali-
fications deemed material ; but it would render nugatory
those discriminations which the best interests of society
require; which are necessary for the encouragement
of needed and useful industries, and the discourage-
ment of intemperance and vice; and which every State,
in one form or another, deems it expedient to adopt.’’
(Italics supplied)
And in Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. at 606, this
Court said:
‘But the amendment does not prevent the classifica-
tion of property for taxation—subjecting one kiad of
property to one rate of taxation, and another kind of
property to different rate—distinguishing between
franchises, licenses and privileges, and visible and
tangible property, and between real and personal
property. Nor does the amendment prohibit special :
legislation. Indeed, the greater part of all legislation
is special, either in the extent to which it operates, or
the objects sought to be obtained by it.”’
In Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. at 562, this Court,
with reference to classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment said: ;
‘It is not necessary to state the reasoning upon
which classification by legislation is based or justified.
This court has had many occasions to do so, and only
lately reviewed the subject in Magoun v. Illinois Trust
and Savings Bank, 170 U. 8S. 283. We said in that
case that ‘the State may distinguish, select and classify
objects of legislation, and necessarily the power must
have a wide range of discretion.’ And this because of
FF
the function of legislation and the purposes to which
it is addressed. Classification for such purposes is not
invalid because not depending on scientific or marked
differences in things or persons or in their relations,
It suffices if it is practical, and is not reviewable unless
paipably arbitrary.’’ (Italics supplied)
In Citizens Tel. Co, v. Fuller, 229 U. 8. at 329, 331, this
Court said:
12
‘‘The power of exemption would seem to imply the
power of discrimination, and in taxation, as in other
matters of legislation, classification is within the com-
petency of the legislature. We said in American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. 8S. 89, 92, that from
time out of mind it has been the policy of this Govern-
ment to classify for the purpose of taxation, and a
discrimination was supported between taxation of pro-
ducers and manufacturers of products; and yet in
Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. 8S. 97, 102, we compared the
rule with that in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,
184 U. S. 540, where a distinction between buyers of
products and the producers of them was held an illegal
discrimination.
It may, therefore, be said that in taxation there is a
broader power of classification than in some other
exercises of legislation. * * *
To these cases may be added others. They illustrate
the power of the legislature of the State over the sub-
jects of taxation and the range of discrimination
which may be exercised in classifying those subjects
when not obviously exercised in a spirit of prejudice
and favoritism. Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S.
261, 274; Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165. The cases
decided subsequent to the decision in Bell’s Gap Rail-
road Vo. v. Pennsylvania, have applied its principle to
many varying instances. Granting the power of classi-
fication, we must grant Government the right to select
the differences upon which the classification shall be
based, and they need not be great or conspicuous.
Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 536. The State is
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
——
13
not bound by any rigid equality. This is the rule ;—its
limitation is that it must not be exercised in ‘clear and
hostile discriminations between particular persons and
classes.’ See 223 U. S. 59, 62, 63. Thus defined and
thus limited, it is a vital principle, giving to the Gov-
ernment freedom to meet its exigencies, not binding
its action by rigid formulas but apportioning its bur-
dens and permitting it to make those ‘discriminations
which the best interests of society require.’ ”’
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. at 255, this
Court stated the rule as follows:
‘In its exercise in taxation, we have said, it is com-
petent for a State to exempt certain kinds of property
and tax others, the restraints upon it only being against
‘clear and hostile discriminations against particular
persons and classes.’ Discriminations merely are not
inhibited, for, it was recognized, that there are ‘dis-
criminations which the best interests of society re-
quire.’ Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. 8.
232, 237.
The principle of that case, and its concession to the
power of a State, has received expression and illustra-
tion in cases which concerned the exercise of the power
in the classification of objects for taxing purposes. In
Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 124, it is
said, ‘Any classification is permissible which has a rea-
sonable relation to some permitted end of governmental
action. . . . It is enough, for instance, if the classi- ;
fication is reasonably founded in ‘the purposes and ;
policy of taxation.’ In other cases it is said that facts ;
which can be reasonably conceived of as having existed
when the law was enacted will be assumed to justify it.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78; {
Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129,
137. And ‘it makes no difference that the facts may be
disputed or their effect opposed by argument and
opinion of serious strength. It is not within the com- :
petency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety.’ ’’
Wr
To this point, and to the question of violation of the pro-
visions of the state constitution, this Court in Puget Sound
Co, v. King County, 264 U. 8. at 27, 28, said:
‘*We are considering this case only from the stand.
point of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. The objections based on the state con.
stitution of Washington have been settled adversely
and conclusively for us by the decision herein of the
State Supreme Court. Counsel cite us cases which
have little relation to the federal question before us,
Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 239 U. S. 234; Ewert v.
Taylor, 38 8. D. 124; State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 161
Wise. 188, and like cases involved the application of
somewhat stringent provisions of state constitutions ag
to equality of taxation on all kinds of property which
left but little room for classification. Such restrictions
have much embarrassed state legislatures because
actual equality of taxation is unattainable. The theo-
retical operation of a tax is often very different from
its practical incidence, due to the weakness of human
nature and anxiety to escape tax burdens. This justi-
fies the legislature, where the Constitution does not
forbid, in adopting variant provisions as to the rate,
the assessment and the collection for different kinds of
property. The reports of this Court are full of cases
which demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not intended, and is not to be construed, as hav-
ing any such object as these stiff and unyielding re-
quirements of equality in state constitutions. No bet-
ter statement of the unvarying attitude of this Court on
this subject can be found than in the often quoted lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Bradley in speaking for the Court
in Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232,
237.”’
14
See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. at 159 wherein
this Court said:
‘*The States have a wide discretion in the imposition
of taxes. When dealing with their proper domestic
BLEED THROU GH-POOR COPY
15
concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of
the national government or violating the guarantees of
the Federal Constitution, the States have the attribute
of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to
insure revenue and foster their local interests. The
States, in the exercise of their taxing power, as with
respect to the exertion of other powers, are subject to
the requirements of the due process and the equal pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that
Amendment imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibit-
ing the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to
schemes of taxation. The State may tax real and per-
sonal property in a different manner. It may grant
exemptions. The State is not limited to ad valorem
taxation. It may impose different specific taxes upon
different trades and professions and may vary the
rates of excise upon various products. In levying such
taxes, the State is not required to resort to close dis-
tinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity
with reference to composition, use or value. To hold
otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing
power of the State to an intolerable supervision, hos-
tile to the basic principles of our Government and
wholly beyond the protection which the general clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to assure.’’
(Italics supplied.)
In Lawrence v. State Tax Com., 286 U. S. at 284, it is said
that tax burdens ‘‘which are based upon discriminations
not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within
constitutional prohibitions.’”’ :
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 4
U. S. 36, sustained an exemption from taxation of a single :
railroad. This Court (289 U. S. at 46) said: ;
‘Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new
conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the
correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes
the new conditions affect one only or a few. If so the
16
correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief.
The Constitution does not prohibit special laws inflex.
ibly and always. It permits them when there are spe.
cial evils with which existing general laws are incom.
petent to cope. The special public purpose will then
sustain the special form. Baltimore v. United Rail.
ways Co., supra. The problem in last analysis is one
of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in cases of plain
abuse will there be revision by the courts.’’
In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. at
508, 510, this Court stated the rule as follows:
‘*Taxes, which are but the means of distributing the
burden of the cost of government, are commonly levied
on property or its use * * *. It is inherent in the
exercise of the power to tax that a state be free to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions.
Neither due process nor equal protection imposes upon
a state any rigid rule of equality of taxation. See
Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. 8. 232, 237;
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U. S. 276, 284,
This Court has repeatedly held that inequalities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption, infringe no constitutional limi-
tation. Magoun v. Illinois Trust d Savings Bank, 170
U. S. 283, 293; Amerircan Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisi-
ana, 179 U. S. 89, 94; Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy,
200 U. S. 226, 235; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217
U. S. 563, 573; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59,
62, 63; Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. 8. 1, 6; Alaska
Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. 8. 44, 48; State Board of Tax
Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537; Broad River
Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178, 180; Fox v. Standard
Ou Co., 294 U. 8. 87, 97; Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, ante, p. 308; Great Atlantic d Pacific Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, ante, p. 142.
Like considerations govern exemptions from the op-
eration of a tax imposed on the members of a class. A
legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class
a
DLEED THROU GH-—POOR COPY
17
or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a
rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny
they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is
any conceivable state of facts which would support it.
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357;
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. 8. 245, 255;
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Shanks, 273 U. 8. 407, 413; Lawrence
r. State Tax Comm’n, supra; ef. Metropolitan Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. 8. 580, 584.
This restriction upon the judicial function, in pass-
ing on the constitutionality of statutes, is not artificial
or irrational. A state legislature, in the enactment of
laws, has the widest possible lattitude within the limits
of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot
record a complete catalogue of the considerations which
move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such
a record courts cannot assume that its action is capri-
cious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local
conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it
was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis
for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guid-
ing principle of judicial review of legislation is it pos-
sible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful
independence and its ability to function.’’
See also Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303
U.S. at 578; and Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, wherein
this Court at pp. 87, 88, said:
“The broad discretion as to classification possessed
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been
recognized. This Court fifty years ago concluded that
‘the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to com-
pel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation,’
and the passage of time has only served to underscore
the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of
discretion which is needed by a legislature in formu-
lating sound tax policies. Traditionally classification
has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs
and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution
of the tax burden. It has, because of this, been pointed
=
out that in taxation, even more than in other fields,
legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classijica-
tion. Since the members of a legislature necessarily
enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this
Court cannot have, the presumption of constitution.
ality can be overcome only by the most explicit demon.
stration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes,
The burden is on the one attacking the legislative ar.
rangement to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it.’’
18
From the foregoing cases, and hundreds more which
might be cited, it is apparent that the Fourteenth Amend.
ment permits classification for tax purposes; that it does
not prohibit a state from adjusting its tax burdens upon
any basis deemed fair and equitable by the legislature
thereof; that the Amendment does not prescribe any iron-
clad rule of tax equality, but permits discriminations; and
that the Courts will not interfere with a legislative classifi-
cation unless it is clearly arbitrary, capricious, hostile, and
palpably erroneous.
Ill
Proposition
A legislative classification of agricultural or horticultural
lands or producers in a class and according them partial tax
exemption or tax credits is a reasonable exercise of legisla-
tive discretion and within the legislative power, and is not
clearly arbitrary, capricious, hostile or palpably erroneous;
and is therefore not in violation of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
AUTHORITIES
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. 8. 89
at 92, 94, 95, 45 L. Ed. 102 at 104, 105, 21S. Ct. 43 at
45, 46;
BLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY
>"
19
Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Miss., 286 U. Ss.
296 at 280, 281, 76 L. Ed. 1102 at 1106, 52 S. Ct. 556
at 557;
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 at
372, 76 L. Ed. 1155 at 1167, 52 S. Ct. 595 at 602;
Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169 at 176, 78 L. Ed. 247 at
952, 54S. Ct, 142 at 145;
Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Com., 295 U.S.
285 at 291, 7% L. Ed. 1439 at 1444, 1445, 55 S. Ct. 709
at 711, 712;
Carmichael v. So. Coal € Coke Co., 301 U. 8. 495 at 512,
@1 L. Bad. 1245 at 1255, 57 8. Ct. 868 at 873, 874;
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 at 145, 147, 84 L. Ed.
1124 at 1127, 1128, 60 S. Ct. 879 at 881;
Nashville, C. € St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. 8. 362 at
368, 369, 60 S, Ct. 968 at 972, 84 L. Ed. 1254 at 1257,
1258;
Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines v. Lord, 271
U. 8. 577 at 582, 70 L. Ed. 1093 at 1101, 46 S. Ct. 627
at 629;
Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261 at 274, 49 L. Ed.
471 at 476, 25S. Ct. 233 at 237;
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Grower's
Cooperative, 276 U.S. 71 at 89, 90 and 96, 72 L. Ed.
473 at 480 and 483, 48 S. Ct. 291 at 294 and 297 ;
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 at 117, 119, and 120, ‘
44 L. Ed. 392 at 397, 20S. Ct. 284 at 286 ; :
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 at 978 and 280, 281, 42
L. Ed. 740 at 746, 747, 18 S. Ct. 340 at 345, 346;
Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U. 8.
592 at 603, 615, and 620, 621, 43 L. Ed, 823 at 827 and
832, 833, 19 S. Ct. 553 at 557, and 562, 564;
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 272 N. W. 787 at
792, 794, 65 S. D. 173;
i
Hill v, Rae, 158 Pac. 826 at 828, 829, 52 Montana 378;
Apartment Operators’ Ass'n v. City, 254 N. W. 443 at
444, 445, 191 Minn. 365;
Leicht v. City of Burlington, 73 Iowa 29 at 30, 32, 34,
N. W. 494;
Farwell v. Brick Mfg. Co., 97 lowa 286 at 294, 66 N. W.
176;
Clear Lake Co-op L. 8. S. Ass’n v. Weir, 200 Iowa 1293
at 1298, 206 N. W. 297 at 299;
Blume v. Crawford Co., 217 Iowa 545 at 550, 551, 250
N. W. 733 at 735.
Application of Cases Cited
The Supreme Court of Iowa held, in the instant case, that
the legislative enactment was enacted in aid of agriculture,
and that the classification of ‘‘agricultural lands’’ as ‘‘ajl
tracts of land of ten acres or more, and not laid off into lots
of less than ten acres or divided by streets and alleys into
parcels of less than ten acres lying within any school cor-
poration in this state and in good faith used for agricultural
or horticultural purpeses. Any land laid off or platted into
lots of less than ten acres belonging to and a part of other
lands of more than ten acres and in good faith used for
agricultural or horticultural purposes shall be entitled to the
benefit: of this chapter’’ (Italics supplied.) See Par. B,
Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction (Section 426.2,
Code of Iowa), at page 2) was not in violation of Section 1, |
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United |
States.
This question has been determined by this Court so many
times that it no longer presents a substantial Federal ques-
tion.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa (Filed Decem-
ber 14, 1948, and reported in 35 N. W. (2d) 66 and appended
DLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
21
to Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction as Appendix
«@”’) that this classification for the purposes of taxation,
rtial tax exemption, or tax ‘‘eredits’’? was amply sup-
ported by opinions of this Court, the Supreme Court of
Iowa, and the Courts of highest jurisdiction of many states
of the United States.
Time will not permit treatment of all such cases. Refer-
ence to all cases hereinbefore cited is respectfully requested.
In American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Lowisiana, 179 U.S. 89 at
95, this Court sustained a classification of sugar refiners for
the purpose of taxation into those who refined the products
of their own plantations, and those who engaged in a general
refining business, and at the cited page said:
“The discrimination is obviously intended as an en-
couragement to agriculture, and does not deny to per-
sons and corporations engaged in a general refining
business the equal protection of the laws.’’ (Italics
supplied)
This last cited case has been cited and followed many
times by this Court and by the Courts of highest jurisdiction
in the States of the United States.
It is true that the tax there involved was a license tax, but
this is immaterial. This Court, in Lawrence v. State Tar
Com., 286 U. S. 276 at 280, said:
“The present tax has been defined by the Supreme
Court of Mississippi as an excise and not a property
tax, Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss.
34; 88 So. 4; Knox v. Gulf, M.& N. R.Co., 138 Miss. 70;
104 So. 689, but in passing on its cons(iiutionality we
are concerned only with its practi“. operation, not its
definition or the precise for.s of descriptive words
which may be applied ‘ it. See Educational Films
Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. 8. 379, 387; Pacific Co. v. John-
son, 285 U. 8. 480; Shaffer v. Carter, supra, pp. 54-55.”’
This Court sustained as reasonable and not arbitrary the
exemption of farmers as & class from a license fee required
22
of other carriers. In Acro Mayflower Transit Co. v. Geor.
gia Pub. Service Com., 295 U.S. 285 at 290, 291, this Court
said:
‘*The court took notice of a common opinion, ‘well
justified by the facts,’ that the farm lands of the state
had been ‘accustomed to bear an undue proportion of
the taxes.’ The effect of the exception would be to
equalize the burden. ‘Every one knows that as a gen-
eral rule a tax of this kind finally reaches the consumer
of the product, or user of the service; and hence an
exemption of carriers of such products is to be taken
as an exemption of the products themselves, and not
of the carrier.’’ The enumeration of rational bases of
distinction was not put forward as exhaustive. The
court expressed the belief that others could be added.
We think a classification thus designed to ameliorate
the lot of the producers of farm and dairy products is
not an arbitrary preference within the meaning and
the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment, The
plight of the Georgia farmer has been pictured by the
state court in words already quoted. To free him of
fresh burdens might seem to a wise statecraft to be a
means whereby to foster agriculture and promote the
common good."’
The Supreme Court of South Dakota in Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 254 N. W. 787 likewise
took judicial notice of the fact that lands used exclusively
for agricultural purposes receive less benefits from school
taxes than other lands. In the cited case, the Court, 272
N. W. at 792, 793, said:
‘*We believe it true also that the Legislature could
reasonably conclude that the benefit to agricultural land
from school taxes is less than the benefit to other lands
from the same source. See Clark v. Kansas City, 176
U.S. 114, 20 S. Ct. 284, 44 L. Ed. 392, which held valid
a statute which excepted from its operation lands used
exclusively for agricultural purposes if owned by indi-
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
—,
23
viduals, but not if owned by corporations. It is con-
ceivable that the benefits from education so far as real
estate is concerned, whether it be the enhanced value
of that real estate due to adequate educational facilities
offered or some other benefit, reflects itself less in real
estate used exclusively for agricultural purposes than
any other land, For example, a merchant’s business
or even a railroad’s business, which is dependent some-
what upon real estate in the operaticn of the business,
might be quite differently affected by an adequate edu-
cational system located in the community, than the
business of agriculture. So far as concerns real estate,
which is set apart primarily for homes or residences
by being platted, obviously educational advantages
reflect themselves in that real estate differently from
the manner in which they reflect themselves in land used
exclusively for agriculture.”’
The Supreme Court of Iowa in the instant case, 35 N. W.
9d 66 at 73 said:
‘Tt is true of course there are common characteristics
between agricultural land and other realty in the mat-
ter of taxation for school purposes. But we cannot say
there are not characteristics which differentiate it from
other realty in relation to school taxes. We are not con-
vineed the legislature could not with reason conclude
that agricultural land derives less benefit, in enhanced
value or otherwise, from the money raised by school
taxes than other real estate. City or town residence
property or real estate used for business purposes may
well be affected by our school system in quite a differ-
ent way than land used for agricultural purposes which
consists of comparatively large tracts. The legislature
could reasonably have concluded that agricultural lands
are taxed excessively for school purposes as compared
with property devoted to other uses and that such taxes
should be equalized in accordance with benefits re-
ceived. * * °
Leicht v. City of Burlington, 1887, 73 Iowa 29, 31, 34
N. W. 494, 495, upheld as uniform in the constitutional
ae
ad
EPAPER SET PCE RE TENS PONG SW
RS rae ey
7
sense chapter 47, Acts 16th General Assembly (as
amended section 616, Code, 1897, section 404.4, Code,
1946), which completely exempted from taxation for
any municipal purpose, except road tax, lands within
the extended limits of a city or town containing more
than ten acres, occupied and used for agricultural pur-
poses. The opinion states ‘the design of the legislature
evidently was to exempt property which is used es.
sentially for agricultural purposes.’
The language just quoted is repeated in Farwell y.
Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa 286, 294, 295, 66
N. W. 176, 35 L. R. A. 63, apparently as stating the effect
of the decision in Leicht v. Burlington, supra. 1 Cooley,
4th Ed., Section 284, page 599, says that in Iowa an
exemption from city taxation of agricultural or un-
platted land in a city has been upheld, citing the Leicht
case.’’
24
See Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction, Appendix
*C’’, p. 8, 9.
Furthermore, this fact was substantiated by proof. Ex-
hibit ‘‘B’’ (certified to this Court) shows that the ratio
of taxable farm property per child to taxable non-farm
property per child in Iowa in 1941 in the 99 counties in
Iowa was from 1.85 to 1 in Dubuque County to 8.97 in Mills
County. Exhibit ‘‘C’’ shows the ratio in 97 consolids’sd
schools of Iowa was from .97 to 1 in the Cotter District 0
62.80 to 1 in the Sommers District. Exhibit ‘‘D’’ shows
that the ratio of taxable farm property to non-farm prop-
erty in 99 city or town independent districts was from 1.17
to 1 in Ridgeway District to 68.37 to 1 in Jewell District.
In other words the farm or agricultural property paid
from 1.17 to 68.37 times as much school taxes per child
as did the non-farm property. To say that the legislature
could not under the Fourteenth Amendment equalize this
school tax burden ‘‘ would render nugatory those discrimina-
tions which the best interests of society require; which are
necessary for the encouragement of needed and useful in-
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
_ ——
25
dustries.”” Bell’s Gap. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S.
at 237.
This Court, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal é Coke Co.,
301 U. S. at 512, said:
‘‘Reasons for the selections, if desired, readily sug-
gest themselves. Where the public interest is served
one business may be left untaxed and another taxed, in
order to promote the one, American Sugar Refining Co.
». Louisiana, supra; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.,
supra; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service
Comm’n, supra; or to restrict or suppress the other,
Magnano Co. v. Hanailton, 992 U. 8. 40; Fox v. Standard
Oil Co., supra; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, supra; Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304; Alaska
Fish Co. v. Smith, supra, 48: Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Grosjean, supra. The legislature may with-
hold the burden of the tax in order to foster what it con-
ceives to be a beneficent enterprise. This Court has
often sustained exemption for the encouragement of
agriculture, American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana,
supra, 95; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service
Comm’n, supra, 291. Similarly, the legislature is free
to aid a depressed industry such as shipping. The
exemption of business operating for less than twenty
weeks in the year may rest upon similar reasons, or
upon the desire to encourage seasonal or unstable in-
dustries.’’ (Italics supplied.)
That property may be classified for tax purposes, taxing
one class and exempting another, without violating the
equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, is settled
beyond peradventure of doubt by this Court in Nashwille
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, wherein at p.
368 it is said:
“This Court had previously had occasion to advert to
the narrow and sometimes cramping provision of these
state uniformity clauses, and has left no doubt that their
inflexible restrictions upon the taxing powers of the
state were not to be insinuated into that meritorious
_
conception of equality which alone the Equal Protection
Clause was designed to assure. See Puget Sound Co,
v. King County, 264 U. S. 22, 27.
That the states may classify property for taxation;
may set up different modes of assessment, valuation
and collection; may tax some kinds of property at
higher rates than others; and in making all these dif.
ferentiations may treat railroads and other utilities
with that separateness which their distinctive char.
acteristics and functions in society make appropriate—
these are among the common-places of taxation and of
constitutional law.’’ * * * Since, so far as the Fed.
eral Constitution is concerned, a state can put railroad
property into one pigeonhole and other property into
another, the only question relevant for us is whether
the state has done so. If the discrimination of which the
Railway complains had been formally written into the
statutes of Tennessee, challenge to its constitutionality
would be frivolous. If the state supreme court had
construed the requirement of uniformity in the Tennes-
see Constitution so as to permit recognition of these
diversities, no appeal could successfully be made to the
Fourteenth Amendment.”’ (Italics supplied.)
26
Referring to Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. 8.
540, this Court, in Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. 8. at
274 said:
‘Tt can scarcely be doubted that, if the Connolly case
had dealt with the subject of taxation, a discriminative
tax upon producers of agricultural products, either
greater or less than that imposed upon other manv-
facturers or producers, might have been held valid with-
out denying to either party the equal protection of the
laws.’’
Also referring to Connolly’s case, this Court in Tigner v. |
Texas, 310 U.S, at 145, 146, said:
‘Since Connolly’s case was decided, nearly forty
years ago, an impressive legislative movement bears
BLEED THROU GH=POOR COPY
—
27
witness to general acceptance of the view that the dif-
ferences between agriculture and industry call for
differentiation in the formulation of public policy. The
states as well as the United States have sanctioned
cooperative action by farmers; have restricted their
amenability to the anti-trust laws; have relieved their
organizations from taxation.”’
See also Lake Superior Con. Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U.S.
577, wherein a classification of ‘‘ore’’ lands was sustained.
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Grower's Co-
operative Marketing Ass’n., 276 U.S. at 96 ‘‘recognized as
permissible some discrimination intended to encourage
agriculture”’ citing American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisi-
ana, 179 U. 8. 89, 95.
In Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, this Court sus-
tained a tax statute which excepted ‘‘from its operation
lands used for agricultural purposes if owned by individ-
uals.’’ The Court, p. 120, said:
‘In the case at bar the distinction is between tracts
of agricultural lands in a certain relation to cities and
lands used for other purposes in such relation.
We think the distinction is justified by the principle
of the cases we have cited. That principle leaves to the
State the adaptation of its laws to its conditions.”’
In Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U. 8.
592, this Court sustained an attack upon the city charter
which exempted tracts of land of ten acres devoted to farm-
ing purposes. At p. 620, 621, this Court said:
“The assignments of error embrace the contention
that the judgment below denies to the Bridge Company
the equal protection of the laws, ‘in that its property
has been subjected to taxation from which all other land
not divided into lots has been exempted, although the
only reason for exemption apply with much greater
force to the property of the plaintiff in error than to
the property which enjoys the exemption.’
4
This contention is based upon the proviso in the city’s
charter declaring that ‘no land embraced within the
city limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally
laid off, shall be assessed and taxed by the city council,
unless the same is divided or laid out into lots of five
acres or less, and unless all of same is actually used
and devoted to farming purposes.’ Kentucky Acts
1887-88, Vol. 2, p. 991.
We are of opinion that this proviso has no reference
to bridges, their approaches, piers, etc., but refers only
to lands capable of being cultivated or used and divided
into lots upon which buildings may be erected or over
which streets or other highways may be constructed,
This is the better interpretation of both the old and
the new charter of the city. Besides, the construction
placed by the state court upon the charter of the city in
respect of its power to tax the bridge property neces.
sarily leads to the conclusion that the provision forbid.
ding the taxation of lands not divided into lots of five
acres or less does not apply to a bridge erected over the
Ohio River within the city’s limits. In this view there
is no basis for the suggestion of a denial of the equal
protection of the laws,’ * * °,
28
The Courts of highest jurisdiction in numerous states of
the United States have followed the foregoing cited cases
decided by this Court.
In Hill v. Rae, 52 Montana 578, 158 Pac. 826 at 828, 829,
the Supreme Court of Montana said:
‘That classification is permissible, because in the
essential nature of things and in any due appreciation
of equality in the operation of the law it is necessary in
legislation for purposes of revenue, or in the applica-
tion of the police power strictly so-called, or in legisla-
tion designed to increase the industries of the state,
develop its resources, or add to its wealth and prosper-
ity, is abundantly settled by judicial decision as well as
by the course of legislation. To cover the entire field
of this subject is impossible within any reasonable
DLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY
_ ——
29
limits. Suffice it to say that by the Supreme Court of
the United States, construing this very amendment,
classifications have been sustained based upon differ-
ences in the amount of legacies, differences ‘petween
corporations, differences between land dependent on its
us for agricultural and other purposes, differences be-
tween fire insurance and other insurance, differences in
the character of work, differences between hiring per-
sons to labor in the state and hiring persons to labor
out of the state, differences between sugar refineries
based entirely on whether the sugar refined was pur-
chased or produced by the refiner, as well as various
other differences too numerous to mention. Magoun v.
Illinois T. & S. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594,
42 L. Ed. 1037; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 20
Sup. Ct. 284, 44 L. Ed. 392; Gundling v. Chieago, 177
U S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725; Petit v. Minne-
sota, 177 U. S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L. Ed. 716; Wil-
liams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128, 45 L. Ed.
186, American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179
U. 8. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102; and cases cited
in these decisions. * * °’’
‘In Clark v. Kansas City, supra, a state statute was
under consideration which authorized certain cities to
annex lands adjoining the city limits, but provided that
‘nothing in this act shall be taken or held for agricul-
tural purposes when the same is not owned by any rail-
road or other corporation,’ and the court upheld the
distinction, declaring that it was justified by the prin-
ciple of the cases cited above :
:
‘That principle leaves to the state the adaptation of
its laws to its conditions. The growth of cities is in-
evitable, and in providing for their expansion it may
be the judgment of an agricultural state that they
should find a limit in the lands actually used for
agriculture.’ )
‘In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, supra,
a state statute imposing a license tax upon persons
and corporations carrying on the business of refining
7
sugar and molasses, but exempting from its operation
‘planters and farmers grinding and refining their own
sugar and molasses,’ was sustained with the remark
that:
30
‘The discrimination is obviously intended as an en.
couragement to agriculture, and does not deny to
persons and corporations engaged in a general refin.
ing business the equal protection of the laws.’
‘So, too, legislative activity having for its avowed
purpose the encouragement of this or that particular
industry deemed of importance to the state has been
prolific of results.’’ (Italics supplied)
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 254 N. W. 787 likewise took
judicial notice of the fact that lands used exclusively for
agricultural purposes receive less benefits from school taxes
than other land, sustained a classification of agricultural
lands for tax purposes, and cited numerous eases from this
Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral constitution.
In the cited case, the Court, 272 N. W. at 792, 793, said:
‘“‘We believe it true also that the Legislature could
reasonably conclude that the benefit to agricultural land
from school taxes is less than the benefit to other lands
from the same source. See Clark v. Kansas City, 176
U.S. 114, 20 S. Ct. 284, 44 L. Ed. 392, which held valid a
statute which excepted from its operation lands used
exclusively for agricultural purposes if owned by in-
dividuals, but not of owned by corporations. I? is con-
cewvable that the benefits from education so far as real
estate is concerned, whether it be the enhanced value of
that real estate due to adquate educational facilities
offered or some other benefit, reflects itself less in real
estate used exclusively for agricultural purposes than
any other land. For example, a merchant’s business or
even a railroad’s business, which is dependent some-
BLEED THROU GH=—FPOOR COPY
31
what upon real estate in the operation of the business,
might be quite differently affected by an adequate edu-
cational system located in the community, than the
business of agriculture. So far as concerns real estate,
which is set apart primarily for homes or residenced
by being platted, obviously educational advantages re-
flect themselves in that real estate differently from the
manner in which they reflect themselves in land used
exclusively for agriculture. Land used exclusively for
agriculture consists of a comparatively large tract
which is the whole base of the business. This is not true
of land used in other businesses. It seems to us that
repeatedly courts have sustained classifications founded
upon reasons much more obscure than those here pre-
sented.
We believe it reasonable for a Legislature, in an agri-
cultural state, to offer inducements to agriculture
through its tax laws. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas,
217 U. S. 114, 30 S. Ct. 496, 54 L. Ed. 688; American
Sugar Refining Company v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89,
21 S. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102; Bell’s Gap Railroad Co. v.
Pennsylvania, supra.
In all probability other considerations occurred to
the Legislature in making the distinction, but the pos-
sible considerations herein pointed out are sufficient in
our opinion to prevent us from holding that there could
be no possible rational basis for the legislative classi-
fication. This opinion is further confirmed by a reading
of the case of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S.
245, 43 S. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237, wherein it was held that
the differences between bituminous coal and anthracite ,
forms a just basis for their different classification under
the tax laws, and the case of State Tax Board of Com’rs
v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540, 75 L. Ed. 1248,
73 A. L. R. 1464, wherein it was held that the differences
between chain store operation and the conduct of a
single store was a sufficient basis for legislative classi-
fication for taxation.’’ (Italics supplied)
< EPC VN
The State of Iowa has, for more than 70 years, had a
statute which exempted lands used for agricultural pur-
I
poses (in tracts of ten acres or more) from municipal taxes,
except for library purposes and at not to exceed one and
one-fourth (14%) mills for road purposes. Section 404.4,
Code of Iowa, 1946, provides as follows:
‘*404.4 Agricultural lands. No land included within
the limits of any city or town which shall not have
been laid off into lots of ten acres or less, or which
shall not subsequently be divided into parcels of ten
acres or less by the extension of streets and alleys,
and which shall also in good faith be occupied and used
for agricultural or horticultural purposes, shall be
taxable for any city or town purpose, except that said
lands and all personal property necessary to the use
and cultivation of said agricultural or horticultural
lands shall be liable to taxation for city and town road
purposes, at not exceeding one and one-fourth mills;
and for library purposes.”’
This statute was first enacted as Chapter 47, Laws of
the 16th General Assembly of Iowa in 1876. It then pro-
vided for its application to tracts of land of twenty acres
or more used for agricultural purposes. This statute was
amended by Chapter 169, Laws of the 17th General Assem-
bly of Iowa in 1878 to reduce the size of the tracts to ten
acres.
This statute was attached in Leicht v. City of Burlington,
73 Iowa 29, 34 N. W. 494 upon the grounds that the classi-
fication was purely arbitrary, discriminatory, and capri-
cious, and denied the plaintiff of the equal protection of
the laws.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in 73 Iowa at 31, 34 N. W.
at 495, said:
‘It is urged by the plaintiffs, to be sure, that the
distinction which the legislature has attempted to make
between lots containing more than 10 acres, and those
containing 10 acres or less, is purely arbitrary, and that
for this reason tke act cannot be said to have a uniform
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
33
operation, as it might if the larger lots as provided
could be said to constitute a class, as distinguished
from the smaller lots. As to this we think it may be
said that the design of the legislature evidently was
to exempt property which is used essentially for agri-
cultural purposes. Where the limits of a city are ex-
tended so as to take in what is used essentially as a
farm, there is much reason for exempting it from city
fares. But where the property is substantially resi-
dence property, as distinguished from agricultural,
and valuable only as such whether improved or not,
there is less reason, when it becomes city property,
that it should be exempt from city taxes.’’ (Italics
supplied)
In Farwell v. Brick Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa 286 at 294, 295; 66
N. W. 176 at 179, in commenting on Leicht v. City of Burl-
ington, supra, said:
“Tn Leicht v. City of Burlington, 73 Iowa, 29 (34 N. W.
Rep. 494), in which was involved the constitutionality
of the act of the Sixteenth General Assembly, it was
said that ‘the design of the legislature evidently was
to exempt property which is used essentially for agri-
cultural purposes.’ ”’
In Blume v. Crawford County, 217 Iowa 545 at 550, 551;
250 N. W. 733 at 735, 736, the Supreme Court of lowa sus-
tained a declaration of public policy of the legislature of
Iowa to aid agriculture against attack on the grounds of
unconstitutionality. At the cited page, 217 Iowa at 550, 551,
950 N. W. 735, 736, the Court said:
‘So in the case at bar the legislature in chapter 138
of the Code has declared the public policy of this
state, with reference to extending aid to agriculture,
the great basic industry of this state. There is no
inhibition against this power in any of the provisions
of the Constitution, and it is not repugnant to any con-
stitutional provision. The legislature, under the pow-
ers vested in it by the state, has extended aid to farm
ee eee
7
associations for the purpose of aiding agriculture,
horticulture, animal industry, and similar kindred oe.
cupations. The unconstitutionality of this act is raised
at a time when the national government, and all state
governments, are bending every effort to aid agricul-
ture in their present distressed condition. The de-
fendant farm bureau was not organized for private
purposes. On the contrary, it is an enterprise engaged
in furthering the welfare and benefit of agriculture,
the great basic industry of this state, and for the benefit
of the public generally. The act in question is a valid
exercise of the state’s governmental functions, and
does not delegate the taxing power of the state to a
nonofficial body. The lower court held this legislation
constitutional, and we find no error therein.’’
34
To the same effect, see Carman v. Hickman County, 215
S. W. (Ky.) 408.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has held that classifications
based upon agriculture are natural, and obvious, and not
arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. In Clear Lake
Co-Op L. € S. Ass'n v. Weir, 200 Iowa 1293 at 1298, 1299;
206 N. W. 297 at 299, the Supreme Court of Iowa said:
‘Agriculture, of which stock-raising is a part, is a
basic industry in this state, as well as in a large part
of the nation, north and south. A much larger pro-
portion of the people of this state are engaged in agri-
culture than in any other industry or business. There
is no industry to be found anywhere in which classifica-
tions based thereon are more natural, obvious, and
exclusive than in agriculture. It is as distinct in its
character as mining, manufacturing, banking, or any
other branch or division into which society is economi-
cally divided.’’ (Italics supplied)
Numerous classifications of agricultural products for tax
purposes appear in the laws of Iowa, some dating back
as far as 1851. Examples are exemption from taxation of
agricultural produce harvested by or for the person as-
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
__—
35
sessed within one year of assessment, all wool shorn from
his sheep within said time, swine under nine months of
age, all other domestic animals under one year of age, and
all farming utensils of any person who makes a living by
farming. Other classifications in said laws exempt family
equipment, tools of mechanics, books of lawyers, all up
to $300 in value, and the team, wagon and harness of
teamsters, and capital stock of electric utilities, and manu-
facturing, and mercantile corporations. See Section 427.1,
Code of Iowa, 1946.
Classifications for exemptions or different tax treatment
are therefore within the ‘‘ purposes and policy of taxation’’
inIowa. ‘‘Traditionally classification has been a device for
fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to
achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.”’
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83 at 87, 88.
These authorities clearly support such tax exemptions.
The statute here under consideration may properly be held
as Appellees contend as placing a ceiling upon the tax
levied upon agricultural land, as defined in the law, and
an appropriation to the school district to reimburse it for
the revenue lost. The State of Iowa through its legislature
long ago placed a ceiling upon such land within cities and
towns and made no such appropriation. In no event is
Appellant’s tax on her land raised. It would be if the
ceiling were placed on the agricultural land, as defined by
the legislative enactment, and the funds not appropriated
to reimburse the school district for the revenue lost.
In so far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the
language of this Court in Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. 8.
165, 48 L. Ed. 133, 24 S. Ct. 53 is applicable. In the last
cited case, in 191 U.S. at 170, 171, this Court said:
‘‘However this may be, the petitioner admitted at
the argument that his own tax was correct, and that he
would have had no case under the Fourteenth Amend-
ae
BR kt
7
ment if the companies had been exempted altogether.
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. g,
283, 293-295; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U. 8S. 540, 562. But his rights under that amendment
turn on the power of the State, no matter by what
organ it acts. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318,
Therefore, if the Supreme Court of the State cop.
strued the statutes as exempting express companies
from this tax and substituting another, as it is argued
on behalf of the defendants in error that the statutes
do, the petitioner cannot complain here. For the legis.
lature could exempt them, and the question whether it
has done so or not is for the state courts to decide
in their construction of its acts. Furthermore, if the
State could grant a total exemption it could grant a
partial exemption, and if it has done so, de facto,
through its officers, the petitioner cannot come here on
an allegation that the officers acted as they did without
the authority of the State. That again is for the state
court to decide. The petitioner has no case under the
Constitution of the United States, and nothing else
is open.’’
Certainly, the Appellant in the case at bar has not raised
any substantial Federal question under Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and this Court should decline jurisdiction
to review the opinion and decision of the Supreme Court
of Iowa.
IV
Proposition
The classification of agricultural lands at ten acres in
size in order that the tax credit may apply is not arbitrary,
hostile, capricious, or unreasonable, and does not violate
Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
37
AUTHORITIES
King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404 at 435, 436, 43 L. Ed.
214 at 226, 18 S. Ct. 925 at 937 ;
Leicht v. City of Burlington, 73 lowa 29, 34 N. W. 494;
Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U.S.
592 at 620, 621, 43 L. Ed. 823 at 833, 19 S. Ct. 553 at
564 ;
Toyota Vv. Hawaii, 226 U. 8. 184 at 191, 192. 57 L. Ed.
180 at 184, 53 S. Ct. 47 at 48;
Booth v. State of Indiana, 937 U. S. 391 at 397, 398,
59 L. Ed. 1011 at 1017, 35 S. Ct. 617 at 619, 620;
Northwestern Laundry V. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S.
426 at 495, 60 L. Ed. 396 at 402, 36 S. Ct. 206 at 210;
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. 8. 300 at 314, 315,
65 L. Ed. 276 at 282, 283, 41 S. Ct. 118 at 121;
Louisville Gas € Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32
at 41, 72 L. Ed. 770 at 775, 48 S. Ct. 423 at 426;
Carmichael v. Southern Coal € Coke Co., 301 U. 8. 495
at 510, 511, 81 L. Ed. 1245 at 1254, 57 S. Ct. 868 at 873;
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83 at 88, 84 L. Ed. 590
at 593, 60 S, Ct. 406 at 408 ;
Apartment Operator’s Ass’n. v. City of Minneapolis,
191 Minn. 365 at 370, 954 N.W. 443 at 449;
Baker v. Town of West Hartford, 89 Conn. 394, 94
Atl. 283 at 285.
Application of Cited Cases
Appellant complains that the classification of ‘‘agricul-
tural lands’’ at 10 acres or more for the purposes of the
legislative enactment constitutes an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable classification and grants to certain citizens and tax-
payers rights and privileges not equally granted to all citi-
zens and taxpayers. (See Appellant’s Assignment of Er-
rors, p. 2.)
7
Specifically, Appellant’s complaint is that, since she owns
4.13 acres of land devoted exclusively to agricultural pur.
poses, and does not fall within the benefited class, whereas
land in tracts of 10 acres or more devoted to the same uses
fall within the benefited class, the classification at 10 acres
or more renders the legislative enactment in violation of
Section One, Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Cop.
stitution as an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination
against her.
That size may be taken into consideration or become the
basis of classification is settled beyond doubt by the adjudi-
cated cases, both in this Court, and in Courts of highest
jurisdiction of the states of the United States.
Illustrations in state statutes are too numerous to men-
tion more than a few.
In Iowa, it has been the policy of the state to base
tax laws as well as others upon size or number. Many
statutes apply only to cities of a certain population, and the
classification is not objectionable if any city reaching that
population comes within the terms of the Act.
Homesteads in Iowa are classified at one-half (1%) acre
within corporate limits and forty (40) acres without such
limits with a limitation of $2500 in value for tax ‘‘credits”’
purposes. In Minnesota, homesteads are classified for par-
tial tax exemption purposes at eighty (80) acres in un-
platted lands within corporate limits or without corporate
limits, and in cities or towns of less than 5000 population
at one-half (14) acre, and in cities of more than 5000 popula-
tion at one-third (1) acre with an assessment of twenty
(20% ) percent of actual value provided that if the valuation
of the homestead is in excess of $4000, the excess is assessed
at 3314 per cent of actual value.
In Nebraska a homestead is limited to $2000 in value, and
may consist of up to 160 acres outside corporate limits and
not over 2 lots within corporate limits. In Kansas, the
38
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
__—
39
homestead may consist of 160 acres of farm land, or 1 acre
within corporate limits.
In Iowa, forest reservations of not less than 2 acres, of
continuous area, and fruit tree reservations of not less
than 1 acre nor more than 10 acres are assessed at #4 per
acre. The fruit tree reservation is assessed ut this amount
for a period of 8 years after planting. See Section 161.2,
Code of Iowa, 1946 and Section 441.5, same Code. These
statutes date back to 1906. Other states in forest areas
have similar laws.
For this Court to enter the field of determining the ‘‘size’’
or ‘‘acreage’’ of tracts of land would constitute an invasion
of the power of the legislature to classify property for taxa-
tion, This the Court will not do.
In King v. Mullins, supra, this Court sustained a classi-
fication of lands at 1000 acres against the attack that the
classification was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
This Court in the cited case, 171 U. 8. at 435, 436 said:
‘Another point made by the plaintiff in error is,
that the provision of the constitution of Virginia ex-
empting tracts of less than one thousand acres from
forfeiture is 4 discrimination against the owners of
tracts containing one thousand acres or more, which
amounts to a denial to citizens or landowners of the
latter class of the equal protection of the laws. We do
not concur in this view. The evil intended to be reme-
died by the constitution and laws of West Virginia was
the persistent failure of those who owned or claimed
to own large tracts of lands, patented in the last cen-
tury, or early in the present century, to put them on
the land books, so that the extent and boundaries of
such tracts could be easily ascertained by the officers
charged with the duty of assessing and collecting taxes.
Where the tract was 4 small one, the probability was
that it was actually occupied by some one, and its .
extent or boundary could be readily ascertained for pur-
poses of assessment and taxation. We can well under-
——
stand why one policy could be properly adopted as to
large tracts which the necessities of the public revenue
did not require to be prescribed as to small tracts, The
judiciary should be very reluctant to interfere with
the taxing systems of a State, and should never do go
unless that which the State attempts to do is in palpable
violation of the constitutional rights of the owners of
property. Under this view of our duty, we are unwil.
ling to hold that the provision referred to is repugnant
to the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding
a denial of the equal protection of the laws.’’
This specific classification was sustained by the Supreme
Court of Iowa in 73 Iowa 29, 34 N. W. 494. The legislative
enactment challenged in the case at bar, in so far as the
classification in tracts of 10 acres or more, was modeled after
Section 404.4, Code of Iowa, 1946 hereinbefore quoted. This
latter statute and classification was attacked on the grounds
that this specific classification is purely arbitrary. The
Supreme Court of Iowa, 73 Iowa at 30, 31; 34 N. W. at 494,
495, said:
‘It is said that, in exempting lots of over 10 acres in
size, and not exempting those of less size, of like charac-
ter and situation, the act in question does not have a
uniform operation, and that certain citizens are allowed
privileges and immunities which do not belong to all.
But this act was not made to apply to specific property,
nor to specific persons. It was made to apply to a cer-
tain class of property, and to the owners of such prop-
erty, whoever they might be. It is true that privileges
and immunities cannot be granted to a class of citizens.
But those who happen to be owners of a certain class
of property do not themselves become a class in any
proper sense. They do not sustain a relation to each
other, but a mere property relation. They are affected
by the statute in consequence merely of the circum-
stances in which they happen to be. It was said in Iowa
Railroad Land Co. vy. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112: ‘If the law
operates upon every person within the relations and
BLEED THROU GH=POOR COPY
—
41
circumstances provided for, it is sufficient.’ The prin-
ciple involved appears to us to be not unlike what has
peen frequently decided. McAunich v. Miss. & M. R’y
Co., 20 lowa 338; U. 8. Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Id.,
370; State v. Shroeder, 51 Id. 197.
It is urged by the plaintiffs, to be sure, that the dis-
tinction which the legislature has attempted to make
between lots containing more than 10 acres, and those
containing 10 acres or less, is purely arbitrary, and that
for this reason the act cannot be said to have a uniform
operation, as it might if the larger lots as provided
could be said to constitute a class, a8 distinguished from
the smaller lots.”’ (Italies supplied.)
The Court answered this contention in the following iang-
uage at 73 Towa at 31, 32 N. W. at 495 where the Supreme
Court of Towa said:
“The legislature seems to have thought that large
lots bought within the city, and used for agricultural
rposes do constitute a class, as distinguished from
small lots, though agricultural products be grown upon
them to some extent; and we think that it cannot be
denied that the thought is correct. Proceeding mam-
festly upon this thought, it fixed the limit between what
might be considered as belonging to one class and what
to the other. This was necessary as a practical guide
to the assessor. It is of no use to consider the imper-
fection of the division. Absolute justice in taxation is
wnattainable.’’ (Italics supplied)
The statutes of Connecticut exempt from taxation for a
period of 20 years forest reservations of one acre oF more
planted to trees specified in the statute. This statute was
attacked upon the grounds that it ‘‘provides a special
privilege’ to the owner of the tract. The Supreme Court
of Connecticut sustained the classification. See Baker v.
Town of West Hartford, 89 Conn. 394; 94 Atl. 283.
en ee ee
_ a
The case of Leicht v. Burlington, supra, has been cited
repeatedly by the Courts of highest jurisdiction of the
several states,
In Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U. §,
592 this Court sustained an attack upon the city charter
which exempted tracts of land of ten acres devoted to farm.
ing purposes.
This case is quoted at length on pp. 27, 28 of this Brief
and will not be repeated here.
This Court also sustained a licensing statute enacted by
the Territorial Legislature of Hawaii which classified the
District of Honolulu and other districts of the Islands, for
the purpose of a differentiation in the license fee required.
The plaintiff appellant claimed discrimination in this re-
spect. This Court in Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. at 191,
192 held that the classification was reasonable and within
the legislative discretion.
This Court, 226 U. S. at 191, 192, said:
‘‘The remaining contention, urged in various forms
by the assignments of error, comes to the single point
that the statute created an arbitrary classification. It
cannot be said, however, that there was no reasonable
basis for a distinction between Honolulu and other dis-
tricts. And it was the province of the legislature to
decide upon the amount of the fees which should be
charged. It must be assumed that in so deciding it took
into account varying conditions in the respective locali-
ties, as, for example, in the amount of business trans-
acted and in the corresponding value of such licenses.
Necessarily, as was said in Magoun v. Illinois Trust
and Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 294, the power of
classification ‘must have a wide range of discretion.’
It is not reviewable ‘unless palpably arbitrary.’ Orient
Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 562; Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 52-55; Engel
v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell,
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
a
43
922 U. S. 225, 235. With its intimate knowledge of
local conditions, the Supreme Court of the Territory
said upon this point: ‘The great bulk of the business
of the Territory is done in Honolulu. It is not for us
to say whether we would make the difference in the
amount of license fees in this case as large as the legis-
lature has made it. It is sufficient that we cannot 497
that the difference is unreasonable or that the statu‘e is
unequal or arbitrary in its operation.’ ’’
In Booth v. State of Indiana, supra, this Court sustained,
against a challenge that the classification was arbitrary and
in violation of Section 1, of the 14th Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, a law of Indiana which required
operators of coal mines to provide a wash house upon re-
quest of 20 miners, and if the mine did not employ 20 miners,
then upon request of one-third (14) of the miners employed.
The Court, in the cited case 937 U. 8. at 397, 398, pointed
out the reasoning by which the Courts sustain ‘* fixed bounda-
ries’ in the field of classifications. At the cited pages this
Court said:
“Tt is, however, further objected that the law dis-
criminates because it may be applied to one mine and
not to another, all other conditions being the same but :
the desire of the miners—indeed, discriminates upon 4 |
distinction more arbitrary that that, upon the desire of
twenty in one mine as against a lesser number, nineteen,
it may be, in another. The objection is a familiar one
and has an instance and answer in McLean v. Arkan-
sas, 211 U. S. 539. It is the usual ground of attack upon
a distinction based on degree, and seems to have a
special force when the distinction depends upon a dif-
But there are many practical analogies. The juris-
diction of a court is often made to depend upon amounts
apparently arbitrarily fixed. For instance, the juris-
diction of the District Court of the United States (for-
merly the Cireuit Court) is limited to civil suits in law
a
44
and equity in certain instances in which the amount in
controversy is $3,000. It could be objected, as it js
here objected, that the amount is arbitrary and that
there cannot be any difference in principle between suits
for $3,000 and suits for $2,999, a distinction dependent
upon one dollar. Indeed, in more acute illustration,
the distinction may be made of one cent only. And so
might there be objection to any amount which might be
selected, as it might be also to any number of petition.
ing miners which the legislature of Indiana might have
selected. Indeed, would not an objection have the same
legal strength if the law had been made to depend upon
anything else than unanimity of desire? To require
that it might well have been thought by the legislature
would render the legislation nugatory, and that a lesser
number would call it into exercise and attain its object.
The conception, no doubt, was that a lesser number—in-
deed, the number selected—would be fairly representa-
tive of the desire and necessity of the miners and that
use would breed a habit, example induce imitation and
a healthful practice starting with a limited number
might become that of all. And such consummation
justified the effort, the manner adopted attaining the
end sought as well as if not better than a direct and
peremptory requirement of the miners and mine
owners.”’
In Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. 8. 486
sustained a law which applied to laundries in cities of the
State of Iowa. ‘‘Now or hereafter having a population of
sixty-five thousand (65,000) inhabitants or over.”’ This
statute was attacked upon the grounds that the classifica-
tion was arbitrary and an illegal classification in violation
of Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. This Court sustained the classification and in
239 U.S. at 495 said:
‘* As to the attack upon the ordinance because of arbi-
trary classification, this question has been so often dis-
cussed that nothing further need be said. The ordi-
DLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY
_ ———
45
nance applies equally to all coming within its terms,
and the fact that other businesses might have been in-
cluded, does not make such arbitrary classification as
annuls the legislation. Nor does it make classification
illegal because certain cities are included and others
omitted in the statute. Eckerson v. Des Moines, 137
lowa, 452.’’
In Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300, 65 L. Ed.
976, 41 S. Ct. 118, this Court sustained a law of the State
of Wyoming which designated the location of gas wells as
“within ten miles of any incorporated town or industrial
plant’’ for the operation of a classification statute. After
citing Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. 8. 311, and with reference
to Bacon v. Walker, supra, in 254 U. S. at 315, this Court
said:
‘*Pertinent cases were cited, and the exclusion from
grazing within two miles of the possessory claim of an-
other was decided to be legal, that ‘the selection of
some limit is a legislative power,’ and that it was ‘only
against the abuse of the power, if at all, that the courts
may interpose.’ The mere distance expressed noth-
ing.”’
To this same point of legislative power to fix a limit or
line of demarcation between the taxed and the untaxed, Mr.
Justice Holmes in a dissenting opinion in Louisville Gas &
Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. 8. at 41, said:
‘‘When a legal distinction is determined, as no one
doubts that it may be, between night and day, childhood
and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be
fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out
by successive decisions, to mark where the change takes
place. Looked at by itself without regard to the neces-
sity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It
might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one
side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or
point there must be, and that there is no mathematical
or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the
my
46
legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it
is very wide of any reasonable mark.’’
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Lowis.
ville Gas & Electric Co., supra, becomes important for the
reason that it is cited and followed by this Court in Madden
v. Kentucky, 309 U. 8. 83 at p. 88. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
his dissenting opinion in Louisville Gas € Electric Co,,
supra, 277 U. S. at 44, 47, said:
‘In Magoun »v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170
U. S. 283, 300, 301, the inheritance tax, in the case of
strangers to the blood, exempted estates of $500, but
did not allow that exemption to larger estates. More.
over, it prescribed progressive rates, rising in steps
with the amount of the gift and applying to the entire
gift and not merely to the excess. Under the law a
legatee of $10,000, being subject to a 3 per cent tax,
would receive net $9,700, whereas a legatee of $10,001,
being subject to a 4 per cent tax on the entire legacy
would receive net only $9,600.96. The Court held the
classification reasonable, saying:
‘The condition is not arbitrary because it is deter-
mined by that value (of the inheritance) ; it is not
unequal in operation because it does not levy the
same percentage on every dollar; does not fail to
treat ‘all alike under like circumstances and condi-
tions, both in the privilege conferred and the liabili-
ties imposed.’ The jurisdiction of courts is fixed by
amounts. The right of appeal is. As was said at bar
the Congress of the United States has classified the
right of suitors to come into the United States courts
by amounts. Regarding these alone, there is the
same inequality that is urged against classification
of the Illinois law. All license laws and all specific
taxes have in them elements of inequality, neverthe-
less they are universally imposed and their legality
has never been questioned.’
The Court has likewise sustained a statute which im-
posed an ad valorem tax upon telephone companies with
BLEED THROUGH=-POOR COPY
_ —_
47
annual earnings of $500 or,more, while exempting
others similarly situated whose earnings were less than
$500, Citizens Telephone Co. Vv. Fuller, 229 U. 8. 322,
329; a statute which imposed a license fee upon ‘all
persons’ engaged in the laundry business but exempted
concerns employing not more than two women, and
steam laundries, Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. 8.
59, 62; an ordinance under which a $5 tax was laid
upon merchants whose gross sales were $1,000, and a
tax of $10 upon those similarly situated whose sales
were $1,001, Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. 8. 329, 331; an
ordinance which laid a tax of $1,000 upon theatres whose
admission was $1 or more, but only $400 upon those
similarly situated whose admission prices were less
than #1 and more than 50 cents, Metropolis Treatre
Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70.
In the light of these decisions, I should have supposed
the validity of the classification made by the Legis-
lature of Kentucky to be clear. Recognizing that mem-
bers of the legislature of the State which made the
classification, and members of the court which sane-
tioned it, necessarily possessed greater knowledge of
local conditions and needs than is possible for us, I
should have assumed that this classification, which ob-
viously is not invidious, was a reasonable one, unless
some facts were adduced to show that it was arbitrary.
Compare Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S, 245,
255; Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. 8. 392, 397. No such
facts have been adduced by the Company. On the other
hand, facts called to our attention by counsel for the
Commonwealth and of which we may take judicial
notice, McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 208
U. 8. 38, 50; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. 8. 52, 61, show
that the classification was adopted by the Legislature
of Kentucky in an effort to equalize the tax burden
incident to loans.’’
And again Mr. Justice Brandeis in the last cited case,
277 U. S. at 53, said:
“Wherever the line might be drawn, the statute would
sometimes operate unjustly. But such occasional in-
—
stances of injustice would not render the classification
arbitrary. As was said in Metropolis Treatre Co. y,
Chicago, 228 U. 8. 61, 69, 70: ‘The problems of govern.
ment are practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be,
and unscientific.’ ’’
In Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, this Court spoke
definitely upon the question of classification, and at p. 88
cited the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Louis-
vile Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, supra.
Extensive quotation from Madden v. Kentucky, supra, is
made at p. 17, 18 of this Brief and same will not be repeated
here. Appellees respectfully ask the Court to refer to the
previous quotation.
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. 8S. 495,
construes the unemployment compensation Act of Alabama
in which it was charged that the classification of employers
who had eight or more employees for the operation of the
statute was arbitrary and in violation of Section 1, Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Speaking to this question, this Court, in reversing the
Trial Court (301 U. S. at 510, 511), said:
‘*Distinetions in degree, stated in terms of differences
in number, have often been the target of attack, see
Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. 8. 391, 397. It is argued here,
and it was ruled by the court below, that there can be
no reason for a distinction, for purposes of taxation,
between those who have only seven employees and those
who have eight. Yet, this is the type of distinction
which the law is often called upon to make. It is only a
difference in numbers which marks the moment when
day ends and night begins, when the disabilities of in-
fancy terminate and the status of legal competency is
assumed. It separates large incomes which are taxed
from the smaller ones which are exempt, as it marks
here the difference between the proprietors of larger
businesses who are taxed and the proprietors of smaller
businesses who are not.
48
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
49
‘‘ Administrative convenience and expense in the col-
lection or measurement of the tax are alone a sufficient
justification for the difference between the treatment
of small incomes or small taxpayers and that meted
out to others.’’
It is to be noted that the language of this Court in the
above quotation is distinctly similar with respect to when
‘*q point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn’’ to the
language of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion
in Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, supra.
It may have been determined by the legislature of Iowa
that the administrative convenience and expense in apply-
ing the legislative enactment challenged in the case at bar
to many small tracts of land would be greater than the
benefits. This would have been sufficient distinction if
there were none other. Or it may have been, as was said
by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Leicht v. Burlington,
supra, fixed at 10 acres as @ guide to the assessor or other
taxing officials. At any rate, it is as logically placed at
10 acres as at 8 acres, or any other figure. The classifica-
tion at 10 acres for tax exemption purposes of lands used
for agricultural purposes has existed in the law of Iowa
for more than 70 years, and was held constitutional by the
Supreme Court of Iowa as a reasonable classification more
than 60 years ago. See Leicht v. City of Burlington, su-
pra, decided in 1887. Surely, under the rules of construc-
tion of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution
hereinbefore quoted, this Court cannot say that the classi-
fication is in the remotest chance arbitrary, capricious,
hostile, or palpably erroneous, and that a substantial Fed-
eral question is raised by reason of the 10 acre line of de-
marcation; especially in view of the long established hold-
ings of this Court. This Court should, therefore, decline
jurisdiction in this case.
50
V
Proposition
The classification of school districts wherein the millage
levy is 15 mills for general (operational) school purposes
in order that the tax credit may apply is =ot plainly arbi-
trary, hostile, capricious, or palpably erroneous; and js
therefore not violative of Section 1, of the 14th Amend.
ment to the Constitution of the United States.
AUTHORITIES
See cases and quotations in Division IV of this Brief:
Miller v. Childers, 107 Okla. 57, 238 Pac. 204 at 206, 207,
Great Northern R’y Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 272
N. W. 787 at 790, 791.
Apartment Owners Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 191
Minn. 365, 254 N. W. 443.
Myers v. Board of Education, 48 Oh. App. 43, 192
N. E. 393.
Application of Cited Cases
The cases cited and quoted in Division IV, P. 35, relating
to the classification at 10 acres for the operation of the
legislative enactment apply with equal force to the 15 mill
classification. The Legislature of Iowa determined that
where millage levies are below 15 mills for general oper-
ating expenses, the school taxes were not a burden on agri-
cultural lands. This Court has said that where a line must
be drawn the Courts will leave it to the legislative body
as to where it may be drawn.
The 15 mill limitation for the purpose of tax limitation
or ceiling, or for the purpose of appropriations to aid edu-
eation are not unusual. The Constitution of Oklahoma
provides that school districts are authorized to levy up to
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
—_—
51
15 mills for general school purposes. The legislature made
an appropriation to aid school districts where such millage
did not raise sufficient funds to carry on a school. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the legislative en-
actment against an attack that the Act was arbitrary and
an unreasonable classification.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 238 Pac. at 206, said:
“The Constitution has specifically authorized each
school district to levy and collect a 15-mill tax levy,
to be by it expended in carrying on this work. There
the Constitution terminates the expenditure by a school
district, and from there, where the school district’s
work must end, tk > Legislature must ‘carry on’ to the
point where we can say that there is satisfied the con-
stitutional mandate for the maintenance of a free
publie school system. The Legislature, with authority
so to do, has said an 8 months annual school term is
necessary. Affirming its decree, we adopt its judg-
ment as our own. With the maximum levy expended,
many school districts will have perhaps only a 3 months
term, while others may have a 12 month school if
they so desire. Without affirmative aid by the Legis-
lature, the constitutional mandate for an efficient free
school system will be unexecuted in those weak school
districts.”
And further, 238 Pace. at 207, that Court said:
“The act makes the appropriation available in all
school districts in the state where, under the restric-
tion of the Constitution, such districts are unable to
maintain the public schools for such length of terms
as the Legislature, acting within its constitutional au-
thority, and the exercise of sound legislative discre-
tion, has declared must be provided. The classification
is a reasonable one. The act applies to all then or
thereafter coming within the classification, and is not
violative of the section of the Constitution to which
we have referred.”’ (Italics supplied)
—
52
In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 272
N. W. 787 at 790, 791, the Supreme Court of South Dakotg
sustained a law of that state which fixed the maximum levy
on agricultural lands at 8 mills against an attack that the
law constituted an arbitrary classification in violation of
Section 1, 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
Appellees here point out that the statute attacked in the
case at bar applies to any and all school districts in the
state, either now or in the future, where the millage rate
for general tax purposes exceeds 15 mills. Naturally, the
millage rates in school districts vary from time to time
and the statute applies in any and all school districts where-
in the levy exceeds 15 mills in any year.
Assessment statutes may be fitted to the state’s tax sys-
tem either by maximum tax levies in mills on a class of
property, or by a percentage of the assessed valuation.
In the laws of Minnesota, property has long been classi-
fied on the basis of a percentage of actual value. This
scheme of taxation was sustained against an attack that
it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In Apartment
Operators’ Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 254 N. W. at 444,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, citing many opinions
of this Court, sustained the law and at the cited page said:
‘In classifying property for the purpose of taxation,
the Legislature is determining a matter of state policy
and is not tied down to any narrow or technical rule.”’
Dohs v. Holm, 152 Minn. 529, 189 N. W. 418, 420.
Prior to the 1933 enactment here considered, real
property was divided into three general classes, viz.:
‘Real estate in which iron ore is known to exist’ (the
iron ore, mined or unmined, assessed at 50 per cent
of its true value) ; ‘unplatted real estate’ at 33% per
cent of its true value, and all other real estate at 40
DLEED THROUGH=—FPOOR COPY
—
53
per cent of its true value. Mason’s Minn. St. 1927,
p. 1933. Chapter 359 provides:
‘Class 3 b. All unplatted real estate, * * * which
is used for the purposes of a homestead, shall consti-
tute class three ‘b’ (3b) and shall be valued and as-
sessed at twenty (20) per cent of the true and full value
thereof. Provided, if the true and full value is in
excess of the sum of $4,000.00, the amount in excess of
said sum shall be valued and assessed as provided for
by class three (3) hereof. (Property coming within
class 3 is valued and assessed at 3344 per cent of its
true value.)
‘All platted real estate * * * which is used for the
purposes of a homestead, shall constitute class 3c and
assessed as provided for by class four (4) hereof.
(Property coming within class 4 is valued and as-
sessed at 40 per cent of its true value.)’
“The classification of platted and unplatted land still
remains. That classification is again divided into
homestead and nonhomestead lands, the former being
assessed at a lesser percentage of true value. The
distinction is predicated upon the use made of the
property. The other change is based upon value and
gives a preference to homesteads of a value of $4,000
or less.’’
And again at p. 445 the Court said:
‘Placing homesteads in two classes on the basis of
valuation was within the scope of the broad power 0”
the Legislature to classify property for the purpose
of taxation. Its selection of property for one classt-
fication or another is binding upon the courts, ‘unless
it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the legis-
lative body acted arbitrarily and without sufficient m-
formation.’ McReavy v. Holm, 166 Minn. 22, 206 N. W.
942, 944. The United States Supreme Court, in Citi-
—
54
zens’ Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 33 S. Ct. 833, 836,
57 L. Ed. 1206, stated: ‘Granting the power of classi.
fication, we must grant government the right to select
the differences upon which the classification shall be
based, and they need not be great or conspicuous, * * *
The state is not bound by any rigid equality. This is
the rule; its limitation is that it must not be exercised
in ‘clear and hostile discriminations between particu-
lar persons and classes.’ We conclude that the class-
ification here considered does not come within the
above quoted limitations.’’ (Italics supplied.)
A classification of school districts at 15 mills was sus-
tained against an attack that it was not uniform in opera-
tion in Myers v. Bd. of Education, 48 Ohio App. 43, 192 N. E.
393. The statute provided that school districts wherein
the millage levy for school purposes was 15 mills could
participate in the state educational equalization fund by
voting on additional school fund tax levy of not to exceed
3 mills. The first qualification for participation in the
state fund was that the levy for school purposes must ex-
ceed 15 mills in some districts and 9.5 mills in other dis-
tricts. The Court held that the Act was of uniform oper-
ation, and in 192 N. E. at 400, said:
‘*Under the provisions of section 5625-18a, the period
the levy remains in effect is the number of years the
school district may continue to participate in the equal-
ization fund, which is a matter of public record and
determinable from such record, and the rate of tax
is fixed by definite arithmetical processes, determinable
from public records, so that the rate of the tax and
the period for which it is to run are both definite and
certain. The act is of uniform operation throughout
the state, as all school districts similarly situated were
entitled to its benefits; and the tax therein provided
to be levied was by uniform rule, as it was the same
in every school district proceedings pursuant to the
act, and the object of the tax was distinctly stated.”
(Italics supplied.)
BLEED THROU GH-—POOR COPY
—
55
Although the question of special privileges and immuni-
ties and equal protection of the laws clause of Section 1,
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was
not raised and decided, the question of uniformity of
operation was raised and decided, and, if uniform in
operation the Act could not be arbitrary, or hostile within
the meaning of that amendment.
These cases from state courts are not binding upon this
Court and are cited merely to show that a 15 mill limita-
tion, or other millage limitation, are common in school tax
law legislation and that the line of demarcation at 15 mills
is within legislative discretion with which the Courts will
not interfere or hold in violation of Section 1, of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
This Court cannot say that a substantial Federal ques-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment has been raised by
this 15 mill classification, and this Court should decline
jurisdiction on this ground.
vi
Proposition
The legislative enactment challenged in the case at bar
was enacted for a public purpose, to-wit in aid of agricul-
ture as an industry, and to encourage the reorganization
of public school districts; the legislature of the State of
Iowa, and the Supreme Court of Iowa have so determined ;
and this Court will not hold the enactment void unless ‘‘the
act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does
not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes,
in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different
and forbidden power, &s, for example, the confiscation of
property’’.
AUTHORITIES
Dickinson v. Porter, (The case at bar), 35 N.W. 24
(Iowa) 66 at 76, 78, 79, 81, Appellant’s Statement
as to Jurisdiction, Appendix ‘‘C’’, p. 15 to p. 28;
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. 8. 112 at
157 to 161; 41 L. Ed. 388, 389; 17 S. Ct. 56 at 62 to 64;
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 at 278, 279, 42 L. Ed
740 at 746, 18 S. Ct. 345;
Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. 8S. 527
at 530, 531, 50 L. Ed. 581 at 583, 26 S. Ct. 301 at 302,
303 ;
Hairston v. Danville € Western Ry., 208 U. 8S. 598 at
606, 607, 52 L. Ed. 637 at 641, 642, 28 S. Ct. 331 at
334, 335;
Union Lime Co. v. C. d N.W. Ry. Co., 233 U. 8. 211 at
218, 58 L. Ed. 924 at 928, 34 S. Ct. 522 at 524;
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. 8. 217 at 221, 222, 62
L. Ed. 252 at 255;
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. 8S. 233 at 239, 240, 64 L. Ed.
878 at 881, 882, 40 S. Ct. 499 at 501;
Rindge v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. 8S. 700 at 705,
706, 67 L. Ed. 1186 at 1192, 1193;
Mitheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U. S. 710 at 717,
67 L. Ed. 1194 at 1199, 43 S. Ct. 694 at 696;
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. 8. 32
at 40, 72 L. Ed. 770 at 775, 48 S. Ct. 423 at 426;
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U. 8S. 36 at 41, 42,
77 L. Ed. 1015 at 1021, 1022, 53 S. Ct. 431 at 433;
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 8. 40 at 43, 44,
78 L. Ed. 1109 at 1113, 1114, 54 §. Ct. 599;
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. 8.
495 at 514, 515, 81 L. Ed. 1245 at 1256, 57 S. Ct. 868
at 874, 875;
BLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY
—
57
Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U. 8. 32 at 35, 89 L. Ed.
95 at 28 65 S. Ct. 9 at 10;
Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 at 214,
215, 90 L. Ed. 6 at 153, 14, 66 S. Ct. 62 at 65;
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. 8. 1 at 6, 7, 91
L. Ed. 711 at 718, 719, 67 S. Ct. 504 at 506, 507;
Board of Supervisors v. Stewart, 30 Iowe 9 at 22, 29,
1 Am. Rep. 238;
Grout v. Kendall, 195 lowa 467 at 477, 478, 192 N.W.
529 at 533;
Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277 at 282, 292,
261 N.W. 652 at 655, 660;
Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 lowa 229 at 233, 236, 283 N.W.
889 at 891, 892;
Apartment Operators’ Assn. V. City of Minneapolis,
195 Minn. 365, 254 N.W. at 443, 444, 445;
State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pace. 771, 777, 782.
Application of Cases Cited
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the opinion in the case at
bar, 35 N.W. 2d 66 at 76, held that the legislative enact-
ment for the purpose of benefiting agriculture, lowa’s
basic industry, and to encourage the reorganization of
school districts to improve the state’s educational system,
both of which are universally held to be for the general
welfare and therefore each is for a ‘‘ public’ purpose. These
holdings are assigned as error in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and
8, p. 2, 3, Appellant’s Assignment of Errors.
The Supreme Court of Iowa in the case at bar, 35 N.W.
2d at 76; Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction, p. 15,
17, said
‘As stated in Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U.S.
122, 124, 125, 41 S. Ct. 43, 44, 65 L. Ed. 170, 175: ‘Any
classification is permissible which has a reasonable
relation to some permitted end of government action.
: |
* * * It is enough, for instance, if the classification
is reasonably founded in ‘the purposes and policy of
taxation’. (Citations.)’
The power of state legislature to adjust their tax
laws in order to encourage an industry or undertaki
deemed vital to the welfare of the state or in further.
ance of some related principle of public policy has
frequently been upheld.
The governor of the state in commenting upon the
report of the school code commission said in his mes-
sage to the legislature that enacted this law, ‘We all
know that agriculture is Iowa’s basic resource. Upon
its prosperity depends the prosperity of our great
number of small businesses and communities.’ It was
most effectively demonstrated during the depression
of the early nineteen thirties that the well-being of the
state as a whole is directly dependent upon the welfare
of agriculture. The prosperity of our basic industry
was no less vital when this act was passed nor is it less
vital now when many other countries look to us for
food and agriculture must supply their needs.
Our state constitution contains the express mandate,
‘The General Assembly shall encourage, by all suitable
means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral,
and agricultural improvement.’ Art. IX. 2d div., see.
3.
We have frequently referred to agriculture as the
basic industry in this state. See for example Blume v.
Crawford County, 217 Iowa 545, 550, 551, 250 N.W.
733, 92 A.L.R. 757; Clear Lake Co-op. Live Stock
Shippers’ Ass’n. v. Weir, supra, 200 Towa 1293, 1298,
206 N.W. 297. The Blume case (217 Iowa 545, 250
N.W. 735) upholds a law directing county boards of
supervisors to appropriate funds raised by taxation
to county farm bureaus under certain conditions and
says a statute in aid of agriculture ‘is not repugnant to
any constitutional provision.’ The plain inference from
the opinion is that what benefits agriculture benefits the
state as a whole. Other decisions generally like the
Blume case appear in Annotation, 92 A.L.R. 768, 770.
BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY
__—
59
Pertinent here is this language from Carman v. Hick-
man County, 185 Ky. 630, 215 8.W. 408, 411:
‘* * © it is a matter of common knowledge, of which
everybody must take notice, that in the agricultural
interests of the state lie its chief source of wealth,
and that the prosperity of the state springing from this
source contributes to the growth and importance of
every other industry in the state, as well as to the
comfort and happiness of the whole people; * * °’.
It is not debatable that it is part of the public policy
of this state, evidenced by our constitution and numer-
ous statutes, to encourage agriculture. It seems equally
plain the encouragement of our basic industry serves
the public interest. We are not convinced the legisla-
ture might not fairly conclude this law in its practical
operation will both benefit and encourage agriculture.”’
(Italics supplied.)
To sustain this holding the Court cited (See 35 N.W.
9d at 77) from the opinions of this Court the following
cases:
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.
495, 57 S. Ct. 868, 872, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 1253, 1255,
109 A. L. R. 1327, 1333, 1335;
Aero-Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv.
Comm. 295 U. 8. 285, 291, 55 S. Ct. 709, 711, 79 L.
Ed. 1439, 1444;
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. 8.
89, 95, 21 S. Ct. 43, 46, 45 L. Ed. 102, 105;
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct.
599, 78 L. Ed. 1109;
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S.
32, 48 S. Ct. 423, 72 L. Ed. 770.
The Court also cited cases from many state jurisdictions.
With reference to the furtherance of the reorganization
eee eet
—
of school districts to improve the state’s educational 8ys-
tem, the Court, 35 N.W. 2d at 78, said:
‘*Since we have upheld the classification” of lands
used for agricultural purposes upon the reasons stated
in Division IIL and this Division IV, it is unnecessary
to consider whether, as suggested by the legislative
commission that recommended the passage of the act
and as argued by defendants, the classification might
also be sustained as in furtherance of the reorganization
of school districts in order to improve our educational
system. We may observe, however, this might well
have been one of the considerations that occurred to the
legislature in making the classification and we cannot
say such conclusion could not be reached in good faith.
The test of reasonableness of a classification is good
faith of the legislature in making it.’’ (Italics supplied)
60
The operation of the Act is simple. Sections 426.6, et seq.,
Code of Iowa, 1946, p. 2 of Appellant’s quotation of the
statutes attacked, provide that the county auditor (who
makes up the tax lists in Iowa) lists by school districts all
the tracts of lands entitled to credit under the Act together
with the taxable value, as shown by the assessment rolls
returned to him by the assessors of the county. He then
determines from this value and the budget of the school
district filed with him the millage rate in each school dis-
trict for general school purposes. If the millage rate is in
excess of 15 mills he computes the amount of credit each
and all the tracts are entitled to, by multiplying the taxable
value thereof by the millage rate in excess of 15 mills. He
totals the amounts for all school districts in his county and
forwards the total for his county to the state comptroller.
The state comptroller then totals the amount of credits for
all counties of the state and apportions the funds appropri-
ated and in his hands to the several counties in the state,
and forwards state warrants to the county auditors of the
several counties of the state. Upon receiving the warrants,
BLEED THROU GH-—POOR COPY
—
61
the county auditor determines the amount of credit to be
credited to each tract of agricultural lands and enters that
amount on the tax list. He then delivers the tax lists (show-
ing the credit to each tract of agricultural land) and the
state comptroller’s warrant representing the total credits
to the agricultural land in his county to the county treasurer
who credits each school district with the total amount of the
tax credits credited on lands in the district, and enters the
amount credited to each tract of land in the county upon
the tax receipt for the land.
The Court, 35 N.W. 2nd at 81 pointed out that this proce-
dure is modeled after the Homestead Tax Credit Act, Chap-
ter 425, Code of lowa, 1946 enacted in 1937. The Court
said:
‘The law in question seems directly analogous to the
Homestead Tax Credit Act, Ch. 425, Code, 1946. It is
plainly patterned after the homestead law. The public
policy served by the former is the encouragement of the
industry on which the prosperity of the state largely
depends. The public policy served by the other, as
stated in Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 Iowa, 229, 233, 236,
283, N.W. 889, is the encouragement of home owner-
ship. Perhaps the ownership of homes is more bene-
ficial to the state than the welfare of agriculture. If
80, the distinction is largely of degree and not of kind.”’
(Italies supplied)
In the case of Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 lowa 229, 233, 236;
283 N.W. 889, 891, 892, the Supreme Court of Iowa said:
“Thus it appears that the legislature, realizing the
social and material benefits to the public at large from
the ownership of homesteads by the people, sought to
encourage and increase such ownership and occupation.
The method adopted was to grant to each homestead a
credit against the real estate taxes for each year the
property constituted a homestead.’’
1:
The Court in the cited case, 283 N.W. at 892 said:
62
‘The tax credit is not a credit to the owner, but to
the homestead, although this results in benefit to the
owner and cash refunds were allowed taxpayers who
had paid such taxes prior to the allowance of the credit.
That the credit is to the property, as distinguished
from the owner, is evident from various provisions of
the act. The credit (or refund) is given against the tax
on the homestead and the taxpayer makes claim therefor
as owner of the homestead.
‘The Homestead Exemption Law was not adopted
upon the premise that a homestead credit was a gift
or bonus with no consideration requirements in re-
turn. The principle behind the act was benefit to be
returned to the state and its people by homestead own
ership. As consideration for exemption it might be
said that the homestead earns its credit each year of
its existence. Consequently, it should not be entitled
to credit for any other year. The credit against the
1936 tax may be explained and justified upon the theory
that it was morally due for service already rendered.”
(Italics supplied)
The Court in the case at bar, 35 N.W. 2d 81, also said:
‘**Again, from 1 Cooley, 4th Ed., section 175, page
384: ‘In case of doubt, courts are largely influenced by
the public policy of the state, in determining whether
taxation is for a public purpose.’ See also 61 CJ,
Taxation, section 20.
As previously indicated, there can be no question
it is part of the public policy of this state to encourage
agriculture. And the furtherance of the reorganization
of school districts in order to improve our educational
system would be as plainly part of our public policy.
As hereinafter pointed out, it has been the policy of
the legislature from its inception to grant numerous
tax exemptions.’’ (Italics supplied)
BLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the state’s early history
(1870) sustained a tax levied to aid in the construction of
railroads as a tax for a public purpose. See 30 Iowa 9,
I Am. Rep. 238. That Court also sustained an appropri-
ation through a bond issue for the payment of a bonus to
soldiers, sailors and marines for service in World War I
as being for a public purpose. In Grout v. Kendall, 195
Iowa 467, 477, 478; 192 N.W. 529 at 533, that Court said:
‘‘Whether a particular purpose is a public purpose,
and whether it has the sanction of a moral obligation
of the state, are questions which have never been defi-
nitely answered or defined. It has been quite uniformly
held by the courts that the determination of such ques-
tions inheres largely in the legislative power. Within
the zone of doubt that is a moral obligation of the state,
and that is a public purpose, which the Legislature
deems to be such.”’
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the case at bar, construed
the legislative enactment to place a ceiling of 15 mills upon
agricultural lands in tracts of 10 acres or more, and by ap-
propriation from funds in the state treasury reimburses
the districts wherein the ceiling applies. In the opinion, 35
N.W. 2d at 79, Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction,
Appendix **C,”’ p. 22, the Iowa Court said:
‘‘In reality, however, the law separately classifies
only lands used for agricultural purposes and those not
so used and then subelassifies agricultural lands into
tracts containing ten acres or more and those not that
large (section 424.2) for the purpose of applying a dif-
ferent tax burden to the lands thus classified in order
to apportion the taxes to the actual benefits received,
to encourage agriculture and, the legislature may also
have felt, to further the reorganization school districts
so as to improve our educational system.
A ceiling of 15 mills for school taxes is placed upon
agricultural tracts of ten acres or more and the state,
|
64
to the amount of $500,000, reimburses the districts jp
which the ceiling is applied. The South Dakota law,
upheld in Great Northern R. Co. v. Whitfield, supra,
65 8.D. 173, 272 N.W. 787, 111 A.L.R. 1475, fixes eight
mills as the ceiling for school taxes on agricultural
lands.”’
The 52nd session of the lowa General Assembly created
a Military Service Tax Credit Fund, (Ch. 231, Laws of 52nd
G.A.). For more than fifty years, the State of lowa has
granted exemption in a limited amount to persons for mili-
tary service in the various wars engaged in by the United
States and that exemption has now been extended to per-
sons for military service in so-called World War II. The
legislative enactment last above referred to made an ap-
propriation to reimburse local taxing bodies for the reve-
nue lost on an analogous basis to the agricultural land credit
act cli#!lenged in the case at bar.
The Court in the case at bar, 35 N.W. 2d at 79, 80, Ap-
pellant’s Appendix, p. 23, 24, with reference to the appro-
priation feature of the challenged enactment, said:
‘*Since, as we have held, this act is a valid taxing
measure is not rendered invalid by the appropriation
provision. The public policy in furtherance of which
the classification is made for the purpose of applying
a different tax burden or a partial tax exemption, if
the law be considered a partial tax exemption measure,
is sufficient to support the appropriation. An act can-
not be said to be for a private purpose where ‘some
principle of public policy’ underlies its passage,
Whether an appropriation connected with a taxing
statute is for a public purpose depends upon whether
the remainder of the statute is for such purpose. See
1 Cooley, 4th Ed., section 177.
Without the appropriation made by the act the loss of
revenue to the school districts by the imposition of the
ceiling of 15 mills would fall wpon other property
BLEED THROU GH=-POOR COPY
—
65
owners in the districts. Under the law as written, how-
ever, such loss is borne by the state up to the amount
appropriated. The money is taken from one public
fund and put into another.
That the appropriation feature of the act does not
render it invalid in the respect claimed see State ex rel.
Board v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771, 777, 782,
which sustains a law that exempts from taxation prop-
erty to ‘he amount of $2000 of certain war veterans
and provides for reimbursement by a state appropri-
ation to each county in the amount of county tax on the
exempted property. The court holds it a valid tax
exemption statute because the legislature might have
found it served a public purpose as an incitement to
patriotism and encouragement to defend the country in
future conflicts and the validity of the law is not aff ected
by the appropriation measure. This from the opinion is
pertinent here:
‘A lawful exemption from taxation cannot, we think,
be regarded as a gift or donation to or in aid of the
individual * * * in whose favor the exemption is de-
clared. * * * Indeed, we do not think the statute makes
a gift to the exemption claimant even indirectly. The
state may be regarded as the sole actor. It exempts
the property declared to be exempt, and stands the loss
not only of the state tax which would otherwise be col-
lected, but the county tax as well. The money appro-
priated is public money, whether in the state or county
treasury, and by the statute is taken out of one
publie pocket or fund and put into another.’ *’ (Italics
supplied)
For more than 50 years, this Court hes held that where
the legislatures and the courts of a state has construed
a legislative enactment to be a part of the public policy of
the state and to be enacted for a public purpose, this Court
will treat such determination ‘‘with very great respect
and * * * regard the decisions as embodying the delib-
—
*
erate judgment and matured thought of the courts of that
state on this question.’’ See Fallbrook Irrigation District
v. Bradley, 164 U. S. at 160, 161 where this Court said
that the rule applies to ‘‘the exercise of the right of emi.
nent domain or by that of taxation.’’
In Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. 8. at
530, this Court, speaking to the same subject of ‘‘ publie pur.
pose,’’ said:
‘*In view of the decision of the state court we assume
that the condemnation was authorized by the state laws,
subject only to the question whether those laws as con-
strued are consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Some objections to this view were mentioned, but they
are not open. If the statutes are constitutional as con-
strued, we follow the construction of the state court.”
In Hairston v. Danville d Western Ry. Co., 208 U. §.
598 at 606, 607, speaking to the same subject, said:
“‘The rule of state decision is clearly established
and we have no occasion here to consider the varying
reasons which have influenced its adoption. But when
we come to inquire what are public uses for which the
right of compulsory taking may be employed, and what
are private uses for which the right is forbidden we
find no agreement, either in reasoning or conclusion.
The one and only principle in which all courts seem to
agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or
private, is ultimately a judicial question. The deter-
mination of this question by the courts has been in-
fluenced in the different States by considerations touch-
ing the resources, the capacity of the soil, the relative
importance of industries to the general public welfare,
and the long-established methods and habits of the
people. In all these respects conditions vary so much
in the States and Territories of the Union that differ-
ent results might well be expected. * * * The pro-
priety of keeping in view by this court, while enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment, the diversity of local eon-
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
—
67
ditions and of regarding with great respect the judg-
ments of the state courts upon what should be deemed
publie uses in that State, is expressed, justified, and
acted upon in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,
ub. sup., Clark v. Wells, ub. sup. and Strickley v. High-
land Boy Mining Co., ub. sup. What was said in these
eases need not be repeated here. No case is recalled
where this court has condemned as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment a taking upheld by the state
court as a taking for public uses im conformity with its
laws.’’ (Italics supplied.)
In Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, this Court ap-
plied this rule to municipal taxation to establish and main-
tain a municipa! wood, coal and fuel yard in the City of
Portland, Maine. This Court, 245 U.S. at 221, said:
‘The act in question has the sanction of the legis-
lative branch of the state government, the body pri-
marily invested with authority to determine what laws
are required in the public interest. That the purpose
is a public one has been determined upon full consid-
eration by the Supreme J udicial Court of the State
upon the authority of a previous decision of that Court.
Laughlin v. City of Portland, 111 Maine, 486.
The attitude of this court towards state legislation
purporting to be passed in the public interest, and so
declared to be by the decision of the court of last resort
of the State passing the act, has often been declared.
While the ultimate authority to determine the validity
of legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment is
rested in this court, local conditions are of such vary-
ing character that what is or is not a public use in a
particular State is manifestly a matter respecting
which local authority, legislative and judicial, has
peculiar facilities for securing accurate information.
In that view the judgment of the highest court of the
State upon what should be deemed a public use in a
particular State is entitled to the highest respect.’’
With reference to the application of the rule on publie
purpose to the taxing power, this Court, in Green v. Frazier,
253 U. S. at 239, 240, said:
‘*The taxing power of the States is primarily vested
in their legislatures, deriving their authority from the
people. When a state legislature acts within the scope
of its authority it is responsible to the people, and their
right to change the agents to whom they have entrusted
the power is ordinarily deemed a sufficient check upon
its abuse. When the constituted authority of the State
undertakes to exert the taxing power, and the question
of the validity of its action is brought before this court,
every presumption in its favor is indulged, and only
clear and demonstrated usurpation of power will au-
thorize judicial interference with legislative action.
In the present instance under the authority of the
constitution and laws prevailing in North Dakota the
people, the legislature, and the highest court of the
State have declared the purpose for which these sev-
eral acts were passed to be of a public nature, and
within the taxing authority of the State. With this
united action of people, legislature and court, we are
not at liberty to interfere unless it is clear beyond rea-
sonable controversy that rights secured by the Federal
Constitution have been violated. What is a public pur-
pose has given rise to no little judicial consideration.
Courts, as a rule, have attempted no judicial definition
of a ‘public’, as distinguished from a ‘private’ pur-
pose, but have left each case to be determined by its
own peculiar circumstances. Gray, Limitations of Tax-
ing Power, sec. 176, ‘Necessity alone is net the test by
which the limits of State authority in this direction are
to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look be-
yond the expenditures which are absolutely needful to
the continued existence of organized government, and
embrace others which may tend to make that govern-
ment subserve the general well-being of society, and
advance the present and prospective happiness and
prosperity of the people.’ Cooley, Justice, in People
v. Salem, 20 Michigan, 452. Questions of policy are
not submitted to judicial determination, and the courts
have no general authority of supervision over the exer-
BLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY
—
cise of discretion which under our system is reposed in
the people or other departments of government.”’
Williams v. Mayor etc. of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, con-
strued a statute of the State of Maryland exempting a single
railroad which was insolvent. The Circuit Court of Appeals
held the statute in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution on the grounds that it granted
special privilege to a single railroad. This Court reversed
the Cireuit Court of Appeals and in the opinion, 289 U. S.
at 42, said:
‘‘Tt is not the function of a court to determine whether
the public policy that finds expression in legislation of
this order is well or ill conceived. Otis v. Parker, 187
U. S. 696, 609; Missouri Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v.
May, 194 U. 8. 267; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. 8. 374,
388, 389. The judicial function is exhausted with the
discovery that the relation between means and end is
not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory pretense.
Within the field where men of reason may reasonably
differ, the legislature must haveits way. Otis v. Parker,
supra. Nor in marking out that field will a court be
forgetful of presumptions that help to fix the boun-
daries. ‘As underlying questions of fact may eondi-
tion the constitutionality of legislation of this charac-
ter, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail
in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute.’ ”’ (Italics supplied.)
In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. Ss.
495, this Court construed the Alabama Unemployment Com-
pensation Act as levying a tax for a public purpose. In
the opinion, 301 U. S. at 514, 515, the Court said:
“The states, by their constitutions and laws, may
set their own limits upon their spending power, see
Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; ef. Parkers-
burg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Cole v. La Grange, 113
U. 8. 1, but the requirements of due process leave free
scope for the exercise of a wide legislative discretion
in determining what expenditures will serve the public
interest.
—
70
This Court has long and consistently recognized that
the public purposes of a state, for which it may raise
funds by taxation, embrace expenditures for its gen-
eral welfare. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v, Bradley,
supra, 161; Green v. Frazier, supra, 240, 241. The
existence of local conditions, which, because of their
nature and extent, are of concern to the public as a
whole, the modes of advancing the public interest by
correcting them or avoiding their consequences, are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the legislature, and
to it, and not to the courts, is committed the duty
and responsibility of making choice of the possible
methods. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
supra, 160; Jones v. Portland, supra, 221, 224, 225;
Green v. Frazier, supra, 239, 240. As with expendi-
tures for the general welfare of the United States,
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 67; Helvering v.
Davis, post, p. 619, whether the present expenditure
services a public purpose is a practical question ad-
dressed to the law-making department, and it would
require a plain case of departure from every public
purpose which could reasonably be conceived to justify
the intervention of a court.’’ (Italics supplied.)
Certainly, it is clear at first giance that legislative enact-
ments to aid and encourage agriculture, and to promote
the reorganization of school districts are a part of the public
policy of the State of Iowa. As pointed out by the Supreme
Court of Iuwa, 35 N. W. 2d at 76, the Constitution of Iowa
contains the express mandate that ‘‘The General Assembly
shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improve-
ment. Art. IX, 2d div., see. 3.” There is, in fact, a com-
pact with the Government of the United States to do that
very thing.
Can this Court say that a law enacted for the very pur-
poses of that mandate from the people of Iowa and that com-
pact with the Federal Government was not enacted for a
public purpose as a part of the public policy of the State of
Iowa in the face of the determination of the legislature and
BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY
—
71
every Court of Lowa, including the Court of highest resort
that the statute was enacted as a part of the public policy
of the State of Iowa ‘‘to encourage agriculture’ and ‘‘the
furtherance of the reorganization of school districts in order
to improve our educational system’’? See 35 N. W. 2d at
81.
” Contatale, at ‘‘first blush” it is apparent that the legis-
lative enactment challenged in the case at bar is a valid
exercise of legislative power, and no substantial Federal
question is raised under Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.
In Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U. S. 32, this Court
sustained a statute of the State of Kansas prohibiting the
sale of ‘filled milk’’. In the opinion, 323 U.S. at 34, 35, this
Court said :
‘Apparently the objection under the equal protec-
tion clause is that the Kansas statute permits the sale
of skimmed milk which has less calories and fewer
vitamins than petitioners’ compound and yet forbids
the sale of the compound despite its higher nutritive
value. Such an objection is governed by the same
standards of legislation as objections under the due
process clause. It is a matter of classification and the
power of the legislature to classify is as broad as its
power to prohibit. A violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in either case would depend upon whether
there is any rational basis for the action of the legis-
lature.”’
In Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. 8S. 207 this
Court sustained a law of North Dakota which excepted from
compulsory sale lands acquired, lands owned by corpora-
tions whose business was dealing in farm lands and lands
belonging to certain cooperative corporations. In sustain-
ing the classifications, this Court, 326 U.S. at 214, 215, said:
‘The North Dakota Legislature may have thought
that its policy with reference to corporate-owned agri-
emmy
cultural lands would be advanced by permitting corpo-
rations engaged in the business of dealing in farm lands
to acquire and sell without restriction lands forced
upon the market by the statute. It could have t
that its policy would be in part defeated by withholding
authority from farm cooperatives to acquire and use
farm lands for agricultural purposes. Cf. United
States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, 562-564.
Statutory discrimination between classes which are in
fact different must be presumed to be relevant to a per-
missible legislative purpose, and will not be deemed
to be a denial of equal protection if any state of facts
could be conceived which would support it. Rast v.
Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. 8. 342, 357 ; Carmichael
v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509, and cases cited.”
(Italics supplied.)
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. 8. 1, this Court
sustained a law of New Jersey which provided for paying
costs of transporting pupils to school, including those who
attend parochial or church schools, and to reimburse parents
for transportation costs paid. This law was attacked on
the grounds that it appropriated tax funds to private pur-
poses in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution.
In the opinion, 330 U. S. 1 at 6, 7, this Court said:
‘*The fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public
need, coincides with the personal desires of the indi-
viduals most directly affected is certainly an inadequate
reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously
appraised the public need.
It is true that this Court has, in rare instances, struck
down state statutes on the ground that the purpose for
which tax-raised funds were to be expended was not a
public one. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655;
Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. 8S. 487; Thompson v. Con
solidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. 8S. 55. But the
Court has also pointed out that this far-reaching au-
thority must be exercised with the most extreme caution.
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. 8. 233, 240. Otherwise, a state’s
72
DLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY
73
power to legislate for the public welfare might be seri-
ously curtailed, a power which is a primary reason for
the existence of states. Changing local conditions
create new local problems which may lead a state’s
people and its local authorities to believe that laws
authorizing new types of public services are necessary
to promote the general well-being of the people. The
Fourteenth Amendment did not strip the states of their
power to meet problems previously left for individual
solution. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. 8. 97, 103-
104; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. 8. 27, 31-32; Fallbrook
Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. 8. 112, 157-158.
It is much too late to argue that legislation intended
to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular
education serves no public purpose. Cochran v. Louisi-
ana State Board of Education, 281 U. 8. 370; Holmes, J.,
in Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87. See
opinion of Cooley, J., in Stuart v. School District No. 1
of Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 (1874). The same thing
is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents,
or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children
so that they can ride in pubiic busses to and from schools
rather than run the risk of traffic and other hazards
incident to walking or ‘hitchhiking.’ See Barbier v.
Connolly, swpra, at 31. See also cases collected 63
A. L. R. 413; 118 A. L. R. 806. Nor does it follow that
a law has a private rather than a public purpose because
it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to reim-
burse individuals on account of money spent by them
in a way which furthers a public program. See Car-
michael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 518.
Subsidies and loans to individuals such as farmers and
home-owners, and to privately owned transportation
systems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have
been commoaplace practices in our state and national
history.’’ (Italics supplied)
It is perfectly clear, at first blush, that the classifications
in the legislative enactment attacked in the case at bar are
in no way in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that
the act was enacted in aid of agriculture (since it applies to
all agricultural and horticultural land in the state except
Be
—-
tracts of less than 10 acres); that the classification at 10
acres is within legislative discretion; that the act was en.
acted for a ‘‘publie purpose’’ as a part of the ‘‘ public policy
of the state’’ to encourage reorganization of school dis-
tricts; that it has been so construed by the Court of highest
jurisdiction in the State of Iowa as well as by the lower
Court; that under the decisions of this Court these deter-
minations are entitled to great respect by reason of local
conditions, and the public policy of the State; that there is
no substantial Federal question raised under Section 1, 14th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and that this Court
should decline jurisdiction in this case.
74
Wuenrerore, Appellees pray that an order be entered by
this Court sustaining their Resistance to the Jurisdiction in
this cause, and for their costs.
Rosert L. Larson,
Attorney General of Iowa,
Des Moines, lowa;
Dow Hiss,
First Assistant Attorney
General of lowa,
Des Moines, Iowa;
Eart F. Wisvom,
Special Assistant Attorney
General of Iowa;
1114 Register & Tribune Building,
Des Moines, Iowa;
Bert F. Wispom,
1.14 Register & Tribune Building,
Des Moines, Iowa;
F. H. Becker,
County Attorney of Dubuque County,
Dubuque, Iowa,
Cownsel for Appellees.
PLEED THROUGH-—POOR COPY
—
APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
Come now all of the Appellees, by Robert L. Larson, At-
torney General of lowa, Don Hise, First Assistant Attorney
General of Iowa, Earl F. Wisdom, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General of lowa, Bert F. Wisdom, and F. H. Becker,
County Attorney of Dubuque County, Iowa, their counsel,
and respectfully move this Court to dismiss the appeal taken
herein by Laura Dickinson, or affirm the decision and judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Iowa rendered and filed
herein and as grounds therefor states:
75
(1) That the appeal is taken for the purpose of delay
only;
(2) That the cause shows upon its face that no substantial
Federal question is presented for review under Section One,
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution;
(3) That, although the record in said cause may show that
this Court has technical jurisdiction, it is manifest that the
questions upon which the appeal is taken and the errors
cited by said Appellant are so unsubstantial that further
argument is unnecessary.
Avrnorrries ty Support or Motion
Rule 7, U. 8S. Supreme Court Rules;
Rule 12, Par. 3, U.S. Supreme Court Rules;
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541 at 544,
56 L. Ed. 875 at 878, 32 Sup. Ct. 606 at 608;
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. 8. 52 at 54,
60 L. Ed. 140 at 142, 36 Sup. Ct. 27 at 28;
Boston v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309 at 314, 67 L. Ed. 274 at
282, 43 Sup. Ct. 129 at 131;
—
76
Hoages v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600 at 601, 67 L. Ed. 819 at
821, 43 Sup. Ct. 435 at 436.
In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541, at 544,
this Court said:
‘*Defendant in error moves to affirm the judgment
under subdivision 5 of Rule 6. The motion we think
should prevail, since the questions urged upon our
attention as a basis for a reversal of the judgment have
been so plainly foreclosed by decisions of this court as
to make further argument unnecessary.’’
This is the universal rule in this Court.
In further support of the Motion, see Authorities cited
under Proposition II to Proposition VI, inclusive, of Appel-
lees’ ‘‘ Brief in Suport of Resistance to Appellant’s State-
ment of Jurisdiction.”’
The cases cited and quoted in Proposition II to Proposi-
tion VI, inclusive, of Appellees’ ‘‘ Resistance to Appellant’s
Statement of Jurisdiction’’ show conclusively that the clas-
sifications made by the legislative enactment challenged
herein are reasonable and proper and within public policy
of the State of Iowa throughout its history. Said citations
from the opinions of this Court show conclusively that the
errors upon which Appellant bases her claim for reversal
have been so plainly foreclosed by the decisions of this Court
as to make further argument unnecessary.
DPLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY
a
77
Wuererore, Appellees pray that the appeal herein be dis-
missed; or in the alternative, that the decision and judgment
of the Supreme Court of Iowa be affirmed. .
Rosert L. Larson,
Attorney General of Iowa,
Des Moines, lowa;
Dow Hise,
First Assistant Attorney
General of Iowa,
Des Moines, Iowa;
Eaart F. Wispom,
Special Assistant Attorney
General of lowa,
1114 Register & Tribune Building,
Des Moines, lowa;
Bert F. Wispom,
1114 Register & Tribune Building,
Des Moines, Iowa;
F. H. Becker,
County Attorney of Dubuque County,
Dubuque, Iowa,
Counsel for Appellees.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.