Jurisdictional Statement — Doss v. Lindsley

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INDEX

Sussect Inpex

Page

Statement as to jurisdiction...................... 1

Statutory provisions sustaining jurisdiction _. 2

Nature of the case and rulings below.......... 2

Appendix:

Section 237(a) of the Judicial Code ........... 10

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Peo-

mee ¥. Teme, SEG BE, TOW... cece. = 10

TaB.Le or Cases Cirep

Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252........ 5

Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Rela-

tions Board, 142 Fed. (2d) 922 .................. 4

Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. 8. 233... ... 5

ee 8 ee ee eer 2, 3, 6, 8

People v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 49 8. Ct. 61...... 5

Stuart v. The People, 4 1ll. 399 ................ 7

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-

is oo asia ga she vive see ss ea 5

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357............... 5

Sratutes CrTep

Constitution of the United States:

yo a oxy Vans unde eos 2,4

Fourteenth Amendment ..................... 2, 4,5

Judicial Code, Section 237(a) .................... 1

—8037

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

ILLINOIS

No. 28507

WILLIAM A. DOSS,

Petitioner,

vs.

E. E. LINDSLEY, Suenirr or Piatr County, [111no1s,

Respondent

(The Original Petition of William A. Doss of Monticello,

Illinois, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in a Certain Mat-

ter)

In Re: Petition for Leave to Appeal Said Proceedings to

the Supreme Court of the United States

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction to review the order and

judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, made and

entered in the above entitled matter on January 9th, 1945,

under Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code because by

said order and judgment that State Court held against

this petitioner in an original petition for a writ of habeas

corpus on his contention that he was restrained of his

2

liberty by and held in the custody of the respondent in

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to

the Constitution of the United States and the rights of

this petitioner to freedom of speech and of the press se-

cured to him by said Amendments. The order and judg-

ment of the Supreme Court of Illinois from which appeal

is now sought, the Section of the Judicial Code aforesaid

and the opinion of the Illinois Court in People v. Doss, 382

Ill. 307, are set out in an appendix to this Statement.

The application for leave to appeal is presented to the

Honorable William J. Fulton, Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court of Illinois, on this 2nd day of April, 1945, at Syca-

more, Illinios.

The instant proceeding is a cause wherein final judg-

ment rendered by the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

in a habeas corpus proceeding therein, that Court being

the highest court of that State of Illinois in which a decision

could be hed, draws in question the validity of an order

and judgment of the Circuit Court of Piatt County, in the

State of Illinois, sentencing this petitioner to jail and fining

him for contempt committed outside the presence of the

Court on the ground that said order and judgment are

repugnant and violative of the Constitution of the United

States and specifically the First and Fourteenth Amend-

ments thereof, guaranteeing the freedoms of speech and of

press.

The instant proceeding involves a trial right privilege

and immunity specifically set up and claimed by the

petitioner under the Constitution of the United States and

the Federal Bill of Rights as hereinbefore specifically

stated.

It is alleged in the information that the petitioner was

guilty of contempt—if any contempt was committed, it was

indirect—because he delivered and caused to be delivered

in the ordinary course of the mails, copies of the Liberty

—

3

Press, a publication sponsored by this petitioner, to a Grand

Jury of Piatt County (Orig. Rec., p. 28); the contempt

was not charged on the theory that some language in the

Liberty Press was ‘‘intemperate in the extreme’’, as seems

to have been the belief of the Supreme Court of Illinois as

shown in the opinion of that Court in People v. Doss, 382

Ill. p. 307, a view probably adopted in the case in that

Court from which appeal is now sought to be prosecuted

(Orig. Rec., p. 265). That opinion is set forth in an appen-

dix hereto. The portions of the articles in the Liberty

Press selected for inclusion in the information are critical

of the State’s Attorney (Orig. Rec., p. 34) and of certain

private persons mentioned by name. They charge that

the State’s Attorney is not a truthful man and that he is

not impartial in the matter of initiating criminal prosecu-

tions. They show that a special prosecutor was named to

handle certain matters before the Grand Jury, but no at-

tack is made on him in the articles set forth in the informa-

tion. On the contrary, petitioner commended him (Orig.

Rec., p. 134). Neither is there any question raised or doubt

insinuated concerning the integrity of the Judges, and there

is no appeal to Grand Jurors to depart from their duties

as Grand Jurors.

The matters involved in this case and on this proposed

appeal are of a substantial nature. They raise questions

which involve (1) the right of a person to publish and cir-

culate charges against public officers concerning the man-

ner in which they perform their official duties (Orig. Rec.,

p. 136) and for the publication of which such person is ex-

pressly willing to answer fully in the Civil Courts under

the laws enforced for the protection of good character

against defamation (Orig. Rec. pp. 131, 141, 143 and

passim) and (2) whether free speech and a free press may

be intimidated or throttled through the indirect contempt

process without any findings (Orig. Rec., pp. 271-2) that

4

the exercise of these rights, in the manner charged in the

information, constituted such great and present danger to

a paramount public interest, namely, the unimpeded ad-

ministration of public justice, as te warrant and justify

restriction of such rights by fining and imprisoning the

author of the articles.

In Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations

Board (1942), 142 Fed. (2d) 922, 928, the Cireuit Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit condemned the use of ‘‘in-

substantial findings of fact screening reality’’ in a con-

tempt proceeding. How much more serious it is when there

are no findings of fact in a case where, as here, freedom of

speech and of the press is sought to be controlled through

the process of indirect contempt! The petitioner objected

in the State Courts (Orig. Rec., pp. 271-2) to the omission

to make findings of fact. The effect of this omission is

obviously to make it impossible for a reviewing court to

pass upon substantial and vitally important questions of

Constitutional law involving fundamental rights of peti-

tioner under and secured by the United States Constitution,

namely, whether the writing, publication and ‘citéulation of

the Liberty Press, in the manner charged in the informa-

tion (Orig. Ree., pp. 27-42) constituted such great and

present danger to a paramount public interest, to-wit, the

administration of public justice, as to justify or warrant

restrictions upon the rights of free speech and a free press

as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments

to the Constitution of the United States. This question

was expressly raised and overruled in the State Court

(Orig. Ree., pp. 271-2). The State Courts of Illinois may

not destroy the Constitutional Rights of this petitioner by

refusing to make findings of facts, without which the Courts

of tue United States, including the Supreme Court thereof,

may be hindered or prevented from passing upon substan-

tial and vital questions of Federal Constitutional law in-

5

volving such rights as free speech, a free press, and the

liberty of a citizen when sought to be destroyed by im-

prisonment under an order or judgment of a State Court for

indirect contempt.

The following decisions hold this Court has the jurisdic-

tion and the power on appeal from the adverse judgment of

a State Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, to correct the

order and judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois from

which the appeal here is sought; People v. Zimmerman

(1928), 278 U. S. 63, 49 S. Ct. 61; and the following de-

cisions show the power and jurisdiction in this Court to cor-

rect rulings of State Courts on the subject of free speech

and a free press and sustain the claim of the petitioner that

a substantial question is involved in this case; Whitney v.

california, 274 U. S. 357, especially concurring opinion of

Justice Brandeis; Bridges v. State of California (1941),

314 U. S. 252; Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936),

297 U. S. 233, 249; West Virginia State Board of Education

y. Barnette, 319 U. 8. 624, especially p. 630, where the Court

said with reference to the rights secured by the First

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as

transmitted through the Fourteenth Amendment:

‘“‘They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent

grave and immediate danger to interests which the

state may lawfully protect ° * * They may not be

restricted in order to protect private rights susceptible

to redress by other means.”’ (Emphasig supplied.)

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,

319 U. S. 624, 639, 641.

This petitioner urged that to punish him for publishing

or circulating the words and charges in the information for

contempt, would be an invasion of his right under the First

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States, (1) in the Liberty Press, (2), at all stages

6

of the contempt hearing before the Judge of the Circuit

Court of Piatt County (Orig. Rec. p. 12), (3) in the Su-

preme Court of Illinois in the case from the judgment in

which an appeal is sought to this Court (Orig. Ree. pp. 2-3) ;

and that in all these stages and in both the State Courts

petitioner contended in his answer to the amended informa-

tion for contempt (Orig. Rec., p. 217), in argument and in

printed briefs, that his right to speak and write his senti-

ments, as that right is guaranteed under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States, was violated, infringed and abridged by the con-

tempt order of the Circuit Court of Piatt County, Illinois

(Orig. Rec. p. 217). In each and every stage in the Court

of first instance, namely the Circuit Court of Piatt County

(Orig. Rec. p. 264, par. 3), and in the Supreme Court of

Illinois (Orig. Rec., p. 278), said Courts ruled against your

petitioner upon each and all of his contentions as above

set forth.

The Supreme Court of Illinois did not file an opinion in

support of or explanation of its judgment from which an

appeal is now sought to this Court and petitioner believes

that the Supreme Court of Illinois, in denying the Applica-

tion of petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus in the case

at bar, relied on its holding on the Federal questions of

Constitutional law respecting the freedoms of speech and

press, as did the State’s Attorney in his argument and mo-

tion (Orig. Rec., pp. 263, 271-2) in People v. Doss, 382 Ill.

307, where, on the questions now raised and in the same

manner, the Court said at page 315:

‘‘The constitutional guaranties invoked by defendant

were never intended to and do not sanction such conduct

as exhibited by defendant. These rights are not abso-

lute. Neither liberty of the press nor freedom of speech

have yet become license,’’

7

Stuart v. The People (1842) 4 Ill. 399, is a case remark-

ably reminiscent of Bridges v. California. In that case the

defendant was charged with contempt for publishing criti-

cal comment on the conduct of a juror while actually sitting

in a criminal case. If contempt, it was constructive or in-

direct. The language of the court is lucid, its grasp of the

fundamental principles of liberty, as we in America have

understood them, is firm, and its defense of these principles

is worthy of the best judicial traditions of our country.

Judge Breese, a great jurist in Illinois history, often com-

pared to-the famous Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts,

said:

‘Our Constitution has provided that the printing

presses shall be free to every person who may under-

take to examine the proceedings of any and every de-

partment of the Government, and he may publish the

truth, if the matter published is proper for public in-

formation, and the free communication of thoughts and

opinions is encouraged.

‘The contempt, in this case, was by a printer of a

newspaper, remarking on the conduct of an individual

juror, who, whilst he was engaged in the trial of a

capital case, and whilst separated from the public, and

in charge of the officer of the Court, was furnishing

articles for daily publication in a rival newspaper; and

in admitting a communication from a correspondent,

calculated to irritate the presiding judge of the Court,

though not reflecting upon his integrity, or in any way

impeaching his conduct. The paragraphs and com-

munication published had no tendency to obstruct the

administration of justice, nor were they thrust upon

the notice of the Court, by any act of the plaintiff in

error.

‘“‘The right to punish for contempts committed in the

presence of the Court is acknowledged by our statute;

(1) and while it affirms a principle that is inherent in

all courts of justice, to defend itself when attacked, as

the individual man has a right to do for his own preser-

vation, it may also, with great propriety, be regarded

as a limitation upon the power of the courts to punish

for any other contempts. In this power would neces-

sarily be included all acts calculated to impede, em-

barrass or obstruct the Court in the administration

of justice. Such acts would be considered as done in

the presence of the Court. So of rules entered by the

Court prohibiting the publication of the evidence or

other matters while the case is pending and undecided.

The limitation of the power to such cases only, is better

calculated to strengthen the judiciary, and fasten it in

the affections and esteem of the people, who have so

large a stake in its purity and efficiency, than the en-

larging the power to the extent claimed.

‘*An honest, independent, and intelligent court will

win its way to public confidence, in spite of newspaper

paragraphs, however pointed may be *eir wit or satire,

and its dignity will suffer less by passing them by un-

noticed, than by arraigning the perpetrators, trying

them in a summary way, and punishing them by the

judgment of the offended party.

It does not seem to me necessary, for the protection

of courts in the exercise of their legitimate powers,

that this one, so liable to abuse, should also be con-

ceded to them. It may be so frequently exercised, as to

destroy that moral influence which is their best pos-

session, until, finally, the administration of justice is

brought into disrepute. Respect to courts cannot be

compelled; it is the voluntary tribute to the public to

worth, virtue, and intelligence, and whilst they are

found upon the judgment seat, so long, and no longer,

will they retain the public confidence. o

Through oversight, doubtless, no reference is made to

this great case in The People of the State of Illinois v.

William A. Doss, (1943) 382 Ill. 307.

Prayer for Reversal

For which errors the plaintiff, William A. Doss, prays

that the said judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of

eam emaammmmaaes eres

9

Illinois, dated and entered on January 9th, 1945 in the above

entitled cause, be reversed, and a judgment rendered in

favor of the said plaintiff, and for costs.

Wiruum A. Doss,

Petitioner—Pro Se.

Ricuarp E. Westsrooks,

Attorney for Petitioner

Address: 3000 South State Street,

Chicago, Illinois.

10

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

(1) Seetion 237 (a) of the Judicial Code of the United

States:

‘*Sec. 237. (a) A final judgment or decree in any suit

in the highest court of a State in which a decision in

the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the

validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, and

the decision is against its validity; or where is drawn

in question the validity of a statute of any State, on

the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,

treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision

is in favor of its validity, may be reviewed by the Su-

preme Court upon a writ of error. The writ shall have

the same effect as if the judgment or decree had been

rendered or passed in a court of the United States.

The Supreme Court may reverse, modify, or affirm the

judgment or decree of such State court, and may, in its

discretion, award execution or remand the cause to the

court from which it was removed by the writ.’’

(2) The order and judgment of the Supreme Court of

Illinois appears on page 278 of the original record, as

follows:

‘‘The motion by petitioner for leave to file petition

for habeas corpus is unnecessary; petition is treated

as a petition for habeas corpus and petition denied.’’

(3) Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in People

v. Doss, 382 Ill. 307:

‘‘Mr. Justice Wilson delivered the opinion of the

court:

‘“‘The defendant, William A. Doss, was adjudged

guilty of criminal contempt by the circuit court of Piatt

county and fined $2000 and sentenced to imprisonment

in jail for a period of three months, the sentence to not

run concurrently with any other sentence. He prose-

cutes a direct appeal on the ground, among others,

that the order of conviction infringes the constitutional

11

guaranties of liberty of the press and freedom of

speech.

‘*An information was filed January 15, 1942. The

amended information, filed May 9, 1942, charged the

defendant with delivering or causing to be delivered

a copy of each of five issues of Tue Liserty Press, pub-

lished by him, to the foreman and a majority of the

members of the Piatt county grand jury then in session

investigating alleged violations by defendant of the

criminal libel law which had previously appeared in

his paper. It was also alleged that some of the issues

of the paper were sent by mail to several of the mem-

bers of the grand jury. The five issues of defendant’s

publication appear in the amended information. No

useful purpose can be served by narrating, in detail,

the voluminous contents of the issues of Tur Liserty

Press sent by defendant to the grand jury. It suffices

to observe that the language of the excerpts is intem-

perate in the extreme, and consists largely of accusa-

tions against the members of the bar of Piatt County,

attacks against the State’s Attorney of the county,

and, also, the special State’s Attorney who was ap-

pointed special prosecutor to act with reference to the

questions concerning the alleged violations of the

criminal libel law by defendant, and of repeated efforts

to dissuade the grand jury from returning indictments

against him. Those portions of the five issues made a

part of the amended information abound in vilifying

and vituperative statements concerning the objects of

defendant’s spleen. The articles urge the grand jurors

to not follow the advice and recommendations of the

prosecutors and, instead, to be guided by the advice of

the defendant. Defendant’s motion to strike the in-

formation was overruled. Thereafter, he answered,

admitting that he published the five issues of Tue

Liserty Press in question, and delivered or caused to

be delivered a copy of each of them to the foreman and

the majority of the members of the grand jury, and

that he mailed copies to other members of the grand

jury, but denied that they constituted contempt of

court, or that they were intended to wrongfully in-

12

fluence the grand jury in the performance of its duty,

**In the meantime, on February 10, 1942, defendant

applied for a change of venue from Judge W. S. Bod-

man, presiding judge of the circuit court of Piatt

county. His application was granted, and, on Febru-

ary 10, he filed a petition for change of venue from

Judge F. B. Leonard, another of the judges of the

circuit court. No formal order was entered with re-

spect to this second petition. It was, however, in effect,

acted upon and allowed by Judge C. Y. Miller, the third

of the judges of the circuit court, on March 6 in a

written statement in which he stated that he would not

try the contempt charge, and that the three judges had

decided that the administration of justice would be

best served by asking the Supreme Court to assign a

trial judge to the county. March 11, 1942, on motion

of the three judges of the sixth judicial circuit, this

court ordered that Judge James V. Bartley, one of the

circuit judges of the twelfth judicial circuit, be as-

signed to preside in the cireuit court of Piatt county,

at such times and for such period as may be necessary

to dispose of the matters pending against William A.

Doss. May 19, 1941, defendant filed a petition for

change of venue from Judge Bartley. This petition

was denied.

‘*Defendant contends that the denial by Judge Bart-

ley of the petition for change of venue constitutes

reversible error. The contempt charged against de-

fendant was a constructive criminal contempt com-

mitted out of the presence of the court, one which par-

takes of a criminal nature. Section 26 of the Venue

Act provides that no more than one change of venue

shall be granted to a defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,

chap. 145, par. 26.) The right to a change of venue is

statutory, and the applicant must bring himself within

the statutory requirements. (People v. Toughy, 361

Ill. 332; Hutson v. Wood, 263 id. 376.) Defendant was

granted a change of venue from Judge Bodman and

was, for all practical purposes, granted a second

change of venue from Judge Leonard. His complaint

is that his third request was refused. For the ade-

13

quate reason that under section 26 of the Venue Act

he was entitled to only one change of venue, there was

no error in the denial of the petition by Judge Bartley.

Defendant argues, however, that the amended infor-

mation, filed May 9, 1942, constitutes a new cause of

action, and that, hence, the previous changes of venue

cannot be considered. No authority is cited, and we

have been unable to find any, for this novel proposition.

It is elementary that the filing of an amended informa-

tion or an amended complaint does not necessarily

constitute a new cause of action. Moreover, defendant

is not in a position to contend that the amended in-

formation presented a new cause of action against him

since he has failed to include the original information

in either the record or his abstract. Upon the record

thus made, there is no possible way of determining

whether the amended information did, as asserted,

constitute a new cause of action.

‘‘Apart from the fact that defendant has failed to

satisfy procedural requisites with respect to his con-

tention concerning change of venue and that substan-

tive grounds adequately support the denial of his third

petitioner, there is respectable authority for the

proposition that statutory provisions relative to change

of venue do not apply to proceedings to punish con-

tempts, unless such proceedings are expressly included,

eo nomine, in the statute. (Rapalje on Contempts, p.

110; State of Oklahoma ex rel. Short v. Owens, 125

Okla. 66; VanDyke v. Superior Court, 24 Ariz. 508;

Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430.) The reason assigned

for inapplicability of change of venue statutes to con-

tempt proceedings is that a contempt is neither civil

nor criminal in fact, but sui generis.

‘‘Defendant claims that he was entitled to a trial by

jury, as requested. In a case, as here, where a con-

tempt proceeding is instituted to maintain the court’s

authority and to uphold the administration of justice,

and where the acts charged were not committed in the

presence of the court, a sworn answer denying the

alleged wrongful acts is conclusive, extrinsic evidence

may not be received to impeach it, and the defendant

14

is entitled to his discharge. (People v. Whitlow, 357

Il]. 34; People v. McDonald, 314 id. 548; People v. Sey-

mour, 272 id. 295.) If the answer is false, the remedy

is by indictment for perjury. (People v. McLaughlin,

334 Ill. 354.) On the other hand, if the answer admits

the material facts charged to be true and the facts con-

stitute a contempt of court, punishment is imposed.

(People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524; People v. Seymour,

supra.) In either event, the offender is tried solely

upon his answer. It follows, necessarily, that the

defendant is not entitled to a trial by jury because no

issue of fact is or can be formed by a jury to try.

People v. Seymour, supra; O’Brien v. People, 216

Ill. 354.

‘‘The gist of several errors relied upon by defendant

for a reversal is to the effect that the amended informa-

tion should have been stricken on his motion. It is now

definitely settled in Illinois that written communica-

tions to members of a grand jury while in session, con-

taining malicious accusations against private citizens

and public officials, including the State’s Attorney, and

couched in such language that they can serve no useful

purpose but show only personal enmity, constitute con-

tempt of court as an unauthorized interference with the

administration of justice, even though the letters do not

refer to cases pending before the grand jury. (People

v. Parker, supra.) The amended information satisfies

the requirements of the law as a pleading, and it

affirmatively appears from the information that de-

fendant sent copies of five different issues of his paper

to members of the grand jury while in session, with

respect to matters pending before the grand jury di-

rectly affecting defendant himself. The motion to

strike was properly overruled.

‘*In an analogous case, Commonwealth v. McNary,

246 Mass. 46, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-

sachusetts, in deciding, as a matter of law, that the

sending of a letter by one under investigation to mem-

bers of the grand jary, in view of attending circum-

stances, could have been found to be a contempt of

court, observed; ‘The court has the power and is

15

charged with the duty of punishing for contempt any

one whose conduct interferes with or has a tendency to

obstruct the grand jury. Such conduct is as much con-

tempt, and punishable as such as that which interferes

with or has a tendency to obstruct the administration of

justice in the courts in another form or manner. It may

be as necessary to put forth the power of the court to

protect itself against contempts committed against this

instrumentality of justice as against others. It is a

contempt of the court of which the grand jury is a part

to obstruct its normal and legal functions.’

‘*Defendant complains that the court erred in declin-

ing to permit him to produce witnesses, including two

members of the grand jury, upon the hearing of the

contempt proceedings. In a contempt alleged to have

been committed beyond the presence of the court, no

evidence other than defendant’s sworn answer can be

heard and considered by the court in the determination

of his guilty or the enormity of the offense. (People v.

Severinghaus, 313 Ill. 456.) In short, error would have

been committed had the court allowed witnesses to

testify in this action.

‘*Defendant contends that the court erroneously ad-

judged him guilty of contempt. It is established that

when communications to a grand jury having a tendency

to directly impede, embarrass or obstruct it in the dis-

charge of any of its duties remaining to be discharged

after the publications were made, such publications con-

stitute contempt. (People v. Parker, supra.) It is

manifest that defendant was seeking, by all means at

his command, to influence the grand jury in its delibera-

tions concerning the criminal charges under investiga-

tion with respect to the alleged criminally libelous arti-

cles published by him in The Liberty Press. His para-

mount purpose was to influence the grand jury to not

indict himself. The publications go further and indi-

rectly, if not directly, urge that several members of the

bar of Piatt county, including the State’s Attorney, be

indicted. In addition, he repeatedly professed in-

nocence of any criminal charges, told the grand jurors

16

that the State’s Attorney was not correctly advising

them concerning the law, and arrogated himself the

duty of instructing the grand jury as to the law. De-

fendant’s actions were highly contumacious, as he well

knew. More than five years ago he had been charged

with circularizing the grand jury by mail regarding a

matter to come to it. He admitted mailing the articles

in question to each grand juror prior to the meeting of

the grand jury. Particularly pertinent is our observa-

of his guilt or the enormity of the offense. (People v.

tion made at the time of defendant’s disbarment (In re

Doss, 367 Ill. 570): ‘The publication of the newspaper

articles, regardless of when they appeared, and

especially the circularization of the grand jury are

especially to be condemned. The invariable effect of

this sort of propaganda is to create disrespect for the

courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute

with the public.’

‘*Defendant argues, bowever, that his efforts neither

influenced nor appreciably affected the actions of the

grand jury. The success or failure of an attempt to

influence the jury is not the test of liability, since no

one can know what, if any, effect it had. (12 American

Jurisprudence, Contempt, sec. 37.) Defendant’s con-

tention does not, however, square with his argument, as

he states in his brief that the actions of the State’s At-

torney and Special State’s Attorney ‘undoubtedly did

unlawfully so interfere with the grand jury’s actions

and deliberations that it netted them, according to the

record, four indictments, although I admit they had de-

manded more indictments.’ We do not deem it ma-

terial whether defendant’s actions actually influenced

the grand jury. That he intended the five issues of The

Liberty Press to influence the grand jury is beyond

doubt. They reflect a coolly calculated tendency to

directly impede, influence, embarrass and obstruct the

grand jury in the discharge of its duties. The constitu-

tional guaranties invoked by defendant were never in-

ténded to and do not sanction such conduct as exhibited

by defendant. These rights are not absolute. Neither

17

liberty of the press nor freedom of speech have yet be-

come license.

‘‘Finally, defendant complains that the punishment

imposed was too severe. A disavowal, or denial under

oath, of intent to insult the court or to s!ander or deter

the grand jury in its duty, should be considered by the

court in mitigation of the offense but it cannot be con-

sidered as a complete justification. (People v. Parker,

supra; People v. Severinghaus, supra.) By his own ad-

mission, defendant published and circulated copies of

The Liberty Press ‘by the thousands’ in Piatt county,

thereby indicating he was well able to pay the fine. De-

fendant was for approximately thirty years a member

of the bar of this State and during this period he oceu-

pied positions of public honor and responsibility as

county judge and State’s Attorney of Piatt county. As

an active practitioner, as a former jurist and a former

prosecutor, he was particularly well qualified to know

the effect likely to be produced upon the grand jury by

the articles written and published by him in The Liberty

Press. These circumstances, together with the admoni-

tion of this court in 1937 render his conduet in forward-

ing the papers to the grand jurors inexcusable.

‘‘The order of the circuit court is affirmed.

Order affirmed.’’