Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jasinski v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MATHEW S. JASINSKI, EDWARD BOROWIK, MAX R.

SHELTON, JOHN R. THOMAS, GEORGE WIMBERLY,

JOHN GOODLEFSKY, STEPHEN J. KRATZ, PHILLIP

BEAULIEU, M. E. URRA, J. STEWART HARRISON,

JOHN W. ROACH, JR., and CHARLES K. JOHNSON,

Petitioners,

VS.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

AND AEROSPACE WORKERS:

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

TOM CARTER,

Counsel for Petitioners

1726 Fulton National Bank Bldg.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

404—688-7026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Pat |

I. OPINIONS BELOW witebibetieibelas ig ile ls a te 2

II. JURISDICTION __.. wok 2

III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW -___. 2

IV. STATUTES INVOLVED 3

(a) Section 2, Fourth of the Railway Labor Act,

45 USC Section 152, Fourth ae ae

(b) Section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act,

45 USC Section 152, Ninth 4

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE _ 4

A. Summary of the Facts 4

B. Proceedings Below 7

VI. REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE

GRANTED ____ 7

A. What Petitioners Seek is Simply to Enjoy

Right of Craft Organization and Craft Repre-

sentation in Collective Bargaining as Sanc-

tioned by the Act and the Board’s Prior Cer-

tification __ 8

B. What Petitioners Do Not Seek is any In-

fringement of the Board’s Jurisdictional

Functions ___. _ 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

C. The Board Itself has Expressly Denied Any

Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Petitioners’ Sub-

ject Claim (Appendix C) —-....------ 12

D. Court Jurisdiction of Petitioners’ Claim is

Strongly Suggested by Prior Decisions of this

Court Holding, that the Exclusive Jurisdic-

tion of the Railroad Adjustment Board under

the Act, did not Bar Court Jurisdiction to

Define Unfair Representation Cases Against

Unions and Employers Jointly - _ 15

VII. CONCLUSION -....- 18

CERTIFICATE _.. 19

APPENDICES—

APPENDIX A—Opinion of the District Court for

the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Di-

vision (No. C74-1780A), rendered on February

4, 1975 20

APPENDIX B—Final Judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

rendered July 29, 1975, reported at 517 F.2d 478. 31

APPENDIX C—National Mediation Board’s De-

termination dated July 15, 1974, File No. C4294... 32

II

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Howard, 348

US, M8: DLR we TTT...

Conley vs. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44, 41 LRRM 2089

| PG RA irene einen: |

Cunningham vs. Erle R.R. Co., 266 F.2d 411, 415-16

A a aS bdabhcisanks simulans Oe

Czosek vs. O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 73 LRRM 2481

PINs ui Salas tastttete htetcas-casdceidindataenaemmanetinienthabeaies 15, 17, 18

Gainey vs. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship

Clerks, 313 F. 2d 318, 324, 52 LRRM 2196 (3d

BN ID hoch nccceepersscchssccnioreittnedolestielaarbbataisticelieniiantttiion 10

Glover vs. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,

393 U.S. 323, 70 LRRM 2097 (1969) __ 15, 16, 18

Graham vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &

Enginemen, 388 U.S. 232, 25 LRRM 2033 _...... 10

Hayes vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 184 F. 2d

337, 26 LRRM 2566 (CA 9, 1950), cert. denied,

340 U.S. 492, 27 LRRM 2456 (1951) — 16, 17

Simberlund vs. Long Island Railroad Company, 421

F, 2d 1219, 73 LRRM 2451 (CA 2, 1970) —.. .. 10

Steele vs. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,

Se IE III hci cea cack elseshencnsincnrchaneticidiaseiaoincnnccamescbiek 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

CASES: Page

Thompson vs. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,

316 F. 2d 191, 198-99, 52 LRRM 2880 (4th Cir.

1963) 10

Tunstall vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &

Enginemen, 823 U.S. 210, 15 LRRM 715 10

Vaca vs. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-93, 64 LRRM 2369

(1967) 10

STATUTES:

28 U.S.C. Seetion 1254 (1) 2

ae Sees ee Oe Oe a 7

Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act, as amended

45 U.S.C. Section 152 (Ninth) 3, 4, 7, 11

Section 2, Fourth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 USC.

Section 152, Fourth 3,8

45 U.S.C. Section 1831 7

Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 USC

Section 153, First (i) 15, 16

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

National Mediation Board's Determination dated July

15, 1974, File No. C4294 28

IV

ge eer ee tans suc He ts es erg et ON

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Term, 19

No.

MATHEW 8S. JASINSKI, EDWARD BOROWIK, MAX R.

SHELTON, JOHN R. THOMAS, GEORGE WIMBERLY,

JOHN GOODLEFSKY, STEPHEN J. KRATZ, PHILLIP

BEAULIEU, M. E. URRA, J. STEWART HARRISON,

JOHN W. ROACH, JR., and CHARLES K. JOHNSON,

Petitioners,

VS.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

AND AEROSPACE WORKERS:

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners here were plaintiffs in the lower district

court, and were appellant in the Fifth Cireuit Court of

Appeals below. Petitioners pray that a Writ of Certiorari

issue to review the final judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in the

above case on July 29, 1975.

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I. OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion in this case of the District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, (No.C74-

1780A) was rendered on February 4, 1975, and a true and

correct copy of that court’s judgment and opinion is ap-

pended hereto as Appendix A.

The final judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sustaining the

lower district court, was made and entered on July 29,

1975, and the same is reported at 517 F 2d 478; And, a

true and correct copy thereof is appended hereto as Ap-

pendix B. Said judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals issued as the court’s mandate on August 20, 1975.

Il. JURISDICTION

This petition for writ of certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeks to review

that court’s said final judgment of July 29, 1975 (appended

as Appendix B) which affirms the lower district court’s

judgment of dismissal (Appendix A) of petitioners’ Com-

plaint in the court. The jurisdiction of this court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254 (1).

Ill. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the lower courts correctly hold that the district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction based upon the con-

clusion that exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter

was in the National Mediation Board (herein the Board)

under the Railway Labor Act (herein, Act). notwithstand-

ing the Board’s prior express determination (see Appendix

C) that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioners’ fol-

lowing claim:

3

That IAM, the respondent labor organization

(which had previously been certified by the Board

pursuant to provisions of the Act to represent

petitioners’ certified employmental collective bar-

gaining craft) violated its lawful duty of fair

representation owed petitioners; through IAM’s

manner and method of representing petitioners

said certified bargaining craft—not as a separate

certified bargaining craft, but merely as a small

part of a single and substantially larger un-

certified and heterogeneous collective bargaining

class of sundry employees of petitioners’ employer,

in a single process for all collective bargaining

purposes.

More specifically, did the lower court correctly hold that

petitioners’ said claim constitutes a “. . . dispute...

among a carrier’s employees as to who are the repre-

sentatives of such employees designated and authorized

in accordance with the requirements of . .. (the Act)”

within the meaning of Section 2, Ninth of the Railway

Labor Act as amended, 45 USC Section 152 (Ninth); so

as to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board

to certify an appropriate collective bargaining craft or

class of employees and the representative to represent

them.

IV. STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

(a) Section 2, Fourth of the Railway Labor Act, 45

USC Section 152, Fourth, provides in pertinent parts as

follows:

“Employees shall have the right to organize

and bargain collectively through representatives

of their own choosing. The majority of any craft

4

or class of employees shall have the right to de-

termine who shall be the representative of the

craft or class for the purpose of this Chapter. . .”

(b) Section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act, 45

USC Section 152, Ninth, provides in pertinent parts the

following:

“If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s

employees as to who are representatives of such

employees designated and authorized in accord-

ance with requirements of this chapter, it shall

be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon re-

quest of either party to the dispute, to investigate

such dispute and to certify to both parties, in

writing, within thirty days after the receipt of

the invocation of its services, the name or names

of the individuals or organizations that have been

designated and authorized to represent the em-

ployees involved in the dispute, and certify the

same to the carrier . . . in the conduct of any

election for the purposes herein indicated the

Board shall designate who may participate in

the election and establish the rules to govern the

election... .”

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary of the Facts

Petitioners are employees of Eastern Airlines (herein,

Eastern), an air carrier subject to the provisions of the

ACT. Petitioners are employed in a collective bargaining

unit or craft of Eastern employees; which craft, in prior

years, has been certified by the Board, pursuant to the

provisions of the Act, to include principally Eastern’s

highly skilled and lawfully licensed airline mechanics, such

5

as petitioners, and also including certain smaller fringe

groups of shop laborers, janitors, and ground service and

cleaning employees (herein called PETITIONERS’ CRAFT

OR UNIT).

However, the last formal certification of petitioners’

bargaining craft by the Board itself expressly EXCLUD-

ED therefrom Eastern’s numerous cargo and baggage

handling employees, and sundry other employees.

The Board itself has never issued a formal certification,

accompanied by a customary election among effected em-

ployees, for the inclusion of these aforesaid cargo and

baggage handling employees and sundry other employees

of Eastern into petitioners’ certified bargaining craft.

As is often the case in the airline industry, the airline

mechanics of Eastern were among the first ground em-

ployees to be organized and represented by IAM a num-

ber of years ago. And, historically the collective bargaining

contracts between IAM and Eastern covering petitioners’

bargaining craft, contain the usual unionshop provisions

conditioning employment upon timely acquisition of union

membership in IAM. Thus, any expansion of petitioners’

bargaining craft and contract coverage, which could be

achieved by IAM in bargaining with Eastern, would re-

sult in a corresponding increase in the union’s dues paying

membership among Eastern’s employees, via the contract

union shop provision.

During the years of IAM’s representation of petitioners’

bargaining craft, a growing number of Eastern’s aforesaid

cargo and baggage handlers and various other groups of

Kastern’s employees (having substantially lesser degrees

of skill and training requirements for their jobs) have

6

been grouped together with petitioners’ said bargaining

craft by IAM into a single process of collective bargaining

representation.

With the result, that petitioners’ original certified bar-

gaining craft has, become gradually absorbed into one big

communalized and heterogeneous bargaining class of East-

ern’s employees; which is represented by IAM, in sub-

stance and manner, as one whoie class or unit of em-

ployees for all purposes of collective bargaining; That

has been placed by IAM under a single collective bargain-

ing contract.

All employees in this said heterogeneous and communal-

ized single bargaining class are permitted by IAM in an

ongoing single collective bargaining process to vote on

pertinent matters, affecting petitioners’ employmental in-

terests and careers, such as: collective bargaining contract

ratification, the calling of strikes, the designation of bar-

gaining negotiators to conduct bargaining negotiations,

and the like.

IAM’s said grouping of petitioners’ original certified

bargaining craft into this said heterogeneous bargaining

class during recent years (without prior Board certifica-

tion therefor), has resulted in petitioners’ certified bar-

gaining craft having only a numerically minority voice

in all important employmental matters vitally affecting

their employmental interests and careers.

As was noted by the lower district court in its Opinion

(see Appendix A, Page 28), petitioners’ earlier presenta-

tion to the NMB of their subject claim had resulted in the

NMB’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to decide

this controversy (Appendix C).

7

B. Proceedings Below

The subject complaint was filed by petitioners in Sep-

tember of 1974. On October 23, 1974, IAM filed its motion

to dismiss alleging as ground one therein that: “. . . the

Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the complaint.” On February 4, 1975, the lower district

court issued his ruling sustaining IAM’s said jurisdictional

ground for dismissal (Appendix A). The lower court ex-

pressly based its ruling upon its legal conclusion that the

Board had exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim,

under Section 2, Ninth, of the Act, 45 USC Section 152

(Ninth).

In due course, petitioners perfected their appeal from

the lower court’s judgment of dismissal to the Fifth Cir-

cuit; which rendered its per curiam judgment of “af-

firmed” on July 29, 1975 (Appendix B). It is from this

judgment of affirmance by the Fifth Circuit that peti-

tioners seek this court’s issuance of a writ of certiorari.

JURISDICTION IN THE LOWER DISTRICT COURT

was based upon the allegation in the complaint that the

subject matter of the controversy arises under the Act,

45 US Code, Section 151 et seq.; along with the allegation

that the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $10,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs. Thus, orig-

inal jurisdiction in the district court was based upon Sec-

tion 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code, as

amended.

VI. REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD

BE GRANTED

The Fifth Circuit has decided an important question of

federal law in a way that would potentially and wrong-

fully deny tens of thousands of airline industry employees

Rowe ays

8

access to the Federal Courts to correct violations of a

lawful duty of fair representation owed them under the

Federal Act by their respective collective bargaining rep-

resentatives; and in a way which conflicts with an ap-

plicable analogous principle of law previously laid down

by decisions of this court.

The lower court's ruling, that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because petitioners’ claim was found by the

court to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board

under the Act, must be considered in the light of peti-

tioners’ basie claim set forth in their complaint, and stated

below.

A. What Petitioners Seek Is Simply to Enjoy Right of

Craft Organization and Craft Representation in Col-

lective Bargaining as Sanctioned by the Act and the

Board’s Prior Certification

Petitioners claim that they, as well as the other em-

ployees in their Board certified bargaining craft are being

denied by IAM their statutory rights that are conceptually

stated in Section 2, Fourth, of the Act, 45 USC Section

152, Fourth, providing in pertinent parts as follows:

“Employees shall have the right to organize

and bargain collectively through representatives

of their own choosing. The majority of any craft

or class of employees shall have the right to de-

termine who shall be the representative of the

craft or class... .”

This denial of petitioners’ said statutory craft organiza-

tional and craft representational rights stems from IAM’s

manner and method of collectively representing petitioners’

Board certified bargaining craft, as but a minority part

9

of an overall heterogeneous single bargaining class of

sundry Eastern employees (WITHOUT PRIOR BOARD

CERTIFICATION OF SUCH A SINGLE HETERO-

GENEOUS CLASS) (see the Summary of Facts in the

Statement of the Case, supra).

IAM’s complained of manner of representing petition-

ers’ certified bargaining craft, in effect ab.ogates the

statutory concept of CRAFT organization and CRAFT

collective bargaining. It also emasculates the Board’s prior

certification of petitioners’ homogeneous bargaining craft

consisting primarily of highly skilled and highly craft

motivated employees such as petitioners, who are lawfully

licensed career airline mechanics.

The plight of petitioners’ certified bargaining craft may

be compared to that of a mighty ship that is desirous and

capable of charting its own course to its own more distant

port of call; but instead is commandeered into a single

large convoy of other smaller vessels, which is sailing

perhaps to another port.

Petitioners find frustrating and humiliating irony in

the circumstance that their own collective bargaining rep-

resentative, LAM, would deny them their craft aspirations

and status; notwithstanding that petitioners’ bargaining

craft is sanctioned by the Act, as well as by the Board's

prior certification. While at the same time, the craft

aspirations and the craft organizational and bargaining

rights, of the laborers, the ironworkers, the electricians,

the plumbers, the heavy equipment operators, ete., who

build and maintain the hangers and airports in which

petitioners perform their very highly skilled tasks, are

preserved intact.

i

10

Petitioners claim essentially that IAM’s complained of

manner and method of representing them in collective

bargaining in the context presented constitutes a violation

of IAM’s lawful duty for fair representation owed to

petitioners, as their statutory collective bargaining repre-

sentative under the Act. Steele vs. Louisville & Nashville

R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 15 LRRM 708; Tunstall vs. Brother-

hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210,

15 LRRM 715; Graham vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive

Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 25 LRRM 2033;

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Howard, 343 U. S.

768, 30 LRRM 2258; Vaca ws. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-93,

64 LRRM 2369 (1967); Thompson vs. Brotherhood of

Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F, 2d 191, 198-99, 52 LRRM

2880 (4th Cir. 1963); Gainey vs. Brotherhood of Railway

& Steamship Clerks, 313 F 2d 318, 324, 52 LRRM 2196

(3d Cir. 1963) ; Cunningham vs. Erle R.R. Co., 266 F. 2d

411, 415-16, 44 LRRM 2093 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Simberlund

vs. Long Island Rail Road Company, 421 F. 2d, 1219, 73

LRRM 2451 (CA 2, 1970).

B. What Petitioners Do Not Seek is any Infringement of

the Board’s Jurisdictional Functions

In no way do petitioners seek to intrude into the exclu-

sive jurisdictional domain of the Board to determine and

certify bargaining crafts or classes along with the unions

to represent them. For here the Board has already spoken

by certifying petitioners’ said bargaining craft, and IAM

to represent petitioners’ certified craft.

Neither do petitioners dispute the status of IAM as the

certified statutory collective bargaining representative for

petitioners’ craft.

Neither do petitioners question the legality of IAM’s

11

lawful right to separately represent any of Eastern’s cargo

and baggage handlers or other sundry groups of Eastern’s

employees; who were not included by the Board in its

certification of petitioners’ bargaining craft; but who have

been grouped by IAM along with petitioners’ certified

craft into a single overall heterogeneous bargaining class

for all purposes of collective bargaining representation, as

complained of by petitioners.

Indeed, it is petitioners who seek to give vitality and

meaning to the Board’s certification; by requiring IAM

to honor the Board’s prior certification of petitioners’

bargaining representation of petitioners’ bargaining craft,

by simply recognizing and conducting it’s collective bar-

gaining representation by petitioners’ bargaining craft

in a manner and method consistent with, and called for

by, the Board’s certification; At least, UNTIL SUCH

TIME AS THE BOARD ITSELF MIGHT THROUGH

LAWFUL PROCESSES DECIDE TO MODIFY ITS

CERTIFICATION OF PETITIONERS’ BARGAINING

CRAFT.

For the courts to fail to adjudicate petitioners subject

claim is to hold that the statutory collective bargaining

representative—and not the Board, has power to determine

which employees may appropriately be included in a statu-

tory collective bargaining craft or class for purposes of

collective bargaining representation. But, such a conclu-

sion is in direct contradiction to the plain provisions of

the Act that the Board—and not the union, is to determine

and certify the bargaining craft or class, found in Section

2, Ninth, of the Act, 45 USC Section 152 (Ninth).,

In affirming without comment the lower district’s court

judgment and opinion, the Fifth Circuit presumeably acted

on the same apparent basic misapprehension of the factual

and legal issue presented in this case, as did the district

12

court. For, the district court in its opinion (see Appendix

A, page 27), indicated that plaintiff's claim is based:

“. . . Solely on the ground that the NMB has

‘communalized’ into one bargaining unit the em-

ployees who rightfully should be part of another

bargaining unit. This is the principal legal ques-

tion the court is called upon to decide, and, as

noted above, it is precisely this question of ‘who

represents whom’ which is vested in the unreview-

able discretion of the National Mediation Board.”

But, as is pointed out herein, and as petitioners sought

to point out to the lower courts, petitioners’ claim makes

no attack upon any action by the Board. Rather, petition-

ers’ claim attacks only the manner and method utilized by

IAM in representing, or misrepresenting, petitioners’

Board certified bargaining crafé.

Petitioners’ claim seeks to acknowledge, honor, and ad-

here to the Board’s prior certification of their bargaining

craft; whereas, IAM has, through its complained of

manner and method of collective bargaining representa-

tion of petitioners’ bargaining craft, disregarded and

undermined the Board’s prior certification of petitioners’

craft, usurping unto itself the Board’s statutory jurisdic-

tion and discretion in determining which employees should

be included in a bargaining craft. And, in so doing, IAM

has at the same time denied petitioners their statutory

right of craft organization and craft collective bargaining

representation under the Act.

C. The Board Itself Has Expressly Denied Any Jurisdic-

tion to Adjudicate Petitioners’ Subject Claim (Ap-

pendix C)

13

The lower district court in its opinion quoted the fol-

lowing language from the determination by the Board

that it (the Board) did not have jurisdiction over peti-

tioners’ subject claim:

“In reviewing your application for the Board’s

services, it does not appear that there is an alle-

gation of the existence of a representation dis-

pute as described in Section 2, Ninth, of the Rail-

way Labor Act. Additionally, there is no allega-

tion that the certified representative and the

carrier are at a bargaining impasse concerning

the matters contained in your application, and

thus an invocation for the Board’s mediatory

services is not appropriate.

_ “ ‘The National Mediation Board does not have

jurisdiction to determine the manner in which a

carrier and a union, certified for one or more

crafts or classes, bargain, and thus the questions

which you raise are not properly resolved by the

National Mediation Board, but may be more

effectively resolved by direct conferences between

the affected parties.

“Since there is no jurisdictional basis for the

processing of your application in its present con-

text, that is, failure to allege and demonstrate

the existence of a representation dispute, the ap-

plication is dismissed.’” (See District Court’s

opinion, Appendix A, Page 28).

The Board, unlike the lower district court and the Fifth

Circuit, recognized and acknowledged its own inadequacy

as a forum to adjudicate petitioners’ basic claim of unfair

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representation by IAM. To illustrate, let it be postulated

that the Board had concluded that it did have jurisdiction

of this claim (as held by the lower courts); and further,

that it did agree with petitioners’ basic complaint that IAM

has unfairly represented petitioners; and further that

IAM shall likely continue its said unfair representation

of petitioners’ certified bargaining craft. WHAT COULD

THE BOARD DO ABOUT IT? FIRST of all, we know

of no method by which the Board could award any com-

pensatory or other damages for IAM’s past unfair repre-

sentation. SECOND, neither could the Board enjoin IAM

from continuing such unfair representation of petitioners.

AND THIRD, all the Board could do pursuant to its ex-

clusive statutory jurisdiction, is to determine that petition-

ers’ bargaining craft is appropriate and then certify peti-

tioners’ bargaining craft along with IAM as its statutory

collective bargaining representative; But this would

amount to only a redundant echo of what the Board has

already done.

On the other hand, what would be the case if the lower

court had asserted jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioners’

said claim of unfair representation by IAM. FIRST, the

court would not be called upon to determine either the ap-

propriateness of petitioners’ bargaining craft as an appro-

priate unit, or IAM’s status as the craft representative,

since the Board has already done this. SECOND, if the

court determined that petitioners’ claim was meritorious,

then the court could award appropriate damages to cover

any of petitioners’ properly proven losses. AND THIRD,

the court could insure that IAM would desist from its

subject course of unfair representation of petitioners’

bargaining craft, through exercise of the court’s injunctive

powers. Each of these said possible remedies by the court

would have the effect of upholding and requiring adherence

15

to—and not departure from, what the Board had previous-

ly provided through its said certification of petitioners’

bargaining craft and IAM as: its representative.

D. Court Jurisdiction of Petitioners’ Claim is Strongly

Suggested By Prior Decisions of this Court Holding,

that the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Railroad Ad-

justment Board under the Act, did not Bar Court

Jurisdiction to Decide Unfair Representation Cases

Against Unions and Employers Jointly

The lower courts’ denial of jurisdiction, to adjudicate

petitioners’ claim of unfair representation by IAM, runs

counter to the analogous rationale of the Supreme Court

announced in the following cases: Conley vs. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 44, LRRM 2089 (1957) ; Glover vs. St. Louis-San

Francisco Railway Company, 393 U.S. 323, 70 LRRM 2097

(1969); Czosek vs. O’Mara, 397 U. S. 25, 73 LRRM 2481

(1970).

In the Conley case, supra, this court reversed the lower

court’s conclusion that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the

Adjustment Board under Section 3 First (i) of the Rail-

way Labor Act, 45 USC Section 153, First (i). The

complaint there, as here, charged that the defendant statu-

tory collective bargaining representative had unfairly rep-

resented plaintiffs. In this regard the court stated:

“We hold that it was error for the courts below

to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

They took the position that Section 3 First (i) of

the Railway Labor Act conferred exclusive juris-

diction on the Adjustment Board because the case,

in their view, involved the interpretation and

application of the collective bargaining agree-

ment. But Section 3 First (i) by its own terms

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applies only to ‘disputes between an employee or

group of employees and a carrier or carriers,’

This case involves no dispute between an em-

ployee and employer but to the contrary is a suit

by employees against the bargaining agent to en-

force their statutory right not to be unfairly

discriminated against by it in bargaining. The

Adjustment Board has no power under Section 8

First (i) or any other provision of the Act

to protect them from such discrimination. .... a

Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule that the Act

places exclusive jurisdiction in the Railroad Adjustment

Board, under Section 3 First (i) of the Act, to interpret

the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; and not-

withstanding that this Said Section 3 First (i) of the

Act by its terms applies to “. . . disputes between an

employee or group of employees and a carrier or car-

riers. . .”; nevertheless, employees may also JOIN THE

CARRIER in a suit involving the terms of a collective

bargaining contract, brought against their statutory col-

lective bargaining representative for breach of its duty

of fair representation. See the Glover case, supra, wherein

the court said:

“, . . In the present case . . . the plaintiffs

sought relief not only against their union but

also against the railroad, . . . it might at one

time have been thought that the jurisdiction of

the Railroad Adjustment Board remains exclusive

in a fair representation case, to the extent that

relief is sought against the railroad for alleged dis-

criminatory performance of an agreement validly

entered into and lawful in its terms. (See, e.g.

Hayes vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 184

17

F 2d 337, 26 LRRM 2566 (CA 9, 1950), cert.

denied, 340 U.S. 492, 27 LRRM 2456 (1951).

This view however, was squarely rejected in the

Conley case, where we said ‘for the reasons set

forth in the text, we believe (Hayes, supra) was

decided incorrectly.’ 855 U.S., at 44, N.4.....

Moreover, although the employer is made a party

to insure complete and meaningful relief, it still

remains true that in essence the ‘dispute’ is one

between some employees on the one hand and

the union and management together on the other,

not one ‘between an employee or a group of em-

ployees and a carrier or carriers.’ FINALLY,

THE RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD

HAS NO POWER TO ORDER THE KIND

OF RELIEF NECESSARY EVEN WITH RE-

SPECT TO THE RAILROAD ALONE, IN

ORDER TO END ENTIRELY ABUSES OF

THE SORT ALLEGED HERE (emphasis

added). The Federal Courts may therefore prop-

erly exercise jurisdiction over both the union and

the railroad. (Citations omitted) .”

In Czosek, this court said in an unfair representation

case that:

“. . . Surely it is beyond cavil that a suit

against the union for breach of its duty for fair

representation is not within the jurisdiction of

the National Railroad Adjustment Board nor sub-

ject to the ordinary rule that administrative

remedy should be exhausted before resort to the

courts. (Citations omitted). The claim against the

union defendants for the breach of their duty of

fair representation is a discreet claim quite apart

je 2

:

18

from the right of individual employees expressly

extended to them under the Railway Labor Act

to pursue their employer before the Adjustment

Board.”

This court's rejection of the exclusive jurisdictional

argument advanced in the Czosek, Glover, and Conley

cases, is analogous and applicable to the lower court's dis-

missal in this case based upon their conclusion that ex-

clusive jurisdiction over petitioners’ subject unfair repre-

sentation claim against IAM was within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board.

VII. CONCLUSION

On the basis of the arguments advanced herein, and the

authorities cited in support thereof, petitioners, respect-

fully submit that the petition for writ of certiorari should

be granted. Upon issuance of the writ, the decision of the

Fifth Cireuit Court of Appeals should be reversed and re-

manded with instructions to reverse the lower district

court's dismissal of petitioners’ complaint, and to send the

proceeding back to the lower district court for further

proceedings.

TOM CARTER,

Counsel for Petitioners

1726 Fulton National Bank Building

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 688-7026

19

CERTIFICATE

1, TOM CARTER, Counsel for Petitioners in this Court,

do hereby certify that I have this day mailed, postage

prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Writ of

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Cireuit to the following persons:

Mr. J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr.

Adair, Goldthwaite, Stanford & Daniel

600 Rhodes Haverty Building

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attorney of record for Respondent in this

Court, who was the Appellee in the Fifth

Cireuit Court of Appeals, and defendant

in the Lower District Court.

This day of October, 1975.

TOM CARTER,

Counsel for Petitioners

EE ak, SRF I os. OD

NENA A OPN NN ret TRC EN

20

APPENDIX “A”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

Civil Action File No. C?4-1780A

MATHEW S. JASINSKI, EDWARD BOROWIK, MAX

R. SHELTON, JOHN R. THOMAS, GEORGE WIM-

BERLY, JOHN GOODLEFSKY, STEPHEN J. KRATZ,

PHILLIP BEAULIEU, M. E. URRA, J. STEWART

HARRISON, JOHN W. ROACH, JR. and CHARLES K.

JOHNSON

VS

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

AND AEROSPACE WORKERS

JUDGMENT

This action came on for consideration before the Court,

Honorable Richard C. Freeman, United States District

Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly con-

sidered and a decision having been duly rendered, GRANT-

ING deft’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

21

It is Ordered and Adjudged that the plaintiffs take

nothing, that the action be dismissed, and that the de-

fendant, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MA-

CHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS recover of

the plaintiffs, MATHEW S. JASINSKI, EDWARD

BOROWIK, MAX R. SHELTON, JOHN R. THOMAS,

GEORGE WIMBERLY, JOHN GOODLEFSKY, STE-

PHEN J. KRATZ, PHILLIP BEAULIEU, M. E. URRA,

J. STEWART HARRISON, JOHN W. ROACH, JR. and

CHARLES K. JOHNSON, their costs of action.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia, this 4th day of February,

1975.

BEN H. CARTER

Clerk of Court

By: Mary E. Hall

Filed and entered in Clerk’s Office February 4th, 1975

BEN H. CARTER, Clerk

By: Mary E. Hall

Deputy Clerk

22

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

Filed in clerk’s office Feb. 4, 1975.

BEN H. CARTER, Clerk

By: Hary E. Hall, Deputy Clerk

C74-1780A

MATHEW S. JASINSKI, EDWARD BOROWIK, MAX

R. SHELTON, JOHN R. THOMAS, GEORGE WIM-

BERLY, JOHN GOODLEFSKY, STEPHEN J. KRATZ,

PHILLIP BEAULIEU, M. E. URRA, J. STEWARD

HARRISON, JOHN W. ROACH, JR., and CHARLES K.

JONHSON

Vv.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

& AEROSPACE WORKERS

ORDER

Plaintiff airline mechanics bring this action against

the defendant labor union under 28 U.S.C. $1331 for

violations of the Federal Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

$151, et seg. The plaintiffs allege that defendant In-

ternational Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers [IAM], in conjunction with plaintiffs’ employer,

Eastern Airlines, Inc. [Eastern], has wrongfully ignored

plaintiffs’ craft and unit status as a separate bargaining

unit, consisting of only airline mechanics and specialists

23

and their helpers and apprentices, to the plaintiffs’ detri-

ment. The plaintiffs alleged damages of $15,000 to each

plaintiff and ask for injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees

of $25,000 and exemplary damages of $1 million. The

case is presently before the Court on defendant's motion

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Specifically, the planitiffs allege injury by the de-

fendant’s actions in

“. . . unilaterally unlawfully absorbing for all

collective bargaining purposes plaintiffs’ said

certified craft and unit into one big communal-

ized and heterogeneous class and uncertified bar-

gaining unit of employees; including not only

plaintiffs’ said unit, but the separate bargain-

ing unit of Eastern’s stock (store) clerks, and

the separate bargaining unit of Eastern’s print

shop employees, and the separate bargaining unit

of Eastern’s employees performing mostly cargo

and baggage handling work and other various

and sundry employees.”

The plaintiffs show that the National Mediation Board

[NMB] is the administrative agency empowered by state

to certify a craft or class of employees as an ppro-

priate collective bargaining unit and to certify a duly

selected labor organization as the exclusive collective bar-

gaining representative of that craft. Plaintiffs’ claim that

their bargaining unit was determined and certfied by the

NMB in a Board proceeding styled Case No. R-3639 to

include the following: (1) airline mechanics, specialists,

their helpers and apprentices previously certified by the

Board in Case Nos. R-407 and R-576; (2) a “fringe

group” of Eastern’s employees who performed ground

service and cleaning functions a preponderance of their

24

time; and (3) a “fringe group” of shop laborers and

janitors added by the Board in Case No. R-1976.

Plaintiffs’ claim the Board in Case No. 3639 expressly

excluded from plaintiffs’ bargaining unit the following

groups of Eastern’s employees: (1) cargo and baggage

handlers, (2) stock (store) personnel, and (3) print shop

employees.

It is the inclusion without Board certification of these

latter three groups which plaintiffs allege put them in

a minority position in their “own” union, and deprives

them of a meaningful and effective voice and the right to

organize and bargain collectively in their union and has

caused them monetary damages and economic losses _be-

cause they have lost the majority and lack a fair voice

in bargaining with Eastern about wages, hours, terms and

conditions of employment.

The defendant’s first ground for dismissal in its motion

is that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

hear a dispute concerning representation of employee bar-

gaining units subject to the Railway Labor Act—a matter

vested in the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Media-

tion Board. Switchmen’s Union v. N.M.B., 320 U. S. 297

(1943); Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,

etc. v. United Transportation Service, etc., 320 U.S. 715

(1943); General Committee of Adjustment, etc. v. Mis-

souri-Kansas-Texas R. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 (1943) ; Rose,

et al. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, etc.,

181 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. den., 340 U.S. 851

(1950); UNA Chapter, Flight Engineers’ Int. Assoc. v.

N.M.B., 294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Brotherhood of

Railway and Steamship Clerks, etc. v. N.M.B., 374 F.2d

269 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. N.M.B.,

25

380 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. den., 289 U.S. 912

(1967); Reynolds, et al. v. Int. Assoc. of Machinists, ete.,

.... F. Supp. —., 87 LRRM 2133 (MD N.C. 1973),

aff'd., 498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974).

Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C.,

$151-163, 181-188, provides:

“If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s em-

ployees as to who are the representatives of such

employees designated and authorized in accord-

ance with the requirements of this Act, it shall

be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon re-

quest of either party to the dispute, to investi-

gate such dispute and to certify to both parties,

in writing, within thirty days . . . the name or

names of the individuals or organizations that

have been designated and authorized to represent

the employees involved in the dispute and certify

the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such cer-

tification the carrier shall treat with the repre-

sentative so certified as the representative of the

craft or class for the purposes of the Act... .”

It is clear from the case law that disputes concerning

the representation of employees in bargaining units are

exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Media-

tion Board and therefore not reviewable by the courts.

Switchmen’s Union v. N.M.B., supra, and other cases cited

above.

As the Court of Appeals stated in the Rose case, supra:

“In the light of the decisions of the Supreme

Court, there can be no doubt that the effect of

this statute was to vest in the Mediation Board

exclusive jurisdiction over the certification of

bargaining. And it is equally clear that the ex-

ercise of discretion by the board with respect to

such matters is not subject to review by the

rrr =

| cs

26

courts. Switchmen’s Union of North America v.

National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct.

95, 88 L.Ed. 61; General Committee, ete. v.

M-K-T R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 64 S.Ct. 146, 88

L.Ed. 76; Brotherhood of Railway Clerks ete. v.

United Transport Service Employees, 320 U.S.

715, 64 S.Ct. 260, 88 L.Ed. 420; Order of Rail-

way Conductors of America, ete. v. Penn. R. Co.,

323 U.S. 166, 65 S.Ct. 222, 89 L.Ed. 154; Steele

v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 205 65 S.Ct.

226, 89 L.Ed. 173. And see Slocum v. D. L. &

W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577.” 181

F.2d at 946.

The legislative history of Section 2, Ninth, of the Rail-

way Labor Act bears out this construction of the Act, as

the Court in General Committee, etc. v. Missouri-Kansas-

Texas R.R. Co., supra, noted:

“It is clear from the legislative history of $2,

Ninth, that it was designed not only to help free

the unions from the influence, coercion and con-

trol of the carriers but also to resolve a wide

range of jurisdictional disputes between unions

or between groups of employees . . . However

wide may be the range of jurisdictional disputes

embraced within $2, Ninth, Congress did not

select the courts to resolve them. To the contrary,

it fashioned an administrative remedy and left

that group of disputes to the National Mediation

Board. If the present dispute falls within §2,

Ninth, the administrative remedy is exclusive.”

14 LRRM at 632, 633 (footnotes omitted).

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim is that they are being

unfairly represented by the IAM because other crafts and

classes of employees have been wrongfully included with

them in a single bargaining unit. For this lack of fair

representation, they seek monetary and exemplary dam-

ages. Plaintiffs allege that a federal question is presented

by their claim of unfair representation under the Railway

Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seg. Steele v. Louisville &

Nashville Railway Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Czosek ve.

O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Glover v, St. Louis-San Fran-

cisco Railway Co., 393 U.S. 323 (1969); Thompson v.

Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4 Cir. 1963), and that

the courts federal question jurisdiction is properly invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ claim of unfair repre-

sentation is based solely on the ground that the NMB has

“communalized” into one bargaining unit employees who

rightfully should be part of another bargaining unit.

This is the principal legal question the Court is called

upon to decide, and, as noted above, it is precisely this

question of “who represents whom” which is vested in

the unreviewable discretion of the National Mediation

Board.

The cases cited by plaintiffs where the Court assumed

jurisdiction are inapposite to the instant case because they

are distinguishable on their facts. The Steele case, supra,

did not invoke the question of which crafts or classes should

be included in a single bargaining unit. Steele concerned

blatant racial discrimination by white firemen in the

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen

against negro firemen—members of the same “craft.” The

Court in the Czosek case, supra, allowed a suit by plain-

tiffs against their union for the union’s “arbitary and

capricious” refusal to process the claims of the plaintiffs

who had been discharged after the merger of the Erie and

Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroads. Czosek in-

volved no claim of an improper grouping of employees by

the NMB into a single bargaining unit. The Clover «. St.

oe

BSc saa Sheik aaa AR RINE RADIA DID Bo CIRCE K Da le Si SRE A SAE SO

28

Louis-San Francisco Railway case, supra, involved a claim

by 13 employees, eight black and five white, against their

railroad and union, for failure to promote them to the

position of carmen allegedly in order to keep blacks out

of that position. As in Steele, the cause of action con-

cerned racial discrimination, not the misgrouping of dis-

tinct crafts into a single bargaining unit. The Thompson

case, supra, allowed a claim of unfair representation

against the union. But Thompson was grounded on alleged

ingidious nonracial discrimination against the plaintiff

and did not concern misgrouping of employees by the

NMB, as in the instant case.

The plaintiffs argue that this controversy lies wholly

outside the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board

and the NMB has already expressly held so regarding this

specific case. The plaintiffs applied to the NMB on

February 28, 1974, to have this controversy decide by the

Board. The defendant union and Eastern Airlines sub-

mitted their response. On July 15, 1974, the National

Mediation Board rendered its decision in the proceeding

designated “File C-4294.” The Board denied that it had

jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. The Board

stated the following:

“In reviewing your application for the Board’s

services, it does not appear that there is an alle-

gation of the existence of a representation dis-

pute as described in Section 2, Ninth of the

Railway Labor Act. Additionally, there is no al-

legation that the certified representative and the

Carrier are at a bargaining impasse concerning

the matters contained in your application, and

thus an invocation for the Board’s mediatory

services is not appropriate.

“The National Mediation Board does not have

29

jurisdiction to determine the manner in which a

carrier and a union, certified for one or more

crafts or classes, bargain, and thus the ques-

tions which you raise are not prop:'!y resolved

by the National Mediation Board, vut may be

more effectively resolved by direct conferences

between the affected parties.

Since there is no jurisdictiona’ basis for the

processing of your application in its present con-

text, that is, failure to allege and demonstrate the

existence of a representation dispute, the applica-

tion is dismissed.”

The Board characterized this dispute as one concern-

ing “the manner in which a carrier and a union, certified

for one or more crafts or classes, bargin . . .” This Court

does not characterize this case as involving a dispute be-

tween the union and carrier. This is a dispute between

the union and its employees over the propriety of includ-

ing various crafts and classes of employees in one bargain-

ing unit. Such a determination lies within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board, as the Court

has noted above. The failure of the National Mediation

Board to characterize this case as the plaintiff urges, and

as this Court holds, is a matter to be pressed upon the

Board by the plaintiffs in subsequent proceedings. In any

event, this Court is barried by statute and case law from

determining who should be included in plaintiffs’ bargain-

ing unit. Therefore the Court lacks the jurisdiction to

award a monetary judgment to plaintiffs on the basis of

a proven wrongful grouping of employees, since such an

award would have to be bottomed on a resolution of the

underlying legal question which the Court lacks the sub-

ject matter jurisdiction to resolve.

Inasmuch as this issue is dispositive of the entire case

30

the Court declines to address itself to defendant’s other

ground for dismissal.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the defendant’s motion

to dismiss GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdic-

tion.

SO ORDERED, this 4 day of February, 1975.

RICHARD C. FREEMAN

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

ais Sia Pango SORAE AAR SSL aig RRO aE salah sss cia ik oe ANQe Ur te KA NS hea AS ORE itd Baa SAR ean ck Ree ae Seek

31

APPENDIX “B”

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1978

Summary Calendar*

MATHEW S&S. JASINSKI, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

(July 29, 1975)

Before COLEMAN, AINSWORTH and SIMPSON,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

AFFIRMED. See Local Rule 21."

*Rule 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty

Company of New York, et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

1See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 5 Cir.

1970, 430 F.2d 966.

a

ae

32

APPENDIX “C”

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20572

July 15, 1974

File No. C-4294

Mr. Thomas Linton Carter, Jr.

Suite 1726

Fulton National Bank Building

55 Marietta Street, N. W.

Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Mr. Carter:

This has reference to the exchange of correspondence

generated by your letter of February 28, 1974, attaching

an application to invoke the services of the National Medi-

ation Board which you captioned as involving “Dispute-

Violation of Eastern and IAM of the collective bargaining

craft and unit of Eastern’s airline mechanics and related

employees; and deprivation of the statutory organizational

and craft rights of Applicants and their fellow employees

under the Railway Labor Act, as amended. The National

Mediation Board has circulated your application to the

Union and Carrier involved soliciting their comments.

Comments of the Carrier were received on March 18,

1974, and transmitted to you on April 5, 1974. The IAM,

on April 12, 1974, indicated that it agreed with the Car-

rier’s position in this matter and that the application

should be dismissed for the same reasons expressed by the

Carrier. Unfortunately, the letter of the IAM dated April

12, 1974, was not sent to you before this date (copy now

enclosed).

In revewing your application for the Board’s services,

33

it does not appear that there is an allegation of the ex-

istence of a representation dispute as described in Sec-

tion 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act. Additionally,

there is no allegation that the certified representative and

the Carrier are at a bargaining impasse concerning the

matters contained in your application, and thus an in-

vocation for the Board’s mediatory services is not appro-

priate.

The National Mediation Board does not have jurisdiction

to determine the manner in which a carrier and a union,

certified for one or more crafts or classes, bargain, and

thus the questions which you raise are not properly re-

solved by the National Mediation Board, but may be

more effectively resolved by direct conferences between

the affected parties.

Since there is no jurisdictional basis for the processing

of your application in its present context, that is, failure

to allege and demonstrate the existence of a representation

dispute, the application is dismissed.

Very truly yours,

Rowland K. Quinn, Jr.

Executive Secretary

ce-to: Mr. John P. Mead

Staff Vice President-Industrial Relations

Eastern Airlines, Inc.

Miami International Airport

Miami, FL 333148

Mr. Floyd E. Smith, Int’] President

International Association of Machinists

& Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO

1300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036