Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Katranis v. United States

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

a

no. 75.27.10 7

a

MICHAEL P. KATRANIS and

CHRIST M. KATRANIS,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

-————_ ¢—-—

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT

a

CARL ZIEMBA

Attorney for Petitioners

2000 Cadillac Tower

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) WO 20525

Interstate Brief & Record Co., 1036 Beaubien St., Detroit, Michigan 48226

962-8745—962-8732

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Index to Authorities Cited. ................0.00.. ii

SO I iF gh cewek lp eiveNe te vekk dene 2

eabement of Juriediotion. ....... ci ccccccaascen 2

Constitutional, Statutory and Rule Provisions In-

WE Ae eC aKw nd i AD NER URENe wack Gh kane toa 2

NE FI sc ic ccckna nb anakueaWaxe see « 5

IE Oe a io eis aie ns cs Pan coe bhaeicews 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................... 13

MNO btS cs ckccdnbadnupwdssskaen boosie 31

Appendix “A”—Order of the Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Cireuit affirming petition-

OTs" CONN ses. iradinn ks 33

Appendix “B”—Order of the Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit denying peti-

tioners’ Petition for Rehearing... . 34

Appendix ‘‘C’’—Indictment filed in District Court

Criminal No. 47858. ............. 35

Appendix *‘D”—Indictment filed in District Court

Criminal No. 48377.............. 38

id

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases: Page

American Tobaceo Company v United States, 328

US 781, 66 S Ct 1125 (1946). ...... cc cena 24

Keck v United States, 172 US 434, 19 S Ct 254

SE Fin CS ChASHESSEMAGAAD EAS WAReedsaea SS 30

Meer v United States, 285 Fld 65 (CAL0 1956)... 27

Mortsen v United States, 822 US 3869, 64S Ct 1040

SEE cab era keke oad aeeLAS AWA WA weds 8 6 24

Russell v United States, 369 US 749, 82S Ct LO3s8

SEE sie Cy RNA WSGE NRO A WES UR GR GRRE TEKS 15, 30

United States v Apex Distributing Company, 148

UD CEP ER AUPE Ps. isa'y vine Na waccce veces 28

United States v Baker, 444 F2d 1290 (CAL0 1971) 24

United States v Baker, 494 Fld 1262 (CAG LOT4) 21, 28

United States v Cameron, 460 F2d 1894 (CAS

Re ee Ui Ga a Ab GN A Ww heb bncicds caves 21

United States v Cruikshank, 92 US d42 (1875)... l4

United States v Hess, 124 US 483, 8 S Ct 571

CEE Watdi d pewaune cuss sseakiadsadiawa<s 15

United States v Hull, 512 F2d 66 (CAS 1975)... 16

United States v Lrick, 369 F Supp 594 (SD Tex

| BARBERS Pr FESR rape epee oe ener 28

United States v Leggett, 292 Fld 423 (CA 6, L961) 24

United States v MeCall, 460 F2d 952 (CADC

SER eds Kia uie REA MA AA SADAN EOL KC Re MEO ERES 24

United States v Seeger, 303 Fld 478 (CA 2 1962 27

eee

United States v Simmons, 96 US 360 (1877). .... 14

United States v Whitman, 480 Fld 1028 (CAG

WNU 4wabe cn di kae tr waskcdwhin eves caudseuns 23

United States v Williams, 470 F2d 1339 (CAS

EE bh 40h ks CANRAD 604.6 686s OCR ALAN eel 21, 29

Other:

6th Amendment, United States Constitution. ...3, 27,31

Sth Amendment, United States Constitution... .2, 13,31

RB UE, eetiems BUG) CSD ins cc caccescccanccceas 4,5,7

18 USC, Seetion 1510(2)... <3, 4, 6,8, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29

Rule 7(¢), Fed Rules of Crim Proe....... 0... 5, 30

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

) | Sell ea ate

MICHAEL P. KATRANIS and

CHRIST M. KATRANIS,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

a

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT

a

Michael P. Katranis and Christ M. Katranis, by their

attorney, Carl Ziemba, respectfully petition this Court

issue its Writ of Certiorari to the Lnited States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to review the judgment of

that Court entered in an Order dated May 16, 1975 and

Order denying rehearing entered on June 17, 1975 in the

above entitled matter, Nos. 75-1205 and 75-1206, consoli-

dated by order on appeal.

ORDERS BELOW

The Court of Appeals did not issue an opinion. The

Order of the Court affirming petitioners’ convictions was

entered on May 16, 1975 and is unpublished. It is ap-

pended hereto as Appendix ‘‘A”.

The Order of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners’

petition for rehearing was entered on June 17, 1975. It

is unpublished and is appended hereto as Appendix ‘‘B”.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment o. *“e Court of Appeals affirming peti-

tioners’ convictions was embodied in its Order entered

May 16, 1975. Petitioners’ petition for rehearing was

timely filed and its was denied by Order dated June 17,

1975.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 USC

1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND

RULES INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States provides as follows:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-

ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases

arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,

when in actual service in time of War or public

3

danger; nor shall any person be subject for the

same offense te be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation.”

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States provides as follows:

‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the State and district wherein the

crime shall have been committed, which district shall

have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;

to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to

have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in

his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel

for his defense.”

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1510 and 2 pro-

vide as follows:

§ 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigations.

(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of

bribery, misrepresetnation, intimidation, or force

or threats thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the

communication of information relating to a viola-

tion of any criminal statute of the United States

by any person to a criminal investigator ; or

Whoever injures any person in his person or

property on account of the giving by such person

or by any other person of any such information to

any criminal investigator—

4

Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned

not more than five years, or both,

(bd) As used in this section, the term ‘eriminal

investigator” means any individual duly authorised

by a department, ageney, or armed force of the

United States to conduct or engage in investigations

of or prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws

of the United States,

Title IS, United States Code, Seetions 924 (e) and 2 pro

Vide as follows:

(ec) Whoever

(1) uses a firearm te cenit any felony

for which he may be prosecuted in a court of

the United States, or

(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the

commission of any felony for which he may

be proseouted in a court of the United States,

shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the

conmission of such felony, be sentenced to a term

of imprisonment for not less than one year ner

more than ten years, In the case of his second or

subsequent conviction under tis subsection, such

person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisen-

ment fer net less than two ner more than twenty:

five years and, notwithstanding any other provision

of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence in

the ease of a second or subsequent conviction of

such person or give hin a probationary sentence, ner

shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this

subsection ren coneurrently with any term ef im:

prisonment imposed for the commission of such

felony.

5

Rule 7 (¢) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides as follows :

(e) Nature and Contents, The indictment or the

information shall be a plain, concise and definite

Written statement of the essential facts constitutuung

the offense charged, Ut shall be sugned by the attor.

ney for the government, LU need not contain a formal

comunencenent, a formal conclusion er any other

matter Not necessary to such statement Allega-

tions made in ene count may be incerperated by

reference in another count, Lt may be alleged in a

single count that the means by which the defendant

committed the offense are unknown or that he com

mitted it by one er more specified means, ‘The in.

dietinent or information shall state for each count

the oficial or customary citation of the statute, rule,

regulation or other prevision of law which the de-

fondant is alleged therein to have violated, Error |

in the citation or its omission shall not be ground

tor dismissal of the indictment er information or

for reversal of a conviction if the error or emission |

did not misload the defendant to his prejudice,

|

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

L

|

Whether under an indictment charging a violation of IS

Y24(e) the commission of the offense of knowingly carrying

and using handguns during the commission of the offense

of obstruction of a crimmnal vestigation must identify the

offense of obstruction of a eruminal investigation with par.

ticvlarity other thaa giving merely the date of the offense,

6

IL.

Whether under an indictment charging a violation of 18

USC, Sections 1510 and 2 the trial] court erred in not di-

recting a verdict of acquittal when the evidence showed

that the government’s theory of the case was that peti-

tioners threatened the complainant with violence if he

went to the FBI with a report of the beating which he re-

ceived at the hands of petitioners, an act which was not

a federal offense.

IIT.

Whether an indictment charging an offense under 18

United States Code, Sections 1510 and 2 is insufficient for

failure to allege that the federal officers involved were au-

thorized to investigate violations of federal law and for al-

leging the use of “threats” instead of ‘‘threats of force”.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Both Petitioners and one Gregory George “Pete” Ka-

tranis were charged in a two count indictment in District

Court, Criminal No. 47858 with (1) conspiring to prevent

by threats and intimidation one George Nicolaou from

communicating to special agents of the FBI information

relating to violations of Section 1955 and 1511 of Title 18,

USC, and (2) with commission of the substantive offense

which was allegedly the subject of the conspiracy. This

indictment was dated and filed October 4, 1972 (al3).*

See Appendix ‘‘C’’ hereof.

*The (a) in the parentheses refers to Petitioners’ Appendix filed

in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; the num-

bers, to the pages within.

7

Both Petitioners and the said Gregory George “Pete”

Katranis were charged in a second indictment of one

count in District Court, Criminal No. 48377 with the com-

mission of the offense of knowingly carrying and using

“two handguns, during the commission of the offense of

obstruction of a criminal investigation”, in violation of

Sections 924(c) and 2 of Title 18, USC. This indictment

was dated and filed February 21, 1973 (al6). See Ap-

pendix “D” hereof.

Prior to trial, said Gregory George ‘‘Pete” Katranis

died.

Prior to trial, the Government moved the court to con-

solidate Criminal No. 47858 and Criminal No. 48377 for

the alleged reason that both indictments were based on

precisely the same transaction (al8).

Petitioners answered this motion for consolidation with

assertions that it did not appear from the faces of the in-

dictments that the same grand jury returned both indict-

ments and that the grand jury found that the charge laid

in the second indictment arose out of the same events which

were involved in the first indictment (a21, a25).

The court granted the Government’s motion and en-

tered an order consolidating for trial the two indictments

(a28).

Petitioners filed a motion to quash the indictment in No.

47858 on the bases (1) that there was no allegation in the

indictment that “Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation are individuals authorized by a department,

agency, or armed forces of the United States to conduct

investigations of or prosecutions for violation of the erimi-

nal laws of the United States’’; (2) that the language of

18 USC 1510 proscribes the use of ‘‘force or threats there-

of’’ but that the indictment charges the use of “threats”

8

simply; and (3) that the indictment does not set forth pre-

cisely what acts of the defendants which were in violation

of 18 USC 1510 (a30).

Petitioners filed a motion to quash the indictment in No.

48377 on the basis that the crime charged—using a firearm

in the commission of a felony—was dependent on the com-

mission by defendant of a felony and although the indict-

ment named the felony in terms of the statute, no particu-

lars of the felony were alleged so that petitioners could

know what they were to defend themselves against and

could not protect against double jeopardy (a33, a35).

The court denied petitioners’ motions (a38).

The case was tried to a jury.

Upon the completion of the Government’s opening state-

ment to the jury, Petitioners moved the court to direct a

verdict of acquittal in their favor and to declare a mistrial

on the following grounds: (1) the government attorney as-

serted that Petitioners had punished complainant for past

acts of giving information to the ‘BI whereas the indict-

ment charged Petitioners with endeavoring to prevent com-

plainant from giving information to the FBI in the future;

(2) that the information which Petitioners endeavored to

keep from being communicated concerned an assault made

by them upon the complainant, an act which was not a vio-

lation of any federal criminal statute; and (3) that the

assertion by the government’s attorney that the Petitioners |

were intent on taking over gambling operations in the hotel |

in question and other places was an impermissible mention

of other crimes.

The court denied both motions.

George Nicolaou, the complainant, testified that at about

4:00 am to 4:30 am of May 28, 1972, he went to the Clifford

ee

9

Hotel in the City of Detroit (a43) to gamble. When he

entered, he saw “Fat” Bernie with a cut lip and blood on

his T shirt (a45). He then saw Petitioner Mike Katranis

behind a table with a cane (a45). Mike said “Mr. Nick,

the FBI informer” (a45). Pete Katranis, Mike’s brother,

said ** Who is this” (a45). Mike said: ‘The FBI informer”

. . . “*My brother Pete just got out of prison” (a45).

The witness then testified that he was shaking hands with

Pete when he noticed blood on his hand (a51), and then

Pete hit the witness with a gun on the right cheek and

called him “ You son of a bitch. What you talk to the FBI

for?” (ad51). The witness denied having talked to the FBI

and then Pete hit him on the kidney side with the gun

(ad1). Pete again asked the witness *‘Why did you talk

to the FBI” and tie witness said ‘‘] didn’t talk to the

FBI” (a52). Pete hit him with the gun again (a52) and

asked ** Why you go and talk to the FBI or the police when

you’re not supposed to? (a53) and the witness said ‘‘l

didn’t say anything” (a53). Mike Katranis then said:

“He’s going to talk to the FBI all right. I know he’s going

to talk to the FBI” (a53). Then Christ Katranis said:

“Now we know where you live and where you work. If

you talk to the FBI, we going to get you” (a54). Pete

said that they would use “Coke” bottles on the witness’s

daughters (a54). Then all three said: ‘‘Don’t talk to the

FBI or the police. We know where you live and we're

going to get you and your family. We got cousins and

uncles and they going to get you even if we don’t find you

ourselves” (a56). After the defendants and Pete left,

someone said: ‘‘Mike Katranis, Christ and Pete Katranis,

they were going to take the Clifford over and the gambling

over and around downtown, all the gambling places” (a67).

Petitioners objected to the last statement of the witness

as being hearsay and irrelevant (a57). The court overruled

10

the objection (a65) and cautioned the jury that the state-

ment was not being offered for the truth of the contents

but merely that it was said (a66).

On cross-examination, Nicholaou testified that in 1969

about Eastertime he was in business as a barber in the

Park Avenue Baths and was accused by one Lynn Carey

of stealing money from her (a76). Petitioner Mike Ka-

tranis talked to the witness about the theft and struck the

witness (a77); the witness characterized this as a beating

and he went to the FBI about it (a77). The witness did

not see Petitioner Mike Katranis from the time of the beat-

ing until the morning of May 28, 1972 except to say ‘‘hi”

once (a79).

Robert W. Knapp, a government agent, was called by

the government. He testified on cross examination that

he interviewed Nicolaou at the hospital after the Clifford

Hotel incident, and that he appeared before the grand

jury (a85) and that the United States Attorney who was

trying the case for the Government appeared with him

before the grand jury and asked the witness this question:

*Q. And just to review the testimony you have

previously given, Michael and Peter Katranis—

correct me if I’m wrong—according to Mr. Nicolaou

were the individuals who threatened him with great

bodily harm or death if he went to the FBI con-

cerning this beating.”

and that the witness answered “ That’s correct” (a86).

The Government called two witnesses in an endeavor to

prove that the gambling at the Clifford Hotel was in vio-

lation of Section 1955 of Title 18.

il

This was essentially the Government’s case.

At the conclusion of the presentation of the Govern-

ment’s case, Petitioners moved the court (1) to direct a

verdict of acquittal in favor of Petitioners on the basis

that the Government’s opening statement did not set

forth a violation of a federal criminal statute, (2) to dis-

miss the indictments because the grand jury had before

it insufficient evidence upon which to return an indict-

ment, and (3) to direct a verdict of acquittal on all counts

for the reason (a) that no conspiracy was shown and

proven by the evidence and (b) that the evidence showed

that Petitioners sought to prevent the communication to

the FBI of information concerning their beating of Nico-

laou, an act which was not a violation of any federal crimi-

nal statute (a87).

The court denied Petitioners’ motion based upon the

Government’s opening statement (a91).

The court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss the in-

dictment (a92).

The court granted a judgment of acquittal on Petitioners’

motion for acquittal on the conspiracy count (a94).

The court denied Petitioners’ motion for a judgment

of acquittal on the substantive count (a98).

The Petitioners rested without offering any evidence

whatever, and they renewed their motions made at the

conclusion of the Government’s case with the court ren-

dering the same rulings as initially (a99).

The jury returned verdicts of guilty against Petitioners

on Count II of the indictment in No. 47858 and on the

indictment in No. 48377.

12

Petitioners filed a motion seeking the setting aside of

the verdicts and for the entry of a judgment of acquittal

on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

a conviction for the reason that the evidence did not es-

tablish that Petitioners sought to prevent the communica-

tion of information regarding a violation of 18 USC 1955

(a39).

The court denied this motion.

The court sentenced Petitioner Christ Katranis to a

term of 3 years on No. 47858 and to a term of 1 year on

48377, the terms to run consecutively.

The court sentenced Petitioner Michael Katranis to a

term of 5 years in No. 47858 and to a term of 5 years in

No. 48377, the terms to run consecutively.

Both Petitioners filed their appeals in timely manner as

a matter of right, and their appeals were consolidated in

the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioners’ convictions

and denied Petitioners’ petition for rehearing.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

AN INDICTMENT MUST ALLEGE ALL THE ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND IT MUST

STAND ON ITS OWN CONTENT WITHOUT DEPENDENCE

FOR ITS VALIDITY ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF ANY OTHER

INDICTMENT.

The indictment in No. 47858 charging the substantive

crime of making threats of force to prevent communica-

tion and conspiracy to commit that offense was dated by

the grand jury on October 4, 1972.

Some four months later, @ grand jury handed up an

indictment dated February 21, 1973, charging that Peti-

tioners used two hand guns during the commission of the

offense of obstruction of a criminal investigation.

The date of the offense set forth in the second indictment

is given as ‘‘on or about the 28th day of May, 1972." No

other information is given. Neither the place of the offense

nor the name of the offended party nor any particulars of

the offense is given in the indictment.

The trial court granted the Government's motion to

consolidate the two indictments for trial on the basis

that the two offenses arose out of the same events.

° ° °

Since petitioners had a right under the 5th Amendment

and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States to be informed in an indictment of the pre-

cise charges against them, it was error for the court to

order the consolidation for trial of the two indictments

because there was no way to determine from the faces

14

of the two indictments that the grand jury found that the

offense set forth in the second indictment was committed

concurrently with the offense set forth in the first indict-

ment, and that the grand jury had in mind the offense

charged in the first indictment when they handed up the

second indictment.

° ° °

In United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 558 (1875),

the Court said:

“The object of the indictment is, first to furnish

the accused with such a description of the charge

against him as will enable him to make his defense,

and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal

for protection against a further prosecution for

the same cause; and, second, to inform the court

of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether

they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if

one should be had. For this, facts are to be stated,

not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up

of acts and intent; and these must be set forth

in the indictment, with reasonable particularity of

time, place, and circumstances.”

In United Slates v Simmons, 96 US 360, 362 (1877), the

Court found the indictment to be insufficient where de-

fendant was charged with causing or procuring some one

to use a still and the name of that person was not given

in the indictment:

“But to this general rule there is the qualifica-

tion, fundamental in the law of criminal proce-

dure, that the accused must be apprised by the in-

dictment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature

of the accusation against him, to the end that he

15

may prepare his defense, and plead the judgment

as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the

same offense. An indictment not so framed is de-

fective, although it may follow the language of the

statute.”

In United States v Hess, 124 US 483, 487, 8 S Ct 571, 573

(1888), where the defendant was charged with devising

a scheme to defraud but the scheme was not deseribed in

particulars in the indictment, the Court said:

| “The doctrine invoked by the solicitor general,

| that it is sufficient in an indictment upon a statute,

| to set forth the offense in the words of the statute,

does not meet the difficulty here. Undoubtedly, the

language of the statute may be used in the general

| description of an offense, but it must be aceompan-

) ied with such a statement of the facts and cireum-

| stances as will inform the accused of the specific

offense, coming under the general description, with

which he is charged.”

)

|

|

See also Russell v United States, 369 US 749, 82 S Ct

1038 (1962), for a thorough analysis of the question of

the sufficiency of allegations in an indictment and for a

complete citation of authorities.

Particular note should be taken of the statement by

the Court in Russell, supra, that a bill of Particulars can-

not save an invalid indictment:

“To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make

a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of

the grand jury at the time they returned the in-

dictment would deprive the defendant of a basic

protection which the guaranty of the intervention

of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a de-

16

fendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts

not found by, and perhaps not even presented to,

the grand jury which indicted him.”

The Court’s attention is respectfully directed to the case

of United States v Huff, 512 2d 66, 69 (CA 5, 1975), where

the defendant was charged in the first count of the indict-

ment with distribution of ‘'3, 4 methylenedioxy”, a con-

trolled substance, and in the second count with possession

with intent to distribute “methylenedioxy amphetamine”,

On trial defendant moved for an acquittal on the second

count on the basis that “methlenedioxy amphetamine’’,

as distinguished from ‘‘3, 4 methylenedioxy”, was not a

controlled substance.

The trial court denied the motion and told the jury that

the words “methylenedioxy amphetamine” in the second

count “should be described as 3, 4 methylenedioxy amphe-

tamine, the same substance as described in Count One”.

In reversing defendant’s conviction on the second count,

the Court said as follows:

“Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 7(c) states

that the indictment ‘shall be a plain, concise and defi-

nite written statement of the essential facts con-

stituting the offense charged.’ Courts have gener-

ally understood and implemented this rule so as to

let common sense rather than mere technicalities

govern the determination of the sufficiency of an

indictment. But even a liberal construction of this

simple rule does not dispense with the requirement

that an indictment or cach count thereof allege all

the essential elements of an offense. United States

v Clark, 412 F.2d 885, 891 (Sth Cir, 1969). To be

sure, ‘‘[a]llegations made in one count may be in-

17

corporated by reference in another count.” Fed. F.

Crim, P. 7(¢). But cach count of an indictment

must be regarded as if it were a separate indict-

ment and must stand on its own content without de-

pendence for its validity on the allegations of any

other count not expressly incorporated, See Dunn

v. United States, 284 U.S, 390, 393, 52.8, Ct 189, 76

L.Ed 356 (1982); United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d

1068 (7th Cir, 1974); United States vy. Roberts, 465

F.2d 1873 (6th Cir, 1972), Here, the challenged

count of the indictment alleges nothing more than

an act which is legal, And such a failure to allege

a crime cannot be remedied by proof or curative

instructions ‘which attempt to incorporate other

counts not expressly referred to in the challenged

count. A grand jury indictment may be amended

only by resubmission to a grand jury, ‘unless the

change is merely a matter of form.’ Russell v.

United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770-771, 82 S. Ct. 1038,

8 L.Ed. 2d 240 (1962); Stirone v. United States,

361 U.S. 212, 215-217, 80 S. Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed 2d 252

(1960); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct. 781, 30

L.Ed. 849 (1887).” (Emphasis added.)

18

THREATS OF FORCE MADE TO PREVENT COMMUNI

CATION TO FEDERAL OFFICIALS OF INFORMATION CON-

CERNING A STATE CRIME IS NOT A FEDERAL OFFENSE,

AN ACCUSED MUST HAVE KNOWLEDGE THAT AN-

OTHER HAS INFORMATION OF A FEDERAL OFFENSE

WHICH HE INTENDS TO COMMUNICATE TO FEDERAL

OFFICIALS.

At the conclusion of the Government’s case and after

the Government rested, Petitioners moved the court to di-

rect a verdict of acquittal on all counts in favor of the

Petitioners.

The court granted Petitioners’ motion for far as Count

1 in No. 47858 was concerned—the conspiracy count—and

the court directed a verdict of acquittal in favor of Peti-

tioners on that count.

The court denied the balance of Petitioners’ motion.

After Petitioners rested without offering any evidence,

Petitioners renewed their motion for a directed verdict

of acquittal on the remaining counts.

The court denied this motion.

After the verdict of the jury was returned and in timely

manner, Petitioners filed a motion with the court seeking

the court to enter a judgment of acquittal in their favor.

The court denied this motion.

° ° °

The court erred in denying said motions because there

was an absence of evidence to take the case to the jury and

to support the verdict returned for the reason that all of

the evidence supported Petitioners’ theory that if any

threats were made by Petitioners to George Nicolaou they

19

were made in reiation to the beating allegedly visited

upon him which was an act not prosecutable in the federal

courts,

° ° ce)

The evidence is quite clear that in 1969, George Nicolaou

was accused of stealing money from her by one Lynn

Carey (a76) and that Petitioner Mike Katranis remon-

strated with Nicolaou about the accusation and either

struck or beat Nicolaou (a77).1t is clear that Nicolaou went

to the FBI after this incident and told about having been

beaten (a77) by Mike Katranis. It is clear that George

Nicolaou never gave the FBI any information about any

gambling activities of the defendants (a70). It is further

clear that no evidence was presented at trial that the Peti-

tioners had any proprietary interest in or connection with

the gambling operation at the Clifford Hotel. It is fur-

ther clear that no evidence was presented at trial that the

Petitioners were intent on taking over the gambling opera-

tion at the Clifford Hotel or any other gambling opera-

tion; the testimony on this subject given by George Ni-

colaou was clearly hearsay and so held to be by the trial

judge who gave a cautionary instruction to the jury to

that effect (a66). It is further clear that George Nicolaou

did not meet Petitioner Mike Katranis since being beaten

by him in 1969 until the morning of May 28, 1972 except

for one time when he merely said “hi” to him (a79),

Thus it is clear that when on the morning of May 28,

1972 Petitioner Mike Katranis saw George Nicolaou and

hailed him as the BI informer, Mike Katranis was mak-

ing reference to the occasion when Nicolaou went to the

FBI with a report of his having been beaten by Mike Ka-

tranis in 1969, The beating of Nicolaou which followed, if

it did occur, was in retribution for Nicolaou’s having gone

to the FBI in 1969.

20

It cannot be said that the beating of Nicolaou on May

28, 1972 was a violation of 18 USC 1510 beeause it was,

if anything, an injury to a person on account of the giving

by such person of information to a criminal investi-

gator, and the indietment laid against Petitioners did not

charge them with this offense; and further, it was not for

the giving of information concerning the violation of any

criminal statute of the United States.

In other words, 78 (SC 1510 proseribes two types of

acts: (1) acts designed to prevent the future communica-

tion of information to investigators, and (2) acts designed

to injure one for having in the past given information to

investigators. The beating of Nicolaou on May 28, 1972

by Petitioner, if it did oceur, was of the second category

of acts, if anything. But Vetitioners were charged in the

indictment with an act or acts of the first category.

It is too obvious for argument to be made or authority

to be cited that 78 USC 1510 defines two different crimes

and that a defendant charged in an indictment with the

commission of one of them cannot on trial be convicted

of the other.

Hence, we are left, from the evidence, with the threats

allegedly made by the Petitioner to Nicolaou. These threats

fall into the first category above and are in fact the acts

of the defendants which are charged in the indictment. The

indictment charged that the Petitioners did endeavor by

threats to prevent Nicolaou from communicating informa-

tion to investigators.

From the evidence we must decide what information

these threats were designed to prevent from being commu-

nicated by Nicolaou to investigators, if in fact the threats

were made.

21

The element of scienter is here important.

In United States v Williams, 470 F2d 1339 (CA 8, 1973),

the Court quoted from the report of the House Commit-

tee on the Judiciary on 78 USC 1510 to the effeet that if

an accused did not know that the recipient or intended re-

cipient of the information was a federal investigator,

then the accused would not be in violation of the statute

beeause then he would lack scienter,

Similarly, in United States v Baker, 494 F2d 1262

(CA 6, 1974), the Court deemed a substantial question

to be in that case whether the accused was aware of the

existence of a pending federal proceeding and that the

offended person was a witness therein, and the Court re-

jected the Government’s contention that a reasonably

founded belief by the accused that the person he attempts

to influence is a witness in a pending federal proceeding

furnishes the requisite scienter for a violation of 18 USC

1503.

In United States v Cameron, 460 F2d 1394, 1401 (CA 5,

1972), the Court referring to the House report on 18

USC 1510 said:

“This Report makes clear that Section 1510 was

designed to deter the coercion of potential witnesses

by the subjects of federal criminal investigations

prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings.”

(Emphasis added.)

Hence, it should follow that an accused cannot have the

necessary scienter to be in violation of 78 USC 1510 un-

less he knows that he is the subject of a federal criminal

investigation or unless he knows that the person he in-

tends to interfere with has information which would make

him the subject of such investigation.

22

In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Petitioners

were the subjects of a federal criminal investigation.

There was no evidence that Petitioners were in violation

of any federal criminal statute. There was no evidence

that Petitioners knew that George Nicolaou had any in-

formation that Petitioners were in violation of any fed-

eral criminal statute. And there was no evidence that

George Nicolaou had any information that the Petitioners

were in violation of any federal criminal statute. What

George Nicolaou heard from some person whom he could

not identify and of whose identity he never was aware

cannot be said to be ‘‘information” that the Petitioners

were in violation of any federal criminal statute.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the Petitioners had the

necessary scienter to be in violation of 18 USC 1510.

If it is believed that the threats were made to Nicolaou

by the Petitioners, concerning what subject were they

made?

The answer was given by the Assistant United States

Attorney who tried the case at bar, and who presented

the evidence to the grand jury which led to the handing

up of the indictment in the case, and by the agent who in-

vestigated the matter when he interviewed George Nico-

laou in the hospital shortly after Nicolaou was allegedly

beaten on May 28 in the Clifford Hotel.

Before the grand jury, the Assistant United States At-

torney asked the agent, Robert W. Knapp, the following

question:

“Q. And just to review the testimony you have

previously given, ;|Michael and Peter Katranis —

correct me if I’m wrong—according to Mr. Nico-

laou were the individuals who threatened him with

great bodily harm or death if he went to the FBI

concerning this beating.”

23

=>

and the agent answered ‘‘That’s correct” (a86). (Empha-

his added.)

It is clear from the careful formulation of the above

question by the government attorney and from the un-

equivocal answer given by the government agent that

they understood George Nicolaou to have said that he was

threatened by the Petitioners with harm if he reported to

the FBI that they had beaten him in the Clifford Hotel

on the morning of May 28, 1972.

And there is nothing in the testimony of George Nico-

laou which could persuade one beyond a reasonable doubt

that the threats referred to anything else but his going

to the FBI concerning the beating which he received in

the Clifford Hotel on May 28, 1972.

The threats, if made, clearly were made to prevent the

communication by Nicolaou of information to investigators

concerning the beating which he allegedly received at the

Clifford Hotel on May 28, 1972. But this act of the Peti-

tioners was in law an assault and battery or possibly a

felonious assault under Michigan law; it was not a viola-

tion of any federal statute of a criminal nature. As such,

the acts of Petitioners did not fall under the proscriptive

sanctions of 18 USC 1510.

Under the circumstances and under the evidence in the

case, there was insufficient evidence to carry the case to

the jury and the court should have granted Petitioners’

motion for a directed verdict. See United States v Whit-

man, 480 F2d 1028 (CA 6, 1973); United States v Baker,

494 F'2d 1262 (CA 6, 1974).

The court also erred in denying Petitioners’ motion for

a judgment of acquittal filed after trial. The verdict in

a criminal case is sustained only when there is relevant

24

evidence from which the jury could properly find or infer,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty.

Mortsen v United States, 322 US 369, 644 S Ct 1040

(1944); American Tobacco Co v United States, 328 US

781, 66 S Ct 1125 (1946).

In passing upon a motion for judgment of acquittal,

the trial judge must determine whether upon the evidence,

giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credi-

bility, weight the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences

of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt be-

yond a reasonable doubt. If the trial judge concludes upon

such evidence there must be such a doubt, he must grant

the motion. The jury must not be allowed to guess and

conjecture. United States v McCall, 460 F2d 952 (CA DC,

1972) ; United States v Leggett, 292 F2d 423 (CA 6, 1961);

United States v Baker, 444 F2d 1290 (CA 10, 1971).

Ill.

THE INDICTMENT MUST ALLEGE THAT THE FEDERAL

OFFICIAL TO WHOM INFORMATION CONCERNING A

FEDERAL CRIME IS INTENDED TO BE COMMUNICATED

IS AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE COMMISSION OF FED-

ERAL CRIMES.

UNDER THE STATUTE, THE MAKING OF “THREATS” IS

NOT AN OFFENSE; THE MAKING OF “THREATS OF

FORCE” IS AN OFFENSE.

The statute under which Petitioners were charged in

No. 47858—18s USC 1510-—-provides that “the term ‘crimi-

nal investigator’ means any individual authorized by a de-

partment, agency, or armed force of the United States to

conduct or engage in investigations of or prosecutions for

violations of the criminal laws of the United States”.

25

This language can only mean that if a person is not au-

thorized to investigate or prosecute for violations of the

criminal laws of the United States then the prevention by

an accused of the communication of information to him

by another is no offense under this statute.

Hence, a person may be an employee of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation but may not be authorized to

investigate for violations of the criminal laws of the

United States, or he may be an employee of the Depart-

ment of Justice but may not be authorized to prosecute for

violations of the criminal laws of the United States. Pre-

vention by an accused of the communication of informa-

tion to such person by another is no offense under this

statute.

Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that many em-

ployees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are not

authorized to investigate for violation of the criminal laws

of the United States. How can one know, and more to the

point, how can members of the grand jury know which

employees and which agents of the Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation are authorized to investigate violations of the

criminal laws of the United States?

And must not the members of the grand jury find spe-

cifically that the individual to whom one was prevented

from communicating information was authorized to either

investigate or prosecute for violations of the criminal] laws

of the United States?

And must not the grand jury set forth in the indictment

handed up that the accused prevented another from com-

municating information concerning violation of a criminal

statute of the United States to an individual who was au-

thorized to investigate or prosecute for the violation of

the criminal laws of the United States?

26

The answer must be “yes” because without the element

being present of an individual who is authorized to in-

vestigate or prosecute for violations of the criminal laws

of the United States no offense under this statute is com-

mitted.

° ° °

The language of 18 USC 1510(a) proscribes the use of

threats of force to accomplish the end of preventing the

communication of information; the language does not pro-

scribe any “threat”.

The language is:

**Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery,

misrepresentation, intimidation or force of threats

thereof...”

In No. 47858 in Count Two, it is charged that the Peti-

tioners

“ |. . did willfully and knowingly endeavor, and

cause an endeavor (sic), by means of force, threats

and intimidation to obstruct... . ”

It can be seen that Petitioners were charged with en-

deavoring to accomplish the forbidden end by “threats”

but not necessarily threats of force.

Under the language of the indictment, a jury could find

that Petitioners made a “threat” but not a threat of force

or to use force and convict the Petitioners on that basis,

and such conviction would not conform to the proscriptive

intent of the statute.

° ° °

Petitioners in their motion to quash the indictment in

No. 48858 specifically mentioned the above two shortcom-

ings in the indictment.

27

It was error for the trial court to deny Petitioners’ said

motion to quash the indictment.

° ° °

In United States v Seeger, 303 F2d 478, 482 (CA 2,

1962), where the defendant was charged with contempt of

Congress, the Court being concerned with the defendant’s

right under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution “to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”

made against him, held that a conviction under 2 USCA

192, the statute under which defendant was charged, could

not be sustained unless the committee of Congress was

duly empowered to conduct the investigation and that the

inquiry was within the scope of the grant of authority, and

that:

“In view of this constitutional mandate, and the

undisputed fact that the Government must estab-

lish that a committee or subcommittee was duly

authorized and that its investigation was within

the scope of the delegated authority, an indictment

under Section 192 is defective if the authority is

not pleaded,... ”

In Meer v United States, 235 F2d 65, 67 (CA 10, 1956),

where the defendant was charged with perjury for mak-

ing a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court

held:

“While materiality of the false statement to the

matter under inquiry or to the issue presented is

not expressly made an element of the offense, we

are of the opinion that Congress did not intend to

make it an offense to make a false statement in a

bankruptey proceeding, where such statement in-

volved matters extraneous to such proceeding and

not material to the inquiry or issue presented... .

28

“We conclude that materiality of the false state-

ment to the matter under inquiry or to an issue

raised in the proceeding is an essential ingredient

of the offense defined in [18 USCA 152]... .

“It is not sufficient to charge an offense in the

words of the statute, unless the words themselves

fully, directly and expressly and without uncer-

tainty or ambiguity set forth all the essential ele-

ments constituting the offense intended to be pun-

ished.”

In United States v Apex Distributing Company, 148 F

Supp 365 (USDC D RI 1957), where the defendants were

charged with conspiring to defraud the Government, it was

held that under the statute there in question, it was im-

material that the officer of the United States Navy who

was bribed did not have the authority to place the orders

in question and that, therefore, failure to allege that fact

in the indictment does not render the indictment insuffi-

cient. But the count of indictment which charged a viola-

tion of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetie Act must

contain an allegation that the activity of defendants in-

volved interstate commerce because the court’s jurisdic-

tion is conferred through the interstate commerce clause

of the Constitution. The court went on to dismiss the

count for insufficiency because of a lack of averment of

the interstate nature of the shipment involved.

In United States v Irick, 369 F Supp 594, 597 (USDC SD

Tex 1974), defendants were charged that they did ‘‘forcibly

assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, and interfere

with . .. a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Ad-

ministration, United States Department of Justice.” See-

tion 111 of Title 18 prohibits such conduct when directed

29

towards any person designated in 18 USC 1114, but See-

tion 1114 does not name special agents of the Drug En-

forcement Administration. The court in finding the indict-

ment not to state an offense said:

“A narrow, literal reading of the statute is con-

sistent with general principles of criminal] law.

(Citations.) The maxim, expressio untus est ex-

clusto alterius (expression of one thing implies

exclusion of another) is appropriate here. A court

should not depart from the plain meaning of the

statutory language. (Citation.) Also relevant is the

principle that penal sanctions are to be strictly

construed. (Citation.) The definition of criminal

conduct is a legislative rather than judicial fune-

tion, and the Courts should be reticent to broadly

read criminal statutes.”

See also United States v Williams, 470 F2d 1339 (CA 8,

1973), where the Court finds that authorization to inves-

tigate is an element of the offense under Section 1510.

° ° °

The second count of the indictment in No. 47858 recites

that Petitioners:

** .. did willfully and knowingly endeavor, and

cause an endeavor, by means of force, threats and

intimidation to obstruct, delay and prevent the com-

munication of information by George Nicolaou re-

lating to violations of 18 U.S.C. 1955 and 1511 to

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

re eed

In their motion to quash the indictment, Petitioners eom-

plained that the averments in Count IT lacked specificity

30

and cited to the court Russell v United States, 369 US 749,

82 S Ct 1038 (1962) in support of the principle that the lan-

guage of an indictment must descend to particulars so

that an accused might know what it is that he must meet

on trial.

Petitioners also cited to the trial court and cite to this

Court. Rule 7(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

which provides:

**The indictment or the information shall be a plain,

concise and definite written statement of the es-

sential facts constituting the offense charged... .”

(Emphasis added.)

See also: Keck v United States, 172 US 434, 19 S Ct

254 (1899).

Petitioners timely raised the above issues to the trial

court (a30, a33) in conformity to Rule 12(b)(2) Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

It was error for the trial court to deny Petitioners’ mo-

tion to quash the indictment.

31

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons above

given, the Order of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit affirming Petitioners’ convictions is in conflict with

the decisions of this Court and with the requirements of

the 5th and 6th Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States such that plenary review should be granted

in this Court and Petitioners’ request for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

CARL ZIEMBA

Attorney for Petitioners

2000 Cadillac Tower

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) WO 20525

33

APPENDIX “A”

ORDER

Nos. 75-1205 and 75-1206

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

United States of America, :

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Michae] C. Katranis and P

Christ P. ‘‘Chris” Katranis,

Defendants-Appellants. ;

(Filed May 16, 1975)

(John P. Hehman, Clerk)

Before: Kdwards, Celebrezze, and Lively, Cireuit Judges.

Appellants were convicted upon a jury verdict of en-

deavoring to prevent the communication to FBI agents of

information concerning violations of 18 UC. 44 371, 1511,

and 1955, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510 and 2, and of

aiding and abetting another person in using handguns dur-

ing the obstruction of a federal criminal] investigation, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. $§924(c) and 2. Appellants take

a direct appeal from their convictions, assigning nine counts

of error.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and oral argu-

ment, it appears that Appellants were properly convicted

of the federal offenses charged, that the evidence supports

the verdict, and that no reversible error was committed by

the District Court.

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction should be, and

they hereby are, affirmed.

Entered by Order of the Court

/s/ John P. Hehman

Clerk

APPENDIX "RB"

ORDER

Nos, 74 1808, 75-1206

UNTRED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THIS SEN TH CEROCUPE

United States of Ameren,

Mlaintill Appellee,

v.

Michael C. Watranis and

Christ PLS Chris” Katranis,

Defendants Appellants,

(Filed June 17, 1975)

(John PL Hehman, Clerk)

Before: Kdwards, Colebregge, and Lively, Cireuit Judges.

Appellants having filed a petition for rehearing with this

Court, and this Court having considered said petition and

being duly advised in the premises,

It is Ordered that the petition for rehearing be, and it

is hereby denied.

Entered by Order of the Court

/s/ John P. Hehman

Clerk

ah

APPENDIX "'C”

INDICTMENT

UNITED STATES DISERICT COURT

WASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

United States of America,

Plaintiff, Criminal No. 47858

Vv.

Michael C. “Mike” Katranis, Violations:

Ciregory George ‘Pete’ Ka- 18 U.S.C. 1510

tranis, and Christ M. Chris” 1I8 U.S.C. 371

Katranis, 18 U.S.C, 2

Defendants,

The Grand Jury eharges:

Count One

1, From on or about the 27th day of May, 1972, and

continuously thereafter, up to and ineluding the 28th day

of May, 1972, in the Mastern District of Michigan, and else-

where, Michael C. “Mike Katranis, Gregory George

Pete” Katranis, and Christ M. “Chris” Katranis, the

defendants herein, did unlawfully, knowingly, and will-

fully eonspire, combine, confederate and agree together

and with each other, to violate Seetion 1510 of Title 14,

United States Code.

2. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants,

Michael C, “Mike” Katranis, Gregory George “Pete” Ka-

tranis, and Christ M, “Chris’’ Katranis would willfully

and knowingly endeavor by means of foree, threats and

intimidation to obstruct, delay and prevent the eommunica-

36

tion of information by one George Nicolaou relating to

violations of Sections 1955, 1511, and 371, of Title 18,

United States Code, by Michael C. ‘‘Mike’’ Katranis, Greg-

ory George ‘‘Pete” Katranis and Christ M. ‘‘Chris” Ka-

tranis to Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation.

Overt Acts

At the times hereinafter mentioned, the defendants and

co-conspirators committed the following overt acts in fur-

therance of said conspiracy and to effect the objects there-

of :

1. On or about May 28, 1972, the defendants

Michael C. ‘‘Mike” Katranis, Gregory George “ Pete’’

Katranis, and Christ M. ‘Chris’? Katranis entered

the premises of the Clifford Hotel in Detroit, Michi-

gan.

2. On or about May 28, 1972, the defendant Michael

C. ‘‘Mike” Katranis had a conversation with and re-

lating to George Nicolaou.

3. On or about May 28, 1972, the defendant Gregory

George ‘‘Pete’’ Katranis struck George Nicolaou with

his fists and with the butt end of a handgun.

All in violation of Section 371, Title 18, United States

Code.

Count Two

On or about the 28th day of May, 1972, in the Eastern

District of Michigan, the defendants Michae] C. ‘‘Mike”

Katranis, Gregory George “ Pete’? Katranis, and Christ

M. ‘‘Chris” Katranis did willfully and knowingly endeavor,

and cause an endeavor, by means of force, threats and in-

timidation to obstruct, delay and prevent the communica-

37

tion of information by George Nicolaou relating to viola-

tions of 18 U.S.C. 1955 and 1511 to Special Agents of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Depart-

ment of Justice, in the Eastern District of Michigan.

All in violation of Sections 1510 and 2, Title 18, United

States Code.

This is a True Bill

/s/ Fred D. Lalter

Foreman

/s/ Ralph B. Guy, Jr.

United States Attorney

/s/ Laurence Leff

Attorney in Charge

Detroit Strike Force

United States Department of Justice

Organized Crime and Racketeering Section

1064 Federal Building

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(Telephone: 226-7252)

Dated: 10-4-72

APPENDIX “D”

INDICTMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

(Filed February 21, 1973)

United States of America, :

Plaintiff, | Criminal No. 48377

Vv.

Michael P. ‘“‘Mike” Katranis and { Violation:

Christ M. “Chris” Katranis, 18 U.S.C. 2 and

Defendants. t 924(c)

The grand jury charges:

On or about the 28th day of May, 1972, in the Kastern

District of Michigan, Michael P. “Mike” Katranis and

Christ M. ‘‘ Chris” Katranis did unlawfully and knowingly

use and carry, and did aid, abet and willfully and know-

ingly cause Gregory George “Pete” Katranis and Christ

M. “Chris” Katranis to carry certain firearms, to wit: two

handguns, during the commission of the offense of ob-

struction of a criminal investigation, a felony prosecutable

in a court of the United States;

39

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections

924(c) and 2.

This is a True Bill.

/s/ Fred D. Lalter

Foreman

Ralph B. Guy, Jr.

United States Attorney

Eastern District of Michigan

Laurence Leff

Attorney in Charge

Detroit Strike Force

United States Department of Justice

1064 Federal Building

Detroit, Michigan 48226

Telephone : 226-7252

Dated: 2-21-73