Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bistany v. California

i

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

Petitioner prays for Writ of Certiorari .......... 1

CC REGO ca hi dae has Cabs dane te nas 2

Statement of the Case .......... oP wae oie on 2

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved 5

Reasons for Granting the Writ ................ 8

ROE EEG SR SIGS RS kOe 9

1. Penal Code 8 653f is, on its face, an

indefinite and uncertain criminal statute

insofar as it prohibits a solicitation of an

assault by means of force likely to produce

ee I aire seh Sk eS 4h i 9

|

: 2. Assuming for purposes of argument that

Penal Code § 653f is not void “‘on its face,”

the statute is void because of failure to fix

standards as to what is and what is not

I ke rae ree es a 12

3. Assuming that Penal Code & 653f is not

void as a vague and uncertain criminal

statute, the court in this case gave the said

section an unconstitutional application .... 14

4. The petitioner was deprived of his right to

counsel by the denial of his motion for con-

RINE «<b tetideigites nc SuR Se) eda oo oe 15

5. The statute involved violates petitioner’s

right to freedom of speech .............. 16

IIE kia Meda dicks aerecnnakad sek Ux 17

Index to Appendix and Appendixes A and B.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page

Brown v. New Jeisey, 175 U.S. 172,

44 L. Ed. 119, 20S.Ct.77 ........ wae 15

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,

29 L. Ed. 2d 284, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971) .... 16

Giasso v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,

15 L. Ed. 2d 447, 86 S. Ct. 578 (1966) .... 12

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,

9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83S.Ct.792 ..... 15

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,

83 L. Ed. 888, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939) ...... 9,10

Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78,

53 L. Ed. 410, 29 S.Ct. 235 .......... a 15

People v. Fuentes, 74 Cal. App. 2d 737,

169 P.2d 391 (1946) ... 2.2 ee ee eee, 11,13

People v. Kenman, 134 Cal. App. 2d 417 (1955) .. 14

People v. Spreckels, 125 Cal. App. 2d 507 (1954) . 12, 13

People v. Wells, 14 Cal. App. 3d 348,

92 Cal. Rptr. 19

Ricks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1111 ........ 11

United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174,

97 L. Ed. 200, 73 S. Ct. 189(1952) ...... 11

United States Constitution

Amendment No.1 ...... ee as ae 5

Amendment No.5 ..........

eecreesever eevee

0 ate irs ead me

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

United States Constitution (cont'd) Page

ee te 6, 15

TD 6G EA Sivas ewicdk ounces 6, 7, 8, 15

Statutes (United States)

EE a 2

Statutes (California)

Penal Code

PE Oak ews <¢ OR deck UK k ke Oh Kaa 16

NEES ey ame 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16

Deion ees edie eink s 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975

No. ........

HERBERT PEPE BISTANY,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFOR-

NIA, FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;

MUNICIPAL COURT OF BEVERLY HILLS JUDICIAL

DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This is a petition for Writ of Certiorari to review a

judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California

for the County of Los Angeles through its Appellate Depart-

ment (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate Department’’)

and the judgment of the Municipal Court of the County of

SEES aaa ei Ria emamononoes

Qe

Los Angeles, State of California, Beverly Hills Judicial

District (hereinafter referred to as “Municipal Court’’).

The decision of the Appellate Department, affirming

the conviction of petitioner of a violation of Section 653f

of the Penal Code of the State of California, was filed June

13, 1975. A copy of the decision is attached as Appendix A.

A petition for rehearing was denied by the Appellate

Department on June 20, 1975, and a request to certify the

case to the Court of Appeal of the State of California was

also denied in the same order (Appendix B).

JURISDICTION

The ju..sdiction of this Court is invoked under the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1257(3), the Appellate Department

being a court of last resort when it refused to certify a case

to the Court of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner was charged with a misdemeanor viola-

tion of Penal Code § 653f, in that on April 18, 1974, he

unlawfully solicited William Beckett to commit and join

in the commission of the crime of assault by means of force

likely to produce great bodily injury.

The pertinent portions of Penal Code § 653f read as

follows:

“Every person who solicits another to offer or

accept or join in the offer or acceptance of .. .

or to commit or join in the commission of . . .

assault . . . by means of force likely to produce

ee

den

great bodily injury, is punishable by imprison-

ment in the County Jail not more than one

year or in the State Prison not more than five

years, or by fine of not more than five thousand

dollars ($5,000), or by both such fine and impris-

onment....”

The police videotaped a meeting between petitioner and

Beckett on April 18, 1974. The only significant portion

of the tape is as follows:

“BECKETT: They just want him, they

just want him beat up, right?”

“BISTANY: Yeah, beat him up, you

know, I mean, beat him over the, noticeable

though, you know, I mean,a... oryou

know, so he can’t come to work tomorrow.

Something like that, you know.”

The day prior to the videotaping, the police taped a

telephone conversation between petitioner and Beckett

which contained no solicitation by petitioner. Beckett

testified that he was paid $100.00 on account. Petitioner

testified that the $100.00 was partly repaying a loan and

partly payment for a knife. There was evidence that the

intended victim was an attorney who was representing the

wife in a divorce action and the person paying the money

was the husband.

The complaint in this case was filed April 24, 1974.

On May 14, 1974, petitioner pleaded not guilty and pre-

trial was set for June 26, 1974, at which time the case was

set for trial on August 12, 1974. On August 12, 1974,

petitioner’s counsel moved to be relieved as attorney for

petitioner, but no ruling was made on the motion; instead,

tine

the case was continued for one week to August 19, 1974.

On August 19, 1974, petitioner appeared with new

counsel, Robert Fratianne. Fratianne moved for contin-

uance because he had just finished a five-week murder trial

and was not prepared for trial, and on the further ground

that certain pre-trial discovery and suppression motions

were needed and said counsel had not heard the telephone

tape or the videotape. There was no written or spoken

opposition to the motion for continuance. The motion

was denied; however, before trial commenced, Fratianne

was furnished with transcripts of the tapes and viewed the

videotape.

The only instruction the court gave to the jury on

the subject matter of the offense involved was as follows:

“Every person who solicits another to commit

or join in the commission of an assault by force

likely to produce great bodily injury is guilty of

a misdemeanor.”

The court also gave an instruction on corroboration evi-

dence, but the court did not define “great bodily injury”

and the court gave a “general intent” rather than “specific

intent” instruction.

Petitioner was found guilty by the jury, and on

September 25, 1974, imposition of sentence was suspend-

ed and petitioner was placed on probation for three years

on the condition that he pay a $250.00 fine and serve

six months in the County Jail. Petitioner appealed.

~

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Penal Code 8 653f:

“Every person who solicits another to offer

or accept or join in the offer or acceptance of a

bribe, or to commit or join in the commision of

murder, robbery, burglary, grand theft, receiving

stolen property, extortion, rape by force and vio-

lence, perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery,

kidnapping, or assault with a deadly weapon or

instrument or by means of force likely to produce

great bodily injury, is punishable by imprisonment

in the County Jail not more than one year or in

the State Prison not more than five years, or by

fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000),

or by both such fine and imprisonment. Such offense

must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses,

or of one witness and corroborating circumstances.”

Amendment No. | - United States Constitution:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-

lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of

the press; or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble and to petition the government for a

redress of grievances.”

Amendment No. 5 - United States Constitution:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-

=

ment or indictment of a grand jury, except in

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in

the militia, when in actual service in time of

war or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offense to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against him-

self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private

property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.”

Amendment No. 6 - United States Constitution:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by

an impartial jury of the state and district wherein

the crime shall have been committed, which dis-

trict shall have been previously ascertained by

law, and to be informed of the nature and cause

of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-

nesses against him; to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the

assistance of counsel for his defense.”

Amendment No. 14 - United States Constitution:

“Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of

the state wherein they reside. No state shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-

ileges or immunities of citizens of the United

= =

States; nor shall any state deprive any person of

life, liberty or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.

“Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned

among the several states according to their respec-

tive numbers, counting the whole number of

persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed.

But when the right to vote at any election for the

choice of electors for President and Vice President

of the United States, representatives in Congress,

the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the

members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any

of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-

one years of age, and citizens of the United States,

or in any way abridged, except for participation

in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representa-

tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion

which the number of such male citizens shall bear

to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one

years of age in such state.

“Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Repre-

sentative in Congress, or elector of President and

Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,

under the United States, or under any state, who,

having previously taken an oath, as a member of

Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or

as a member of any state legislature, or as an execu-

tive or judicial officer of any state, to support the

=

Constitution of the United States, shall have

engaged in insurrection or rebellion against

the same, or given aid or comfort to the

enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote

of two-thirds of such House, remove such dis-

ability.

“Section 4. The validity of the public debt of

the United States, authorized by law, including

debts incurred for payment of pensions and

bounties for services in suppressing insurrection

or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither

the United States nor any state shall assume or

pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of

insurrection or rebellion against the United States,

or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any

slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims

shall be held illegal and void.

“Section 5. The Congress shall have power to

enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions

of this article.”

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Judges, appellate justices and lawyers are reputedly

men of uncommon (above average) intelligence.

Despite the reputation aforementioned, judges,

justices and lawyers have a difficult time telling what is

prohibited by “assault by means of force likely to produce

great bodily injury.”

oS

California has conflicting decisions on the meaning

of the aforesaid. If men of above the average intelligence

differ on the meaning, then how can men of common

intelligence be expected to understand the meaning?

The above would be the sole problem if this case

involved California Penal Code § 245. But this case does

not involve that section; instead, it involves Penal Code

§ 653f, which makes it a crime to express oneself in speech

so as to solicit an assault by means of force likely to pro-

duce great bodily injury. Since this statute involves a

limitation on the freedom of speech, the danger of inexplicit

legislation in that regard carries with it the same danger as

any other statute impairing the right to free speech.

ARGUMENT

1. Penal Code § 653f is, on its face, an indefinite

and uncertain criminal statute insofar as it prohibits a

solicitation of an assault by means of force likely to pro-

duce great bodily injury.

“No one may be required at peril of life, liberty

or property to speculate as to the meaning of

penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed

as to what the state commands or forbids. The

applicable rule is stated in Connally v. General

Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed.

322, 328, 46 S. Ct. 126: ‘That the terms of a

penal statute creating a new offense must be

sufficiently explicit to inform those who are

subject to it what conduct on their part will

tein

render them liable to its penalties, is a well

recognized requirement, consonant alike with

ordinary notions of fair play and the settled

rules of law. And a statute which either forbids

or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague

that men of common intelligence must necessar-

ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-

tion violates the first essential of due process of

law.’”

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453,

83 L. Ed. 888, 890, 59 S. Ct. 618

(1939).

That portion of Penal Code § 653f applicable in this

matter was not included in said section until the 1970

amendment thereto.

“Great” has a flexible meaning. Among the definitions

of “great” are:

1. Of much more than ordinary size;

2. Higher in some quality or degree;

3. Much above the ordinary or average; and

4. Highest in its class.

The third definition appears the closest to use in Penal

Code 8 653f. In order to ascertain the meaning of “great

bodily injury” one would have to know what the definition

of “average” bodily injury is.

If the respondents do not concede that the meaning

of “great bodily injury” is vague, indefinite and uncertain,

then no doubt the respondents will clarify this meaning in

any response to this petition, and also inform the Court of

the meaning of “average” bodily injury, so that the definition

supplied can be checked.

oe} ee

In Ricks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1111, at page

1117, the court said:

“We are not at liberty to ignore the shortcom-

ings of the statutory language or rationalize

its validity simply on the basis of the methods

associated with its administration. A statute

attacked as vague must initially be examined

‘on its face’, and many times the inquiry need

extend but little further. The sine qua non of

the constitutional certainty in the definition of

a crime is fair warning of the statutory prohibi-

tion to those of ordinary intelligence—notice of

the proscribed activities which is reasonable

when gauged by common understanding and

experience.”

The justices of California courts are unable to agree

on what “force likely to produce great bodily injury” means.

See, People v. Fuentes, 74 Cal. App. 2d 737, 741, 169 P.2d

391 (1946), and People v. Wells, 14 Cal. App. 3d 348, 357,

358, 92 Cal. Rptr. 19.

In United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176, 97 L.

Ed. 200, 73 S. Ct. 189, 190 (1952), the Court said:

“The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is

the treachery they conceal either in determining

what persons are included or what acts are pro-

hibited. Words which are vague and fluid * * *

may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the

ancient laws of Caligula.”

In People v. Wells, supra, the California court reasons

that it is the force likely to produce such injury which is

prohibited by Penal Code § 245, and that the crime occurs

=|

even if no physical injury results, and (impliedly) that a

blow from the fist is such a force.

If the logic of People v. Wells, supra, is applied to

everyday occurrences, our expenses for juvenile courts

will be substantially increased. Under the logic of Wells,

every schoolboy who asks his big brother to beat up another

child will have been guilty of violating Penal Code § 653f.

The same would be true of any minor who requests that his

father beat up a neighbor who has ordered the minor off his

lawn.

2. Assnuming for purposes of argument that Penal

Code § 653f is not void “‘on its face,” the statute is void

because of failure to fix standards as to what is and what

is not prohibited.

“It is established that a law fails to meet the

requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is

so vague and standardless that it leaves the public

uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves

judges and jurors free to decide, without any

legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and

what is not in each particular case.”

Giasso v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402,

403, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447, 450, 86 S. Ct.

578 (1966).

To illustrate that this statute and Penal Code § 245

leave to the judge or jury the determination—without any

fixed standards—what is prohibited and what is not pro-

hibited in any given case, one should see the facts reported

in People v. Spreckels, 125 Cal. App. 2d 507 (1954). In

oo

the Spreckels case the defendant called his ex-wife vile

names, knocked her down, pulled her by the hair of her

head over to a door, kicked her, and beat her about the

head and arms with one of her shoes; she was bleeding,

lost consciousness, and was taken to a hospital where she

remained for 10 days. Although Spreckels was charged

with assault by means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury (Penal Code § 245), a felony, the jury found

him guilty of simple assault—a lesser included offense.

While People v. Fuentes, supra, has been criticized

for some of the statements it contains by justices of the

Court of Appeal on the same level as the court in Fuentes,

the other courts have not criticized the following quote

from Fuentes:

“Battery ‘is any willful and unlawful use of

force or violence upon the person of another,’

(Pen. Code § 242), and is punishable as a mis-

demeanor. When the force used in committing

the battery is ‘likely to produce great bodily

injury’ it becomes a felony if a penitentiary

sentence is imposed as was done here (Pen. Code

§ 245). That the Legislature intended to define

two separate and distinct crimes is clear from

the use of two separate code sections and the

different penalties for each. Of course, the

dividing line between the two is not always

distinct but we do not believe that condition

exists here.” (Emphasis added.)

People v. Fuentes, supra, 74 Cal. App.

2d at 741.

California leaves the determination of force likely

~t4

to produce great bodily injury to the jury without guide-

lines. In People v. Kenman, 134 Cal. App. 2d 417, 422

(1955), the court holds that what force is likely to pro-

duce great bodily injury is a question of fact for the jury,

and whether a fist is likely to produce such injury is to be

determined by the force of the impact, the manner in which

it was used, and the circumstances under which it was

applied. Summarized, Kenman and other cases involving

Penal Code § 245 make the determination of the “force

likely to produce great bodily injury” after the fact, not

before.

Since there is no injury upon which to make the fore-

going determination in a charge involving Penal Code 8 653f,

the said section is a net large enough to catch almost every-

one, leaving the determination as to what is prohibited to

the magistrate or to the jury.

3. Assuming that Penal Code § 653f is not void

as a vague and uncertain criminal statute, the court in this

case gave the said section an unconstitutional application.

The Municipal Court instructed the jury:

“Every person who solicits another to commit

or join in the commission of an assault by force

likely to produce great bodily injury is guilty

of a misdemeanor,”

“(To constitute the offense charged against

the defendant, there must be a joint operation of

act or conduct and criminal intent.

“When a person intentionally does that

a a

which the law declares to be an offense, he is

acting with criminal intent, even though he may

not know that his conduct is unlawful, or even

though he may not intend to violate the law.)”

No further instructions defining force, assault, means

or great bodily injury were given.

No specific intent instruction was given.

The term “due process of law” asserts a fundamental

principle of justice which is not subject to any precise

definition but deals essentially with the denial of funda-

mental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.

See, Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 176, 44 L. Ed.

119, 121, 20 S. Ct. 77.

The definition in each case depends upon the circum-

stances, varying with the subject matter and the necessities

of the situation. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84, 53

L. Ed. 410, 416, 29 S. Ct. 235.

The effect of the court’s instruction was that if peti-

tioner told Beckett to beat up the attorney, he was guilty.

4. The petitioner was deprived of his right to counsel

by the denial of his motion for continuance.

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of

counsel for his defense.”

U. S. Constitution, 6th Amendment.

The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon y. Wain-

wright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 803, 83

S. Ct. 792.

a

Petitioner did not have counsel if counsel cannot

know in advance what the prohibited conduct is from

the language of the statute. Since the courts do not

know what is prohibited until after the jury decides

the case, it would be presumptive to assume that defense

counsel knew same.

Petitioner’s counsel was not prepared for trial. Peti-

tioner’s prior attorney moved to be relieved as his counsel,

and the case was continued one week without ruling on

the motion. New counsel’s motion for continuance

because he had just finished a five-week murder trial and

was not prepared was denied. Since petitioner had no

counsel prepared for trial, in effect he had no counsel.

5. The statute involved violates petitioner’s

right to freedom of speech.

Of California statutes it is not a crime to solicit

a simple assault (Penal Code 8 § 653f and 242).

Since, as a practical matter, it is impossible to deter-

mine the difference between solicitation of a simple assault

and solicitation of assault by means of force likely to pro-

duce great bodily injury, the statute does not put petitioner

on notice of what kind of otherwise permissible speech is

prohibited.

The case of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19,

29 L. Ed. 2d 284, 290, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971), is analogous.

In that case the Supreme Court said, among other things:

“In the first place, Cohen was tried under a

statute applicable throughout the entire

state. Any attempt to support this conviction

een

on the ground the statute seeks to preserve

an appropriately decorous atmosphere in the

courthouse where Cohen was arrested must

fail in the absence of any language in the statute

that would put appellant on notice that certain

kinds of otherwise permissible speech or con-

duct would nevertheless, under California law,

not be tolerated in certain places... .

“No fair reading of the phrase ‘offensive

conduct’ can be said sufficiently to inform the

ordinary person that distinctions between cer-

tain locations are thereby created.” (403 U.S.

at 19.)

Said case also holds:

“The rationale of the California court is plainly

untenable. At most it reflects an ‘undifferen-

tiated fear or apprehension of disturbance

{which] is not enough to overcome the right

to freedom of expression.’ ”” (403 U.S. at 23.)

The constitutional challenges were raised at first

opportunity in respondent Superior Court of the State

of California.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully

prays that this petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted

and that the issues herein raised be given consideration by

this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN GUERIN

Attorney for Petitioner

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

A Decision of the Appellate Department

of the Superior Court of the State of

California for the County of Los Angeles 1

B Order Denying Rehearing and Denying

Certification 2

APPENDIX A 3

DECISION OF THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT

In the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of

the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

Superior Court No. CR A 13087.

Trial Court No. M 39994.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff

and Respondent, vs. HERBERT PEPE BISTANY, Defendant

and Appellant.

[FILED June 13, 1975]

On APPEAL from the MUNICIPAL COURT of the

Beverly Hills Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State

of California. Leonard S. Wolf, Judge. (653[f] PC)

This cause having been argued and submitted and fully

considered, judgment is ordered as follows:

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment

made and entered in the Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills

Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California,

in the above entitled cause be and the same is hereby affirmed.

HOLMES,

- Presiuing Judge

SHALL,

wep.

ALARCON,

Judge

Mailed at Los Angeles, Ca. June 13, 1975

APPENDIX B a

ORDER DENYING REHEARING AND

DENYING CERTIFICATION

In the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of

the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

Superior Court No. CR A 13087.

Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District

No. M 39994.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff

and Respondent, vs. HERBERT PEPE BISTANY, Defendant

and Appellant.

[FILED June 30, 1975]

The petition of appellant for a rehearing after judgment

of this court on appeal, or, in the alternative, petition for cer-

tification of cause to the Court of Appeal in the above-entitled

case, having been filed and having been duly considered,

Said petition is hereby denied.

E

ne S presiding Judge

MARSHALL,

Judge

N,

ALARCO lap

Mailed at Los Angeles, Ca. June 30, 1975

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

) ss.

County of Orange )

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein mentioned, a citizen

of the United States and employed in the County of Orange, over the age of

eighteen years and not a party to the within action or proceeding; that

My business address is 326% Main Street, Huntington Beach, California 92648,

that on AUGUSTO, 1975, I served the within PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI (BISTANY v. PEOPLE OF THE ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA,

et al.) on the following named parties by depositing the designated copies

thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid,

in the United States Post Office in the City of Huntington Beach, California,

addressed to said parties at the addresses as follows:

Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General Superioz Court of the

State of California State of California

3580 Wilshire Blvd., Room 800 County of Los Angeles

Los Angeles, California 90010 Appellate Department

[1 copy] Los California 90012

District Attorney 1 copy]

County of Los Angeles The Hon. Leonard Wolf

Appellate Division Beverly Hills Judicial District

849 South Broadway - 11th Floor Municipal Court

Los Angeles, California 90014 6355 Burton Way

[2 copies] Bevezly Hills, California.

[1 copy]

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

ay

Executed on AUGUSTQO)1975, at HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIFORNIA.

D. A. Standefer

Dean-Standefer, 326% Main St., Huntington Beach, Ca.92648

(714) 536-7161