Amicus Curiae Brief — New Jersey v. General Motors Corp.

ALLEN I, OLSON

Atto General

State of North Dakota

State Capitol

Bismarck, North Dakota 58501

LARRY DERRYBERRY

Attorne —.

State o

112 Lo Canin itol. 1 —

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105

R. LEE JOHNSON

Attorne —

State o —

102 State Office Building

Salem, Oregon 97301

RIcHARD J. ISRAEL

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

Providence County Courthouse

Providence, ‘Rhode Island 02903

DANIEL R. McLEop

Carolina

Hampton Office Building

Columbia, South Caroling 29201

Kermit A. SANDE

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

State Capitol

Pierre, South Dakota 57501

R. A. ASHLEY, JR.

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

Supreme Court Buildin

Nashville, Tennessee 3721

\Joun L. HILL.

General

P.

Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

Vernon B. RoMNEY

Attorney General

WILLIAM T. EvAxs

Assistant Attorney General

State of 1

State Capito

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

KIMBERLY B. CHENEY

At * General

8 Vermont

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

SLADE GORTON

Attorney General

State of Washin

Dexter Horton Building

Seattle, Washingtor. 98104

CHAUNCEY H. BROWNING, JR.

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

State Capitol

Charleston, wae Virginia 25305

i

INDEX Page

Interest of These Amici Curiae 8 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ „„ 4

1. Tho Decision of tho Dictrict Court Raises an

Important Question Concerning State/Federal/

Municipal Relations, the Precise Terms of Which

Have Not, But Should Be, Settled By This Court 4

A. There is No Conflict Between the New Jersey

Statute and Rule 23 satay: ee ae

B. This Amicus Brief Attests to the Significance

II. The Issue Was Properly Appealable Within the

Meaning of the Cohen Doctrine : 9

ESS EB ERAN EL NAO A LEED nS

1

CITATIONS

CASES CITED: Page

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541

(1949) „ 2, 9, 10, 11

Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) 7

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) 7

Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) 8

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) 5, 6

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) 4,5

— 2

Illinois v. Assoc. Milk Producers, 351 436 (N.D.

1 ³˙·ꝛm ˙¹¹mAꝛ cameo eee iets 9

New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413

U.S. 405 (1973) 5 ß. Ce

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 5

Sailors v. Board of Education of County of Kent, 387 U.S.

105 (1967) en e? * 6, 7

State of California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th

Cir. 1973) „ 3

State of Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Company, 470 F.2d 1276

(D.C. Cir. 1972) ran 8 6

Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) 6

STATUTES AND RULES CITED:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1411 et seq. 2

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 15 8

iii

F.R.Civ.P. 17 (a)

F. R. Civ. P. 17 (b)

F. R. Civ. P. 23

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 416.011 et seq.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-821 et seq. .

N. J. S.A. 56:9-12(b) |

28 U.S.C. § 1291

CONSTITUTION CITED:

U.S. CONST. Amend. X

Ee I, Bm, FE sigan cectaesovaccncectvsecmsivcicessosvcreoosurionensnorsonnsnatons

, % ꝙ ——T—T—T—T—T—T—T—T—T————

*

IN THE

Supreme Curt of the United States

OctTosBer TERM, 1974

No. 74-458

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, pursuant to §12(b) of the New

Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J.S.A. 56:9-12(b),

Petitioner,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

FORD MOTOR COMPANY and CHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Respondents.

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT AND

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

ET AL. AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE

PETITION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR

CERTIORARI

This brief is submitted pursuant to Rule 42(4) of the

Court’s Rules by the State of Connecticut, Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, and the States of Alabama, Arkansas,

Cai fornia, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,

Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska,

Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,

Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South

Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and

West Virginia.

INTEREST OF THESE AMICI CURIAE

Your Amici, as States of the Union, have an undeniable

interest in the present action. The order of the District Court

TEE AEE RECO OBI Dn

2

raises once again the issue before this Court: What powers

may a State constitutionally exercise in controlling its own

state agencies and political subdivisions? Your Amici believe

that the order of the District Court, combined with the failure

of the Court of Appeals to apply the Cohen doctrine correctly,

will have an unmistakably pernicious effect upon the

fundamental relationship of the States to their respective

governmental agencies, and upon further attempts at the

type of innovative legislation which New Jersey has passed,

in creating a model centralized authority for the conduct of

federal antitrust litigation.'

The case at bar is one of those consolidated for pretrial

purposes before the Honorable Frank J. McGarr in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at

Multi-District Litigation Docket No. 65.2

Petitioner, the State of New Jersey, alleged in its

original complaint that it brought this action on behalf of

its political subdivisions upon two separate grounds: (1) as

a representative pursuant to Rule 23 of the F.R.Civ.P.; and

(2) pursuant to Section 12(b) of the New Jersey Antitrust

Act, N.J.S.A. 56:9-12(b). Subsequently, the petitioner moved

the Court for leave to amend its complaint in order to delete

the class action provision. The District Court denied leave

to amend stating that the petitioner must proceed by one of

two alternate methods: naming all political subdivisions and

public agencies as parties plaintiff, or proceeding pursuant

to Rule 23 of the F.R.Civ.P. (App. B).

This is a tine when many states are revamping and updating

their antitrust legislation and are contemplating new laws. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1411 et seq. (1974): Mo. Rev. Stat. § 416.011

et seq. (Aug. 13, 1974): Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-821 et seq., as

amended by Legislative Bill No. 1028, effective April 16, 1974.

2 In addition to this current multidistrict litigation, your Amici have

also been participants in other multidistrict litigation involving

antibiotic drugs. automobiles, gasoline, rock salt, asphalt, concrete

and cast iron pipe, and master key and lock systems.

3 Reference is made to Petitioner’s Appendix.

3

The failure of the District Court to recognize that there

does, in fact, exist a third alternative is a matter of grave

import to your Amici.

The New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 56:9-12(b),* gives to

the Attorney General of the State the clear authority to

proceed in federal antitrust litigation not only on behalf

of the State, but also on behalf of the State’s political

subdivisions and public agencies. Furthermore, Section 12(b)

uniquely provides that said political subdivisions and public

agencies may not sue on their own behalf without first

obtaining the permission of the Attorney General. Thus, the

State of New Jersey has removed from its political sub-

divisions and public agencies the capacity to sue on their

own behalf.

The District Court, in substantively interpreting Section

12(b) of the New Jersey Antitrust Act, treated the petitioner’s

leave to amend as a type of subterfuge of Rule 23 of the

F.R.Civ.P. Your Amici assert that a State does have the

power to abrogate the capacity of its political subdivisions

and public agencies to sue, and, in essence, to return the

political subdivisions and public agencies to the corporate

body of the State. The State of New Jersey, suing on behalf

of its political subdivisions and public agencies, is not suing in

a representative capacity. Rather, there is but one unitary

plaintiff: the State of New Jersey.

The failure of the District Court to recognize the power

of the State to sue as a unitary plaintiff, with the result that

the petitioner is confined to Rule 23 of the F.R.Civ.P. is, in

the opinion of your Amici, contrary to stated principles of

4N.J.S.A. 56:9-12(b) states in relevant part:

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State or any of its

political subdivisions or public agencies, or the political subdivision

or public agency at the direction of or with the permission of the

Attorney General, may institute an action to recover the damages

provided for by this section or by any comparable provisions of

Federal law.

1 — eee

*

4

previous decisions of this Court. Moreover, the ruling of the

District Court reveals that an important and novel question

of federal/state/municipal relations has, heretofore, never

been presented to this Court in its present form.

Your Amici believe that the issue centers ineluctably

upon powers historically reserved to the States by the Tenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. We believe

that the distinction that we shall draw, infra, was lost upon

the District Court, and unrecognized by the Court of Appeals.

(App. C)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

RAISES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION CONCERNING

STATE/FEDERAL/MUNICIPAL RELATIONS, THE

PRECISE TERMS OF WHICH HAVE NOT, BUT

SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT.

A. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NEW

JERSEY STATUTE AND RULE 23 OF THE

F.R.CIV.P.

1. In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907),

the Supreme Court clearly enunciated the principle that a

State Legislature may exercise extraordinary power over its

own political subdivisions and public agencies:

“This court has many times had occasion to consider

and decide the nature of municipal corporations, their

rights and duties and the rights of their citizens

and creditors .... We think the following principles

have been established by them and have become

settled doctrines of this court, to be acted upon

whenever they may be applicable. Municipal corporations

5

are political subdivisions of the State, created as con-

venient agencies for exercising such of the governmental

powers of the State as may be entrusted to them

The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred

upon these corporations and the territory over which

they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion

of the State . The State, therefore, at its pleasure:

may modify or withdraw all such powers, . expand

or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part

of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and

destroy the corporation. All this may be done condition-

ally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of

the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these

respects the State is supreme and its legislative body,

conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as

it will... . The power is in the State and those who

legislate for the State are alone responsible for any un-

just or oppressive exercise of it.” Id., at 177-79. (emphasis

added)

2. In recent years, the Supreme Court has applied the

principle of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh in specific circum-

stances. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) ).

In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the

respondents, therein, unsuccessfully attempted to exalt

Hunter into an absolute. (Id., at 342).

Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:

“Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other

state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations

imposed by the United States Constitution.” Id., at 344-

345.

“When a State exercises power wholly within the

domain of State interest, it is insulated from federal

4 N

SRC

„

judical review. But such insulation is not carried over

when the State power is used as an instrument for

eireumventing a federally protected right.“ Id., at 347.

Thus, restrictions upon the State are governed by

reference to a specific federally protected right.“ (See Sailors

v. Board of Education of County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105, 109

(1967) ).

3. In the case at bar, no constitutional prohibition is

present.“ The State of New Jersey has done nothing more or

less than delimit the capacity of its political subdivisions and

public agencies to sue on their own behalf.’ In cases in which

this Court has held that a State was restrained in its exercise

of control over its political subdivisions and public agencies,

5 In Gomillion, of course, the specific federal right was the right to

— 1 — by the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States

n.

s In addition, the F. R. Civ. P. specifically provide that states may

control the capacity of their political subdivisions to sue by

creating state statutes for that purpose. (See F. R. Civ. P. 17 (b)).

In fact, in State of Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Company, 470 F.2d

1276 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court noted, in reference to an action

brought pursuant to the Illinois Antitrust Act, that the District

Court had properly permitted Illinois to proceed on behalf of all

litical subdivisions organized under state — ursuant to

llinois Revised Statutes”. Id. at 1277. (emphasis added).

However, your Amici wish to make clear that we do not suggest,

and New Jersey does not argue, that a state must possess a state

statute permitting antitrust actions on behalf of political sub-

divisions and public agencies before its Attorney General may

bring such actions in Federal Court. Rather, each state’s Attorney

General may proceed as a representative of a class composed of the

governmental entities organized under state law. (See State of

Illinois v. Bristol-Myers, supra: Illinois v. Assoc. Milk Producers,

351 F.2d 436 (N.D. Ill. 1972)).

Further, independent and sufficient federal — and authority

for the state to serve as statutory representative of its political

subdivisions emanates from Rule 17(a) F.R.Civ.P. which provides

in relevant part: an executor... or a party authorized by statute

may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for

whose benefit the action is brought.” (emphasis added)

7It should be noted that this Court has previously held that

municipal corporations have no privileges or immunities. Trenton

v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).

7

the federally protected right was that right actually possessed

by the citizens of said municipality.“

4. Moreover, the New Jersey Antitrust Act constitutes

innovative state legislation, creating a state-wide authority

under the control of the Attorney General for the prosecution

of federal antitrust violations’? There thus exists a

legitimate, if not overriding, state interest in the ehrogation

of the capacity of the political subdivisions and public agencies

to sue on their own behalf without the prior consent of the

Attorney General.

5. The District Court, below, treated the New Jersey

Statute as a subterfuge of Rule 23 of the F.R.Civ.P. and thus,

sub silentio, has stated that N.J.S.A. 56:9-12(b) is incon-

sistent with federal law. (App. B)

Since the power of the State to abrogate the capacity of

its political subdivisions and public agencies to sue on their

own behalf is not impaired by any provision of the United

States Constitution, reliance upon Rule 23 and, more

importantly, upon the procedural safeguards of which the

courts below speak, are entirely inapposite. 0

8For example, the right to vote in Gomillion was that right

— by the disenfranchised black citizens of the city of

uskegee.

9 This Court has steadfastly supported the view that so long as they

avoid conflict with the federal laws, “the state legislatures have

constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques: they

are entitled to their own standards of the public welfare Day-

Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). The states

must have vast leeway in the management of [their] internal

affairs.“ Sailors v. Board of Education of County of Kent, 387 U.S.

105, 109 (1967). Since the States have “broad scope to experiment

with economic problems,” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730

(1963), they “must be allowed considerable latitude in attempting

their resolution.” New York State Dept. of Social Services v.

Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).

10 In State of California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.

1973) parens patriae was rejected as a substitute for Rule 23 in

art because procedural safeguards were lacking. The “class” in

rito-Lay, though, was not composed of political subdivisions, but

rather citizen/consumers. The Fourteenth Amendment problems in

the case are thus obviously distinguishable from the instant action.

2 2 he pO aac RRR OT

wl eae

8

The State, thus, stands in an entirely different relation

to its political subdivisions and public agencies than a State

does to its citizens, or a representative of a class does to the

members of the class.

A State, as here, in abrogating the capacity of its govern-

mental agencies to sue has removed their capacity to be

deemed “persons” within the meaning of Section 4 of the

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. Consequently, if a political sub-

division is not a “person”, a fortiori, it cannot be a member of

a class of “persons” vindicating an interest under the anti-

trust laws pursuant to Rule 23. On the other hand, it is

axiomatic that a state could not abrogate the capacity of its

individual citizens to be deemed “persons” within the meaning

of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.

Thus, the State of New Jersey may constitutionally

abrogate the capacity of its political subdivisions and public

agencies to sue on their own behalf, return said entities to

the corporate body of the State, then sue on behalf of said

entities as a unitary plaintiff without being treated as the

representative of a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the F.R.Civ.P.

6. Your Amici believe, for the reasons stated, supra,

that the decision of the District Court constitutes a clear en-

croachment upon an area of law reserved to the States by

the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

B. THIS AMICUS BRIEF ATTESTS TO THE SIGNIFI-

CANCE OF THE CASE.

In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), wherein a

State was deemed to be a “person” within the meaning of

the treble damage provision of the federal antitrust laws, 15

U.S.C. § 15, this Court, per Mr. Justice Frankfurter, noted:

“The importance of the question . . . is attested by the fact

that thirty-four states, as friends of the Court, supported

9

Georgia’s request that the decision be reviewed on

certiorari. And so we brought the case here.” Id., at 161.

(emphasis added).

Your Amici, thirty-six States of the Union, are here

again urging this Court to accept a case on certiorari which

raises an important 93 concerning federal / state / muni-

cipal relations.

II

THE ISSUE WAS PROPERLY APPEALABLE

WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE

COHEN DOCTRINE

The order of the District Court must be inspected

carefully, for it is apparent to your Amici that the courts

below misconstrued the original motion of the Petitioner.

The manner in which the District Court’s order is framed

indicates that the District Court interpreted the original

motion as a request to amend the complaint in order to con-

vert the prior action, on behalf of the State, into a class

action on behalf of all unnamed political subdivisions."

The actual intent of the Petitioner’s motion, was not to

convert the prior action into a class action, but rather it was

an attempt to amend the complaint to bring the action solely

“pursuant to provisions of the New ae Antitrust Act,

N. J. S.A. 56:9-12 (b).“

The Petitioner’s claim is that it has been empowered by

N.J.S.A. 56:9-12(b), pursuant to the powers reserved to the

States by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Con-

11 “For these reasons, the motion of the plaintiff State of New Jersey

for leave to file an amended complaint converting the prior action

on behalf of the State into a class action on behalf of all unnamed

political subdivisions of the State is denied.” (Emphasis added by

your Amici) (App. B)

Fi Pe settle 8 oe

10

stitution, to bring antitrust actions on behalf of the State, its

political subdivisions, and public agencies wherein the

sovereign State “shall be deemed a person”. The issue there-

fore is not the proper joining and identification of parties, nor

is it the proper certification under Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P. Rather,

the issue is the extent of the State’s sovereign power over its

public agencies and political subdivisions as suggested in

Section I-A of this brief. .

Viewed in this light, your Amici urge that the order

appealed from is final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

as interpreted in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541 (1949).

It was held by the Court of Appeals below that the order

would be “final” and appealable if it met the three character-

istics of the Cohen doctrine. (App. C) It was further held

that the order satisfied the first characteristic, viz. the order

was a final determination of a separate and collateral claim

of right. However, the Court also held that the order failed

to meet the remaining two characteristics of the Cohen

doctrine. As stated in the opinion by the Court of Appeals,

below, these are:

6. (2) it must be ‘too important to be denied review,’

in the sense that it presents a serious and unsettled

question; and (3) its review cannot, in the nature of

the question that it presents, await final judgment be-

cause ‘when that time comes it will be too late effectively

to review the. order and rights conferred will have

been lost, probably irreparably.’ Id., at 546-47.” (App. C)

It can no longer be said that these two characteristics of

the Cohen doctrine are not satisfied. This is a serious

and unsettled question, the review of which cannot await

final judgment. This is not a simple question regarding alter-

native methods of proceeding, but rather it is an important,

complex, and unsettled question that goes right to the heart

11

of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The response by your Amici to this question attests to its

seriousness. (See Section 1-B, supra) Furthermore, this is not

a question that can await final judgment for review. The

order as framed has extinguished Constitutional and statutory

rights of New Jersey, which rights will be irreparably lost

if review is delayed.

For these reasons your Amici contend that the order of

the District Court did fall within the Cohen doctrine, and is

a final and appealable order.

CONCLUSION

Your Amici, thirty-six States of the Union, respectfully

urge this Court to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari

prayed for herein by your Petitioner, the State of New Jersey.

Rospert K. KILLIAN

Attorney General

GERARD J. DOWLING,

JOHN F. McKENNA,

Rosert M. LANGER

Assistant Attorneys General

State of Connecticut

Attorney General’s Office

30 Trinity Street

Hartford, Connecticut 06115

ISRAEL PACKEL

Attorney General

Gerry J. ELMAN

Deputy Attorney General

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Capitol Annex

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

WILLIAM J. BAXLEY

Atto General

State Alabama

State Administration Building

Montgomery, Alabama 36104

Jm Guy TUCKER

Justice Building

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Respectfully submitted,

EvkLLE J. YOUNGER

Attorney General

State of California

State Building

Los Angeles, California 90012

Joun P. Moore

Attorney General

State of Colorado

State Capitol

Denver, Colorado 80203

W. LAInxD STABLER, In.

Attorney General

State of Delaware

901 Farmers Bank Building

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Rosert L. SHEVIN

Attorney General

DANIEL S. DEARING

Chief Trial Counsel

State of Florida

State Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 22204

ARTHUR K. BOLTON

Attorney General

State of Georgia

State Judicial Building

Atianta, Georgia 30534

2 LES

GEORGE Par

Attorney General

State of Hawaii

State Capitol

Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

W. ANTHONY PARK

Attorney General

State of Idaho

State Capitol

Boise, Idaho 83720

WILLIAM J. Scorr

Attorney General

State of IIlinois

Office of the Attorney General

188 West Randolph Street

Suite 220

Chicago, IIlinois 60601

THEODORE L. SEN DAK

Attorney General

State of Indiana

219 State House

Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

VERN MILLER

Attorney General

State of Kansas

State Capitol Building

Topeka, Kansas 66612

Ep W. Hancock

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Kentucky

State Capitol

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR.

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

State Capitol Building

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

FRANCIS B. BURCH

Attorney General

State of Maryland

1 S. Calvert, 11th Floor

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

RosBErT H. QUINN

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Room 373, State House

Boston, Massachusetts 02133

FRANK J. KELLEY

Attorney General

State of Michigan

525 W. Ottowa Street

Lansing, Michigan 48933

ROBERT L. WOODAHL

Attorney General

State of Montana

Capitol Building

Helena, Montana 59601

CLARENCE A. H. MEYER

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

2119 State Capitol

Lincoln, Nebraska 68509

ROBERT LIST

Attorney General

State of Nevada

Supreme Court Building

Carson City, Nevada 89701

WARREN B. RUDMAN

Attorney General

State of New Hampshire

State House Annex

Concord, New Hampshire 03301

Davip L. NorvELL

Attorney General

State of New Mexico

P. O. Box 2246

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

ALLEN I. OLSON

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

State Capitol

Bismarck, North Dakota 58501

LARRY DERRYBERRY

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

112 State Capitol Building

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105

R. LEE JOHNSON

Attorney General

State of Oregon

102 State Office Building

Salem, Oregon 97301

RICHARD J. ISRAEL

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

Providence County Courthouse

Providence, Rhode Island 02903

DANIEL R. McLEop

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

Hampton Office Building

Columbia, South Carolina 29201

KERMIT A. SANDE

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

State Capitol

Pierre, South Dakota 57501

R. A. ASHLEY, JR.

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

Supreme Court Building

Nashville, Tennessee 37219

JOHN L. HILL

Attorney General

State of Texas

P. O. Box 12548

Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General

WILLIAM T. Evans

Assistant Attorney General

State of Utah

State Capitol

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

KIMBERLY B. CHENEY

Attorney General

State of Vermont

Pavilion Office Building

109 State Street

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

SLADE GORTON

Attorney General

State of Washington

Dexter Horton Building

Seattle, Washington 98104

CHAUNCEY H. BROWNING, JR.

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

State Capitol

Charleston, West Virginia 25305