Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Allied Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Board

Supreme Court brief1975

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— CIBRAR Y pn"Supreme court, U.

FILED

DEC 6 1974

CHAEL RODAK, JR.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No 7 710

AR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,

—against—

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent,

—and—

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Intervenors.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

See —— ——

SAMUEL J. COHEN

Attorney for Petitioner

605 Third Avenue

New York, N. Y. 10016

Tei. No. (212) 682-6077

Of Counsel:

COHEN, WEISS and SIMON

HENRY WEISS

ROBERT S. SAVELSON

STEPHEN B. MOLDOF

MICHAEL E. ABRAM

ewe .

INDEX

Questions Presented ......-...-+-+seeeeceeeees

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Statement of the Cage .

Current Mutual Aid Paet and CAB Response

Earlier Limited Forms of the Mutual Aid Pact

and CAB Response q ö

ARGUMENT—

Point I—By permitting a carrier to bargain with

financial assurance that acceptance of a strike

may be more profitable than continued service,

widening industrial disputes, allowing an air

carrier to render such or no service as it may

choose irrespective of its certificated obligations

and requiring contributions from all members

without regard to ability to pay, the Mutual Aid

Pact is adverse to the public interest as defined

in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

Statutory Framework .............-+++00+-

The Adverse Effects of Mutual Aid are Well-

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PRIA te wr

Rage Pb Ctl eine.

awh ow

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1. Profit-Making Strikes

2. Partial Strike- Bound Operations .........

3. The Board Responded to the Dangers of Pro-

longed Industrial Strife in a Manner Totally

Adverse to the Public Interest ..........

a. Redefinition of the Public Interest;

“Reasonable” Settlements ...........

b. Myth of Promoting Financial Stability

c. Myth of Pressure to Settle Strikes .....

4. The Pact Requires Contributions from

Members Without Regard to Ability to Pay

Point II—The Mutual Aid Pact widens the scope

of industrial conflict beyond the parties to a

dispute and violates limitations on multi-

employer action and carrier self-help under

the Railway Labor Act ....................

The Pact Widens the Scope of Labor Disputes

and is Inconsistent with Limitations on

Multi-employer Economic Activity Against

ö·˙d«˙ R ⅛¾ “nAÄ 2

The Pact Does not Constitute Proper Carrier

“Self-Help” in Accordance with the Railway

—.. ̃ ᷣ K ⁵˙· rt err

Point III As a multicarrier combination to con-

trol and depress labor costs, the Mutual Aid

Pact violates the antitrust laws and is not ex-

empted from antitrust regulation by CAB

—! ² mm %⅛ð⸗ „d ²̃

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SSV A SLE RIPE LK) 22

PAGE

NA CPD LEO

iii

AUTHORITIES CITED

Court Cases

American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 318

P. ͤ ũõ (“fk ͤ (v besesaens

Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Ter-

minal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969) ..............

Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry.,

% rae ee eee

Chicago and N.W. Ry. v. United Transportation

e ndccsatassoands

Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y.

PP . Pn a. ee

Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409

/ ˙ĩ᷑—T—,. ͤ eee ees

Kennedy v. Long Island R. R., 211 F. Supp. 478, 488

(S. D. N. V. 1962) aff' d., 319 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.

1963), cert. denied 375 U. S. 830

NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) ..........

NLRB v. Erie Resister Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963)

NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967)

NLRB v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 F.2d

t Wek ö!

NLRB v. Inland Trucking Co., 440 F.2d 562 (7th

NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int’] Union, 361 U.S.

OUT CHR) hos Stree ST EN

NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.

TAT

NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87

— ⅛ ß . ͤ

New York Mailers’ Local 6 v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 292

1 ² oc kK ˙ VmA ⅛˙ům ¼ 0.

PAGE

122

ed e Ne, ere

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 442 F.2d 246

8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 8711 17

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,

e œũQmGmfm . 11, 30

United Transportation Union v. Burlington North-

ern, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1125 (D. D.C. 1971) .... 27

CAB Decisions and Orders

Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, —— CAB ——,

Order 73-2-110 (1973)))) 6, 7, 8, passim

Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement (Renewal), ——

CAB ——, Order 70-7-114 (1970) ............ 2

ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 37 CAB 748

— aaa <eks sicuee canes eaeens 15

Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 CAB 559, Order

,, ̃ !. becouse euboaes 9

Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 CAB 168, Recon-

sideration Denied, 30 CAB 90 (1959) 9,17

Statutes

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12, et seg. .............. 29

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C.

%%Tũ 5, 9, 13, 17

Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141

OC MOE Siac dc ne sad ͤ KA 12, 27

Railway Labor Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151

JJ ᷣͤ ͤᷣ VVV 11, 12, 23, 27

nes Bat, BB een vineckctdccncaceacea.s 12, 29

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974

No.

1 —

Air LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,

—against—

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, :

Respondent,

—and—

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Intervenors.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Air Line Pilots Association, International ALPA“)

respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit entered in the above entitled

action on August 8, 1974.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit is reported at -— U.S.

App. D.C. —, 502 F.2d 453. It is reprinted as Appendix

eee e eee e cee eee

A in the separate Appendix volume submitted herewith.

Order 707-114 of the Civil Aeronautics Board (“ Board“

or CAB“), approving the airline industry Mutual Aid

Pact as amended, is reprinted as Appendix I and is not

reported. Order 70-11-110 of the CAB, vacating Order

70-7-114 and remanding for further evidentiary proceed-

ings, reprinted as Appendix J, is not reported. Order

73-110 of the CAB, approving the Mutua! Aid Pact as

‘amended, reprinted as Appendix K, is not reported. Earlier

orders of the CAB on the Mutual Aid Pact are reprinted

as Appendices B through H.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

August 8, 1974. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

judgment herein by writ of certiorari under 49 U.S.C.

§ 1486 (f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1).

Questions Presented

(1) Is a multi-carrier plan participated in by nearly

all U.S. air carriers and having the following chief attri-

butes:

Virtually all U.S. air carriers* are members and

contribute financially;

Pact payments permit a carrier to bargain with a

single union having financial assurance that the ac-

ceptance of a strike may be more profitable than con-

tinued service;

* Excluding Delta, Allegheny, and Southern.

—— 2 —

OO — — 2 2——ꝛ

The Pact widens industrial disputes by multicarrier

participation beyond the bargaining unit without con-

sent to multicarrier bargaining by the bargaining unit

representative;

The Pact has been accompanied by long service in-

terruptions in air transportation;

The Pact requires contributions from all carriers

without regard to ability to pay;

It demonstrably depends upon confrontation labor

tactics;

It enables the carrier to render such or no service as

it may choose irrespective of its certificated obliga-

tions;

consistent with national labor policy and public interest as

enunciated in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958?

(2) Is a multi-carrier negotiating and anti-strike plan

which brings to bear the economic strength of the entire

industry in the collective bargaining process on a single

air carrier, accompanied by assurance of financial support

to the single carrier immediately involved, in an amount

which makes the acceptance of a strike more financially

rewarding than the settlement of a dispute and which

widens the single carrier and labor organization dispute to

an industry-wide confrontation, consistent with the na-

tional labor policy and the provisions of the Railway Labor

Act?

(3) Is a multi-carrier combination and conspiracy to

contain or depress labor costs throughout an entire indus-

try consistent with the antitrust laws of the United States

or subject to the power of the CAB to exempt from anti-

trust regulation?

— — ELE —— LE AEE ea Ro Fly be

Statutes Involved

The pertinent provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as

amended (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seg.), the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. § 1801, et geg.), the

Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 et seg.) and Clayton Act (15

U.S.C. § 12 et seg.) are set out as Appendix L.

Statement of the Case

In summary, the Mutual Aid Pact is a multi-carrier Pact

having almost industry-wide U.S. airline participation, in-

cluding Pan American World Airways. Mutual Aid Pact

participants have obligated themselves to assessments pay-

able to a carrier struck as a result of a labor dispute with a

particular union. As designed under the Pact and applied,

the carrier in negotiations is assured in advance that if it

is struck a total sum will be received which has turned a

losing operation into a profit-making picture during the

strike period. Coupled with the selection by the struck

carrier of the operation of its most profitable routes and

_ denial of service over monopoly routes generating the least

PRA eres A PAWL

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profit, in order to maximize Pact profits, the net effect has

been to make acceptance of a total or partial strike more

attractive and desirable than a settlement. When, as it has

been applied, this is tied to acceptance of a strike during

off-peak season the negative incentive to the early settle-

ment of labor disputes is greatly compounded.

The Mutual Aid Pact is based upon the premise of con-

frontation labor tactics by the infusion of massive work-

ing capital. This escalates the single carrier dispute into

actual industry-wide confrontation. Although not so

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denominated, the industry-wide bargaining and confronta-

tion occurs, without the consent of the single union bargain-

ing with a single carrier. This has had the effect of

prolonging labor disputes to the detriment of the traveling

public and the employee groups. The payments are exacted

without regard to those carriers who have had the greatest

number of strikes. No incentive within the arrangement

exists to encourage reasonabie accommodations and peace-

ful labor relations. To the contrary, the rewards have gone

and are calculated to go to those carriers most prone to

confrontation labor tactics. This has been at the direct

expense of far weaker carriers such as Pan American

whose labor relations have been essentially peaceful.* The

consequences to the public interest and the employees’ in-

terest in a stable U.S. air carrier system and fulfillment of

national labor policy have been most adverse.

As the pilot-representing organization on every Pact

carrier but one** and the flight attendant representative on

twelve Pact carriers, ALPA opposed CAB approval of the

Mutual Aid Pact under Section 412 of the Federal Aviation

Act, 49 U.S.C. §1382, which required disapproval of the

Pact if adverse to the public interest or in violation of the

Railway Labor Act. The CAB in 1973 approved the Pact

in current form, by a vote of 3-2, against the recommenda-

tion of its administrative law judge who called for dis-

approval of the latest Pact amendments escalating Pact

* Pan American World Airways has not experienced a strike since

August 1969 and has received no Pact benefits since that strike. Yet

from the beginning of 1969 to the present Pan American has paid out

net Pact benefits totalling $22,815,745. In the first three quarters of

1974 alone Pan American has paid out $5,924,654. See discussion,

Point I, infra. ;

** American Airlines.

eek Wer wie eee

232 2

benefits and annual maximum liability of Pact members.

(App. 226a).“

Despite the multicarrier impact of Mutual Aid, all bar-

gaining by ALPA-represented employees is conducted by

the employees themselves on a single-carrier basis.

Current Mutual Aid Pact and CAB Response

Based on 1969-1970 amendments, the Mutual Aid Pact

currently guarantees to any struck carrier member meet-

ing limited criteria fifty percent of its normal air transport

operating expenses for shutdown flight operations, during

the first fourteen days of the strike, and additional amounts

ranging down to thirty-five percent of normal operating

expenses throughout ‘the remainder of the strike. (App.

314a). Every Pact member contributes on the basis of (a)

_ windfail revenue based on a contributor’s increased rev-

enue because of the strike and (b) supplemental payments

in proportion of the contributor’s air transport operating

Werne

revenue for the prior year to the total revenue for all mem-

bers, up to a maximum annual supplemental payment lia-

bility for each member of one percent of the prior year's

operating revenue. There is no provision in the Paet for

exempting any member from liability if required by finan-

*“App.” references herein are to the separate ndix volume.

“Tr.” references are to transcripts of the proceedings held before the

Hearing Examiners (Administrative Law Judges) before the CAB

and reproduced with pagination unchanged from the original in the

volumes entitled “Exhibits to Joint Appendix,” filed in the Court of

— “Ex.” refers to the exhibits introduced into evidence by

PA or the Carrier or Trunk Carrier parties, also reproduced in

the “Exhibits to Joint Appendix” volume. — designated “I”

ate to the 1968 evidentiary hearing; references designated “II” are

to the 1971 evidentiary ‘earing.

cial considerations and a member may withdraw only on

a year’s written notice. (App. 320a).

The record before the Board demonstrated that these

high level of Pact benefits fortified struck carriers’ resist-

ance to union demands without leading to any moderation

of the demands, thus unnecessarily prolonging labor dis-

putes to the detriment of the public interest in air service.

The record also demonstrated that high level of Pact bene-

fits created a strong incentive for struck carrier to prolong

a strike for the short term benefits, particularly where the

carrier is operating at a loss.“ The one percent supple-

mental payment liability represented a serious financial

drain on weak air carriers to the benefit of the financially

strong. Payments have gone in large measure irrespective

of a carrier’s abrasive and disruptive labor policy. See

discussion, Point I, infra.

Despite these clear defects in the amended Mutual Aid

Pact system, the Board’s 3-2 majority refused to disap-

prove the amended Pact. Tne Board held that the publie's

interest in avoiding prolonged strikes because of carrier

strike profits was not an “appropriate issue,” but that the

proper issue was “reasonableness” of labor settlements.

* This is precisely what happened in a flight attendant strike

against TWA in November-December 1973 At that time

3 ith TWA Board int tp C. Tillinghast: “Oddly.

of an interview wi : >

TWA’s profits for 1973 wili be better off if

before year end, Tillinghast noted. That's because TWA is receiving

income under mutual aid’ agreements with other airlines. And mean-

while salary, fuel and other expenses have been shut off. Should the

strike end now, the mutual-aid income would end and all the ex-

penses would resume. Yet for several weeks. TWA’s revenues would

be — since reservations fell with the strike news, Tillinghast

explained.”

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The Board then held that U.S. air carriers would not “re-

sist settlement on a reasonable basis. (App. 234a).

With respect to the financial drain of high levels of Pact

liability, the Board held that Mutual Aid is a form of

insurance and that the “choice of whether to pay what it

costs to have such insurance is . . . for the individual car-

rier to make.” (App. 246a). Members Murphy and Min-

etti, agreeing with Judge Present that the 1969 Pact

amendments should be disapproved, stated:

“The critical point is that under the 1969 amend-

ments a struck carrier’s mutual aid benefits can be

so generous that it can show an operating profit

while its operations are shut down by a strike.”

(App. 261a).

* * *

“We also agree with the judge - though this in our

view is a lesser factor that the increased liability

of participating carriers to pay supplemental bene-

fits under the 1969 amendments poses an unaccept-

able threat to the financial stability of the paying

carriers. As the judge pointed out, the defect of the

Agreement’s provision for supplemental payments

is that it takes no account of the current financial

condition of a paying carrier; and, indeed, the bulk

of the mutual aid payments since the 1969 amend-

ments took effeci have been to otherwise highly

profitable carriers from carriers who were currently

either losing money or earning less than a reason-

able return on investment.” (App. 264a).

Earlier Limited Forms of the Mutual Aid

Pact and CAB Response

The Mutual Aid Pact began as a highly limited arrange-

ment and has been gradually broadened to increase the

pressure on airline unions with continued acquiescence by

* ——UUU— —

the CAB. The original Pact had only six members“ and in

essence provided that in the event of strikes seeking settle-

ments in excess of or opposed to presidential emergency

board recommendation, called before exhaustion of Railway

Labor Act procedures, or “otherwise unlawful,” a Pact

member would receive only windfall payments from the

other members. To maximize windfall, the Pact also pro-

vided that struck carriers would direct as much traffic as

possible to other Pact members. Despite this limited form,

however, the plan was clearly an opening wedge in a long-

term airline industry labor relations carapaign. As later

found by the Board’s Hearing Examiner,

“ . . itis evident that one of the motivating factors

[for the first Pact] was a dissatisfaction with the

operation of the Railway Labor Act in the air trans-

portation industry. The carriers under the leader-

ship of the ATA apparently extensively explored

ways and means to rectify the deficiencies which

the air carriers believed made it unsuitable for the

air transportation industry regardless of its effec-

tiveness in the railroad industry.” (App. 82a-83a).

The Board approved this original Mutual Aid Pact under

Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act on the theory that

the Pact would promote “freedom from industrial strife”

in the airline industry. (App. 10a). The Board disap-

proved the traffic referral clause intended to maximize

windfall payments, but otherwise approved the Pact

against antitrust attack and held that its “order of ap-

proval would grant immunity from the antitrust laws.”

(App. 1la-12a).

* American Airlines, Capital Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Pan Amer-

ican World Airways, Trans World Airlines, United Air Lines.

Thereafter the carriers began their program of amend-

ing and broadening the Mutual Aid Pact. In amendments

from 1959 through 1962 the Pact was made applicable to

almost all strikes against a Pact member. (App. 84a).

Four additional carriers (National, Braniff, Northwest,

Continental) joined the Pact, extending membership to

ben airlines carrying approximately ninety percent of all

trunkline traffic in 1959 (App. 43a), and the Pact was

continued in effect on an indefinite basis with limited with-

drawal rights. Thereafter in 1962 the Pact was again

amended to provide for the first supplemental payments

feature, which guaranteed that a carrier member would

receive twenty-five percent of its normal air transport

operating expenses for shutdown flight operations and

which provided a maximum annual supplemental payment

liability for each member of one-half of one percent of the

prior year’s air transport operating revenues. (App. 123a).

Over dissents of member Minetti and Vice-Chairman

Murphy, the CAB in 1964 approved these amendments for

three years, finding the recent past had “not been typical

either as to the industry, played with the capacity problem,

or labor-management relations, preoccupied with the crew

compliment issue. (App. 48a). This was followed

by the 1969-1970 Pact a nendments doubling supplemental

payment liability and opening the Pact to local service

carriers for the first time. The Pact as thus amended was

approved by the Board in proceedings under review here.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

ALPA and six other labor organizations sought review

of the Board’s 1970 and 1973 orders approving the Mutual

Aid Pact as amended. Two other unions intervened in the

eee —— RM.

proceedings on the side of petitioners; the trunkline car-

rier and local service carrier members of the Mutual Aid

Pact intervened on the side of the CAB. The Court of

Appeals sustained the Board’s orders against ALPA’s con-

tentions based on the public interest, Railway Labor Act,

and antitrust laws. (App. p. iv).

Reasons for Granting the Writ

The chief attributes of the Mutual Aid Pact have been

briefly described. These attributes indicate the public

interest, labor policy and antitrust issues raised by the

Board majority decisions approving the widened Pact.

The Pact permits a certificated air carrier to bargain with

a single union on the assurance that acceptance of a strike

can be more profitable than continued service, and is ad-

verse to the interest of the public whose benefit is paramount

in air regulation. The plan enables the carrier to render

such or no service as it may choose irrespective of its cer-

tificated obligation, so that the Board’s decisions allowing

the plan to go forward requires scrutiny at the highest

judicial levels. The need for review in the present case is

compounded by the demonstrated loss of critical working

capital to such carriers as Pan American World Airways

and United Air Lines; the financial conditions of these and

other carriers suggests that the CAB would have better

served the public by regulating the industry as required

by law rather than approving the Mutual Aid system with

no provision for the finances of unprofitable carriers.

The Court of Appeals below was also in a position to

scrutinize the Mutual Aid system with reference to Rail-

way Labor Act obligations, for it is the role of the federal

Courts to interpret and apply the RLA in light of the na-

tional labor policy. Unfortunately, the Court declined to

exercise its responsibilities with reference to labor policy

issues raised by Mutual Aid and approved the Pact as a

routine instance of economic self-help, on the basis of a

Taft-Hartley decision that on analysis has no bearing here.

Correctly viewed, however, the Pact does not represent a

self-help effort, but is an industry-wide economic effort in

the context of single-carrier bargaining relationships.

This type of effort is antithetical to our national labor

policy of containing labor disputes to the employer who is

bargaining over the disputed contract. in addition, what

the Court below missed is the large difference between the

Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Act schemes, for the

latter statute regulates an employer’s economic weapons

always with an eye on certificated carrier obligations. But

the effect of the Pact, contrary to RLA limitations, is to

enable and encourage a regulated air carrier to accept a

strike and render such service as will increase Pact bene-

fits—even by shutting down service on monopoly routes.

oe — R

The Pact exists as an inter- carrier combination with the

purpose of jointly containing labor costs; this violates the

Sherman Act on its face, for this kind of multiemployer

activity is exempted from the Sherman Act only where the

employees affected have agreed on multiemployer bargain-

ing. However, the Board holds that it has power to exempt

the Pact from the antitrust laws, contrary to the rulings in

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371

U.S. 296 (1963) and Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Air-

lines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).

These issues, significant as they are, are of double im-

portance by virtue of their industry-wide character. For

ne 2 . 2 8 1

—— U ICR LEE ——— 22 NL Re CC —

——— DO — — — BE BD

nearly the entire United States aviation industry have

pooled their resources in the Mutual Aid Pact. The CAB

has all but abdicated its regulatory function toward this

industry by approving the Pact as amended, and the Court

below acquiesced in the Board’s failures as if the Mutual

Aid Pact were not a case of critical significance for one

of the most important industries in the United States. It is

respectfully suggested that this Court should rectify the

Board’s unwillingness to confront the serious dangers

posed by Mutual Aid.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

By permitting a carrier to bargain with financial

assurance that acceptance of a strike may be more

profitable than continued service, widening industrial

disputes, allowing an air carrier to render such or no

service as it may choose irrespective of its certificated

obligations and requiring contributions from all mem-

bers without regard to ability to pay, the Mutual Aid

Pact is adverse to the public interest as defined in the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

Statutory Framework

Section 412(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49

U.S.C. S 1382, required the Board to disapprove the Mutual

Aid Pact and amended Pact if the Pact was found “adverse

to the public interest or in violation of this Act... .” The

public interest objectives mandated by the Aviation Act

plainly include the public. interest in uninterrupted air

» 5

— . —— — — —ö—4—4TZ Au — ̃ — . — —

a service and the financial well-being of all certificated car-

i riers. See Federal Aviation Act, Section 102, 49 U.S.C.

7 § 1302.

The Adverse Effects of Mutual Aid

: are Well-Documented

The multiple defects of the Mutual Aid system are well-

documented on the record of the case. N

sinter 32>

1. Profit-Making Strikes

The national labor policy assumes that employee strikes

are an available technique for moderating the goals of both

parties to a dispute, but the Mutual Aid Pact as amended

actually permits a carrier to bargain with a single union

with financial assurance that the acceptance of a strike may

be more profitable than continued service. The record re-

veals the remarkable fact as noted by Members Murphy

and Minetti that “a struck carrier’s mutual aid benefits

can be so generous that it can show an operating profit while

its operations are shut down by a strike.” (App. 26la).

As a result, the 1969 amendments produce the actual danger

of longer and longer airline strikes. These are the uncon-

troverted facts found by Judge Present:

“National, although it conducted no operations

during the approximately four-month strike by

ALEA, with the aid of mutual aid receipts amount-

ing to $27,985,000, earned, during the strike period,

net income of $810,000 after $8.4 million in charges

for depreciation and amortization.

“Northwest, which during the five-month strike by

BRAC conducted an average of about 29 percent of

its operations, achieved a net profit before income

taxes of $17.9 million during the strike period after

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deducting $32.8 million in charges for depreciation

and amortization. The carrier’s mutual aid receipts

totaled $47,287,000.

“TWA incurred a net loss before income taxes of

$879,000 during the two-day strike to which it was

subjected in October 1970. That result reflects

charges for depreciation and amortization in the

amount of $621,000 and mutual aid receipts of

$2,452,000. The carrier maintained about 25 per-

cent of its operations during the two days. How-

ever TWA estimated that, if it had not suffered

the strike, it would have lost $1,687,000 during the

two-day strike period, so that the carrier actually

gained $808,000 for the period of the strike.

“Mohawk received mutual aid for the first quarter

of 1971. It conducted no operations during the strike

and received no subsidy for that period. Yet, it hd

a net profit of $29,000 for this quarter after taking

‘ato account $1.8 million in depreciation and amor-

tization and $1.4 million in nonoperating expenses.”

(App. 287a-288a; emphasis added).

Increasing management’s capacity to resist union bar-

gaining positions, demonstrated by Pan American’s testi-

mony in the 1968 hearing for the pre-1969 Pact, was like-

wise recognized by the Board as a primary objective of the

1969 amendments. (App. 233a).

The effect of Pact payments on industrial strife is par-

ticularly dramatic when a financially weak carrier is in-

volved in a strike. As found by Judge Present:

“Tt was earlier noted that TWA was financially

better off during the two-day strike it incurred in

1970 than if it had fully operated on those days.

The really dramatic picture is shown when a weak

16.

carrier is involved. Thus, for the quarter ended

March $1, 1971, the period for which Mohawk re-

ceived mutual aid, without any operations or sub-

sidy the carrier enjoyed an operating profit of

$1,445,000 and a net income after special items of

$29,000. In contrast, for the three months ended

March 31, 1969, on the basis of its Form 41 reports,

the carrier realized from its operations (including

$592,000 in subsidy) an operating profit of only

$890,000. Furthermore, after special items it suf-

fered. a net loss of $421,000.” (App. 296a-297a,

footnotes omitted).

The Pact as amended has in fact been accompanied by

strikes among the longest in airline history. From the Pact

amendments through 1972, there were six major strikes

on Pact carriers; 119 days, 160 days, 154 days, 115 days,

95 days and 71 days. Northwest’s two strikes total 255 days

from July 1970—October 1972. Local service carriers

Mohawk, Hughes Airwest and Ozark were struck a total

of 340 days, a figure previously unheard for regional air-

lines with the exception of the 1900-1962 Southern-ALPA

dispute.* (App. 218a-219a).

2, Partial Strike-Bound Operations

Since the Pact has functioned principally in Northwest’s

interest (App. 298a), and Northwest has likewise pioneered

the use of a partial operation and the Pact to maximize its

net profit, the 1970 Northwest-BRAC’* strike merits

special consideration.

Starting in July 1970, Northwest conducted a partial

operation throughout the five month strike. At different

See ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 37 CAB 748 (1962).

** Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks.

— 24 eee

times, it sought injunctive relief to prohibit mechanics and

pilots from respecting legal BRAC picket lines. In Decem-

ber 1970, the Eighth Circuit actually prohibited pilots from

concerted honoring of picket lines. See Northwest Airlines,

Inc. v. ALPA, 442 F. 2d 246 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

404 U.S. 871. This combination of events (1) eliminated

effective inter-union assistance while (2) allowing effective

inter-carrier assistance through Pact payments to North-

west.

In the absence of any constraint or regulation by the

CAB, Northwest itself decided the service which was to be

eliminated, in a manner indicating intent to maximize

profits and Pact payments, at the expense of the public and

its fellow paying carriers, rather than taking action based

upon the needs or convenience of the public over its route

system.

In pursuing its objectives, Northwest eliminated (1) vir-

tually all service over its monopoly routes, where no alter-

native routing was available to the public; (2) a large

proportion of service over routes which were served by

another Pact member from which it would receive windfall

and other payments; and (3) the smallest proportion of

service over routes on which it was competing with airlines

which were not Pact members. These latter were prin-

cipally long and generally profitable overseas routes also

served by foreign carriers. The net effect of this opera-

tion was to obtain large Pact benefits, while continuing to

obtain revenue from the operations where the competition

did not belong to the Pact. (ALPA II, Exs. 1-4). North-

west pioneered in this effort to maximize Pact benefits

while continuing to operate. While it did not take ad-

vantage of every opportunity in this regard, it showed

how it could be done, thereby providing the model likely

to be followed in the future. This pattern of shutdown

operations is not consistent with public service require-

ments.

3. The Board Responded to the of Prolonget

Industrial

ial Strife in a Manner Totally Adverse to the

Pablic Interest.

a. Redefinition of the Public Interest;

“Reasonable” Settlements

The 1959 Board decision defined the “public interest” in

terms of whether the Pact:

“,.. threatens, by aggravation of labor disputes, to

hinder achievement of the objective set forth in Sec-

tion 102 of the Federal Aviation Act. The public

interest which we must guard, though not broadly

one of employee welfare, includes attainment of a

degree of stability and efficiency in air transporta-

tion that freedom from industrial strife will pro-

vide.” (App. 10a)

As previously discussed, the 1972 Board decision, recog-

nizing the effect of the Pact on negotiations and its intent

to increase carrier fortitude in strikes, defined the issue as

whether the Pact so shifted bargaining balance “as to

create a serious likelihood” of resistance to strike settle-

ments “on a reasonable basis in circumstances where such

a settlement was possible”, rather than as whether strikes

would end more rapidly in the absence of the Pact (App.

233a-234a). In 1973, the Board was willing to accept in-

creased industrial strife if there was no “serious likeli-

hood” that carriers would resist strike settlement on a “rea-

sonable basis“ — defined solely by the carrier in its own

self-interest while receiving Pact payments—“in circum-

stances where such a settlement was possible“ —again as

defined by the carrier in its own interest while receiving

Pact payments.

The Board’s redefinition of the issues in terms of “reason-

able” labor settlements is an unacceptable claim cf au-

thority to decide the terms of labor settlements. Moreover,

regardless of Board attempts to define and redefine the

standard for determining whether the Pact is “adverse to

the public interest” or violates the statute, the prior de-

tailed discussion of the record conclusively demonstrates

that the Pact is contrary to the public interest in “freedom

from industrial strife”, does create a serious likelihood that

carriers will resist strike settlements and makes lengthy

strikes inevitable.

b. Myth of Promoting Financial Stability

The Board also held that the risk of prolonged strife is

outweighed by airline financial stability promoted by in-

increased Pact payments. Nonetheless, the 1971 record

finally disposed of the myth that increased Pact payments

are intended, designed or required to maintain financial

stability on struck carriers. Examiner Present found:

“There is no denying that the higher level of bene-

fits bolsters a struck carrier, but the Trunkline Car-

rier Parties have made no showing that an increase

in mutual aid benefits was required to maintain the

stability of any of the carriers involved in these

strikes. Certainly, the record does not indicate that

the 1966 experience established a need for a higher

level of payments. As shown in Appendix F, the

carriers struck by IAM realized rates of return on

investment in 1966 ranging from 7.30 percent by

Eastern to 21.88 percent by Northwest. National,

which did not belong to the mutual aid agreement at

the time, enjoyed a rate of return on investment of

15.87 percent. Indeed, it was not until a meeting

among pact members held on August 7, 1969, that

the proposal was made to raise the ‘standard

amount’. The record is silent as to the events which

prompted this meeting, but the meeting was held

during the course of the IBT strike on Western (not

then a pact member) and just two days prior to the

IBT strike against Pan American.” (App. 286a-

287a)

e inneren

ede Se BI

See > hme | bea

The record fully supports these findings, which were not

modified by the CAB decision. There was also no effort ly

the carriers to introduce evidence that increased payments

would be likely to be required for financial stability in the

future. What the record does show is that these enormous

increases were made without any fiscal study (Tr. II 50,

61). Indeed, there was not even any financial analysis of

payments which would cover a carrier’s actual continuing

expenses during a strike with or without a partial opera-

tion. Even the expenses to be covered were undefined,

except as “the salaries are that you have to pay to your

existing employees, the ones you keep on, the rents you

have to pay, the interest you have to pay to the banks on

your loans, that sort of thing.” (Tr. II 56). The results,

as set forth above, show that the new payments do not even

approximate an attempi w merely cover so called out-of-

pocket expenses, per contra regularly produce profits for

the strike period.

—

Been ce srk nes 208 thE Mian iene ere

ee ea a ee ee —

c. Myth of Pressure to Settle Strikes

Rather than confront specific record evidence of profit-

making strikes, the Board found that in general carriers

are under pressure to settle strikes. But if a carrier is

better off by permitting a strike to continue, thus reaping

operating profits instead of normal losses, there is no

meaningful pressure to settle the strike (See App. 262a).

In other respects, too, the Board’s effort to discount the

danger of profit-making strikes is most unconvincing.

Thus, operating profits under the amended Pact would go

still higher if the carriers did not take strike losses for

“depreciation” of equipment that is not being used and is

not substantially depreciating because its useful life is

extended by the length of service. The Board’s emphasis

on “post-strike” losses as discounting strike profits is

equally baseless. The Board has never studied the nature

or incidence of post-strike losses, and the facts are that

many post-strike losses, such as starting-up costs, occur

whatever length the strike may take. (See App. 263a).

Finally, it is significant that the Board and Court failed

to conside. the dangers of profitable exploitation of the

Pact through partial strike bound operations, i. e., the 1970

Northwest experience. Js the certificate-granting Federal

authority, the CAB was ind is responsible for preventing

the Northwest pattern of evading public obligations for

immediate profit. The Board’s failure to deal with this

issue further indicates that approval of the Pact should

be reversed.

4. The Pact Requires Contributions from Members

Without Regard to Ability to Pay.

Uncontroverted data demonstrates that the increased

supplemental payments required by the 1969 amendments

. A PE se ewe ree

have been largely received by carriers which did not need

support and have been paid by carriers which couid not

afford to give away large amounts of their working capital.

Judge Present properly found:

“A review of mutual aid data over the life of the

agreement again shows that the greatest recipients

have been among the relatively more profitable mem-

bers. Thus, the recipient of the largest amount of

mutual aid has by far been Northwest, which has

had net receipts cf $49,871,000. Yet, in eight of the

ten vears from 1961 through 1970, Northwest had

the highest rate of return on investment of any of

the present trunkline pact members. National was

the next highest recipient of pact aid, a net of

$26,185,000. But, over the period 1961 through 1970,

it had the highest rate of return on investment in one

year, the second highest in four years, and in only

two years was not among the top haif of the present

group of trunkline members of the Pact.” (App.

299a; footnotes omitted.)

Judge Present also found, in the absence of any carrier

studies or provision in the Pact taking into account the

relative financial conditions of paying and receiving car-

riers, that the principal contributors have been the weaker

airlines and that the contention “that the carriers were able

to make the payments called for by the agreement without

impairment of their financial condition is hollow.” (App.

299a). The 1972 Initial Decision said in part:

% the highest contributor under the agree-

ment has been United, with net payments in the

amount of $28,223,000. United has been in the top

half of the ten present trunkline members of the

pact only once in terms of rate of return on invest-

ment during the ten-year period reviewed. That was

in 1969 when the carrier reached fifth place. The

carrier’s rate of return on investment over this pe-

riod did not exceed 9.82 percent and was as low as

0.59 percent. Other evidence of the adverse effect on

United of mutual aid is refiected in the carrier’s

working capital. As of December 31. 1968, United’s

working capital amounted to 845.994.000. At De-

cember 31, 1970, the carrier s working capital to-

talled $17,520,000. The carrier estimated that if

there were no mutual zid «greeiment its working

capital would have been {7.225.900 at December 31,

1970. The n xt highest pever of mutual aid has been

Pan Amorie in, in the net 2mount of $21,846,000.

Pas Amer u has been in the top half of the pact

mer. e:, om terms of rate of return on investment,

te: ~. in the ten-yerr period, but since 1963, it

has ‘ed the topf only once, fifth place in

1967. de carrier had a negative rate of return on

inves. ,ent in 1969 and a return of only 0.51 percent

in 1970.” (App. 299a-300a)

Moreover, Pan American has not suffered a strike since a

brief five-day work stoppage in August 1969—contradict-

ing carrier allegations that the weakest carriers experience

the most strikes. (See App. 262a.) Yet, according to public

record Form 41 documents filed with the CAB, Pan Amer-

ican from 1969 through the third quarter of calendar 1974

has distributed Pact payments in the net amount of

$22,815,745, including $2,765,029 paid out in the third

quarter of 1974 alone. In fact, Pan American’s total cash

distribution under Mutual Aid for the first three quarters

of 1974 alone has been $5,924,654 or approximately four-

teen cents per share of common stock outstanding. In re-

turn, Pan American has received no Pact benefits since

1969.

The Board sought to sustain the discriminatory impact

of the Pact by denominating the Pact as a “form of strike

insurance, stating that the choice of paying the costs of

this “insurance” is for the carrier to make. On the con-

trary, the Pact is not a form of insurance. Neither the

inception of a strike nor its duration are altogether beyond

the control of management. Moreover, the Board, not the

carriers, must decide whether the costs of Mutual Aid are

not adverse to the public interest. In the present case, the

high level of Pact liability coupled with discriminatory

impact on carriers with weak finances and peaceful labor

relations, required disapproval of the Pact.

POINT Iii

The Mutual Aid Pact widens the scope of industrial

conflict beyond the parties to a dispute and violates

limitations on multiemployer action and carrier self-

help under the Railway Labor Act.

It is undisputed that the Board was required to disap-

prove the Mutual Aid Pact if the Pact violates or is incon-

sistent with the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151

et seq. See Section 401 (d) (4), Federal Aviation Act, 49

U.S.C. § 1371. The Board and Court held that it is con-

sistent with the Railway Labor Act for an entire industry

to amass its economic strength to fortify the bargaining

position of a single struck carrier. These decisions are

contrary to established RLA limitations.

— ̃ LOE ILD ,. 7 SDA ALD COALS:

The Pact ä

and is Inconsistent with Limitations on Multi-

employer Economic Activity Against Employees

The Mutual Aid Pact focuses the economic power of an

entire industry against striking employees on a single

carrier where all bargaining is conducted on a single-

carrier basis, widening the scope of industrial conflict and

implicating employers who are not party to the underlying

labor dispute. However, national labor policy generally

limits the scope of industrial dispute to the employer im-

mediately affected to prevent local or particular disputes

from widening into national industry-wide industrial con-

frontation. It is particularly established that multiemployer

economic activity against employees is consistent with na-

tional labor policy only where it is a) confined to a multi-

employer bargaining unit, and b) protects the multi-

employer bargaining group in the face of union action

directed at its common front or integrity. NLRB v. Truck

Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (“Buffalo Linen“);

NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) ; New York Mailers’

Local 6 v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v.

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.

1965). In no instance may multiemployer actions focus on

single-employer bargaining relationships where the em-

ployees have refused to consent to multiemployer bargain-

ing.

In NLRB v. Brown, supra, the Court held that a tem-

porary iockout by employer members of a muitiemployer

bargaining unit in response to 4 whipsaw strike, when fol-

lowed by hiring temporary replacements for the strike-

lockout period, was not an unfair labor practice, inasmuch

as the lockout-replacement combination “was all part and

. AOD PRA Re ARENAS 7

eee

Nee

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parcel of the respondents’ defensive measure to preserve

the multi-employer group in the face of the whipsaw strike.”

380 U.S. at 284.

In NLRB v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra, the

Second Circuit also recognized the limitation on multi-

employer action advanced here. There the respondent stores

locked out employee members of the Meat Cutters Union

in response to a Meat Cutters strike against another store

chain. The Court found:

Slinee the Meat Cutters had not, either by word

or deed, committed themselves to industry-wide bar-

gaining, the food chains’ conduct lost the protective

quality which justified the Buffalo Linen lockout

. . . 340 F.2d at 692-693.

Like the multiemployer lockout in A & P, supra, the

Mutual Aid Pact is an offensive weapon of the carriers

for amassing multiemployer strength against employees

of a single carrier where no multiemployer bargaining has

been established. It is thus inconsistent with the elementary

national labor policy confining economic warfare to the

parties to the economic dispute. As a tactic for turning a

single-carrier brushfire war into an industry-wide con-

flagration, the Pact should be disapproved under the Rail-

way Labor Act. See also Kennedy v. Long Island R. R.,

211 F.Supp. 478, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d

666 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830, where the

Court upheld inter-carrier financial assistance in a context

where ml ulticarrier bargaining of labor demands, re-

ferred to as regional and national handling, has been and

is (since the Act) the customary method of collective bar-

gaining.” 211 F.Supp. at 488. And see United Trans-

92. „

aE CSP S$ AEP ARIE LA SLOP BILE SPE he GR. OE.

portation Union v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 325 F.Supp.

1125 (D.D.C. 1971) ; Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F.Supp.

600, 607 (S. D. N. V. 1970).

The Pact Does not Constitute Carrier

“Self-Help” in Accordance with Railway

Labor Act.

Under the Railway Labor Act the right of carrier “self-

help” is a strictly limited right, to be interpreted in light

of the carrier’s responsibility to make “reasonable efforts

to maintain the public service” during a strike. In Brother-

hood of Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238,

245 (1966), the Court held that a carrier faced with a

strike could take responsive economic action in the form

of continuing operations with replacements, but could only

make changes in the collective bargaining agreement of

the striking employees if they were “reasonably necessary”

to continue the operation. 384 U.S. at 248. It is apparent

from tne Court’s opinion that an employee strike under the

Railway Labor Act is not an occasion for unlimited eco-

nomic warfare, but that any carrier self-help which has

the effect of prolonging interruption of regular service is

inconsistent with the Railway Labor Act. 384 U.S. at 248,

n. 8. This holding is consistent with the comparable con-

cept under the Taft-Hartley Act, where the Court has

indicated it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer

“to replace . . striking employees with others in an effort

to carry on the business.” NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele-

graph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Yet, one of the prin-

cipal effects of the Mutual Aid Pact is to provide economic

motivation to Pact carriers in order to enable them to con-

tinue a strike until management has achieved objectives

which could not otherwise be attained.

The Board and Court held that NLRB v. Insurance

Agents’ Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), precludes judi-

cial limits on economic warfare under the Railway Labor

Act. However, self-help rights under the RLA are much

more limited than under Taft-Hartley, because of public

service requirements. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen

v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969).

Moreover, under the Railway Labor Act ii is the role of the

Federal Courts to give specific content to the broad provi-

sions and concepts of the Act, “ ‘in the way in which the

common law has developed.. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v.

United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 577 (1971).

Finally, the Board's interpretation of Insurance Agents is

much too broad, for that case only held that the Board

may not find that a union slowdown tactics while negotia-

tions are in progress are per se a refusal to bargain in good

faith, 361 U.S. at 489.

Administrative and judicial regulation of economic tac-

ties in fact has not ceased with the Insurance Agents case.

See, ¢.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375

(1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221

(1963); NLRB v. Inland Trucking Co., 440 F.2d 562

(7th Cir. 1971). See also American Ship Building Co. v.

NLRB, 380 U.S. 318 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the

result). Rather, as these cases show, employer economic

taeties are carefully limited. The Mutual Aid Pact should

also be disapproved as a multicarrier combination against

single-carrier bargaining units that broadens industrial

disputes and enables struck carriers to avoid any public

service operations.

— ——U—Ü— — — GAA EE IL! ——— —äʒ4m BLE AD —

POINT III

As a multicarrier combination to control and de-

press labor costs, the Mutual Aid Pact violates the

antitrust laws and is not exempted from antitrust

regulation by CAB approval.

The Mutual Aid Pact is a multicarrier effort to control

and depress wages and working conditions on an over-all

basis throughout the scheduled airline industry, despite

historie single carrier bargaining relationships and agree-

ments in all instances. Indeed, the 1973 Board decision

expressly relied upon a finding that the Pact gave the mem-

ber carriers “a greater measure of influence over labor

costs than they would have without the agreement.” (App.

25la). This multicarrier course of conduct violates Section

1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. As stated by the

Court in Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F.Supp. 600, 607

(S. D. N. V. 1970) (emphasis added):

Aln essential prerequisite to the legality of such

multi-employer combinations with respect to in-

dustry-wide wages or working conditions in the

existence or prospect of a joint collective bargaining

agreement with the union, which all parties concede

to be immune from the antitrust laws. * Absent

such conditions, however, a combination of employ-

ers to reduce their employees’ compensation does not

share labor’s exemption [under Section 6 of the

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17].”

The Mutual Aid Pact is not within the category of car-

rier activity which the CAB has authority to exempt from

the antitrust laws under Section 414 of the Federal Aviation

Act, 49 U.S.C. 1384. As a joint carrier effort with respect

to labor relations it is quite distinct from route awards,

rate making, mergers and simile, matters which are funda-

mental to the Board’s statutory authority for regulation of

air transportation. See Pan American World Airways, Inc.

v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Hughes Tool Co.

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).

The Court’s holding that no consideration should be

given to antitrust issues on this proceeding is clear error.

The 1969 Initial Decision, part of the proceedings under

review in the Court of Appeals, stated as an issue for con-

sideration whether the Agreement will “result in restraints

on competition.” (App. 167a). The CAB has had full op-

portunity to consider the antitrust issues implicit in the

Pact, and it is the responsibility of the Board, not the air-

line unions, to marshall evidence with respect to the public

interest impact of an inter-carrier agreement. Further-

more, the Pact violates the antitrust laws as a matter of

law, leaving no necessity for further development of the

record on this issue.

In any event the Court should review the Board’s hold-

ing, apparently approved by the Court of Appeals, that

Board approval of the Mutual Aid Pact “would grant im-

munity from the antitrust laws.” (App. 11). As shown,

the Pact is well outside the scope of the Board’s exemption

power, and it is clearly in the interests of justice to reach

this issue at the first opportunity. See Hughes Tool Co. v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra.

I —„—y—— Ea

CONCLUSION

The issues presented in this case are among the most

fundamental aviation, labor law and antitrust issues raised

in recent years. They immediately affect an entire industry

and will have wide repercussions through American indus-

trial life. For these and the foregoing reasons, it is respect-

fully urged that the Supreme Court issue a writ of certiorari

to review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia.

Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL J. COHEN

Attorney for Petitioner

605 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10016

Tel. No.: 212-682-6077

Of Counsel:

COHEN, WEISS AND SIMON

HENRY WEISS

RoBERT S. SAVELSON

STEPHEN B. MOLDOF

MICHAEL E. ABRAM

December 6, 1974

EPP

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.