Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pearson Bros. v. National Labor Relations Board
Supreme Court brief1974
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IN THE ares Bi
Supreme Court of the Rnited States
October Term, 1973
"43-1268
THE PEARSON BROS. COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD C. BAUERLE
112 West Second Street
Ottumwa, Iowa 52501
Attorneys for Petitioners
THE CASILLAS PRESS, INC.-1717 K Street. N. W.—Washington, 0. C.-223-1220
(i)
INDEX
OPINIONS DELIVERED IN COURTS BELOW .
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .
QUESTION PRESENTED
STATUTE INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF CASE .
REASONS RELIEF ON FOR ALLOWANCE
eS «¢ « + « « s s +,« «
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
Page
14
la
(ii)
AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases:
Evening News Assn. and American Newspaper
Guild, 146 NLRB (No. 121)
Frank Miller’s Sons Fireproofing Co.
and United Order of American
Bricklayers and Stonemasons,
NLRB (No. 29) .
Master Dynamics Corp. and
James L. Dunlap, 180 NLRB
(No. 121) . ecg Gs
Research Designing Service, Inc.
and Local 155 Auto Workers,
141 NLRB 211 .
Troxel Manufacturing Co. and United
Packing House Workers, 174 NLRB
(No. 127) . . ne
Stacute:
National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.,
Sec. 151, et seq.)
Section 8(a)(1) .
Section 8(a)(3) .
Page
11
11
11
12
11
4,8
4,11
iN THE
Supreme Court of the Hnited States
October Term, 1973
No.
THE PEARSON BROS. COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
To the Honorable Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the Associated
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
This is a petition by The Pearson Bros. Company for a
writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered in the
above case.
2
I.
OPINIONS DELIVERED IN COURTS BELOW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit entered a decision without opinion. The decision
is 486 Fed.2d 1406.
ll.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
handed down its order on October 2, 1973, and the judgment
sought to be reviewed was entered on November 19, 1973.
The statutory provision believed to confer on this Court jur-
isdiction to review the judgment in question is Section 1254
of Title 28 of the United States Code.
il.
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented for review is that where National
Labor Relations Board found that the employer had econom-
ic reasons at the time of the layoff that would justify a reduc-
tion in the work force, can the National Labor Relations
Board order the reinstatement of all twelve employees
who were laid-off and who were union adherents, and
thereby in effect permit only the laying off of non-union
adherents.
3
IV.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The statute of the United States involved is 29 U.S.C..,
Section 158(a) (3) which provides as follows:
“Section 8(a) It shall be an unlawful labor
practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or ten-
ure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. Pro-
vided, That mothing in this Act, or in any
other statute of the United States, shall pre-
clude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization (not established, main-
tained, or assisted by any action defined in sec-
tion 8(a) of this Act as an unfair labor prac-
tice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth
day following the beginning of such employ-
ment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organi-
zation is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate col-
lective-bargaining unit covered by such agree-
ment when made, and (ii) unless following an
election held as provided in section 9(e) within
one year preceding the effective date of such
agreement, the Board shall have certified that
at least a majority of the employees eligible
to vote in such election have voted to rescind the
the authority of such labor organization to make
such an agreement: Provided further, That no
4
employer shall justify any discrimination against
an employee for nonmembership in a labor or-
ganization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available
to the employee on the same terms and condi-
tions generally applicable to other members, or
(B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing
that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of ac-
quiring or retaining membership.”
V.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A complaint was filed by the General Counsel fo the Na-
tional Relations Board alleging interrogation and threats in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act. as amended, and the layoff and/or discharge of twelve
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act. The employer denied that it committed any unfair
labor practices. The case was tried before a Trial Examiner
who thereafter filed his decision finding that the employer
coercively interrogated its employees concerning union ac-
tivities and threatened them with reprisals for engaging in
union activities and laid off and/or discharged twelve em-
ployees because of their union activities. The employer
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner’s Decision and upon
review, the National Labor Relations Board entered a deci-
sion and order affirming the rulings, findings and conclu-
sions of the Trial Examiner and ordered the employer to
5
cease and desist from coercively interrogating any of its
employees concerning union activities or threatening em-
ployees with reprisals for engaging in union activities and
from laying off, discharging or otherwise discriminating
against any employee for supporting any labor organiza-
tion. The National Labor Relations Board further ordered
the reinstatement, with back pay, of the twelve employees
laid off. The petitioner field a Petition to Review before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
and the National Labor Relations Board filed a cross-appli-
cation for enforcement of the order. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the Peti-
tion for Review and ordered the enforcement of the order
of the National Labor Relations Board.
The employer, Pearson Bros. Company, is engaged in the
manufacture of farm equipment, and principally liquid ma-
nure spreaders. During the year 1971 it had obtained a
large contract with Avco for the manufacture of this equip-
ment and this one contract accounted for approximately
one-third of the employer’s production. On January 12,
1972, Leland Pearson, president of the employer, along
with Ed Mendenhall, met with representatives of Avco at
Cold Water, Indiana. They had expected to obtain a sim-
ilarly large order from Avco for the year 1972, but at
this meeting they learned that Avco had approximately
40% of the 1971 production still on hand and unsold.
Consequently, the employer received no new order from
Avco as expected.
The situation of the employer was further complicated
by the fact that these spreaders all use a pump manu-
factured in Italy. The shipment of pumps from Italy had
6
been delayed. The pumps that should have reached the
employer on December 10, 1971, did not arrive until
February, 1971, and then only 100 of the 140 pumps or
dered arrived. Therefore on January 12, 1971, the em-
ployer’s inventory of pumps was depleted and it was not
economical to build these spreaders without the pump.
Gene Nelson, the plant superintendent, urged Leland
Pearson to lay off employees early in December, but Mr.
Pearson refused to lay off any employees before Christ-
mas. Leland Pearson realized some time in December,
1971, that a layoff was likely if the Avco order was not
renewed. During the week prior to January 12, 1972,
he explained the possibility of a layoff to the Coopera-
tion Committee, made up of employees, and asked them
for advice or recommendations as to a layoff procedure.
After the meeting with the representatives of Avco on
January 12, Leland Pearson and Ed Mendenhall made the
decision that the employer would have to cut production
by thirty per cent and would have to lay off a number
of employees. Their return to the employer’s plant was
delayed because of a snow storm so Leland Pearson called
Vernon Pearson (vice-president of the employer) and asked
him to determine who could be laid off without disrupt-
ing production and suggested that he talk to the plant
superintendent, Gene Nelson.
The employer had no procedure or criteria for layoff
and had never had any substantial layoff of employees
prior to this date.
Leland Pearson then discussed the layoff with the plant
superintendent, Gene Nelson, and Gene Nelson offered
the names of several of the employees who he felt would
oe
5
not be needed in view of the curtailment of production.
On January 13, 1972, nine employees were laid off and
on the following day three more employees were laid off.
The first union contact with any of the employees was
made by a representative of the International Molders and
Allied Workers union with employee, Harry Lambert, at
his home on January 3 or 4, 1972. There is no evidence
of any union activity at the plant of the employer until
January 10, 1972.
Prior to January 3, 1972, the employer had no organi-
zational chart, job classifications or seniority list. It had
no system of rating employees or reviewing the perform-
ance of the employees on any systematic or regular basis.
When an employee asked for a raise, it would consider
the request and either grant or deny the raise to that par-
ticular employee. The employer recognized that this lack
of organization and procedure caused inequities, and it
started in the fall of 1971 to formulate a job classifica-
tion and pay scale system. This project was principally
assigned to Ed Mendenhall and he worked on this during
the latter part of 1971. It was finally prepared and ex- é
plained to the employees, to be effective January 3, 1972.
The employer first established a Wage Classification and
Schedule. This chart sets out the labor grade and job title
for the different job operations of the employer and was
intended as a classification of jobs and not of the individ-
ual employees. No employees are listed on the chart,
only jobs. After all the jobs were classified as to the
labor grade and wage schedule, the names of the partic-
ular employees were related to the job titles. It was not
the purpose initially to rate the employees, rather this
initial classification was to establish labor grades and
job titles. Each employee was listed opposite the job
er PUFA
8
title he was performing. This process of indexing the
employees by job title was accomplished, but the em-
ployer was not finished with its task of organization.
Still to be accomplished was the task of rating the in-
dividual employees and necessarily shifting some employ-
ees from their present job classification into a classifica-
tion that would be more nearly descriptive of their skill
and ability.
The wage classification and schedule provides that a
new employee undergoes a work review at the end of a
90 day probationary period.
Of the twelve employees who were laid off, five (Jones,
Wessels, Strouse, Washburn and Bainbridge) were among the
twelve employees with the least seniority. Four of the
employees laid off were among the eleven lowest paid full-
time employees (Jones, Wessels, Washburn and Dunn).
The National Labor Relations Board found the employer
engaged in interrogations and threats in violation of Sec-
tion 8(aX(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Armed
with this finding, the National Labor Relations Board found
that the layoff of each and every employee, regardless of
the employee’s seniority, wage scale, or other evaluation
of performance, was prompted because of their union ac-
tivities and required the reinstatement of all employees.
The enforcement of this order by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the nght of the
petitioner to select union adherents for layoff when such
layoff is justified by economic reasons.
The basis for federal jurisdiction in the court of first
instance is Section 161(f) of Title 29 of the United States
Code.
9
Vi.
REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT
1. The decision of said Court of Appeals as to the
right of the petitioner to layoff union adherents where
the petitioner had economic reasons which would justify
a reduction of force, by ordering the reinstatement of all
employees laid off, involves an important question of fed-
eral law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this court.
2. The decision of said Court of Appeals as to the
right of the petitioner to layoff union adherents where
the petitioner had economic reasons which would justify
a reduction of force, by ordering the reinstatement of all
employees laid off, so far departs from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanction
such a departure by the National Labor Relations Board
as to call for an exercise of this court’s power of super-
vision.
The employer, being faced with the necessity of an
economic layoff, had the decision of what employees
were to be laid off. There are no specific standards set
forth in the NLRA as to the order in which employees
are to be laid off — this remains the prerogative of the
employer. The employer had never had a lay off of any
significance in all of its history. It had established no
precedent and had adopted no procedure for determining
the employees to be laid off. This was a case of first
impression as far as this company was concerned. The
president of the company had even brought up the sub-
ject about layoffs at the Co-operation Committee meet-
ing prior to January 12, and asked for suggestions from
the employees on the committee, but the employees had
no suggestions.
10
The twelve employees with the least seniority were:
Name Date Hired | Name Date Hired
*Jones, Ed l- 3-72 Osborne 9-28-71
*Wessels 12-14-71 Lindsey 9-27-71
Bowyer 12-13-71 Bazzoli 9-27-71
*Strouse 9-29-71 *Washburn 9-22-71
Watson 9-29-71 Luallen 9-20-71
Thompson 9-28-71 *Bainbridge 9-10-71
The eleven employees receiving the lowest hourly
wage were:
Name Wage Name Wage
*Jones, Ed $2.50 Milroy $2.60
*Wessels 2.50 Simmons 2.60
Thompson 2.50 *Dunn 2.65
Layman,R.E. 2.55 * Pennington 2.65
Fritch 2.60 *Washburn 2.65
Galloway 2.60
*These employees were among the twelve employees
laid off.
The Trial Examiner found that a reduction in force for
economic reasons was justified. The employer had suffered
a loss of work that amounted to approximately thirty per
cent of its production, and at the time the employer had
approximately seventy-five production workers. Because
of this loss of work, the employer laid off twelve employ-
ees which was not found to be excessive. The General
Counsel did not contest the proposition that a reduction
in force for economic reasons was justified and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board specifically found that a re-
duction in force for economic reasons was justified. It
does not follow then that every union adherent caught in
the layoff was automatically a discriminatee. The em-
ployer had a legitimate reason for a reduction in force
and certainly some of the union supporters would have
to be laid off.
1]
The National Labor Relations Board has historically at-
tacked layoffs as being discriminatory when they are not
based upon seniority. Master Dynamics Corp. and James
L. Dunlap, 180 NLRB (No. 121); Troxel Manufacturing
Co. and United Packing House Workers, 174 NLRB (No.
127); Frank Miller’s Sons Fireproofing Co. and United
Order of American Bricklayers and Stonemasons, 164
NLRB (No. 29); Evening News Assn. and American News-
paper Guild, 146 NLRB 841. However, in the present
case, the National Labor Relations Board refused to honor
any of the layoffs as being non-discriminatory.
All new employees undergo a normal ninety day pro-
bationary period. Both Jones and Wessels were in the
probationary period and had the least seniority in the
entire plant. The National Labor Relations Board found
that the layoff of Edwin Jones, who was the newest em-
ployee with only ten days seniority, and the layoff of
William Wessels, who was the second newest employee
with only thirty days service, was discriminatory. This
ruling seems indefensible when the employer had a legi-
timate reason for a layoff because of a thirty per cent
loss of work. Apparently under the decision, the em-
ployer was permitted only to lay off nonunion sympathiz-
ers. This is certainly not the intention of N.L.R.B. Sec-
tion 8(a)(3).
Referring to the wage scale, Jones and Wessels were the two
lowest paid employees in the entire production force, both
earning $2.50 per hour, as well as having the least seniority.
There were a total of eleven employees who earned $2.50 per
hour or less among the seventy-five production workers and
Washburn and Dunn were also among the eleven lowest paid
employees. Consequently, Jones, Wessels and Washburn were
not only among the twelve employees with the least seniority,
but they were likewise among the eleven employees receiving
¥ UENO
12
the lowest wage. Certainly the wage scale and the lack
of seniority are the most common criteria for layoffs.
The National Labor Relations Board has recognized that
even though an employer may be guilty of unlawful acts
of threats and interrogation against the employees, the
employer is still permitted to lay off union activists where
a legitimate reason for a reduction in force exists. In the
case of Research Designing Service, Inc. and Local 155
Auto Workers, 141 NLRB 211, the Board said:
“When the factors noted below are weighed
in the light of this pattern of illegal conduct,
it is apparent to us that Respondent was un-
lawfully motivated in making certain layoffs.
But it does not follow, as the General Coun-
sel would have us find, that because the Re-
spondent, under the cover of its economic si-
tuation, sought to weaken the Union’s position
by laying off union adherents, that every union
adherent caught in the layoff was automatically
a discriminatee. Respondent did have a legiti-
mate reason for a reduction in force, and it is
probable that some of the individuals would
have been laid off even if there had been no
union on the scene. Whether or not a partic-
ular individual had suffered discrimination must
turn not simply on whether he was a union
member, but on a number of other factors.
In determining whether an alleged discrimi-
natee was in fact selected for layoff for anti-
union reasons, we have taken into considera-
tion: (1) whether his name was on the Union’s
lists submitted to Respondent; (2) whether
he had been laid off in previous (1960 or
1961) economic reductions; (3) his seniority
13
or length of service with Respondent; (4) his
rate of pay as compared with others retained
in similar job categories; and (5) interroga-
tions or threats directed against him.”
The National Labor Relations Board found there was
an economical justification for a layoff, and did not find
that the layoff of twelve men was excessive in view of
the thirty per cent loss of work. Consequently, the em-
ployer was justified in laying off twelve employees. The
decision below would require the employer to lay off
‘only nonunion sympathizers in order to avert a charge
that the selection of employees was discriminatory. If
the employer has a legitimate basis for an economic lay-
off, then he should be permitted to lay off the most logi-
cal employees, regardless of their union affiliations. Where
a legitimate layoff is authorized, the employer should not
be penalized for laying off those persons with the least
seniority and the lowest hourly rate, particularly when
these employees are singled out by the plant superintend-
ent as being the least necessary.
The employer, at the very least, was authorized to lay
off Jones, Wessels, Strouse, Washburn and Bainbridge who
were among the twelve employees with the least seniority.
In addition, the layoff of Dunn was authorized since Dunn
was among the lowest paid employees in the plant, suf-
fered from a serious health problem that prevented him
from doing production work and was engaged in a non-
essential job as errand man. Ignoring all the evidence of-
fered by the employer as to the qualifications of the em-
ployees laid off and the basis for their selection certainly
the employer is entitled to lay off the foregoing six em-
ployees.
Beers ceamememonesornteteen sen ae
14
Vil.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, The Pearson Bros. Company, petitioner,
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in the above entitled case.
Richard C. Bauerle
112 West Second Street
Ottumwa, Iowa 52501
Attorney for the Petitioner
la
APPENDIX
TRIAL EXAMINER’S DECISION
Statement of the Case
Arnold Ordman, Trial Examiner: This case was tried
in Peoria, Ilinois, on April 10, 11, and 12, 1972 on a
complaint issued against Respondent by General Coun-
sel on February 29, 1972, pursuant to charges filed on
January 18, 1972, and February 23, 1972. The complaint
as amended at the hearing’ alleges interrogation and
threats in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and the layoff and/or
discharge of 12 employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3)
and (1) of the Act. Respondent denies that it committed
any unfair labor practices.
Upon the entire record, upon my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed
by General Counsel and by Respondent, I make the
following:
* At the opening of the hearing General Counsel moved
to amend the complaint by adding an allegation that Inter-
national Molders & Allied Workers Union was a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and additional
allegations relating to further interrogation and threats
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent
opposed the motion to amend limiting its opposition to
the allegation relating to the Molders Union and pleading
surprise. As the facts hereinafter set forth, the Molders
Union was more directly involved in the instant contro-
versy than the Charging Party. The motion to amend was
granted with leave to Respondent to renew its request if
it could show prejudice during the course of the hearing.
No claim of such prejudice was made or tendered and the
ruling on the motion stands.
aor MEIOSIS
2a
Findings and Conclusions
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent, an Illinois corporation, manufactures and
sells liquid manure spreaders at its plant in Galva, IIli-
nois. Both its interstate shipments of goods and mate-
rials and its receipt of goods and materials from outside
the State of Illinois exceed $50,000 in value. Respondent
admits, and I find, that Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
Respondent further admits that the Teamsters Union,
the Charging Party, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and, for purposes
of this proceeding, that the Molders Union (see note
1, supra) is a labor organization with the meaning of
that Section. I so find.
Il. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background; The Issues
On January 3, 1972 Respondent had at its Galva, Illi-
nois, plant a relatively stable complement of approxi-
mately 75 production and maintenance employees. About
17 of these employees were on a part-time schedule. There
was no union at the plant.
Dissatisfaction with certain working conditions gave
rise to some concerted activity among the employees
in 1971. When the employees brought their dissatisfac-
tions to the attention of management, a Cooperation Com-
mittee was formed at management’s suggestion in late
August or early September 1971 to deal with the em-
ployees grievances. The Committee was composed of five
employees representing different departments in Respon-
dent’s plant and several meetings were held between
the Committee and management over the next few
3a
months. Talk of union organization which had taken place
among the employees before the Committee was formed
dwindled during the brief existence of the Committee.
Late in December and early in January 1972 it revived,
culminating in a meeting at the Wagon Wheel Tap in
Galva, Illinois, on January 10, 1972, where a number
of employees signed authorization cards for the Molders
Union. A few more Molders Union cards were signed
within the next day or so, making a total of 22 card-
signers among the approximately 75 employees in Re-
spondent’s employ. On January 13, 1972, 3 days after
the Wagon Wheel meeting, the employment of nine em-
ployees was admittedly terminataed and on the follow-
ing day, January 14, three more omployees were ad-
mittedly terminated.? All 12 employees terminated were
full-time employees and were among the 22 who had
signed cards. General Counsel contends that the selec-
tion for termination of these 12 union adherents from
a work force of approximately 75 production and main-
tenance employees were dictated by antiunion considera-
tions. Respondent counters with the claim that the termi-
nations were the result of a reduction in force dictated
by a falloff in available work and that the selections
were made on the basis of the versatility of employees
to meet the needs of a continuing operation with a more
limited work output.
During this same period Respondent’s officials al-
legedly engaged in interrogation and threats directed
against the union activity of the employees. Involved
in this conduct were Carl Peve and Lester Morrell who,
General Counsel contends and Respondent denies, were
supervisors for whose actions Respondent was answer-
able.
2 While these events were taking place, several employees
signed authorization cards for the Teamsters Union.
SEAN NLR IA
4a
The issues presented are:
1. Whether Carl Peve and Lester Morrell were su-
pervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
» Whether Respondent’s officials, including Peve and
Morrell, engaged in interrogation and threats in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Whether the layoff and/or discharge of 12 Union
adherents on January 13 and 14, 1972, was discrimina-
torily motivated in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
B. The Supervisory Status of
Peve and Morrell
1. Carl Peve
The evidence as to the supervisory status of Carl
Peve was in sharp conflict. Generally speaking, Respon-
dent’s president, Leland Pearson, its vice-president, Ver-
non Pearson, brother of Leland, and E.L. Mendenhall,
assistant to the president, denied that Peve was a de-
partment head, foreman, or leadman, and asserted that
Peve exercised no supervisory functions. Vernon Pear-
son testified that Peve had no title or job classification
as such and that his sole function was that of trouble-
shooter. Mendenhall testified that Peve was a trouble-
shooter, expediter and inspector, that one of his fune-
tions was to oversee the operations of the paint depart-
ment but that Peve operated only under the direction
of Gene Nelson, Respondent’s general foreman. Carl
Peve’s own testimony was to the effect that he was
not a leadman, foreman or department head, that he
exercised no supervisory functions and that he did not
train new employees. Peve testified further that he per-
forined the function of troubleshooter and inspector and
that he never gave an order to an employee unless spe-
cifically directed to do so by the general foreman, Gene
5a
Nelson, or by one of the Pearson brothers. It also ap-
peared that Peve was paid at an hourly rate whereas
all the admitted supervisors in Respondent’s hierachy
were on a salary basis.
On the other hand, testimony of employees was to the
effect that Peve was identified to them by management
as being a supervisor and that Peve, in fact, exercised
supervisory functions. Employee Harry Fritch testified
Vernon Pearson took him on a tour of the plant, and iden-
tified Carl Peve as assistant shop foreman. Employee
Edwin Jones, also hired by Vernon Pearson when he
applied for work in mid-December, testified that Vernon
Pearson introduced him to Carl Peve with the statement,
“Ed Jones, this is Mr. Carl Peve. This is your Foreman—
your boss. You do what he says.” Employee James L.
Bainbridge, hired in September 1971, testified to like
effect. Vernon Pearson introduced Bainbridge to Gen-
eral Foreman Nelson and Carl Peve. Vernon Pearson
left. Nelson then told Bainbridge that Nelson and Carl
Peve “run the shots [sic] and Carl would be my boss.”
Employee William Washburn, hired by Vernon Pearson
in September 1971, testified that Vernon Pearson took him
to the paint department on the day he started work, intro-
duced him to Carl Peve and said, “This is the man you
will be working under.”
Testimony was also given by employees as to Peve’s
functions. Harry Fritch who was transferred to the paint
department after a few months in the shipping depart-
ment, testified that his assignments in the paint de-
partment were given to him by Carl Peve and that
Carl Peve also told other employees in the paint de-
partment what to do.’ Bainbridge likewise testified
that Peve gave directions to the employees in the paint
department. In addition, employees Harry Lambert,
?There were about six employees in the paint depart-
ment.
6a
William Wessels,* Rodney Mackie and Joseph Bickett
testified that Peve issued orders and assignments to em-
ployees and directed them to redo jobs inadequately or.
improperly done. With respect to other aspects of Peve’s
authority, Lambert testified that Lester Morrell told him
he would have to consult Peve or Nelson about a pos-
sible transfer to the shipping department, that he did
consult Peve and, after his third effort in this regard,
Peve told him his transfer was effective. William Wash-
burn testified that he discussed overtime work with Peve
and that on a few occasions Peve gave him time off.
Rodney Mackie stated that Peve gave him his assign-
ments, informed Mackie that his job performance was
inadequate, watched his work and later discharged him.
Even more significant in this regard was other testi-
mony vouchsafed by Respondent’s top officials. Vernon
Pearson, a very difficult or confused witness who, as
already noted, denied Peve’s supervisory status, acknow!}-
edged that on occasion, when he or his brother were
absent from the late afternoon shift and the part-time
employees were at work, Peve was in charge of, and
responsible for, the operation on that shift. President
Leland Pearson conceded that Peve could fairly be char-
acterized as a multi-department leadman. Leland Pear-
son admitted also that in an affidavit he had furnished
to a Board investigator in February 1972, he had listed
Carl Peve among Respondent’s foremen and leadmen
and stated further that among Peve’s duties was that
of oversecing the paint room. In this connection Leland
Pearson iestified also that foremen or leadmen had the
authority to recommend the hire or discharge of ein-
ployees and that in the event of such a recommendation,
‘The incorrect spelling “Wessells” was corrected at the
hearing.
7a
the odds were very high that the recommendation would
he accepted. Relevant here, also, is the fact that Re-
spondent, on or about December 29, 1971, prepared a
complete roster of its rank-and-file employees from which
supervisory personnel were excluded and that the name
of Peve was not on that list.
In sum, it appears that Peve’s job as inspection ex-
pediter and troubleshooter gave him wide range and
seope throughout Respondent’s enterprise with special
attention to the paint department. Cogent evidence, not
seriously challenged, establishes that Peve made job as-
signments, issued orders and ararnged for transfers,
temporary or otherwise. Respondent sought to explain
away these obvious indicia of supervisory status on the
ground that Peve did not bear the title of foreman, de-
partment head, or leadman, that Peve was paid an hour-
ly rate rather than a salary, and that to the extent he gave
orders to employees, he was in each instance merely
relaying ~pecific directives from General Foreman Gene
Nelson.
The explanations are vulnerable. As indicated, several
employees testified that Vernon Pearson, upon their en-
trance into employment, introduced or identified Peve
to thm as assistant foreman or boss or the man they
would take orders from or work under. I credit that
testimony. Leland Pearson acknowledged that he had
listed Peve among the foremen and leadmen in Respon-
dent’s employ, that Peve could fairly be called a multi-
department leadman, and that, as president of Respon-
‘Respondent sought to explain the absence of Peve’s
name on the ground that Peve was undergoing hospitaliza-
tion at the time the list was prepared. Yet it appears that
employee Carl Nelson who was also absent from work
from October 1971 until after January 13, 1972, was in-
cluded in the employee roster.
SHOR RUPEE YSIS ENA HY I ORD PA
8a
dent, he gave great weight to recommendations of fore-
man and leadman with respect to hire and discharge
of employees. The fact that Peve was paid on an hourly
rate rather than on a salary basis is not controlling;
not the method of payment or the title, but the func-
tions performed and the authorities possessed or exer-
cised are the criteria for the determination of super-
visory status. Finally, the claim that Peve exercised no
initiative and made no independent judgment in the
myriad situations where he gave orders or made assign-
ments to employees, but that he acted in each instance
only on specific directives from foreman Gene Nelson
strains credulity.
In determining the supervisory status of a specific in-
dividual it is settled law that “section [2(11) of the
Act] is to be interpreted in the disjunctive, . .. and the
possession of any of the authorities listed in Sec. 2 (11)
places the employee invested with this authority in the
supervisory class.” Ohio Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 176 F.
2d 385, 387 (C.A. 6, 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899;
N.L.R.B. v. Roselon Southern, Inc., 382 F. 2d 245, 247
(C.A. 6, 1967); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 398 F. 2d 631 (C.A. 6, 1968). Moreover, Sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act “does not require the exercise of
the power described for all of any definite part of the
employee’s time. It is the existence of the power which
determires the classification.” Ohio Power, supra, at 388.
On this basis the evidence in the record firmly estab-
lishes, and I find, that Carl Peve is a supervisor within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and an agent of
Respondent as alleged in the complaint.
2. Lester Morrell
The situation respecting Morrell is not too dissimilar
from that respecting Carl Peve and the relevant evi-
: a
9a
dence can be more briefly summarized. Respondent’s
position generally is that Morrell, like Peve, exercised
no supervisory functions. Like Peve, too, Morrell was
paid on an hourly basis. His hourly rate was $2.65, 69
cents more than the next most highly paid employee
in the shipping department where Morrell worked. Mor-
rell’s name like Peve’s was not included in the roster
of rank-and-file employees prepared by Respondent. The
reason assigned for that omission in Morrell’s case was
that Morrell was deemed to be attached to Respondent’s
office staff. Actually, Morrell had a small office in the
immediate area of the shipping dock. Morrell spent most
of his working time in the shipping dock area.
Morrell described his own job. He was a shipping clerk,
“more or less a lead man.” He admitted that when
there was more than one truck to be loaded, he “some-
times” picked the fellows to do the loading, that he “fre-
quently” assigned an employee another job when the
employee completed the job he was working on, that
he would reassign employees, as necessary, when such
jobs came in, and that generally his responsibility was
to see that the work in the shipping department was
done properly, and that there was no “goofing-off.” In
addition, Morrell was responsible for training new em-
ployees in his department and was admittedly consulted
consulted by Peve or General Foreman Nelson as to
how the employees in his department were developing.
Overtime work in the department was frequent but, ac-
cording to Morrell, he did not direct employees to do
overtime work but “asked” them.
Employees Fritch, Bickett and Lambert testified that
Lambert was in charge of, and gave orders to the em-
ployees in the shipping department. Lambert, who was
transferred to that department at his own request was
PARI AC 2 PR RI
ratrerenrnes a a
10a
told by Peve that he would be working for Morrell. Ac-
cording to Lambert, Morrell would make the work assign-
ments to the employees when the buzzer sounded for
the beginning for work in the morning, make additional
assignments, as needed and reassign employees to take
care of such jobs.
There was also extensive testimony by management
officials as to Morrell’s duties and responsibilities. Men-
denhall, assistant to the president, identified Morrell as
shipping clerk and, in response to a question as to who
was head of the shipping department which had a nor-
mal complement of about four employees, replied, “The
shipping clerk is head of the department as such.” Ver-
non Pearson testified that Morrell’s jcb was “seeing to
it that the trucks were properly loaded and took care
of the paperwork on it,” and that in the discharge
of this functicn Morrell told the shipping department
employees what to do. President Leland Pearson also
identified Morrell as shipping clerk but conceded that
Morrell could be regarded as shipping department fore-
man. Leland Pearson also conceded that Morrell would
be consulted on occasion when the question of a wage
increase for a shipping department employee was raised.
Morrell was, of course, answerable to General Fore-
man Nelson and to the Pearson brothers. On the other
hand, the evidence is clear that subject to that con-
trol, Morrell was in complete charge of the shipping
department, spent most of his time on the shipping dock,
and actively directed the work of the shipping depart-
ment employees who, in turn, regarded Morrell as their
superior. The testimony of both Pearson brothers and
Mendenhall essentially confirms that Morrell had this
status. Upon all the relevant evidence, and in the light
of the precedents and authorities cited in the discussion
lla
concerning Peve, I find that Lester Morrell was a super-
visor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and
an agent of Respondent as alleged in the complaint.
C. Interrogation and Threats
As already indicated, in late August or early Septem-
ber 1971 a Cooperation Committee was formed to deal
with grievances of the employees concerning wage in-
equities and working conditions. A series of meetings
were held hetween the Cooperation Committee and man-
agement regarding these matters and some steps were
taken to meet the employee complaints. As already noted
also, talk of union organization dwindled when the Co-
operation Committee was formed but before too long
talk of union organization revived, culminating in the
meeting of January 10, 1972, at the Wagon Wheel Tap
where a number of the employees signed authorization
cards for the Molders Union.
Willaim Wessels, hired as a full-time custodian on
October 16, 1971, had his preemployment interview with
Vernon Pearson. Pearson explained that the lack of clean-
liness in the restrooms and the plant generally was a
source of dissatisfaction to the employees and it would
be Wessels’ job to remedy that situation. Wessels asked
whether in view of these troubles, Respondent had any
kind of a shop union. Vernon Pearson replied in the
negative and explained that Respondent did not need
a union, that the problems would be worked out, and.
that by December the employees would get a raise and
would be given grade classifications. Wessels was termi-
nated on January 13, 1972.
In mid-December 1971 employee Marshall Geirnaeirt,
terminated on January 13, talked to Vernon Pearson about
a raise. The question of raises and wage inequities was
12a
a live issue in the meetings of the Cooperation Commit-
tee with Respondent. In that connection Geirnaeirt com-
mented, “The boys are kind of on their horse. You know
what’s going to happen, don’t you? There’s going to be
a Union.” Vernon Pearson replied, “Well, if there is, I’m
going to shut the doors.” I credit Geirnaerit’s testimony.
Harry Fritch, terminated on January 13, testified that
on January 10, 1972, the day the Wagon Wheel Tap
gathering was scheduled, Peve came to him at the plant
in mid-afternoon just before quitting time. Fritch
stated that Peve asked whether he was going to the
“big meeting.” Fritch asked, “What big meeting?” and
Peve replied, “You aren’t fooling us; we know about it,
and I bet I can even tell you who gave you the word.”
Peve added, “You fellows are going to fool around and
they will close the door and we will all be out of a
- job.” Peve denied making any such statement to Fritch.
Indeed, Peve, who had returned to work on January
4, 1972 after hospitalization and who worked continuous-
ly thereafter during the period of the January 10 Wagon
Wheel gathering and the January 13 and 14 layoffs,
denied that he had any knowledge of union activity or
any awareness of union activity until the week of Jan-
ary 17. In view of the widespread nature of that ac-
tivity, the layoffs of January 13 and 14, and the dis-
cussion of both the activity and the layoffs which ad-
mitiedly went on in the plant, it is difficult to believe
that Peve whose joh required him to operate through-
out the plant, could have been unaware of such activity
and discussion. I credit the testimony of Fritch as to
his conversation with Peve on January 10.
The Wagon Wheel gathering of the employees took
place later that afternoon after regular working hours.
President Leland Pearson was also at the Wagon Wheel
;
:
'
|
13a
Tap. Thereafter he returned to the plant. William Ste-
phen Walker, who had been a recent employee of Re-
spondent, approached Leland Pearson to ask for reem-
ployment. In the course of the ensuing conversation, Le-
land Pearson asked Walker if he knew anything about
a union being organized. Walker said he did not and
Leland Pearson commented that he did not dare talk
to any of his employees about union or about any union
activity. I credit Walker’s testimony.
Bainbridge was among the employees terminated Janu-
ary 13, 1972. The preceding afternoon, according to Bain-
bridge. Peve asked him what he thought about the union.
Bainbridge replied that he was for it. The following af-
ternoon Peve reopened the subject by asking Bainbridge
whether he was still of the same mind about the union.
When Bainbridge said yes, Peve told him, “You know,
you're going to be in big trouble. You and a lot of other
boys can lose their jobs over it.” Bainbridge replied,
“[ can't afford to lose my job but I think this place
needs a union to clean it up.” He added, “It’s a hell
of a shame I can’t voice my own opinion without some-
thing like this happening.”
Very shortly after this conversation, at quitting time,
nine employees, Bainbridge among them received their
termination notices. Peve, of course, denied engaging in
the quoted conversations with Bainbridge. For reasons
set forth in connection with the Fritch incident, I do
not eredit Peve’s denial and find that the conversations
oceurred as Bainbridge testified.
Ikmployee Edwin Jones, according to his testimony,
had a similar experience. Jones testified that during
the noon break on January 12 Peve approached him,
and adjuring him to tell the truth, asked whether re
was for a union. Jones replied, “Yes, I am for a union.
renee ah idl Re Ree He
Cola Achat hole
te PP NAR TAEN NIT T*
aT As a
spars mf
Borer
14a
We need one here.” Peve shook his finger in Jones’
face and said, “That’s all I wanted to know.” Jones’
employment was terminated on January 14. As with
Fritch and Bainbridge, Peve denied that this conversa-
tion occurred. I credit the testimony of Edwin Jones.
LaVern Charlet, manager of the industrial and munici-
pal equipment division and admittedly a supervisor and
agent of Respondent, was also involved in the matters
here under consideration. Leonard Dunn was among the
nine unions adherents laid off at quitting time on Janu-
ary 13. Immediately upon receiving his termination no-
tice, Dunn walked into the truck mount office where
Charlet was engaged in a conversation with Bruce Bry-
nev ard employee Vern Frail. Charlet volunteered that
“if the plant went Union why Lee [Leland Pearson]
would shut the place down.” Dunn, obviously upset at
and move the son-of-a-bitch to Russia.” Charlet admitted
that he had had a conversation with Dunn at the time
and place and under the circumstances to which Dunn
testified but stated that to “the nearest of my recollec-
tion” the conversation consisted of Dunn’s statement that
he would never have been laid off if there had been
a union in the plant and Charlet’s rejoinder that he did
not think anyone at Pearsons was interested in a union.
To the question whether he was said Leland Pearson
would shut down the plant if it went union, Charlet first
replied, “No, sir, I don’t believe I made any statement
like that,” and upon further questioning by Respondent’s
counsel, stated that he did not make a statement like that.
I find Dunn’s recollection more certain and accurate in
this regard and conclude that Charlet did make the state-
ment in question.
Leland Pearson, Vernon Pearson and LaVern Charlet
are admittedly supervisors and agents of Respondent.
ami
15a
The evidence relating to their conduct and statements,
summarized above, adequately justifies a finding of in-
terogation and threats violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. The conduct and statements of Carl Peve, whom
I have found to be also a supervisor and agent of Re-
spondent, furnish additional instances of coercive interro-
gation and threats. In sum, the evidence amply warrants
a finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
D The Discharges on January 13 and
14, 1972
Respondent employed about 75 production and main-
tenance employees. Respondent had never had a major
layoff. Beginning on January 10, 1972, and within 2 days
thereafter, 22 of these 75 employees signed cards desig-
nating the Molders Union as their bargaining represen-
tative. On January 13 and 14, 12 of these 22 card-signers
were terminated, 9 on January 13,3 more on January 14.
No nonunicn adherents were terminated.
Respondent had occasion to learn the identity of the
employees who were union adherents. Ten of the 12 em-
ployees who were terminated attended a meeting at a
tavern in Galva, Illinois, known as the Wagon Wheel
Tap, on the afternoon of January 10, following the end
of the regular work shift.© Harry Lambert, a prime mover
in the union organizational campaign, arranged the meet-
ing to rally support for the Molders Union by obtaining
signatures to authorization cards. As indicated by Peve’s
inquiry of employee Fritch as to whether Fritch was
going to the “big meeting“ and by Peve’s accompanying
*These 10 employees were James Bainbridge, Harry
Lambert, Harold Potter, Leonard Dunn, Jerry Smith,
Harry Fritch, Marshall Geirnaeirt, Edwin Jones, Bernard
Strouse and William Washburn.
Bowre a te
16a
comments, it is apparent that Peve, at least, knew about
the meeting before it took place. Lester Morrell, already
identified here, was present at the meeting." Leland Pear-
son, Respondent’s president, and LaVern Charlet, man-
ager of Respondent’s industrial and municipal division,
came into the tavern during the course of the meeting
and stayed for a while.’ Morrell, of course, and Leland
Pearson and Charlet also, had an opportunity to observe
who was present.
‘Morrell did not sign a card. He informed Strouse,
in response to the latter’s inquiry, that he did not sign
a card because it would hinder his chances of getting a
salaried position. In reply toa similar inquiry Morrell told
Bainbridge that he could not sign a card because he was
boss. According to Strouse and Bainbridge, Morrell was
resent at the tavern while the cards were being signed.
orrell testified that he did not arrive at the tavern until
5:00 p.m., that he did not know union cards were being
signed and that he did not know about the card-signing
until he heard it being discussed in the plant the following
day, January 11. Even on Morrell’s version, he knew as
of January 11 that the employees at the tavern were
signing union cards.
®Leland Pearson testified that he went to the Wagon
Wheel Tap only infrequently. Several employees who
were regular patrons testified they had never seen either
Leland Pearson or LaVern Charlet there before. Leland
Pearson explained the striking coincidence of his presence
of this particular occasion on the ground that he wanted
to have a private business conference with Charlet because
each of them were leaving on separate business trips and
it was difficult for them to have a private uninterrupted
conference at the plant. The explanation seems somwhat
strained. Moreover, inasmuch as Leland Pearson knew
that a number of his employees regularly patronized the
Wagon Wheel Tap after work, the explanation is even
more strained. However, surveillance was not alleged.
The fact remains that Pearson and Charlet were present
and Pearson admittedly saw at least some of the employees
who were present.
17a
The 11th and 12th employees terminated, Joseph
Bickett and William Wessels, were not at the meeting.
However, Morrell had had discussions concerning the
union with each of them prior to their terminations.
General Counsel argues that these facts alone, that
all 12 employees who were terminated were union ad-
herents, that union adherents were far the lesser part
of Respondent’s employee complement and that Respon-
dent had opportunity to know of the identity of the
union adherents, are themselves cogent evidence of un-
lawful discrimination. In support of this position Gen-
eral Counsel cites F.W.Woolworth Company, 25 NLRB
1362, 1372-1374 (1940), enforced in pertinent part, 121 F.
2d 658 (C.A. 2, 1941); N.L.R.B. v. Camco, Inc., 340 F.
9d 803 (C.A. 5, 1965); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
v. N.L.R.B, 107F. 2d 555 (C.A. 7, 1939). Supplementing
this contention is the evidence, already summarized, that
Respondent regarded the advent of a union among its
employees with considerable disrelish and, as manifested
by the statements ofadmitted supervisory officials as
well as by the statements of Peve, made no secret of
its hostility to union organization.
It is arguable that, without more, these facts would
warrant a finding of discriminatory discharge. I find it
unnecessary to, and no not adopt, this contention. How-
ever, the showing here made calls at the very least,
for a critical serutiny of the reasons assigned by Re-
spondent for the terminations. See Montgomery Ward
& Co., Ine. v. N.L.R.B., supra.
These reasons are twofold: first, that a decline in Re-
spondent’s operational needs justified a reduction in Re-
spondent’s workforce for economic reasons, and, second,
that the determination of which employees to release
was made on the basis of the importance of particular
OL AE ILLS PRLS 4
PATS OO
18a
jobs to the continued operation of the plant on a re-
duced production schedule and the versatility of the em-
ployees to handle those jobs.
As to the first reason General Counsel, neither at the
hearing nor in its brief, contests the proposition that
a reduction in force for economic reasons at the time
of the terminations would have been justified. Apart
from other considerations, President Leland Pearson
learned on January 12, 1972, that Avco New Products,
a major customer of Respondent, was not going to re-
new its order. On this state of the record I find that
a reduction in force for economic reasons would have
been justified.
Respondent’s corollary defense is that the terminations
were made pursuant to its determination to cut the work-
force for economic reasons and that the criterion for
the cut was the importance of the job and the versa-
tility of the employee. Here Respondent’s position was
sharply challenged.
Vernon Pearson testified that the decision as to which
employees to terminate was made by him and his broth-
er Leland Pearson on the morning of January 13 and
that he and his brother had worked on the decision on
the evening of January 12 and on January 13. Accord-
ing to Vernon Pearson, he consulted with General Fore-
man Nelson and John Mercer, head of the fabricating
department, before the final decision was made and was
not sure whether he had also had a discussion with Carl
Peve in that regard. Vernon Pearson initially testified
that the criteria governing the selection were the im-
portance of the job to the continuing business, the ver-
satility of the particular employee, his attendance record,
his cooperativeness and his seniority. Confronted with
a sworn affidavit he had previously furnished the Board,
19a
Vernon Pearson agreed that he had there made no men-
tion of cooperativeness and, on further examination, re-
affirmed his express statement in the affidavit that se-
niority of the employees was not a factor in the de-
termination. Vernon Pearson also acknowledged that no
part-time employee had been laid off, that for several
weeks prior to the instant hearing there was a_ sub-
stantial amount of overtime work for which Respondent
paid time and a half, that Respondent was currently
behind in its production and that, notwithstanding, none
of the 12 employees terminated on January 13 and 14
had been recalled.
Leland Pearson testified that he learned of the loss
of business from Aveo New Products at a meeting which
he and E.L. Mendenhall, his assistant held with officials
of Aveo New Products on January 12 at the latter’s
plant in Coldwater, Ohio. According to Leland Pearson,
he called his brother, Vernon Pearson, that night, in-
formed him that a lavoff would be required, and dis-
cussed with him how to implement the layoff so as to
maintain production at a reduced rate. Leland Pearson
further testified that Respondent had no layoff procedure
and no seniority system, and that the criterion applied
to determine layoff or retention was the versatility of
the particular employee to do the jobs which would be
required in a reduced operation.
General Foreman Nelson, confirmed that he had dis-
cussed the impending layoffs with Vernon Pearson a cou-
ple of days before the termination notices were issued.
According to Nelson, he advised Vernon Pearson of at
least eight employees whose services could be dispensed
with in a reduced operation, citing either inadequate work
performance or some other reason for his recommenda-
tion. Reminded that he had furnished an affidavit to
ee rae
20a
the Board about 2 months prior to the hearing and a
month after the layoffs, Nelson acknowledged that the
affidavit recited only one employee he had recommended
for layoff, Harry Lambert. As already noted, Harry Lam-
bert was a prime mover in the organizational campaign.
In sum, it appears that despite testimonial suggestions
of a variety of reasons which allegedly entered into the
layoff determinations, the only asserted reason which
emerged was the versatility of the particular employee
for continued operation of the plant on @ reduced pro-
ductivity schedule. This asserted ground must in the first
instance explain the striking coincidence that its appli-
cation Ied to the discharge of 12 of the 22 union ad-
herents and that every one of the 50 or more nonunion
employees survived this test.
Moreover, even as applied to the 12 employees termi-
nated, Respondent's asserted ground is vulnerable.
(1) James Bainbridge was hired by Respondent in
September 1970 as a spray painter. His wage rate was
$3.50 per hour and he was classified as Labor Grade
6, the next to the highest labor grade in Respondent’s
labor grade seale.* Bainbridge who had long experience
*The data relating to labor grade and wage seale de-
rives from a roster of Respondent’s work force pre red
by Respondent late in December 1971 and accurately re-
porting the status of the work force as of January 3,
1972. The roster, introduced into evidence as General
Counsel’s Exhibit 2, contains a list of the employees, their
starting dates, their rates of pay as of January 3, 1972,
and their labor grades ranked from No. 1 to No. 7 with
the higher labor grades ranked from No. 1 to No. 7 with
the higher labor grades awarded to those employees with
greater skills. Respondent contends that the roster re-
flected a rating of the jobs and not of the individuals who
held those jobs. The claim is suspect inasmuch as Re-
spondent was free to assign the individual it deemed most
2la
as a painter, was the only employee who painted liquid
manure spreaders, a major item in Respondent’s product
inventory. At the hearing, Respondent indicated that it
had been dissatisfied with Bainbridge’s work performance
since September 1971 and suggested that he indulged in
alcoholic beverages. As to the latter allegation, the evi-
dence is clear that Bainbridge never missed a day’s
work and did a great deal of overtime work. Respon-
dent did run an advertisement for 3 days for a spray
painter but, significantly, this advertisement first ap-
peared on January 11, 1972, the day following the meet-
ing at the Wagon Wheel Tap, a meeting which Bain-
bridge attended. Respondent obtained no replacement for
Bainbridge and at the time of the hearing was subcon-
tracting out the painting of truck mounts at admittedly
high rates.
(2) Harry Lambert was hired in August of 1970 as
a laborer and was later transferred to the shipping de-
partment. In both jobs he performed a variety of func-
tions including substituting for Morrell in the shipping
department when the latter was absent. Lambert was
hired at $2.40 an hour and during the course of his em-
ployment received four raises, the last on January 3,
1972. In labor grade 4 at $3 per hour, Lambert was
the highest paid employee in the shipping department.
Immediately below him was Joseph Bickett in labor
grade 3 at $2.80 per hour. Bickett was also discharged.
Not discharged but retained were Galloway and Simmons,
the other two employees in the shipping department who
* (continued)
qualified to any particular job, the designation of labor
grade was within its discretion, and the roster admittedly
included pay raises effective January 3 which one may
fairly assume reflected Respondent’s evaluation of the
work performance of the employee on the particular job.
ewe
es de) Oneret © epi te
PERE ee
22a
were classified in labor grade 2 and received $2.60 an
hour. Unlike Lambert and Bickett, Galloway and Sim-
mons were not union adherents and did not attend the
Wagon Wheel Tap meeting. Respondent complained that
Lambert was guilty of “a lot of standing around.” Only
one specific instance was cited occurring in December
1971. Yet Respondent gave Lambert a raise as of Jan-
uary 3, just 10 days before his termination.
(3) Joseph Bickett was employed by Respondent in
July 1970 on the part-time shift in the paint room and
within a few months was transferred to the full-time
shift in the shipping department. As already noted, Bickett
at $2.80 an hour in labor grade 3 was second only to
Harry Lambert in the shipping department and was above
Galloway and Simmons in both pay scale and labor
grade. In both the paint room and in the shipping de-
partment, Bickett performed a variety of jobs.
(4) Harold Potter hired in August 1970, was initially
assigned to a number of different jobs in Respondent’s
operation and was finally assigned to assist Marshall
Geirnaeirt. In addition to grinding the parts which Geir-
naeirt cut out, Potter processed these parts into finished
products utilizing various machines to punch or drill
holes, ream the holes, and tap or thread them as ap-
propriate. Potter was the only employee doing this work.
His labor grade was 4 and he was one of those given
a 15-cent raise as of January 3, 1972. Despite his ver-
satility, Respondent terminated his employment 10 days
later on the ground that his services were no longer
needed.
(5) Leonard Dunn, was hired in February 1970 and
worked in the truck mount department where he per-
formed a number of operations. At the outset some of
his time was spent running errands and picking up tools
23a
and supplies needed thruout the factory. The latter as-
spect of his work grew and by the time of his layoff,
Dunn was spending most of his time running errands
and making deliveries of spreaders to customers within
a 100-mile radius of Respondent’s plant. Dunn was in
labor grade 3 at $2.55 an hour. Respondent noted that
Dunn had trouble standing on his legs too long. How-
ever, Respondent was aware of this problem when Dunn
was hired. This disability on Dunn’s part was due to a
heart condition whch resulted in his occasional absence
for a day or part of a day for medical treatment.
(6) Jerry Smith was hired in May 1970 and worked
in the tank department. He received four raises, including
a raise of 15 cents on January 3, 1972, raising his sal-
ary from $2.40 and hour to $2.90 an hour. He was in
labor grade 4. Smith performed a variety of jobs in-
cluding maintenance welding when the construction and
repair crew was too busy to do such welding. Of the
several employees in the tank department, only Smith
and Strouse attended the Wagon Wheel Tap meeting.
Only Smith and Strouse were laid off from that depart-
ment.
(7) Harry Fritch was hired into the construction and
repair department in July 1970. He was later transferred
to the shipping department where he got a raise and,
in September 1971 went to the paint department. Fritch’s
labor grade was labor grade 2; his salary was $2.60
an hour. Thomson also at labar grade 2 in the paint
department was paid $2.50 an hour and Paxton, a la-
bor grade 1 in the paint department, was paid $2.20
an hour. Neither Thomson nor Paxton were terminated.
(S) William Wessels was hired in October 1971 as a
custodian to take care of deplorably dirty conditions in
the restrooms and the rest of the plant about which
24a
the employees were complaining. The record establishes
that Wessels did a good job in rectifying this situation.
Although there is no indication that tbe need for Wes-
sels’ services abated, Respondent included him among
the employees terminated. Wessels was in labor grade
2 at $2.50 an hour.
(9) Marshall Geirnaerit was hired in April 1967 at
$2.25 an hour. During his employment with Respondent
Geirnaeirt performed about every job in the shop and
his versatility in that regard was known to Respondent.
His basic job at the time of his dischargewas operat-
ing a flame cutter to cut patterns out of plate metal.
Some time before his discharge, Respondent installed a
new and improved flame cutter. Respondent indicated
that it had a growing dissatisfaction with Geirnaeirt’s
work in that he was reluctant to change procedures with
the old cutter and was also reluctant to adapt to the
use of the new cutter. The dissatisfaction, however, would
appear to have been quite recent inasmuch as Respon-
dent gave him a l5-cent per hour raise on January 3,
1972, 10 days before the layoff, and classified him at
labor grade 5 at a top wage of $3.30 an hour. More
significant perhaps is the fact that Leland Pearson ad-
mittedly saw Geirnaeirt at the Wagon Wheel Tap meet-
ing on January 10.
(10) Edwin Jones was a very junior employee clas-
sified at labor grade 2 in the paint department and was
paid $2.50 an hour. At least one employee in that de-
partment was below him. Paxton was classified at labor
grade 1 at $2.20 an hour.
(11) Bernard Strouse went to work for Respondent
in September 1971. Vernon Pearson, who hired Strouse,
commented on his broad experience. Strouse had per-
formed all kinds of welding and carried the title of Cer-
25a
tified Welder. He was put to work in the tank depart-
ment where he did all varieties of welding and assem-
bly operations and was complimented on his work. He
was classified in labor grade 5 and was paid $3.25 an
hour. Three lower rated employees in the department
were not laid off. Vernon Pearson, commenting on
Strouse’s termination, testified that, according to Mercer,
Strouse was not “a pretty good welder,” but Mercer
did not take the stand to verify that statement.
(12) William Washburn was hired on September 22,
1971 as a dipper in the paint department at $2.50 an
hour. He was in labor grade 3 and, on January 3, 1971,
was raised to $2.65 an hour. In addition to dipping and
some spray painting Washburn did various odd jobs. Two
lower rated employees in the department, at labor grades
1 and 2 respectively, were not laid off.
The net of the foregoing summaries is that in several
of the instances Respondent’s contention that the peo-
ple terminated were the least versatile and were un-
suited to the needs of a business which was going to
be operated on a reduced basis is wholly unsupported.
Even on the assumption that such a conclusion would
have been warranted in a few instances, the claim ad-
vanced by Respondent that this was the guiding consid-
eration in al] 12 instances is patently untenable. Rather
the evidence taken in its totality points inevitably to
the proposition that the unifying thread in all 12 termi-
nations was the union adherence of the employees in-
volved. Respondent had ample opportunity to learn of
the union adherence. Its hostility to union organization,
disclosed by its coercive interrogation and threats, was
manifest. Moreover, its hostility was unremitting. Not-
withstanding the fact that as of the time of hearing Re-
spondent was behind in its production and that consid-
erable overtime at time and one-half was required, Re-
26a
spondent did not recall any of the 12 employees who were
laid off, ostensibly, for lack of work.’
On all the evidence of record and after due con-
sideration of the arguments and authorities urged by
the parties, I conclude and find that Respondent did not
on January 13 and 14, 1972, carry out a reduction in
force for economic reasons, a course of conduct which
would have been warranted, but instead utilized the stra-
togem of a reduction in force as a pretext to rid itself
of union adherents. Accordingly, I find that by terminat-
ing the employment of the 12 employees, named in the
complaint, on January 13 and 14, 1972, Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of theAct.
Conclusions of Law
1. Carl Peve and Lester Morrell are supervisors of
Respondent within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the
Act and are agents of Respondent as alleged in the com-
plaint.
2. By coercively interrogating its employees concern-
ing union activities and by threatening them with re-
2° Toward the end of the hearing the parties stipulated
that 9 of the 12 employees terminated, Bainbridge, Dunn,
Jones, Lambert, Geirnaeirt, Bickett, Wessels, Potter, and
Smith, applied for unemployment compensation with the
State of Illinois Department of Labor and in response to
a question posed by that agency reponded that they lost
their last jobs because of lack of work.
This was, of course, the thrust of the termination notices
which the employees received on January 13 and 14. The
date of the applications for unemployment compensation
and the surrounding circumstances do not appear. Under
the circumstances and weighed against the evidence ad-
duced in the instant hearing, I can attach little, if any,
probative weight to the facts alleged in the stipulation.
27a
prisals for engaging in union activities, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By laying off and/or discharging the following
named employees:
James Bainbridge
Joseph Bickett
Leonard Dunn
Harry Fritch
Marshal] Geirnaeirt
Bernard Strouse
Harry Lambert
Harold Potter
Jerry Smith
William Wessels
Edwin Jones
William Washburn
because of their union union activities, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
To effectuate the policies of the Act, I find it nec-
essary and appropriate to order Respondent to cease
and desist from the unfair labor practices found and,
because of the character and scope of these unfair labor
practices, from infringing in any manner upon the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.”
The unfair labor practices found also dictate the pro-
priety of directing affirmative remedial action. Accord-
ingly, I shall direct Respondent to reinstate the 12 em-
“ Brad’s Machine Products, Inc., 191 NLRB No. 15
(1971).
oes a aa
28a
ployees, above-named, who were laid off and/or dis-
charged on January 13 and 14, 1972, to their former
positions or, if such positions no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, and to make these em-
ployees whole for earnings lost as a result of their wrong-
ful terminations by payment to each of them of a sum
of money equal to that which each would normally have
earned, absent the unlawful discrimination, from the date
of his termination to the date of Respondent’s offer of
reinstatement, less their net earnings, if any, during said
period. Backpay shall be computed in the manner pre-
scribed in F.W. Woolworth Co., Inc., 90 NLRB 289, and
interest shall be added as prescribed in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138NLRB 716.
To facilitate and achieve these ends the remedial order
will include the customary record-keeping and notice-
posting provisions.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions
of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10 (c) of the Act, I recommend the following:
ORDER”
Respondent, the Pearson Bros. Company, its officers,
agents, successors and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating any of its employees
concerning union activities, or threatening employees
with reprisals for engaging in such activities.
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by
Section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions and
recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions and Order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
9
ee ok ee eee
29a
(b) Laying off, discharging, or otherwise dis-
criminating against any employee for supporting In-
ternational Molders & Allied Workers Union, AFL-
CIO; Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No.
15, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America; or any other labor organization.
(ec) In any other manner interfering with re-
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer the individuals named hereunder im-
mediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs,
or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent jobs without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, and to make them whole
for their lost carnings in the manner set forth in
the section of the Trial Examiner’s Decision entitled
“Remedy.” The individuals are:
James Bainbridge Harry Lambert
Joseph Bickett Harold Potter
Leonard Dunn Jerry Smith
Harry Fritch William Wessels
Marshall Geirnaeirt Edwin Jones
Bernard Strouse William Washburn
(b) Notify immediately the above-named _indi-
viduals if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States, of the right to full reinstatement,
upon application after discharge from the Armed
Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and copy-
188, PTI BAIN Me
30a
ing, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and
all records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Galva, Illinois, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.” Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Officer-in-
Charge of Sub-Region 38, after being duly signed by
an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive
days thereafter in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to see that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Officer-in-Charge, in writing, with-
in 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Dated at Washington, D.C. July 17, 1972.
/s/ Arnold Ordman
Arnold Ordman
Trial Examiner
3la
DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On July 17, 1972, Administrative Law Judge Arnold
Ordman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a support-
ing brief, and General Counsel filed a brief in support
of the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this
proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the attached
Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided ot affirm the rulings, finding, and conclu-
sions’ of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt
his recommended Order.
*The title of “Trial Examiner” was changed to “Ad-
ministrative Law Judge” effective August 19, 1972.
*The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently sub-
stituted, in sec. II, B, 2, of his Decision, “Lambert” for
“Morrell” as being in charge of the shipping department.
That statement is hereby corrected to read, “Employees
Fritch, Bickett, and Lambert testified that Morrell was
in charge of, and gave orders to, the employees in the
shipping department.”
*In adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s conclu-
sion that the layoffs were discriminatorily motivated, we
note that such conclusion is further strengthened by evi-
dence not cited in his Decision. On January 14, 1972, em-
ployee Washburn, known by Respondent to have attended
the union meeting on January 10 and to have signed a
union authorization card, questioned Supervisor Peve
concerning the nine employees laid off, on January 13.
Peve’s response was, “You know damned well what hap-
pened. If you don’t keep your mouth shut, you’ll be next,”
and Washburn was laid off that night. ‘Thus, we find that,
while the evidence relied on by the Administrative Law
Judge is sufficient to support the finding that the layoffs
32a
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that
Respondent, The Pearson Bros. Company, Galva, Illinois,
its officers, agents, successors and assigns shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 31, 1972.
were violative of Sec. 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act, Peves
reply provides additional conclusive evidence that Re-
—" discriminatorily selected the union adherents for
ayoff.
33a
COLIN INNT
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Before: LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Chief Judge, LATHAM
CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and ROBERT A.
SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.
THIS CAUSE came to be heard upon a petition to
review, and on a cross-application for enforcement of,
an order of the National labor Relations Board dated
October 31, 1972, against The Pearson Bros. Company,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns. The Court
heard argument of respective counsel on September 18,
1973, and has considered the briefs and transcript of
record filed in this cause. On October 2, 1973, the court
being fully advised in the premises, handed down its
order denying the petition for review and granting enforce-
ment of the Board’s order.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit that the petition for review filed
by The Pearson Bros. Company, be and it is hereby
denied; and that the said order of the National Labor
Relations Board in said proceeding be enforced, and that
The Pearson Bros. Company, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, abide by and perform the directions of the
Board in said order contained.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the
Court that costs shall be taxed against the Petitioner.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.