Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Williams v. United States

een |

INDEX

Pact

Citation to Opinion Below ....................00000- 1

ee rT FT Te ee NOD Lak 2

SD SOND: Sivessnnouaseud ee wenuedeenbe an 2

EE ich sanuseunsdheuws<enes saupeeeeeeeeie e 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..................... 5

DD ciiicccacdencueaniwesss caeweaonek mee 12

DP cst uaunenncaaveumanekeaeeneeunaouee ies 15

(i)

TABLE OF CASES

Pace

Abraham v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 911 ............ 8

Basker v. Crouse, 426 F. (2d) 531 ............. 200000. 13

Bruton v. United States, 391 U. 8. 123, 20 L. Ed. (2d)

a re es EN Grau Ch aduredetcnadbencunechoas 12

Cae wv. Tie Been Oe Pe See iv ke aiccccseccbawenlik 8

Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. 8. 1074, 18 L. Ed. (2d) 934,

Oe Ge SUE Sins eoei snes merbnskecsneerouenees 12

Johnson v. United States, 195 F. (2d) 673 .......... 8, 9

Morandy v. United States, 170 F. (2d) 5 .............. 8

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 138 L. Ed. (2d) 923, 85

ae OE 6 aE ao ek aca Veen ea ba veesaeweuanced 12

Thompson v. United States, 334 F. (2d) 207 .......... 9

Tyler v. United States, 323 F. (2d) 711 .............. 9

United States v. Casey, 428 F. (2d) 229 .............. 9

United States v. Delay, 440 F. (2d) 566 .............. 9

United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F. (2d) 407 .......... 13

United States v. Martinez, 446 F. (2d) 118 .......... 13

United States v. Sawyer, 423 F. (2d) 1335 ............ 13

United States v. Shiver, 414 F. (2d) 461 ........... 9, 12

United States v. Smith, 303 F. (2d) 341 .............. 13

United States v. Thomas, 449 F. (2d) 1177 ............ 13

United States v. Washington, 447 F. (2d) 308 ........ 13

United States v. Wells, 443 F. (2d) 910 .............. 8

Watkins v. United States, 409 F. (2d) 1382 .......... 9

( iii )

preetncrcen oT IAAT ss

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1972

FRANK EDWARD WILLIAMS, SR., Petitioner,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ResponpENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Frank Edward Williams, Sr., prays that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

entered in the above-entitled case on May 7, 1973.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The per curiam opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals from the Fourth Circuit is unreported. A copy of

same is set forth as an appendix to this petition.

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2 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Fourth Cireuit was entered May 7, 1973. On

June 1, 1973, by order of the Chief Justice Burger, the

time within which to file the petition for writ of certiorari

was extended to and including June 21, 1975. The jurisdie-

tion of this Court is invoked pursuant to Title 28, United

States Code, Section 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

correctly disposed of the issues presented on appeal from

the United States District Court for the District of South”

Carolina to the effect that:

I. A Judgment of Acquittal should have been ordered

as to the second count of the indictment in that there was

no competent evidence to identify the automobile described

in said second count of said indictment and the Govern-

ment thereby failed to prove an essential element of the

charge against the defendant, to wit: That the automobile

was a stolen automobile.

II. Appellant was denied the protection of the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in

that the jury was allowed by the Trial Judge to hear dam-

aging hearsay testimony concerning the identity of the au-

tomobile set forth in Count No. 2 of the indictment, which

error was not cured by subsequent instructions by the

Trial Judge that said testimony be disregarded.

III. The supplemental “Allen Type” instructions were

prejudicial to the petitioner in that (1) specifically, the

instructions given in this case contained irrelevant and

immaterial matter which coerced the jury; (2) such type

of instructions are completely unnecessary and serve no

useful purpose, and should be abolished by this Court.

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WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT 3

STATEMENT

Petitioner, Frank Edward Williams, Sr., was convicted

of having received a stolen motor vehicle which had moved

in interstate commerce in violation of Title 18, United ;

States Code, Section 2312.* The relevant facts which led

to petitioner’s arrest and conviction are as follows:

Petitioner, a funeral director, purchased several auto-

mobiles during the period December, 1969 to February,

1970, including the autemobile involved in this petition.

That automobile, a 1970 Chevrolet Impala, was alleged to

have the Serial Number VIN164390T-139578 and was

alleged to be the property of Mrs. Lillian Winnegrad of

New York (R., la).

During the trial, Mrs. Winnegrad testified that she

was the former owner of an automobile, a Chevrolet Tm- i

pala having the Serial Number 1643707139578 (R., pp. 13, :

15), which is different from the number alleged in the in-

dictment. She further testified that she had not seen her

automobile since it disappeared from in front of her home

and had not seen the automobile found in petitioner’s pos-

session (R., 17). Both Mrs. Winnegrad and her husband

stated that they had no way of knowing whether the auto-

mobile found in petitioner’s possession was theirs (R., 61).

Subsequent to Mrs. Winnegrad leaving the witness

stand, the court questioned the validity of testimony of

Richard D. Oyler, special agent for F.B.1., as to the auto-

mobile and also as to photographs attempted to be intro-

duced as to the automobile found in the possession of the

petitioner because of this variation in serial number and

by virtue of the fact that different numbers created a ques-

tion as to whether or not such testimony was relevant or

*The indictment contained three counts, alleging three separate

offenses. Petitioner was found guilty under the second count thereof.

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4 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

material in that it appeared to be a different automobile

(R., pp. 51, 58).

Mrs. Winnegrad was recalled to the stand and in effect

testified that the serial number information first testified

to was obtained from her insurance policy. Also she fur-

ther testified as to an invoice or sales memorandum which

she had in her possession which invoice contained only the

following digits: 164890; but did not contain the full serial

number (R., pp. 58, 61).

No photographs were shown to Mr. or Mrs. Winne-

grad, nor did they identify any automobile from photo-

graphs (R., pp. 12, 17 and 58, 62).

During the course of the trial, counsel for petitioner

objected to the admission of testimony of the witnesses,

Plowden, Hurteau, and Oyler, which attempted to prove

that an automobile described in the second count of the

indictment was a stolen automobile which proof consisted

of referring to tracer systems, manuals, and reports of in-

surance tracing records as to stolen automobiles on man-

uals and records in regard thereto. The court as this stage

of the trial allowed this testimony over the objections of

counsel for petitioner (R., pp. 41, 67, 73, 210).

At the commencement of his instructions to the jury,

the court instructed the jury to disregard this line of tes-

timony and not to consider the same in its deliberations

(R., pp. 353, 355).

Other than the testimony and exhibits of Mrs. Winne-

grad and the testimony ruled incompetent, there was no

other competent testimony to identify the automobile as to

which the petitioner was convicted, as a stolen automobile.

After initial instructions from the Trial Judge, the

jury began deliberating at approximately 1:25 o'clock

P. M. (R., p. 733) and deliberated until 11:25 o’clock P. M.

at which time the jury was escorted to rooms at a motel

WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT 5

with instructions by the court to commence deliberating

on the next morning at 8:30 o’clock A. M.

During the course of deliberation, during the first

afternoon and evening, the jury indicated ONE time that

it was unable to agree (R., p. 381).

During the morning after the jury recommenced de-

liberation, the court recalled the jury to the courtroom and

gave suppplemental instructions to the jury. The jury had,

shortly before, sent word that they were still unable to

agree for the second time (R., p. 382). Counsel for peti-

tioner objected to the supplemental instructions (R., pp.

B88, 393, 394).

Approxmiately 12:05 o’clock P. M., the jury returned

a verdict finding the petitioner guilty on the second count

of the indictment and not guilty on the third count of the

indictment (R., p. 395).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In this case the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Cireuit ruled against the position of the peti-

tioner on appeal from the United States District Court for

the District of South Carolina that his conviction should

have heen reversed as to the charge of unlawfully, willfully,

and knowingly receiving a stolen motor vehicle which was

moving in interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 2312, which appeal challenged

(1) the insufficiency or total lack of evidence as to one of

the elements of the offense (2) violation of the petitioner’s

rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States in that hearsay evidence was admitted

and lieard by the jury over the objection of petitioner’s

counsel ; (3) supplemental “Allen’’ type charge to jury was

coercive to jury and on further grounds that “Allen” type

supplemental instructions should be abolished.

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6 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

In so doing, the Court of Appeals and the District

Court have decided legal issues and a substantial constitu-

tional issue in a manner contrary to established principles

of law and contrary to principle enunciated by this Court.

Review of those decisions is necessary to correct the mani-

fest miscarriage of justice which petitioner’s conviction re-

presents.

I

A Judgment of acquittal should have been ordered as

to the second count of the indictment in that there was no

competent evidence to identify the automobile described in

said second count of said indictment and the Government

thereby failed to prove an essential element of the charge

against the Defendant, to wit: that the automobile was a

stolen automobile.

Petitioner contends in his appeal from the conviction

in the District Court that there was insufficient competent

evidence to identify the automobile described in the indict-

ment as the same automobile found in the possession of the

defendant, petitioner herein.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit in a per curiam opinion finds that the motor vehicle

found in defendant’s possession was sufficiently identified

as a stolen motor vehicle and that the hearsay testimony

concerning the identity of the vehicle was fully corrobo-

rated by admissible evidence.

The Court of Appeals in the instant case did not refer

to any decisions upon which it based its findings.

In this ease, the alleged owner gave a different serial

number than the one alleged in the indictment. (R., pp.

13-15.) Also, the alleged owner testified as to a sales memo-

randum which did not give the complete serial number

which numbers varied from the numbers given in her ini-

tial testimony and this number, being incomplete, only re-

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WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT 7

flected the model and type but did not reflect any specific

automobile. (R., pp. 58-61.) The alleged owner did not

testify as to any unique marks or scratches but only testi-

fied as to make and color. The alleged owner did not have

the original registration and this was not introduced in evi-

dence.

The only other evidence of identification was the testi-

mony of witness Ovler, Plowden, and H urteau, which testi-

mony attempted to identify through “tracer” reports and

manuals which testimony was subsequently ruled incom-

petent by reason of being hearsay. (R., pp. 353-355.)

In this case the Government relied for identification,

solely, upon the introduction of evidence as to serial num-

bers. No eyewitness identifications by the alleged owner

was made even through photographs.

To convict in this instance, the Government must prove

all of the elements of the offense which are: (1) that the

vehicle involved was stolen (2) that it was transported

across a State line (3) that it was willfully and knowingly

received by the Defendant.

The Government proved by the witness, Pinckney,

that the automobile was transported across a State line.

However, the witness, Pinckney, did not testify that he had

stolen the automobile, but, on the contrary, testified that

possession had been delivered to him by one, Tatarka.

Further, Pinckney testified that he had plead nola conten-

dere to transporting automobiles, but no details were testi-

fied to as to which automobile he had transported. (R., pp.

122-176).

Eddie Tatarka was not presented by the Government

and did not testify.

It is undisputed that a blue Chevrolet was delivered

in Sumter, South Carolina to the Petitioner.

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8 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

The owner of the automobile did not identify the auto-

mobile by sight or photograph which was allegedly found

in the possession of the Petitioner and in fact testified that

she had not seen the automobile since stolen and had not

seen it before testifying. (R., pp. 12-17 and 58-62.)

The crux of the failure of the Government’s case is

that it did not prove that the automobile allegedly found

in the possession of the Petitioner was a stolen automobile.

The automobile was not in evidence. Abraham v. United

States, 15F. (2d) 911.

Although the rulings of the District Court and the

Court of Appeals do not cite any cases, it is apparent that

both relied upon the line of cases cited by the Government

in its brief which generally held that an insignificant diff-

erence between indentification numbers presented and the

actual numbers simply raise a question of identity, not

one of sufficiency. Morandy v. United States, 170 F. (2d) 5;

United States v. Wells, 443 F. (2d) 910; Johnson v. U.S.,

195 F. (2d) 673.

At first consideration these cases seem to be in direct

conflict withe Cor v. United States, 96 F. 241, which states,

inter alia,

“Proof that an automobile of a well known and

widely distributed type and model is stolen in one state

on Saturday and that a similar car is sold and deliv-

ered in an adjoining state on the following day is not

sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that the

automobile stolen was the automobile sold, or a find-

ing that the automobile sold was an automobile which

had moved in interstate commerce. This is because the

evidence, taking the view of it most favorable to the

government, is not inconsistent with the hypothesis

that the automobile sold was a different automobile

than that which was stolen. Evidence which is con-

sistent with two conflicting hypothesis tends to prove

neither. (See cases cited) ; and proof of circumstances

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WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT 9

which, while consistent with guilt, are not inconsistent

with innocence, will not support a conviction. (See

cases cited.)”

The Cox case, supra is further supported by the follow-

ing cases: Tyler v. United States, 323 F. (2d) 711; United

States v. Casey, 428 F. (2d) 229; United States v. Delay,

440 F. (2d) 566; Watkins v. United States, 409 F. (2d)

1382; United States v. Shiver, 414 F. (2d) 461. (See also,

C. J. S., Volume 61A, Section 706 (3) at page 609.)

Further, the rulings cited by the Government, and, ap-

parently relied upon by the Court of Appeals are differen-

tiated specifically in the ease of Thompson v. United States,

du4 F. (2d) 207.

In that case, the owner testified, as in the instant case,

that the automobile was stolen from his residence. He

testified as to serial numbers from document in his posses-

sion, ax in the instant case. There was no evidence as to

other distinquishing factors, as in the instant case.

There was a difference in the serial numbers as in the

instant case.

In differentiating between the line of decisions cited

by the Government in that case and in the instant case the

Court of Appeals, in Thompson v. United States, supra,

states:

“The Cox case has been cited with approval and

followed in a number of cases including the recent one,

Tyler v. United States, 10 Cir., 1963, 323 F. (2d) 711,

which held that the evidence of identification was in-

sufficient on facts as strong as those of this case.

“[1] This is not a case like Johnson v. United

States, supra, where the automobile in the defendant’s

possession was satisfactorily identified as the stolen

ear alleged to have been transported in interstate

commerce, even though there was a discrepancy be-

tween the allegations and the testimony as to the serial

numbers. It is rather a case where the issue of identifi-

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10 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

cation depended entirely upon identity of the serial

numbers. There was no other evidence to connect the

automobiles. They were of a standard make, model,

body style and color. No evidence was offered to show

any factor about either one of them other than its iden-

tifying numbers that would distinguish it from others

of the same manufacture. Bohrer was the only witness

who might possibly have given satisfactory testimony

of identification, and he never saw his car after it was

stolen. The evidence was therefore insufficient to sup-

port a conviction under either count.’’

For the foregoing reasons, the Courts below erred in

overruling a motion for judgment of acquittal on the

grounds of lack of evidence in that the Government never

proved the automobile was stolen, a vital and material ele-

ment of proof to support a conviction.

II

Appellant was denied the protection of the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in

that the jury was allowed by the Trial Judge to hear dam-

aging hearsay testimony concerning the identity of the au-

tomobile set forth in Count No. 2 of the indictment, which

error was not cured by subsequent instructions by the Trial

Judge that said testimony be disregarded.

During the trial before the District Court, two wit-

nesses were permitted to testify, contrary to objection,

from the records received by telegram from the National

Auto Theft Bureau, and from a similar ageney known as

N.C.LC. By their testimony, it was attempted to show that

the automobile in the possession of Petitioner described

‘in the Second Count of the indictment was the automobile

previously stolen from Mrs. Lillian Winnegrad of New

York. After admitting this testimony, the District Court

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WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT 11

ruled the testimony to be hearsay and instructed the jury

to disregard it, as follows:

“The Court: That concludes all of the testimony

in the case. Now there’s one matter that I want to call

your attention from the standpoint there are two wit-

nesses that have testified, one was Mr. Plowden from

the National Auto Theft Bureau, | believe that was his

capacity, who testified yesterday, and of course Mr.

Oyler, who is the F.B.L agent who has done most of

the testifying from the standpoint of the investi-

gation. You will reeall that both of them in effect,

and I’m not trying to quote exactly what they say, but

I'll make it definite to where you'll understand what

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I'm talking about, that they in reference to the é

Chevrolet in the second count of the indictment, which :

allegedly was the property of Lillian Winnegrad, of

New York, that’s the lady and her husband that were .

here from New York, both of them testified as you =

will recall. This is as to the black Chevrolet, as it has :

heen referred to, which is the charge in the second ‘

count of the indictment. Both of those government wit- ~

nesses, the F.B.I. agent and Mr. Plowden in effect

testified that during their investigation as to this par- ©

ticular Chevrolet that they by wire took up with the =

National Auto Theft Bureau, which is an ageney or ©

clearing house so to speak of reported stolen automo-

biles, and perhaps with another agency N.C.I.C., which

is another similar type agency, and that they obtained ~

information from the reports as a result of their in-

quiry as to this specifie black Chevrolet Impala, which

is in count two, that that Chevrolet belonged to Lillian

Winnegrad, who was the lady who testified here in the

case. There was a motion made at the time, and due to

the fact that the court was not in a position to know

whether it could be connected up, it hadn’t been specif-

ically ruled on by the court. ’m ruling on it now. The

information that they got from those agencies to the

effect that this specifie Chevrolet was the property

of the lady, Lillian Winnegrad, you will disregard,

because it is hearsay. It was not connected up from

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12 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

the standpoint of tracing it evidentiarily speaking.

That is a conclusion that they have testified to, which

is based on hearsay information that they obtained

from these two agencies. Disregard that as evidence.

I’m washing it out, you are not to consider it as

evidence as to that effect.

“The other parts of their evidence as to the num-

bers, their identification, and the expertice as to what

those numbers mean, of course, you have the right to

consider. The only part I’m striking out of their testi-

mony is the conclusion that they base on the hearsay

report back to them, that it was the property of

Lillian Winnegrad. I think that’s all now, and we’re

ready for arguments.”

This ultimate ruling of the District Court was correct.

United States v. Shiver, 414 F. (2d) 461.

In the Shiver ease, supra, evidence was admitted at

trial of a police report as to the theft, the insurer’s records

identified by an insurance adjuster, and a certified copy of

certificate of title. The Court ruled that this evidence was

inadmissible as hearsay, and against the Government’s con-

tention that the same was admissible under 28 .&<.

Section 1732, The Federal Business Records Act, and re-

versed the conviction of Defendant and ordered a new trial.

But the hearsay evidence also violated Petitioner’s

right to be confronted with witnesses against him, guaran-

teed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States. Painter v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 13 L. Ed.

(2d) 928, 85 S. Ct. 1065; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. 8.

1074, 13 L. Ed. (2d) 934, 85 S. Ct. 1074.

And the ruling out of this testimony came too late and

petitioner submits could not expunge and eradicate the

prejudice in the jurors’ minds. Bruton v. United States,

391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620.

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WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNrrzu STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT 13

III

The supplemental ‘‘Allen Type’’ instructions were

prejudicial to the Petitioner in that (1) specifically, the in-

structions given in this case contained irrelevant and im-

material matter which coerced the jury; (2) such type of

instructions are completely unnecessary and serve no use-

ful purpose, and should be abolished by this Court.

The charge given as supplemental instructions by the

District Court in this case had previously been approved

by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

United States v. Sawyer, 423 F. (2d) 1335.

The long dissertation on this point in the Sawyer case, f

supra, is a slight indication of the variances and nuances

of opinions which plague the Courts in considering the .

effects of the so-called “Allen” charge.

The supplemental instructions have been severely

criticized in numerous jurisdictions. See United States v.

Fioravanti, 412 F. (2d) 407, and cited cases.

Almost every decision considering the “Allen” charge

shows concern and a desire that some definite or definitive

decision be made. See, Basker v. Crouse, 426 F. (2d) 531.

United States v. Martinez, 446 F. (2d) 118.

Also, a divergence of opinion has appeared in numer-

ous cases among judges. United States v. Washington, 447

F. (2d) 308.

It has been held numerous times that extensions of

the charge should be discouraged. United States v. Smith,

303 F. (2d) 341; United States v. Thomas, 449 F. (2d) 1177.

The Thomas case, supra, is somewhat exhaustive in

its discussion and points out further the elements of doubt

involved.

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Petitioner specifically urges that the supplemental in-

structions in the instant case go beyond the bounds of the

original charge as approved by this Court in that the ele-

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14 WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

’ Le

ment of expense of trial to the Government and to the De-

fendant are inserted in.the record by this charge. (R., p.

382.) It is submitted that justice should not be given a

price tag and jurors should not be made to feel that they

are squandering tax money or the Defendant’s money,

should they not agree, and that such a charge is coercive.

It is more broadly urged that the Court should con-

sider the question of the “Allen” charge in this case to

(1) abolish its use, or (2) limit its application and use, at

least, to the recommendations of the American Bar Asso-

ciation Standards.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, Petitioner prays that the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MORRIS D. MAZURSKY,

MAZURSKY & EVANS,

19 North Harvin St.,

Sumter, 8. C. 29150,

MATTHEW J. PERRY,

JENKINS, PERRY & PRIDE,

924 Hampton St.,

Columbia, 8S. C. 29202.

\\ EAL IRLELE DEAD SEAT PORE EMER

APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2110

|

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE,

versus

FRANK EDWARD WILLIAMS, SR., Aprettant

Appeal FROM THE Untren States District Court ror THE

District or Sour CAROLINA, aT CoLUMBIA

J. Roberr Martin, Jr. Cuier Jupce

Argued February 8, 1973 Decided May 7, 1973

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BerorE WINTER anp RUSSELL, Crrever JUDGES, AND

MURRAY, District Jupar, ‘

MORRIS D, MAZURSKY, h

MATTHEW J. PERRY, ‘

Attorneys for Appellant. é

RYAN C. SHEALY,

Asst. United States Attorney,

JOHN K. GRISSO, ;

, United States Attorney,

(on brief),

Attorneys for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, we see no error: The motor vehicle

found in defendant’s possession was sufficiently identified

as a stolen motor vehicle. The hearsay testimony concern-

ing the identity of the vehicle was fully corroborated by

admissible evidence and the jury was unequivocally

charged to disregard the hearsay. The hearsay was not so

prejudicial as to render its admission into evidence incur-

able error. The charge given when the jury reported ten-

tative disagreement was approved by us in United States

ve Sawyers, 423 BF. (2d) 1335 (4 Cir. 1970).

AFFIRMED.

es

APPENDIX

Octosrr Term, 1972

No. A-1214

FRANK EDWARD WILLIAMS, PETITIONER,

versus

UNITED STATES

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Upon Consiperation of the application of counsel for

petitioner(s),

It Is Orperep that the time for filing a petition for

writ of certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the

same is hereby, extended to and including June 21, 1973.

/8/ WARREN E. BURGER,

Chief Justice of the United States.

Dated this 6th

day of June, 1973.

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