Brief for Respondent — Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.

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SUPREME COURT, U. B oe

IN THE | meme. RODAK, JR.

Suyreme Court of the United States —

October Term 1973

No. 72-1622

ALMA F. ANDERSON, DIANA BARCLAY,

BETTY JEAN B. NEILSEN and

PARKER M. NIELSON,

Petitioners,

vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH

CIRCUIT

mneaneemel VEE em

deSepgeest Respondents’ ad

— Td He

CARL J. NEMELKA

SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

MERRILL K. DAVIS

DEPUTY ATTORNEY, SALT LAKE COUNTY

SUITE C-220, COURTS BUILDING

240 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Respondent Salt Lake County

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Argument 1

Reasons for Denying the Writ 1

I. Petitioners’ Three Points Are Literally. Up-

ended by Leading Case Law and the Social and

Cultural History of our Country. 1

II. Accommodation is the Law of the Land. .... 6

III. Local Monuments Are Local Matters and

Should Be Treated By Local Authorities on a Local

Level. 8

IV. There Is No Religious Activity Under This

Section of the Constitution. 10

V. Mere Disagreement in Conscience Is Not a

Constitutional Injury. 11

VI. Monuments Reflect the Culture and the Com-

monplace of the Communities. 12

VII. The Cases Which Create Fictitious Religious

Problems In the Long Run May Do Grievous or

Massive Damage to the General Image of True

Religion. .. . 18

Conclusion . 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page

CASES:

Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203

(1963) 4

Allen v. Morton, 333 F. Supp. 1088 (1971) ............ +

Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (1970) ........ 10

Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 348 F.

Supp. 1170 (D.C., Utah 1972) 2

Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476,

55 N.E. 77, 78 (1889) 12

Cohen v. State of California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)... 2

Davis v. Beason, 183 U.S. 333 (1890) .................... 10

Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429,

432-433 (1952) 6

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 2

In re Opinion of the Justices, 9 N.E. 2d 753

(Mass 1937) 12

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603 (1971) ................ 4

Lewis v. Allen, 159 NYS2d 807 (1957) ................ 6

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1966) ........ 6

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,

238 (1948) 9

McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566 (1922) .................... 10

Milwaukee County v. Carter, 258 Wis. 139,

45 N.W. 2d 90, 92 (1950) 7

People v. Woody, 394 P2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1964) .... 14

Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) -................. 3

State ex rel Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28

N.E. 2d 256, 265 (1940) mek 11

State ex rel Singelmann v. Morrison, 57 So. 2d 2388,

246 (Ct App La. 1952) 11

EO RS OGRE

Page

Queen v. Bishop of London, 24 W.B. Div. 213

(1874) 13

United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,

33 U. S. 364 (1947) 5

Walz v. Tax Commission of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664

(1970) 3

Western Cotton Oil Co. v. Hodges, (CA 5th 1954)

218 F2d 158 5

Woman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (1972) ............ a

Woman v. Kosydar, 353 F. Supp. 744 (1972)........ 4

Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 171, 172, 100 N.E.

2d 467 (1951) 6

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 ROI Seensesdechesssabacedins 3

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Article 1, Section 1 11

BIBLE

New Testament, II Corinthians, Ch. 3, Verse 6 ...... 4

TREATISES

Antieu, Freedom from Federal Establishment,

pp. 128-131 (1964) 12

Moore Federal Practice, Volume 5A, pp. 2613-2661 5

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

8 Harvard L.R. 25, (1962) )

16 Stanford L.R. 494, 495 Footnote 5 (1965) ........ 12

15 Stanford L.R. 389 (1963) 13

iv

69 Michigan L.R. 179, 196-198 (1970) ............

8 Utah L.R. 167 (1963)

Utah L.R., Vol. 4, 503 (1972)

MAGAZINE ARTICLES

Readers Digest, February 1965, pp. 49-51 ....

STATUTES & RULE

Rule 52 (a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Strtes

October Term 1973

No. 72-1622

ALMA F. ANDERSON, DIANA BARCLAY,

BETTY JEAN B. NEILSEN and

PARKER M. NIELSON,

Petitioners,

vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

Respondents.

.

ba) Ta a hla Th i sd

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH

CIRCUIT

In Support of Respondents’ Position :

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Rae

ARGUMENT :

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PETITIONERS’ THREE POINTS ARE LIT-

ERALLY UP-ENDED BY LEADING CASE

LAW AND THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY.

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(a) In this case of Anderson v. Salt Lake City Cor-

poration, 348 F. Supp. 1170, (D.C. Utah 1972), the

Tenth Circuit Court, in an unanimous opinion, re-

versed the District Court’s decision. Circuit Judge

Murrah wrote a commentworthy opinion, and, with

impeccable exactness, did the job of distinguishing the

Anderson case from others offered in opposition.

Judge Murrah summarized these distinctions by

adding, “It does not seem reasonable to require removal

of a passive monument, involving no compulsion, because

its accepted precepts, as a foundation for law, reflect

the religious nature of an ancient era.” ( App. 45a).

No one is coerced to look upon the ‘Ten Command-

ments monument, as Judge Murrah said. Perhaps,

with tongue in cheek, the Judge made reference to

Cohen v. State of California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). (“Al-

though they are in plain view, no one is required to read

or recite them)”. (App. 44a).

An appropriate similar paraphrase of this admo-

nition in Cohen is found in a new Utah Law Review

article, Volume 4, 1972, page 503. It is verbosely

entitled, “He that Hath Eyes to See, Let Him See;

He that is offended, Let Him Look the Other Way—

Obscenity Law and Artistic Expression”. Although

the Cohen decision found its roots in the so-called ob-

scenity law violations, there may be a moral here, as

the same admonitions, for adequate reasons, seem applic-

able to this secular-religious monument located on the

courthouse lawn in Salt Lake City.

(b) In citing the 1947 Everson v. Board of Edu-

cation case, 330 U.S. 1, in support of his argument for

3

a writ of Certiorari, petitioners overlook the fact that

the 1970 Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New

York, 397 U.S. 664, rejected the absolutistic “no aid”

dicta of the Everson case. It further ruled that Estab-

lishment of a religion involved “sponsorship, financial

support, and active involvement of the sovereign in

religious activity.” The position sometimes enjoyed

by the absolute secularists is up-ended by the Walz

decision. Mr. Justice Burger stated, in substance, in

his opinion there, that an essential part of adjudication,

when interpreting the constitution, is the drawing of

distinctions, including the fine ones. Further, that courts

have long been required to determine what acts violate

the religious cases of the First Amendment, and whether

they establish or interfere with religion.

Mr. Justice Burger, in his Walz case opinion,

cited Mr. Justice Douglas in the case of Zorach v. Clau-

son, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), who, in writing for the court

noted:

“The First Amendment, however, does not say that

in every and all respects there shall be a separation of

Church and State.”

Mr. Justice Douglas continued, “We sponsor an

attitude on the part of government that shows no par-

tiality to any one group and that lets each flourish ac-

cording to the zeal of his adherents and the appeal of

its dogma.”

Mr. Justice Harlan expressed something of this

in his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398

(1963), saying that the constitutional neutrality im-

posed on us “is not so narrow a channel that the slight-

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est deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to

condemnation.”

To paraphrase the good book, the Letter of the

Law killeth, and the Spirit of the Law Giveth Life.

New Testament, II Corinthians, Ch. 3, Verse 6.

The urging of Petitioners to grant their Writ to

prevent “emasculation of prior rulings” of this court

is simply without substance or merit.

(c) As to Petitioners proposition III, one’s first

reaction might be, what basic difference does it make

whether “purpose” and “effect” are questions of fact

or law? Do the Circuits need “guidance” in this regard,

as Petitioners request?

Petitioners aver that the Anderson case (supra)

was tried with the understanding that all parties con-

sidered “purpose” and “effect” were factual matters,

to be determined by the court from the evidence pre-

sented. This respondent respectfully takes exception

to this claim. |

The criteria of the Abington Township School

District v. Schempp case, 8374 US 208, (1968), has

been regarded as a question of law in several recent

cases. Among these are: Woman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp.

399 (1972); Woman vs. Kosydar, 353 F. Supp. 744

(1972); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603 (1971);

Allen v. Morton (formerly Allen v. Hickel), 383 F.

Supp. 1088 (U.S. D.C. D.C. 1971) and the Schempp

case itself. Therefore this argument, this respondent

contends, should be summarily rejected.

(d) Petitioners, in their “Statement,” on page 5

of their brief, complain that the Circuit Court failed

NERO IT BIT LO ELLER MO EE ROA BS EINE TEN SOR Ig a tg

5

to discuss the “meaning and effect of Rule 52 (a),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” They further con-

tend that the district court’s findings of fact should

have been held to be “clearly erroneous” by the Circuit

court. This respondent finds nothing to require the

Circuit court to discuss Rule 52 (a), nor use the phrase,

“clearly erroneous,” as relate to the findings.

One of the key decisions which interpret Rule 52

(a) is the 1948 case, United States v. United States

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 864. Mr. Justice Reed, writing

for the court in that case concluded with an often-

quoted formulation, that “A finding is “clearly erro-

neous” when, although there is evidence to support it,

the reviewing court, on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” The Circuit Court, with three judges, were

unanimous in their opinion to reverse the district court

decision. After reading the record, they may have be-

lieved, as this respondent did, that the district court

judge closed his ears to the evidence of defendants,

barely suffered through the expert testimony presented

by the defendants, and then failed to accurately apply

existing case law to the facts of the Anderson case,

(supra).

The Fifth Circuit, in the case of Western Cotton

Oil Co. v. Hodges, (CA 5th, 1954), 218 F2d 158, pro-

poses a three-point test, which, when applied to the

Anderson case (supra), would uphold the district court

findings as “clearly erroneous.” A full treatise on this

respondent’s position here is found in Moore Federal

Practice, Volume 5A, pages 2618-2661, inclusive.

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II

ACCOMMCDATION IS THE LAW OF THE

LAND

Accommodation is squarely the policy of the Su-

preme Court today, and is the law of the land. Accom-

modation means this: that there will be gracious tolera-

tion of religion and all religions; that the State may

and can accommodate all with “benevolent neutrality”

in ways that neither involve oppression nor deprivation

of Exercise or tax, identifiably, for essentially ecclesi-

astical purposes, Doremus vs. Board of Education, 342

U.S. 429, 432-433 (1952). Said Judge Froessel of the

New York Court of Appeals in Zorach v. Clauson, at

the state level, 303 N.Y. 171, 172, 100 NE 2d at 467,

the “wall”

“is designed as a reasonable line of demarcation

between friends and not an iron curtain as be-

tween foes.”

The State is not to be manipulated into a position

of being anti-religion, nor of pitting one irreligion

against religion. Lewis v. Allen, 159 NYS 2d 807, 812-

813 (1957) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U S 420, 444-

445, Readers Digest, Feb. 1965, pp 49-51. Accommo-

dation is here to stay.

1 The catalogue of accommodations is long and impressive. See

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U S 203, 238, 248, 255-

256; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U S 306, 312-313; Engel v. Vitale,

370 U S 421, 435 (footnote 21), 437 (footnote 1), 440-441

(footnote 5), 446-450 (1962); School District of Ab

ownship v. Schempp, 374 U S 203, 212-213, 394-296, 303-

304, 314 (1963); Fellman, “Separation of Church and State”,

1950 Wis. L. R. 427, 743-475; Oaks, The Wall Between Church

and State, p. 21 (U. of Chicago Press, 1963); Konvitz, Fun-

damental Liberties of a Free People, Chap. 7 (Cornell U.

Press, 1957).

7

Two other references should be mentioned here

on this subject of “Accommodation.”

A leading church-state authority, Professor Paul

Kauper of Michigan in “The Walz Decision,” 69 Mich.

L. Rev. 179, 196-198 (1970), highlights the significance

of the case, thus:

(1) A long established practice has persuasive

practical value as an aid in construing the Estab-

lishment clause.

(2) The Court eschews absolute and rhetorical

extremes and speaks of “realistic and sensible solu-

tions.”

(3) Emphasis on the general purposes of the

twin religion clauses, Exercise and Establishment,

to promote and protect religious liberty.

(4) Stresses the “benevolent neutralist” of ac-

commodation which accords a central place to re-

ligious liberty.

“Walz is important because it affirms the ac-

commodation theory in a striking way, notwith-

standing what has been said in intervening opin-

ions about neutrality and secular purpose.”

In the leading case of Milwaukee County v. Carter,

258 Wis. 139 45 N W 2d 90, 92 (1950), the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin observed that a different rule ap-

plies to the use of public parks than to public school

buildings:

“However, yt under Art. I, Sec. 18,

Wis. Const., and the decision of this court in the

Weiss case, supra, and other cases, and likewise

the decision of the Unietd States Supreme Court

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in the McCollum case, supra, such use of tax-

supported pale school property and public

school funds is prohibited, no such restriction is

considered applicable under the recent decisions

of the United States Supreme Court to the use of

public parks or streets by the people in their con-

stitutional right to peaceably assemble in the free

and orderly ewercise of their religion and the

freedom of speech, and of the press, as provided

in the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied. )

III

LOCAL MONUMENTS ARE LOCAL MAT-

TERS AND SHOULD BE TREATED BY LO-

CAL AUTHORITIES ON A LOCAL LEVEL.

The recent Solicitor General of the United States,

the Honorable Erwin N. Griswold, while Dean of the

Harvard Law School, sharply criticized the absolu-

tistic approach in his classic article, “Absolute is in the

Dark,” 8 Utah Law Rev 167 (1963). At page 175, he

stated:

““* * * There are some matters which should

be settled on a local level in each community and

should not become est Supreme Court cases.

This can be presented on an essentially legal level

in terms of ‘standing to sue’ and this has been

thoughtfully developed by my colleague, Pro-

fessor Sutherland.”

The late Professor Sutherland, in “Establishment

According to Engel,” 76 H L Rev 25 (1962), recom-

mended that instead of deciding such constitutional

questions as the “Regent’s prayer in Engel, supra, as

one of Establishment, a judicial self-restraint should be

exercised, leaving this and similar religious controver-

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sies, not involving oppression or taxation, to be resolved

by other agencies of government or by the citizens them-

selves. Trenchant observations in this article by Pro-

fessor Sutherland, (who in his lifetime as a judge’s son,

a clerk to Justice Holmes, a professor, and writer,

stands eminent among Church-State authorities) in-

clude:

“To make inevitable distinctions between a

time for judicial action and a time for judicial

self-restraint, few sources of guidance can be

as satisfactory as the disciplined prepossessions

of an independent judge, aware of history, tol-

erant of the democratic process, and conscious of

human limitations.” (Page 40.)

“In the absence of substantial oppression of

any individual by tax or by regulation, the whole

business of state establishment could have been

treated as a matter of policy for state legislators,

a ‘political question’ as to how far the wholesome

principle of separate church and state, under

which government refrains from

churches and churches do not meddle in govern-

ment, should be pressed to a minimal conclusion

in a society as complex as that of today’s United

States.” (Page 41.)

* * * self-restraint by ordinary citizens is a

virtue essential to life in a democratic society

—a virtue as essential to minorities as to ma-

jorities. Unless some person is substantially hurt

or oppressed, the judicial systems of the states

and of the United States are not often wisely be-

sought to intervene among differing social

groups, even when difference is impelled by

strong emotional urges.” (Page 52.)

Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in McCollum v.

Board of Education, 838 U S at 238, put the heart of

the matter this way:

KO aN oT ine ae A 5’

10

“If with no surer legal guidance we are to

take up and decide every variation of this con-

troversy, raised by persons not subject to penalty

or taa, but who are dissatisfied with the way

schools are dealing with the problem, we are

likely to have much business of the sort. And

more importantly, we are likely to make the legal

wall of separation between church and state as

winding as the famous serpentine wall designed

by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded.”

(Emphasis supplied)

IV

THERE IS NO RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY UN-

DER THIS SECTION OF THE CONSTITU-

TION.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in McMasters v.

State, 207 P 566, 568 (Okl. Ct. Crim App, 1922), dis-

cusses the word religion,” citing Davis v. Beason, 138

U S 888, and states:

“It has been held that ‘religion’ has reference

to Divinity; to reverence, worship, obedience,

and submission to the mandates and precepts of

supernatural or superior beings * * * .”

Petitoners in their Petition show absolutely no

well-pleaded religious activity within the words of this

Court. In Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.C.

D.C., 1970), involving the attendance of Service Acad-

emy members at chapel, the Court states at 316 F Supp

1088:

“The activities involved are not aimed at the

cultivation of religious faith or motivation * * * ”

11

Judge Corcoran further pointed out that cadets are

required to attend chapel but not required to partici-

pate in the service or to worship. He said, at page 1087:

“Nor is it revolutionary to say that First

Amendment rights are not absolute, * * * Tra-

dition—and the continuous public acceptance of

a practice—carries weight and demands recog-

nition, * * * ”

Petitioners have completely failed to show that

this monument is a shrine or a place of worship or

utilized for the propagation of the faith of any specific

religious sect. State ew rel Singelmann v. Morrison, 57

So, 2d 288, 246 (Ct App La., 1952) ; State ex rel John-

son v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 848, 28 N.E. 2d 256, 265 (1940).

¥

MERE DISAGREEMENT IN CONSCIENCE

IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY.

Petitioners cannot press down a crown of thorns

on every monument to serve their personal thoughts

and feelings. In a nation of multiplicity of religious

sect, we cannot give every citizen’s conscience a right

of veto as he sees fit. Petitioners are free to hold their

convictions of conscience, but they have no right, merely

because they are conscientious, to impose them as the

law of the land. Mere disagreement in conscience is not

a constitutional injury. The Oklahoma Constitution is

one of the ten state constitutions which does not even

mention “conscience” in the religion proviso.

Utah, however, does. Article I, Section I, Utah

State Constitution..

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Madison’s efforts to put a right of conscience

in the Bill of Rights failed. Antieu, Freedom from

Federal Estabiishment, 128-131 (1964) ; Note 16 Stan.

L. R. 494, 495 (1965), footnote 5.

VI

MONUMENTS REFLECT THE CULTURE

AND THE COMMONPLACE OF COMMUNI-

TIES.

Theres are no limits on monuments, and the like,

outside of public sentiment or a standard of good taste.

Grounded in history and heritage, monuments are part

of the community and community life. Recognition

is not religion qua religion, or religion per se; deco-

ration is not indoctrination. In re Opinion of the Jus-

tices, 9 N.E. 2d 753 (Mass 1937); Attorney General

v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (1889).

The wisdom of Mr. Justice Jackson in McCollum

v. Board of Education (1948), is applicable here. At

333 U S 233-237, he observed:

““* * * it may be doubted whether the Con-

stitution, which, of course, protects the right to

dissent, can be construed always to protect one

from the embarrassment that always attends non-

conformity, whether in religion, politics, be-

havior or dress.”

“ * * * The fact is that, for good or for ill,

nearly everything in our culture worth transmit-

ting, everything which gives meaning to life, is

saturated with religious influences, derived from

paganism, Judaism, Christianity, both Catholic

and Protestant and other faiths accepted by a

large part of the world’s peoples.”

13

“Neighborhoods differ in racial, religious and

cultural compositions. It must be expected that

they will adopt different customs which will give

emphasis to different values and will induce

different experiments. And it must be expected

that no matter what practice prevails, there will

be many discontented and possibly belligerent

s noritics.”

vil

THE CASES WHICH CREATE FICTITIOUS

RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE LONG

RUN MAY DO GRIEVOUS OR MASSIVE

DAMAGE TO THE GENERAL IMAGE OF

TRUE RELIGION.

The great mischief inherent was wisely noted a

hundred years ago in Queen v. Bishop of London, 24

W. B. Div 213 (1874):

“ * * * such litigation becomes more mischie-

vous, the longer it is continued, while the results

from it are of exceeding little value * * * ”

Examples of such litigation have been frequent

the last dozen years.? Tolerance and toleration, rather

than litigation, should be our state and national theme.

To paraphrase Madison: we must beware lest the tiny

trickle of one unfinished case swell into a raging torrent

of absolute secularism. The American Jewish Congress

author of “Religion-Blind Government,” 15 Stan L R

389 (1963), defines its sweep at page 404:

2 See O’Hair v. Payne, supra; Protestants United ete v. O’Brien,

272 F Suvp 712. ( US DC, 1967), Baer v. K , 181

NYS 2d 230 (1958), Lawrence v. Buckmueller, 243 NYS 2d

87 (1963), Lewis v. Allen, 207 NYS 2d 862 (1964), Brown v.

Heller, 273 NYS 2d 713 (1966).

ALES MED REPU ANE Hlth I YE

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14

“Outlawed, too, would be all references to God

in oaths of office, state constitutions, presiden-

tial resolutions, the pledge of allegiance, the

national motto, currency and postage stamps,

etc. I have | felt that these were inconsist-

ent with the spirit of the Constitution and the

first amendment and with the decisions of the

Supreme Court, but I am notoriously ‘absolut-

ist’ and ‘doctrinaire’ ”.*

CONCLUSION

The briefs submitted by the two respondents herein,

and by that of the Amicus Curiae, abound with author-

ity to the effect that there is no conflict of decisions here-

in. Further, that the questions raised by the petition-

ers are not as important as claimed by them.

The Circuit Court decision, which reversed that of

the District Court, is one wherein the decision turns on

its own facts, as Judge Murrah so ably set forth in his

opinion from the Circuit Court. The outcome will prob-

ably affect few others than these petitioner litigants,

who ostensibly represent some non-religious sect or

group. Hopefully, the authorities cited by the respond-

ents and the Amicus Curiae will convince the court that

the decision below was the correct one and that the

petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Mr. Justice Tobriner expressed the theme (and it

could relate to this monument case) all so very well in

People v. Woody, 394 P 2d 813, 817 (Cal., 1964) :

3 To which Mr. Justice Jackson’s words in Douglas v. City of

Jeanette, 319 U S 157, 179 (1943) are a fitting reply:

“I do not think it any more intended to leave the consci-

ence of a minority to fix its [society’s} limits. Civil gov-

ernment cannot let any group ride rough shod over others

simply because their ‘consciences’ tell them to do so.”

EER PRE RE ENA eS es

15

“In a mass society, which presses at every

point toward conformity, the protection of a self-

expression, however, unique, of the indivi

and the group becomes ever more important. The

varying currents of the subcultures that flow

into the mainstream of our national life give it

depth and beauty.”

Respectfully submitted,

CARL J. NEMELKA

Salt Lake County Attorney

240 East 4th South St.

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MERRILL K. DAVIS

Deputy County Attorney

240 East 4th South St.

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111