Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission
Supreme Court brief1972
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Pee COURT, U. S. 73 - 1990
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United State
OcrosEr Term, 1971
THe Criry or New York,
Petitioner,
—against—
FrperaL Power Commission, ConsoLipateD Epison CoMPaNy
or New York, Inc., Town oF CoRNWALL, VILLAGE OF
CornWaLt and Pauisapes INTERSTATE Park CoMMISSION,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
J. Lee Rankin - ' -
Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York,
Attorney for Petitioner,
Municipal Building ©
New York, New York 10007
Peter C. DEMETRI
EVELYN J. JUNGE,
Of Counsel
.
I Ee =
INDEX
PAGE
Fa ai ernie d nee re ea ROR ae eae SR Rants ae De 2
ition Belew eran
Questions Presented .........02...-....-..e---e-eee- sini Sipescstisieeiee _ =
Pertinent Statutes 2.0220... EBV) Rieiceneeetee, te Te .
Statement of the Case 20.02.0002... RSs asses SEEN 6 4
A. Description of the Project -....20.00.022222eeee eee 4
B. Reasons for the City’s Opposition -...0..0.0.20.......-- 6
1. The “Aqueduct. siidattant diet canes ia sec 6
2. Increased Air Pollution —................:.. 9
3. Damages to the Hudson Highlands Cae
C. The Court of Appeals Opinion ita joensen 10
Reasons Why the Writ Should Be Granted -:....000000....... 13
I. The failure of the Court below to recognize
the Commission’s lack of expertise resulted in
erroneously limiting the scope of its review ...... 13
-A. The Danger to the Aqueduct is Not-a -
Highly Complex Technological Issue En-
trusted by Congress to the F.P.C. ............. . 16
B. The Extent to Which a Reviewing Court
Must Defer to Ageucy. Expertise .................. 17
yh Ayreesiog PPAR apes
FACES REI
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ngeomicemaatenyy
SLR DH NAY RMN i tpransnang 29 army ee gen
-
ea CS a Saas Sn ote: he a eee
NE OT OP ae Fe
7 _
i
PAGE
II. The Court below erred in finding compliance
with NEPA «.,..-.ccc.0- iiaeoasusbeticnciasaenetaesdaicnacan ciate 20
A. The Commission’s Final Opinion Was Not
a Sufficient -Environmental Impact State-
SIR eeisiachsapaieltttesecrecencaentnntencchdeateeseebiceeco sega 20
L. The Commission’s Consultations With Other
Agencies Failed to Meet the Requirements
oes Poa a 21
III. This license is precluded by Section 27 of ‘the
FE Pe ing ee 25
A. Section 27 Is Applicable to This License ..... 25°
B. Relief Under §27 Is Not Limited to Com-
pensation for State-Conferred Water Rights 26
CONCLUSION .....0...-:.- See Pe eee At Cr hr 28
Ce Bp erneprer gerne doe nc nan ea eR At Us MORE Ren A la
pT aT OR TR PEN NRE PORES 63a
TE ccicctes cece: , SEE SEE eR: 202a
_ APPENDIx D ose nd ON OU ETO TSO EIT TO 205a
Cirations |
Cases: | |
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156
(1962) .. piieriaioddanaeencdonic pcumubetiie SSE reer 19
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee. v. Atomic
Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 24
itl
PAGE
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, a. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971) ; PRT a ON WER ES oe 14
Consolidated Edison Co. of ine tut v. eel Hud-
' son Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 gilding 2
‘a
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) eS
Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 40 U.S. Law Week 4141 (1972) AS ete re 16, 18
Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954) x 26":
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power
' Commission, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) ... a 17, 27-28
Gainesville Utilities Department v. Florida Power Cor-
poration, 402 U.S. 515 (1971) ........ ecdicailaasietasinn Oe
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 444 F.2d 841 (1570), cert.
denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971) .........-..- 15, 18, 19
Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Com-
mission,. Docket Nos. 71- 1991, 71-1996 (2nd Cir.
1972) Seren 13, 20-21
roan Ford & Son, Inc. v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280
U.S. 369 (1930) _ uns 26
Lathan v. Volpe, 3 ERC 1362 (9th Cir. 1971)... 18
National Labor Relations Board v. Brown, 380 U.S..
278 (1965) Saditekpiincecadeinisieacmamaudedibes 19
' Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 16
~~ :
ee
. Py
ROT RIC Rize sats Cam meeseus — .
cieeieenatinn - SPL HOSMER NIE eres none ieuccohonanige
iv
PAGE
Portland General Electric Co. v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 328 F.2d 165 (9th’ Cir. 1964) oe 26
Scenic Hridson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965) .2...° 2
Udall v. Federal Power Commission, 381 U.S. 428 ©
PIO Fai ecaset snccs putt gelato caca gutta enencion alice coined 13
United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 191 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1951) oe 16
Universal Camera v. National Labor Relations Board,
340 U.S. 474 (1951) ee Ma hale tiated ieecttaoubaats 15
Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Act
Section 10(e), 15 U.S.C. §706 (2)(A)(B)(C)(D) .. 14
Federal Power Act
Section 10(c), 16 U.S.C. §803(¢) vanced O7
Section. 27, 16 U.S.C. §821 o..ecceccceccssoeeceseoe- 11, 25, 26, 27
Section 313(b), 16 U.S.C. §825(1)(b) .. 7 2
National Environmental Policy Act ;
Section 101, 42 U.S.C. §483 oo... cccccccececccceccececceseeeeee 3
- Section 101(b){2), 42 U.S.C. §4831(b) (2) ...---o---e--- 94
Section 101(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. §4331(b) (3) ........--.-- 24
Section 102, 42 U.S.C. §4832 oo. eccceccceceeeees 3,11, 20, 21
Reclamation Act
Section 8, 43 U.S.C. §383 ccccccccccccccclccecssiccsssssseseeee 26
8 U.S.C. §1254(1) cece "coeceerceceenlectennsene 2
a
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER Term, 1971
THe City or New York,
Petitioner,
—against—
FrpERAL PowER Commission, CONSOLIDATED [}pISON COMPANY
oF New York, Inc., Town or CorRNWALL, VILLAGE OF
CorNWALL and Pauisapes INTERSTATE PARK CoMmMISSION,
Respondents.
<i
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit made ‘and entered on October 22, 1971
in the cause entitled Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al. in: which
the City was a petitioner. The City supports the compan-
ion petitions being filed on behalf of Scenic Hudsqn Preser-
vation Conference, The Wilderness Society, The Izaak
Walton League of America, National Audubon Society, Na-
tional Parks and Conservation Association -and the Sierra
Club and its Atlantic Chapter.
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Seer
A POM oN ge Hane
CEPTS PCR IINS Bera REN Cee pe aR
; he Opinions Below
The project which is the subject of this litigation has.
twice been licensed by the Federal Power Commission |
(“F.P.G” or “the Commission”). The 2 to 1 opinion of
the Court of Appeals upholding the second license is offi-
cially reported at 453 F. 2d 463 (2nd Cir. 1971). It is an-
nexed .hereto as “Appendix A” and is referred to herein
as “Scenic Hudson 11.” The Court’s opinion reviewed and
upheld an August 19, 1970 opinion and licensing order
(No. 584) of the F.P.C. which is annexed hereto as “Ap-
pendix B.” The earlier decision of the Second Circuit
which set aside the original license and remanded the pro-
ceedings to the Commission, Scenic Hudson Preservation
‘Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F. 2d 608 |
(2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom., Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) is referred to herein as “Scenic
Hudson I.” The orders sald rehearing are found in
“Appendix C.”
Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was made and
entered on October 22, 1971. On November 26, 1971, the
Second Circuit by a vote of 4 to 4 denied applications for re-
hearing in bane which had been timely filed. The time for
filing the within petition for certiorari was extended by
order of this Court dated February 15, 1972, signed by
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, to and including
March 24, 1972. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
Title 28 of the United States Code §1254 (1) and Section
313 (b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §825 I(b).
3
Questions Presented
1.. Whether a court properly exercises its judicial fune-
tion when it defers to conclusions reached by a federal
regulatory agency in an area in which the agency is without
expertise. -
2. Whether a final opinion licensing a project, in and of
itself, meets the requirement of §102 of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act that an agency prepare an environ-
mentai impact statement for each major federal action; and
whether §102 requires a meaningful attempt on the part
of the licensing agency to consult with other agencies with
jurisdiction and/or expertise.
3. Whether Section 27 of the Federal Power Act pre-
cluded issuance of a license for this project at the Storm
King site.
Pertinent Statutes
The statutory provisions involved are Section 27 of the
Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1077, 16 U.S.C. §821 (1964),
and Section i101 and Section 102 of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 [“NEPA”)], 83 Stat. 852, 42 —
U.S.C. $4332 (Supp. 1971). These provisions are annexed
hereto as Appendix D.
rhe eno my
Statement of the Case
A. Description of the Project
The Storm King project, will be the largest pumped
storage facility in the world, capable of producing 2,000,000
kw of electricity. It will use energy generated in off-peak
hours (i.e., at night and on weekends) for which there is .
otherwise no demand, and convert it into energy to meet
peak or emergency electrical requirements of the metro-
politan New York City area served by Con Edison. For
this reason it has been likened to a storage battery, al-
though the analogy does not make clear the fact that,
because of frictional losses, more energy is consumed in
pumping water to an upper reservoir than is returned to
the system by reversing the pump-turbines to generate
electricity. For each kilowatt of power produced by the
project, 1.4 kw of power will be expended in pumping the
water. This fact is significant in assessing the effects of
project operation on pollution produced at generating
plants used to pump the Storm King project.
As this will be the world’s largest pumped storage instal-
lation, it is not surprising to note that the elements of the
project are indeed massive. Water for operation of the
project will be provided by the Hudson River. It will be
pumped to a storage reservoir, 1000 feet above the Hudson,
through a tunnel 40 feet in diameter and over 2 miles long.
‘The upper storage reservoir, formed by diking in a natur-
ally formed basin behind the mountain, will have 240 acres
of surface space. As a consequence, an existing reservoir
of the Village of Cornwall will be thereby inundated and
destroyed.® .
*In light of the City’s long-standing opposition to the Storm
King project because of the danger to its Catskill Aqueduct, it is
5
From the City’s point of view, the most disturbing ele-
ment of the project is the underground powerhouse which
will be blasted within the rock of Storm King Mountain.
Consisting of three chambers, the powerhouse will be 715
feet long, or the length of 2 football fields stretched from
end zone to end zone. A total of 254,000 eubie vards of
rock, or sume 580,000 tons, will be blasted and removed
from the mountain. The largest chamber will be 150 feet
high and 78-feet wide, or the height of a modern 15 story
building taking up over a third of an average City block.
This chamber will be blasted out of the rock only 140 feet
away from the Moodna Tunnel Section of the City’s Catskill
Aqueduct. This Aqueduct furnishes about 40 percent of the
City’s water supply, and as well provides the water re-
quirements of some 20 upstate communities which by law
the City is obligated to supply.
The F.P.C. has taken the unusual precaution of licensing
the Storm King project at two sites, both on the west bank
of the Hudson River and approximately 40 miles north of
New York City. [App. B, 7335 at 170a]. The primary site
(“Storm King site” or “Site 1”) is at Storm King Moun-
tain;* the alternate site (“Palisades Park site” or “Site
2”), licensed only if the primary site is overturned by a
reviewing court, is some 114 miles south of Storm King
at Crows Nest Mountain and within the Palisades Inter-
ironic to note that the Village intends to make up part of the result-
ing deficit in its water supply by tapping the City’s Catskill
Aqueduct.
* Part of this land was conveyed by the City to the Palisades
Interstate Park Commission in 1963. The deed provides that the
land shall be used for park purposes only, and contains a restrictive
—— barring drilling at depths greater than 200 feet from the
surface.
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6
state Park.* Except as otherwise noted, the discussion
herein is limited to the Storm King site.
B. Reasons for the City’s Opposition
A pumped storage facility has obvious benefits not only
for Con Edison but for its major area of service, New York
City. It is impossible: to conceive of a viable future for
the City whether as a hub of business and industry, or as a
cultural center, or as a major residential community with-
out an adequate and reliable supply of electricity. And it
is undisputed that the project is a means of bringing ad-
ditional peaking power and reliability to the Con Edison
system. In light of these facts, it is obvious that the City’s
opposition would not be, and is not, lightly undertaken.**
1. The Aqueduct
The primary reason for the City’s opposition to the proj-
ect is its concern for the safety of its water supply. This
concern is caused by the fact that the massive powerhouse
previously described will be excavated only 140 feet from
the Moodna Tunnel Section of the City’s Catskill —
duct.***
* Rejected by both the Commission and the Hearing Examiner
was a third site, also within the Palisades Interstate Park, referred
to as “Site 2A” or “Site 2CT.” It is not discussed herein.
** In 1966, after Con Edison had changed its plans for the project
in order to avoid the possibility of danger to the Aqueduct, the
City voiced its support of the project (contingent upon Con Edi-
son’s ability to meet objections concerning the possible destruction
of marine life and the impairment of the natural beauty of the
area) in a Memorandum of Understanding with the utility.
*** The City’s concern about damage to its Aqueduct caused by
the project dates back to 1963 when the project was first proposed.
The powerhouse would have been partially above ground and
there would have been an excavation far smaller than that now pro-
7
The importance of the Catskill Aqueduct to the City’s
water supply system must not be underestimated. Except
for a portion of Queens, all of the City’s water supply is
carried into the City from upstate watershed areas. The
Catskill, one of the three water systems, supplies approxi-
mately 40 percent of the City’s water requirements. While .
for most of its length the Catskill Aqueduct is “eut and
cover” (i.e., a concrete tunnel covered by earth conveying
the water by gravity), in order to cross the Hudson River
at Storm King Mountain it becomes a series of pressure
tunnels known collectively as the Moodna-Hudson-Break-
neck Pressure Tunnel. The Moodna section is the -west
bank portion of tunnels which convey the water in an east-
erly direction from the surface until, by a series, of drops,
it reaches a point 1,111 feet below sea level, where the water
enters the Hudson tunnel and crosses to the east bank of
the river. When it was first constructed in 1913, the Moodna
Tunnel section consisted primarily of a long, gradually
descending tunnel from which the water fell to the Hudson
Tunnel in one precipitous drop. However, the last 900 feet
ofthe Moodna Tunnel had to be abandoned because it had
broken and was leaking. To correct the situation, the Sup-
plementary Moodna Tunnel was sunk 400 feet beneath the
posed 175 feet away from the Aqueduct. As a consquence of the
City’s objections, Con Edison changed the plans in order to avoid
interference with the Aqueduct. After the remand in Scenic Hud-
son I Con Edison decided to put the powerhouse entirely under-
ground, thereby bringing the powerhouse within 140 feet of the
Aqueduct. This of course was far worse from the standpoint of
possible damage to the Aqueduct than the original proposal that
was opposed in 1963. In October 1968, after negotiations with the
company to relocate the project had failed the City petitioned to
intervene before the F.P.C. The petition. was granted and the
record was reopened to consider the issues of danger to the Aque-
duct and possible alternate sites.
ELON Fc A DB a
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8
900-foot portion which had failed, and as a result today the -
water reaches the Hudson Tunnel by two drops rather than
the original one drop. Operation was resumed in 1918 and
the tunnels have been in constant use since then. Needless
to say, with each passing year the City has become increas-
ingly dependent on the Catskill Aqueduct to help meet its
water requirements. It is that portion of the Moodna Tun-
nel which immediately precedes the 900 foot portion which
failed and was hence abandoned, which will be only 140
feet away from the massive powerhouse excavation. At this
point the tunnel is 14 feet in diameter. —
The City’s concern for the safety of its Aqueduct is based
upon several interrelated factors. First, there is the fact
that the evidence is uncontradicted that excavation of the
powerhouse will cause stress changes in the rock of Storm
King Mountain. What those stress changes will be and what
effect they will have is unknown and a subject of contro-
versy among experts. .
Second, there is the fact that the present condition of the
Moodna Tunnel is unknown. The tunnels have been in ¢on-
stant use since 1918. Thus no one: not the City, not the
F.P.C., not Con Edison—knows the present condition’ of
_ the Moodna tunnel. All that is known is that the tunnel
continues to operate. It is probable that even though the
tunnel was sunk with the greatest care, cracks and fissures,
masked by the constant hydrostatic pressure, have de-
veloped. But the number and extent of these faults, if any,
are simply not known and thus no one can judge how the
Aqueduct will react to changes in stress in the surrounding
rock caused by the massive powerhouse excavation.
Finally, there is the historical evidence that the rock in
the area of the proposed powerhouse excavation is under
9
high stress, prone to stress relief and consequently unstable.
Although Storm King Mountain is generally sound rock—
- indeed this is why it was chosen as the Aqueduct crossover -
point—two facts concerning the area of excavation indicate
lack of homogeneity and instability : first, failure of the
last section of the Moodna Tunnel (now replaced by the
Supplementary Moodna Tunnel) which occurred at the
depth of the portion still in use, and which was attributed
in part to stress relief; and, second, the incidence of “pop-
ping” (spontaneously scaling) rock in excavation of the
access shaft to the Supplementary Moodna Tunnel.
In light of these factors—the fact that stress relief will
occur; the fact that the condition of the Moodna Tunnel
is unknown; and the fact that there is historical .evidence
of stress relief and hence instability of rock in the area of
the. powerhouse excavation—it is the judgment of the en-
gineers entrusted with the safety of the water supply that
the risk of damaging the 14 foot diameter Aquedutt tun-
nel, which carries 40 percent of the City’s daily water sup-
ply, caused by an excavation only 140 feet. away and re-
sulting in the removal of 580,000 tons of rock should not
be taken.
2. Increased Air Pollution
The City is further opposed to ‘his project because it
will cause increased air pollution in the City even though
the City cannot now, and will not for the foreseeable future,
be able to meet acceptable air quality standards. Even after
this was pointed out, the F.P.C. refused to require that the
energy used to pump Storm King originate outside New
” York City.
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10
The Commission has asserted that the plant will con-
tribute to the abatement of air pollution in the City,* based
on its assumption: that “very little” City generated power
will be used to pump the project [Appendix B, 983, at 91a-
92a]. Unfortunately. this assumption is baseless both in
the record and in the “economic realities” supposedly re-
lied on. The facts are that retirement of Con Edison’s
older, inefficient plants is not tied to this project; that it
is more economical (and efficient) for Con Edison to run its
generating plants in the City around the clock than to buy
power; that Con Edison’s nuclear capacity is too small and
unreliable to pump this project for the foreseeable future;
and that even Con Edison’s most efficient conventional
generating units cause substantial pollution, ‘particularly
in light of shortages of low sulfur fuels and natural gas for
industrial purposes. . |
3. Damage to the Hudson Highlands
The City also opposes this project because the unique
scenic beauty and other natural resources of the area have
not been safeguarded. This fact assumes particular im-
portance because this largely unspoiled area is unique in
its close proximity to a major metropolis.
C. The Court of Appeals Opinion
‘Bya2 to 1 decision, the Court of Appeals approved the
F.P.C.’s grant of a license for the Storm King project.
Writing for the majority, Judge Hays found: compliance
with the Court’s earlier remand in Scenic Hudson I; sub-
* For a time this misapprehension was shared by the City. See,
e.g., its 1968 Petition to Intervene.
11
stantial evidence supporting the F.P.C.’s conclusions; and
compliance with applicable statutes.* [App. A at. 7a].
On the issue of danger to the City’s Aqueduct, the ma-
jority found that §27 of the Federal Power Act did not pre-
clude licensing the Storm King project; that in any event, —
$27 protected only the right to compensation for holders
of state-conferred water rights; and that the Commission’s
finding that the remoteness of probability of damage to the
Aqueduct was supported by substantial evidence. [App. A
at 3la-35a]. The Court never considered the City’s objec-
tions to the F.P.C.’s analysis of the air pollution conse-
quences of the project, but merely summarized the F.P.C.’s
findings. [App. A at 19a-20a]. The Court further found
_ that NEPA applies to this proceeding, and that the proce-
dural requirements of §102 of that Act were met by the
F.P.C.’s requests for comments and by its final opinion.
. [App. A at 36a-38a].
Judge Oakes dissented. He found that the F.P.C. al-
though purporting to follow the mandate of Scenic Hudson
I, had actually acted arbitrarily and capriciously in licens-
ing the project. Since he found that the F.P.C. had twice
failed in its obligation to analyze and consider all aspects
of the license for the Storm King project, Judge Oakes
recommended that there would be no useful purpose in
further remand and that pete tiie the F.P.C. showd
be reversed.
Specifically he was particularly disturbed that the F.P.C.
had decided the Aqueduct issue without benefit of relevant
expertise and contrary to the recommendations of its staff.
* Only those areas of the decision specifically raised by this peti- -
tion will be discussed herein.
os?
| eo
12.
[App. A at 47a]. In commenting that the F.P.C.’s findings
as tothe Aqueduct while contradictory and insufficient
nevertheless showed that the project does present a risk
to it, he noted:
“... there is a world of difference between no danger
and a ‘remote’ danger. If a danger is ‘remote’ the de-
gree of remoteness assumes importance in proportion
to the magnitude of the danger. Here the danger is
obviously great,-and there is no finding as to the de-
gree of remoteness.” [App. A at 49a] (Emphasis in
original) - |
Furthermore he found that the F.P.C. had misconstrued the
burden of proof, noting that it was not the City’s task to
show that the Aqueduct would break, but rather, Con Edi-
son’s burden to prove and the F.P.C.’s task to find that the
project would not endanger the public health, life and
property. [App. A at 49a].
Judge Oakes was also disturbed by the Commission’s con-
clusions on the air pollution consequences of the project,
finding them to be incomplete and insufficient. He found
that by failing’ to require that pumping energy originate
outside the City, the F.P.C. had failed in its statutory re-
sponsibility to avoid adding to air pollution. [App. A at
54a]. Finally, with respect to NEPA he found that there
had in fact been no compliance with the statute. [App. A
at 57a-6la].
_ Because the judges of the Second Circuit were evenly
divided, a petition for rehearing in bane was denied. Judge
Timbers filed a written dissent.
.
13
Reasons Why the Writ Should Be Granted
The F.P.C. has concluded that this project will neither
cause the Aqueduct to break nor cause increased air pollu-
tion in New York City. Should such conclusions be wrong
in law and in fact, as the City contends, the health and
safety of at least 8.5 million people will have been wrong-
fully put in jeopardy. For this reason alone, apart of the
errors specifically discussed below,. this petition presents
an important question which should be decided by this
Court. —
Additionally, this petition affords the Court an oppor-
tunity to speak definitively as to what constitutes compli-
ance with NEPA.
Finally, this case requires interpretation of §27 of the
Federal Power Act arising in a novel fact situation, but
one to which the section clearly applies.
POINT I
The failure of the Court below to recognize the Com-
mission’s lack of expertise resulted in erroneously limit- ©
ing the scope of its review.
In Scenic Hudson II, the Court was reviewing the license
for the Storm King project for the second time. While
the role of the reviewing court after remand is no different
from that of the reviewing court in the first instance, the
"very fact of remand in this and similar cases* points up
*For example, failure to gonsider environmental impact has
been adjudged an element requiring remand. See, e.g., Udall v.
F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428 (1966). Cf. cases remanded for failure to
comply with NEPA, e.g., Greene County Planning Board v. F.P.C.
(Docket Nos. 71- 1991, 71- 1996, 2nd Cir., 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451
F.2d 1130 (4th Cir., 1971) ; Lathan v. ’ Volpe, 3 ERC 1362 (9th
Cir., 1971).
14
the fact that the record developed by the agency has been
found to be lacking in areas where the agency may have
some peripheral experience*with the field, but no expertise
in it. It is submitted that in such a case, the court must
be especially careful not to let mere length of the record
substitute for meaningful consideration of the issues raised,
for to hold otherwise would cause remand to be a vain
gesture, resulting only in delay.
The issue squarely raised by the decision in Scenic Hud-
son II is: can a court properly defer to agency expertise
when the agency is called upon to make judgments in areas
where it is not expert? It is submitted that petitioners
in Scenic Hudson II did not, as the Court alleged, urge a
“new standard of judicial review,” [App. A at 10a], but
rather they sought to assure that the findings of the Com-
mission would be subject to searching and careful judicial
review mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Although the Federal Power Act specifically provides
that findings of the Commission as to facts where supported
by substantial evidence shall be conclusive, [§16(b), 16
U.S.C, §825 1 (b) (1964) ], this provision does not preclude
the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971). Indeed in all eases where judicial review
is permitted, the administrative action must be reviewed
to determine whether it was “‘arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
law’ or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or
constitutional requirements.” Jd. at 413-14 citing §10(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706 (2) (A)
(B) (C) (D) (Supp. V). And even though agency action
often involves areas of specialization committed by Con-
15
gress to the jurisdiction of that agency, the court would
be derelict in its duty if it failed to study the evidence on
technical and specialized matters to determine not only
whether the agency's findings are supported by substan-
tial evidence, but also whether it has exercised “a rea-
soned discretion.” Greater Boston Television Corp. Vv.
F.C.C., 444 F. 2d 841, 850 (1970), cert. denied 403 US.
923 (1971).
However, the scope of such review is narrow, since within
an agency’s area of expertise the courts will ordinarily
defer to an agency’s expert judgment, even where the court
might justifiably have chosen differently had it determined
the issue de novo. Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B., 3A0 US.
474, 488 (1951). See also Citizens to Protect Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, supra, at 416.
The Court in Scenic Hudson II after reciting the evi-
dence concerning danger to the City’s Catskill Aqueduct
(consisting solely of conflicting expert opinion), stated:
“It is clear that the resolution of highly complex tech-
nological issues such as these was entrusted by Con-
_gress to the Commission and not to the courts. Where
the Commission’s conclusions are supported by sub-
. stantial evidence, the Courts must accept them. [App.
A at 34a] (Emphasis supplied).” .
It is submitted that this statement is erroneous in “concept
as well as in fact.
*
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16
A. The Danger to the Aqueduct Is Not a Highly
Complex Technological Issue Entrusted by
Congress to the F.P.C.
Merely because the question of danger to the Aqueduct
from excavation of the Storm King project is a “highly
complex technological issue” does not necessarily put it
within the purview of the F.P.C.’s area of expertise. It
involves two highly complex areas of expert judgment:
the nature and effect of stress relief in rock and the evalu-
ation of a risk presented to a water supply system.
The F.P.C. has been adjudged expert in-many areas
directly related to the regulation of conventional sources
of energy.* But, as Judge Oakes cogently pointed out in
his dissent, while the F.P.C. may have some familiarity with
geology, its general familiarity does not cof&titute exper-
tise on the effects of stress relief on aqueduct pressure |
tunnels in rock. Furthermore, whatever expertise it did
have was ignored: the Commission overrode the recom-
mendation of its own staff that some precautionary measure
be taken to protect the Aqueduct.** [App. A at 47a].
* Thus for example it has been held to be expert in-resolving
highly complex issues of natural gas rate regulation [Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968)]; in hydraulic
ineering [United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F2d
796, 808 (4th Cir. 1951)); in determining the necessity and condi-
sions of interconnections between electric utilities [Gainesville
Utilities Dep't v. Florida Power Corp., 402 US. 515 (1971); and,
in the flow of electricity within a transmission line [F.PC. v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 40 U.S. Law Week, 4141, 4145 (1972)].
°° It must be noted that the City opposed the two precautionary
measures considered—building a bypass or lining the Moodna
Tunnel with steel—because of the extensive shutdown of the Aque-
duct required and the resulting risk to the water supply and to the
integrity of the Aqueduct.
17
Had the procedures of NEPA been complied with, the
Court might have had more cause for comfort in relying
upon the F.P.C.’s determination. It is possible that in the
circulation of the required environmental impact statement
there could have resulted some relevant analysis of the
evidence by an agency of government with expertise (e.g.,
the Bureau of Mines). But all that we have here is a bare
assertion by a federal agency which, in the name of elee-
tric power as being the “lifeline of the city” [ App. B, 53,
at 8la} has abrogated to itself an expertise, which it plainly
does not have, and puts 40 percent of the City’s water sup-
ply in jeopardy. This point is most clearly underscored
by the Commission’s licensing of the alternate Palisades
Park Site without any investigation as to its geological
feasibility or as to the subsurface conditions. [App. B,
{317 at 165a]. Furthermore, not only are the F.P.C.’s find-
ings as to the danger internally meonsistent (see the dis-
cussion in Judge Oakes’ dissent, App. A at 47a-50a), but
they miss the essential point that the question is not one
of whether a risk exjsts but rather the judgment as to
whether the risk should be taken at all. Again, this re-
quires an expertise—this time in matters of water supply
—which the Commission clearly does not have.
B. The Extent to Which a Reviewing Court Must
Defer to Agency Expertise :
The City is not urging that because 40 percent of its
water supply is at stake, it thereby has the right to “‘veto”
this project. Scenic Hudson II, App. A at 34a-35a citing
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152,
164 (1946). Rather, it urges that a reviewing court may
not, simply because highly complex and technological is-
sues are at the crux, abdicate its role of review by hiding
owe
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18
behind the veil of agency expertise, particularly where that
expertise is not relevant to such issues. It does not urge
a new standard of review, or a higher burden of proof.
The City simply asks the courts to recognize the undeniable
fact that agencies are not necessarily expert in all aspects
of the decisions they are called upon to make, and that
where an agency has no particular expertise (and hence
where: the reviewing court is not justified in deferring to
the agency), the court may not stop at the determination
of substantial evidence, but must probe further to deter-
mine whether the agency has exercised the “reasoned dis-
cretion” demanded of it. Greater Boston Television Cor-
poration v. F.P.C., supra.
While theré is no ruling directly on point, it is submitted
that the treatment of agency expertise by the courts has
constituted a de facto recognition of this distinction. Con-
sequently, the extent to which the courts must defer to
agency expertise has been narrowly construed. Thus in
the Florida Light and Power case, this Court said in speak-
ing of the nature of the flow of electricity in a transmission
line:
“Particularly when we consider a purely factual ques-
tion within the area of competence of an administra-
tive agency created by Congress, and when resolution
of that question depends on ‘engineering and scientific’
considerations, we recognize the relevant agency’s
technical expertise, and defer to its analysis unless it
is without substantial basis in fact.” Supra at 4144.
This statement must be contrasted with the case at Bar
which does not involve “purely factual question[s] within
the area of competence” of the F.P.C., but revolves around
>
\
ay.
19
matters about which the F.P.C. does not have relevant tech-
_ neal expertise and its experience is at best limited. More-
over, lacking such expertise, the F.P.C. nevertheless chose
to ignore the urgings of its own staff.
Where 40 percent of the water supply of the nation’s
largest city is at stake, and where the F.P.C.’s decision as
to a source of additional electric power for that city must
necessarily involve a judgment as to the safety of that
water. supply, it is submitted that it is especially important
that a reviewing court take a hard look at the Commis-
sion’s conclusions to determine whether they constituted
an abuse of discretion or were arbitrary and capricious,
lest expertise become “a monster with no practical limits
on its discretion.” Burlington Truck Lines vy. U.S., 371
U.S. 156, 167 (1962).
It is submitted that in areas outside an agency’s expertise,
the courts are not to be reduced to mere “rubber stamps”
but rather, as this Court said in the context of statutory
interpretation, in such areas the courts would “abdicate
their responsibility” if they did not, in addition to finding
_ substantial evidence, determine whether a reasoned discre-
tion had been exercised, V:L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,
291 (1965); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C.,
supra. .
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20
POINT Il
The Court below erred in finding compliance with
NEPA.
The Storm King project, as a major federal action li-
censed after January 1, 1970, must comply with the require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§4321 et seq. (Supp. 1971). [App. A at 36a]. Those require-
ments are set out in $102 of the Act which in part (C) pro-
vides that for each major federal action a federal agency
must, prior to making the detailed environmental impact
statement required by the Act, confer with and get the
opinions of other federal agencies, having jurisdiction
or expertise, on the possible environmental consequences
of that action. In Scenic Hudson II the Court below found
that there had been compliance with the mandates of $102
and the Act as a whole. [App. A at 37a-38a]. It is sub-
mitted, as demonstrated below, that the Court erred in
so finding. © |
A. The Commission’s Final Opinion Was Not a
Sufficient Environmental Impact Statement
It was specifically found by the Court below that the Com-
mission’s opinion constituted the environmental impact
statement required by NEPA. [App. A at 38a]. It is sub-
mitted that this finding was not only in error but that it
is in conflict with a later decision by a different panel of
the same circuit court, Greene County Planning Board v.
F.P.C., Docket Nos. 71-1991, 71-1996, 2nd Cir., Jan. 17,
1972.*
—_-_—_
* The F P.C. has petitioned for rehearing in banc, alleging that
a conflict exists between Greene County and Scenic Hudson II,
21
While the facts in the case at Bar and in the Greene
County case differ—in the former hearings were completed
as of the effective date of NEPA, whereas in the latter
hearings are still in progress—they share a common ele-
ment: the F.P.C.’s contention that NEPA’s requirement
for an environmental impact statement prepared by the li-
censing agency can be satisfied by the Commission’s final
order. In Greene County this contention was rejected by the
reviewing court on the ground that {1062 of NEPA specifi-
cally requires that the agency’s own -impact statement ac-
company a proposal through the existing agency review
process. *
It is conceded that in the case at Bar at the effective
date of NEPA the review process was all but complete,
since all that remained undone was the Commission’s own
decision. Yet it is submitted that by postponing the impact
statement to the final agency procedure, the F.P.C. effec-
tively circumvented a fundamental purpose of NEPA: that
the licensing agency review the expert comments of other
federal agencies prior to a final evaluation of a project’s
environmental impact.
B. The Commission’s Consultations With Other Agencies
Failed to Meet the Requirements of NEPA
It was further found by the Court below that the Com- .
- mission had met the §102 requirement that. a_ licensing
agency, prior to making its detailed environmental impact
statement, consult agencies with expertise or jurisdiction
over possible environmental impact. It is submitted that
at least insofar as the issues of danger tq the Catskill Aque-
duct and air pollution consequences of the project are con-
cerned, the Court was in error in so finding because the few
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22
consultations which did take place were inadequate to assess
the scope of the project’s impact, and in any event failed
to take into aceount recent-developments.
As to the issue of danger to the Aqueduct, the only com-
ments which might possibly have had relevance were made
by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1963 and 1964. These
comments were made before project plans were changed so
as to locate the powerhouse underground, and in any event
concerned only the navigational impact of the project. It is
therefore apparent that the F.P.C. relied entirely on its
_ own judgment in evaluating the risk presented to the City’s
water supply.
_ With respect to the issue of the air pollution consequences
to New York City of project operation,, tlie Commission
had found the following: that the project would permit
retirement of Con Edison’s older, inefficient plants; that
the project would be pumped primarily by energy from non-
polluting sources outside the City; that to the extent in-
City pumping power was used, this would be from Con
Edison’s more efficient generating units using relatively
pollution-free fuels. On this basis, it was concluded that
the Storm King project would have air pollution benefits
for the City. This analysis was not questioned in the ma-
jority opinion below. [App. A at 20a].
In its petition for rehearing (and subsequently in its
briefs before the Court) the City pointed out the inade-
quacies and inaccuracies of the foregoing analysis. In par-
ticular it noted that the F.P.C. should have known from Con
Edison’s 10 Year Plan, filed with the Commission, that re- .
tirement of Con Edison’s older, inefficient plants is not
linked to the Storm King project. It was shown that the
23
Commission’s confidence that the project would be pumped
by energy from non-air-polluting sources outside the City
was misplaced since for the foreseeable future Con’Edison’s
nuclear capacity will be too small and unreliable to pump
this project. Furthermore, the “economic realities” (sup-'
posedly relied on by the Commission in its analysis) do not
support its conclusion that power generated outside the
City will be used, since Con Edison’s conventional generat-
ing capacity outside of the City will be similarly limited,
and those “realities” actually dictate that it is cheaper to
run conventional generating plants in New York City
around the clock than to buy power. Nor, as it was further
pointed out, is there comfort if only Con Edison’s more
efficient units are used because even these generate sub-
stantial amounts of pollution and will -be creating it at a
time when there: is the least likelihood of dispersién.*
Moreover, the least polluting fuels—low sulfur content oil
and natural gas—are in short supply. Finally, it was shown —
‘that the Commission did not consider pollution from par-
ticulates or nitrogen oxides, and the Commission’s analysis
of pollution from sulfur dioxide .was clearly inadequate.
It is submitted that had the F.P.C. solicited the comments
of other agencies (e.g., the National Air Pollution Control
Administration, “NAPCA”) prior to issuing its opinion,
at least some of these errors might have been noted. In any
event, at the least the Commission might have been -bettér
* Pumped storage projects utilize off-peak hour pumping energy.
As a rule this means that the energy used to pump water will be
generated ‘during the late evening and early morning hours. While
these hours are optimum from an economic point of view, they are
the worst from the standpoint of air pollution because the stillness
of the air at these hours decreases the likelihood of dispersing the
pollutants.
-
2
24
able to evaluate the consequences of project operation on
the basis of current data showing the severe air pollution
problem in New York City,and in particular the City’s dif-
ficulty in meeting the air quality criteria which had been
proposed by NAPCA. The only “consultation” on air pollu-
tion which appears in the record—the testimony of an em-
ployee of the Public Health Service in 1967—was clearly
inadequate to aid'the Commission in assessing the present-
day consequences of the project. ,
Among the purposes of NEPA are assurance of “safe,
healthful surroundings” and attainment of the widest range
of beneficial uses of the environment without “risk to health
or safety”. [42 U.S.C. §4331(b)(2), (3)]. It is submitted
that this project insofar as it endangers the safety of the
water supply of 8.5 million people and will cause increased
air pollution in the already dirty atmosphere of the City
where these people live and work, presents the kind of risk
to health and safety NEPA was designed to avoid. At the
very least, the consultation required by NEPA might have
resulted in a provision, advocated by the City,.that Con
_ Edison be banned from using City-generated power to pump
* the Storm King project. Minimally, relevant expertise
should have been applied to the problems of the risk to the
water supply and air. quality of the nation’s largest city.
In Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C.,
449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir., 1971), the Court found that the
procedural requirements of NEPA are “not discretionary”,
_but in fact “establish a strict standard of compliance”,
which is not substantially altered by the phrase “to the full-
est extent possible.” Jd. at 1112. It is submitted that the
case at Bar dramatically points up the fact that unless the
procedural requirements of NEPA are followed—including
25
~ consultation with other agencies—the purpose of NEPA
will be effectively thwarted.
POINT III
This license is precluded by Section 27 of the Federal
Power: Act. |
The words of Section 27 of the Federal Power Act are .-
clear and unequivocal:
“Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be con-
strued as affecting or intending to affect or in any way
interfere with the laws of the respective States relat-.
ing to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution
- of water used ... for municipal or other uses, or any
vested right acquired therein.” 16 U.S. C. $821. (Em-
phasis supplied.) .
It is submitted that the Court below was in error when it
determined that §27 did not preclude the license for the
Storm King project. It was also in error in holding that
the “only purpose” of $27 is to preserve the right to com-
pensation for holders of state-conferred water rights.
[App. A at 3la-32a].
A. Section 27 Is Applicable to This License
One need not go beyond a plain reading of the statute to
determine that §27 is applicable to this license. By state
law there is imposed upon the City responsibility for meet-
ing the water requirements of New York City, as well as
for making available water from its supply system to com-
munities in certain upstate counties. It is submitted that
when, despite its concession that the project would pre-
- sent some risk to the Catskill Aqueduct, the F.P.C. issued
~~.
the license for the Storm King project in disregard of the
City’s objections, the F.P.C. was interfering with the City’s
control of water used for municipal uses, thereby bringing
this case squarely within the language of $27. The type of
control here referred to is perhups best illustrated by the
restrictive covenant in the deed by which the City conveyed
the larid above the Aqueduct to the Palisades Interstate
Park Commission. That covenant bans drilling at depths
greater than 200 feet from the present surface, thereby
leaving a rock cover of over 200 fect to protect the Aque-
duct.
B. Relief Under §27 Is Not Limited to Compensation
for State-Conferred Water Rights
The statement of the Court below that 627 protects only
the right to compensation for state-conferred water rights
quotes dictum from an opinion of the Ninth Cireuit, Port
land General Electric Co. ©. F.PC., 223 F. 2a 165, 176 (9th
Cir. 1964). This dictum in turn is based upon two deci.
sions of this Court construing 68 of the Reclamation Act
(43 U.S.C. (383). Whether the Ninth Circuit is correct
in so interpreting (8 of the Reclamation Act is not at ix<ue
here. But from the history of (27 of the Federal Power
Act what is certain is that relief under this section has not
been limited to money damages. Thus in the case of Henry
Ford and Son, Inc. ¢. Little Falls Fibre Co., 230 US. aa
(130), this Court affirmed a New York State judgment
granting damages avd permanent injunctive relief. This
duality of relief was specifically recognized by this Court in
F.C. v. Niagara Mohawk Power ‘Corp., 47 US. 239,
254 (1954).
While it ix therefore clear that relief under 627 is not,
as the Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded, limited solely
a8 ee-—— —ee «--
27
to compensation for state-conferred water rights, the cases
decided under §27 are generally not helpful in applying ,
$27 to the facts in the case at Bar, because such cases con.
strue only the second of the two situations saved from
federal supersedure by §27—casés dealing for tie most
part with vested rights in water.
However, the statute on its face clearly presents two
categories of laws affecting rights in water which are saved
from the operation of the Federal Power Act. The first
category is concerned with the “control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for
municipal or other uses”: ‘he second with vested richts in
the water. By using the disjunctive “or”, Congress was
clearly differentiating between the two categories: one
dealing with water used for municipal or irrigation or simi. .
lar purposes, and the other covering vested rights in water.
The absurdity of concluding that Congress meant monetary
compensation to be the only remedy for interferencs with
the first category of rights is shown by the application of
that formula to the facts in the case at Bar. Of what value
would it be to New Yorkers deprived of a substantio! por-
tion of their water to know that Con Edison must compen.
sate the City for the cost of repairs to the Aqueduct! That
Congress intended to encompass something more thon the
‘Ninth Circuit's determination as to the intent of 27 ix °
. Obvious from the fact that §10(¢) of the Federal Pow. c Act,
[16 U.S.C. §803(¢)] specifically provides that licenses are
liable for damages cansed by a project.
The only case construing §27 not dealing with ested
rights in water is First Jowa Hydroelectric Coop. +. F PC.
supra. It is urged that that case is not directly in Doint
because basically it involved a state's attempt to require
the receipt of a state permit as a condition Preeedeat to
a federal license. This Court held that such an interpreta-
tion of §9(b) of the Federal Power Act [16 U.S.C. (802
(b)] would result in the sfate having a veto power over a
federal licensing procedure, and as a consequence, the state
statute requiring such permit was not saved by §27.
The City’s rights to control its supply system and its
Aqueduct cannot be compared with the duplicative licens-
ing procedure sought to be superimposed by Iowa. The
City is not setting up a procedure to be superimposed upon
the federal licensing process, but rather is merely trying
to protect rights and obligations, created pursuant to a
state law specifieally exempted by §27, which rights and
obligations existed prior to the federal license being issued.
Whether or not Congress envisaged facts comparable to
those here, it seems clear from the wording of the statute
that Congress did not intend that the navigable waters of
the United States be developed for power if doing so meant
risking a water supply system. It is submitted that where
the country’s navigable waters cannot be developed for
power save at the expense of a water supply system, $27
precludes licensing such a power preject.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
March 24, 1972
J. Lee Rasxrs,
Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York,
; Attorney for Petitioner.
Peres C. Demerat
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APPENDIX A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Dated October 22, 1971
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE Seconp Circuit
_—_—
—
Nos. 1033-1038—September Term 1970.
(Argued June 9, 1971 Decided October 22, 1971.)
Docket Nos. 35678, 35676, 35677, 35683, 35688, 35689
>
Scenic Hupson Preservation Con rerence, Pavisapes-Lyter-
staTe Park Commission, Crry or New Yorn, Tae Srerra
Civus anv 1ts AtLantic Cuaprer, Toe Wi_perness So-
ciety, Ture Izaak Wattow Leacve or America, Nation aL
Avovson Society anp Nationat Parks anp Conserva-
TION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioners,
v.
FeperaL Power Com Miss‘ox,
Respondent,
and
Conxsotipatep Episoxn Company or New York, Iwc.,
Towns or CorNwat anp Vittace or CornwalL,
Intervenors.
Before:
Faienpiy, Chief Judge,
Hays and Oakes, Circuit Judges.
ee
Petitions for review filed pursuant to Section 313(b) of
the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §825(b) (1964) seek-
ing to set aside an order of the Federal Power Commis-
O cure woe
2a
sion granting a license to Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc. to construct a pumped storage powe er
plant on the Hudson River.
Petitions denied. ,
_—_
Luoyp K. Garrison (Albert K. Butzel, Paul
Weiss, Goldberg, Rifkind, Wharton & Gar-
rison, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for
Petitioner Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference.
Puriuip Wernsers, Ass’t Attorney General (Louis
J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of the State
of New York.
Samuet A. Hirsnowrrz, First Assistant Attorney
General, Cyril H. Moore, Jr., Assistant At-
torney General, on the brief), for Petitioner
Palisades Interstate Park Commission.
Evcene Marcouis (J. Lee Rankin, Corporation
Counsel, City of New York, Evelyn Junge,
on the brief), for Petitioner City of New
York. |
Luoyp K. Garrison (David Sive, Sigmund
Anderman, Bertram Braufman, Winer,
Neuburger & Sive, New York, N.Y., on the
brief), for Petitioner The Sierra Club and
its Atlantic Chapter.
Liuoyp K. Garrison (James Marshall, Henry
Winestine, Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Al-
lison & Tucker, New York, N.Y., on the
brief), for Petitioner The Wilderness So-
ciety.
3a
Luoyp K. Garrison (Angus Macbeth, John H.
_ Adams, National Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Ine., on the brief),-for Petitioners Izaak
Walton League of America, National Au-
dubon Society and National Parks and Con-
servation Association.
Gorpon Goocn, General Counsel (J. Richard
Tiano, Assistant Solicitor, Leonard D.
Eesley, Assistant General Counsel, John D.
Lane, Raymond E. Hagenlock, Charles K.
Barrow, Attorneys, Federa] Power Com-
mission, Washington, D.C., on the brief),
for Respondent.
Cameron F. MacRak (Carl D. Hobelman, G: S..
Peter Bergen, Sheila H. Marshall, Jeffrey
E. Silver, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & Mac-
Rae, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for
Intervenor Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
James R. Lors, Rider, Weiner & Loeb, New-
burgh, N.Y., on the brief, for Intervenor
Town of Cornwall,
a
Hays, Circuit Judge:
By Opinion No. 584, dated August 19, 1970, the Fed-
eral Power Commission granted a license to Consolidated
Edison Company of New York, Inc., to construct, operate,
and maintain a pumped storage project along the western
shore of the Hudson River at Cornwall, New York. Eight
parties’ have filed petitions pursuant to Section 313(b) of
1 All of the petitibners except Palisades Interstate Park Commission
object to the licensing order of the Federal Power Commission in toto.
The Palisades Interstate Park Commission opposes only the site 2 alter-
Se 1 ee opr ee an
4a
the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §825 1(b) (1964) seek-
ing to set aside this order on-various grounds. The is-
sues raised by these petitions are both complex and im-
portant, involving, as they do, the conflict between the
needs of a highly technological sociéty and the increased
awareness of environmental considerations:
The opinion and order. of the Federal Power Commis-
sion presented here for review follow by five years the
earlier remand by this court in Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. Federal Power, Commission, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom., Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York v. Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), in which the petitions
challenged three 1965 orders of the Commission licensing
the project and refusing to reopen proceedings and take
additional evidence on various issues. In the intervening
period extensive hearings have been held, two decisions
have been rendered by a Hearing Examiner and the Com-
mission has issued its own opinion.
The new proceedings have produced a project that is
different in some ways from the project that was before
this court in 1965. .
The functional elements of the project remain the same.
It is still to be the largest pumped storage plant in the
world and its principal function, to provide energy for
peak load periods, is unchanged. The proposed location is
the same as that previously proposed, the Hudson River at
approximately river mile 56.5, about 40 miles north of
native which calls for the location of the powerhouse within Palisades
Interstate Park. The objection of petitioner (ity of New York is based
on the aqueduct and air pollution question alone. The Izaak Walton
League of America rests its objection primarily on the fisheries ques-
tion and other environmental factors. All other petitioners raise vir-
tually all the issues discussed in this opinion. Intervenor Consolidated
Edison Company of New York, Inc., supports the Commission's order,
as does intervenor Town of Cornwall.
. . . da
New York City at Storm King Mountain near Cornwall,
New York, “an area of unique beauty and major histor-
ical significance.” Scenic Hudson, supra at 613. The
project would consist, as did the earlier version, of an
upper reservoir, a tunnel between the reservoir and the
powerhouse, and the powerhouse itself, a pumping-gen-
eration station located at the riverside containing eight
reversible pump-turbine and motor generation units as
well as switching gear and primary transmission lines.
However, unlike the project presented in 1965, which pro-
vided for a powerhouse that was 80 per cent underground,
the powerhouse now licensed by the Commission is to be
entirely underground.
The upper reservoir would be situated approximately
10,000 Yeet south and west of the powerhouse in a natural
mountain basin behind Storm King Mountain. When filled
to its maximum elevation it would have a surface area of
240, acres. It would be formed and enclosed by five earth
and rock dikes. The lower reservoir would be the Hudson
River itself.
The capacity of the eight pumping-generating units in
the powerhouse would be 2,000 megawatts, or 2,000,000
kilowatts. However, the project would be constructed in
a manner which would permit enlargement to a maximum
of 3,000 mw. Eight discharge tunnels from the reversible
pump-turbine and motor generation units would convey
water between each turbine ard an open tailrace leading
to the river. The tailrace with abutments at both ends
would run 685 feet along the river. A fish protective de-
vice is to be located in front of the tailrace intake.
The third major facet of the project relates to trans-
mission facilities. Submarine cable installations and spare
2 One megawatt (me) equals 1 million watts; one kilowatt (kw) equals
one thousand watts. We will use the megawatt terminology throughout
this opinion. . 6
2-—eee C:—””—“—Ot——”—
a ii entettiacacnntncscernateadl
ers
6a
pipes would transmit the energy generated in the power-
house under the Hudson River and would continue under-
ground on the east side of the river for approximately 1.6 ©
miles to a point out of sight of the river. At this point
overhead transmission. would commence and would con-
tinue for approximately 9.2 miles through Putifam County
to Con Edison’s existing Pleasant Valley-Millwood-Sprain
Brook transmission right of way. Changes have been
made in the proposed route and the towns of Cortlandt,
‘Putnam Valley and Yorktown, which challenged the route
before this court in 1965, no longer do so.
The project would function in the manner described
in our earlier opinion. Scenic Hudson, supra at 612. The
units in the powerhouse would use off-peak energy gener-
ated not at the project but at other facilities in the Con
Ed system to pump. water from the Hudson River to the
upper reservoir. When needed for peak power produc-
tion, that is,-during hours of highest kilowatt demand,
_ the units would reverse direction of rotation and provide
power derived from the fall of the water released into the
river from. the upper reservoir. This power would then
be transmitted through the transmission system described
above. “The water in the upper reservoir may be regarded
as the equivalent of stored electrical energy; in effect,
Consolidated Edison wishes to create a huge storage bat-
tery at Cornwall.” Scenic Hudson, supra at 612.
A visitor’s information center and picnic and parking
facilities, proposed in the original project for the power-
house site, have been eliminated. In their place, a 57
acre, mile-long park is to be constructed along the river-
front. Additional recreational facilities are to be pro-
vided at a 36 acre scenic overlook inland from the project
with access from the existing State Highway 9-W.
As an alternative the Commission has licensed the
powerhousé aspect of the project at a location within
7a
Palisades Interstate Park, approximately one and one-
half miles downstream from the Storm King Mountain
site. Construction at the Palisades site is to be consid-
ered approved by the Commission only if construction
at the Storm King Mountain site “shall be precluded on a
- petition to review this order.”
The petitions in this case are occasioned by the “grave
concern” aroused among conservationist groups by the
Storm King project. Scenic Hudson, supra at 612. The
petitions allege lack of compliance with the terms of our
earlier remand, absence of substantial evidence to sup-
port the Commission’s findings, and failure to comply with
statutory mandates. We find, however, that the Commis-
sion has fully complied with our earlier mandate and with
the applicable statutes and that its findings are supported
by substantial evidence. In view of the extensive powers
delegated to the Commission and the limited scope of re-
view entrusted to this court, it is our duty to deny the
petitions.
I.
Congress has given the Federal Power Commission broad
responsibility for the development of national policies in
the area of electric power. In Section 4(e) of the Fed-
eral Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §797(e) (1964), the Commission
is authorized |
“To issue licenses . . . for the purpose. of construct-
ing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits,
reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines or other
project works necessary or convenient for the develop-
ment and improvement of navigation and for the de-
velopment, ‘transmission, and utilization of power
across, along, from, or in any of the streams or
other bodies of water over which Congress has juris-
diction....” °
——s ee ee ne ee ee
EE
There are statutory limitations on the issuance of such
licenses. Section 10(a) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. $803 (9)
(1964), requires |
“That the project adopted . . . shall be such as in the
judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to
a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of in-
and utilization of waterpower development, and for
mental Policy Act, 42US.C $§4321 ef seq. (Supp. 1971).
In the Federal Power Congress granted the Commis.
vinty 2 ePing authority and a specific planning responsi
would promote the comprehensive development of the na.
tion's water resources.” Scenic Hudson, supra at 613 and
authorities cited there. -
The scope of review of the Commission's exercise of its
authority and responsibility is narrowly limited. The Act,
“Insofar ax the Court of Appeals’ opinion implies that
there was not substantial evidence to <upport o find.
ing of some benefits, it ix clearly wrong. And insofar
to constitute ‘compensation . . - Te@sonalbly due.” the
Court of Appeals overstepped the role of the judiciary.
Congress ordained that that determination should In
made, in the first instance, by the Commission, arn ay,
the record made in this case, the Court of Appeals
erred in not deferring to the Commission's expert
judgment.” Gainesville Utilities Department «. Florida
Power Corp., 402 US. 515, 527 (1971).
Petitioners would have us reject these familiar principles
because, they argue, different standards ought to prevail
taken a similar approach. See, ¢9.. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. ¥. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Udall y.
108
Federal Power Commission, 37 U.S. 428 (1967); Zabel v.
Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 213 (Sth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 910 (1971).
To read these cases as sanctioning a new standard of
judicial review for findings on matters of environmental
policy is to misconstrue both the holdings in the cases amt
the nature of our remand in Scenic Hudsow. An element
common to all these cases wax the failure of an agency
or other governmental authority to give adequate con<il-
eration to the environmental factors in the <ituations with
which they were presented. In Cifizens to Preserre Over.
ton Park, lac. +. Volpe, supra at 416, for example, the Court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whethe
the Secretary of Transportation's decision “wax based on
a consideration of the relevant factors.” The Court pointed
out that “[a]ithough this inqury into the fact« ix to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review ix
a narrow one. The court ix not empowered to <ubstitute
its judgment for that of the agency.” Id. In Udell v. Federal
Power Commission, supra at 450-51, the remand to the
Commission instructed it to explore the “neglected phase
of the cases” and to make “an informed judgment on these
phases of the cases.” The Court explicitly stated that it
expressed “no opinion on the merits.” It added, “It is not
our task to determine whether any dam at all should be
built dy whether if one is authorized it should be private or
public.” .Id. at 450.
In our opinion in Scenic Hudsow. supra, remanding the
1965 orders of the Commission, we were careful to make it
clear that we were raising no question of change in the haxic
standard of administrative review and that the purpose of
our remand was only to require the proper performance of
its fonctions by the Commission. We said:
“While the courts have no authority to concern them-
selves with the policie« of the Commission, it ix their
lla
duty to see to it that the Commission’s decisions receive
that careful consideration which the statute contem-
plates.” ld. at 612.
“This-court cannot and should not attempt to substitute
its judgment for that of the Commission. But we must
decide whether the Commission has correctly dis-
charged its duties . . . . The Commission must see
to it that the record is complete.” Id. at 620.
Where the Commission has considered all relevant fac-
tors, and where the challenged findings, based on such full
consideration, are supported by substantial evidence, we
will not allow our personal views as to the desirability of
the result reached by the Commission to influence us in our
decision. We now turn therefore to ‘an examination of
whether our remand has been complied with, whether there
is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s deci-
sions on the issues remanded and other challenged issues,
and whether the Commission has complied with all appli-
cable statutory requirements. |
I.
In our opinion remanding this proceeding to the Commis-
sion we directed the Commission to weigh a number of fac-
tors which we believed had not been given adequate consid
eration. Holding that “recreational purposes” in 610(a) of
the Act (16 U.S.C. §893(a)(1964)) “encompasses the con
servation of natural resources, the maintenance of natural
beauty, and the preservation of historic sites,” we required
the Commission “properly [to] weigh each [such] factor.”
Scenic Hudson, supra at 614. We held “that the Commis-
sion is under a statutory duty to give full consideration to
alternative plans” (Id. at 617). We criticized the Commis-
eens be —
Bn ols eee
12a
_sion’s refusal to “receive proffered information on fish
protective devices and underground transmission facilities
..+.” Id. at 620, and directed it to “take the whole fish-
eries question into considesation before deciding whether *
the Storm King project is to be licensed.” (Id. at 624). We
ordered the Commission to weigh “the aesthetic advantages
of underground transmission lines against the economic
disadvantages” (Id. at 623). In-sum the Commission was
admonished to “reexamine all questions on which we have
found the record insufficient and all related matters.” (Id.
at 624). -
On January 25, 1966, acting on our remand, the Commis-
sion ordered that further proceedings be commenced before
a Hearing Examiner. In that order the Commission said:
“We do not understand the Court's order as restrict.
ing any further proceedings to the specific matters on
which it found the present. record insufficient to support
our previous determinations and we do not believe it
would be in the public interest to do so. The record
in the first two hearings in the proceeding will, of
course, be part of the present hearing. But all parties
will be free to offer timely presentations of evidence
on all matters. relevant to the question whether a li-
cense should be granted.”
The hearings were commenced on November 14, 1966 and
with several brief recesses, were concluded on May 23, 1967.
A motion of the State of Connecticut's Board of Fisheries
and Game to intervene was subsequently grantetl, and fur-
ther bearings were held on the issue of the protection of
fish. These hearings were closed on October 16, 1967. On
August 6, 1968, the Hearing Examiner issued his Initial
Decision recommending that Con Ed be granted a 50 year
license for the project. On November 19, 1968, the proceed-
13a
|
hazards to its Catskill Aqueduct. At this proceeding, fur.
ther evidence was taken on the alternative site in Palisades
Interstate Park. The Hearing Examiner issued a Supple- )
mental Initial Decision on December 23, 1969, which con-
eluded that the project did not endanger the Aquednet and. :
that the alternative site was “not a proper and preferable
alternative location for applicant's projected project.” In :
all other respects, except for minor items,* the Initial De.
cision remained unchanged. . :
The proceedings on remand involved 100 hearing days,
the testimony of some sixty expert witnesses, and the in-
:
posed site and the surrounding area before rendering their ‘
decisions.
On August 19, 1970, the Commission issued its decision. :
In its opinion the Commission reviewed the power needs :
of the area served by Con Ed and considered possible al-
ternatives to the Storm King project in terms of re- :
liability, cost, air and noise pollution, and overall environ-
mental impact. Concluding that there was no satisfactory
alternative, the Commission evaluated the environmental
5 The Tuitial Decision was amended “only to provide for the loration
l4a
undergrounding of transmission lines would result in un-
reliability in the delivery of power and would be too costly.
The Commission determined that construction of the project
would entail no appreciable hazard to the Aqueduct.*
We find that the proceedings of the Commission and its re-
port. meet the objections upon the basis of which we re-
manded the earlier determination. Examination of the
Commission’s conclusions and the evidence on which the
conclusions are based establishes that the Commission has
complied with our instructions and that the evidence sup-
porting the Commission’s conclusions amply meets the
statutory requirement of: substantiality.
A. “Alternative plans”
The Commission gave detailed and comprehensive con-
sideration to alternatives. Its initial statement of the basic
issues of the case before it and the manner of its subse-
quent dealing with those issues demonstrates that there
is no sound basis for petitioners’ contention that the Com-
mission’s approach was too narrow. The Commission said:
“The weighing of social values required by the concept
of the public convenience and necessity in this case
‘involves on the one hand the alleged greater and much
needed reliability, economic savings, and anti-air pol-
lution benefits which this project offers compared with
any feasible alternative, and on the other hand the
alleged aesthetic and enviornmental detriment the proj-
ect would impose on an area of great scenic, natural
and historic value.
6 The Commission, disagreeing with its Hearing Examiner, authorized
use of the alternative site within Palisades Interstate Park on the con-
ditions to which we have referred above. In view of our denial of the
petitions in this case, it will be unnecessary for us to review this last
determination.
sa
Simply put, the insue | is whether the project offers
substantially more reliable electric service as well as
cheaper electricity generated in a cleaner manner than
any other feasible alternative and, if so, whether the
project will-create detrimental aesthetic and environ-
mental conditions of such degree as to lead on balance
to a judgment that the public convenience and necessity
would be better served by denying the appaeetion
herein.”
In deciding this issue the Commission proceeded to eval-
uate the needs of Con Ed and the probability that the pro-
posed project would supply these needs in a more desirable
way than would the possible alternatives. .
The Con Ed system serves the densely populated area
of New York City’s five boroughs and part of Westchester
County. The electric load requirements that Con Ed must
meet are constantly growing. The Commission found that
in 1970 Con Ed’s capacity would be approximately 10,126
mw, plus 520 mw contracted from other utilities. However,
much of the system is outdated and about 2,000 mw of its
present capacity are due to be eliminated by 1978. And
yet by 1979, Con Edison’s annual peak load’ will be ap-
proximately 10,850 mw.
Two factors were cited by the Commission as necessary
to insure availability of the required amount of energy and
to prevent major power failures, such as that which oc-
curred in the northeast United States in 1965, as well as
the lesser “brownouts” and “blackouts” which have become
all too frequent in the New York area. The first of these
two factors is the existence of adequate power facilities to
meet the growing demand for electrical energy in the area
served. The second is an adequate “reserve,” a.part of
7 The Commission noted that the annual peak loads have shifted from
the winter season to the summer.
OPP or) Mey re
et eer ee
16a
which must be what is called a “spinning reserve.” * This
“spinning reserve” is provided by units operating at less
than full capacity but synchronized to the system so that
the energy generated by them will all be immediately avail-
able to meet an increase’ in loads. It is this latter need
that the Storm King project is designed to meet.
' The Commission found that in order to prevent a
major power failure the “spinning reserve” must be fully
available within two minutes.’ The Commission expressed
the opinion, based on the record before it, that “if Corn-
wall or a pumped storage equivalent with its very fast
pick-up characteristics had been available the blackout of
1965 might have been avoided.”
The Commission examined in detail the possibility that
there were alternatives more desirable than the Storm
King project which would be capable of meeting these
needs. Our earlier opinion required the Commission to
consider the use of gas turbines. The Commissjon de-
termined that using gas turbines alone would not be a
' feasible alternative to a pumped storage unit since the
turbines would be less reliable and more expensive. Gas
‘turbines, the Commission found, take between three min-
utes and ten seconds and four minutes to be brought to
full operation from a cold start. Moreover, the Commis-
sion stated, unlike pumped storage units, gas turbines
have a relatively low capacity for storage of rotational
energy, and thus do not provide as substantial a cushion-
ing effect in the event of a disturbance.
Gas turbines were found to be considerably more ex-
- ,pensive to operate than pumped storage units. The Com-
8 Sec Prevention of Power Failures, A Report to the President br the
Federal Power Commission July 1967, Volume I at 43-44.
9 “It appears from the evidence that to be effective in such an event
70 to 75% of the spinning reserve should be synchronized and avail-
able in 30 seconds to one minute, with all of the reserve available
within two minutes.”
ae
a
»-
17a
mission adopted the conclusion of a staff study that the
‘ operating costs of a pumped storage project would be
at least $119,000,000 less over a twenty-year period than’
the operating costs of gas turbines." It would cost about
$38,000,000 less, the study estimated, to construct the
pumped storage project than to provide the gas turbines. —
The Commission also considered the possibilities of a
project composed entirely of nuclear units but found that
such an alternative would be inadequate for reasons which
are fully developed in the report. The Commission was
of the opinion that a nuclear-gas turbine combination"
“suffers from the shortcomings inherent in its com-
ponents, that is, unless the gas turbines are spinning
they cannot be brought into operation soon enough to
meet emergencies and the nuclear component has rel-
atively slow response characteristics which when com-
bined with the forced outage reduces the reliability,
quotient of such a combination.” »
“(T)he reliability quotient of a nuclear-gas turbine
combination,” the Commission said, “is far less than
Cornwall’s.”
The Commission estimated that construction of the nu-
clear-gas turbine alternative would cost $158,794,000 more
than Cornwall. On the basis of these findings the Com-
mission said:
“We do not accept the proposition put forth by Scenic
Hudson that this extra cost is de minimis when
10 A Con Ed study had estimated a twenty year operating savings of
_ $137,023,000. .
11 Several combinations of gas turbines and a nuclear unit were pro-
_ posed. Con Ed believed that eight gas turbines would be required,
Scenic Hudson, five. The staff study concluded that six somewhat larger
units would be adequate. The Commission based its conclusions on the
combination found by. the Examiner to be most appropriate: seven
turbine units coupled with a 1000 mw nuclear unit.
18a
spread among all of Con Ed’s customers. There are
often good reasons why it is in the public interest
to utilize a more expensive alternative.; In appro-
priate cases the extra cost may even be substantial.
But whether substantial or not, the extra cost mnst
be justified by a showing that the alternative is in
the public interest. There has been no showing that
a combination nuclear-gas turbine alternative offers
any advantages or indeed is even reasonably equivalent
to Cornwall.”
.
The Commission also considered the feasibility of using
power purchased from outside sources to supply Con
Ed’s needs as an alternative to building the Storm King
plant. It found that the maximum amount that could be
assured would be slightly in excess of 1000 mw.’ Thus
this alternative, the Commission held, would not provide
sufficient power. .
Petitioners do not suggest that interconnections alone
could provide a feasible solution. Seenic Hudson pro-
posed a combination of 810 mw of purchased power with
gas turbines. However since the gas turbines in this
combination would not be used to generate spinning reserves
but to take on the load, the Commission found that tltis
alternative would not serve the principal function for
which the Storm King project is designed:
“In view of the assumption inherent in this. sugges-—
tion by Scenic Hudson that the gas turbines would
_not operate as a spinning reserve, the spinning re-
serve would have to come from the purchase sources
12 The New York Power Pool consists of the Upstate New York System
and the Southeastern New York Companies (SENY). The Commission
estimates that the seasonal exchange between these two would amount
to 500 mw in 1975 taking into account the requirements for maintenance
of generating capacity. Another 465 mw could be secured from the
New England Power Pool and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Power Pool. .
19a
if this alternative is to be comparable to Cornwall.
Accordingly this possibility eannot be deemed reliable,
since such purchases would not be available in the
event of a separation, the very time they would be
most needed.”
The Commission also examined the possibility of al-
ternative sites for a pumped storage project. As the
Commission poimts out, none of the petitioners offered
any evidence on possible alternative hydro-electric sites.
However, both Con Ed and the Commission staff conducted
extensive surveys to determine if such alternatives existed
within a hundred mile radius of New York City. Detailed
studies for five such sites showed that they would be
more costly and less reliable than the Cornwall project.
All of them would require the construction of long trans
mission lines. For example, the Bashbish site, in New
England, would require a transmission system of between
-32 and 56 miles, with attendant effects on the surround-
ing land, as compared to the 9.2 miles of overhead cor-
ridor planned for the Cornwall project.
In it examination of alternatives the Commission con-
sidered their effect on air pollution, noise pollution and
the overall environmental situation. Nuclear energy was
found by the Commission to be the method of generation
of electric power involving the least pollution. However
since nuclear energy by itself is inadequate for’ peaking
purposes, the effect on air pollution must be measured
with relation to gas turbines, operating either as parf of
a nuclear-gas turbine system or operated partly loadéd
as spinning reserve. The Commission pointed out that the
peaking energy generated at the Cornwall project is itself
pollution free. Whatever pollution results from the oper-
ation of the project -will be caused by the plants which
supply the power for pumping the water into the reservoir.
OT OLED
eT ET ACR OI Igy yy
‘
ee te ei eee
aa ae ett te a ee ET
20a
As the Commission said, “if the energy necessary to pump
Cornwall comes from polluting power plants in New York
City that would otherwise be idle, little or nothing would
be gained in reducing the air pollution problem.” The
Commission concluded, liowever, that “water for Cornwall
will normally be pumped by use of electric energy from
non-polluting seurces ....” The Commission believed that
construction of the Cornwall project would permit a more
rapid replacement of old relatively inefficient steam-clectric
plants with large nuclear plants. Even during the early
years of the project’s operation, because pumping would
take place during off-peak hours, i.e., at night, “clean-
burning” natural gas would probably be available in
amounts sufficient to meet a large part of the Cornwall
requirements.
The Commission pointed out that proposed alternative
methods of meeting Con Ed’s need for power, since they
too require construction of new facilities, would have an
overall impact on the physical environment similar to that
to which the opponents of the Cornwall project are object-
ing.
“Still another approach to weighing ‘alternativés to
the proposed action’ from an environmental stand-
point is to compare the operational consequence to
the environment of the Cornwall project with similar
consequences which would result from any reasonable
alternative project. We conclude that none of the most
likely proposed alternatives, including an all-nuclear
unit or the mixed nuclear-and gas turbine combina-
tion, could be sited within 100 miles of New York City
with any less physical impact on the environmental as-
pects of the affected area than the Cornwall project.”
a -
Che a Lk er sa oS Ba ER
21a
B. “The conservation of natural resources, the mainte-
nance of natural beauty, and the preservation of historic
sites.”
The Commission gave extended consideration to the en-
vironmental aspect of our remand order. Testimony was
taken from “a veritable ‘Who’s Who’ of conservation, each
witness discussing a different facet of this esoteric and
subjective matter.” The Commission, said: “{[O]ur con-
clusion that the license must issue does not rest upon any
discounting of the case made by the intervenors relating
to the natural beauty, historical signifieance, and spiritual
qualities of the Storm King Mountain in its setting.” Its
essential finding in this regard was that the Cornwall
project, as modified by the Commission to make any struc-
tures not buried “as unobtrusive as ingenuity can make
them,” constitutes “no real impairment of the environ-
mental and seenic aspects of the Highlands.”
- The original plan for the project provided for a power-
house that would be 80 per ceni underground. The project
licensed by the Commission now ealls for the powerhouse
to be completely underground. While in-an area visually
part of Storm King Mountain, the powerhouse would not
be under the mountain itself but in the Village of Corn-
wall “on a small river-bottom foothill.” Scenic Hudson’s
witness Vincent J. Scully, professor of art and architec-
ture at Yale University, although he was opposed to other
features of the project, stated that the underground power-
house itself did not “enter into the problem of visual rela-—
tionship.” The external features of the powerhouse site
would all be located below the cut of Storm King High-
way on the mountain." The only features on the power-
house site which would be aboveground would be the en-
13 The highway crosses the mountain at an elevation varying from 200
feet to 280 feet. The height of Storm King Mountiin is 1,343 . fect.
22a
trance to the underground plant, an access road, and the
tailrace. The Commission said that “the land surface
above the power station will be planted and as much of the
existing growth as possible preserved.”
The tailtace and abutments would be located at the river’s
edge, in an area partially occupied at present by a de-
cidedly unscenic railroad bridge. The tailrace would be 685
feet long, with a vertical rock cut rising from 10 to 32 feet
above the river. At the east end of the tailrace the visible
height of the cut would be at most 20 feet above the exist-
ing railroad bridge. At the west end, the cut would be
completely obscured by the existing bridge. The Commis-
sion pointed out that the “planting of vines on the rock
face behind the tailrace would further serve to ameliorate
the view from the river.” With respect to the effect of the
construction of the tailrace on the view of the mountain,
the Commission said:
“The tailrace would be located where the river widens
above the gorge and curves west by north, above the
powerhouse. From the bank directly across the river
the distance is 4000 feet. Because of the curved shore-
line at that distance, at the river level there would be
no direct view of the tailrace.”
The tailrace and the vertical cut would not, therefore,
destroy a scenic, unspoiled view of the mountain. They
would in iarge part be hidden from view hy existing man-
made structures or natural phenomena. The scenic impact
of that part of the tailrace and cut that would be visible
are to be evaluated not in terms of the number of square
feet potentially visible but in terms of the entire visible
panorama. The total area that would be occupied would
be minuscule in proportion, to the total area encompassed
within a viewer’s peripheral vition. The Commission could
- ae PEA LGD LIST PTR WCE BE pb THE:
ed
ee v—
23a .
reasonably find that with the river in the foreground and
the mountain majestically rising 1343 feet behind, the tail-
race and the vertical cut would not seriously impair the
mountain’s scenic aspects.
The Commission found, in summary, that:
“Limiting the external features at the power house site
to the portal entrance, tailrace, and access road, total-
ling approximately 3 or 4 acres—out of Storm King’s
total of over 400 acres—should reduce to a minimum
‘the visual impact on the scenic vistas of Storm King -
Mountain or the Highland Gorge of the Hudson River
and thereby preclude any material scenic impairment
or detriment.” ee
The reservoir would not be on Storm King Mountain
itself but behind the mountain from the river about two
miles south and west of the powerhouse site, on lands owned
in part by the Village of Cornwall and in part by Harvard
University." It would not be visible from the river; its
visibility from other points “varies in relation te the eleva-
tion and distance of the view.” From many of the points
from which the reservoir can be seen various industrial
developments can be seen as well.
The Commission found that, although the 240 acre reser-
voir will be larger than any of the other nearby bodies of
water, “in the scale of the area it does not reasonably ap-
pear to dwarf the scene. Nor should it be materially differ-
ent in appearance from ponds in the area and thus should -
not be deemed incongruous with the present character of the
area 99 15
14 The part owned by Harvard is a portion, of Black Rock Forest, a
3,700 acre experimental traet of timber. About 240 acres at the east
end of the forest would be acquired for the project. The remaining
land will be unaffected.
15 The Commission noted that all large ponds in the area are artificial.
-
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24a
Finally with respect to the contention that the inside
walls of mud, or rock fill, would be exposed as the reservoir
rises and falls, the Commission found that the rock and
earth comprising the dikes would not be out of character
with the rock and bare spots common in the Highlands and
that “[t]he plantings and natural growth which would ad-
here to the exterior and possibly interior surfaces of the
dikes would also serve to ameliorate any intrusion of the
reservoir and dikes on the natural scene.”
The Commission’s criticisms led to the substantial modi-
fication of the recreational aspects of the project. Con Ed’s
original proposal included an information center and recre-
ation area to be located in the vicinity of the powerhouse
site. These features were eliminated by the Commission.
The Commission approved the construction of a riverfront
park and a scenic overlook. The park is to be built on the
rock excavated from the site of the power plant. It would be
located in that part of the river to the north and west of the
project adjacent to the shoreline. This 57 acre mile-long
recreational facility, to be linked by two bridges to the
Town of Cornwall to which it will be transferred upon com-
pletion, is to consist of play area, picnic sites, shelters, and
sanitary facilities. The scenic overlook is to occupy a
36 acre tract-abutting State Highway 9-W, and would also
inelude picnic sites."* The Commission found that the over-
look would enable visitors to enjoy “the scenic vistas of the
Hudson River” *” and “will not seriously or substantially
16 Of the one hundred and forty acres to be acquired by Con Ed, over
100 acres is to be transferred to the Palisades Interstate Park Com-
mission for recreational use.
17 This accords -with the findings of the New England-New York Inter-
Agency Committee, Report of the New England-New York Region, Sub-
region “E” (Hudson River Basin), 999 (d) (reprinted as Sen. Doc.
No. 14, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) ) which recommended for the Hud-
son River Gorge “. . . establishment of a system of highway waysides
. to make available, in a safe manner, the scenic,vistas of the
countryside.”
LEELA SCOR REHEAT EB Ie” k OO
25a
impinge on the scenic historic or environmental qualities of
the area.”
The Commission heard extensive testimony on the effect
of the project on historic sites in the area. There is no
record that any event of historical significance took place
‘at Cornwall or on Storm King Mountam. Constitution
Island and West Point, and Forts Clinton and Montgomery,
which are at Bear Mountain considerably below the project
site, are the closest areas of historical importance. The
project site is not visible from either Constitution Island or
West Point. However, Constitution Island, which has the
best preserved revolutionary fortification in the Highlands,
- will be visible from the proposed scenic overlook. None of
the parties has offered any specific rebuttal to the Com-
mission’s conclusion that “the project will not cause the
destruction of any historical site.” ’*
The thrust of petitioners’ arguments is that the principle
of preservation of scenic beauty permits of no. intrusion at
all into this area and that, therefore, no power plant, no
matter how innocuous, may be built. This is clearly a policy
determination which, whatever may be our personal views,
we do not have the power to impose on the Commission.
The Commission has complied with the terms of our re-
mand by giving careful and thorough consideration to the
18 The propriety of the use by the Commission of the findings of the
Advisory Council on Historie Preservation, set up by the Historic
Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §470 f (Supp. 1971), is the subject
of some dispute. The Advisory Council found that plans for the project
would have a “minimal adverse effect” on the scenic values of the arex.
Petitioner Scenic Hudson contends that the Council’s finding is not only
contrary to evidence but also that it ought not to be considered by the
Commission because Scenic Hudson did not participate in the delibera-
tions of the Council while the Commission’s staff did. The Commission
ruled that it had a statutory obligation to consider the report. We
need not resolve this minor issue since the Commission stated that its
“finding is made on the basis of record evidence, independent of con-
sideration of the findings of the Agnes Council, which simply affirms
our conclusion.”
————— rt t—
26a
impact of the project on the envirnoment. The conclusions,
it has reached are supported by substantial evidence.
a)
C. The “fisheries question.”
In our remand order, in additional to requiring further
consideration of the overall environmental impact of the —
project, we specifically directed the (‘ommission to “take
the whole fisheries question into consideration before decid-
ing whether the Storm King Project is to be licensed.”
Scenic Hudson, supra at 624. We had im mind the allega-
tions of fishermen’s groups that the project threatened to
destroy the eggs of the striped bass whose major spawn-
ing grounds, they maintained, are in the immediate vicinity
of the project, and “that ‘no sereening device presently
feasible would adequately protect these early stages of fish
life’ and that their loss would ultimately destroy the eco-
nomically valuable fisheries.” Id.
The Commission took official notice of the report of the
Hudson River Policy Committee entitled “Hudson River
Fisheries Investigations 1965-1968,” which was based upon
a study sponsored by the New York State Conservation
Department and the United States Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice and conducted under the field direction of a technical
advisor of the United States Bureau of Sport Fisheries.
The “Hudson River Fisheries Investigations” concluded
that: - ’
* .. the evidence indicates that there would not be any
vigiebioned adverse effects to the striped bass and
American shad fisheries of the Hudson River from a
‘pumped storage generating plant at Cornwall, New
York.” |
The Policy Committee’s study lends strong support to
the views presented by a number of witnesses at the hear-
27a
ings to the effect that the spawning grounds of striped bass
extend from locations at river mile 35 to river mile 123,
and that these spawning grounds are, in the Commission's
words, “not consistently more favorable in one location
than another.” The Commission found “that bass spawn
substantially in the Hudson River over an 80 mile reach,
including the Cornwall area, and that no part thereof is
distinguished as a major spawning area.” ee
The devices originally proposed to protect the fish Have
been redesigned to afford greater protection. Referring to
the testimony of a fishery biologist from the Commission
staff, the Commission said:
. that while the mortality rates of fish, fish eggs,
and larvae inhabiting the water which will be drawn
through the screen and the plant cannot be measured
‘short of actual measurement during project operation,
in his own opinion the losses to the fishery caused by
the operation of the project would not significantly
affect the Hudson River fishery resources.”
In order to compensate for the loss of fish resulting from
the operation of the proposed plant, Con Ed proposed, and
the Commission approved, construction of a fish hatehery.
The Commission concluded :
“Witness Raney’s fear’ as to what might or could hap-
pen are counterbalanced by testimony based on sam-
19 Scenic Hudson’s witness, Raney, testified:
“Anything that man does is substantially opposed to natures So ff
you build any sort of a structure you will have situations which
are not found naturally in the environment so here you have an
additional situation where you have fishes drawn up into an arti-
ficial impoundment, eggs drawn up, larvae drawn up, possibly
thirty species upon which they féed. So it is a very complicated .
business to try to evaluate the overall effect this will have. But
basically the effect will be harmful to the fishes.
28a
« pling studies which relating egg producing capacity of.
the striped bass to volumes of water in plant operation
indicates that the impact on Hudson fishery would: not
he substantial. Thus even if none of the fish and eggs
at Cornwall survived, the total impact would be small.
The evidence, however, is to the effect that no such
disaster would befall the Cornwall segment. Eggs,
larvae and ‘fish entering the plant would have a’ sur-
‘al rate in the area of 80 per cent. Further, hatchery
bee A elsewhere indicate the Secaibility of an
‘operation in the Hudson which would be capable of
replacing any losses attributable to the project.”
D. The “aesthetic adv itunes of underground transmis-
sion lines against the economic disadvantages” and related
routing problems. :
a
In compliance with our mandate, the Commission investi-
gated the possibility of constructing the transmission lines
of the project entirely underground. The Commission
weighed the obvious aesthetic advantage of underground
transmission as against its economic and functional dis-
advantages. ,
The evidence shows that putting the transmission tam
underground would cost substantially more than having
them overhead. The Commission’s staff estimated that con-
sidering both construction and maintenance costs, under-
ground lines would be approximately 16 times as expensive
as overhead lines: The Commission explained that:
*“The relative costs of undergrounding can be appre-
ciated from the fact that the problems. inherent in
transmitting power underground at high voltages are
T think anything that affects any substantial number of eggs, lar-
vae, young or adult, could ultimately have a substantial effect on
a fishery. But the degree of the effect I don’t know.”
. 29a
not simply a matter of putting an overhead transmis-
sion line, ‘which is merely a bare insulated piece of
metal conductor, into a trench. The phenomena of heat
buildup and condenser (or capacitance) effect require
that underground cables be an entirely different spe-
cles of equipment. ° 3
o
The Commission cited a number of technological factors
_ that result in higher labor and material costs for under-
grounding. Underground cable requires a: type of insula-
tion which can be applied only by highly skilled labor. —
Transmission of power by underground lines presents prob-
lems which can be solved only by the installation of large
magnet-type coils every 2 to 3 miles. Various other expen-
sive techniques, such as intricate splicing, are needed to
meet other problems presented by the electrical and thermal
properties of underground lines. |
The Commission found that there were functional dis-
advantages in underground cables. Although overhead
lines have more outages, there can generally be immediate
' automatic reclosure with no disruption of service. Outages
in underground cables, on the other hand, result in consid-
erably greater disruption of service since the failure must
be located, the damaged area excavated, and complicated
repairs made.
The Commission, balancing he several factors which are
involved, concluded:
“It is thus apparent that only for the most cogent rea-
sons, as where no feasible alternative is possible or
where the aesthetic detriment is so violent as to pre-
clude any consideration of overhead transmission facil-
ities, that undergrounding ‘should be required.
Nor do we believe it is in the public interest to burden
consumers with the cost of undergrounding cables un-
30a
-less it were necessary to prevent such destruction or
. serious damage.” .
The transmission route which is now approved is differ-
ent from the route challenged before this‘court in 1965. .
The ney route is not the route preferred by Con Ed, but
is a modified route developed by the Commission staff.
Although it is 5 to 6 miles longer than the route proposed by
Con Ed, it would require 4 miles less of transmission cor-
ridor because it uses a greater length of the existing Pleas-
ant Valley-Millwood corridor. The alternative route was
selected because “it will impinge less on the area through
which it passes than would any other route.” The area
traversed is “rough, wooded and hilly. More importantly,
its valleys lie in a north-easterly direction and are oriented
so as to provide the possibility of locating lines below
crests.” The wooded nature of the area will provide natural —
screening. The Commission found that “the area will re-
main what it is now—scenic and pleasant, with open farm-
land and orchards and partly wooded with some brooks.
To say that this will be seriously damaged or destroyed
by an overhedd transmission liné is not consistent with
reality.” *
Since the Commission’s conclusions on this issue are
hased upon consideration of all relevant factors and are
supported by substantial evidence, they cannot be rejected.
20 Con Ed is required by the license order to follow recognized guide-
lines for the construction of overhead transmission lines. Article 35(5)
of the Commission's license order includes the guidelines contained in
the Hudson Valley Power Commission's “Power Lincs and Scenic Values
in the Hudson River Valley.” In addition, Con Fa ‘is bound by the
Commission's Order No. 414 which prescribes general regulations for
the “protection and enhancement of aesthetic and related valuce in the
design, location, construction, and operation of project works” (35 Fed.
Reg. 18585 (1970)).
3la
E.. The Catskill, Aqueduct
The issue of possible danger to New York City’s Catskill
Aqueduct was not involved in the earlier proceeding. It is
presented in the new application because of the change in
the Cornwall project to provide for construction of the
powerhouse completely underground. As a consequence of
that change the powerhouse is to be located at its closest
point a distance of about 140 feet from the Moodna Pres.-
sure Tunnel, a link in the Catskill Aqueduct system. The
Catskill system is one of three systems that supply New
York City with substantially all of its water. Twenty-odd
communities in upstate counties also have the right to, and
do tap the Catskill Aqueduct,
The city contends that the Cornwall project interferes
with its control of the Catskill Aqueduct and is therefore
precluded by Section 27 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C,
“S21 (1964), which provides that:
“Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed
ax affecting or intending to affect or in any way to
interfere with the laws of the respective States re-
lating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution
of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other
uses, or any vested right acquired therein.”
The argument based on Section 27 is without merit. The
license that the Commission has issued does not authorize
Con Ed to divert any of the city’s water or to interfere
with the tunnel. Moreover the “only purpose of Section 27
is to preserve to holders of state-conferred water rights a
right to compensation if those rights are taken or destroyed
as an incident to the exercise by another, of a license granted
by the Commission.” Portland General Electric Co. v.
Federal Power Commission, 328 F.2d 165, 176, & no. 23
(th Cir, 1964), citing City of Fresno x. California, 372
32a
U.S. 627, 629-30 (1963) and Ivanhoe Irrigation District v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291 (1958), both of which involved
the very similar language of Section 8 of the Reclamation
Act of 1902, 48 U.S.C. (383 (1964).2' Section 27 was not
intended to give the city the power to veto Commission
action.
The Commission concluded that excavation of the power-
house site would not cause damage to the Moodna Pres-
sure Tunnel, that controlled blasting during construction
would not endanger the Aqueduct and, generally, that
“the probability of damage to the Aqueduct is remote.”
We think that there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the Commission's determination.
The Commission found that the rock underlying the
project “is a very large mass of dense uniform crystalline
- rock underlain by sedimental rock capable of sustaining
great loads.” The city contends that, on the contrary, in-
stability of the rock at the Aqueduct site can he deduced
from a failure of the original Moodna Tunnel in 1913 and
by the phenomenon of “popping rock” encountered in
construction of the tunnel. However, the evidence shows
that the failure of the original Moodna Tunnel was due to
excessive water pressure and insufficient rock cover. The
tunnel was corrected by construction of an alternate shaft
and has operated for a period of over 50 years without
untoward incident. The Commission found that “(t]he
phenomenon of ‘popping rock’ occurs in rock of this area
only at depths below 1,000 feet,” far below the depth pro-
_ posed for the Cornwall project.
21 That statute provides: :
“Nothing in sections . . . of this title shall he construed a= affecting
or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested rights
acquired thereunder... .” 43 U.S.C. §383 (1964).
2. aR ge tee - ad are.
' 33a
Although witnesses for the City testified that stress
changes caused by the powerhouse excavation and by
blasting might present hazards to the Aqueduct,”? other
witnesses seriously disputed these contentions. Smith, a
consulting geologist for Con Ed, testified, as the Com-
mission said, “that he could conceive of no possible con-
dition in this area which would make the proposed plan
hazardous from a geological point of view.” Dr. Bartlett W.
Paulding, Jr., Associate Professor and Acting Head of the
Basic Engineering Department of the “olorado School
of Mines, who was retained by Con Ed at the suggestion
of the City, testified that the effect of excavations on the
aqueduct would be insignificant. Dr. Paulding, whom the
Commission described as “a geologist and geophysicist
specializing in rock mechanics,” concluded, in the Com-
mission’s words
“that the absence of adverse geological conditions,
coupled with the results of a photoelastic analysis of
22 Torris Eide, consultant engineer to the Chief Engineer of the New
York City Board of Water Supply testified that the removal of 254,000
cubic yards of rock might disturb the equilibrium in the forces within
the rock formation, and thus present a risk to the Aqueduct. However,
he had conducted no geologic or seismic tests of the area. Thomas
Fluhr, engineering geologist and consultant to the New York City Board
of Water Supply testified that the rock in the area appeared to be
under stress. He stated “[t]he risk of failure of the aqueduct cannot
be regarded as imminent but it represents a definite hazard.” He con-
ceded that the risk was small, but stated that “there certainly is some
- tisk.” He too had made no surveys beyond general mathematical studies.
Malcolm T. Wane, Associate Professor of Mining and Engineering at
Columbia University, testified for the city that he found that a vertical
stress relief of 14% and a horizontal stress relief of 11% would result
from excavation. He did not know what effect such changes would have
since the present state of equilibrium of the Aqueduct was unknown.
Don W. Deere, Professor in the Department of Civil Engineering and
Geology at the University of Mlinois, testified that there were too
many unknowns to permit evaluation of stress changes. He believed
that “there was a small but real risk involved to the present aqueduct
because of the changes in stress and nae activities associated with
the construction of the project at this si
34a
the stress conditions around rectangular openings .. .
indicate that the existing Catskill Aqueduct will not
be endangered ... during . . . excavation for the
power plant.”
Similar testimony was offered by Charles P. Benziger
» who based his conclusion on lew stress conditions at the
site as shown by seismic tests in drilled holes at the point
where the power station is to be located.
The Commission’s conclusion that blasting would pose
at most a remote possibility of damage has ample support
in the record. The city’s own witness, Don V. Deere, testi-
fied that it was “possible, but unlikely that blasting, if
restricted and properly controlled, will cause damage to
the pressure tunnel.” Another of the city’s witnesses,
Malcolm T. Wane, testified that the effects of blasting are
somewhat conjectural. Con Ed’s witness Paulding testified
that the Aqueduct would not be endangered if blasting
charges were limited to 55 pounds per charge.. The Com-
mission’s conclusion that properly controlled blasting
presented at’ most a “remote” danger is not seriously
challenged by the city.
It is clear that the resolution of highly complex techno-
logical issues such as these was entrusted by Congress
to the Commission and not to the courts. Where the
Commission’s conclusions are supported by substantial
evidence, the courts must accept them. It seems to us
that it would he very difficult indeed to argue that the
evidence supporting the Commission’s determination with
respect to the Aqueduct is insubstantial. In fact the argu-
ment presented to us on this issue appears to be either
that some higher burden of proof should be imposed with
respect to the matter or that the city should be able to
exercise what, in effect, amounts to a veto power. However,
there is no authority whatever to support the imposition
35a
of any greater burden of proof than that provided in the
statutory standard and “[{s]uch a veto power easily could
destroy the effectiveness of the Federal Act. It would
subordinate to the control of the [city] the ‘comprehensive’
planning which the Act provides shall depend upon the
judgment of the Federal Power Commission or other
representatives of the Federal Government.” First Iowa
Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,
328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946) (footnote omitted).
11.
The only remaining concern is the allegation that the -
Commission failed to comply with certain statutory di-
rectives. :
The first of these statutes is Section 10(a) of the Fed-
eral Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §803(a) (1964 & Supp. 1971)
which provides:
“$803. Conditions of license generally.
All licenses issued under sections 792, 793, 795-818,
and 820-823 of this — shall be on the following con-
ditions:
(a) That the project adopted . . . shall. be such as in
the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted
to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing
a waterway or waterways for the use or. benefit. of
interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement
and utilization of water-power development, and for
other beneficial public uses,-ineluding recreational
purposes; and if necessary in order io secure such
plan the Commission shall have authority to require
the modification of any project and of the plans and
specifications of the project works before approval.”
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36a
This is the statute upon which, to a large extent, our °
- earlier remand was based. In our opinion we said that the
phrase “recreational purposes” “undoubtedly encompasses
the conservation of natural resources, the maintenance of
natural beauty, and the preservation of historic sites.”
Scenic Hudson, supra at 614. We directed the Commission
to consider all of these factors in.reaching its decision.
It is obvious that in finding compliance with our re-
mand order, we also find compliance with the statute on
which that order was. based. As we have pointed out, the
Commission has given careful and thorough consideration
to “recreational purposes,” and, indeed, has used its “au-
thority to require the modification of [the] project” in a
number of aspects related to this end.
There is no real dispute as to other findings required
by the statute. The Commission found that there would
be no impediment to navigation, that use of the Hudson
River for electric generation by this project is “well adapted
to development of the waterway for the use or benefit of
interstate or foreign commerce,” and that the project will
not interfere with any future program for the river since
it will discharge no chemical, thermal or solid pollutants
into the waterway. In short, the Commission has given
‘full consideration to all of the statutory factors and has
thus performed the “specific planning responsibility” en-
trusted to it by Congress in Section 10(a).
The petitioners also claim that the Commission has vio-
lated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42- U.S.C.
§§4321 et seq. (Supp. 1971). This Act was passed after the
close of the hearing, but before the Commission’s decision.”*
Its applicability to this proceeding is clear, and is con-
ceeded. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 213 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). Section 101 “recognizing
23. The Act became effective January 1, 1970.
pe aaa
37a
. the critical importance of restoring and maintaining
environmental quality to the overall welfare and develop-
ment of man” requires the federal government to
“(b) ... use all practicable means, consistent with other
ccnentiol considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the Nation may—
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wher-
ever possible, an environment which supports diversity
and variety of individual choice ;
(5) achieve a balance between population and re-
source use which will permit high standards of living
and a wide sharing of life’s amenities ... .” 42 U.S.C.
§4331 (Supp. 1971).
Section 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §4332 (Supp. 1971),
requires agencies of the federal government to take certain
prescribed measures.
The policy statement in Section 101 envisions the very
type of full consideration and balancing of various fac-
tors which we, by our remand order, required the Com-
mission to undertake. Like our remand, the Act does not
require that a particular decision be reached but only
that all factors be fully explored. ‘The eventual decision
_ still remains the duty of the responsible agency. a
The Commission has complied with the specific direc-
tives contained in Section 102 of the Act. The hearings
reflected the “systematic, interdisciplinary approach” re
quired by that section. The Commission consulted with
other agencies, as required by Section 102, including the
Chief of Engineers, the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, the Department of the Interior, the Atomic
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38a -
Energy Commission and a number of state and local .
groups that stand to be affected. The environmental state-
ment required by Section .102(2)(C) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§4332(2)(C) (1964), was submitted in the form of the
Commission’s opinion. In view of the exhaustive environ-
mental findings which occupy a substantial portion of the
Commission’s opinion, and the Commission’s explicit con-
formance with the enumerated portions of the required
statement, we conclude that full compliance with the Na-
tional Environmental] ‘Policy has been demonstrated.
IV.
We do not consider that the five years of additional in-
vestigation which followed our remand were spent in vain.
The petitioners performed a valuable service in that eariier
ease, and later before the Commission. By reason of their
efforts the Commission has reevaluated the entire Cornwall
project. The modifications in the project reflect a height-
ened awareness of the conflict between utilitarian and
aesthetic needs. Whether the project as it now stands
represents a perfect balance of these needs is not for this
court to decide. Since the Commission has fully performed
the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it, it is our
' obligation to deny the petitions in all respects.
_—own
—-
———
39a
OaKEs, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :
If this case came to us without environmental overtones
and with no threat to the water supply of the largest city
in the United States, I would be constrained to take the
viewpoint of the majority. For, whether or not I agreed
with the weight given by the Federal Power Commission
to alternative sources of power, such as the purchase of
Canadian énergy,’ the court would be conclusively bound,
1 The FPC findings on the feasibility of purchasing, rather than creat-
ing, power are not entirely consistent. Finding 82 says in pertinent
part: ;
If the energy necessary to pump Cornwall comes from polluting
power plants in New York City that would otherwise be idle, little
“or nothing would be gained in reducing the air pollution problem.
Based on the assumption that Cornwall would go into operation in
1972 a Staff study introduced in evidence showed that by 1980 ap-
proximately 89 percent of its pumping requirement eould be met by
virtually non-polluting sources of generation. Cornwall, to the extent
that its water is not pumped by power from Con Ed low cost nuclear
plants will be powered primarily from sources in areas adjacent to
. the Con Ed service area, and perhaps by imported Canadian hydro-
electric power. .
Finding 134 says in pertinent part:
Another considered alternative to the Cornwall development is the
possibility of purchased power from Canada, namely from Churebill
(Hamilton) Falls projeet, now under construction. To be a proper
source of power supply, the energy from Canada would have ,to be
taken substantially 24 hours per day; otherwise this would not be an
economic source. The transmission distance involved and the relatively
high cost of transmission facilities makes Churchill Falls pewer com-
patable to base load nuclear power or base load mine-mouth power
or other sources of base load power outside of New York City, rather
than an alternative to the Cornwall development. There is no indica
tion when, if ever, Churchill Falls Power might ‘be available to electric
systems outside of Canada. In addition, there is no assurance that it
would be available upon system separation.
It has been reported that on July 30, 1971, “dedication ceremonies”
were_held for a 345 KV transmission line linking the Canadian New
Brunswick Power Commission with twelve investor-owned and- two co-
operative New England Utilities, with a power transfer capability of
600 megawatts. The intertie runs 230 miles southeast from Frederickton,
New Brunswick, to Wiseasset, Maine. In its first 25 days of operation
40a
both under Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. §8251(b), and the case law, e.g., Gainesville Utilities
Dep’t v. Florida Power Corp., 91 S.Ct. 1592 (1971), by
findings supported by “substantial evidence,” particularly
when the Commission is acting within its own field of
“expertise and judgment” Gainesville, supra, 91 S.Ct. at
‘1598. It is also true, of course, that the courts cannot
: quarrel with the Congressional policy impliedly expressed
in Sections 207 and 311 of the Federal Power Act, that puts
great emphasis on “adequate service,” 16 U.S.C. §824f, the
“cost of generation .. .” and “the development of naviga.,
tion, industry, commerce, and the national defense,” 16
U.S.C. $825.” : |
it transmitted 58,000,000 KWH of base-load and peaking energy. Other
Canadian interconnections total about 3540 MW, including 2,000 MW
to New York and Michigan. See Public Power Weekly Newsletter
(A.P.P.A.), Aug. 6, 1971, at 5. It is also interesting to note that on
July 21, 1971, Senators Metcalf and McGovern introduced 8. 2324, a
bill to establish “a national power grid system,” the underlying concept
of which was perhaps first advanced by the father of modern conserva-
tion, Governor Gifford Pinchot of Pennsylvania. In the course of Rhode
Island Representative Tiernan’s remarks on the companion House Bill
(H.R. 9970), he said:
Only with a national grid system can we assure all Americans an ade-
quate and reliable supply of electric power. . . . An [sic] an example
of how the national grid could accomplish this, consider the acute
power shortage which struck New York City in 1969. Basin Electric
Power Cooperative in North Dakota, along with the Bureau of Recla-
mation and Missouri Basin System wired Consolidated Edison in New
York to say that they would supply all of the power New York
needed. The city remained dim, however, because there was no way
to transmit the power from North Dakota-to New York. Had a
national grid existed, this power would have -been readily available
to the energy-starved area. 117 Cong. Rec. H7005 (daily ed. July 21, .
_ 1971).
Section 207 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824f, does not
speak of conserving use of electrical energy, a policy which Consolidated
Edison, the applicant here, is at least partially promoting with its
1971 “Save-A-Watt” advertising campaign. Nor does Section 311, 16
U.S.C. $825j (dealing with the investigatory and information-gathering
function of the FPC) in any way refer to conservation of the environ-
to
4la
a
On the other hand Congress has now placed a measure of
responsibility with the FPC, and the other federal agencies,
to take environmental factors into account.’. The FPC also
has its own duties, specified in Section 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §803(a), to issue a license to use
water power only when the project will be best adapted for
“beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes.”
And indeed as Judge Learned Hand once put it, alfhough in
reference to agency interpretation of statutes:
In spite of the plenitude of discussion in recent years
- as to how far courts must defer. to the rulings of an
administrative tribunal, it is doubtful whether in the
ment. We are left with Congressional policy underlying the Federal
Power Act that is read to assume that future electrical needs will in-
crease and that the only way to meet them is to construct more and
more generating capacity. This is an assumption that certainly bears
re-examination [see P. Ehrlich & J. Holdren, “The Energy Crisis,”
Saturday Review, August 7, 1971, at 50], and one which automatically—
in the present state of the generating art—involves a consumption of ©
depletable natural resources (coal, oil, natural gas, uranium), an adverse
impact of one sort or another on the environment, or both. The 1970
National Power Survey (FPC) Pt. II estimates annual “peak demands”
for the metropolitan New York City power supply area at 7,350,000
Kilowatts in .1970, 13,360,000 in 1980 and 21,160,000 in 1990, id., at
II-1-8, and on this basis one could argue for perhaps three or four
Storm King projects. The same report makes reference, inter alia, to
the problems of air pollution from coal-fired plants,id., at II-1-19; deple-
tion of oil and gas reserves, id., at II-1-19, 27; thermal pollution by
nuclear plants, id., at II-1-48; thermal discharges generally, id., at
II-1-49; ash disposal and nuclear fuel disposal, id., at II-1-50. See also
Sarvicki, “The National Power Crisis and Its Effect on Rural America,”
Rural Electrification, June 1971, at 15; M. Katz, “Decision-making in
the Production of Power,” Scientific American, Sept. 1971, at 191.
See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality—The
Second Annual Report. 25-26 (Aug. 1971). Sec. 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. saan 47,
’ directs “all agencies of the Federal Government” to
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environ-
mental design arts in planning and in decision making which may
have an impact on man’s environment ; ;
at
42e
end one can say more than that there comes a point at
which the courts must form their own conclusions. Be-
fore doing so they will, of course,—like the adminis-
trative tribunals themselves—look for light from every
quarter, and after all crannies have been searched, will
vield to the administrative interpretation in all doubt-
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with
the Council on Environmental Quality established by tithe II of this
Act, which will insure that presently cxqualified environmental ameni-
ties and values may be given appropriate consideration in derision-
making along with economic and technical considerations ;
(C) imelude in every recommendation or report on propoxals for legis
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on
(i) the environmental impact of the propowd action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity, and
Cv) eng teseveniite onl teschiorshte commitualio of vewsusets
which would be involved in the proposed @ction should it be imple-
mented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal -
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect
to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and
the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made avaiiable to the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by Section 552
of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes ;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources; . . . 42
U.S.C.A. $4332. ‘
The efficacy of this Act is in large part dependent on the decision in
the instant case; as Schroeder puts it in “Pollution in Perspective: A
43a
ful cases; but they can never abdicate. Niagara Falls
Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 1943).
I take it also that we cannot abdicate when the Commission
fails “to make findings or evaluate considerations relevant
to its determination.” Gainesville Utilities Dep't v. Florida
Power Corp., supra, 91 S.Ct. at 1598 n.7; and see Schaffer
Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957):
Scemic Hudson-Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F 2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Simi-
larly, if the agency findings are internally inconsistent, the
court is not bound to accept them. Cf. Gallick v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963); Telex Corp. v.
Balch, 382 F.2d 211, 215 (8th Cir. 1967); Freightways, Inc.
v. Stafford, 217 F.2d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1955); Williams v.
United States, 126 F.2d 129, 132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 655 (1942). Finally, while judicial deference to
administrative expertise is required, not every agency is
expert in every aspect of science, technology, aesthetics or
human behavior. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 476 (1951); see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Survey of the Federal Effort and the Case Approach,” Vol. IV, No. 2,
Natural Resources Lawyer, 381, 419 (April 1971): “The key question
ahead is whether, after balancing all pertinent considerations, an ad-
ministrative decision is made that provides for less than full environ-
mental protection—whether that decision will be upheld if challenged
jn the courts.” It is interesting to note, although I place little signif
cance on it here, that at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Environ-
mental Quality Control of the ABA Committee on Environmental Quality,
the Assistant to the Chairman of the FPC strenuously criticized NEPA,
quoting a former AEC attorney who termed NEPA “an atrocious piece
of legislation,” calling it “woefully ambiguous,” “an invitation to
litigation,” and expressing the hope that “reviewing courts will take a
practical approach” and the fear that “to construe the statute as a rigid
prescriptior of the quality or quantity of evidence required would
quickly cripple the administrative process.” Annex A, Minutes of Meet
ing 14, 19 (April 20, 1971). To what extent this genuinely reflects thix
agency's attitude toward NEPA, however, is doubtful; one might hope
that Congressional concern with the U.S. environment might be given
more respect by the Commission as a whole.
Pee ee ee ee
44a
Administrative Action 576 et seq. (1965). As Professor
Jaffe has said, “ ... expertness is not a magic wand tvhich
can be indiscriminately waved over the corpus of an
agency's findings to preserve them from review.” Id. at
615; see also 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
(30.07 (1958).
With these considerations in mind, I dissent. I dissent
because I think the FPC acted arbitrarily, abusing its dis-
cretion while purporting to act under the mandate of this
court in Scenic Hudson, supra; because its findings in re-
spect to the Catskill Aqueduct are inconsistent and in-
sufficient ; because its findings as to the effect of the project
upon New York City air pollution are incomplete and fail
to take into account relevant factors; and because the Com-
mission's findings and conclusions show that it has not
really followed the mandates of the National Enyironmental
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190 (Jan. 1, 1970), 42 U.S.C.
°£4321-47.
The City of New York has pointed out, in opposition to
the license granted by the FPC, that the Storm King (some-
times called “Cornwall”) project powerhouse is proposed
to be built only 140 feet from the Moodna Tunnel section of
the Catskill Aqueduct. This aqueduct is one of three svs-
tems supplying water to New York City. It is a gravity-
flow aqueduct over 50 years old, conveying approximately
40 per cent of the city’s average daily water supply from
the Ashokan Reservoir, 100 miles north of the city to the
Kensico Reservoir, 15 miles north of the city line. Those
who may remember the effects of severe droughts in the
1940's and the 1960's on the New York City water supply
must realize the importance of such a vast quantity of water
to the city, and imagine th» consequences of its disruption.‘
4 In addition to New York City, some twenty-four smaller communities
tap into the Catskill Aqueduct. Any of those towns which rely on it
exclusively for water would be perhaps more seriously endangered than
the City by any damage to it.
45a
- The Moodna Pressure Tunnel begins at a downtake shaft
some five miles westerly of the Hudson River, set in the
rock of Storm King Mountain. Lined with concrete, it
tunnels through the mountain at an clevation of minus 220
_ feet until it is 900 feet from the river; there it descends to
an elevation of minus 616 feet to the river. From this point
water continues to flow under pressure at 1100 feet below
the Hudson Riyer through the Hudson Pressure Tunnel
and then connects to an uptake shaft on the east side of
the River, surfacing at Breakneck Ridge. This whole com-
plex of tunnels by which the Aqueduct crosses the Hudson
is known as the Moodng-Hudson-Breakneck Pressure Tun-
nel. It has had a continuous water flow since it broke down
and was repaired in 1913°; consequently it has not been in-
spected since then. In a “pressure” tunnel, hydrostatic
pressure is constantly maintained. The City, aware of the
risk to its water supply from drilling, in its deed of Storm
King land to the Palisades Interstate Park Commission, in-
cluded a protective covenant to ban drilling within 200 fect
of the Aqueduct.‘ When Consolidated Edison first proposed
5 After the completion of the Aqueduct in 1913 there was considerable
leakage in the No. 7 downshift leading to the Hudson Tunnel, apparently
attributable to the eombination of hydrostatic pressure and “relief of
_ Stress” in the rock surrounding the tunnel. The tunnel had to he
“dewatered” and a new shaft (No. 7A) which by-passed the failed sec-
tion was drilled to correct the situation.
6 Whereas, the Board of Estimate of the City of New York...
authorized a grant and’ conveyance to the Palisades Interstate Park
Commission, of the fee of the City-owned land hereinafter described . _.
Subject to the following conditions, covenants and restrictions... :
"1 The City of New York retains a permanent sub-surface easement
to operate, maintain, and repair the Catskill Aqueduct which,
at this location, is approximately 400 feet below the surface.
5 Drilling of any kind is not permitted to depths greater than 200
feet below the present surface.
ht aie
46a
in 1963 to build a powerhouse some 175.feet from the Aque-
duct the City objected and in the original Consolidated Edi-
son project turned down in Scenic Hudson, supra, the pro-
posed powerhouse was moved some 400 feet to meet the
City’s objection.’ At the hearings below the City presented
two experienced engineers, Professor Malcolm T. Wane,
with experience in mine design and rock mechanies and with
mine failures due_to stress conditions, and Dr. Don U.
Deere, a professor of engineering and geology familiar with
the major pump storage projects at Yard’s Creek, North-
field Mountain and Churchill Falls. Dr. Deere concluded, on
the basis that the Consolidated Edison excavation would
cause an estimated 31 per cent increase in tangential
stresses at the top and bottom of the tunnel and a decrease
of 50 per cent on the sides, that there is “a small, but real”
risk to the Aqueduct from the project. Dr. Deere pointed out
that the degree of risk is unknown:
Moreover, considering for the moment that the pre-
cise magnitude of the stress changes around the tunnel
were accurately known, the effect of these stresses on
stability of the tunnel lining and adjacent rock, i.e.,
the factor of safety, could still not be determined
because neither the strength of the lining in its present
condition nor of the adjacent jointed and fractured rock
mass is even approximately known. Deere, 124/18,-
577-78."
He was joined in this conclusion by Dr. Wane:
One of the outstanding features of the whole problem is
a lack of specific knowledge of what exists at this
7 When Consolidated Edison came up with its presently proposed
project the City rather slowly moved to intervene and the FPC reopened
the proceedings to take evidence on this project. Presumably we should
pot penalize the City for its delay on this, an issue of mountainous
importance.
° References are to volume/page @umber of the transcript of the
hearings. :
be
ae
47a
site... [since] we do not know anything about the state
of nature in the immediate neighborhood of the aque-
duct. Wane, 124/18,550-51.
Consolidated Edison’s chief witness, Dr. Bartlett Pauld-
ing, a geologist who had done no work on tunnels or under-
ground excavations, testified that on the basis of a “photo-
elastic” technique his estimate of radial stress changes
. around the Aqueduct resulting from the powerhouse exca-
vation would come to only 11 per cent, and that this meant
that the excavation would not significantly affect the exist-
ing Aqueduct. Paulding, 112/17,203. Professor Wane sig-
nificantly indicated that the photo-elastie method, while
sound as far as it goes, only accounts for the unloading or
“vertical effect of excavation, not for the horizontal effects.
I do not take it that there is any particular FPC ex-
pertise in geology, and particularly the effect of unloading,
that is, relief of rock stress by excavation, on pressure aque-
duct tunnels. In answer to a question on oral argument
along this line, the FPC assured the court that its staff
had some knowledge and expertise. If this be so, one ma v
wonder why the commission did not follow the reeommenda-
tions of its staff that “an appropriate precautionary mea-
_ Sure should be undertaken by the Applicant to safeguard
the Moodna Tunnel Section- of the Catskill Aqueduct.” *
Several of the commission’s own “findings” on the danger
' to the Aqueduct tend to support the City’s position and not
the applicant’s, and most of the commission’s findings on
the Aqueduct are couched in terms of uncertainty. For
example, in Finding 270 reference is made to the city’s wit-
ness Fluhr and mention is made of his testimony that “there
8 - See Commission Staff Brief on Exceptions to Initial Supplemental
Decision, February 12, 1970, at 11. The City itself takes the position
- that either to construct a by-pass of the Moodna Tunnel section of the
Aqueduct or to line that section with steel would require an extensive
shutdown of the Aqueduct with “a resultant risk to the integrity of
the aqueduct.” °
VTT Ory,
4
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.
3
5
sh. ee 2S
velthete
48a
is certainly some risk,” but the commission never tells us
what this risk is or indeed whether the commission finds
any risk. Again, Finding 271 refers to the former leaking
of the aqueduct necessitating its closing down during con-
struction in 1913 and goes on to say, “any large open joints
connecting the bypass* and aqueduct could be grouted off if
‘the experience of the original construction is typical.” The
- commission, however, does not tell us whether it is likely
that “the experience of the original construction” will be
“typical” or just how this grouting would be accomplished.
Indeed, one surmises that to accomplish any grouting the
Aqueduct would have to be shut down, and that this might
impair the integrity of the Aqueduct.
The Findings fail to convince me that there is no sub-
stantial risk to the Aqueduct. Finding 272 says that the
operation of the Aqueduct for over fifty years indicates
that it ean withstand all of the hydrostatic pressures and
stresses involved in the construction at Cornwall. But how
such operation can establish this is not indicated, since even
on the Consolidated Edison evidence there will be new
and changed stresses resulting from drilling and blasting
for the powerhouse excavation. .
In Finding 284 the commission states that “[t]he evi-
dence, thus, reasonably is to the effect that the probability
of damage by reason of blasting is remote” (italics sup-
plied). But Footnote 25 to Finding 287 says “[t]here is no
evidence concerning the condition of the Aqueduct’s lining.
Its structural integrity is unknown to the city or any of its
witnesses.”
The mere recitation of testimony by the Federal Power
Commission does not amount to the making of. findings.”
9 By “by-pass” here it is unclear whether the Commission was referring
to the tunnel “rom the reservoir to the power station.
10 Cf. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1943);
Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415, 422 (1943);
Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Irvin, 134 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir. 1943).
>
-
49a
. The comment above in Footnote 25 to Finding 287 is
revealing, moreover, in that it seems to imply that there
is some duty on the part of the City to make a substantial
showing that the Aqueduct will break. If the structural
integrity is unknown to the City or any of its witnesses,
presumably it is also unknown to the commission and to
‘Consolidated. Edison’s witnesses. The burden is not on
the City to prove that the Aqueduct will not break, but
on the applicant to prove and the commission to find no
danger to public “life, health and property.” " The com-
mission’s reliance in its Footnote to Finding 287 on trouble-
free operation for fifty years under entirely different
circumstances seems’ to me insufficient to support the
required finding of safety.
Finding 290 contains the conclusion “that the evidence
in the record indicates that the probability of damage to
the aqueduct is remote and that a by-pass is not required.”
Even if this in and of itself be supported by the evidence,
Finding 295 that “construction of the powerhouse will not
endanger the aqueduct” is inconsistent with it and not
based on the evidence: there is a world of difference be-
tween no danger and a “remote” danger. If a danger is
“remote” the degree of “remoteness” assumes importance .
in proportion to the magnitude of the danger. Here -the
danger is obviously great, and there is no finding as to
the degree of remoteness.
11 “Further, the project must be safe so as not to endanger life, health
and property.” Commissioner Ross, dissenting in Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York, Inc. (FPC March 1965), rev’d in Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Section 10(c) of the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. §803(¢), requiring a licensee to “conform to such rules and
regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe for the
protection of: life, health and property,” and rendering the licensee liable
“for all damages occasioned to the property of others by the construc-
tion... of the project works. . . .”
|
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50a
The commission’s Added Findings 33 and 34 are not
based upon the earlier findings and in turn are not based
on the evidence when they say (1) that the constfuction
will not constitute a hazard to the aqueduct and (2) that
the site does not constitute a hazard to the aqueduct.
The most compelling statement in the record evaluating
the problem is that of City’s witness Thomas W. Fluhr,
an engineering geologist who is a consultant for the City
of New York Board of Water Supply:
The geologic risk is that during construction of the
- project or during construction of the proposed bypass,
stresses already present in the rock may be triggered
and cause failure of the aqueduct. Moreover, even if
the bypass were successfully constructed and placed
in operation, and the pump-generator and transformer
_ galleries also completed, there would be no assurance
that orogenic stresses would not build up and cause |
failure of the aqueduct even after a lapse of many
years.
The risk of failure of the aqueduct cannot be re-
garded as imminent but it represents a definite hazard.
When the Moodna Tunnel was first constructed and
failed, ample time was available to rebuild it since
there were no consumers dependent on it for water
supply. At present there is no substitute for the
Catskill Aqueduct; its failure could have catastrophic
consequences. , |
Evaluation of the risk involved in constructing the
power plant near the aqueduct tunnel cannot be made
on an actuarial basis. The risk might be taken as a
calculated business risk if only money were involved;
however, a failure of this water supply system might
jeopardize the lives and welfare of millions of persons
5la
in the city and the upstate communities served by
the Catskill Aqueduct. Fluhr, 110/16,837-38,"2
On this record and on the commission’s findings and in
the light of the commission’s own staff recommendation,
I would dissent as to the Storm King site even if the
aqueduct were the only factor involved. But there are
other points on which it seems to me the commission was
only paying lip service to the mandate of this court in
Scenic Hudson, supra.
The first of these is air pollution? While the extent
to which the FPC possesses any particular expertise on
air pollution may be doubted, we may assume some
familiarity with the subject in the light of the commission’s.
comments’ in, and experience in preparing, the 1970
National Power Survey." Unfortunately, one generating
plant after another has been constructed in the past with-
out much attention to this problem'*—one that by contrast
is perhaps more readily visible for a visitor to New York
12 Mr. Fluhr was originally engaged by the consultants to Consolidated
Edison Co. and later by,Consolidated Edison directly, with the under-
standing that the interests of the City of New York would take priority.
He thought the original surface plant, rejected in Scenic Hudson,
supra, safe and “geologically sound.”
13 “Air is our mést vital resource, and its pollution is our most serious
environmental problem.” President Nixon’s Message to Congress, re-
ported in 21 BNA Environmental Reporter 0201, 0204 (Feb. 10, 197Q).
14 See pt. IT, at IT-2-61-62.
15 “Industries, power plants, furnaces, incinerators—these and other so-
called “stationary sources’ add enormously to the pollution of the air.
In highly industrialized areas, such pollution can quite literally make
breathing hazardous to health, and can cause unforeseen atmospheric
and metéorological problems as well.” President Nixon’s Message to
Congress, 21 BNA Environmental] Reporter at 0204 (Feb. 10, 1970).
-
z
— wet gata >
. Sth pectin Smee. cat.
52a
than it may be to full-time citizens of the city..° The
Cornwall project as an alternative to other generating
methods on its face is more conducive to eliminating air
pollution, except for one catch: in order to pump water
from the river to the reservoir at Cornwall, Consolidated
Edison may, as the commission order now reads, pollute
_ the city during pumping hours, which are usually at
night,’? when the air is most still and the pollutants sit
low over the city. In other words, there is no requirement.
that Consolidated Edison refrain from using its - present
generating facilities for pumping purposes; most of those
facilities are, according to fhe commission’s Finding 82,
relatively inefficient and burn relatively expensive, de-
pletable fossil fuels, and some of them are outmoded."
16 New York City is subject to pollutants emitted in both a gaseous
and particulate form from a wide variety of sources, including power
generating plants. Finding 75.
It should be noted that serious air pollution episodes resulting from
inversions have occurred in New York City in 1953, 1963, and 1966.
An “inversion” occurs in periods of little or no wind when a layer
of cold air covers a layer of warm air to prevent it from rising.
Without an: upward current of air or wind the pollutants cannot be
dispersed. As a result, the pollutants mass in a thickening stagnant
cloud above the area affected and they diffuse down to the ground
line. While inversions are not very frequent, they can last for several
days and can be present day and night. A typical episode, to which
are attributed 168 deaths, occurred during the Thanksgiving holiday,
November 22 to 26, 1966. Finding 76.
17 By utilizing energy surplus to system needs during night-time and
_ week-ends, or purchasing low cost surplus energy. from interconnected
systems, ‘Cornwall is designed to convert low cost surplus energy into
high value energy during periods of peak demand. Finding 70.
18 Consolidated Edison’s eleven fossil fuel plants contributed in 1969
34 percent of the sulphur dioxides and 9.1 percent of the fly ash and
"other “particulate matter” that is so evident to the senses of sight and
smell in New York City. skies.
The United States Public Health Service estimates that in 1969
approximately 400,000 tons of sulphur dioxide and approximately
70,000 tons of “particulate matter” were emitted in New York City.
Of that total, Con Ed’s eleven fossil fuel plants accounted for ap-
53a
Since by FPC calculations it will take 1.4 KWH of pump-
ing energy supplied during non-peak periods to produce
1 KWH of project energy, Finding 71, it is obvious that
additional air pollution will result if the pumping energy
comes from those old fossil fuel plants.’® If, as Finding
83 says, “[vJery little city generated power will be used
to pump Cornwall, particularly as Con Ed’s interconnec-
_ tions and_nuclear generated capacity increase with time,”
why would it not be proper to order that only the most
efficient and least polluting fossil fuel generating units
be utilized for pumping purposes now ??° Indeed, Finding
proximately 156,000 tons of sulphur dioxide and approximately 6,400 -
tons of fly ash and other particulates, primarily from the combustion
of bituminous coal and residual oil for the generation of electricity.
Although Con. Ed’s emissions are less than half of what they were a
_ few years ago, and are expected to be even less with the planned
elimination by 1972 of coal and a further reduction in ‘sulphur content
of residual oil, Con Ed is likely to continue to be a substantial con-
tributor to air pollution in the City so long as fossil fuel generating
facilities comprise the greater part of its system. Finding 77 (em-
phasis supplied). :
19 If the energy necessary to pump Cornwall comes from polluting
power plants in New York City that would otherwise be idle, little or
nothing would be gained in reducing the air pollution problem. Based
on the assumption that Cornwall would go into operation in 1972 a
Staff study introduced in evidence showed that by 1980 approximately
89 percent of its pumping requirement could be met by virtually non-
polluting sources of generation. Cornwall, to the extent that its water
is not pumped by power from Con Ed low cost nuclear plants will
be powered primarily from sources in areas adjacent to the Con Ed
service area, and perhaps by imported Canadian hydroelectric power.
Findig 82. -
20 The FPC argues this is impractical, because electrical energy “flows
through a system like Con Edison’s in a unitary fashion.” But surely
the Commission’s great expertise in transmission matters ean come into
play here: experience must have shown what the minimum safe loading
parameters are for night-time base-load plants to assure the necessary
system stability and to provide the necessary load service; operation —
above such limits, with possible exceptions for emergency situations,
could be prohibited as a condition to the license.
-
S4a
84" seems to suggest that gas plants will be used for
pumping but the order does not require their use. Of
course, it may be that Consolidated Edison will be pro-
hibited from using its old fossil fuel plants for pumping
or otherwise under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970*
to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1857-18571. But this
does not absolve the FPC of its responsibilities to avoid
adding to air pollution under its own governing Act
or under NEPA, supra note 3. Consolidated Edison's own
studies made in 1966-67 show that Storm King will result
in more fossil fuel usage in New York City than would
certain other alternatives. While this study has been ques-
tioned by the FPC itself, one of the justifications made
by the company for the Storm King plant bas been that it
would permit otherwise idle large base-load plants in the
city to generate at night.
ry
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See. 111(4)), 1
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’ (1970)
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Our customers’ demands for electricity are high when .
they are awake and at work. Conversely, during the
night time when most are sleeping, their need for elec-
tricity is at a low level—much below the capability of .
our most modern and efficient generating capacity.
We plan to use this otherwise idle but efficient eapecity
to pump and store water in the upper reservoir at
times of ligt customer demand. 32/4191.
Beyond this, we are told that Consolidated Edison gen-
erating facilities in the City produced 113,700 ton» of
nitrogen oxides, constituting about 38 per cent of ‘otal
emissions of those compounds in the City.” Yet there is
no mention of these in the Commission findings, «scent
perhaps by implication in Finding 76° To my mind. re-
mand is required not only on the strength of the provent
record and Scenic Hudson, supra, for insufficiency of ‘nd.
ings, but also in view of the changes which have occurred
in Congressional policy 6n air pollution control,” an) in
22 hee City Petition for Rebearing p. 19 (R. 276, 694). Nitregen decide,
ome of the oxides, le apparently « compenrst of eeeg, HT! ore
more than three days are dengerwes te bealth, eoele of © oa
(4 be. avetage) promote ecg formations Thee levels ote sooty
vxcecded im the city. With the thought that operation of th = ity.
located plants will be im the relatively still night-time cit, Ger bee
vistons of evonoméiral and ficient pemping at Storm King eb) Nee
Vortere rough and gacp for treath
24 «= The Comeniesion’s brief argues from the testimony of EPA © ‘oem
Lowgeker thet “the exe of eulfer oxide eerved a6 & more ieper ant
‘parameter or index of pollution from large stationary sources ‘has
particelate emissions,” as if te tell the court that the index of @'" ere
otrde «mLemon me
SS ee OPP PSR s-oe eng + enone”
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*--s
- plans to eliminate air pollution in New York City.” It
is no answer to say that the City may invoke its own
police power, if necessary, to regulate the dispersions from
Consolidated Edison fossil fuel plants; Consolidated Hdi-
son would be the first to cite, indeed it already relies upon,
First lowa Hydroelectric Coop. v. FPC, 328 US. .152
(1946), to avoid undue inhibition of its rights under any
license granted for Storm King.
The final matters which, to my mind, tip the scales for
a reversal rather than simply a reversal and remand are
two. The first concerns what may broadly be called ae«thet-
ies,” impairment by the project of the mountain's scenic
grandeur. The commission's Finding 148 refers to the
mountain “swallow|ing|)” the “sear of the highway, the
intrusive railroad structure and fills and tolerat{ing} both
the barges and scows which pass by it and the thoughtless
humans [sic] who visit it without sewing it... .” The
finding goes on to say that just ax the mountain «wallows
present day intrusions, “it will «wallow the structures
which will serve the needs of people for electric power.”
This argument borders on the outrageous; it can be used
to justify every intrusion on nature from strip mining to
ocean oil spills, riz., “the Santa Barbara coastline already
has an ocean-side highway, numerous offshore oil rigs,
and a lot of flotsam and jetsam comes on to Wie beaches,
ete... .” Two scenic wrongs do not necessarily make a
right. On the basis of the commission's thesis, wherever
57a
one overhead transmission line you can put another, you
can add blight to blight to blight. That a responsible fed-
eral agency should advance that proposition in the form
of a finding and in the teeth of the NEPA seems to me
shockipg. The commission’s finding overlooks the fact
that we are considering here a power station which above
ground will consist of a concrete tailrace with abutments
32 feet high and 685 feet long, cutting back existing
shore line from 195 to
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