Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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GREAT Dane, TRAILERS, Inc.

‘Petitioner

NATIONAL eee (RELATIONS BoaRD

& ’ . Respiondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO -

THE UNITED STATES.COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT *

0. R. T. BOWDEN

| Attorney for Petitioner

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Jacksonville, Florida 32207 °

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Opinions Below : : : F

Jurisdiction. AONE: = : ay

Question Presented -. 3 ssoapeecse ; a

_ Constitutional Provisions and Statutes: Involved _...... ee

Statement OF ee a 2:

Reasons for Granting. the Writ : ee 6:

Conclusion _.... 7 Il

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Cases

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| “AUTHORITIES CITED 7

Real

er att

* Boyle’ s Poncws Cort setd Beef Co. v. N.L. R. Bi, >

"400 F.2d-154 (8th Cir. 1968) lee

‘Consolidated Edison Company v. NL. R. B.; ya oe

- . 305 U.S. 197, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) 2:2. 8

. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., | ?

376 F.2d 482, (Sth Cie) 1067) 6

Federal C ommunications ape ae Ww] R, .

377 U.S. 265, 93 L‘Ed. 1353 (1949) “8

Federal Power Commission v. United Gas . ae

Pipe Line Company, ~ o Me ace

393. U.S. 71, 21 L.Ed. 55 (1968) - Lceiuca tars Ware

Florida: United States; ' | .

282 U.S. 194, 75 L.Ed. 291 (1981)° 10

~ annah v. Larche,. °

Morgan v. ‘United States,

298 U.S: 468, 480, 80 L.Ed. 1288

363 U.S. 420, 4L. Ed.2d 1307 (1960) epson Weed 9. -

me nterstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville |

&N.R.Co, i”

227 ‘U.S, 88, 57 L.Ed, 431 (iy ae

it , 1904-(1098) - ik CN A,

: Morgan v, United States, ; sae PM cae

an 304 U.S. 1; 82 L.Ed. 432) (1036) = +... ee

N.L.R.B. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., Let Pa hee et

419 F.2d 1080 (ist Cir. 1969) 3 6

N.L.RB. v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, . ;. |

175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949) se 6

N.L.R.B.v.H.E.FletcherCo,- +: 2° of

| 298 F.2d 594 (Ast. Cir. 1962) . gee 6

we N.L.R.B. v, Johnson, eee

| 822-F 2d 216 (6th, Cir. 1963) . as wanes = y

: oie ii TEs ret |

304 U.S. 333, 82 L.Ed. 1381 Rie cope ae ‘8

N-L.R.B. v. Majestic Weaving Co., *. ~

355 F.2d 854 (2nd Cir, 1966) $-

NLRB: v: Tennsco Corporation, So aba

339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1964) 0g

~ N:L.R.B.-v. Virginia Electric & Len Compan ue

- 314 USS. 469, 8 L.Ed. 348 (1941) oe

Phelps Dodge Corp.-v. N.L.R.B.,; t he oa .

- 313 U.S_W7, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941) © Nea aioe eae | | ween es

Republic Aviation Corp. v.N.L.R.B. hae

: 324 U.S. 793, 798, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945) =

i Russell-Newman Mfg: Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., “15

- 370 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966)

. Securities and Exchange Commission v. 3 BC

Chenery Corp., wi a

332 U.S: 194; 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ARO ee

- Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company,-

“ce 305 U.S.177, 83 L:Ed: 111 (1938) Ae ae

S. 8. Kresge Co. v. N.LRB., tok : oa a

416 F.2d 1225 (6th, Cir. 1969 ) SEI pee een mane oat

. Texas Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,

- 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir: secs

Yang Sung v. McGrath, ret RIOD oe,

339.U.S. 33, 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950) eS OB D5 Te

| United States v; .Chicago, Milwaukee, |

St. Paul &- Pacific RR Co.,

294 U.S. 499, 79: L.Ed. 1023 (1935). eee aN! o

| Vitarelli v. Seaton, , et Taree Es

| 359 US. 535, 3 LEd. 2d G12, '(1959) elle

Statutes: ae area Be otbsSs =, Rei we

|’ National Lalor aie Act 4 |

a 8 (A) (1) ees

2 a 8(k)(3 > poe :

“Administrative Procedure Act

Iu The Supre e Court of the United States

. October Term, 1971

No.

Great Dane Tracers, Ixc., PETITIONER

v. ae

NATIONAL Lasor RELaTions Boarp, ResPONDENT

PETITION FOR A-WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF A?PEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Great Dane Trailers, Inc., througli its undersigned

. counsel, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the de-

cision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit Court. entered in this cause on September 9, 1971,

rehearing denied on November 19, 1971. |

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App. A. tlie

p. 2a) is reported at — F.2d —, 78 LRRM 2384. The De-.

cision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board

(J.A. 51-53)’ is reported at 186 NLRB No. 43.

JURISDICTION

"The Decision of the Court of. Appeals was rendered on

September 9, 1971 and a Petition for Rehearing was denied

* References to the Joint , Ap ndix, filed with the Court of Ap-

peals, will be through use of the : symbol “J.A.”, followed bv y*

appropriate page number. |

j. | 2 | oe

~ on November 19, 1971. On September 21, 1971, prior to

receipt of the Petition for Rehedring, the Court of Appeals

entered a Decree enforcing the Order ‘of the N National

oe poset of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED .: .

Whether, consistent with the requirements of due pro-

cess, there may be an administrative adjudication of prop-

erty rights on the basis of findings which vary materially

from the allegations of the complaint, or, other instrument

eby which such administrative adjudication was initiated.

- Where there has been no subsequent ame ndment of such

* complaint and ne finding by the agency-that the dissimilar

matters in question were ever actually litigated. ae

: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

sie STATUTES INVOLVED

The applicable constitutional provision is the I *ifth:

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Ap

plicable statutes. are the National Labor Re ‘lations Act.

amended, {29 U.S.C. § 154, ef seq) and the Adeabbiabrativ %

Procedure Act.(5 U.S.C. $ 551, et seq), relevant portions

of which are set forth in Appendix B, infra, p. 3a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Following an investigation of .unfair labor praqtice

charges filed by the union’, the Board’s Regional Diretior

for the Tenth Region issued. a Complaint against Great

Dane Trailers, Inc., (“Company”) in which it was alleged,

inter alia, that the Company had discriminatorily discharg-

ed five employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the .

- Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 728. (“Union”)

National Lies Relations Act. (J. A. 3 4). The Company’s

Answer, while. admitting certain allegations,*denied the

discharge allegations, in thein ‘ir entirety (J.A. 6).

With the issues thus joined, a hearing was held hefore

‘a Board’ Trial Examiner. Thereafter the Trial Examiner

issued an Intermediate Report, in which he concluded,

-inter alia, that two employees, Vangiller arid Hodge. had

been dis@fiminated against in violation of Section 8(a)(3)

of the Act (].A, 28-29:'14). With respect to Vangiller. while

the complaint alleged he had been discharged, the Com-

pany denied that such was tlie case and contended, both

in the course of the’ hearing and in post hearing briefs to

the Trial Examiner and the Board, that Vangiller had

voluntarily quit his job. At'the hearing.it sought to demon-.

strate this through testimony from Vangiller’s imnicdiate

supervisor (J.A. 148), his departinent head (J.A. 138). the

* Director of Industrial Relations ( (J-A. 203-204) as well as

through cross examination of Vangiller himself (J.A. 166-

167). Consistent with the Company’s contentions in this

regard, the Trial Examiner concluded “there is no question

that he in fact resigned.” (J.A. 26). Nonetheless it was

— concluded that Vangiller had been discriminated against on

a different theory, not alleged in the Complaint. that the

Company had wrongfully refused “to consider a with-

drawal of the resignation.” (JA. 28). The Complaint was

never amended to allege this as-an act of discrimination

and the theory was first advanced in post hearing briefs to

the Trial Examiner. S flrs de

In the case of the other emplovee ( Hodge). the Cols.

pany sought to show that he had been discharged for cause.

‘It also introduced evidence to show that, in the course of

preparation for this hearing. it came t “s dt-

tention that I lodge had concealed a long criminal record

. ——<————

- Hodge had been discriminatorily discharged a

when he applied‘for employment. On the basis of this, the

Company argued that, in keeping with Board precedent

in similar situations, the usual remedy of reinstatement

with back pay should be withheld. even if discrimination

were found. The Trial Examiner simply concluded that

recom--

mended the usual reinstatement Fem: ‘dy, without comment

On the alternative contention that it should be withhe Id in

any event (J.A..13-14).

. °

~The National Labor Relations Ded subuiipnently

issyed its Decision and Order in this maNer. in which it

atopted the previously described findings and conclusions

of thie Trial Examiner.

- The Company then petitioned the-United States Court

of Appeafs for the Fourth Circuit to rev iew and’ set aside

| _ the Decision and Order of the Board. After the Pet ition for

_modify its Decision and Order. The Court of Appéals—

granted this request-and the Board later issued an “Order

“*

Review was filed, the Board, by motion filed-in the Fourth

Circuit proce< edings, indicated it was reconsidering a por-

tion of its Decision and requested an opportunity to retain

jurisdiction of the cause, in the event it, should decide to

Amending Decision and Order”, int which the contention.

regarding Hodge's entitlement to reinstatement, was men-

tioned for. ag first tinie by either the Board or Trial

Examiner. While acknow ‘edging that the poiyt had been

raised, the Board nonctheless declined to’ ‘pass upon it for-

the stated reason that it did not feel the issue was “fully

and fairly litigated at the hearing.”

* Neither the Board's General Counsel nor the union ever contended

this-i issue had not been fully or fairly litigated.

. ' =

At no point has the Board Ynentioned the variance be-

tween the allegation that Vangiller was discharged and the a»

theory upon which the Trial Examiner, ‘with Board. ac-

quiesence, ultimately found discrimination. Specifically

thére was. no attempt to justify the variance, either on the

theory that the alternative ground had been fully ayd

fairly litigated (the approach taken in the Hodge case.) or

* otherwise. - | A |

+. The Court of Appeals deriied the Petition for Review

‘and granted the>Board’s Cross. Application. for Enférce-

ment of its Order. (App. A, infra, p. la): The Company’s

Petition for Rehearing, addressed solely to the due process

issue raised herein; was subsequently denied. —

_ -REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

_ 1. The Fourth Circuit's holding is in conflict with the

decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in N.L.R.B.

v. Johnson, 322 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376

U.S. 951, 11 L.Ed.2d 971 (1964) -on the important question

ef whether the Board may find a violatlon on some theory

other than that which is advanced by its own Complaint

against what it deems to be an offending party. In a broader

. sense the issue concerns the role of the complaint, or other

means by which administrative action is initiated, as estab-

lishing a standard of relevance forthe hearing required by

the National Labor Relatious Act or any other enactment,

whether it be a hearing to be conducted in accordance wi th

the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, or in-

instances where administrative adjudication is not con-

trolled by the Procedure Act, but -where the fundamental

requirements of. due process, such as adequate notice and

opportunity to be heard, must'be fulfilled.

ic)

De? ae

. : 6

The factual situation in the Johnson case is, in all

‘material respects, comparable to that in question here. In

that case, the Board's complaint alleged, as an’ act of un-

lawful discrimination, the failure to reinstate certain strik-

ing employees. This, according to the Sixth Circuit, pre-

sented a clear, theory of allegedly unlawful conduct. Yet

the Board, in. what might be termed the converse. of the

situation presented here, made a finding that the employees -

in question had ,been discriminatorily discharged.. The

Sixth Circuit concluded that the Board’s complaint “tends

to point away from contemplation ef any theory of disctim-

inatory discharge” and the Board was therefore not justified

in making a findi»g on that theory. The Sixth Circuit

reasoned that: - z “y oes

+ “There is no reference to discriminatory dis-

charge concerning the failure to reinstate or as a

violation in itself Discriminatory discharge is a

violation of Section 8(a)(3) and failure to rein-

state on request following a discriminatory’ dis-

. 319). is yet another violation... (322 F. 2d at Pp.

219

The reasoning applies with equal force here. An alle--

gation of discharge peints away from any theory of dis-

criminatory refusal to permit withdrawal. of .a resignation,

no less than it points away from.a theory of refusal to rehire

orreinstate. re

Similar views as to the office of the-Complaint have

- been expressed in other circuits. N.L.R.B. v. Dennison Mfg.

Co., 419 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1969)N.L.R.B. v. H. E.

Fletcher Co., 298 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1962); N.L.R.B. v.

Maiestic.Weaving Co., 355 F.2d: 854 {2nd Cir. 1966);

Engineers & Fabricators, Inc? v. NLRB. 376 F.2d 482

(5th Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B. v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills,

soak

175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949): Texas Industries, Inc. v.

N.L.R.B.; 336.¥.2d_ 128 (5th Cir. 1964), Boyle’s Famous

Corned Beef Co. v. N.L.R.B., 400 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1965).

See also S. S.. Kresge-Co. v. N.L.R.B., 41642 1225 (6th

Cir. 1969), which reiterates thie vite. explicated itt the

Johnson | case, that “an essential clement of due process (is )

that an interested party, must be given notice and an op-

portunity to prepare a ‘defense prior to an’ adjudicative

proceeding.” (emphasis supplied ). .

2. The holding of

Section’554 of the Administrative Procedure Act‘and ‘the

decisions of other Circuits construing Urat Séction of the

Act. Section 554 requires that.parties to ay administrative

proceeding be given “prompt notice of issues controverted | -

in fact or law.” This has been construed to mean that there:

must bé a full and faiy hearing, “conduc! ‘ed in accordance

with fundamental principles of fair play” and unless there .

is fair notice of the claims of the opposing narty.and an

opportunity to meet those claims, the requirements of due

pro¢ess have not been met. Russcll-Newman Mfg. Co..:

Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 370 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966), citing and

relying upon the holding of this Court in Morgan v. United

States, 304 U.S..1, 82 L.Ed, 1129 (1935-). ‘Similarly, learn-

_ing of such claims after the hearing does not, and cannot,

constitute “fair notice.” N.L.R-B., v. Tennsco Corporation,

339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1964).

. 3. The question of. what constitutes adequate notice

and the related question of the role of the compl: vint.

comparable instrument, as establishing a standard of réle-

vance which shall govern the subsequent hearing pro¢e-

dures, are matters which. in light of increasing resort to

-administrative adjudicative procedures, have simplications

e Fourth Circuit is in conflict with

SEA RRR SRI

Papers ‘ .

which go far beyond the immediate factual situation and

shouldbe weiglied and passed upon by this:Court. ————J-

Whether a hearing is required ly statute or*by reason

of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, there - -

exist the same fundamental requirements. as to notice of,

. e ‘ i

and opportunity to meet, whatever. opposing contentions

are involved. Yang Sung vy. McGrath, 339'U.S. 33, 94 L.Ed.

616 (1950). In light of the “vast and varied administra-

tive’ tribunals.“and the equally numerous .and diversified

interests affected by their functioning,” the questions pre-

sented. are’ of sigitificant. constitutional import and: effect.

Fede ro Communications Commission v. Station WJR, 377

U.S. 265, 93 L.Ed. 1353 (1919). The need for guidance

from this Court, in the form of specific pronouncement

upon the necessary relationship between the original con-

tentions and ultimate findings, is further pomted up by

the already accepted fact that the administrative’ bodies

are riot bound by strict rules as to admissibility of evidence

which prevail in conventional judicial. proceedings. The

Court-has recognized that “the more liberal the practice in,

admitting testimony the more imperative the obligation to

preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are.

asserted or defended.” Interstate Commercé Commission

v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U.S..88, 5#4e-Ed. 431 (1913).

More specifically the assertions must be and remain such y-

that the “parties[ will] be. fully apprised of the evidence

findings or conclusions. (/bid.) (emphasis added). The

Court has passed upon the propricty of altering or amend-

ing the initial assertions at the outset of a-hearing,. while —

submitted or to be considered,” in arriving at the ultimate ,

the hearing is in progress, and even at its conclusion when -

-no material change was intended. Consolidated Edison

Company v. N.L.R.B?, 305 U.S. 197, 83 L'Ed. 126 (1938);

. N.L.R.B.-v.. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,

80 L.Ed. 1288, 1294 (1936); Shields y

‘

He 82 Lied: 1381. But these cases. left open the important.

- “question of whe ther, and to what extent, the complaint

_ shalbset a standard of relevance.w hich will govern the na-

ture and extent of the findings ultimately made. This is

particularly significant in, the‘context of Natio: al Labor:

Relations Board proceedings because Congress did not un-

dertake to enumerate specific acts or conduct which, shall

‘constitute an unfair labor practice.» Rather, it delegated

to the Board “the work of applying the Act’s general pro-

hibitory language in the liglit of the infinite com binations

of events which might be charg ged as violative of its ter ms.

Republic Aviation Corp* v. N.L.R.B., 324 U:S.793, 798,

89 L.Ed. 1372°(1945). It is the, very heot of these “infinite

combinations” which makes it: esseitial ’ that the Board,

which on. the basis. of its preliminary investigation of

charges is in @ position to know and sav, be required to.

adhere: to the contentions raised before e and during the -

hearing, and not enjoy the element of surprise which re-

sults from advancement. of a dissimilar contention in its.

post hearing brigf. Such an advantage is not tolerated in|

conventional judicial proceedings and. though not such a

required by due process is in the “traditioy of judicial pro-

ceedings.” . Morgan vy. United are 298 U.S. 468, 480,

tral Railroad Company,: 305° U.S. “zi 83. L-Ed: 111

.(1938).. And. “when governmental agencie s adjudicate or,

- make binding deterniipations which diréetly affect the le-

gal rights’of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies

use ‘the - procedures. which have traditionally: been: ‘ asso-

ciated with the judicial-process.” “This includes, the right

to know. the ‘specific charges mto which inquiry is-to be.

-made. Hannah vy. Larche, 363 U.S: 420, 4. L.Ed. 2d 1307

(1960). In the ‘absence of an appropriate amendment of

‘ those charges, reliance upon matters beyond their scope.

, * . ° .

. . Py a —

2 ‘tal idalio Cc en- +.

)

_ Cae

is viewed asan inbeieaieia nt upon procedural tights. Vi-

-tarellj v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1012 1959).

oe ‘ ’ .

4. The decision below conflicts it principle with the

decisions of this Court in Florida v. United States, 282 U.S.

194, 75 L.ked. 291 (1931); United States y..Chicago, Mil-

-awaukee, St. Paul & Pacific RR Co., 294 U.S. 499, 79 T. Ed.

*-1023 (193 5); N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Com-

pany, 314 U.S. 469, 86 L.Ed. 348 (1941); Phelps Dodge

Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 85 L.Ed: 1271 (1941);’

Securities and Exchange Commission’ v. Chenery. Corp.,

332 U.S. 194, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); Federal Power Com-

mission v. United Gas Pipe’ Line Company, 393 U.S. 71;

21 L.Ed. 2d 55 (1968). These’cases establish and reaffirm

the rule that i basis for administrative action must be

set forth with sufficient clarity to enable a reviewing court

to determine if the agency has acted within the séope-of

the: authority entrusted to it. This includes an aie quate

-explication.of the theory underlying * agenev action, an ex-

pression of ifs reasons “with a clarity and thoroughness

that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of its

order.” Securities and ;Exchange Commission v. Chenery

Corp., supra. A finding (suchas the finding of discrimina-

tion in this case)’ based-upon a theory which is at variance

~ with that announced it the complaint, without explana-

tion of the reasons for ‘such variance, contravenes this Jong

established pr inciple. In contrast, the Board gave due con-

sideration to this: principle when it provided an explana-

tion for not disposing of the contention as to reinstatement

in the other ( Hodge } case. 7

ae re

CONCIUGION: 2" et

: For the forégoing reasons itis respectfully submitted.”

“y. that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Ane : . ret seas SS

. O. R: T. Bowden

' " ~ ro = -_ - - - a =

be = ; og toberk C. Lanqguist °°

- . &

. ’ ede * Counsel for Petitioner ~~ *.

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APPENDIX A

[Caption Omitted }

=. Ow Petition ror Review or an ORDER OF THE

"i - Nationat Lasor RELations Boarp *

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard upon the petition °

of Great Dane Trailers, Inc., for review of an order issued

against it by the National Labor Relations*Board on Octo-

ber 21, 1970, in proceedings before the said Board known

upon its record as Case No. 10-CA-8095.: upon the cross

application for enforcement, and upon the certified list in

lieu of a transcript of the,record: and the said cause was

argued by counsel. ° J

. ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered.

“adjudged and -decreed by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circyit, that the said petition of

reat Dane Trailers, Inc., be, and it is hereby denied: and

that the said order of the National Labor Relations Board

- be, and it is hereby, enforced; and that Great.Dane Trail-

ers, Inc., abide by and perform the directions of the Board

in Said order contained. ° es Bi a ae

Clerk

2¢ °* : FILED.

SEP 21 1971 A

SAMUEL W. PHILLIPS

CLARK

“

APPENDIX

- {Caption Omitted |

(Argued August 97.1971. Decided September 9, 1971.)

Brrone SOBELOFF., — Circuit Juoce, AND

WINTER and RUSSELL, Cincurt Jupers. .

Robert C. Lanquist (Hamilton and Bowden on brie for

Petitioner, and Frank Vogel, Attorney, National Labor

~ - Relations Board, (Arnolg Ordman, General Counsel, ,

Dominick L.. Manali, Associate General Counsel. Marcel

_ Mallet-Prevost, Assistant General Counsel, and Elliott

‘\lgore. Attoritey, National Labor Relations: Board, on :

brief) for ‘Respondent. (Robert L. Mitchell on brief)

For Invervenor. “ a, :

PER CURIAM: —

There was substantial evidence to support the Board s_

~ gadings and its conclusion that §§ 8(a) (3) and (1) were

violated. We- find that none of the company s procedural

due process rights were violated in the conduct of the pro-

ceedings. The company’s motion that the proceedings .

should-be reopened for the receipt of after acquired evi-

dence is lacking in merit. .

ENFORCEMENT GRANTED,

vy wee |

APPENDIX B

NATIONAL LaBor RELATIONS Boar.

The relevant provisions of the National Labor Rela-

tions Act, as amended, (29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.) are as

follows:. ; : :

_ UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES |

employer — . ae ‘ :

(1) to interfere. with, restrain, or cé@rce employ ees

in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 7;

(3) by discrimination in-regard to hire or tenure of

employment or any term or condition of emplayment to |

encourage or discourage membership in any labor -organ-

izaWon. :

‘The nae ant portions of the Administrative Procedure

Act. (5 U.S. C.§ $551, et seq.) are as follows: ;

Sec. 554. evens entitled to notive of an agency hear-

ing shall be timely informed of —

(3) the matters of fact and law asserted.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.