Petition for Rehearing — Grounds v. Northern Natural Gas Co.
Supreme Court brief1971
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Text
Excerpt From Brief of United States in
NE BE FID csi nti cso insiemseteions 13
Transcript of Oral Argument of Floyd France
on Behalf of United States in Court of Appeals ....20
Petition of United States for Rehearing
ts OUI CE TI eric ninciceteineenigiann 25
TABL® OF CASES
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 10 L.ed.2d
583, 08 80% TI iirc 4
Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 86
Cae. SE ee ee I hcicccncdircbalemsaes 2
Brady v. Terminal R. R. Ass’n., 302 U.S. 678, 82
6, Sa. Dee ee Fe vocesencencinticnaeoaae 2
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 319 U.S. 753,
Be I SE | sivemneeniciasaninaiiieecaentiesnantitainenonincitntiieiionn 2
Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 64 Led. 616,
| E __- g ROR RUNES 4
Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Company, 148
US. 262, 37 L.ed. 443, 13 S.Ct. 590 -..............2.-- 4
Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing
Company, 145 U.S. 608, 36 L.ed. 834,
RAE Oe FA X20 Re oe 4
National Bank of Rondout v. Smith, 156 US. 330,
Se Ee Re | Pease mn e 4
United States v Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 15 L.ed.2d
cece 4
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S.
173, 89 Led. 160, ke Ue. | ean 4,5
United States v. Girault, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 22, 13
IE cc sitsseshestnwieensceineieiscaeidicttieatamiicsninssudabtiennnniane 4
United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 11 L.ed.2d 527,
I nee ce aenieneaidiihencauneiiaaee 4
IN THE
OCTOBER TERM, 1971
NO. 71-218
RALPH GROUNDS, HENRY HITCH, ET AL.
(LANDOWNERS)
Petitioners,
vs.
NORTHERN INATURAL GAS COMPANY, ET AL.
(HELEX GROUP)
| and
SOCONY MOBIL OIL CO., INC.
(MOBIL OIL. CORPORATION substituted),
ET AL. (LESSEE-PRODUCERS)
Respondents.
On Petition For Certiorari
LANDOWNERS’ PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF DENIAL OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Grounds For Rehearing
1. For purposes of certiorari the judgment of the
Court of Appeals became final only when it was final as
to all parties and as to all issues.
2. The filing of timely petitions for rehearing by
some parties rendered the judgment interlocutory as to all
parties until the petitions were ruled upon.
Argument
The petition for certiorari was denied as untimely. If
that dismissal was based upon a misapprehension of the
record, as we believe it was, the case is peculiarly one for
2
consideration upon petitica for rehearing. Brady v. Termin-
al R. R. Ass’n., 302 U.S. 678, 688; Bakery & Pastry Drivers
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 773; Cafeteria Employees Union
v. Angelos, 319 U.S. 753, 778.
In the trial court six interpleader cases and two suits
against the United States under the Tucker Act and the Tort
Claims Act were consolidated for trial. Landowners were
patties in all eight cases. The United States was not a party
to the interpleader cases. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the helex group in the interpleader cases and in favor of
the United States in the other two cases.
In the Court of Appeals the appeals were consolidated
for all purposes with a single caption and elaborate time
rules for filing a single consolidated brief were prescribed.
(Order Directing Procedure, A. 9)
As construed by all the parties the cite? order created
a single case with multiple issues to which all parties in the
consolidated cases became parties.
The understanding of the United States of the effect
of the order is shown by its brief in the Court of Appeals.
In that brief was presented an argument under the heading
“Section 11 Of The Helium Act Amendments Of 1960
Does. Not Abrogate The Gas Sales Contracts Insofar As
Conveyance Of Or Payment For Helium Is Concerned.” The
Opening sentence under that heading reads, “This issue
relates primarily to the interpleader actions in which the
lessee-producers are parties and the United States is not but,
as already noted, the United States may be affected by the
outcome of those cases.” (A. 13-20)
PERE Siren EA Mee PIER aw eae
3
In the Court of Appeals, Mr. Floyd France, counsel
for the United States in that court and in this court, made an
oral argument upon that issue, although, apact from the
consolidation into a single case, the issue was not involved
in the two cases to which the United States was a party.
(Transcript of oral argument of Floyd France, Esq. before
Court of Appeals, A. 20-24)
The Court of Appeals decided that issue in favor of
lessee-producers and against the contention of the United
States. The United States filed a petition for rehearing on
that issue, (A. 25-28), which was considered by thc
Court of Appeals along with petitions for rehearing by
other members of the helex group. All were overruled on
May 20, 1971. (App. to Petition for Certiorari p. 186)
Landowners filed their petition for certiorari on August 16,
1971.
In this court the United States filed a memorandum in
support of petitions for certiorari in Northern Natural Gas .
Company, et al. v. Mobil Oil Corporation, et al., No. 71-238
and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, et al. v. Mobil
- il Corporation, et al., No. 71-243. Except for the consoli-
dation into a single case in the Court of Appeals, the United
States would not have been a party in either case.
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar seeks re-
view of the same judgment as the cases mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. It was filed before either of them were
filed.
The filing in the Court of Appeals of timely petitions
for rehearing by the Unized States and by the helex com-
4
panies rendered the judgment of the Court of Appeals inter-
locutory. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 11 L.ed.2d
527; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 41, f.n.1, 15
L.ed.2d 572, 574, 86 S.Ct. 708.
It has been the rule of this court since its earliest days
that a judgment is not final until it is final as to all parties
and as to all issues. United States v. Girault, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 22, 13 Lied. 587; Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher
Manufacturing Company, 145 U.S. 605, 36 L. ed. 834;
Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Company, 148 U.S.
262, 37 L.ed. 443; National Bank of Rondout v. Smith,
156 U.S. 330, 39 Lied. 441; Collins v. Miller, 252 US.
364, 64 L.ed. 616; United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173, 89 L.ed. 160; Andrews v. United States,
373 US. 334, 10 L.ed.2d 383.
The reason for the rule is stated in Collins v. Miller,
252 U.S. 364, 376. 64 L.ed. 616, 618 as follows:
““* * A case may not be brought here by appeal or writ
of error in fragments. To be appealable the judgment
must be not only final, put complete. [Citing cases. ]
And the rule requires that the judgment, to be appeal-
able, should be final not only as to all the parties, but
as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes
of action involved. [Citing cases. ] The seeming excep-
tion to this rule by which an adjudication final in its
nature, of matters distinct from the general subject
of the litigation, like a claim to property presented by
intervening petition u: a receivership proceeding, has
been treated as final, so.as to authorize an appeal with-
out awaiting the termination of the general litigation
below [Citing cases], has no application here. * * *
a
>)
Here a single judgment deals with the detention on
three affidavits. Only one branch of the case has been
finally disposed of below, therefore none of it is ripe
for review by this court.”
Landowners were indispensable parties to every one
of the eighty-eight consolidated appeals. Certainly neither
the helex companies nor the United States could have sought
review’ of the judgment of the Court of Appeals during the
penacncy of their petitions for rehearing. Since they could
not, landowners could not. A judgment becomes final as to
all parties at one and the same time. Petition for certior-
ari by landowners prior to disposition of the petitions for
rehearing filed by the helex companies and by the United
States would have sliced off and placed in this court only a
portion of the controversy, a procedure which has been dis-
approved throughout the history of the court.
In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S.
173, 177, 89 L.ed. 160, 165, the trial court rendered a
final judgment. Plaintiff United States appealed on the
sixtieth day thereafter. On that date timely motions by cer-
tain defendants to amend the findings were pending. Those
motions had nothing whatever to do with the portion of
the judgment about which the United States complained.
Nevertheless it was held that the‘appeal by the United States
was premature and it was dismissed. A subsequent appeal
perfected withi sixty days after the date the motions were
overruled was held to be timely.
A red herring has been injected into the case by some
of the respondents. In the Court of Appeals landowne::
filed a motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing out
6
of time to bring before the court a decision of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma rendered subsequent to the decision by
the Court of Appeals. That motion was denied.
Landowners did not in their petition for certiorari and
do not now rely upon that motion to extend the time for
filing petition for certiorari. Landowners rely upon the fact
that the judgment became final as to all parties and all issues
on the date the petitions for rehearing were denied. Land-
- owners’ petition for certiorari was filed within ninety days
after that date.
Conclusion
Landowners pray that the order denying landowners’
petition for certiorari as out of time be set aside, that the
petition be considered on its merits and the writ granted.
Respectfully submitted,
of Counsel:
KRAMER, NORDLING &
NORDLING
P. O. Box 969
Hugoton, Kansas 67951
FLEESON, GOOING, COULSON
& KITCH
P. O. Box 997
Wichita, Kansas 67201
STIPE, GOSSETT & STIPE
323 East Carl Albert Parkway
McAlester, Oklahoma 74501
BERNARD E. NORDLING
LELAND E. NORDLING
P. O. Box 969
Hugoton, Kansas 6795i
WAYNE COULSON
DALE M. STUCKY
16th Floor, 125 N. Market
P. O. Box 997
Wich:ta, Kansas 67201
GENE STIPE
RICHARD L. GOSSETT
323 East Carl Albert Parkway
McAlester, Oklahoma 74501
LEO WINTERS
P. O. Box 53411
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
W. A. secre Halen
Hightower Buildin
OklakLoma City, i 73102
Attorneys for Landowners
DONALD I. MITCHELL
Federal Land Bank
P. O. Box 458
Wichita, Kansas 67201
Attorney for Federal Land Bank
PETITIONERS
5
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
The undersigned counsel for petitioners does hereby
certity, pursuan. to Rule 56 § 2, that this petition for rehear-
ing is presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay
and that the matters presented herein relate to issues which
arose subsequen< to the filing of the petition for certiorari.
DALE M. STUCKY
8
APPENDIX
Order Directing Procedure in Court of Appeals sienatasens 9
Excerpt From Brief of United States in Court
ee IE caret cry sedan akaceannere na ceinwn sc bitatnns 13
Transcript of Oral Argument of Floyd France on
Behalf of United States in Court of Appeals ........ ee
Petition of United Statés for Rehearing in Court
I I a pcensccaesan an esilage ni nab eieponia See duel nas dennentn 25
9
SEPTEMBER TERM, SEPTEMBER 10, 1969
Before Honorable Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge
Northern Natural Gas
Company, et al
(Helex Group)
Appellees and
Cross-Appellants
VS.
Ralph Grounds, Henry Hitch,
et al (Landowners)
Appellants and
Cross-Appellees,
and
Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc.
(Mobil Oii Corporation
substituted ) et al.
( Lessee-Producers )
Appellants and
Cross-Appellees.
307-69, 308-69, 309-69,
310-69, 311-69, 312-69,
313-69, 314-69, 315-69,
316-69, 317-69, 318-69,
319-69, 320-69, 321-69,
322-69, 361-69, 362-69,
363-69, 364-69, 365-69,
366-69, 367-69, 368-69,
369-69, 370-69, 371-69,
372-69, 373-69, 374-69,
375-69, 376-69, 377-69,
378-69, 379-69, 380-69,
381-69, 332-69, 383-69,
384-69, 385-69, 386-69,
387-69, 388-69, 389-69,
390-69, 391-69, 392-69,
393-69, 394-69, 395-69,
396-69, 397-69, 398-69,
399-69, 400-69, 401-69,
402-69, 403-69.
ORDER DIRECTING PROCEDURE
On stipulation of al! parties, it is ORDERED:
First: All present and future appeals from the judg-
ment of the United States District Court in the consolidated
cases entitled Northern Natural Gas Company, et al. v.
Ralph Grounds, Henry Hitch, et. al., Civil Action No.
10°
KC-1969 and Consolidated Civil Actions, Nos. KC-1945,
KC-1946, KC-1947, KC-1948, KC-1980, W-3009 and
W-3159 are consolidated for hearing in this court.
Second: The consolidated cases shall bear the title
stated in the caption of this order.
Third: All pending motions and proposed orders are
withdrawn.
Fourth: The time for transmitting the record or docu-
ments in lieu thereof and for docketing the appeals is ex-
tended to September 28, 1969.
Fifth: No docketing statement shall be required and
the appeals are assigned to the general calendar.
Sixth: Typewritten briefs of appellant landowners and
lessee-producers shall be served within forty-five days after
the record or documents in lieu thereof is transmitted and
the clerk so notifies all parties. Designations of contents of
appendix shall be served at the same time.
Seventh: Typewritten briefs of the Helex group ( Pipe
Line Companies, Helex Extraction Companies, and United
States of America) shall be served within sixty days after
service of the later served brief of landowners and lessee-
producers. Designation of contents of appendix shall be
served at the same time.
Eighth: Typewritten reply briefs of landowners and
lessee-producers and answers to briefs of appellant Pipe Line
Companies and Helex Extraction Companies shall be served
within sixty days after service of Helex group briefs.
11
Ninth: Typewritten reply briefs of appellant Helex
group shall be served within thirty days after service of the
later filed answer brief of landowners and lessee-producers.
Tenth: Original briefs of landowners and _ lessee-
producers shall not exceed 150 printed pages. Original
briefs of Helex group shall not exceed 200 pages. Reply
briefs by all parties shall not exceed fifty pages.
Eleventh: All parties shall be entitled to designate
supplements to the appendix within fifteen days after ser-
__ vice of the last brief provided for herein. Within thirty days
after service of the last brief provided for herein, a composite
designation of the appendix, including all prior supplemen-
tal designations, will be filed by landowners.
Twelfth: All appellants elect not to have the append‘x
printed under the direction of the clerk, but landowners and
lessee-producers assume in equal shares the payment to the
clerk of the sum of $250 for the assistance of the clerk in
the preparation of the appendix, such payn.ent to be taxed
as costs.
Thirteenth: Landowners and lessee-producers shall be
allowed sixty days after final designations of the appendix
within which to print it. Forty extra copies of the appendix
shall be printed.
Fourteenth: It shall be unnecessary to include the
pleadings in the appendix, relevant portions of the pretrial
order being sufficient. Any party may designate portions of
the pleadings for inciusion in the appendix, but such desig-
nations shall be kept to a minimum.
12
Fifteenth: Printed briefs shail be served within thirty
days after receipt of the printed appendix.
Sixteenth: The record shall remain in the office of the
clerk of the district court.
Seventeenth: All parties shall co-operate in furnishing
the clerk of the district court with an index to exhibits.
Eighteenth: The appeals will be set for argument at
the September, 1970, session in Wichita, Kansas, unless the
court otherwise directs.
13
UNITED STATES COURT UF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
a
NORTHERN NATURAL
GAS COMPANY, etal.
(Helex Group),
Appellees and
Cross-Appellants
V.
RALPH GROUNDS,
HENRY HITCH,
et al. (Landowners),
Appellants and
Cross-Appellees
and
SOCONY MOBIL OIL CO.,
INC. (MOBIL OIL COR-
PORATION substituted )
et al. ( Lessee-Producers ) ,
Appellants and
Cross-Appellees
307-69, 308-69, 309-69,
310-69, 311-69, 312-69,
313-69, 314-69, 315-69,
316-69, 317-69, 318-69,
319-69, 320.69, 321-69,
322-69, 361-69, 362-69,
363-69, 364-69, 365-69,
366-69, 367-69, 368-69,
369-69, 370-69, 371-69,
372-69, 373-69, 374-69,
375-69, 376-69, 377-69,
378-69, 379-69, 380-69,
381-69, 382-69, 383-69,
384-69, 385-69, 386-69,
387-69, 388-69, 389-69,
390-69, 391-69, 392-69,
393-69, 394-69, 395-69,
396-69, 397-69, 398-69,
399-69, 400-69, 401-69,
402-69, 403-69, 486-69,
487-69, 488-69, 489-69,
490-69, 491-69, 492-69,
493-69, 494-69, 495-69,
496-69, 497-69, 498-69,
499-69, 500-69, 501-69,
502-69, 503-69, 504-69,
505-69, 506-69, 507-69,
508-69, 509-69, 510-69,
511-69, 512-69, 513-69,
514-69, 515-69.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES, APPELLEE
14
[p. 34]
II
SECTION 11 OF THE HELIUM ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1960 DOES NOT ABROGATE THE
GAS SALES CONTRACTS INSOFAR AS CON-
VEYANCE OF OR PAYMENT FOR HELIUM IS
CONCERNED.
This issue relates primarily to the interpleader actions
in which the lessee-producers are parties and the United
States [p- 35] is not but, as already noted, the United States
may be affected by the outcome of those cases. This is par-
ticularly so in view of the position taizen by the lessee-
producers on this appeal.
In the court below, the lessee-producers claimed that
the leases conveyed title to the helium cunstituent of the
gas but that the gas sales contracts did not. Apparently, they
have not urged either point in this Court but argue that by
reason of Section 11 of the Helium Act Amendments of
1960, 50 U.S.C. sec. 167i, the gas sales contracts are abro-
gated insofar as they embrace payment for the helium con-
stituent of the natural gas stream sold. They then ask this
Court to award them as a separate additional payment the
value of the helium constituent of the gas sold and delivered
under the contracts. It is not clear whether they contend that
this results in a title failure. If the Court holds that it does,
then the provisions of the contracts between the United
States and the Helex Companies relating to title failure
might come into play.
The argument of the lessee-producers completely ig-
nores the purposes of Section 11 of the Helium Act Amend-
15
ments of 1960. As already noted, that Section has two
principal objectives. First, Congress desired to preserve the
arrangement under which the Bureau of Mines has been
responsible for helium production. It likewise desired to
continue without interference from the [p- 36] Bureau of
Mines, the regulation of the natural gas industry by the
Federal Power Commissicn as it had done since the Natural
Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. secs. 717-717W.
The second purpose to be accomplished by Congress
in Section 11 was to provide that revenues from the sale of
helium shall not be used by the Federal Power Commission,
and certain costs shall be excluded, in determining rates of
a natural gas company. These purposes are abundantly clear
from the wording of Section 11 and also from the legisla-
tive history wh.ch is discussed at length in the memorandum
opinion of the court below, pp. 106-113, and ic the brief
of the Helex Group. Historically, the Department of the
Interior, acting through the Bureau of Mines, has been the
agency upon which Congress has conferred the duty of mak-
ing helium available for essential uses, including conserva-
tion for future needs, Acts of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1110,
September 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 886, and September 13, 1960,
74 Stat. 918. Likewise, the Federal Power Commission has
been charged by Congress with the responsibility for the
regulation of the transportation and sale of gas in interstate
commerce for resale.
The Department of the Interior has carried out its
functions without experiencing any difficulties arising out
of the exercise by the Federal Power Commission of its
16
[p- 37] jurisdiction over natural gas under the Natural Gas
Act. The Federal Power Commission has exercised its juris-
diction under the Natural Gas Act without interference from
ariy of the helium activities of the Department of the Inter-
ior (Wheeler, R. Vol. 66: 6342-6344; App. 887-9). This
has never required the Commission to deal with less than
the entire gas stream. The Commission’s jurisdiction, of
course, does not extend to certain constituents of a gas
stream, such as sulphur compounds, when considered as «
separate commodity.
By Section 11 of the Helium Act Amendments of
1960, Congress clearly continued the pre-existing situation
under which the Department of the Interior administered
the Government’s helium program and the Federal Power
Commission regulated, to the extent directed by Congress,
the natural gas industry. This is the thrust of the opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co. v. F.P.C., 359 F.2d 675 (CA. 8,
1966). That opinion clearly upholds the jurisdiction of
the Federal Power Commission over the entire gas stream,
even though it may contain helium in a significant amount
which is being or may be treated for helium extraction. The
Eighth Circuit found such jurisdiction necessary for the
Federal Power Commission to carry out the responsibilities
conferred upon it by Congress. The Eighth Circuit points
out that the legislative i ‘story fully supports its view.
[p. 38] The second purpose of the Section also is im-
portant from the standpoint of the United States. Represent-
atives of the Department of the Interior objected before
17
Congressional commitiees to revenues of sales from helium
to the United States being used for the purpose of reducing
rates on natural gas sold to fuel or other consumers. This, of
course, would have made it more difficult for the Depart-
ment of the Interior to contract with private industry since
it was anticipated the helium extraction companies would
not be satisfied with a public utility rate of return (Wheeler,
R. Vol. 66:6336; App. 887). At the same time, repre-
sentatives of the Federal Power Commission objected to
the original wording of the legislation on the ground that
it would eliminate from Federal Power Commission juris-
diction gas containing helium in significant amounts. The
proposed legislation was amended to take care of the
objections. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, S. Rept. No. 1814, 86th Cong., p. 5, R. Vol. 183,
Hel. 281 Jt.; App. 2111, states that the revised Section 11
“makes it clear that the Federal Power Commissicn retains
jurisdiction over natural gas containing helium but has no
jurisdiction over helium itself.” Thus, the Committee clearly
understood that the Federal Power Commission was to
have “no jurisdiction over helium itself” as a separate
commodity but that ic “retains jurisdiction over natural gas
containing helium.” [p. 39] As the Eighth Circuit pointed
out in the Panhandle decisicn, this must mean that the
Federal Power Commission retains jurisdiction over the
whole gas stream if it is to carry out the responsibility
entrusted to it by Congress. For the reasons stated, it is the
Government’s position3/ that the Federal Power Commis-
3/ Undersigned counsel do not purport to represent the Federal Power
Commission. But see the position taken by F.P.C. and sustained in
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. F.P.C., 359 F.2d 675 (C.A. 8, 1966).
18
sion rate schedules apply to the entire gas stream subject
only to the exclusion of nonjurisdictional constituents such
as sulphur and helium when dealt with as separate com-
modities.
The lessee-producers contend that Section 11 abro-
gated their gas sales contracts at least to the extent of
making the prices paid fur gas sold to pipelines applicable
only to combustibles, or at least not applicable to the
helium. There is absolutely nothing in the legislative history
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to abrogate
any contracts and the lessee-producers have pointed out
none. The partial abrogation of the contracts is in no way
essential or beneficial to the [p- 40] helium conservation
program and there is no reason why Congress should have
been interested in this question which at that time was
entirely between the lessee-producers and the pipelines.
The contracts between the Helex Companies and the
United States did not come into existence until several
years later. The interpretation urged by the lessee-producers,
if it had been included in Section 11, would only have
made it more difficult and costly for the Government to
negotiate the contracts necessary to carry out the helium
conservation program.
The lessee-producers also fail to point out that their
interpretation of Section 11 would give them an increase
in price, but without action by the Commission, for that
portion of the stream which they allege remained subject
to F.P.C. jurisdiction. There seems to be no question but
that prior to Septemver 13, 1960, the prices stated in the
19
gas sales contracts or the rates established by tke F.P.C.
covered the entire stream. The lessee-producers say that,
subsequent to that date, those prices or rates cover some- .
thing less than the entire stream. But they continued to
receive the same price based upon the total volume delivered.
There was no reduction in price or in volume due to the
alleged partiai abrogation of the contracts eliminating he-
lium (and possibly other noncombustibles). They point to
[p. 41] nothing in Section 11 or in the legislative history
showing Congress intended such a windfall, completely
apart from what they may or may not receive for the
helium, which would result if their interpretation is adopted.
An intention should not be lightly imputed to Congress to
effect a rate increase for natural gas without sanction of
the Federal Power Commission.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in
the memorandum findings of fact and conclusions of law
of the court below and the brief of the Helex Group, the
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed insofar
as:
a. It holds that oil and gas leases convey title to the
helium and dismisses the landowners’ claims against the
United States on the merits;
b. It holds that the defendant, the United States,
take nothing on its claims against the third party defendants
in the government actions; and
c. It holds that neither the landowners nor the lessee-
20
producers have a valid claim to title or additional compensa-
tion for the helium constituent of the natural gas processed
for helium extraction by the Helium Companies and sold
to the Usiited States [p. 42] under the four contracts be-
tween the Helex Companies and the United States.
Transcript of Oral Argument of Floyd France on
Behalf of United States in Court of Appeals
[p. 197] MR. FRANCE: May it please the Court, the
contentions made now by the lessee-producers raise a ques-
tion of statutory construction. As usual, in determining ques-
tions of statutory construction the controlling factor is the
intent of Congress. Here the intent of Congress, we submit,
is readily available, both from the Act itself — the 1960
Act itself — and from the legisiative history. Prior to the
enactment of the 1960 Act, the primary purpose of the
Federal helium program was to furnish helium for current
uses of the Government and of industry.
The increasing demands for helium during the 1950's
demonstrated a need for a conservation program. The
resources were being wasted and not used, and so in order
to meet this need for future anticipated need for helium,
Congress passed the 1960 Act, the Helium Act Amend-
ments of 1960, which authorized a large scale long-range
helium conservation program. Actually, it is rather a simple
program. Under it the Government purchases crude helium,
extracted from the gas stream in pipelines going from the
Hugoton field, and it is stored in an underground reservoir
until needed at some time in the future.
21
This gas is produced under the oil and gas leases by
the lessee-producers, and by the lessee-produ-ers [p. 198]
it is sold and delivered to the pipeline companies uader
gas sales contracts which are and for some time have been
subject to regulation by the Federal Power Commission.
Each of thes. contracts contains a warranty of title and I
believe one of the features of the contracts which remains
effective, notwithstanding FPC regulation, is the warranty
of title provisions. The contracts prior to 1960 clearly
covered the entire gas stream, including the inerts such as
nitrogen and helium, and the warranty of title extended
to all of these constitutents.
The question now before this Court, therefore, is
whether Congress in 1960 intended to interfere with or
abrugate in any way the contractual arrangements then
existing between the lessee-producers and the pipeline com-
panies in those particular instances where the pipeline
companies or their subsidiary companies extracted the he-
lium and sold it to the United States. .
Now, the purpose of the 1960 Act was clearly con-
servation of helium and it was not necessary in order to
obtain this conservation of helium for Congress to interfere
in any way with the existing contractual relationship be-
tween the lessee-producers and the pinelines. The fact is
that if that existing contractual relationship is inverfered
with, it will not help the conservation program. It will
[y- 199] only interfere with it, make it more difficult for
the Bureau of Mines to carry out that program and make
the program more expensive. Certainly, Congress did not
intend this result when it enacted the 1960 Act.
—
22
Now, that is looking at the Act as a whole, at its
general purpose to conserve helium. Tne lessee-producers
rely particularly upon Section 11, and so we will take a
further look at the purposes of Section 11. Now, prior to
this time the Federal Power Commission had followed the
practice of taking profits from non-jurisdictional activities
of the pipeline companies, taking those profits into con-
sideration when it fixed the rates of the pipeline companies
or of the producers. If the Federal Power Commission were
to do the same with respect to the sale of helium to the
United States, it would make it more difficult for the
Bureau of Mines to contract, to negotiate contracts with
the helium companies; if the helium companies could retain
the profits they would be much more eager to enter into
it than it would be if the profits were going to be used
for rate-making purposes.
So when Congress enacted Section 11, it provided
that profits from the sale of helium as a separate com-
modity, and also certain joint costs, should not be taken
into consideration by the Federal Power Commission in
fixing [p- 200] rates for gas.
The second purpose of Section 11 was to continue
the historic separation of duties between the Federal Power
Commission and the Bureau of Mines. The Federal Power
Commission fer many years had been the Government
agency responsibie for the regulation of the natural gas
industry. The Bureau of Mines for an even longer period
had been the Government agency responsible for the pro-
duction of helium to meet the demands of both the Gov-
23
ernment and private industry. Obviously, Congress desired
to continue this separation of powers, desired that the Fed-
eral Power Commission continue its supervision or regula-
tion of the natural gas industry, continue the Bureau of
Mines to have the responsibility for the helium production
program and also for che new helium conservation program.
Now, again, it was not necessary at all for Congress
to interfere in any way with the contractual relationship
theretofore existing between the lessee-producers and the
pipeline companies in order to put into effect these two
purposes of Section 11 of the Helium Act Amendments.
Again, if Congress had interfered in any way with the con-
tractual relationship it wouidn’t help but it would hinder
the helium conservation program. The Act itself gives no
indication whatever that Congress. intended any interfer-
ence [p- 201] whatever with the contractual relationship.
The legislative history is even more clear as discussed
by Mr. Blaes and by Mr. Richardson, and I may say that
the Government supports fully the statements made by
Mr. Blaes and Mr. Richardson and I will not repeat any
of them. However, as pointed out by them, as pointed out
by the court below and as pointed out in the briefs, the
legistative history is very clear as to the intent or Congress.
Congress intended the Federal Power Commission continue
its regulation of helium-bearing natural gas the same as it
had done before.
The fact that the Helium Act Amendments, or Section
11 in particular, might in any way whatever interfere with
the contractual relationship existing between the lessee-
24
producers and the pipeline companies is not mentioned in
the 1960 Act and that possiblity is not even mentioned
in the legislative history. In other words, the particular
contentions that are being made by the lessee-producers
here were never presented to Congress, they were never
considered by Congress, and were never acted on by Con-
gress. The intent of Congress was simply the conservation
of helium and the preservation of the historic separation
of powers between the two Government bureaus: the Fed-
eral Power Commission and the Bureau of Mines. That can
be accomplished [p. 202] without any abrogation of the
contracts.
Now, the court below has considered this and the
Court found that if the lessee-producers’ claims are to be
allowed that would amount to a partial abrogation of the
existing contracts. The trial court considered these questions
very carefully, they are discussed in the trial court’s opinion,
and I respectfully submit the trial court’s findings in this
connection should be affirmed in every respect.
Thank you.
JUDGE BREITENSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. France.
25
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 307-69, etc.
NORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY, et al.,
(Helex Group)
Appellees and Cross-Appellants
v.
RALPH GROUNDS, HENRY HITCH, et al.,
Appellants and Cross-Appellees
and
SOCONY MOBIL OIL CO., INC. (Mobil Oil
Corporation substituted), et al.,
( Lessee-Producers )
Appellants and Cross-Appellees
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States of America, appellee, presents this
petition for rehearing. In support thereof, the United States
adopts, insofar as applicable to it, the reasons set forth in
support of the petitions for rehearing being filed by Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Line Company and National Helium
Corporation and by the Cities Service Companies and the
Northern Companies. The United States specifically sets
forth and emphasizes the following points:
—=
26
1
It is submitted that, after determining that the gas
sales contracts are not abrogated, this Court committed
error in determining that the Federal Power Commission
(F.P.C.) rice superseded the contract price as to the
helium constituent and that the lessee-producers are entitled
to the re.sonable value of the helium’ where the gas is
processed. The point is whether in these circumstances,
the lessee-producers are entitled to the ..ontract price or
the reasonable value of the helium.
The basis on which this Court finds the lessee-pro-
ducers are entitled to any additional payment (they have
already received either the contract price or the F.P.C. price
for the full volume of gas delivered including the helium)
is its finding that under the Helium Act Amendments of
1960, the F.P.C. jurisdiction does not extend to the helium
constituent. If F.P.C. jurisdiction does not extend to the
helium constituent (a conclusion with which we disagree) ,
then the F.P.C. price cannot supersede the contract price
as to the helium constituent. It is plainly contradictory for
the Court to find that the helium is not subject to F.P.C.
jurisdiction, but that the contract price is superseded in some
fashion by F.P.C. regulation. As set forth in the Helex
Companies’ brief, the holding that the Helium Act Amend-
ments of 1960 and F.P.C. regulation in some manner
vitiated the price provisions of the gas sales contracts in
a manner not necessary to the puiposes of the Natural Gas
Act of 1938, as amended, raises serious constitutional
problems.
€
a?
II
The holding of the Court is too broad in requiring
that the Helex and Pipe Line Companies pay the lessee-
producers the reasonable value of the helium constituent
of all gas delivered and processed. The holding is based to
some extent, and presumably entirely, on the effect of
F.P.C. regulation of the natural gas industry. If so, the
holding must be limited to the extent that the industry
is subject to F.P.C. regulation. This would require elimina-
tion from the Court’s holding of.gas purchased and pro-
cessed under the following conditions:
A. All gas delivered under sales contracts where the
contract price does not exceed the F.P.C. price since in
those cases it cannot be found that the F.P.C. price super-
sedes the contract price.
B. All situations where there is no gas sales contract
subject to F.P.C. regulation. This would include the situ-
ation where the Pipe Line or Helex Company is the pro-
ducer, and also all gas sold and delivered after March 18,
1971, by small producers exempted from F.P.C. regulation
by F.P.C. Order No. 428 dated March 18, 1971, Docket
No. R-393.1/
There may be other situations which would require
special attention.
1/ If H.R. 2513, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., exempting small sales of gas from
F.P.C. regulations should become law, it would require another ex-
emption.
28
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this petition for rehearing
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRO KASHIWA,
Assistant Attorney General.
RICHARD E. OXANDALE
Assistant United States Attorney,
Wichita, Kansas 67202.
EDMUND B. CLARK,
FLOYD L. FRANCE,
Attorneys, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C. 20530.
APRIL 1971
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.