Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Richardson v. United States
Supreme Court brief1971
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
*
— 0 ary
@teeciic COURT, Us S.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1971
. * 43 3 1
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON,
Petitioner
9.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JOHN CONNALLY, Secretary of the Treasury
S. S. SOKOL, Commissioner of Accounts
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Before Judgment
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
For the Third Circuit
No. 19,277
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON, pro se
149 Westmoreland Avenue
Greensburg, Pa. 15601
Bethlen Freedom Press, Inc, Ligonier, Pa. 15658
ee ee 85 — 5 — . tan eee eer heen nE Werner wr ent menver eC hs St ky Te ee
li
INDEX
Page
I. Opinion Below — 1
II. Jurisdiction 2
III. Questions Presented 2
IV. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved _. 3
V. Statement of the Case 3
VI. Reasons for Granting the Writ 8
Appendix A: Complaint la
Appendix B: Memorandum and Order Disnissing
Complaint in District Court 18a
Appendix C: Order of Circuit Court of Appeals
Appointing Amicus Curiae 21a
Appendix D: Pertinent Text of Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions Involved — 23a
CITATIONS
Cases:
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 523 (1859) 8
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2 (1866) 7
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) 10
Gibons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 Ub.S. 483 (1880) 9
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962) — 3
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) 5,8
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U S. 303 (1813) 6
New York Times v. U.S. . U.S. 29
L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971) . 9
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, (1956) 6
Sic Wane eed eal nnn eek
2i
Richardson v. Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 866; 600 F. 2d 2;
cert. den. 596 U.S. 949 (1969) 2
Schneider v. Rusk, 872 U.S. 224 (1962) 8
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) 6
Zemel v. Rusk, 881 U.S. 1 (1965) 8
Constitution:
Article I, Section 9, Clause (7) 6
Article III 5,8
Amendment I | 4
Statutes:
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1861 8
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 5
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2202 5
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2282 8, 5
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2284 3,5
Title 50 U.S.C. Section 408f 6
Title 50 U.S.C. Section 3083 6
Supreme Court Rules:
Rule 20 1
Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Rule 29 2
Miscellaneous Authorities:
Judge Gurfem’s statement, New York Times 9
Articte L. Seetom 4. lemme: [34
The Leguuesure rr amo Stat
Articte TIL een
The 4 of Ä 0° Sess anc Reem
Amenamerr _
Title
Title
err “Te
Crmmes ang looms Steer
Title 18 C. r 167
eS RPERERESS
272
4i
Money and Finance
Title 31 U.S.C. section 548 (Note 1) 32a
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Title 28 U.S.C. section 1846 (a) (2) 28a
Title 28 U.S.C. section 1861 28a, 36a
Title 28 U.S.C. section 2201 37a
Title 28 U.S.C. section 2202 37a
Title 28 U.S.C. section 2282 J5a
Title 28 U.S.C. section 2284 35a, 36a
War and National Defense
Title 50 U.S.C. section 401 29a
Title 50 U.S.C. section 402 29a, 30a, 3la
Title 50 U.S.C. section 403 31a
Title 50 U.S.C. section 408 31a
Title 50 U.S.C. section 408b 31a
Title 50 U.S.C. section 4030 31a, 32a
Title 50 U.S.C. section 403f 32a
Title 50 U.S.C. section 4083 38a, 34a
Code of Federal Regulations:
Money and Finance: Request for Identifiable Record
Title 31 CFR section 270.3 (a) (b) 35a
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1971
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON,
Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JOHN CONNALLY, Secretary of the Treasury,
S. S. SOKOL, Commissioner of Accounts
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Third Circuit
Petitioner, William B. Richardson, prays that a writ of
| certiorari issue to review the order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania prior to judg-
ment in the Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 20
of the Federal Rules of Procedure for the Supreme Court.
I.
| OPINION BELOW
The opinion and order of the District Court was made and
entered on June 16th, 1970, dismissing the case and refusing to
convene a three-judge court. A copy of the unreported opinion
and order is attached as Appendix B. The appellant docketed an
2
appeal in the Court of Appeals on September 23rd, 1970. Fol-
lowing submission of written briefs and oral argument, and over
objection of Appellant, the Court of Appeals appointed an Amicus
Curiae pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and permitted this Amicus late filing without showing
cause therefore (see Appendix C). Accordingly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has never rendered any
opinion on the judgment which is here sought to be reviewed.
II e
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has by reasonable calculation delayed
a decision until next year by their order of July 28th, 1971 ap-
pointing an Amicus Curiae. In view of the important nature of
the issues involved and their bearing on the continuity of the
Constitutional system as the American People have come to know
it, jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28 of the
United States Code, Section 1254(1), providing for the granting
of a Writ of Certiorari upon the petition of any party before
rendition of judgment by the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner began in November, 1967 a conscientious
attempt to get this matter heard on its merits. See Richardson v.
Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 866 (W. D. Pa., 1968) ; dismissed as a juris-
dictional mater 409 F.2d 3 (C.A. 5, 1969), certiorari denied,
396 U.S. 94% (1969). The petitioner believes the case to be of
such imperative public importance and so long delayed as to
justify the deviation from the normal appellate processes and to
require immediate settlement in the Supreme Court.
II.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Should a three-judge District Court be promptiy con-
vened in this case?
2. Is the case of sufficient National importance to merit
the Supreme Court’s consideration of a guideline opinion on any
of the Constitutional issues raised?
if
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Constitutional and Statutory provisions which are rele-
vant to a decision in this case are set out by enumerated title in
the Complaint, paragraphs one through siz in Appendix A, pages
la, 2a, and Za. Because of the number of such provisions, they
are set out in pertinent text in Appendix D in the same order as
they appear in the Complaint — grouped and designated by para-
graph to correspond to paragraph numbers. These provisions are
also included as an “Index Addendum” to facilitate their location
in Appendix D.
V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition, inter alia, seeks to rescind the judgment of
the District Court and accelerate compliance with the three-judge
Federal statutes (Title 28 U.S.C. 2282 and 2284 — Appendix D,
page 23a). A plaintiff is entitled to a three-judge court at any
time a substantial constitutional attack is made upon a Federal
statute seeking to enjoin the enforcement of that statute. Idlewild
Liquor Corp v. Epstem, 370 U.S. 713; 8 L, ed. 2d 794; 82 S.
Ct. 1294 (1962) : Schneider v. Rusk, 372 U.S. 224; 9 L. ed. 2d
695; 83 S. Ct. 621 (1962): Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1; 14 L.
ed. 2d 179; 85 S. Ct. 1271 (1965): reh. den. 382 U.S. 873, 15
L. ed. 2d 114, 86 S. Ct. 17.
The Nacional Secuzity Statutes unconstitutionally authorize
civilian elements of the Executive Branch to:
1. Deprive the petitioner of his constitutional right to
know the true receipts and expenditures of his government.
2. Deprive the petitioner of assurances that when he pays
tax moncy his money will go into the Treasury and not directly
to the Central Intelligence Agency or for some other clandestine
expenditure.
+
3. Falsify government reports.
4. Circumvent constitutional appropriation mandates.
5. Use tax money to make secret “rental of news reporting
services” which gives the Executive authority to do clandestinely
that which the Constitution (Amendment I — page 28a Appendix
D) openly forbids.
6. Raise, maintain, and equip armies composed of foreign
and/or indigenous personnel paid and provisioned by tax money
for which there is no constitutional authority except by Act of
Congress.
7. Purchase, rent, operate and maintain all the equipment
essential to military operations coupled with unlimited expendi-
tures of funds for personal services, “including personal services
without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed”
contrary to our constitutional mandates that the Armed Forces
are to be ruled and regulated by the Congress.
8. Conduct para-military operations with funds not ap-
propriated within a two year period prior to expenditure.
9. Maintain and fund an agency with clandestine, unac-
countable and unregulated procurement authority that unques-
tionably uses tax money ultra vires the constitutional authority
for taxing and spending.
10. Use the President of the Senate as an Executive Officer
on the National Security Council contrary to our separation of
powers belief.
All of the concepts of unconstitutionality have been care-
fully set out in the Compiaint (Appendix A) along with the
customary prayer for equitable relief.
The Petitioner believes that by incorporating the Complaint
in Appendix A by reference at this point, a sufficient Statement
of the Case has been made for convening a three-judge court.
There remains then only the question on Constitutional issues
(question number two) and whether it would be proper for the
Supreme Court to rule in advance on any selected Constitutional
—— aL —
5
question raised by the Complaint and associated Constitutional
and Statutory provisions.
Article III Section 1 of the Constitution states: The judi-
cial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. - - -” and in Section 2 of Article
III proclaims: “(1) The judicial power shall extend to all cases,
in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, .“ (Appendix D page 23a). While the
Supreme Court would not issue an injunction (Title 28 U.S.C.
2282 and 2284, page 35a and 36a of Appendix D) or a mandamus
(Title 28 U.S.C. 1361 page 36a of Appendix D) where Congress
has specifically delegated original jurisdiction to the District
Courts, the Supreme Court does have statutory authority in Title
28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202, in addition to their Article III author-
ity, to issue declaratory relief because declaratory relief in those
statutes is not assigned as original jurisdiction to the District
Courts (Appendix D. page 37a) but is within the province of
“any court” of competent jurisdiction. i
The Motion to Dismiss in this case contains an alleged
affirmative defense: “res judicata” and “law of the case” (see
the Motion to Dismiss at end of Complaint, Appendix A, page
17a). For this reason, the petitioner has maintained that this
Motion is actually a responsive pleading or answer but this would
be immaterial because it was early established that the Supreme
Court will assume jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of
a Federal statute even in the absence of any response or appear-
ance of the defendant. Rarbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.
Ed. 60, (1803). Incidentally, this was one of the most important
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court. It was many years
before the Declaratory Judgment Acts.
There is certainly statutory authority and case law prece-
dent for declaring a constitutional repugnancy whenever the
offending statute is before the Court and especially where the
repugnancy is determinable by a simple examination of the statute
in question and by comparing it to a constitutional limitation.
In the absence of having this comparison brought to their atten-
tion, the Court will, on its own, measure the statute against the
requirements of the Constitution. The petitioner respectfully
suggests that the Supreme Court will find Constitutional issues
raised by the Complaint warranting immediate resolution as guide-
line assistance to the three-judge District Court or as imperative
declaratory relief at this time. In particular, the petitioner
respectfully says that Title 50 U.S.C. 403f (32a, Appendix D)
and Title 50 U.S.C. 403j (33a, Appendix D) are repugnant to
Article I, Section 9, Clause (7) (28a, Appendix D) of the United
States Constitution and that the repugnancy is clear on its face
and should be so declared at this time.
“_ The Constitution is the supreme law of the land
ordained and established by the people. All legislation
must conform to the principles it lays down. When an Act
of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as
not conforming to the Constitutional mandate the judicial
branch of the Government has only one duty — to lay the
Article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the lat-
ter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do,
is to announce its considered judgment on the ques-
tion. - - United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62, 63;
80 L. Ed. 477, 486, 487. (1936).
The United States is entirely a creature of the Federal Con-
stitution; its power and authority has no other source and it can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 at pages 5 & 6; 77 S.
Ct. 1242; 1 L. Ed 2d 1148, 1157: (1956): Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 at page 33, 9 Wheat 1, 33; (1824) : Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, 14 U.S. 303 at page 326; 1 Wheat 303, 326; 14 L. Ed.
96, 102 (1813). In Reid v. Covert the Court explained (at page
6) that when a United States citizen goes to a foreign land he has
not waived his protections under the Constitution ; similarly, when
a Government agency is commissioned to handle secret matters
originating outside the territorial United States (the CIA also
has offices in every major stateside city) it is not free from the
restraints of the Constitution. Of course, if it is so secret that no
one knows what it is doing or what it is spending, it would, as a
7
matter of fact, be free of any constitutional restraint. But when,
as in this case, the violations are obvious and generally known,
failure of the judiciary to act decisively and promptly can sound
the death knell to constitutional law. In such an event, history
will mark us as a milquetoast society ruled by a hierarchy of
government “servants” whose source of power emanates from a
stamp pad and a secret stamp and whose panacea for overt
restraint is to act covertly without restraint on the theory that
only those aspects of government known to the people come within
the purview of constitutional mandates. Thus the people would
then have in toto what in part they have today: the classification
of documents, materials, funds, and agencies to circumvent em-
barrassment of the Government not because of disclosure to a
foreign power but because of disclosure to the American people.
Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors; - - -
those great and good men foresaw that troublesome times
would arise, when rulers and people would become restive
under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures
to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the
principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless
established by irrepealable law. The history of the world
had taught them that what was done in the past might be
attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United
States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its pro-
visions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of goverament. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy
or despotism; but the theory of necessity on which it is
based is false; for the government, within the Constitution,
has all the power granted to it which are necessary to
preserve its existence - - Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2,
118; 18 L. Ed. 281, 295 (1866).
If a litigant, a United States citizen, can be prevented from
litigating genuine constitutional issues because the agency under
attack is super secret in funding and operation and has a foreign
8
mission associated with the National Security, then the American
people are grossly misled on the efficacy of their Constitution or
that it ap, lies uniformly to the Government which they created.
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of Government is to afford that protection. In Great
Britain the King, himself, is sued in the respected form of
a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment
of his Court.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163;
2 L. Ed. 60, 69 (1803).
The petitioner respectfully submits that the Supreme
Court has the Article III power to decide any of the Constitu-
tional issues raised by the complaint and pleadings in this case
at this time subject to no restriction except that which the Court
itself would impose.
“The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the
states against danger from foreign nations, but mainly to
secure union and harmony; for if this object could be
attained; there would be but little danger from abroad;
e Ableman v. Booth (Wis. 1859) 62 U.S. 517, 21
Howard 517, 16 L. Ed. 169 at p. 173.
“The grant of judicial power is not confined to the ad-
ministration of laws passed in pursuance to the provisions
of the Constitution, nor confined to the interpretation of
such laws; but, by the very terms of the grant, the Con-
stitution is under their view when any Act of Congress is
brought before them, and it is their duty to declare the
law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to
the legislative powers conferred upon Congress.” Ableman
v. Booth, (Wis. 1859) 62 U.S. 523, 21 Howard 523, 16
L. Ed. 169 at p. 176.
VI.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Resolution of the issues on the merits in this case does not
permit delay. Considering that written briefs under the Court of
9
Appeals order of July 28th, 1971 (Appendix C) will not be
completed until November 15th; that oral arguments are tenta-
tively planned ; that the holiday season begins with Thanksgiving
and does not end until after the first of the year; one can readily
see that it will be well into 1972 before the Circuit Court will
decide if this case is to be heard on its merits. Too late, in fact, to
affect the Treasury report due in January, 1972.
Meantime, the United States citizen taxpayer underwrites
the continuity of a repugnant and potentially dangerous govern-
menta! anomaly which is fast becoming a permanent fixture and
whose charter will soon become irrevocable — assuming this is not
already a fait accompli. For twenty-two years now the people
have been financing this unprecedented means of undercover
propaganda, conducting government, creating and funding armies,
and disposing of the Nation’s fiscal resources.
To the petitioner, the urgency of having this case resolved
on its merits is too plair to require elaboration. The Circuit Court
of Appeals has been adequately apprised of the applicable law.
A recent right to know case, not too much different from the one
being presented by the appellant, was initiated and decided during
the morth of June this year including review and opinion by the
Supreme Court. New York Times v. U.S., U.S 91
S. Ct. 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, (1971). To misinform the people
of the United States or to clandestinely authorize governmental
control of news reporting services is to defraud the people of
their right to know the honest details of Government and effec-
tively curtails their power to govern.
There can be no limitation on the power of the people of
the United States.” Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
25 L. Ed. 628, 630 (1880)
“Yet in the last analysis it is not merely the opinion of
the editorial writer, or of the columnist which is protected
by the first amendment. It is the free flow of informaticn
so that the public will be informed about the Government
and its actions.”
From Judge Gurfein’s opinion in the case of the U. S. v. the
New York Times. Taken from the New York Times, “Text
. 5 Opinion - - page 26, Sunday Edition, June 20,
1971.
10
It is axiomatic that a magnanimous and innovative social
contract breeding intelligent and aggressive constituents will,
from time to time, develop those who patriotically and inad-
vertently misapply the fundamental law to meet the exigency of
a particular governmental problem. In the present case, if just
a little more thought were applied, it would be possible to see that
the practical effect of such action was to distort and debase, and
ultimately destroy, that which they would protect. The history of
government quite clearly illustrates that this is how power is
transposed from the many, to the few, and finally to the one.
Fortunately, a citizen suffering deprivation of rights as a
result of such action and recognizing its inherent evil can turn to
the judiciary for help providing he can survive and surmount the
monumental technicalities of pleading. Unfortunately for an
ordinary citizen who seeks no remuneration except the dividends
of good government and the conservation of tax money, constitu-
tional litigation can come at a high price. It is said to be contrary
to the spirit of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure for a court
to avoid a decision on the merits on the basis of mere technicali-
ties. Foman v. Davis, 871 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).
VII.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted:
(1) This petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be
(2) That on the basis of the record a three-judge District
Court be promptly convened.
(3) That the Supreme Court exercise supervisory control
over the conduct of this litigation by:
a — Issuing a guideline opinion.
b — Postponing argument before the Supreme Court ex-
cept for appealable issues arising from the hearing by
the three-judge tribunal.
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON, pro se
149 Westmoreland Avenue
Greensburg, Pennsylvania 15601
1 1
— ——
ND N r e Treascrt
3. . . rr COTE
— — © — — 2 N
- 2 iy ee Se — — 2 ONS
= T
ii) ur ai en r e — Secu: . Clause
„ of de eee rr nc: tne United
States is ‘ollows:
3@ TSE eee lee OS — mee om Constitution.
ttle 29 TSE ea 130 — . t compe agency.
W 2c — Te — reve of apenct ac
TSE S Di rt ore ape
2a
B. On Basis of Action
(2.) The action arises under the Constitution of the United
States; the non-jurisdictional portions of that Constitution giving
basis to this complaint are:
Article I Section 3 Clause (4) — Vice-President — Duties.
Article I Section 7 Clause (2) — Definition of “Law”.
Article I Section 8 Clause (1) — Taxing and Spending
Article I Section 8 Clause (12) — Military Appropriation
Limits.
Article I Section 8 Clause (14) — Land and Naval Forces.
Article I Section 9 Clause (7) — Appropriation and Ac-
counting. |
Amendment I (Bill of Rights) — Freedom of Speech and
Press.
(3.) The action arises under the laws of the United States
relative to the National Security as follows:
title 50 USCA sect 401 — declaration of purpose
title 50 USCA sect 402 — National Security Council
title 50 USCA sect 403 — Central Intelligence Agency
title 50 USCA sect 403a— CIA Act — definitions
title 50 USCA sect 4083b—CIA Act — Judicial Notice
title 50 USCA sect 4036 — CIA Act — procurement
title 50 USCA sect 403f— CIA Act — general authority
title 50 USC A sect 403j — CIA Act — appropriation au-
thority
(4.) This action is suggested in part by criminal code title 18
section 1001 in-so-far as that statute proclaims governmental
policy but the defendant, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
has countered its own policy directives through unconstitutional
legislation exonerating the natural defendants in this case. No
further reference to this statute is set out in this complaint.
(5.) This action arises under the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, title 31 section 270.3(a)(b) in-so-far as it supplements
the Administrative Procedure Act cited para (1.) above (title 5
USCA 701 et seq.) and defines final agency action in regard to
requests for records from the Commissioner of Accounts.
3a
C. Nature of Proceeding
(6.) This is a proceeding for an Injunction pursuant to the
provisions of title 5 USCA sect 552(a)(b), title 28 USCA sect
2282, and title 28 USCA sect 2284; for a Mandamus pursuant
to title 28 USCA sect 1361; and for a Declaratory Judgment
pursuant to the provisions of titie 28 USCA 2201 and 28 USCA
2202.
II. PLAINTIFF
(7.) Plaintiff is a resident of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, a
member of the electorate, and a loyal citizen of the United States.
He is furthermore a taxpayer paying Federal income taxes and
other Federal taxes.
III. DEFENDANTS
(8.) The defendants are:
a. the limited sovereign, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, who has consented to be sued by statutory enactment.
b. the Secretary of the Treasury for the sovereign
defendant, Mr. JOHN CONNALLY, with offices in Washington,
D. C. As Secretary of said Treasury, this defendant is head of
the depository for all public mor cy held by the Federal Govern-
ment and is bound by Federal laws to honestly and faithfully
account for all receipts and expenditures as prescribed by the
Constitution.
c. the third defendant is Mr. S. S. SOKOL, Commis-
sioner of Accounts, Fiscal Service, United States Treasury, with
offices in Washington, D. C. who has been delegated responsibility
for honest and faithful reporting of the receipts and expenditures
of all public money and who represents that his department pub-
lishes the document required by Article I, Section 9, Clause (7)
of the United States Constitution.
4a
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE
A. Background Information
(9.) On May 12, 1967, the plaintiff wrote the Government
Printing Office saying that he desired to obtain the documents
published by the Government in compliance with Article I Section
9 Clause (7) of the United States Constitution. Under date of
August 9, 1967, a reply was received from the Treasury Depart-
ment, Fiscal Service, Bureau of Accounts explaining that they
produced this document and that “This report is now known as
the ‘Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances
of the United States Government’ ” (attached to this letter were
copies of the monthly and daily reports. Examination of these
reports showed no listing for the operation of the CIA). This
letter was signed by H. A. TURNER, Deputy Commissioner for
Central Accounts and Reports. The plaintiff wrote Mr. TURNER
on August 21st, 1967 and quoted part of the CIA Act and
enquired if this did not operate “to cast reflection upon the
authenticity of the Treasury’s Statement?” Also, the plaintiff
enquired how he could receive the expenditures of this Agency.
Under date of August 24th, 1967, Mr. TURNER replied saying
that plaintiff had only quoted a part of the Act and directing
plaintiff’s attention to further sub-sections to be read and stating
in conclusion: “We have no other information available with
respect to the Agency mentioned in your letter.” On September
25th, 1967, the plaintiff wrote Mr. TURNER setting out essenti-
ally that (1) the Constitutional mandate was clear (2) that the
report of the Treasury should include all public money (3) that
such report should be published for the benefit of the public (4)
that if their reports are to be represented as complying with
Article I Section 9 Clause (7) of the Constitution, they should
immediately terminate their present methods of reporting, and
(5) that they should present the matter to the Attorney General
for a determination as to what should be published.
(10.) Under date of October 24th, 1967, Mr. S. S. SOKOL,
Commissioner of Accounts, Fiscal Service, Treasury Department,
replied to plaintiff's letter of September 25th saying that they
would not cease publication of their documents and explaining
5a
that once a statute was on the books, he was prohibited by estab-
lisked practice from requesting an opinion as to its constitu-
tionality. Further, Mr. SOKOL stated: “All the receipts and
expenditures of the Government are published in the Secretary’s
reports; however, by statute, the details of receipts and expen-
ditures for the above Agency (CIA) are not available.”
B. Statement on Constitutional Repugnance
(11.) The plaintiff car not obtain a document that sets out the
expenditures and receipts of the Central Intelligence Agency in-
cluding the amounts appropriated for this Agency ; instead, he is
asked to accept a fraudulent document. The Treasury Depart-
mer.t’s action is final agency action on his demands. Upon author-
ity of the United States Constitution, he is entitled to ask for and
receive a reliable publication that makes sense from the accounting
standpoint.
(12.) The Central Intelligence Agency Act is repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States in several ways which will be
shown; but primarily, and most prominently, it operates to falsify
the Regular Statement and Account of All Public Money. For the
Government to spread the appropriations, receipts and expendi-
tures of this Agency throughout a document diabolically titled to
resemble the wording of Article I Section 9 Clause 7 and then
represent it as complying with the Constitution is a misrepresen-
tation inconsistent with responsible government. This is especially
shocking when that government exists only by virtue of a social
contract where-in the People have relinquished certain powers in
the form of delegated authority none of which included the author-
ity to commit fraud on them. The only logical conclusion that can
be drawn from such behavior is that the Federal Government views
the American People as a potential enemy against whom the
Government must be protected at all cost.
(13.) No one wants to destroy the Central Intelligence Agency;
or even curtail its activities in the area of coordination, correla-
tion, collection, evaluation and dissemination of Intelligence if
these are the only areas within which the Central Intelligence
6a
Agency operates; and, accordingly, there would be no need to
usurp Constitutional authority. It should be a relatively simple
matter to write legislation allowing ample flexibility of operation,
protection of intelligence sources and methods, reporting under
Article I Section 9 Clause (7), and for imposition of stringent
rules and regulations to safeguard American ideals.
(14.) Besides the irregular accounting engendered by the CIA
Act, the Federal Government has no authority to create a para-
military organization and give it perpetual funding; no authority
to create and fund a para-military organization over which it has
relinquished the rule-making responsibilities associated with the
land and naval forces; nor can it provision such an organization
with “personal services, including personal services without limita-
tions on types of persons to be employed — - -” and “purchase,
maintenance, operation, repair aircraft, and vessels of all
kinds.“
(15.) Furthermore, the Federal Government does not have the
authority to create an organization, fund it clandestinely, and
empower it to purchase news reporting services. The temptation
for ambitious men to use such unprecendented power as a weapon
of intimidation to stifle free speech and freedom of the press is
too great.
(16.) If it is assumed that the document produced by the
Treasury Department and titled “Combined Statement of Re-
ceipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States Govern-
ment” is intended by the Government to be the fulfillment of
Article I Section 9 Clause (7) (and this is what they represent it
to be); then, the following situation exists with regard to CIA
funding:
a. Such funding and reporting practices prevent the
receipts and expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency from
becoming available to the producer of what should be the Regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of All
Public Money and forces on the People an irregular statement
and account.
7a
b. Such funding and reporting practices authorize col-
lusion between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of the
Budget and “other agencies” to transfer public money in such a
manner that certain so-called receipts and expenditures of the
“other agencies” are transfers to and from the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and not, in fact, reccipts and expenditures of
_ those “other agencies.”
c. Such funding and reporting practices authorize de-
positories of public money within other agencies that draw on the
Treasury to insulate the Central Intelligence Agency from any
record of having drawn public money from the only Constitu-
tional depository of record within the Federal system as far as
the People are concerned.
d. Such funding and reporting practices promote
double dealing in government finance by taking money drawn
from the Treasury “in consequence of appropriations made by
law” which is limited in use to the mission of the drawing agency
then transfering this money to the Central Intelligence Agency
without limitation on spending and without accountability.
e. Such funding and reporting practices undermine
public confidence in the Government’s ability to produce a regular
statement and will eventually be calamitous.
(17.) There are additional Constitutional repugnancies
associated with the National Security Statutes which ad versely
affect funding and spending. These are stated and clarified under
part F (Statement on Declaratory Findings).
C. Statement on Federal Tarpayer’s Suit
(18). The plaintiff is taxed by the laws of the United States
on income and through other forms of taxation. The money
extracted from him should be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States under the direction and control of the defendant
CONNALLY. This defendant has no authority to release money
from the Treasury except “in consequence of appropriations
made by law.” When an appropriation establishes a credit in the
8a
Treasury for a particular agency, that agency and no other can
draw on that credit. The Congress has no authority to pass
statutes that countermand Constitutional mandates. It is obvious
from simple reading of the statutes on the National Security
(cited: page No. 1 this complaint, para (3.)) that certain man-
dates incorporating specific limitations and restraints on the
spending power have been breached.
(19.) The Congress has exceeded its taxing and spending
power under Article I Section 8 of the Constitution. In addition,
the laws relative to the National Security cited in paragraph
(3.) page No. 1 of this complaint exceed specific constitutional
limitations and restraints on the taxing and spending power.
These specific limitations and restraints are further described and
clarified in part F (Statement on Declaratory Findings), para-
graphs (26.) through (54.).
(20.) Accordingly, the taxpayer’s money is being extracted
and spent in violation of specific Constitutional protections
against such abuses of legislative power and such an injury is
appropriate for judicial redress.
D. Statement on Duty Owed the Plaintiff
(21.) Defendant SOKOL hes been delegated the authority
to prepare and publish for public consumption the report ordered
by Article I Section 9 Clause 7 of the United States Constitution.
Defendant SOKOL does not publish the report as required by the
Constitution but represents that he does. Defendant SOKOL
refuses to take any steps to bring his report up to the standards
required by the Constitution and he relies on unconstitutional
statutes as his authority which, he says, he cannot question once
the statutes are on the books.
(22.) The Commissioner of Accounts is duty bound to de-
liver to the plaintiff a document that complies with Article I
Section Clause (7) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the plaintiff
has been denied a Constitutional right arising from deliberate
actions of his Government in passing legislation purposely de-
signed to defeat the Constitutional mandates.
9a
(23.) Wherefore, the plaintiff can maintain this action in
the nature of a mandamus to compel an officer or employee of
the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff and such an action will have judicial cognizance.
E. Statement on Appeal from Final Agency Action
(24.) Part A (Background Information) of this section
titled “Statement of Case” gives a resume of plaintiff’s written
demands on the Commissioner of Accounts and the Commissioner’s
reaction thereto. Significant among these demands were (1) that
plaintiff desired the expenditures of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and (2) that the Commission’s non-compliance with the
Constitutional mandate was so flagrant that the Commission
should immediately discontinue production of their reports until
the matter was thrashed out within the Executive Departments
and all public money properly accounted for and/or reported.
The Commissioner’s reply was to deny, in effect, that the docu-
ment he produced transgressed the Constitutional directives and
that he could do nothing further in the absence of a court ruling.
This amounted to final agency action as described in title 31
section 270.3(a)(b) of the Code of Federal Regulations headed
“Availability of Records” and is specifically applicable to the
Commissioner of Accounts when requests for records are denied
by him.
(25.) Accordingly, the plaintiff has suffered legal wrong
because of agency action and is entitled to judicial review and
corrective action.
F. Statement on Declaratory Findings
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands that the Court adjudge:
( 26.) That Congress and the President, like the courts,
possess no power not derived from the Constitution and the United
States is entirely a creature of the Federal Constitution; its Power
and authority h as no other source and it can only act in accord-
ance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.
10a
(27.) That the rights and liberties of citizens of the United
States are not protected by custom and tradition alone, they are
preserved from the encroachment of government by express pro-
visions of the Federal Constitution.
(28.) That the language of the Federal Constitution where
clear and unambiquous must be given its plain evident meaning.
(29.) That the prohibitions of the Federal Constitution are
designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and
they cannot be nullified by the Congress and the Executive
combined.
(30.) That Article I Section 9 Clause (7) of the Constitu-
tion of the United States acts as a limitation and restraint on
the taxing and spending clause of that Constitution.
(31.) That Article I Section 9 Clause 7 incorporates by
reference Article I Section 7 Clause 2 of the United States Con-
stitution and the two articles act as a limitation on the taxing
and spending clause specifically requiring hat no money shall be
drawn from the Treasury except on authority of a Bill of Ap-
propriation passed by both houses and signed by the President
or passed over his veto and setting forth the amount of appro-
priaticn, the name of the government agency to be credited by
the Treasury, and the time period during which the credit shall
be available to the agency.
(32.) That Article I Section 8 Clause 12 acts as a limita-
tion on the taxing and spending clause and, acting in conjunction
with Article I Section 9 Clause 7 and Article I Section 7 Clause
2, limits the appropriation of money to raise and support armies
to a bill duly passed by bcth houses and signed by the President
or passed over his veto; and said bill cannot appropriate such
money beyond a two year period.
(33.) That the Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the
Press provisions of Amendment I act as a limitation and restraint
on the taxing and spending provisions of Article I Section 8
lla
Clause (1) and specifically deny the Federal government any
right to authorize undisclosed and indiscriminate rental of news
reporting by any agency of government; such abuse of the Bill
oi Rights would be further magnified if such rental funds were
unlimited and unaccounted for.
(34.) That a receipt of public money occurs at any time a
government agency receives credit in its Treasury account for
funds based upon a Bill of Appropriation. This is a checking
account established for that agency. Thus, Article I Section 9
Clause (7) meant that all appropriations were to be reported in
the “regular statement and account of the receipts and expendi-
tures of all public money ;” such report to be by heads of appro-
priation whose access to public money is based only on the credit
accrued in t’ eir Treasury account.
(35.) That an expenditure of public money means a laying
out of public funds in a transaction following which that money
is no longer public money. Thus, the transfer of public money
from one government agency to another does not constitute an
expenditure and should not be reported as such in any document
purporting to be published in compliance with Article I Section
9 Clause 7.
(36.) That it was the intent of Article I Section 9 Clause
(7) to make available to every United States citizen a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all
public money published by an instrument of government having
a thorough knowledge of the flow of public money in and out of
the Federal structure and having indisputable access to all re-
ceipts and expenditures where public money is concerned.
(37.) That it is a condition attached to the use of public
money by a government agency that its receipts and expenditures
shall be available to the instrument of government producing the
statement and account required by Article I Section 9 Clause (7)
and no agency can be the subject of government classification,
security or otherwise, that would prevent its inclusion. Further-
more, legislation is inherently defective that orders the courts to
12a
take judicial notice of the existence of an Agency and at the same
time orders the Treasury Department to treat the same Agency
as though it did not exist.
(38.) That the annual document titled “Combined State-
ment of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States
Government” prepared by the Treasury Department and offered
for sale by the Government Printing Office is not, in fact, the
document required by Article I Section 9 Clause 7 of the United
States Constitution but is represented by the Government as
identical.
(39.) That no document is now being published for infor-
mation of the People that meets the requirements of Article I
Section 9 Clause 7.
(40.) That failure to publish a Regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of All Public Money
and make it available to the People and to the plaintiff is a
mockery of delegated authority and a violation of plaintiff’s con-
stitutional rights when he demands such a document from his
Government.
(41.) That when the Government produces a document pur-
porting to be a constitutionally founded document giving a
regular statement and account of all public money and setting
out the appropriations, receipts and expenditures as they relate
to each government agency but in correspondence they admit that
there is one Agency which receives and spends public money but
which they have no inf rmation on, then their document is fraudu-
lent as to the People for whom it is prepared especially when the
appropriations, receipts and expenditures of the renegade Agency
are spread throughout the entire document allegedly complying
with Article I Section 9 Clause (7).
(42.) That it was never intended by the Founding Fathers
that appropriations, receipts and expenditures of the United
States Government were to be reported in any other manner than
in a manner that made sense.
23. Tat ² ,w̃— A ee mne u crewing money
‘rom ae nnr — . rr: reg statement and
leer i nm. n — bubu Money.
. That rer <= weet rere document: neid
ur omi - — : /%ëw-t eure naue ‘7 pvt m fact
r 32 (SDUTTOUS ‘cece S -en tee Constitutional
“SQUITEMERt. Ise 2 2 nr om te bimtif? and 2
7oiamion of W W.. os
+6. That rrrumer - 5 8 ec: 4038 stating:
“and ner tner r D 2 nere to transier to
r “seve 1 —— = nor regard to anx
Drovision ü -wãghꝶꝶagŚb- y. = TEEMSIST: e e
oMmations’ .ru , — 1 nen & Cisuse and
Articie | Seemom © Lame % „ ro to tm American
Deodie mere — Dees SET to aecerve everyone
ne:ucing ae , . Stee D accounting of
Zzunlic none:
8. r e intelupencs Agenct
Act OC rr Dum transferred to
the ger a —— = m pm expended
‘or de uro ] ; A t secuons 4032 - 403)
of dis e .] == n. ¢: eppropmation: from
vun ram. . 1 — aeregetion of goverr-
nentai mntaor r- ~eesmae Y if > seco mg as ar “unimited
3 “eDUgMant ~3 ott e
L Seetion ~ me 2:
N. That —— * B rornzuom A title 50
USCA 3 en gener mar
de Trernen war i> ue: nn and reguls-
ions . ef⁴ůãůhſ i = = f tuns repeais
ail a zovermmug dan monet tue hands
a mis ne 2c 2 ..... anc unworthy of
comment.
l4a
( 48.) That the statement “and for objects of a confidential,
extra-ordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be
accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every
such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified” is too broad and comprehensive and is
giving this Agency more power than the Federal Government
itself has — being specifically repugnant to Article I Section 9
Clause.7 of the Constitution. The interpretation of this provision
has resulted in nothing being reported.
( +49.) That the CIA Act (50 USCA sect 403f(a)) is repug-
nant to the United States Constitution wherein it states that “the
Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to- (a) Transfer to
and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may
be approved by the Bureau of the Budget - - -” because such sums
could be transferred from collection agencies thus circumventing
entirely the Treasury of the United States; furthermore, the
delegation of such authority to the Bureau of the Budget to
accomodate the funding of the Central Intelligence Agency so
that this Agency never appears on the regular statement and
account of all public money and has perpetual appropriation
status is a deliberate fraud on the People of the United States
and permits the Bureau of the Budget to operate outside the nar-
row lines of governmental authority delegated to the Federal
Government by the People of this Country being especially repug-
nant to Article I Section 9 Clause 7, Article I Section 7 Clause 2,
Article I Section 8 Clause 12, and Article I Section 8 Clause 14.
(50.) That the power granted to Congress by Article I
Section & Clause 14 of the Federal Constitution to make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces
does not extend to civilians. Thus, Coagress has delegated author-
ity in the CIA Act to the Executive for an organization which, in
some operations, is para-military, over which Congress makes no
rules for its government and regulation and to attempt to fund
such an Agency is ultra vires the Constitutional authority of
Article I Section 8 Clause 1 because Article I Section 8 Clause
14 limits spending to those organizations composing the land ard
naval forces when the rules and regulations for such organizations
are made by Congress.
15a
(51.) That the Central Intelligence Agency is, in part, a
para-military organization and that it is an unlawful delegation
of legislative authority and a violation of Article I Section 8
Clause 12 of the United States Constitution to automatically fund
this Agency on a continuing basis without regard to the two year
limitation on such funding.
(52.) That the Central Intelligence Agency is, in part, a
para-military organization and that it is an unlawful delegation
of legislative authority and a violation of Amendment I of the
Bill of Rights to give such an organization automatic funding
without limitation or accountability for the undisclosed and indis-
criminate “rental of news reporting services” such being in dero-
gation of the Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press
provisions.
(53.) That it is an unlawful incorporation by reference to
write-in the Central Intelligence Agency as an additional partici-
pant under the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947“
(Public Law 413, Eightieth Congress, second session) by making
reference to said Act and the relationship thereto of the Central
Intelligence Agency in “The Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949” (Public Law 110, 81st Congress, title 50 USCA sect 403c).
That notwithstanding, this procedure was adopted, but subse-
quently, the “Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947” was
repealed and replaced by the Act of August 10, 1956 “Procure-
ment Generally” (title 10 USCA sects 2301 thru 2314) and the
subsequent Act has never been incorporated by reference, or other-
wise, into the CIA Act; accordingly, the CIA is without any
restrictior as to its procurement procedures; therefore, the
People of this Country are confronted with the untenable situa-
tion of a secret organization with unlimited access to the United
States Treasury, statutably protected from accountability, with
the funding system rigged for fraudulent appropriation and
accounting of public money, and running wild as far as procure-
ment procedure is conce: ned.
(54.) That the Vice Presidency of the United States is a
Constitutionally ordained office. The duties are prescribed by the
16a
Constitution. No other duties can be assigned this office. As a
practical matter, the Vice-President is not a member of the
Executive nor of the Legislature and is not subject to assign-
ment by either. To assign such an elected official to an Executive
post on the National Security Council where he can exercise
certain control over he expenditures of an organization with
unlimited funding and no accountability violates Article I Section
3 Clause (4) of the Constitution in that he is assigned to duties
not prescribed by the Constitution and may vote on appropria-
tions which he later takes part in spending.
(55.) That the Vice President of the United States is elected
as a member of the Executive but, once in office, he is assigned
the duty of presiding over the Senate. After taking office, he is
constitutionally bound to work in the legislature. There he is
“buried”, so to speak, and he is only resurrected in the Executive
Branch should the President become incapacitated. By putting
the Vice President on the National Security Council, which is
purely an instrument of the Executive Department, the Govern-
ment is breaching the Separation of Powers doctrine.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
(56.) WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that upon
the filing of this complaint this court give precedence over all
other cases on the docket except as to causes the court considers
of greater importance and this case to “be assigned for hearing
and trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every
way” as prescribed in title 5 USCA sect 552(a)(3) and that
a three Judge Court be especially convened to:
(a.) adjudge, decree and declare the rights and other
legal relations of the parties to the subject matter here in contro-
versy, in order that such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment;
(b.) issue a mandamus compeling the defendants to
perform their duty to the plaintiff as prescribed by the United
States Constitution.
" 25
—— —— —— 4 PWVw—— 2 — wnt
17a
(c.) issue a permanent injunction enjoining the de-
fendants from publishing their “Combined Statement of Receipts,
Expenditures and Balances of the United States Government”
and representing it as the fulfillment of the mandates of Article I
Section 9 Clause 7 until same fully complies with those mandates.
(d.) graut plaintiff such other, additional or alterna-
tive relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable.
(e.) grant plaintiff his costs herein.
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON
149 Westmoreland Avenue
Greensburg, Pennsylvania 15601
— END OF COMPLAINT —
MOTION TO DISMISS
And now comes the United States of America by Richard
L. Thornburgh, United States Attorney for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, and Thomas A. Daley, Assistant United States
Attorney, and moves the Court to dismiss the captioned action
for the following reasons:
1. The action is barred by the principles of “res judicata”
and “law of the case”, the plaintiff having previously brought the
action in this Court, and judgment of dismissal having been
entered against him, Miller, J., 285 F. Supp. 860, aff'd, 409 F.
2d 3 (3d Cir. 1969).
2. The plaintiff lacks standing to bring the action.
8. No justiciable controversay is presented by the com-
plaint.
4. The complaint fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted.
5. The Court lacks jurisdiction.
— END OF MOTION TO DISMISS —
18a
APPENDIX B
IN THE
United States District Court
FOR THE
Western District of Pennsylvania
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 70 23
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JOHN CONNALLY, Secretary of the Treasury,
S. S. SOKOL, Commissioner of Accounts,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLSON, Senior District Judge
On January 8, 1970, William B. Richardson filed his com-
plaint in which he named as defendants the United States of
America; David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury; and
S. S. Sokol, Commissioner of Accounts for the Secretary of the
Treasury. The pro se complaint consists of some 56 numbered
paragraphs.
In the complaint plaintiff gave a brief history relating to
his contention that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Com-
missioner of Accounts in publishing the receipts and disburse-
en er et er Seo os
2
ee ee 5 ee
19a
ments of the Government via the Bureau of Accounts failed to
list monies expended in the operation of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Plaintiff mentions letters to various departments and
replies, the last of which is a reply from Mr. Sokol and quoted in
part by the plaintiff as follows:
All the receipts and expenditures of the Government
are published in the Secretary’s reports; however, by
statute, the details of receipts and expenditures for the
above Agency (CIA) are not available.“
Piaintiff says in his complaint that the action of the defend-
ants as mentioned is contrary to Article I, Section 9, Clause 7
of the Constitution of the United States, which reads:
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by lew; and a
regular Statement and Account of the Recepits and Ex-
penditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time.”
Under the circumstances just recited and averred in the com-
plaint in considerable detail plaintiff avers as a member of the
electorate, a citizen of the United States, and a Federal taxpayer
that he is entitled to declaratory relief and a mandamus directing
the defendants to publish expenditures of the CIA.
In the first instance, this complaint came before The Honor-
able John L. Miller for a decision as to whether on its face a
Three Judge Court was appropriate. On January 16th, 1970,
Judge Miller denied the application for a Three Judge Court
and directed that the Clerk make an assignment of the case in
the usual manner. Thereafter on March 20, 1970, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, and on April 22, 1970, filed a memoran-
dum in support thereof. On May 19, 1970, plaintiff filed what he
styled a motion to quash motion in opposition to convening a
Three Judge Court and a motion to convene Three Judge Court
without further oral or written argument.
The parties have been heard at oral argument on the motion
to dismiss and on plaintiff’s contention that he is nevertheless
20a
entitled to a Three Judge Court even though Judge Miller has
denied his prior application.
On behalf of defendants, Thomas A. Daley, Assistant United
States Attorney, first contends that the plaintiff lacks standing
to bring this action. He has cited a prior case by this same
plaintiff in Richardson v. Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 860 (W. D. Pa.
1968), which is affirmed in 409 F. 2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 949. Since those decisions, Flast v. Cohen, 392
U. S. 83, (1968) was announced by the Supreme Court. Under
the cited decisions and considering Article I, Section 9, Clause
7 of the Constitution, the conclusion must be reached that plaintiff
has no standing to bring this civil action.
But equally important to the decision is the contention of
the Government that the complaint presents no justiciable contro-
versy. Mr. Daley cites several statutes which create the CIA and
regulate its expenditures: The National Security Act of 1947,
50 U.S.C. 403 as amended, and Section 6 of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. 403 (g) as amended.
The publication of the details as to the funding of the activities
of the CIA has been limited by Congress. Congress has done this
in the interest of national security and national defense as well
as foreign policy.
It is this Court’s view that the subject matter complained
of by plaintiff raises political questions in a governmental sense
and the subject is not open to a United States District Court for
adjudication in any manner.
— END OF OPINION —
ORDER
AND NOW, June 16, 1970, for the reasons stated, the
motion of the defendants must be and is granted, and this civil
action is dismissed of record.
JOSEPH P. WILLSON
Senior District Judge
2la
APPENDIX C
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE
Third Circuit
No. 19,277
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON,
Appellant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JOHN CONNALLY, Secretary of the Treasury,
S. S. SOKOL, Commissioner of Accounts,
Appellee.
ORDER OF CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Present: VAN DUSEN and ROSENN, Circuit Judges,
and KRAFT, District Judge.
After consideration of the briefs, oral argument presented
June 25, 1971, the record, the attached letter of the Clerk dated
June 30, 1971, and the answering letters of the parties dated
July 7 and July 21, 1971,
22a
It is ORDERED that Ralph Spritzer, Esq., 3400 Chestnut
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, is appointed amicus
curiae, with leave to file and serve legible, typewritten brief in
the above-entitled case on or before October 18, 1971, appellant
and appellee to have leave to file and serve legible, typewritten
answering briefs on or before November 15, 1971.
BY THE COURT: —
FRANCIS L. VAN DUSEN
Circuit Judge
Dated: July 28, 1971
23a
APPENDIX D
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
REQUIRED BY RULE 23(1d) CORRELATED
TO FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OF COMPLAINT
Paragraph One of Complaint:
Article III, Section 2, Clause (1) provides as follows:
(Pertinent Text)
Section 2. The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
28 U.S.C. sect 1846(a)(2) provides as follows:
(Pertinent Text)
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the Court of Claims, of:
(1) - - - not applicable
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United
States, not exceeding $10,900.00 in amount, founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort. For the purpose of this para-
graph. - - - -
28 U.S.C. sect 1361 provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or em-
ployee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the pluintiff.
24a
5 U.S.C. sect 701 provides as follows:
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that —
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.
(b) For the purpose of this chapter —
(1) “agency” means each authority of the Government
of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency, but does not include —
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions
of the United States;
(D) the ogvernment of the District of Columbia;
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the par-
ties or of representatives of organizations of the parties
to the disputes determined by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of
war or in occupied territory; or
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743,
and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of title 41; or sections
1622, 1884, 1891-1902, and former section 1641(b) (2),
of title 50, appendix ; and
(2) “person”, “rule”, “order”, “license”, “sanction”,
“relief”, and “agency action” have the meanings given them by
section 551 of this title.
(Definitions from Title 5 U.S.C. sect 551 incorporated by
reference)
2 Fern erer. verTtmersnip. corpore-
“10M. AOczar -an. zurn r crpenrmseuo0r otner than an
— ?Tg)—— 2 ne. ber E: agency state-
nenr of Perner n anc future efiect de-
ignea rr. . vererrn un or policy or
iescridng ne === rr ¢- precuc: requirements
oT un .gemeT na nee rn vresermtior for the
future of “Stee “Reem ann structures or re
-PgaMIZarions e— Trem rr ppuances services or
Alowances zerrar © Wr s- cv accounting. or
oractices earn n 22 ven
3 Hre— . nne ber c im disposi-
ion. whether rr . ure or aeciaratory in
orm. t n : r r nr Tue making but w-
ucdng cer:
e 1 runner
20 Dancer nr nes cr ber oi an gener —
33 N ,æe EE
Ty
= r soe restmctiye action
2 ]]] Geo eee ub of an gener —
— —
FEE. eee... OF Peer"
(13) “agency action” includes the whole or a part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act.
5 U.S.C. sect 702 provides as follows:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
5 U.S.C. sect 703 provides as follows:
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a
court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof,
any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declara-
tory judgments or writs of prohibition or mandatory injunction
or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. Except to
the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for
judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to
judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial
enforcement. |
5 U.S.C. sect 704 provides as follows:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or inter-
mediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject
to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise
final is final for purposes of this section whether or not there has
been presented or determined an application for a declaratory
order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency
otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile
is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
5 U.S.C. sect 552(a)(3) provides as follows:
((a) Each agency shall make available to the public infor-
mation as follows) :
27a
(3) Except with respect to the records made available
under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency,
on request for identifiable records made in accordance with pub-
lished rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized
by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall make the records
promptly available to any person. On complaint, the district
court of the United States in the district in which the complainant
resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the
agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and to order the production of
any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.
In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo and
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. In the event of
noncompliance with the order of the court, the district court may
punish for contempt the responsible employee, and in the case of
a uniformed service, the responsible member. Except as to causes
the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the
district court, as authorized by this paragraph, take precedence
on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for
hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited
in every way.
Paragraph Two of Complaint: 3
Article I, Section 3, Clause (4) provides as follows:
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
Article I, Section 7, Clause (2) provides as follows:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall
sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that
House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider
it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objec-
tions, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be recon-
28a
sidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be enter d on the
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted)
after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law,
in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return, in which case it shall not be a
Law.
Article I, Section 8, Clause (1) provides as follows:
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States;
Article I, Section 8, Clause (12) provides as follows:
(The Congress shall have Power): To raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for
a longer Term than two Years;
Article I, Section 8, Clause (14) provides as follows:
(The Congress shall have Power): To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces;
Article I, Section 9, Clause (7) provides as follows:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.
Amendment I to the Constitution provides as follows:
Congivss shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petit on the Government for a
redress of grievances.
298
Paragraph Three of Complaint:
50 U.S.C. sect 401 provides as follows:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to
provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the
United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated
policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and func-
tions of the Government relating to the national security; to
provide a Department of Defense, including the three military
Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation
and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under
the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense;
to provide that each military department shall be separately
organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the
direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense;
to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the
Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or ser-
vices; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified
combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to
such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the
Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research
and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the
Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and
economical administration in the Department of Defense; to pro-
vide for the unified strategie direction of the combatant forces,
for their operation under unified command, and for their in-
tegration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but
not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor
an overall armed forces general staff.
50 U.S.C. sect 402 provides as follows:
There is established a council to be known as the National
Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the
Council“).
The President of the United States shall preside over
meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may
designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.
80a
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security so as to enable the mili-
tary services and the other departments and agencies of the
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security.
The Council shall be composed of —
(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other
executive departments and of the military departments, the Chair-
mar of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research
and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the
President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively co-
ordinating the policies and functions of the departments and
agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it
shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the
Council —
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commit-
ments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and
potential military power, in the interest of national security, for
the purpose of making recommendations to the President in con-
nection therewith ; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest
to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned
with the national security, and to make recommendations to the
President in connection therewith.
/// / /
31a
(e) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian
executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President. The
executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is
authorized, subject to the civil- service laws and the Classification
Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation of such per-
sonnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be
prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of
its functions.
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recom-
utendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems
appropriate or as the President may require.
50 U.S.C. sect 403 provides as follows:
(Pertinent Text)
(a) There is established under the National Security Coun-
cil a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central
Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, - - -
50 U.S.C. sect 403a provides as follows:
When used in sections 403b - 403} of this title, the term —
(a) “Agency” means the Central Intelligence Agency ;
(b) “Director” means the Director of Central Intelligence ;
(c) “Government agency” means any executive department,
commission, council, independent establishment, corporation
wholly or partly owned by the United States which is an instru-
mentality of the United States, board, bureau, division, service,
office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment,
in the executive branch of the Government.
50 U.S.C. sect 403b provides as follows:
The Director of Central Intelligence shall cause a seal of
office to be made for the Central Intelligence Agency, of such
design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall
be taken thereof.
50 U.S.C. sect 408c provides as follows:
(Pertinent Text)
(a) In the performance of its functions the Central Intel-
—
|
82a
ligence Agency is authorized to exercise the authorities contained
in sections 151(c) (1-6), (10), (12), (15), (17)- 155 and 159
of Title 41.
NOTE: (Title 41 sects 151-162 “Procurement of Supplies and Services by
Armed Services” was repealed Aug. 10, 1956. Since all of 403c is
related to the Title 41 statute, the balance of 50 U.S.C. 403c is
being omitted. There is no “procurement authority” statute that
would govern the manner in which this agency makes large pur- |
chases as far as the writer knows. W.B.R.) |
50 U.S.C. sect 403f provides as follows:
(Pertinent Text)
In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence
Agency is authorized to —
(a) Transfer to and receive from other Government agen-
cies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget,
for the performance of any of the functions or activities author-
ized under sections 403 and 405 of this title, and any other
Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from
the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law
limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums
transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may
be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections
403a-403 of this title without regard to limitations of appropri-
ations from which transferred ;
(b) Exchange funds without regard to section 543 of
Title 31
1 Section 543 of Title 31 provides as foll we:
(Pertinent Text)
No exchange of funds shall be made by uny disbursing officer or agent
of the Governmem:, of any grade or denomination whatsoever, or connected
with any branch of the public service, other than an exchange for gold,
silver, United States notes, and national-bank notes; and every such dis-
bursing officer, when the meane for his disbursements are furnished to him
in gold, silver, United States notes, or national-bank notes, shall make his
payments in the moneys so furnished; or when they are furnished to him
in drafts, shall cause those drafts to be presented at their place of payment,
and properly paid according to law, and shall make his payments in the
money so received for the drafts furnished, unless, in either case, he can
exchange the means in his hands for gold and silver at par. - - -
88a
(e) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of
pereonnel assigned to the Agency, and such other Government
agencies are authorized, without rega to provisions of law to
the contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or employee for
duty with the Agency ;
50 U.S.C. sect 403j provides as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums
made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may
be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions,
including —
(1) personal services, including personal services with-
out regard to limitations on types of persons to be em-
ployed, and rent at the seat of government and elsewhere;
health-service program as authorized by law (5 U.S.C.
159); rental of news- reporting services; purchase or rental
and operation of photographie, reproduction, erypto-
graphic, duplication and printing machines, equipment
and devices, and radio-receiving and radio-sending equip-
ment and devices, including telegraph and teletype equip-
ment; purchase, maintenance, operation, repair, and hire
of passenger motor vehicles, and aircraft, and vessels of
all kinds; subject to policies established by the Director,
transportation of officers and employees of the Agency in
Government-owned automotive equipment between their
domiciles and places of employment, where such personnel
are engaged in work which makes such transportation
necessary, and transportation in such equipment, to and
from school, of children of Agency personnel who have
quarters for themselves and their families at isolated sta-
tions outside the continental United States where adequate
public or private transportation is not available; printing
and binding; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of fire-
arms, including purchase, storage, and maintenance of
ammunition ; subject to policies established by the Director,
expenses of travel in connection with, and expenses incident
34a
to attendance at meetings of professional, technical, scien-
tific, and other similar organizations when such attendance
would be a benefit in the conduct of the work of the
Agency; association and library dues; payment of pre-
miums or costs of surety bonds for officers or employees
without regard to the provisions of section 14 of Title 6;
payment of claims pursuant to Title 28; acquisition of
necessary land and the clearing of such iand; construction
of buildings and facilities without regard to sections 259
and 267 of Title 40; repair, rental, operation, and main-
tenance of buildings, utilities, facilities, and appurten-
ances ; and
(2) supplies, equipment, and personnel and contrac-
tural services otherwise authorized by law and regulations,
when approved by the Director.
(b) The sums made available to the Agency may be ex-
pended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations
relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects
of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such ex-
penditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the
Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient
voucher for the au.ount therein certified.
Paragraph Four of Complaint:
18 U.S.C. 1001 provides as follows:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and will-
fully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations; or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
$10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
ee ee eed
35a
Paragraph Five of Complaint:
The Code of Federal Regulations title 31 section 270.3 (a) (b)
provides as follows:
(a) Procedure. A written request for an identifiable
record shail be addressed to the Commissioner of Accounts, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20226. A request presented in person shall be made
at the office of the Operating Facilities Officer, Room 100,
Treasury Department, Annex 1, Pennsylvania Avenue at Madison
Place.
(b) Determination of Request. Determination as to the
disclosure of a record request shall be made, subject to appeal to
the Commissioner of Accounts, by the head of the division in
which the record belongs and by the Assistant Commissioner for
Records in the Office of the Commissioner. The decision of the
Commissioner shall constitute final agency action, unless he refers
the appeal to the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in which case the
decision of the Fiscal Assistant Secretary shall constitute final
agency acticn.
Paragraph Six of Complaint:
Title 5 U.S.C.A. 552 (a) (3) has been set out page 26a & 27a this
Appendix.
Title 28 U.S.C. sect. 2282 provides as follows:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for
repugnance to the Constitution of the United States shall not be
granted by any district court or judge thereof unless the applica-
tion therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three
judges under section 2284 of this title.
Title 28 U.S.C. sect. 2284 provides as follows:
(Pertinent Text)
In any action or proceeding required by Act of Congress to
36a
be heard and determined by a district court of three judges the
composition and procedure of the court, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, shall be as follows:
(1) The district judge to whom the application for
injunction or other relief is presented shall constitute one
member of such court. On the filing of the application, he
shall immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who
shall designate two other judges, at least one of whom
shall be a circuit judge. Such jadges shall serve as
members of the court to hear and determine the action or
7 5 2
(2) ---
(3) ---
(4) In any such case the application shall be given
precedence and assigned for a hearing at the earliest
practicable day. Two judges must concur in granting the
application.
(5) Any one of the three judges of the court may
perform all functions, conduct all proceedings except the
trial, and enter all orders required or permitted by the
rules of civil procedure. A single judge shall not appoint
a master or order a reference, or hear and determine any
application for an interlocutory injunction or motion to
vacate the same, or dismiss the action, or enter a summary
or final judgment. The action of a single judge shall be
reviewable by the full court at any t ne before final
hearing.
Title 28 U.S.C. sect. 1861 provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.
Title 8g. ! 2: ichow:
AL u its Jurisdiction, except
vith meer 3 “sasr== come. er con- of tne United States,
won the tiling cr u νν nn. me; aeciare the rights
sna tner n r <= A rerested parts seeking such
lectaration. rr mr or could be sought.
Ar ͤ ucn erar- n . te- teres and efiect of a final
Udgment r rr
Titie 23 a . π ?W½ᷓͥᷓ· 2: iohow:
rer —— r need on « declaratory
jUagment r ==. te reasonabie notice and
zern, — . pert »in rights have been
letermimes OY er wr
— & — ⏑ DP —
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.