Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Morgan v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1970

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eee "IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- Ortober Term, 1970. +.

Cio (

No,

ROBERT D: MORGAN,

Petitioner,

VS.

“ -

_METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC.,

a Delaware corporation,

es Respondent,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO ~

-* 2° ‘THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

THE STATE OF ARIZONA”

wor

STEWART L. UDALL

1700 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington, D.C. 20006

| “Attorney for Petitioner }

_—

: ry

TABLE OF CONTENTS ,

| : a) ee Page

‘CITATIONS TO OPINIONS: BELOW 2.00.0 2

JURISDICTION 1. ie Aen d ee OR 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED | ae ee ee 2

- CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY _

PROVISIONS INVOLVED .00........-..:.-00ess:escsssse lees EP

STATEMENT OB TE CASE 2... ee ee os.

~ ARGUMENT AND REASONS FOR - | :

‘GRANTING WRIT 22 aan ates 10

ONCLUSION oi a ee ta fe

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE pe, Bikes ttn ene

eg P |

— Bullock v. Texas Employers Ins. Assn,

Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity Company,

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases: i an ia a Page»

Arizona Title Guarantee & Krush Co. v. . Modern Homes, |

- 84 Ariz. 399,330 P.2d 113 ¢ — ioe a ne aa res cae

Beacon Theatres v. Westover, on

359 US. 500, 3 L.Ed. 2d 988, 7 79 S.Ct. 946 (1959) ........ “5

Brady v. Beanvs, (10th Cir. 19 42) 132 F.2d 985 Reet ati Bb

| Brown v. Ann Arbor R.. Co. ? : .

183 Mich. 574, 149 N.W. 1031 peer a nee pls anes 16

Baffum v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, bye

‘(7th Cir. 1951), 192 F.2d 58, cert. den. slides 944, a

96 L.Bd. 702, 72 Gt. $58 .c....ce.00--- ferrari fee eo” ‘16

254 S.W:2d 554

Byrd ve. Blue Ridge Rural | Elec. Coop., ; eas ™ :

(1958) 78 S.Ct. 893; 356 US. 525, 2 L.Ed.2d one ee

“(8th Cif 19635 314 F.2d 657 ooeeeecceeeceecccbeceetnee 16

ee City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz, 214, 29 | P.2d 1062 ........ tee

. City -of Tucson v. Koerber, - pane rae

KIDS T) Be tia. S47; 519 PAS civics ch Shoat 16°

Clavey v, Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20, 251 Pac. 232 cece 13

Collins v. The Industrial Commission, a

" 102. Ariz.509,, 433 P.2d | Speer ere Ehatitndbesriuns ae &

_Coutles ». Ohio Farmers Insurance Group, — ; ere

a (4th Cir. 1957), 242 F.2d TW: secvopiscriaenauaeees " ee eLe 16

Dice v. Akron C. 6 Y.R. Ce... - a ghia L~

342 U.S. 359, 96 L.Ed. 398, 72 S.Ct. 312 are Se oo a

Duncan u, Louisiana,

1969), 391 US. 145, 20 LEd. 24491, 88 sie e118 19 |

, .

‘ re)

. i en Loe

o- : .

TABLE OF CASES silanes AUTHORITIES ( tCnatingsd)

ae Cases: Set ee ° Page

- Duncan v. Texas Employers dis Assn, sarees

105 $.W.2d 403 ........ peek ee Seka ne en a6

«Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, ae! oh a

185 U.S. 148, 46 L.Ed. R47, 22 S.Ct 605. 2 ete. ah

| C Gant v:' Oklahoma City, fe J i

289 US. D8, 77 L.Ed. 1058, 53 S.Ct. bc Bee None I}

Gideon-v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 9 L Ed.2d = ae |

*8 S.Ct.792, 93 A.L.R.2d° TES Liason reas 1s

Godfrey ty. Godfrey, 30 Cal.App.. 2d 370, 86 P. 2d. 357. mee WE |

Grand 1. B.. of Locomotive Engrs. ov. Mills,. | “

nnn BS ARI. STD. DE PDMS Eide syst stcca stinks Re haenca 18

| . Hazel-Atlass Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co... *_ , Pe”

_ (1944) 322 US. 238, 88 L.Ed. 1250, 64 S.Ct. RT sesrass 12,13."

Sok,

In re Brandt's Estate, ( 1948) 67 Ariz.42, 190 P. ad ADT ° 38.21 1G

a Jeffords v. Young. (Cal. ) 27 7 P.2d — Cn tee eee S.

. Jeune t. Del E. Webb Constr. en eee ay ite vo

~ (1954) 76 Atiz. 418, ye Eo, eee aE 15

7 a Johnson’ v. American-Hawaiian a5, GS. Scr

(9th Cir. 1938) 98 F.2d 847 ...2.2..000002..2., ae item ? A6

rid Klopfer v. North Carolina, | mac | |

(386 US.213, 18 LEd.2d 1, 87.S.Ce sg eR Cees 19:

‘seeds Reciprocal Ass’ nv. Day. ugh .

(Tex.). 17 S.W.2d 1043 op Nemes MR sata’ Cone 16

, Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, - Pe

(1959) 360 US. 273, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1224, 79 $Ct. 1184. 4.

Marks F wad Corporation tv. Barbara Ann Baking Co., ‘

(9th Cir. 1959) Ue Ob 5 eemaaOneueene yey 15

e ee

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Gases: ‘ Bet Page

- Meason v. RalstonPurina Co., tas .

(1940) 56 Ariz. 298, 107 P.2d 224 ead pa Senne 6

Miles v. Lav ender, thi Cir. 1926) 10 F.2d 450 bier tte? 15,16 |

__ Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, om <3 : = /

241 US. 211, 60 L.Ed. 961, 36 Sup. Cr. 595 eae

Morgan v. Hays;

102 Ariz. 150, 426 P.2d 67, cere. den. 389 US. 859

19 L.Ed.2d 125, OSG 103... Sees 2,6, 11, “eo:

* Morgan v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,

od Ariz.App. 223, 463 P.2d 118 ...........2....... pateneed fier 2,9

~ Murphey v. Valenzuela, - ee Wee:

(1963) 95 Ariz. 30, 386 P. 2d 78. BAe ee See eee lo--

~ Parker v. Gladden, ) Stns .

385 US. 363, 17 L.Ed.2d°420, °87 S.Ct ae oe Veen

Peacock Records,-Inc. v. Checker Records, Inc., 7 ees

(7th Cir. 1966) 365 F.2d" AS eoescorneeeesin Shas wee 13

sia ford v. Talbott,

225.US. 651, 56 L.Ed. 1246, 32 S.Ct. 687. anaes sacningpemmsniens AZ

Reece v. Georgia, ° . :

350 US.A5,.100 L.Ed. 77, 76 S.Ct. 167 ee owe

Ross Engineering Co. v. Pace, : oe |

(Ath Cir. 1946) 153 F.2d 35 Se A Gee Sted oe

mith v. Price ‘Bros. Co.,

(6th Cir. 1942) 131 F.2d 750, cert, den., 318 US. 762 Bae

rm 8098, 3 Oe 00 ei le. . 16

Sossbem Pacific Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106; 283 Pac. 719 , 16

Southern R. Co. v. Kentucky, . ee

274.US. 16, pp ee Re te tip 2) eee Td

Sauthwest Cotton Cv. v. Valley Bank, |

- (1924) 26 Ariz. 559, 227 Pac. 986 0) eee 16.

vr f

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES: (Continued).

Cases: . a . . \ Page

State v. Pressley, (1952) 74° adic 3 412, 250 P.2d 992.7... lM.

Taylor v. Hubbell, (Sth Cir. 1941) 188 E.2d 106, Ag Ses 14,15"

Tube City Min. etc. Co. v.,Otterson, eet eee : won

16 Ariz. 305, 146 Pac. 203 4... .eece. pe Soy Ero} 17

United States v. Miller, (9th Cit. 1964) 331 P:2d-414 2.15

United States v. Throckmorton, Sate ae ;

(1878) 98 US. 61,25 L.Ed. 93 eas. 12

| Washington ex rel. Grays H. L. Co. v. Superior Court, | :

243 US. 251, 61 ‘L.Ed. 702, S.Ct. 295 pkteere nega Ona 1]

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ag , si

aU. ‘$9 Const. amend. VI 2/0... fisleeeaedee SMM RRCEE e-E SLD 19

, amend. VIE ee. A- 52). Ee eceneign 3.4 4, 6, ‘11

a i, 16, | t8, 19 -

amend. VIII ....... PENRO RHO Oe,

s amend. XIV oe ASP sagen ey Gey AT

, ; 14, 18,19

hae he 2423 (App. AS2) 0. a ee

ee 692 AOL Se ect re, 5

< Ast-18-$6. (App: ASB) occ eccsssectdcsctcne et

Art. 18 $8 = A553) Sistes taeda pkgaekin tecag ede 2,3, bS

STATUTES ; | pe oe oe

Ariz. Rev. Stat.*$23-906 (App. A-54) 1.0.00... ae: Ni-ae ee a, a

- $23-1061 (App. A-55). etc cectecscsossceeeeee 13

Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. ie |

Rule 60(c) €App. A-56) Piamaendt opaeatsisaeemmantoes tewtenees 9,11, br:

ee Seer, OE avec ce Ce, ae Seen: Sass aren 4, 11, 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES eee

30A Am. Jur., Judge nts, $358, pp. 399-100... Boats Vn a

U.S. Code. Title 28 $1257(3 )- :.....2.---0---- Ei I MIO ED

TM 4 >

SUPREME SOURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

- October Term, 1970.* .. - . ~ :

° % :

-_No.——r—

ROBERT. D. MORGAN; ee a

_ Petitioner,

| oa a

coe ah 4 Th, \ ;

METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC.,

a Delaware corporation, |

ape "Respondent,

PETITION FOR ‘A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

-.. THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

er -.. THE: STATE OF —

Pag

Petitianer prays that a Writ of Ceftiorari’ issue to review the

Judgment ‘of the Court of Appeals of Arizona, entered in the

above entitled case January 6, 61970.

8 - tse " 5 Siar do esi

Bo a

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW |

The opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals af- Arizona,

Division One, Dept. B, rendered January 6, 1970 affirming the

Arizona Superior Court's order denying Plaintiff's Motion tor new.

trial entered on July 25, 1967 jis reported at 11 Ariz. App. 223,

463 P.2d 118, and is iepiodnced in: — c hereto { App. :-

A-24). 7

. The ‘decision- and dissec’ in Morgan 1. ae ot -the Supreme

. ° . . . , ~ ; = Aas es 2 Do

Court of Arizona in certiorari. proceeding rendered April 12,

1967, is reported at 102 Ariz. 150, 426 P.2d 647, and ts » Fepro- |

duced in Appendix B ‘hereto ( App. A- 3)., 2 : 7

* JURISDICTION

~The pou and decision of the Arizona Court at Appeals,

— Ong Dept. B, avas entered on January 6, 1970. Rehear~

g was denied on February 19, 1970. Petition. for Review was

_ denied March 17, “1970 by the Arizona ‘Supreme Court.

~ This.Court’s order signed by Mr. Ju tice Stewart grinned | an

extension’ of time within which. to, s Petition this Court for cer-

tiorari to and including August 13, 1970. sis

“e

‘The jurisdiction of this Court j is. invoked by reason of the Pro :

visions of Title 28 United “States Code ‘$ $ 12573).

QUESTIONS’ PRESENTED

. Where a state court has been’ ousted of Jurisdiction and an

eae workman denied the right to a jury trial by means of

fraud conceived and perpetrated by the chief counsel of the Indus-

trial Commission of Arizona and its subofdinate miployecs,. does.

the: Seventh and Fourteenth. Amendments of. the Constitution of

-the United States‘ become applicable to the States in order to pro-

tect this fundamental. right, essential to a fair trial on the. issues

| gf fraud, election of remedies and waiver of said workman's right —

to’ suc his cmaployer: at common law -to recover damages under

Article. 18.°$°8 Arizona Constitution. and ARS § 23-906 D.:.-

and. E?_ 7

i Pa

in ye eae or | |

- 2. Does the Due Process Chia of die F aniadadle Amendment

~ protect the right to a jury trial. guaranteed by the Seventh Amend-

nent in a civil /case involving substantial property rights which

otherwise would be destroyed without 4 trial because of the refusals.

of the state courts” to accept pamiecen re ae SE

CONSTITUT — AND ST ATU LORY PROVISIONS *

| | “INVOLVED o-w a

The follow: ing constitutional and statutory provisions which are

involved will be" set: forth verbatim. in “Appendix F-| through

io 7 inclusive (App. "A-52-56).: # oe

an - The Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments: to itlic Constitution

of the United States (App. “A-52), Constitution ef Arizona,

Article 18-$8 (App. A-53), Article 18 § $6 (App. A-53),

‘

“Article 2 $*23 (App. A-52), A.R.S: § 23- 906 (App. A-54-55 9; .

cA.RLS. § 23-1061A ( App: A55),_ Rule 60(c). A.RCP. 16

ARS. (App. A-56). :

7 id o

STATEMENT OF THE. CASE

Robert D. Morgan, petitioner, Was employed by Metro- Gold-

wyn- -Mayer, Inc., _ (hereinafter referred to as “M-G:M”) prior to”

“April 9, 1962, as a stunt man in the filming ot the movie, “How

the West Was Won.” On location near Superior, Arizona on that

day, while in discharge of his duties, he was knocked: underethe

’ wheels of a railroad car due to the reckless conduct of an assistant

director, as a result of which Morgan suffered: gross and crippling

injuries. His right eye was destroyed, his left leg was caused to’.

he amputated substantially ahove the knee, and-he was otherwise

- * most severely injured about the face, -head and body.

Subsequently, on the 13th day of December, 1962, petitioner

filed a common law action against M-G-M in the Superior Court

of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, for °

permanent injuries and loss of eatnings which to date, after eight

and one-half years; total in excess of $225, 000.00, predicated

upon his proven earning capacity. Petitioner alleged that an INEX- |

perienced co-employee eu -caused Morgan to be knocked

- <

-§ 23-906, requiring that notices of Workme

of a

under the wlieels of the train on which he was’ performing, caus-

ing the wheels of three cars to run over him ,thereby inflicting the

injuries complained of with consequent pata, suffering, permanent

fhjury and loss. Further, that M-G-M on the date of ‘said injury

had wholly failed to: comply with the- requirements of A.R.S.

s Cdmpensation be

and rejection

conspicuotisly and continuously post

» blanks. be made avaiable to all employcks fo} their usc In reject

_ing Workmen’s Compensation benefits prior to injury, and that

‘by reason of M-G-M’s failure so to do, Morgan elected ‘to suc his

employer at common law for the injuries s and loss sustained pur-

- suant to said statute.

M-G-M answered,. gener sie denying die allegation of negli-

gence and pleading multiple defenses including the one pertinent

hereto — lack of jurisdiction upon the grounds that petitioner had

accepted benefits and thereby: waived his right to sué his employer

at common law, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. ©

On April 30, 1964, M-G-M filed a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b): and (d) Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, . 16

A.R.S.' upon’ the grounds ‘stated in the answer that the court

lacked jurisdiction by reason of Morgan’s acceptance of workmen’s

compensation benefits thereby electing his remedy and waiving his_

right tq sue; and sought a preliminary hearing to the court upon

‘these issues. On May 19, 1964 defendant's: motion for pretiminary

_ hearing .was granted over plaintiff's. objection’ (including the.

objection that-such @ hearing would deny plaintiff of his right to

jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States

Constitution ). Pretrial order was entered, whitch, among. other

things adjudicated that the motion to dismiss on the jurisdictional

.. Arizona, has adopted: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule

- 12(d) is identical with the Federal Rule. :

See Muvenan v, Actua Vreivht Lines. 79 ‘SCr. 118% 360 WS. 273,

3 LFdi3d -1224, 1229 and See Byrd v. Blake Ridge Raval Elec. Coop.

_78 S.Ct. 893 (1958), 356 US. 525; 2 L.Ed.2d 953, 962.

question would be heard without a jury bat that the issues of

negligence and damages would be submitted to a jury.

On Fane 4, 1964 petitioner ioughe certiorari upon said .order *

in the Arizona Supreme Court cause No. $8407, on. the grounds

that his right to a jury trial had been denied’ The Supreme Court

_ refused to issue said writ on June 9, 1964.

Thus, the preliminary hearing-on jurisdiction was conducted

betore a trial judge, sitting without a jury, commencing on June

10, 196-4, and continuing on through the cleventh, twelfth and

fifteenth days of June, 196-4 at which time the court ordered a

jury for the following day’s trial. On June 16, 1964, at the con-

clusion of argument on the legal and factual issues, the court took

defendant’ s motion. to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under advise-

ment and declined to rule on the jurisdictional question in advance

of a jury trial on the remaining issues of negligence and damages.

M-G-M then petitidned the Arizona Supreme’ Court for a writ of

mandamus (Cause No. 8421 ), demanding that the trial judge be

ordered to rule on the jurisdictional question before proceeding

further. The Arizona Supreme Court. on that sanie day, without

“written opinion “(contrary to Article 6 $ 2 of the Constitution of

- Arizona) issued a preemptory writ directing the trial court ‘to

rule. On June 17, 1964 the trial,court granted M-G-M’'s motion

to dismiss for lack .of jurisdiction. Findings of tact, ace ap ot”

law and+ judgment ‘thereon was entered on January 5, +1965.

Among its findings’ and, conclusions the court found that Pie

on or about April 33, 1962, had either executed ‘or caused to be

executed and filed with the Industrial Commision of Arizona the

“Workman's Report of Injury and Application for Benefits” (de-

nominated ‘throughout the record as Form C-407 App. A-39.)

(patently » referring to the forged document semeyer had

obtained as hereinafter set forth); and that sane théeto he

had ireceivéd and accepted both medical and’ cowapensation. bene-

fits, hereby effectively-making an irrevocable election of remedies

and waived any right or option to sue his entployer at common

law, even though the court also found that M-G-M had not

fulfilled its statutory’duty to post workmen's compensation notices

on the job site (App. A-54).

At this point, Morgan again petitioned’ the Arizona Supreme

| Court, (Cause No. 8653) fora writ of certiorari to review said

‘judgmént upon the grounds, among others, that he had been

denied the right of trial by jury on the issues contrary to the pro-

visions of Article 2 § 23 of. the Arizona Constitution and the

Seventh and Fourteenth Amendmengs to the Constitution ot the

United States. This writ was granted and on April 12; 1967 the

Supfeme Court of Arizona, in a split three-to-two decision affirmed,

with Justice Fred C. Struckmeyer authoring a vigorous dissent,

‘concurred in by Chief Justice Charles C. Bernstein. The decision

is reported at 102 Ariz. 150, 426 P.2d 647 (App. A-3).

’ Within the time permitted by the rule, Morgan next filed in

this Court a petition for certiorari to review the aforesaid judg-

ment of the Supreme Court of Arizona upon the grounds that

petitioner had been denied the right of jury trial guaranteed by

the Seventh and/Fourteenth Amendments and that he had further

been denied due- process of law (Cause No. 454, Octobér Term,

1967) On October 9,-1967, the majority yoted to deny the writ

with Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas voting to grant:

(389 US. 859, 19 L:Ed.2d 125, 88 S.Cr. 105).

Charles M. Brewer, counsel for petitioner, on or about March

15, 1965 first- discovered that the trial court had been ousted

of jurisdiction by mieans of multiple acts of fraud) (A.R. 168).

This occurred at a luncheon meeting between Mr. Brewer and

Richard J. Daniels, chief counsel of the Industrial Commission

of Arizona and Who was associated as co-counsel for M-G-M in

the aforesaid preliminary hearing. Daniels revealed the fact that

Glenn E.. Jurgemeyer, claims investigator for the Industrial Com-

mission of Arizona who purportedly obtained the “Workman's.

Report of Injury and Application’ for Benefits” (Form C-407),

had been secreted or was told to absent himself from Maricopa

. . .

Ps x y

ete ye et

County to-avoid testifying at the trial. Having been unable to

serve Jirgemeyer with a subpoena requiring, his attendance at.

the preliminary hearing, Brewer in concert WwW ith two other attor-

neys, intersogated Jurgemeyer in the presence of the chief inves-

tigator ‘of -the Industrial. Commission of Arizona (Elmer: sous oh

with Jurgemeyer admitting in the recorded interview that’ he

had never seen Morgan in the hospital and that he neither

obtained nor filed the Form C-407 purportedly signed by Morgan —

and filed with the Commission (App. A-39). Concluding from

this that Morgan’s signature on the Form C-407 was a. forgery,

Brewer promptly secured the services of Dr. Paul Kirk, a qualified

and nationally known criminologist, consultant on .questioned

documents and handwriting expert, who examined the document

Form C- 107 and executed an affidavit that Morgan's signature

appearing on the said Form C-407 was either a forgery-or placed

thereon by the direct intervention of another person who guided

the hand of Morgan in affixing his signature thereon -( App. ,

A-40). Jurgemeyer Was next interrogated’ by the Maricopa

County Attorney's Office at which time he admitted that he ob-

tained the Form C-407 from Morgan and that he did not in-any

way assist Morgan in affixing his signature thereto. He further

stated that he secured said signature between 10:30 and 11:00

a.m.-on April 23, 1962,

This. version of Jurgemeyer's complicity in the fraud is made

wholly incredible by the affidavits of two of Morgan’s physicians

who,were, in attendance at his bedside removing wire sutures from

his leg preparatory to surgery thereon scheduled later in the day.

The physicians were assisted by a nurse who recorded on ‘her

patient’s hospital chart (nurses notes) that the procedures car-

ried out ‘by the physicians were performed at the exact time

Jurgemeyer claims to have obtained Morgan’s: signature. Both

physicians and the nurse unequivocably state that neither Jurge-

meyer nor any other claims investigator was in Morgan's room at,

the time or even on the day Jurgemeyer claims to have ohinined

- the C-407.

Dr. Willard Hunter, Morgan’s orthopedic surgeon, gave an —

. * : ¢ ee

eal

; 8

affidavit in which he verifies that he not only advised the nurse

" not to let-anyone attempt to contact Morgan at said time but that

Morgan at that time was neiher lucid nor rational and tacked”

comprehension, and was physically unable to even hold a fountain

pen because. of his-position on the. fracture. bed‘a which he lay

(App. “A-43). Morgan’s other physician, Dr. Payl B.. Jarrett,

confirms petitioner’s complete incapacity on said date ¥A.R. 211).

in Morgan’ s special nurse (Krouse) not only corroborates the state-

" meénts of the two physicians but further alleges that Industrial

Commission employees attempted a bribe to secure her testimony

‘at the preliminary hearing to the effect that Morgan was lucid

- or rational at or near the time he purportedly executed the C-407,

for which said Commission would award her workmen’s compen-

‘sation upon a claim then pending with the Commission’ for in-

juries purportedly sustained while employed. at another hospital

(App. A-46). This attempted bribe is corrobdrated in full by a .

“Memorandum Confidential” from the chief special agent of the

Industrial Commission to its chief counsel, the said Richard ¥.

Daniels, explaining that workmen's compensation had been paid

to nurse Krouse “‘in order to put her in a more cooperative frame

of mind” (App. A-44). After a new chief counsel had been

appointed for the Industrial Commission, Glenn E. Jurgemeyer

gave his third version of his complicity in the ‘ ‘Morgan affair”

admitting in writing that-he had secreted himself in Pinal County,

Arizona under an ashumied | ame until after the preliminary hear-

ing had been as at the express direction of Richard J.

Daniels (App. A-51). The foregoing was corroborated by other

responsible officials of said Industrial Commission, to wit: Elmer ~

' E. Snow, chief investigator (A.R. 194), C. E- Singer, Jr., chief °

referee (App. A-50), T. H. (Jack) Newman, Jr., legal investi-.

-- gator (A.R. 229), Archie R. Tufts, claims investigator Sit

244). .

Based on‘ this nesly discovered evidence of fraud contaminat-

ing the judgment, petitioner filed a motion for a new trial in the

* ie

9 - oa im es

Superior Court of Maricopa Councy, under Rule 0c) A.B.CP....

showing: the following:

1. That the ’ ‘Workman’ s.Report of tetas and Appli¢ation ‘for

Benefits” purportedly filed by Robert D. Morgan was a forgery.

On April 23, 1962, Morgan was physically incapable and men- |

tally incompetent. by reason of his injuries to execute such an.

“instrument, or to comprehend the nature or consequences of any

act according to his doctors and nurse who emphatically deny the:

presence of any state claims agent.

. That Richard J. Daniels, chief counsel for the Seles:

Copsistigine of Arizona (also employed as associate counsel and

as a witness, for M-G-M at the preliminary hearing) had directed

and caused Glenn E. Jurgemeyer, the Indusfrial Commission

claims investigator who purportedly oo ie “Workman’s

Report of Injury and Application:for Benefits” orm C-407) to

_. avoid a subpoena issued out of the court oa his attendance

at the trial and to absent himself from Maricopa County under an

assumed name until the cause had been concluded, thereby pre-

venting petitioner from fully exhibiting his case.

The 60(c) motion and relevant portions of the supporting

_ documents furnishéd to the trial court are contained i in the Appen-

dix E 1-9 (App. A-34-51). Said motion was continued by stipula-

tion of the parties pending determination of the pretogative writ _

to the Arizona Supreme Court (No. 8653) above and was ulti-

mately denied ‘aftér oral argument by formal written order on -

July 25; 1967. An appeal from said order was takén by Morgan

to the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona, Division One, .

Department B, which court rendered \jts decision on January 6,

1970 affirming the denial of petitioner’s motion, for new trial.

Rehearing was denied by said court February 19, 1970 and peti-

tion for review to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona was

denied on March 17,1970. On June 16, 1970 Mr. Justice Potter

Stew art\upon Morgan’s petition, ordered that the time for filing

*. . ° r . e ~ . . . .

a petition for Writ of Certiorari herein be extended to and includ-

ing August 13, 1970. | ; | ; ee | )

ARGUMENT AND REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

\__ Petitioner urges the following reasons why the tain for

Writ of Certiorarit should’ be granted in this case:

The petitioner has been denied. the fundame ae tal right to trial ‘

by jury deemed essential to a fair trial upon the issugs of fraud,

waiver, and election of remedies, resulting Th the refusal of the

" state court to assume jurisdiction. The contest from its inception —

was unequal, and remained so throughout the proceeding because

the fraud was practiced upon petitioncr by representatives of the

Industrial Commission 6f Arizona and his employer M-G-M at a

time when Morgan_was rendered physically helpless and mentally

inserisible from the near fatal injuries ‘sustained in performance of

his work. On April 23, 1962 while Morgan was virtually mori-

bund, Glenn E. Jurgemeyer, the Industrial-Commission claims

investigator, procured a forged or otherwise fraudulent ‘“Work-

man’s Report of Injury and Application for Benefits” (Form

C-407 ) bearing petitioner's purported signature thereon and which

"was received in the Commission’s office ‘on April 24, 1962. The

claim was thereupon approved for payment and the Conniditesion

issued checks in partial payment of petitioner’s medical expenses

for hospital, doctors and nursing care and treatment and further ©

issued a number of compensation checks payable to petitioner

commencing with the date of April 27, 1962 and concluding on

‘November 21, 1962. These checks were deposited to Morgan's

acciunt althoygh there is not a,scintilla of evidence in the record |

. that Morgan was advised, knew or understood that by accepting

the same he was electing his remedy under the Worknicn’s Com-

pensation Act and was waiving his right to sue his employer.

The filing of the “Form C-407” together with.the payment of

benefits as aforesaid, canstituted the elements of M-G-M's defense

asserted at the preliminary’ hearing in the state court betwe cen dates

dm,

of June 10th and 15th, 1962, The federal question as ‘to whether

» petitioner was. entitled to 4 jury trial.of the issues under the Sev- |

enth Amendment was promptly raised at the trial level in Mor- °

gan’s objections to M-G-M’s request for a hearing under Rule

12(d); and petitioner's right to a jury trial under the Seventh

and Fourteenth"Amendments was again raised in Morgan’ S peti-

tion for certiorari to t the Arizona Supreme Court (No. 3653)

~ which was granted to review the findings, conclusions and judg-

ment entered on Jantiary 5, 1965, by the trial court at the con-

clusion of the preliminary hearing. The Arizona Supreme Court in.

its decision on an extended certiorari filed April 12, 1967, in

Morgan v. Hays, supra, affirmed the trial court's denial of the

right to a jury trial without mention of the federal constitutional

guarantees, and in ruling on the merits held the findings, con-

clusions and judgment to be sustained by the evidence.

While this petition for certiorari is taken from the judgment of

the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona, Sustaining the

superior court’s denial of petitioner's motion for new trial under

Rule 60(c) A.R.C.P., it is submitted that petitioner is not thus

toreclosed from reliance on the basic and fundamental. right to a

trial by jury preserved by Article 2 § 23 of the Arizona.Consti-

‘tution and the guarantees of the Seventh: and Fourteenth Amend-

_ments of the United States Constitution in that the federal ques-

tion, having been considered in the Supreme Court of Arizona on .

the certiorari. (No. 8653) is properly before this Court. Gant ..

Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98, 53 S.Ct. 530, 77 L.Ed. 1058;

‘Washington ex rel. Grays H. L. Co. v. Superior Court. 243 US.

251, 37 Sup.Ct.Rép. 295, 61 L:Ed. 702; Erie R. Co. v. Purdy,

-185 US. 148, 154, 46 LEd. 847,.850, 22 Sup.Ct.Rep: 605;

Southern R..Co. v. Kentucky, 274 US. 76, 90, 91, 47 Sup.Ct.Rep.

542, 71 L.Ed. 934, 941; Reece v. Georgia. 350. U.S. 85, 100 -

L.Ed. 77, 76 S.Ct. 167. |

‘As stated, the Arizona Supreme Cone sustained the superior.

court judgement for lack of jurisdiction upon the assumption that

Morgan had know ingly applied for and accepted the benefits pro-

‘ re

‘

influencing the

vided under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that by reason

thereof. was conclusively deemed to’have waived his right to sue

at common law under state statutes and case law. On. the motion

. ‘new trial, it was conclusively shown:

. Thac. Morgan did not execute the “Workman's Report of

a and ‘Application for Benefits,” but that his signature on ‘said

form C-407 was the product of a forgery (App. A-40, 42);

my That Morgan _waNphysicallyincapable-of signing and’ men-

tally incompetent to understand or comprehend the significance

ot. - election of remedies _ accomplished thereby (App: A-43,

46); ae, ; — “

a That the judgment was. isla by . hewad cactiioed: and

directed by Richard J. Daniels — chief counsel for the Industrial

Commission of Arizona and co-counsel for M-G-M in the conduct

of the preliminary hearing, intentionally causing GlennE. Jurge

meyer to avoid the service of a.subpoena issued at the request of

-_petitioner’s counsel-requiring said witness's testimony to ber given

at said hearing, and further causing said witness to be secreted out-

‘side the county where. the hearing was conducted under. an

assumed name until the case had been concluded, thereby effec-'

tively preventing Morgan from fully exhibiting. his case and dem-

onstrating the fraud which wa8 ultimately unfolded (App. A-51).

Where, as in this case, a litigant has been prevented from fully

exhibiting his case by fraud,- either, in Me presentatijn of forged

instruments, perjured testimony, or in secreting witnesses, thereby

U.S. v. Throckmarton, 98 US. 61, 25 L.-Ed.93 ( 1878); and see

Hazel-Atlas 5 Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 US. 238, 246,

64 S.Ct: 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944); and Pickford v. Talbott:

_ 225 US. 651, 56 L.Ed. 1246, 32 S.Ct. 687, holding that when a

_ judgment is.procured by a fraud on the. court, the insult to public

institutions is so great that it cannot he tolerated in an ordered

society and requires a new trial: Where cither perjured testimony

or forged documents influence the ¥endition of a*judgment it

judgment entercd, a new trial’ must: be granted..

13 | 3 bes ce

ee the duty of a court to grant a new trial; Peacock Records, ee

Inc. v.. Checker Records, Inc., (7th Cit. 1966) 365 F.2d. 145,

147; ae see Brady v. Beams (10th Cit. 1942) 132 F.2d 985-

987, Wherein it is, among other things, held that wrongfully pre-

_ventinig a material witness ae ‘attending the trial constitutes

extrinsic. fraud upon the coyrt “justifying: relief. Accord: Clavey

, Loney, 80 Cal.App. 20, 251. Pac. 232; Godfrey v. Godfrey,

60 Cal. App:2d 370, 86 P.2d. 357; Jeffords v. Young, 277 P.2d

163 (Cal).

Having prevailed in the hearing condu¢ted under Rule 12(b)

(d) A.R.C.P. because’ of the: fraud practiced: upon the court by

- one of its attorneys, M- G-M is estopped to. dispute’ or ‘reftite the

cffectiveness of the contrivances bringing abeut the judgment and

ippellate court decisions based thereon which: followed. Hazel

» Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Con. supra; nor will jgde per-

mitted to escape thé Consequences of the deception practiced upon

all the courts which. have heretofore undertaken to review’ this

cause%on a record. then seemingly. devoid. ef fraud. See also, at

cock Records, enc. v. Checker Records, Inc.,-supta.

Except for Morgan's forged signature upon. the Form C-407

andthe wholly’ unauthorized filing of the same, the Industrial

Commission of Arizona ‘would. have been entirely without juris-

diction and could not have made an award’ of benefits of any

: “eo The Arizona. Supreme Court i in its recent decision of Collins

ares edges that no jurisdiction is granted the InduStrial Com-

mission of Arizona until a formal application. is filed Dursuant to .

. The Industrial Commission, 102 Ariz. 509, a 2d S01,

- ARS. § 23-1061 (App. A-55). | eer ee

At this-point. we deem it imperative to point out that the Ari-

zona. legislature intended a built-in safeguard to prevent over- -

: zealous ‘claims investigators or.other industrial ‘commission per-

sonnel from defrauding injured workmen. or Subverting the

purposes of the Act, in thar § 23-1061 in part states:

See The physician’ shall inform the injured cinployce “of

~ A

—

ee Re eae ee

ie his rights under: this chapter and shull give “ull necessary as-

sistance in making the application for compensation and such

proof as required by the rules of the Commission ‘without

charge.” (Emphasis supplied )

Thre i is not one scintilla of evidence hat” anyone informed Mor-.

gan as to his rights en April 23,962, when the C-407 pur- ,

portedly was obtained. The evidence is exactly to the contrary, for

Dr. Willard S. Hunter had in effect placed a “no visitors” sign -

on Morgan's door, barring all claims men and other investigators

interested in-the case, because Morgan was in such poor mental

and physical condition he simply wasn’t competent to deal with

« them (App. A-43). er,

If Glenn E. Jurgemeyer, Industrial Eomoniesion sc claims investi-

gator who procured and tiled the C-407 ) a0 the Commission,

had not been secreted from *the trial atéthe direction of * the

Commissidn’s chicf coyinsel, Richard J. Daniels, the shabby fraud

perpetrated upon petitioner could have*been detected by the court

and the hypocrisy of M-G-M's procedural strategy. and substantive

‘defense on the jurisdictional aspect laid bare. — , ys

As the matter stands here it is plain that notwithstanding’ state

‘law scemingly giving petitioner the right to his day in court, state:

judges have cither been unequal to the task or insensitive to the

commands of not only the State Constitiition but also the Due yg

Process® Clause: of ‘the Fourteenth Amendment protecting the

Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.. The view

“that in case brought under the _ provisions of the Workmen's

Compensation Act the trial court's jurisdiction, was a question off — *

law to be determined by the court without a jury w is first given:

voice in the United States Court of Appeals-in Taylor 1. Hubbell,

(9th Cir. 1951) 188 F.2d 106, which was followed by the _

Arizona Supreme Court a short ti time later i in, its decision in State ‘

, Pressley, 74 Ariz. 112, 250 P.2d 992 1952). Arizona has

‘ever since.adhered to'the rule thus laid down although it scems

to have countenanced a jury trial upon the same jurisdictional’

Ca . ’

See

question herg at issue in, Jucve v. Del E. W ‘ebb: Constr. Ca 6

~ Ariz. +18, 2 P.2d 1076 (1954) wherein it is said?

ane hesimportynt issué to determine in this appeal is hese

appellant submitted any competent evidence’ that’ entitled in

to go to the jyry upon the ground that: sdefendant-appellee

monn,

failed to post a notice as. required " the’ satute, (Emphasis.

supplied )

Mageover, the 9th Circuit decision in 7 ‘oda £, Hubbell, supra,

is not.consistant with its prior decision in Miles v. Lavender. (Yth

Cir. 1926) 10 F.2d 450, which recognized the necessity of a jury .

trial when expressly aus with. the question of election of

remedies | under the’ Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act. In

that casg ‘ait injured workman, w as allowed to prevail even though

he Jkad applied” for and accepted benefits for a substantial period

before commencing his action in the District Court\of Arizona.

~The view that a written election may be-considered voidable by

a claimant under the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act if

there has not been an intentional abandonment of a known right +

or privilege is again expressed in United States v. Miler. (9th

e Cir..1964).331 F.2d 414, 416 which held that a claimant was ‘not

foreclosed by having had accepted compensation payments in:

Arizona for a period of twenty-three months where it did riot

appear that the claimant had -knowledge of her ‘fights. The 9th

Circuit seems to have come full circle since in. 1959 that court in

Marks Food Corpordtion 1. Barbara Ann-Biking-Co., 274 F2d

«O34, sustained the right to a jury trial and quoted extensively

from Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 US. 500, 3° L.Ed.2d

, 988, 79: S.Cr. 948, and in a footnote qualified its holdings in

Taylor ve Hubbell. supra. ‘ . | .

The foregoing makes ‘it clear that petitioner heré is. the victim |

ofa construction’ of state law which was originated in the federal —

‘-courts although. such courts havé now abandoned their, prior

Views. . Albeit, Arizona courts, in this type of. action, deny ‘petitioder

a jury trial-upon ISSUCS. which are-qtiestions of fact.

The issues of Ww aiver, release, election of remedies, in common

q .

tad

law. civil actions have always’ been triable to a jury in both the

state and federal. courts: Smith v. Price Bros. Co., (6th Cir.

1942), 131 F.2d 750, cért. denied, 318 U.S. 762, 87 L:Ed. 1134,

63 S.Ct. 560; Dice ti. Akron C..G Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 96

" L.Ed. 398, 72 S.Cr. 3.12 > Johnson v. American- Hawauan S. S. Co.

(Oth Cir. 1938), 98 F.2d Si7” Miles v. Lavender, _ Byrd

wv. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop, — :

See also Ross. Engineering Co. 9, Puce (4th Cir. 1946), 153 —

‘F.2d 35, 50 (waiver); Cannon.v. Travelers Indemnity Compan)

(8th Cir. 1963) 314 F.2d 657 (waiver )s Cowles 0. Ohio Farm-

ers Insurance Group (Ath Cit. 1957), 242: F.2d 73; Buffum v.

Chase Nat. Bank of -City fe York (7th Cir. 1951) 192

F.2d 58,-eert. denied, 34 £944, | 96.1. Ed. 702, 72 S.Ct. 558.

- State courts also gfant jury trials on issues. of waiver and re-

lease. See Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Modern Homes,

84 Ariz. 399, 330 P.2d 113 (1958); Marphey v. Valens =uela, 7

95 Ariz. 30, 386. P.2d 78 (1963); City of Tucson v. ‘Koerber.

82 Ariz. 347, 313 P.2d 411 (1957); In re-Brwidt's Estate, 67

Ariz.,42, 190 P.2d 497 (1948); Meason’ v. Ralston dodo Co.,

56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224; Southwest Cotton Co, v. Valley

Bank, 26 Ariz. 559, 227 ‘Pac’ .986 (192: 1) 5/ ‘and also: grant jury ;

trials on issues of fraud:

Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Ass nU. Day (Tex.) 17 S.W.2d 1043

270; Duncan-t- Pexas Employers’ Ins. Ass'n 105 S.W’. 2d 403,

~ 405; Bullocks v. Texas ais. eae Ins. Ass p 2544 YM.2d 554;

’ Mich.) Southern Pacific Co\-v. Gastelum. 36° Ariz: 106, 123,

283 Pac. 719; Brown v. Amo Aor: “R. Co., 183 Mich. 574

— 149 NW. 1030. we 4 :

Though adjuring for-dgcades that the first ten Amendments -

are not concerned with state action,: and’ a corollary: that the

Seventh Amendment applies, only to proceedings ‘in the courts

of the United Statés. and does not in. any manner whatever

govern or regulate. trials by jury in state courts as the standards

_. which must be applied ‘concerning same; Minnéapolis & 3t..L. RK.

Co. v. Bombolis. 241 US. 211,,60 L.Ed. 961, 36 Sup. Cr. 595;

~ 17.

_.° this Court has not remained insensitive to the necessities for

changes in the construction of’ these Amendments..

_ Fact questions on the issue of fraud, waiver, and: release have

uniformly: been considered issues which must be submitted’ to

a jury under both state and federal law. We should be immod-

est, did we not urge Justice Struckmeyer’s dissent (concurred

' in by Chief Justice Bernstein) in Morgan v. Hays, supra, (App.

7 " A-14 4), as our’ best reasons why Morgan is entitled to a jury

‘trial under state law. Where fraud has tainted the judgment at

issue, the reasoning of that) dissent becomes: much mofe per-

_suasive, even though the facts disclosed in petitioner's 60(c)

“motion were unknown, ‘and were.not considered at ‘the. time

~ the case. was reviewed by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Although petitione: ‘ cheatly, ‘convincingly, and ceed con-

clusively, demonstrated that the’ judgment. dismissing plaintift’s

‘ complaint was the result of fraud which was not kitewn at the

time of the hearing or shown to the Arizona: Supreme Court on

the certiorari, (and patently was not considered there) the trial

court, remaining obdurate on the jurisdictional question, denied

relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, Morgan v. Hays, supra,

onthe grounds or res judicata, citing the very findings.and con-

clusions entered by. the trial court relied upon in the Arizona .

Supreme Court's decision on the certiorari, which were, and are

i irredeemably tainted. by the fraud practiced on. the court in

‘secreting a material witness and forging documents prerequisite

and indeed indispensible to any attempt to gust the court of

jurisdiction. Moreover, it is uniformly held that ‘the doctrine of

res judicata may not be invoked. to sustain a judgment ‘obtained

by means of fraud. The réason is well stated in 30A Am.Jur.,

Judgments, $358, pp. 399-400. Arizona is committed to the

principle that a ‘final judgment’ may-always be impeached for

fraud Taube City Min. ete. Co. ts Otterson. 16 Ariz. 305, 146:

Pac. 203; City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz: 214, 29 ‘P.2d 1062.

The rule-is particularly applicable where, as here, the fraud goes

18 cl

‘ < . ©

to the jurisdiction of the court; Grund 1. B. af se eeaiaas | Engrs.

v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.2d 971.

Lastly, there was no impediment to the tiling of the 60(c)

motion after the Supreme Court's ruling on the certiorari, since

petitioner first returned to that court and was there granted leave

to seek relief if any was to be granted at the trial level.

Lying at the very threshold of our contention that this Court -

should issu¢ the writ under the Due Process Clause of the Four:

teenth Amendment is the illuminating language of the ma-

jority opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. |: 15, 20 L.Ed.2d

491, 88 S.Ct. Lid, wherein’ the majority recounts: that no less

than ‘five of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution are

now made applicable to the states.

* While Mr. Justice White did not in that decision inglude the

‘Eighth Amendment among those protected against state action

by the Due Process Clause, it must certainly be included under

‘Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 8 S.Ct.

7921, 93 A.L.R.2d 733. From this we observe shat the neces-

sities of the people have changed this Court's construction of the

Bill of Rights trom its early position that none of the first ten

Amendments were applicable to the states, Minn. 6 S. L. R. Co.

v. Bombolis, supra, to the current status where fifty per cent of

said first ten Amendments have been held by this Court to be

applicable to the states. We are not aware that this Court has

. directly held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial ’

under state law, and yet there is'no reason why this should not be’

so in this unique afd. selective case. Here the “record shows that

‘an agency of the State of Arizona, thrdugh its responsible officials

arid employees, have defrauded a crippled workman out of his day

in court. Despite strenuous efforts to correct the wrong, Morgan is

still without a remedy, although undeniably he has the right to

sue his employer under the Constitution of the State of Arizona,

Article 18 §8, (App.*A-53) and the statutesenacted by the legis-

Jature, pertinent thereto, A.R.S. $23-906. These . circumstances

- &

’

<..

patently Show that Morgan’s right’ is among those “fundamental

principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our

-civil-and political institutions”; it is a right “basic in our system of

jurisprudence” and it is “a fundamental right essential to a fair

trial”. These paraphrases from Durican v. Loutsidna, supra, are the

heart of the quest here.’

If the potential of a ‘ial sentence of two years on a-conv iction

tor an offense triable without a jury was sufficient to invoke the

Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights guaranteed « under

the Sixth Amendment (Duncan v. Louisiana, supra), then surely

the same reasoning requires that the Seventh Amendnient pro-

tect a jury trial inthis civil action for damages’ which have strip-

ped Morgan of his manhood as well ag his livelihood,

No tribunal .has been more sensitive than’ thisjCourt to the

necessity for updating and even upgrading the quaficy of the law

throughout the nation, especially as it relates to due process in

" \al of its applications.

Parker v. Gladden. 385 U.S. 363, 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 87 S.Ct.

468, while dealing with a criminal case, is a clear indication that

when state officers (there a court bailiff) prejudice the rights of a

-defendant in the eyes of a jury it is sufficient to be controlled

by the command of the Sixth Amendment made applicable to

the states through the Due Process Clause of the. Fourteenth

Amendment. Here’ petitioner was prejudiced in an even more

serious manner since his entire: life i is affected by his loss of sight

and limb. : | | ,

Either it should be held that the devon Tenaadiiine is applic-

able to the states or that the fraud perpetrated by the’ chief counsel’

- and subordinate employees-of the Arizqna Industrial Conimission

violated the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the

Due Process €tause of the Fourteenth. See Mr. Justice Hirlan’s

concurring Opinion in ssid t. North € Carolina, 386 U.S. 21.3,

“. é

ess L,Ed.2d. 1, 87 S.Ct 988. .

ee 4

20.

CONCLUSION

“he Writ of Certiorari should issue in this case for the reasons

stated.

bdenbiae os

¢é

STEWART L. UDALL

~ 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington, D. C. 20006.

Attorney for Petitioner |

ye Certificate of Service ,

IT Hereby Certify that three trut copies of the foregoing

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Appendix thereto were: de-

livered to Robert Park, Chief Counsel, Arizona. State Compen-

sation Fund, 1616 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona, $5007,

and to Jennings, Strouss.& Salmon, 111 West Monroe Street,

Phoenix, Arizona, 85003, this 12th day df August, 1970,

Stewart L. Udall >t

. ,

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LISRARY | aera Pre

7 | SEP 12 1970

JPREME COURT, U. S.

_E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT TES

October Term, 1979 ae

| No. 532 | .

? os Q ¥ : ; \

” METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC. -

7 a Delaware corporation, ee ah ee

Respondent,

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO. &

_ PETITION FOR A. WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

_°. °.... THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

iA ‘ THE STATE OF ARIZONA :

,» 0. ROBERT K, PAK a ¢

Bee 1616 W. Adams ee

Phoenix, Arizona .

JENNINGS, STROUSS .& SALMON

Rex H. Moore

Rex E. Lee |

111. W. Monroe

Phoenix, Arizona

Attorneys for Respondent

Petitioner, °

por

ae ie

3s j

TABLE OF CONTENTS / |

Jurisdiction | ae makin ee ees Z hi J

/ .

Cpeetioms Paceiign i 5o2ccetec len Perc RaRe ay 2 Aid

Atizona Rulé of Givil Procedure tee 35 , f Qe

Statement of the Case ... ES Ment See 1 3

Reasons for Denying the Writ 2220000000000 08 cece Sa ae

Conclusion .:....... MRE cla paeerepmapeen dr 3 Fnorhi I Wi 2. SO

_ Appendix A. .......... oe EN Yi wi oe ses ee ees ee 22

un PS ee om. Fe

= 7 tc - . e ‘ - : - , + F 7 : 2

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Fa _ . e 6

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.