Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Southern Pacific Co.

LIBRARY 7; wearer

SUPRBEMG& COURT. UW &

MAR 14 1969

No. d 157

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Missouri Paciric Rarroap Comvany,

Petitioner.

Vv.

SouTHerNn Paciric Company,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To ture Court or Crvit APPEALS FOR THE

FourTEENTH SUPREME JupiciaL District or TEXAS

Ben G. SEweE 1.

701 Capital National Bank

Bldg.

Houston, Texas 77062

Of Counsel:

SEWELL, JuNELL & Rices

701 Capital National Bank Bldg.

Houston, Texas 77002

FIDELITY PRINTING COMPANY, INC., HOUSTON

JOHN F. DAVIS, ce

SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE

Opinion Below (Citation) .....cccccseseneeneeeneseseesessseseseeseeenens 1

SUPIMAICEION — cccecosesersssssveccosersesocsnnsvesssnecseccssenssnovesesesenesressessevanesosecs 2

Question Presented ...........scssssessesessssesees sceventiinianciieineiiucieins 2

Statute IUnmvolved .......ccccoccsrssesresssscsscsrsccsccersscesssvesevesvessvesvensevosees 2

Statement of the Case ..........cccrscsccccsssosssrssessccsecssccesecsseseneoesaees 3

Reasons For Granting the Writ ..............sccccssssscssecsssesssescsesees 4

Importance of Question and Errors In Decision of State

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COMCHIBION — .osrccccvesssesscesssvcesevescsosseenscsssoscceonccscsssessronsssesenenesaseoneeee 12

Appendix A: Statute Involved... cccssseeseserenesnensnenenensees la

Appendix B: Opinion of Court of Civil Appeals ............0000 2a

Appendix ©: Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals ........ 13a

Appendix C-a: Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals

Overruling Motion For Rehearing ..........ccseeeseeeeeeeeeeeees 15a

Appendix D: Excerpt From Application For Writ of Error 16a

Appendix E: Certified Copy of Order of The Supreme

Court OF Texas ...ccccscccoscscrscereccsrsccrsscrcsscscoscssessosvcssessenceoossooseee 17a

Appendix F: Stipulation as to Transcript of Record —

BRUNO BD wecescesncscssosccvcccenessonscescsonescneseeennsasnoenscessoveeseesocsonssossnenoene 19a

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Arnold v. Panhandle & 8.F. R. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 1 L.ed. 2d

889 at 891, 77 S. Ct. 840 ou... .ccssscsssccrsscsercssesesesssssesesseaessses 4

Baltimore & O.S.W.R. Co. v. United States, 242 F. 420, 425

(Gth Cir. — 1917) ..c.cccssssssssesseeseessseneneerseesensssensssnsnesaneseserstes 7

Brady v. Terminal R. Asso., 303 U.S. 10, 15, 58 S. Ct. 426,

Be i RE ccareckssencceresascarsanssssessavenensavsntenssonsoeneesensounionaseounbonne 6

Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 205 F. 2d 589 (5th

Cir. — 1953, Cert. Denied, 346 U.S. 873, 74 S. Ct. 123,

QB Lied. SEZ) .......csccocsrsecsscsserssccseccvscersornsesserssesssscesesseseesessosssess 9

ee a ene ee etek atk

il

Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.,

280 F. 2d 110 (8th Cir. — 1960) cert. Denied, 81 S. Ct.

378, 364 U.S. 931, 5 Lied. 2d 864 cccccccssessssccossscecoeccc

Clark v. Atlantie Coast Line Railroad Co., 244 F. 2d 368

ep Mbinitans sR HR CLEATS SII

Cush v. Pittsburgh Chartiers & Youghiogheny Ry. Co., 157

F. Supp. 350 (W.D. a ess | RRR UI I

Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. Co. y. Nass, 59 S.W. 870 (Tex. —

SNE rstsinsthciaiatidascdninesisiieindaiusiaisnpasablaieieidssmigieiiicn.

Kernan vy. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 2 Lied. 2d 382

oe Sey AF a ANE pitchrneenntere sicbietioenindiihapanstonrieicas oases da.

Lowe v. New York Central Ry. 148 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mich.

ENO E” "St leah tbindalpedaipicigeaintondbenesdieinumessencians.acc

Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 482, 67 S. Ct. 1334, 91

FR I - eabbinclatinhessaidtncalninistitceueinidinetiloamiienues a ok

O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 70 S. Ct.

200, 94 Lied. 187, 16 ALR 2d 646 oeccccccsssecscsssssesssssseccess..,

Patton v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 197 F. 2d 732 (3rd Cir.

a ee

Rufo v. Orlando, 309 N.Y. 345, 130 N.E. 2d 887 (1955) ........

San Antonio Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484, 36 S. Ct. 626,

Oe I IE TIED cords Chtcinsihoanioreeas acaba taae ie

Tex. & P.R. Co. v. Sherer, 183 S.W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. —

BEE MID winiesdriiessocewntosenititinibineapiziipipnice ody orgs

Union Stoek Yards Company v. Chicago, Burlington &

Quincey Railroad Co. 196 U.S. 217, 25 S. Ct. 226, 49 L.ed.

ci sg tN RE, SOAS

421, 424 (Sth Cir. — 1954) oieeeccccccsssssecssessssssssecssescoosecess.,

U.S. v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 361 U.S. 78, 4 Led.

vorositen tensnpege toe Rig Te LIES

United States v. Southern Pacifie Co., 187 F. 699 (D.C.,

SAUL. secseaibbdiesniadeapessniecsssbsnesicisesminiteisiasidviunatiaseiatainssiis sie.

9, 10

6

10

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PAGE

Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189, 69 5. Ct. 1018, 93 L.ed.

SOOe STRIND. -Aaversstrsinstesrsstetionibsensiappieuibitiivea deus neue... 10

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

atcsiitadt baonscrdhe i: ee 2

Safety Appliance Act of 1910, 32 Stat. 298, 45 USC § 11-16 2,5

Ne Sew HIE nibcoeneseneauainannunhaacene nicl ica 3

TL Stat. 852, 45 USC §13 o......ccccssssssssessssssssssesssssssssesseseessossooees, 5

TEXTS

Prosser On Torts — 3rd ed. 8 fe OT 6

za

INO, sscceisereee

In Tue

Suprene Court of the United States

Missourt Paciric Rartroap Company,

Petitioner,

v.

SouTHerN Paciric Company,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To THe Courr or Crvi, APPEALS FOR THE

FourTEENTH SuPREME JupiciaL District or TExas

Petitioner, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, respect-

fully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the

judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourteenth

Supreme Judicial District of Texas entered in this cause

on June 19, 1968.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Four-

teenth Supreme Judicial District of Texas filed June 19,

1968, is reported in 430 S.W. 2d 900 and is printed infra

as Appendix B.

——. ct eee SS ee

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—

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals for the

Fourteenth Supreme Judicial District of ‘Texas was entered

on June 19, 1968 (Appendix C). The Supreme Court of

Texas “refused «s presenting no error requiring reversal”

Petitioner’s Application for Writ of Error on November

20, 1968, and overruled Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing

on January 22, 1969, making final the decision of the Court

of Civil Appeals (Appendix EK).

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked un-

der 28 USC § 1257(3). The federal question presented by

this Petition was the identical question and the sole ques-

tion presented to the Supreme Court of Texas (Appen-

dix D).

QUESTION PRESENTED

A railroad company’s liability to its employee for per-

sonal injury is “absolute” because of such railroad com-

pany’s vioiation of the Safety Appliance Act in using a

freight car with a defective hand brake. Such railroad

company settles with its injured employee. Is such rail-

road company entitled to be fully reimbursed in an action

for indemnity against another railroad company which neg-

ligently furnished the freight car with the defective hand

brake, notwithstanding that as between the two railroad

companies only the one seeking indemnity was guilty of

the violation of the Safety Appliance Act which gave rise

to the claim?

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statute involved is what is commonly known as the

Safety Appliance Act of 1910, 32 Stat. 298, 45 USC § 11-16,

and specifically that portion of the Act ($11) which makes

3

it “unlawful” for any common carrier to use on its line a

freight car not equipped with “efficient” hand brakes.

The above statute, to the extent relevant, is set forth as

Appendix A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

One Liles, a brakeman in the employ of Respondent,

Southern Pacific Company, received personal injuries while

engaged in switching railroad cars. One car (MP4626) was

owned vy Petitioner, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.

The freight car MP4626 was equipped with a hand brake

which was defective. Liles was injured hecause he could

not properly stop the freight car with the hand brake.

Earlier in the day, prior to Liles’ injury, the freight car

MP4626 with the defective hand brake had been left on

an interchange track by Petitioner to be transferred to,

and accepted and picked up by Respondent in accordance

with the established Interchange Rules (Tr. 47-48) and

customary practice in the interchange? and transfer of

freight cars between common carriers. Respondent had ac-

cepted the freight car and was using it on its line in mak-

ing up a freight train when the uccident occurred. Although

acknowledging that the brake was defective, and, therefore

that its use of the car constituted a violation of the Safety

Appliance Act, Respondent negotiated with its injured em-

ployee for over two years before finally settling with him.

Prior to such settlement Respondent made demand on Pe-

titioner to settle with the injured employee and Petitioner

declined to do so because of Respondent’s admitted viola-

1 “The boundary between carriers is the place where the train is

received in interchange under 49 C.F.R. 132.12 because at that

point the use or haul on the line of one carrier ceases and the

use cr haul on the line of the other carrier commences.” ICC

Rules and Regulations under 49 C.F.R. 132.12 as quoted in

U. 8. v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown RR Co., 397 F. 2a 139

(6th Cir. — 1968).

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4

tion of the Safety Appliance Act, (among other reasons).

After finally settling with its employee, Respondent filed

this suit against Petitioner seeking full indemnity and re-

imbursement for the amount paid its employee in settle-

ment. After trial before the Court without a jury, Re-

spondent obtained judgment against Petitioner for full

indemnity on the basis of the trial court’s findings that

Petitioner was negligent in failing to properly inspect and

correct the hand brake defect while the car was in its pos-

session. Although the trial court found Respondent not

guilty of common law negligence,” it found that Respondent

violated Section 11 of the Safety Appliance Actin using

the car with a defective hand brake.

Petitioner appealed from the adverse judgment on the

ground, among others, that Respondent’s violation of the

Safety Appliance Act precluded it from shifting its re-

sponsibility to and obtaining full indemnity from Petitioner

for the amount paid Respondent’s employee in settlement

of his claim against Respondent under the Safety Appli-

ance Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1, The decision of the Texas court concerns an ex-

tremely important federal question® not ueretofore deter-

2 Although exonerating Respondent of common law negligence the

Court found that in addition to violating the Safety Appliance

Act: “Any inspection made by T&NO’s [Respondent] employees

at Sinton, Texas, of the hand brake on the hopper car MP4626

was not an inspection of such character or care as to disclose

existence of a defect then existing in the hand brake (Emphasis

added) (Tr. 52).

3 Comm .\ting on the Federal Employers’ Liability Act it was said

in Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F. R. Co., 353 U.S. 360 1 L.ed. 2d

889 at 891, 77 S. Ct. 240: ‘The petitioner having assert. federal

rights, it is our duty under the Act to make certain that they are

fully protected, as the Congress intended them to be.” (Empha-

sis added)

5)

mined by this Court, involving the construction and

effectiveness of the Safety Appliance Act, and as such

bears on the safe handling of railroad cars interchanged

between common carriers and the prevention of injuries

to employees and the public.

2. The decision of the Texas court reaches an erroneous

result; is contrary to well settled principles of indemnity

and public policy as enunciated by the Supreme Court of

the United States and other courts; would seriously impair

the congressional intent to impose “absolute liability” on

only the railroad using a freight var with a safety appli-

ance defect; would encourage litigation between railroad

companies in an eifort to shift responsibility to injured

employees under the Safety Appliance Act and would im-

pede and complicate the settlement of valid personal injury

claims of railroad employees.

Importance of Question and Errors

In Decision of State Courts

Section 11 of the Safety Appliance Act, (27 Stat. 531,

as amended 32 Stat. 298, 45 USC § 11) in relevant part,

provides that it shall be “unlawful” for any common car-

rier subject to the Act “to haul, permit to be hauled or

used in its line” any car not equipped with “efficient hand

brake”. This is a penal as well as a remedial statute. Even

more important, it is essentially a safety measure as this

Court and other courts have specifically stated.

4 In 1957 the penalty was increased from $100.00 to $250.00 “for

each and every such viciation.” (71 Stat. 352, 45 USC §13).

5 “History showed that hundreds of workers had been injured or

killed by the stopping of unbraked cars, by the operation of

hand brakes, and by the use of hand couplers. This history well

known to Congress, was the primary purpose behind the legisla-

6

Respondent’s violation of the Safety Appliance Act ren-

dered it “absolutely liable” to its injured employee without

regard to Respondent’s care or negligence and without rea

gard to any negligence on the part of the employee. The

duty imposed by the statute is “absolute”, “unqualified” and

“unconditional”, nd the carrier “using” such a defective

freight car is not excused by any showing of care, however

assiduous. Myers v. Reading Co., 331 US 477, 482, 67 S. Ct.

1334, 91 L. ed. 1615; Brady v. Terminal R. Asso., 303 US 10,

15, 58 S. Ct. 426, 82 L. ed. 614; O’Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E.

Ry. Co., 338 US 384, 70 8. Ct. 200, 94 L. ed. 187, 16 ALR 2d

646.

‘ = . *

+i ER BOE POS LE mT Nae

In permitting indemnity in this case, the Texas court com-

pletely ignores the congressional intent behind the Safety

Appliance Act. Indeed, for all practical purposes, it com-

pletely ignores the Safety Appliance Act. It treats the case

in terms of an ordinary common law indemnity action be-

tween joint tort feasors — speaking in terms of alleged

breaches of duty as between joint tort feasors and citing

Texas cases® having nothing to do with railroads or the

Shs AE esac RE RRA DE RRS He Se: he es

tion. The Act, therefore, should be liberally construed as a safety

: measure.”

7 U.S. v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.,

361 U.S. 78, 4 L.ed. 2d 25, 80 S. Ct. 12

4 “Our view is that the obvious purpose of the Safety Appliance

4 Act is to induce carriers to adhere to higher standards of safety

j in their operations by imposing a liability on interstate carriers

if they do not comply with the Act... .”

Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

Co., 244 F. 2d 368 (D. C. Cir., 1957)

“Congress . . . for its own reasons imposed extraordinary

safety obligations upon railroa -

Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S.

426, 2 L.ed. 2d 382 at 390, 78 S.Ct. 394

® This case involving the construction and effect of a Federal

Statute the Court need not be concerned with trying to fit the

case into one of the many, confusing “indemnity semantic

cubicles.” Prossor On Torts — 3d ed. p. 278.

isi ws hetoc MeaSacbns, Sharia Mla at seit

7

Safety Appliance Act. This led the Court to an erroneous

result. It has been made abundantly clear that a railroad’s

liability for violation of the Safety Appliance Act is an

independent “actionable wrong” (O’Donnell v. Elgin J. &

' E. Ry. Co., 338 US 384, 70 8. Ct. 200, 94 L. ed. 187, 16 ALR

2d 646) ; that such liability ir not imposed on a carrier for

the acts of other carriers, but because of its own wrongful

and “unlawful” conduct in the “use” of a car with a safety

appliance defect; that it is not the mere “possession” of

a car with a penalty defect which results in the liability,

but it is the carrier’s use of such car on its own line, U. S.

v. Western, etc. RR. Co., 297 F. 4892 (D.C., Ga., 1924).’

It is both the right and duty of a carrier to refuse to ac-

cept a defective car at interchange if acceptance would

necessarily involve its use of such car in violation of the

Safety Appliance Act. Baltimore & O0.S.W. R. Co. v. United

States, 242 F. 420, 425 (6th Cir. — 1917 ); United States v.

Akron, Canton & Youngstown RR Co., 397 F. 2d 139 (6th

Cir. —- 1968). As stated in United States v. Southern Pacific

Co., 167 F. 699 (D.C., Cal.):

“A company is under no obligation to receive cars

defective as to safety appliances from any other rail-

road, and when it does so, it must know at its peril

that each car so received is equipped with the lawful

safety appliances . . . It is the use of a car in a

7 The Court in the cited case in considering the constitutionality

of an act which would impose a penalty for the acts of others

over whom it had no control said:

“The answer avers that the statute, thus originally con-

strued, takes the carrier’s property without due process of

law, in that a penalty is imposed for the acts of others over

whom it had no control, .. . Had the penalty been inflicted

for the possession of the defective car . . . there would be

force in the contention ; but the penalty is laid only on a use

of the car, and that may be avoided. The very agents of the

carrier who use it may, by diligence, inspect it, and are under

duty to lay it aside if it be defective.”

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8

defective condition that the law seeks to prevent. . .”

(Italics added).

It is significant that as between the two railroads — Pe-

titioner and Respondent — only Respondent was guilty of

a violation of the Safety Appliance Act. (Even assuming

Petitioner was responsible for the brake defect in the first

place.) The law is settied that the entire responsibility for

a freight car with respect to a Safety Appliance Act defect

rests with the railroad which is using the car, irrespective

of ownership of the car and irrespective of the condition

of the car at the time it was delivered to the carrier using

it with such defect. After Respondent accepted Petitioner’s

freight car on the interchange track, under the terms of

the Safety Appliance Act it became solely and fully respon-

sible for any brake defect, and Petitioner was forthwith

relieved of any liability it might have under the Act. Clark

v. Atlantic Coast Lime, 244 F. 2d 368 (D.C. Cir. — 1957) ;

Patton v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 197 F. 2d 732 (3rd Cir.

— 1952). The reason for this is obvious. The policy of the

law here in imposing absolute liability on the carrier using

the car with the defect is to encourage that carrier to be

certain by inspection, and repair, if necessary, that the car

is not used with a defective hand brake.® This sound and

obvious policy of the law would be completely circumvented

if the only carrier guilty of violating the Safety Appliance

Act, and liable to its injured employee as a conseauence

thereof, was permitted to shift the entire loss to, and be

8 “Treating each carrier which handles a train movement inde-

pendently, and compelling it to inspect for itself rather than

rely on an inspection by a previous carirer is a reasonable means

of promoting safety, and appears to be intended by the regula-

tions.”

United States v. Terminal RR Assn. of

St. Louis, 397 F. 2d 467, 470, (7th Cir..

1968) cert. den’d. Dec. 9, 1968, 89 S.

Ct. 447

completely reimbursed by. another carrier which may have

been guilty only of ordinary, common law, negligence. The

clear intent of Congress to limit this liability to the car-

rier using the defective car would be thwarted if by cir-

cumvention, in an indemnity action, this liability is shifted

to a carrier not using the defective car.

Indeed, it has been held that a carrier subject to the

Safety Appliance Act may not even by contract relieve it-

self of its statutory liability under the Safety Appliance

Act. United States v. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co.,

2i0 F. 2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. — 1954); Clark v. Atlantic

Coast Line RR Co., 244 F. 2d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. — 1957).

In Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 205 F. 2d 589

(5th Cir. — 1953 Cert. Denied, 346 U.S. 873, 74 S.ct 123 98

L. ed 382) the Court even held that a written contract for

indemnity would be invalid as contrary to the spirit and

prohibitions of the law and not enforceable so as to permit

a railroad company liable to an employee for a Safety

Appliance Act violation, to be indemnified.

In cases decided before the Safety Appliance Act of 1910

the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme

Court of Texas both held that as between two railroad

companies, both of whom were guilty of common law negli-

gence in failing to properly inspect or repair freight cars,

there could be no indemnity. Union Stock Yards Company

v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincey Railroad Co., 196 U.S.

217, 25 S. Ct. 226, 49 L.ed. 453 (1905) ; Galveston H. & S.A.

Ry. Co. v. Nass, 59 S.W. 870 (Tex.-1900). This has also

been the holding of the courts since the enactment of the

Safety Appliance Act. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., v. Chicago

& Northwestern Ry. Co., 280 F. 2d 110 (8th Cir. — 1960)

cert. denied, 81 S. Ct. 378, 364 U.S. 931, 5 L.ed. 2d 364.

A carrier guilty of the more serious offense of violating

the Safety Appliance Act and thus being guilty of “unlaw-

10

ful”, penal conduct, and negligence per se,® should not be in

a more favorable position.

This was precisely the reasoning of the Court in Lowe v.

New York Central Ry., 148 F. Supp. 337 (E. D. Mich.-1957),

a case directly in conflict with the holding of the Texas

court in the instant case. In that case indemnity was

denied to a railroad company liable because of its viola-

tion of the Safety Appliance Act. That court properly

noted that “the violation of the Federal Safety Appliance

Act — considered to be negligence per se — is certainly not

a less blameworthy act than failure to use ordinary care.”

See also, to the same effect, Cush v. Pittsburgh Chartiers

& Youghiogheny Ry. Co., 157 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Penn. —

1957).

Irrespective of whether the cai.ier seeking indemnity is

liable because of common law negligence or negligence

per se by legislative fiat, the policy considerations are

identical in both instances:

“The very foundation and principle of public policy

that denies recovedy in such cases [is that] .. . be-

cause, if that were allowed, the negligent party would

be offered an inducement to relax its vigilance in the

protection of those who are largely dependent upon it

for their safety in the performance of hazardous duty.”

Galveston, H. d 8.A. Ry. Co. v.

Nass, 59 S.W. 870 (Tex. — 1900)

To the same effect are thie cases holding that violation

of a state safety statute precludes the violator from ob-

9“... it clearly is the legislative intent to treat a violation of the

Safety Appliance Act as ‘negligence’ — what is sometimes called

‘negligence per se’.” Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189, 69 S.

Ct. 1018, 93 L.ed. 1282 (1949). Accord: San Antonio Ry. v.

Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484, 36 S. Ct. 626, 60 L.ed. 1110 (1916),

Tex. & P. R. Co. v. Sherer, 183 S.W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. — 1916,

error ref’d.)

it

taining indemnity. This has been the reasoning of the New

York Courts under comparable facts:

“To hold otherwise would encourage disregard for

the objectives of the statute. The objectives of the

statute are not alone to provide remedies for laborers

but more particularly to prevent accidents causing the

injuries. The saactions imposed by the statute and by

the cases are necessary to compel a higher standard

of care by forbidding any delegation of responsibility

and any other right of recovery even against a joint

tort feasor.”?

The holding of the Texas Court in the instant case not

only defeats the basic purposes of the Safety Appliance

Act but would result in protracted litigation between rail-

road companies seeking indemnity for the consequences of

their own Safety Appliance Act violation. And even worse,

such holding would result in endless delays in settling valid

personal injury claims under the Safety Appliance Act. If

this remains the law, why should a railroad company set-

tle with its own injured employee, even though absolutely

liable under the Safety Appliance Act, when it can implead

another carrier in the event a lawsuit is filed — and ver-

haps escape scot-free? This must have been one of the major

considerations by Congress when it provided bv terms of

the Safety Appliance Act that liability be imposed abso-

lutely on the carrier using the defective car with the de-

fect, and only on that carrier.

1° Rufo v. Orlando, 309 N.Y. 345, 180 N.E. 2d 887 (1955), denying

indemnity to a contractor liable to an injured person because of

violation of a New York safety act.

Dna dyes De Ne ee

Ne ne ee ee ee

12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Ben G. SEWELL

701 Capita] National Bank

Bldg.

Houston, Texas 770092

Of Counsel:

SEwELL, JuNELL & Ricos

701 Capital National Bank Bldg.

Houston, Texas 77002