Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maddox v. Smith
Supreme Court brief1968
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SUPREME COURT 11. 5 . | |
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Supreme Court of the United States |
" OCTOBER TERM, 1967
No. 3 1 0 8
: LUTHER RoBINSON MaDpox,
Petitioner,
v.
BERTHA E. SMITH and Mary Lois MCNEIL,
_ Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, WITH APPENDIX
a
"-OLUTHER ROBINSON Mappox, PRO SE, _&£
1133 Woodward Building
Washington, D. C..20005
(Phones; 347-2323; CO. 5-4111)
DATED: FEBRUARY 5, 1968. :
kaise
_ Eastern ditties, Inc. Vv. Flight Engineers, ete 5
De Ws Te By TOD ne creerecsenesoorneeseenonepereyvejuonvoneonons’ ~ 4
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI epee cs a
OPINIONS BELOW . int GREE) OO cee ee
JURISDICTION — : eeiaaaan
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW | cvtenveneese 2-3
STATUTES INVOLVED —_.. PLS AE see ER EOP a 7 rc
ag LH >
FEDERAL RULES .. nny 12, 586A, CA
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT SUS ee 6
~ ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING REASONS RELIED aed *
+ PU GARE ROETEE FORE E cececnceccceccccrcdeccceveceveeseceiucesecees "9
PUIG Secsicteetiocnecpnontshecninis eokeicnion Ses 15
TABLE lead CASES
Albrecht v. The Herald, ete., 367 F. 2d 517 (8 CA).. ioe 7
American Security Co. of New York.v. Cane,
381 F. 2d 185 (5 CA) rN U URI necitoah aa Ne
Armstrong v. Mango, 380 US. 545, 85'S. Ct. 1187, “
SIS SE: UI ci ccceenciehaciachccasats Sasndeteustionigticenenaabineabia 13 a:
Bledsoe and Marcum, ete. v. Wirtz, 384 F. 2d 27
, OO RP ORES ae MEAN De x 10; 26.8.
Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Nurinam ie, Co., 881 F. 2d
546 (10 CA) ne sdide i rave URI rooms ~
BancoNacional de Cuba V. Sais 383 F. 2d a (2
P|: ped Catena I yer sh OE ECM ACTON ND 8
Brooklyn’ Savings Bank v. “O'Neil, 65. S. = 895, |
324 U.S. 697, 80 L. Ed. 2005 ........ 9,10
' Brown Vv. Thompson, 150 F. 2d 171 ...................- inte 13
. ‘Coverg V. Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 100 L. Ed. 1021 .. hy
Cle ons V. Board of Education of Hillsboro, 228
F. 2d 855 ¢ S|, USE aan HRS Ss MEE n el eels eae 9,14
ii
INDEX (Continued)
CONSIDER, ETC., (DENIED) _.020 joa
Page
Fayette Vv. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,' 273 .F.
Supp. 323 doeensiionsinvetiocediapeninevsinennaliceceegigitilS Cnn nhnessous 6
Gramins Vv. Ordean, 2384 U.S. 385 2a<........ oo Leas ae
‘General Electric v. Southern Construction Co., 383 :
eR DT Fata a Se ee he Poe
Howard v. Local 74, etc., 208 F. 2d 930- (7 CA)*... 25-A |
* Hovey V. Elliott, 167 U. S. ___ AIEEE NPS ene 14
In Re. Elmore, 382 F. 2d 125 (D.C. 1965) 8,12 go
_ Mashak v. Hacker, 297. F. 24 495 (TCA) ccc JOA.
McGrath v. Christenson, te lle BO cctrttesicseekceeece 10
_Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 2... aides 14.
Petteys and Reavis v. Butler, etc., 367 F. 2d 529
‘(8 CA) lasscleeuonabbeaibbdndbaaieiniosdenichinitoade newkasoscalezoces oe 7,8.
Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d oc adh on 6, 9.-
Schlagenhauf v. Halder, (1964) 279 US. 104, 85
S.Ct, S86; SO L.-Bds 168 ais. eenctan 10, 11
Slochower v. Board of Education of New York
. City, 350 U.S. 551, 100 L. Ed. 692 200 14
Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 680 0. 14.
St. Lukes Hospital v. Melin, 172 F. 2d 532. (8
ce, OT ORE a ER EE RE 13
Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp. 383 F. 2d 634 |
(9 CA) acvetvesscncuneowonnetassivesnestnenenenetdoennvesonssatodbeneniieeeses 6, 11
JO. 8S. Vv. Kirby, 7 Wall. (US) 482 00 7
“ U.S. v. Randa, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967) 0 7,13
Union Tool C. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112, 42 S.
Ct. 427,66 L. Ed. 848.00 *.9, 14°
Whitehead v. American Security and Trust Co., 285 ; ;
F. 2d 282, 109'U.S. App. D.C. 212 (1960) ~_.... 11 Ay
Young Vv. St. P. RR Co., 369 F. 2d 502 (1966) _..... 13, 25-A’ Le i
_ APPENDIX
ORDER of OCTOBER 4, 1967, affirming ven ;
court’s judgment. 17-A
ORDER DENYING MOTION to reconsider etc. of.
NOVEMBER 15, 1967 ii cisiaiei bepleidadeiiesthaetoascictininie: ' 18-A
MOTION OF PETITIONER in trial court to RE- /3
INDEX (Continued) Si
Page
ORDER OF JUDGE McGUIRE EXTENDING
- TIME FOR cone to file. record in No.
BN MRE a Colt eA ln ES 2 nA
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS. AP-
_. PEAL in No. 20794 (CROSS APPEAL) .......... -~A
MOTIONS AND VARIOUS ORDERS IN lS age
(No. 20794 and 20786) _..... Ab 2-ABT-A
FEDERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE RI LES
effective Snr Se JO-A aa A
.
©
IN THE
| Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER Trae, -1967
No.
?
_ ROBINSON Mappox,
- Petitioner,
v.
BERTHA E. SMirH and Mary Lots McNen.,
er
- PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, WITH APPENDIX
=A
Petitioner, | ‘ater ‘Robinson Maddox, Pro Se, prays
. that a-writ of certiorari issue from this Court to review
judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the e-
District of Columbia Circuit, also in case No. 20794, bo h
cases heard together but not consolidated, entered in .the
. above entitled cause on October 2, 1967, affirming the
judgments of the trial court, without an opinion (Per -
Curiam), and directing that each party bear their own
costs on appeal (R. IV). A Motion for a Rehearing en
bane was duly filed by Petitioner on October 16, 1967,
and it, was denied on November 15, 1967 (Per Curiam)
~(R. V(a)), on which. date the Judgments of the Court
of Appeals became final.
-_ ees
.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Judgments of the Court of Appeals were entered z
- without an opinion, thus not reported. The pertinent and
‘material ‘parts of opinions of the trial-court is shown in
R, II, J.A. 30(a)-81(a), and- full text in O/R. -
JURISDICTION’ ~
_ The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the pro-
visions, of 28 U.S. Code, Section 1254(1) and pursuant
to Rule 19 of this Court, where (1) the court below has
decided a ‘case in conflict with decisions and principles
_ of law laid down by this Court and other Circuit Courts, -
even in its.own circuit; (2): and where it has decided
important questions of law-involving not only the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure but statutory law of gen-
eral; special and great importance for every future liti-.
gant with similar questions in the District of Columbia,
which statutory law (12-103) that has never been passed
upon by this highest appellate court; and which should
be settled by this court; and (3) where it has departed
so far from the accepted and usual course of judicial pro-
ceedings, or so far. sanctioned such a depafture by the
trial court as to call for the exercise of this Court’s power
of supervision; (4) and, further, where it has decided
federal questions and issues in conflict with applicable
decisions of this Court and well-established law.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW >
I. Did the Court below err when it affirmed the trial _
court’s order and judgment of October 4, 1966, without
an opinion, overlooking or ignoring ,the plain provisions
of the District of Columbia Code (12-103) that plainly
. Says and/or intends to say that‘ the substituted parties
‘defendant (Smith and MeNeil)‘ are charged with, and
’. liable for, all assets ande properties that came to their
Ow
Oo
oe
3.
-hands or descended to them as the result of Fred Smith’s
death (the original defendant herein), and not only what
- could be executed on just prior to his death?
II: Did the trial court err, and also the court of ap-
peals when it affirmed the trial court’s order and judg-
ment of October 4, 1966, without an opinion, thereby °
approving the trial court’s denial of your petitioner’s mo-
tion.on October 31, 1966 [R. II, J.A. 22(a)-28(a)], when
said trial court refused to hear and allow this petitioner
to be heard and have his day in court on the issue and:
question of what the substituted parties (the respondents
herein) were burdened with as the result of Fred Smith’s
death?
Il. Did the Congress of the United States mean to
include wives who are self-supporting as the réspondent
Bertha E. Smith, receiving the same salary and emolu- :
ments, as a supervisor at St. Elizabeth Hospital ($244.00 -
a month), as her husband, and owning property of a
value of about $40,000 in her own name, in addition to
being joint owner in their homé place (Lot 800, Square
5972) at 3310 5th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., when
. that Code (Sections 35-716 and 35-718) was provided by
Congress for the District of Columbia—many years before
our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted?
IV. Did not the court:of appeals err when it affirmed
the lower courts order and judgment, in both cases (with-
out an opinion, Nos. 20794 and. 20786) when it ruled
that your petitioner should bear his oyn costs-on appeal,
and refused to dismiss respondents’ appeal in No. 20794,
when that case was not docketed: and perfected in time
(not until February 24, 1967)? - ies
AOE SPINOR RN CEM ENO es
plates 4 7 @
STATUTES, FEDERAL RULES, ETC.
District of Columbia Code, Section 12-103: (effective Dec.
1963)
_ “Tn all cases where 2 new party is made to an
action the costs which accrued before the new party
is made to the action shall be taxed as part of the
costs in the action, and the judgment rendered shall
be the same as if the action had been originally com-
menced between persons who are made parties to the
action.” (However), “A defendant who is made a
new party to the action may not be burdened with |
debts, damages, or costs beyond the amount of prop-
erty or assets that have descended or come to his
hands from the deceased.”
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 73 (g), 75, 76
* & z
Rule 73(g), FRCP, provides for filing and docket-
ing cases (as in this case): “Where more than one
appeal is taken from the same judgment to the same
court of appeals, the District Court: may -prescribe
the time for filing and docketing”. * * * (and that
is constitutional, statutory and mandatory—see' rec-
ord; see record in No. 20794 (R. I, page 2 of answer
to motion to dismiss appeal, where an incorrect state-
ment has been made “time to docket appeal was ex-
tended to February 24, 1967,” which is contrary to
the order of Judge McGuire of February 9, 1967
(O/R and BA), 24-A January
District of Columbia Code,. 1929 Ed. (on jurisdiction) p.
163, title 18:
District Court “91, Jurisdiction—The District
Court shall have and exercise the same powers and
jurisdiction as other courts of the United States, and
such further special jurisdiction as may from time to
time be conferred by Congress and of all proceedings
instituted in exercise of the right of ominent domain.”
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a long-drawn-out case, where a judgment was.
obtained in 1930, by one Michael, against one Fred Smith,
based on a conspiracy to defraud him out of certain stock
the said Michael held. Harry Chester Smith, his brother,
was also charged and made a defendant therein, but he
- could never be served (R. II, J.A. 1a, A, as he left
this jurisdiction. That judgment obtained by Michael was
_ revived and renewed in 1942, 1955, and again in 1966
(October 4, 1966), certain portions of which judgment
_and order this petitioner appealed from, to the court be-
low, so far as liability of the substituted parties defend-
ant were concerned (R. II, J.A. 29a, 20a, 21a). In 1963
‘Fred Smith died (R., 3a); prior thereto Michael died
and. this petitioner was substituted in his place as plain-
tiff on November 1, 1955 (R. II, 2(a)) therein.
In that order and judgment of November 4, 1966 of the
trial court, supra, that court signed an order presented
by the respondents’ attorney Lane (at that time) where-
in was added and inserted, after extending and reviving
the judgment for another twelve years (R. II, J.A. 20a,
21a, 32a, 33a), that the substituted defendants (Smith ~
‘and MeNeil, respondents herein), instead of the one
(order and judgment) presented by this petitioner (R.
J.A. 32a, 38a), _
“but that the said parties Bertha E. Smith and Mary
Lois McNeil shall be held liable on the judgment only
to the extent of that’ property, if any, which was
owned by Fred Smith and upon which execution could
have issued just prior to his death and which passed
to Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil by reason
of his death” (R. II, J.A. 21a).
This was the portion of the order and judgment appealed
from by this petitioner; so, it went to the court of appeals
below, was heard and decided, without an opinion, per -
curiam, on October 2, 1967, affirming the lower court’s
v ROE RCNP IR REE RE oY
6
Ge
order and judgment (R. V, V(a), IV and III in No.
20794). Hence it is not known on what grounds or for :
what reason that court. based its order affirming the trial
court’s-order and judgment.
This petitioner duly. filed a motion. for a reconsidera-
tion and a rehearing: ete, ( R. II, J.A. 22a) in the trial
court and it was denied summarily on October:31, 1966,
although duly and properly filed, as the record shows.
The respondents appealed also (No. 20794) from the trial
courts order.and judgment but did not say what part |
or portion from which they appealed (as the Rule, FRCP,
requires), yet part of the order and judgment was in
favor of the respondents and part of it was against them,
* So it was argued-on that basis, both cases together, in .
the court of appeals (see R. II, J.A. 29a). - Their appeal
was not perfected and docketed: untit February 24, 1967,
yet their extension of time for filing record was extended
only through February 23 (for filing record only). That
point was challenged in the court of appeals by this peti-
tioner as being beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for that reason, and the motion to dismiss was
denied (see R. V, in No. 20794, I (1), (2), (8) and A),. .
although the burden was on the respondents to show that
- the. court had jurisdiction when challenged and that bur-
den rested on them to show it, which was not done: Fay-
ette v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 323,.
285 F. 2d, at p. 186, Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp.,
383 F, 2d 634, Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d: 709.
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
I. The court of appeals below has decided this case
in conflict with decisions of other courts of appeals and
in conflict with decisions of this court ; and have- decided ©
a special and important question by ‘implication, at least,
contrary to a statutory law of Congress for the District
of Columbia (12-103), a federal jurisdiction,
‘
7
IL. ‘And/or have decided a federal question or ques- .
tions ini a way in conflict. with applicable decisions of
this court, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a.
lower court, as to call for:the exercise of this court’s
power of supervision.
A..
‘The District of Columbia is a federal ‘jurisdiction and
title and section of 12-103 is a Federal Statute that has |
never been interpreted or construed by this highest of
appellate courts. This case is one of first impression on
that issue. The court of appeals, below, has said, at least’ °
by implication, when it affirmed.the trial court’s order
and judgment contrary to that statute, supra, in this
case, that its decisions was correct, when it signed that
order and judgment inserting the followjng:
#4 “shall be held liable on the judgment only to
the extent-of that property, if any, which was owned
~~ by Fred Smith and upon which execution could have
issued just prior to his death and which passed to
Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil by: reason
of his death” (J.A, 21a, R. II). | via ee
- That holding is plainly and obviously contrary to the
statutory law itself. See U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U.S.)
482, and Albrecht v. The Herald Co., d/b/a Globe Des-
mond, etc., 367 F. 2d 517, where it was held that all
laws: should receive a sensible: construction. See also
_Petteys and Reavis v. Butler and Maratime Air Lines,
Inc. v. Blair and New Orleans, 367 F. 2d 529, where it
was said: “When reason of law ceases, law itself ceases -
to operate”.. In U. S. v. Rands (1967), 88 S. Ct. 265,
this court granted a writ where there was seemingly a
conflict between decisions of the court of appeals and this
court. Cf. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Flight Engineers —
(C.A. Fla), 340 F. 2d 104; 106.
In the Albrecht Case (1966), supra, at p. 525, quoting
the Supreme Court, it was said: “Nothing is better set-
ie al a og ne
SPURTE *
BE CN Fe
8
tled than that statutes should receive a sensible construc-
tion, such as will effectuate the legislatiye intention” (of
- Congress), and; if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an
‘absurd conclusion. : ;
In the Petey case, supra, at p. 525, that court -said:
“Since the purposes of the act are stated clearly and ap-
pear side-by-side with the literal demands, we do’ not be-——
r lieve we have been precluded by Congress from passing
an equitable and historic role by examining the facts of
each case in the Jight-of the stated goals to determine
- on an ad, hoc bases whether the purposes of the act are in
any way being served by an application of the later provi-
sions * * * This we believe to be the correct law and it
will be applied to the facts of this case.” ae
In the case of In Re Elmore, 382 F. 2d 125 (D.C. 1965)
it was held: “Reviewing court has power not only to cor-
rect errors in judgment under review but to make such
disposition of case as justice requires. Exceptional cases
or particular circumstances may prompt reviewing or ap-
pellate court, where injustice may otherwise result, to
consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor
passed upon by court or administrative agency below.
In Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Nurinam Nav. Co., 381 F.
2d 546, it was held: On occasions, a theory raising ques-
tion of law not in issue before trial court will be consid-
~ ered on appeal in: order to prevent manifest injustice.
In American Security Co. of N.Y. v. Coblentz, 381 F.
2d 185, it was said: “The general rule is that reviewing
courts will not consider issues raised for first time on
appeal, but exception is made on occasion to this rule
when the issue tardily presented raises a pure question
of law and where a refusal to consider it would result in,
a miscarriage of justice.” }
In Banco Nancional de Cuba v. Farr; 383 F. 2d 135,
it was held: A case must be decided according to the law
as it exists at the time of final judgment.
?
9
And, in General Electric Co. v.. Southern Construction
_ Co., 383 F. 2d 185, it was held: Court must give effect
to plain and obvious meaning of statute without reading
in or reading out (C.A. 5).
In Brooklyn Savings Bank v: O’Neil, 65 S. Ct. 895,
.824 U.S. 697, 80 L. Ed. 2005, it was said: “The Supreme
Court would grant a writ of certiorari to review a deci-
sion involving a federal statute of substance not thereto-
fore determined by the Supreme Court.” |
In Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d 709, it was held: That
Court of Appeals must follow U: S. Supreme Court’s opin-
ions. . .
__ In Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, 228
‘F. 2d 853, at 857, that court said: “It follows that the
judgment of the District Court is contrary to the rules
of equity and constitutes an improvident exercise of ‘judi-
cial power. Jt is generally held that trial court abuses
its discretion when it fails or refuses properly to apply
the law to conceded or undisputed facts.”
And, in Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 US. 107, 112,
42 S. Ct. 427, 66 L. Ed. 848: It was said “Misapplica-
tion of the law to facts is in itself. an abuse of discretion.” °
B.
ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING THE REASONS RELIED ON
FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT -
There is involved here a Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure: There is also involved here the construction. of a
ruling on statutory law for the District of Columbia (ef-
fective in, Dec. 1963) that has never been passed upon by
this Court as to what the English thereof and therein,
plainly stated, means (12-103, supra), if i: does not mean
- what it says.
fa
10
- In Schlagenhauf v. Holder (1964), 85 S. Ct. 234, 379
U.S. 104, 39 L. Ed: 152, this court’ granted a writ to
review it concerning validity and construction of Rule
35 (FRCP). " oe
In the Brooklyn Savings’ Bank Case, supra, this Court
granted certiorari to review a decision involving a simi-
lar case. This case here, before this highest appellate
-* @frt, involves a statutory law-for the District of Colum-
bia, which is a federal jurisdiction (not a state) and,
therefore, the construction of its statute involves ‘a fed-
eral question. The construction of this statute by the
highest’ appellate court. is necessary and proper because
it not only basically affects materially this petitioner, but
every other litigant who may be involved in a similar
question or questions in this district. Then, moreover,
there is a serious question involved here where the lower
court assumed jurisdiction of the case for cross appel-
lants (Smith and McNeil) when on the face of the record
itself it had no jurisdiction, as the case was docketed too
late-and not perfected in: time: the record was filed in
the court of appeals by this petitioner on February 23,
1967, and his appeal perfected on that date; but the re-
spondents herein did not docket their case (No. 207944 —
until February 24, 1967, so it is most highly important
and necessary to have this Court, say whether or not Rule
73, 75 and 76, FRCP, means a case must be docketed
and ‘perfected, before the time expires for perfecting the
appeal. | iis '
In Bledsoe and Emmitt Marcum d/b/a Oklahoma Auc-
tion Yard v. Wirtz, Sec’y of Labor (CA. 10), 384 F. 2d
767, it was held: The question of whether the court’ has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a cause of action «
has primary importance and can be raised at any time ©
even on the court’s own motion. (See McGrath v. Kris-
tensen, 340 U.S. 162 cited therein.) © Se .
Here, in this case (20794) the District Court extended
the time for filing the record to February 24, 1967, but
eee coe |
11
said nothing about docketing the case and perfecting it
on appeal. It is most strongly argued and submitted that
¢ is oversight obviously under the rule gave the court of
ppeal no jurisdiction over the case on February 24, 1967,
and that court should have taken notice of that fact, par-
‘ticulfrly so, when challenged by this petitioner (R. and
A). Hence, a gross error on its part; and contrary to
other appellate courts’ decisions.
Cf. Whitehead case, 285 F, 2d 282, 109 U.S. App. D.C.
212 (in No. 20794, motion to reconsider order of June
9, 1967, denying dismissal etc., R. I1(3)): These respond-
, ents did not: even specify what part. of the trial court’s
judgment of Uctober 4, 1966, from which they appealed.
The Whitehead: case seemed to show it was most highly
important, to docket and perfect one’s appeal on time.’
In Taylor v. Partlow. Paramount Corp., 383 F. 2d 634,
it was held: Party asserting jurisdiction has burden of
, estabiishing it if his allegations are challenged in any
appropriate manner. ;
That was not done by these respondents; ‘the only at-.
tempt they made to do that was to state that to docket ew’
case time was extended to February 24, 1967, which was - |
an erroneous statement. This court, therefore should do jus-
tice and review this case which the record shows is full
of errors in rulings that are contrary to well established
law.
In the Schlagenkauf « case, supra, at p. 110, this mart
‘ indicated that a writ of certiorari should issue when
clear abuse. of discretion by the trial court and the court
of appeals has been shown. Only a glance at the record
may be necessary for one to see that a-gross abuse of
discretion was made when the trial court signed that
order of October 4, 1966, with the liability limited for
the respondents as was done contrary to the statute itself
(R., supra, Br. II, p. 15). The court below also undoubt-
edly overlooked or ignored that statutory law also (12-
AYO ER, A Bones
we
o
103, supra) and committed a grave error too when it |
affirmed the lower court’s judgment, with that provision
An it, instead of what the statutory law said. .
In U. S. v. Rands, 88 S, Ct. 265 (1967), 'a writ was
granted, and accordingly issued, where a seeming conflict
between the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and prior.
decisions of this court.
It is certainly of great and general importance to every
District litigant, and others in ‘the future, who may: be
involved in questions of this kind to have those questions
. passed upon by the highest appellate court, because, main-
ly the Federal-Rules are constitutional,. Statutory and
mandatory to the effect that.a case must be docketed in,
time. The record shows that; see new Federal Rule to
become effective July 1, 1968, which emphasizes that point
and shows very clearly a case must be docketed in time: -
“Rule 12(c), FRAP, (effective July 1, 1968). Dis-
missal for failure of appellant to cause timely trans-
mission or to docket appeal. If the appellant shall
fail to cause timely transmission of the record or to
pay the docket fee if a docket fee is required, any
appellee may file a motion in the court of appeals
to dismiss appeal.” - See also 12(a). aa
It should be noted especially that emphasis has been
laced upon “timely transmission ‘of the ‘record. or to
ket appeal” and this matter is Statutory, constitutional
. and mandatory, as the appellate courts have held. oSee
also new Federal Rules, 38 and 39 as to costs ete., to
become effective July 1, 1968, which has clarified to a
great extent that situation. . :
The present rule 73(g) (FRCP), also covers docketing’
sufficiently, it is submitted (supra). In the Elmore case,
supra, it was said: “Reviewing court has power not only
. to correct error in judgment under review but to make
such disposition of case as justice requires. In determin-
ing what justice requires, reviewing court: is bound ‘to
‘
ay
.
13
consider any change, either in fact or in aw, which has
supervened since justice was entered. Change either in —
fact or in law‘supervening since. judgment was entered
_ May be accommodated. by reviewing court’s grant of ap-
peal solely to enable remand for further consideration.”
In Young v. St. P. R. Co., 369 F. 2d 502 (Dec. 12,
_ 1966) at p. 504, it was said:. “It is essential for this
court to stay within its limits of statutory jurisdiction .
and to refrain from deciding cases and questions which it
has no authority to decide”, Brown v. Thompson, 150 F.
- 2d 171, 178, St. Luke’s Hospital v. Melin, 172 F. 2d 533.
In the Thompson case the appeal was dismissed for lack —
of, jurisdiction.
; In Armstrong v. Mango et Ux., 380 U.S. 545, 85 S. Ct.
1187, 14 L. Ed. 62 (1965) this court said: “A funda-
. mental néquirement of due process is the opportunity to
be h Gramins v: Ordean, 234. U.S. 385. It is an. |
opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. The trial court could have
‘fully accorded the right to petitioner only by granting
his motion to set aside the decree and consider the case
“anew. Only that would have wiped the slate clean. Only
that would have restored the petitioner to the position. he-
‘would have occupied had due process of law been accorded
him in the first place. His motion should have been
granted.” c
That statement of this highest appellate court certainly
should ‘apply to the trial court when trial court denied
petitioner’s motion on October 31, 1966, and refused to
permit him to have his day in court and to be heard on
that point and issue of liability extended to the respond-
ents herein.’ This petitioner was denied then and there
due process of law. (R. ‘II, 22a), for -he was not per- -
mitted to be heard on that point and issue. The trial
court’s action was arbitrary, capricious and a gross abuse,
_ of di8tretion, the court of appeals overlooked or ignored
~~ it also) bhave
> ’
*
:
:
:
|
Lae
14
In Covey v. Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 100 L. Ed. 1021,
. this court held: The elementary requirements of due
process assumes reasonable notice calculated to apprise
interested party of pendency of action and afford such
party an opportunity to be heard and present objections.
(See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 and Hovey v. Elliott,
167 U.S. 418). In Slachower v. Board of Education of
New York, 350 U.S. 551, 100 L. Ed. 692, it was held:
The protection of. the individual from arbitrary action
ts the very essence of due process of law. And in.Smith
v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, this court said: “Life, liberty,
property, and ‘the equal protection of the law, grouped —
together in the Constitution, are so related that the de-
. privation of any of these separate and individual rights
may lessen or extinguish the value of the other three.”
And in Clemmons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, 228
_ F, 2d 858, at p. 857, that court said: “It is generally
held that the trial court abuses its discretion ‘when it
fails or refuses properly to apply the law to conceded
facts or undisputed facts.” And, in Union Tool Co. v.
- Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112, 42 S. Ct. 427, 66 L. Ed. 848,
It was said: Misapplication of the law to the facts is _
itself an’ abuse of discretion” * * * “such abuse of dis-
cretion requires reversal.” .
Both the trial court and the,court of appeals, the rec-
ord and law show, most clearly, were arbitrary, -capri-
cious, and discriminatory when it acted as it did on the
portions of that order and judgment of October 4, 1966,
this petitioner appealed from: “but that the said parties,
Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil, shall be liable
on the judgment only to the extent of that property, if
any, which was owned. by Fred Smith and upon which -
execution could ‘have issued just prior to his death and
which passed to Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil
by reason of his death.” (R. II, 20a, 21a)
road
Se Na
14° —
CONCLUSION -
For the foregoing reasons and authorities cited, appli-
cable to the facts of recorde-before this court, in cases
below Nos. 20786 and 20794 (a ‘cross appeal) a writ of
certiorari to the.Court of Appeals fersthe District of
Columbia Circuit should be granted, to-review its judg-
ments in this case and dg justice to this petitioner.
Respectfully submitted:
LUTHER ROBINSON MADDOX, PRO. SE,
1133 Woodward Building
Washington, D.C. 20005
(Phones; 347-2323; CO. 5-4111)
DATED: FEBRUARY 5, 1968. -
Note: Emphasis added
0/R—Original Record in Trial Court;
~ R—Record in Court of Appeals; |
(Both cases, Nos. 20786 and 20794 (Cross Appeal) ).
' : :
en ea ot
° oe
16-A
APPENDIX
No. 20786—Maddox v. Smith, et al October 2, 1967
Dear Sirs:
I am enclosing herewith a copy of the judgment entered
today without an opinion in the above entitled case.
: Very truly yours,
NATHAN J. PAULSON
» Clerk °
(Copies to attorneys sicieleniats
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
September Term, 1967. | Law No. 74531
No. 20786
| LUTHER .ROBINSON MADDOX,
° . ai Appellant,
Se, Gt,
saree E. SMITH and Mary Lois MCNEIL,
- Appellees,
ds (Stamped)
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Filed Oct. 2, 1967,
Nathan J. Paulson, Clerk.
Appeal from the United States Distetet Court for the
District of Columbia.
| Before: Burger, Wright and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
17-A
JUDGMENT (R. IV)
This cause came on to be heard on the record on appeal
from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia and was argued by counsel.
On consideration thereof it is ordered and adjudged by
this Court that the judgment—of the District Court ap-_
pealed from in this cause be, and it is hereby affirmed.
It is further ordéied by this Court that each party bear -
their own costs on this appeal.
Per Curiam.*
Dated: Oct. 2, 1967
*(In Case No. 20794, duplicate “judgment” (Smith et
al. v. Maddox)
clerk)
Petition for a rehearing, reconsideration, etc., filed
October 16, 1967 and denied on November 15, 1967 (R.
V(a)), as follows: on es
% * : *. *
September Term, 1967 _ Law No. 7453]
No. 20786
LUTHER ROBINSON Mappox,
. Appellant,
Vv. :
BERTHA E. SMITH and Mary Lots MCNEIL,
_ . Appellees.
[Stamped]
(Same filing date, etc., and same kind of letter from,
? ORRIN Ore ETS i) are om teeter ¥
18-A
‘United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Filed Nov. 15, 1967,
Nathan J. Paulson, Clerk.
Before: ‘Bazelon, Chief Judge; Danaher, Burper, Wright,
McGowan, Tamm, Leventhal, and Robinson, Circuit
Judges, in Chambers. *
ORDER [R. V(a)]
On consideration of appellant’s pro se petition for re-
hearing, reconsideration and oral hearing, en bane, it-is —
ORDERED by the Court en bane that appellant's afore-
said petition is denied.
Per Curiam. 7
* * * *
(Motion to reconsider ete. denied on the margin of mo-
tion, see original in file, “Denied, Holtzoff, J., 10/31/66”)
‘ Motion to reconsider, vacate, set aside, hold for naught,
so much of the orders and judgments of October 4, 1966,
granting a revival and renewal of judgment revived and
renewed by Judge Tamm on February 23, 1955,.as covers
liability of these substituted defendants. (O/R,, R. II,
J.A. mere.) :
. (Filed October 11, 1966)
Plaintiff, Pro Se, moves’ the Court to reconsider, vacate,
set aside, and hold’ for naught, so much of the court’s
order and judgment of October 4, 1966, limiting the lia-
bility of Bertha E. Smith .and Mary Lois MeNeil; sub-
stitute defendants for the original defendant (Fred
Smith), to-wit, all remaining parts of order after. =z
Place of Fred Smith” (third line, last paragraph),
gining with “but that the.said parties, Bertha E. ae
etc. (2) and/or make finding of facts and conclusions of
19-A
law, for the record, covering such order and judgment on
liability of substituted defendants herein; and (3) direct
the Clerk of this Court to file for record herein the order
plaintiff presented to the Court for’ signature on Septem-
ber 30 that it refused to sign, also defendants’ objection
thereto with their points and authorities presented to the
court in plaintiff’s absence; and further (4) «to direct
the Clerk of this court to change records in this case to
‘conform accordingly. And as grounds therefor, plaintiff
says there is nothing in the Rules of Federal Procedure
(25, or elsewhere therein) or the codes to limit liability |
as has been done in this order to support such a ruling,
- neither substantive nor procedural law to support, so far
as plaintiff has been able to find. -
‘ It is contended and submitted that the defendants are.
simply placed in the shoes of the deceased Fred Smith -
and encumbered with all of his liabilities at the date of
his death, accordingly. The case they cited’ (Attorneys
for’ Defendants) to support their order presented ‘does
not, and: did not, apply to this matter before the court,
for that Water’s case was a will case, and no will is in- .
volved here so far as plaintiff knows, in the case before
this om
again, it is, and would be, only justice to force the substi-
_ tute defendants to be made pioneers and take it there, as
- Fred Smith never paid any of the costs when it went there
and was reversed before (221 F. 2d 59), nor any part of
the original judgment (see Judge Tamm’s order and judg-
ment in file, of February 23, 1955, ordering judgment
for costs, ete. ). And further specific reasons and grounds,
as shown in points and authorities annexed hereto, and
made a part thereof. ' od
-
/s/ LUTHER ROBINSON Mappox, PRO SE
* * . * @ e . d
Dated: October 10, 1966. °
If this case must go to the court of appeals —
%
Pod
‘
SRNL LPI NG OEE RINT 8
ES
e
44.966)...
20-A
Points and Authorities in.support of the above motion
to reconsider, etc.,. order and judgment of October 4
septe mbe -
7 I,
In opposition. to Plaintiff’s order presehted by him for
signature, on the 30th day of , 1966, substitute .
defendants for Fred Smith (their attorneys) say Fred
Smith died without assets or virtually no assets to pass
to his heirs is absolutely an erroneous statement, for the
transcript in.file in this case, showing the examination
of- Bertha E. Smith in aid of execution of judgment
against Fred Smith now deceased (p. 11), shows a deed
from Bessie van Watd passing the title to the home prop-
erty at 3310 - 5th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., to Fred _
Smith, Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil, wherein ,
Smith held a tenancy in common thereafter. This prop-
erty has been assessed recently for taxation purposes at’
$6,808.00, Plaintiff has been informed; hence it is of com-
-mon knowledge that the market value is about $14,000
or $15,000, or more today, or at the date of his death,
_Wwhereon there was a lien valid and existing, at the time
of his death. The records also show that Fred Smith paid
taxes thereon, and made all improvements and repairs
(Tr. 27, 28). The property next door (3314 - 5th Street,
S.E.) standing in the name of Bertha E. Smith and Mary
Lois McNeil, at that time was assessed at $17,174, making
it worth about $35,000 or more. Moreover, ‘the records |
show Fred Smith held insurance of $750.00, which un-
doubtedly his wife Bertha or Lois McNeil, recovered at
his death, or soon thereafter. He was a civil service
worker at St. Elizabeth Hospital, it appears, of the gov-
ernment and undoubtedly the heirs have been drawing his
‘retired pay, or portions thereof, since Fred Smith’s death.
His retired pay, the record herein shows, was $244.99 a
‘month. So it may easily and clearly be seen that state-
ment was in error. The first paragraph of. defendants’
statement is correct; in their second paragraph it is:-in- .
correct, and not worthy of comment. ;
eo
21-A
Il.
Their third paragraph say Waters v. Taylor iti and >
explicitly set out the substitute defendants liability on
the judgment. In all of these statements made here, ex-
cept the quotation, which did not go far enough, are mis-
. leading, for that Water’s case was a will case and has
no application to this situation before the court. Follow-
ing their quotation, there may be seen the following:
“That proceeding is warranted against devisees only in
case they have actually succeeded to real estate devised
to them; and does not lie in the event that testator dies —
leaving no property. In other words, the liability of de-
visees for judgment debts of a testator attaches solely
because lands have come to them under his will, and if
the devise fails, either because the testator died leaving
no real property or for any other reason, the devisees
named in a will are not chargeable with the debts of the
testator.” (emphasis added )
So, it may be seen that case has no application here
and: is misleading’ to say the least. Moreover, that case
was decided in 1933, and therefore has no application or
bearing whatsoever, for the Rules of Civil Procedure have
“superseded in a great measure many of those old cases
and ©, n our District of Columbia Code has been changed
very -ecently, so far as liability may be concerned.
Ill...
In their last paragraph of their points and authorities,
they refer to rights reserved to appeal and seek review,
it should be noted. It should be observed also that the 7
Court’s order refers all .the way through, as does the
papers for the defendants, on judgment—singular, if you
please. Plaintiff’s motion for renewal and revival was
- for a revival of “judgments” against Fred Smith—plural.
See Judge Tamm’s order of February 23, 1955. There
were several —_— against Fred Smith. See the fol-
lowing: * * *
ONT LON NT ee =
22-A
(See Joint Appendix in file, pp. 22a-27a, 17a-19a). See . |
also pp. 30a, 31a, wherein is.shown the material and
pertinent portions of opinion of Judge Holtzoff, motion °
. heard on, September 28, 1966 (see'‘O/R). .
ORDER
oar . |
’ (Granting Extension of Time for Filing Record in
| Case No. 20794)
(Filed January 9, 1967)
Upon consideration of this order, it is this 9th day of
_ Jannary, 1967, aes
ORDERED that the time for filing the record on appeal
by defendants, Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil
shall be extended to February 24, 1967.
/s/ MATTHEW F. McGuIRE
Judge, ,
United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(Copy letter of Clerk here, dated February 23, 1967,
which was ordered by Court to be filed in Case No.
20794); (R. IV) * * * order dated Dec. 18, 1967
* * * *
Joshua H. Lane, Esq. | | ,
600 Hill Building 7
Washington, D. C. 20006
ee No. 20786—Maddox
v. Smith et al.
~ Dear. Sir:
, In the above entitled case the original record on appeal
was filed in this court on February 23, 1967, and the
above-entitled appeal was docketed on that date.
23-A
The appeal by Bertha E. Smith and Mary Lois McNeil
will not be docketed until the $25.00 docket fee is paid.
See Rule 13(b) and Rule 20(h) of this court, An appear-
ance should be filed at: the time of docketing. See Rule
13(e). ;
Very truly yours,
NATHAN J. PAULSON
Clerk
By: ELIZABETH E, NAMETH'
Deputy Clerk
No. 20794,
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL IN 20794, OR/AND
FOR OTHER RELIEF (FILED MAY 8, 1967)
* a +
III,
Finally, their appeal was not perfected in time: (See
docket and record). The extension of time was only to
February 24, 1967, and did not include the 24th of Feb-
ruary. The law is statutory, jurisdictional and mandatory
on appeals, and they must be perfected in time. It is be-
lieved that this Court had no power or authority over
case No. 20794 after midnight of February 23, 1967; it
was extinguished at that moment and time, except to dis- _
miss the appeal. (See Yaghak v. Hacker, 297 F. 2d 495,
at p. 496, Howard v. Local 74 Wood and Metal Lathers
_ ‘International, 208 F. 2d 930, at p. 932, Young v. St. Paul
R.. Co., 369 F. 2d 502, Dee. 66), holding time require-
ment within which appeal must be taken is mandatory.
and jurisdictional. Z a
Wherefore Plaintiff Maddox (* * *) for convenience
respectfully prays that this motion be granted: and that
24-A
the appeal in No.°20794 be dismissed as frivolous, be-:
cause the appeal was not perfected until after February
23, 1967, and that attempted appeal after that time was
a nullity’ on the face of the record, after that time. Re-
spectfully submitted : iii,
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEES MOTION TO DISMISS
AND CONSENT. TO TREATING HIS-BRIEF AND
APPENDIX IN NO. 20786 AS SUFFICIENT
FOR THIS APPEAL. R. I(1)
aa
* . hed * *
3. With respect to Appellee’s contention that this ap-.
peal was not perfected in time, Appellant’s Notice of
Appeal was filed on December 13, 1966, the date for dock-
eting the record appeal was extended to February 24,
1967, by order of the District Court, which order is con-
tained in the original record now on file in this Court of
Appeals. Appellee’s contention that the record ‘was not
‘ docketed in time is without, foundation.
/s/ *+* + te ‘ | . w
Attorneys for Appellants
yy ie
(See order of Judge McGuire, sup nf it says nothing
about docketing). | e,
| (Filed on June 9, 1967, order aston motion. to dis-
miss appeal ‘in No. 20794).
Rule: 73(g) FRCP, docketing. and record on appeal:
“The record on appeal as provided for in Rules 75 and
76 shall be filed with the appellate court and the appeal
_ there docketed within 40 days from the. date of filing the
first Notice of Appeal; except. that, when more than one
appeal is taken from the same judgnient to the same
appellate court, the. District Court ‘may prescribe the time
for filing and docketing sd Naas
-25-A : f
See Record in Case No. 20794, R. I(2), motion of this
_ petitioner and respondents’ statement in opposition saying
just the opposite of order of Judge McGuire* ** —
In Bledsoe and Emmitt Marcum and d/b/a Oklahoma -
Auction Yard v. Wirtz, Sec’y-of Labor (C.A. 10) 384
' F. 2d 767 held: : Ss
The question of whether the court has jurisdiction over
the subject hatter of a cause of action has primary im- ,“:
portance and can be raised at.any time even on the court’s
. own motion. (See McGrath v. Christenson, 340 U.S. 162,
’ cited therein) ;
_ (See Rule 12(a) and 12(c), FRAP, to become effective:
July 1, 1968) “(a) Docketing the Appeal within the time. -
allowed or fixed for transmission of the record, the ap-
pellant shall pay to the clerk of the rt of Appeals the
‘docket fee fixed by the Judicial Conference of the United |
States pursuant to 28 U.S.C., Sec. 1913, and the Clerk:
will thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket.” * * *
— “The Court of Appeals may upon motion for cause shown
enlarge the time for docketing the appeal or permit the
appeal to be docketed out of time.” * * *
No. 20794
_ , Filed June 9, 1967
~ :
Before: Bazelon, Chief Judge; Wilbur K. Miller, Senior
Circuit Judge; and Danaher, Circuit Judge, in cham-
bers. : | deat
ORDER A
On consideration. of appellee’s motion to dismiss this .
appeal as frivolous or, alternately, to treat appellee’s
brief filed in Appeal Case No. 20786 (Maddox v. Smith
TF ad
ee nae
¥
4
|
26,-A
et al, )' as his brief in this case and of — opposi-
tion thereto, it is»
ORDERED by the Court that appellee’ aforesaid mo-
| tion to dismiss be denied, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that the brief
. filed by appellee in case No. 20786, wherein he is the
; “appellant, shall be treated as his brief i in this appeal.
vor Curiam, (R. V)
No. 20794
(RVI
Filed July 27, 1967 —
Before: ‘Bazelon, Chief Judge, in chambers. P
( ORDER
On consideration of appellee's S motion to permit appellee ,
to file a supplemental brief it is, oe
ORDERED that the tea ‘entton be cite and
appellee within twenty days.from the date of this order
may file a supplemental brief in this case.
J
No. 20794
(R. VI). :
» » ‘Filed July 3,.1967
Before: Bazelon, Chief Judge; Wilbur K. Miller, Senior
Circuit Judge; and Danaher, Circuit Judge, in cham-—
=
o7-A
ORDER
On consideration of appellee’s motion to reconsider this
court’s order of June 9, 1967, and to reconsider his motion
. to dismiss, it is
. © ORDERED BY THE COURT that the order entered
herein on June 9, 1967, is ‘amended, and appellee’s brief
and joint appendix filed in case No. 20,786 shall be treated
as his brief and the joint appendix in this case, and it is ©
. ‘FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that the Clerk
shalt set this case and case No. 20,786 for hearing before . -
the same division of this court on the same day.
Per Curiam.
* * * *
No. 20786
Filed December 18, 1967
Before: Burger, —— McGowan, Cireuit J udges, in
chambers.
| ORDER
; On inutile of appellant’s motion to stay the trans-
mission of ‘the certified copy of this Court’s judgment.
- pending application to the Supreme Court of the United
States for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, it is
ORDERED by the Court that appellant's aforesaid
motion is denied.
Per Curiam.
28-A
No. 20786
Filed January 2, 1968
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO RETURN CERTIFIED
COPY OF JUDGMENT TO THIS COURT AND/OR
~ FOR OTHER RELIEF IN THE PREMISES
(Denied 2/2/68 as to Return of C/C/J)*
Appellant, Pro Se, moves this Court for an order direct- }
ing the return of the judgment in this case pending ap-
plication to the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari to review said judgment. and: to direct the
Clerk of this Court to file the herewith attached Exhibit
“A” (Motion for a Reconsideration to: stay, ete., which
speaks for itself), or for other relief in the premises.
The reasons and grounds therefor are as follows:
the Exhibit “A” herewith attached speaks for itself
(original and three copies). It-was presented to the
Clerk of this Court and ‘received on December 28,
1967, at 9:05 A.M., and at that time there was no
entry made. upon the docket in this case.to show that
the judgment herein’ had=gone down to the lower
court. On December 30, 1967, Appellant received:
back through the mail this motion’ for reconsidera-
tion, ete. (Exhibit ‘“A”) from the Clerk’s office with
'a memorandum saying that the judgment had-in this
case been issued to the District Court and that the -
Motion, therefore, could no longer be filed (Exhibit
“A” herewith). See File and Record in case.
/s/ LUTHER ROBINSON MADDOX, PRO SE
29-A
, No. 20786 |
Filed December 28, 1967 .
Exhibit “A” (Original and 3 Copies)
(Ordered Filed 2/2/68) (See Above) * cae
MOTION OF APPELLANT FOR A ,RECONSIDERA-
_ TION OF ITS MOTION TO STAY TRANSMISSION
OF THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT
IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE PENDING AP-
PLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO RE-
VIEW SAID JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Rule 27(e) of this Court, Appellant, Pro
Se, moved this Court on November 18, 1967, to stay safd
judgment being sent down to the lower court, affirming
_Said judgment below, without an opinion, directing costs
to be borne by each party herein, pending application to ‘
the Supreme. Court of the United States.for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment herein. “That motion
was denied on December 18, 1967. The reasons and
grounds ‘therefor are as follows:
I
-It is believed that this Court has overlooked the fact
that the fundamental question that should be passed on
by the Supreme Court, and since. this is a case of first
impression, to construe or interpret Section 12-103 of our
District of Columbia Code (a federal jurisdiction, and
not a state), it is only justice and fair treatment, based
on the record before this Court, to stay the transmission
of that judgment to the lower Court until that highest
appellate court has passed on the questions involved here-
in. ;
= INP RP ME TAS FO
' 80-A
— II.
The Appellees’ liability was fixed below by that Court
contrary to established law, without having allowed this
appellant to be heard on the important question involved
under the new Statute (12-103). ;
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ LUTHER ROBINSON Mabpox, PRO SE.
* * - 3° *
September Term, 1967 Law No. 74,531.
~ No. 20786
[Stamped]
United States Court of Appeals for the District. of
Columbia Circuit, Filed Feb. 2, 1968,
Nathan J. Paulson, Clerk
Before: Burger, Wright and McGowan, Circuit Judges,
in chambers.. ie . :
ORDER
On consideration of appellant’s motion for an order to
return the certified copy of the judgment to this court
pending application to the United States Supreme Court
for writ of certiorari, and to direct the clerk to file the
attached exhibit “A” entitled: Motion of Appellant for
_ Reconsideration of its Motion to stay transmission of the
. Judgment Pending Application for Writ of Certiorari, it
is. tah &
ORDERED by the court that the clerk is directed to
file the aforesaid exhibit “A” and it is
FURTHER ORDERED by the, court that appellant’s
motion for an order to return the certified copy of the
judgment pending’ application. to the United States Su-
preme Court for writ of certiorari is. denied.
‘\ Per Curiam.
RP
&
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.