Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — South Texas Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner
Supreme Court brief1967
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
@
. on the Supreme Gout of the luted Bates
_ OcTOBER TERM, 1966 \
No.’ 910
SoutH TExas Rick WaRkEHOUsE Co., PETITIONER
Vv.
— o INTERNAL REVENUE
ON PETITION "FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ©
MEMORANDUM FOR = RESPONDENT IN’ OPPOSITION
This case 5 involves the scope of the Commissioner’ Ss
power under § 482 of the Internal Revenue. Code of
* .1954 (App. infra, p. 9) to -Allocate ‘income and
‘deductions among commonly controlled organizations
in order to prevent the avoidance of taxes or clearly
to reflect their income. . s
Petitioner’ S principal sities consisted of drying,
7 cleaning and warehousing - rice. Its-stock was owned
by four families, each owning a’ one-fourth interest.
‘During June, 1957, various members of the four
families formed a partnership (with. each. family —
owning a 25 percent interest). Petitioner then leased
its operating assets—which were worth at least
(1)
?
ai ie cae
" $700,000—to the partnership for an annual rental of
_ $48,000.. (Pet. 28-30, 36.) Ce |
_.,' For the three fiseal years preceeding this lease to
| + the partnership (1955-1957), petitioner had net earn-
_.. ings of $130,000, $171,000 and $75,000, respectively:
_For the three fiscal years following the lease (1958-
1960), petitioner. suffered net losses. of $33,000, $18,-
000, and $12,000, 7.¢., its deductions for depreciation,
taxes, etc. exceeded its $48,000 annual rental income —
by these amounts. During these same three‘years the
partnerships’ net income from operating the leased
prepare was. $127, 000, $75,000, and $109, 000. (Pet.
37.) °
‘Petitioner sought to carry its 1958-1960 net losses
back ‘to. previous years and filed: a claim for refund
of taxes paid in earlier years. The Commissioner,
exercising his authority under § 482, determined, inter
waar
alee
alia, that the rental paid by the partnership to peti-
tioner was inadequate; that the rent was not nego-—
tiated in an armi’s length transaction; and that suffi-
~ cient partnership income should be allocated to peti-
_ tioner to provide a reasonable rental of $78,000 per
year. (R. 227.)* Both the Tax Court and the court
- of appeals upheld the Commissioner’s determination.
(R. 229-241; Pet. 32-41.) eer
The decision -below is correct, turns on the. particu-
lar facts of this case, and presents no conflict or other
-Teason warranting further review by this: Court.
. 1. The purpose of § 482 (first appearing in its pres-
_ ent form in the Revenue Act of 1928, ec. 852, 45 Stat.
1“R.” references are to the printed record in the court of
appeals,
. 3 ,
791) is to prevent a. taxpayer from arbitrarily shift-
ing part of its income or deductions to a related tax- _
ablé entity, and thereby ‘distorting its true, taxable.
-» income. The Commissioner’s reallocation authority .
. under § 482 extends to any case in which, either by in-
advertence or design, the taxable net income is differ-
/ ent than it would have -been had the commonly
controlled entities dealt with each other at arm ’s
length. See Treas. Reg., § 1.482-1(b) (App., infra,
- pp. 10-12) ; Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, 197 F.
2d 620 (C.A. 3); ; Grenada Industries, Ine. v. Commis-
stoner, 17 T.C. 231, affirmed, 202 F. 2d 873 (C.A. 5),
certiorari denied, 346 U.S. 819; Aiken Drive-In
Theatre Corp. v. United States, 281 F. 2d 7 (C.A: 4);
Spicer Theatre, Ing. v. Commissioner, 346°. 2d 704
(C.A. 6); Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 362 F, 2d..
212 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 928.
Whether the Commissioner, under § 482, properly
allocated incéme from the partnership to petitioner, |
is, as the court below recognized (Pet. 41), essentially
a question of fact.” The Tax Court analyzed the facts’
in great detail and concluded that the Commissioner
did not abuse his discretion .in allocating additional in-
come from the partnership to petitioner in order
2 See Asiatic ‘Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F. ‘oa 234
(C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 296 U.S. 645, rehearing denied,
296 U.S. 664; National Seorrities Corp. v. Commissioner; 137
F. 2d 600 (CA. 3), certiorari -denied, 320: U.S. 794;. Advance
- Machinery Exch. v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 1006 (C.A. 2),
certiorari: denied, 344 U.S. 835; Grenada Industries, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra; Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner,
321 F. 2d 796 (C.A. 4) ; Spicer Theatre, Ine. v. Commissioner,
yrs; Oil Base, Ine. v. Commissioner, supra.
@
ee +g 08 CFR
clearly to reflect ‘income (R. 231-241). Despite peti- |
tioner’s contentions (Pet. 11-15, 19-24), this factual
conclusion is amply supported by the record and was
” eorrectly. sustained by the court of appeals. This
- concurrent finding of both courts below should not be .
disturbed: except upon’an ‘extraordinary showing of _
error (Corn Products Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S.
46; Comstock v. Group of . Investors, 335 U.S. 211), ’
and no such showing is made here.
' 2. In summary, the evidence shows the bette:
| Virtually all of petitioner’s operating assets—which
had been producing an average net profit of $122, 000
er year for the previous three years—were leased
to the partnership for a gross rental of $48,000 per
year. This caused petitioner to operate at an average
net loss of $21,000 per year for the three year's after |
the lease, while the partnership had average net
: profits: ‘of $104,000 per year (Pet. 37).
. The same four families owned and controlled both
junds and the. partnership. The principal dif-
x ference in ownership was that the senior “members
_ of 4 two families—L. D. Clements and S. M. Clem-
-ents—who owned 20 percent and 15 percent, respec-
. tively, of ‘petitioner’s stock, had no ownership inter-
‘est in the’ partnership, the partnership interests to
which they were entitled being owned by their chil-
dren (Pet. 29-30). As the court of appeals ee
(Pet. 30, fn. 8):
The partnership was formed for the purpose of
letting ‘the Clements families’ children receive
a larger part of the income generated by the |
Tice drying and ‘storage business. |
Thus each of the four families owned 25 percent of
the partnership and 25 percent of petitioner, although.
_ the:ownership of stock within each family varied
suymewhat.*
The Tax Court found that the miniaiine which
led to the $48,000 annual rental were. not at arm’s
length (R. 237) and that a reasonable rental for peti-
tioner’s operating assets—which were worth at least ©
$700,000—would_ be $78,000 per year (R. 241). —
court of appeals affirmed, observing that “The con
clusion is inescapable, that if [the partnership’s]. in- -
come were not going to family members the lease
would not have been consummated, i. €., no independ-
“ent party could have negotiated sych a ; ee in ans.
. arms-length transaction”’ (Pet. 38-39).
3 (a). Petitioner’s principal argument (Pet. 15-26)
is that the Tax Court erred: as a matter of law in
failing to accept the testimony of its witnesses that
a fair rental was not in excess of $48,000. The Tax
Court was not obliged, however, to accept at face
value the opinion testimony of those witnesses, not
even that of the expert. The Tax Court may and
* Petitioner nevertheless argues briefly, (Pet. 12-13) that be-
cause the. two senior Clements did not personally have an
- ownership interest in the partnership, the two entities were
not “owned or controlled.directly or indirectly by the same
_ interests.” Code § 482 (App., infra, p. 9). The statute is
broadly drafted; however, to include related entities which are
“controlled,” even “indirectly,” by “the same interests” (italics
added). Thus the section does not require that the: same
people own the two entities. ‘In any event, there is no con-
flict of decisions on this point and petitioner does not even
mention it as one of the “Reasons For Granting the Writ”
(Pet. 15-24).
stash asec
RAR A LR ER Ree Ke LEAR BEANO REAR RG Si
hs
iz ’ >
DR LAR tk rank SRT Ea A cae SNR Ral SWE TE
=
a ks Be hs af ee
| should exercise its.own judgment on the basis of all :
the evidence before it. See Sartor v. Arkansas Gas
Corp.,.321 U.S. 620, 627-628; Dayton P. & L. Co.-v.
Commission, 292 U.S. 290, 299; Burford-Toothaker
Tractor Co.- V.. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 633, 635
(C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 343 U.S. 941; Penn v.
_ .Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 18, 21 (C.A. 9); Kreis’
Estate v. Commissioner, 227 F. 2d 753, 755 (C.A. 6).
As the court below pointed out (Pet. 40), petitioner’s
witnesses failed to take certain significant factors into
account in forming their opinions. Moreover, peti-
tioner ignores much of the evidence considered by
the Tax Court and makes no attempt to explain why
a corporation that had average net profits of $122,000
for the past three years and had just completed a
‘new. storage facility at a cost of $165,000 would agree
to lease all of its facilities for only $48,000 a year if
--it had been an independent party negotiating a fair
rental, — oy aie Ped = 2
(bh) Petitioner asserts (Pet. 6, 16-20) that the. de-
cision below is in conflict with decisions like Robin-
son Truck Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 739
(C.A. 5); J. M. Perry & Co. v. Gommissioner, 120 F.
2d 123 (C.A. 9); Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Com-
missioner, 321 F. 2d 253 (C.A, 9).. In those’ cases the
taxpayers supported their positions by disinterested
‘and uncontradicted testimony credible in itself and
not impeached in any way, whereas in the instant case
there was ample evidence contradicting the testimony
of petitioner’s witnesses and supporting the finding of
' the Tax Court. Moreover, none of the cases cited by
7 \
petitioner dealt with the Commissioner’s power: un-
- der Code § 482 to alloeate income and deductions he-' .
tween commonly controlled organizations in order to
_ prevent the avoidance of taxes or clearly to reflect
their income.. oe
The petition for a writ of soiteai should. ie |
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
‘THURGOOD’ MARSHALL,
Solicitor General.
RICHARD C. Puan,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
Harry Baum,
Donan ‘W. WILLIAMSON, Jr.,
Attorneys.
——e
<—_™
‘APRIL 1967.
—
a
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.