Memorandum in Opposition — Ach v. Commissioner
Supreme Court brief1966
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In te Supreme Gourt of the Cited i ines
_ OCTOBER TERM, 1966
No. 396
PavuLine W. ACH, PETITIONER |
a * <a
CoMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Estate or Ernest H. AcH, ET AL., PETITIONERS ~
_ COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
This case involves the scope of the Commissioner’s, °
statutory power under 1954. Code § 482 to reallocate
income between entities which are under common con-
trol. Section 482 provides:
In any. case of two or more organizations, |
trades, or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated, whether or not organized,in the United |
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned oF
controlled directly or indirectly- by the same in-
_terests, the Secretary or his delegate may dis-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, —
(1)
280-439—66
a
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on ‘ -
deductions, credits, or allowances between or
_ among such. organizations, trades, or businesses,
if he determines that such distribution, appor- .
tionment, or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such organizations, trades,
‘or businesses.
Prior to August 1953, ‘Pauline és owned and
Operated, as an, individual, a successful dress shop,
~ earning approximately $30,000 per year. Her two.
sons were the sole stockholders of a corporation
which had previously engaged unsuccessfully in the ©
operation of a dairy business but which, having ac-
cumulated ‘substantial net opetating losses, had dis-
continued that business and was inactive and
insolvent. The corporation owed a large sum to
‘Ernest Ach, the father of the corporation’s stockhold-
ers and Pauline’s husband. Because of the hopeless,
financial condition of the inactive corporation, this
debt was uncollectible. ;
On. August 1, 1953, Pauline transferred to the cor-..
poration certain assets of her dress business in ex-
' change for a non-interest-bearing note for $30,705,
which was the assets’ book value. She did.not, how-—
ever, transfer to the corporation certain intangible
assets—the right to use’ her name or the name under .
which she had operated the business, the right to her
managerial services, the goodwill attendant upon her
‘identification with and operation of the business,
ete.—which the Tax Court found to be the most im-
portant and valuable aspects of the business. There-
after, Pauline<continued to manage and operate the
dress shop in the-same manner as before. Although
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the corporation purported to pay her no salary, it.
did, over the five years here in question ( 1954-1958),
pay Pauline and her husband the bulk of the profits
from the dress business, allegedly on account of the
corporation’s debts to them. And in mid-1959. Paul-
ine’s sons transferred to her all of. the corporation’s
stock without further consideration.’ (Pet. 1a+9a,
R. 101a.) . }
On her tax returns for those years, Pauline re-
‘ported no income from her activities in connection
' with the dress business; the corporation. reported the
profits of the dress. business but used the net operat-
ing losses previously incurred in the dairy business to
wipe out any liability for taxes. The Commissioner
took alternative positions, claiming, first, that the .
net income of the dress business should be reallocated
to Pauline under 1954 Code § 482, and, second, that. to
the extent the income was taxable to the corporation,
its claimed net operating loss ii dzone should be
denied.
In the Tax Court, ir ddimaid the appli-
cability of § 482 on the ground that Pauline, fol-
lowing the transfer of the physical assets of her
dress, business to the corporation, was no longer en-
gaged in a “‘business” and that she did. not, en
constitute an independent “organization, ” “trade,”
or “business”? to which incomé might be reallocated
under § 482." The Tax Court found that the most
' valuable income-earning aspects of the business—the
_ 1The lower‘courts found that Pauline had actually acquired
. beneficial ownership to the corporation’s stock at the time
she transferred the assets of her dress business to the corpora-
tion in August 1953.
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intangible assets—had. been retained by Pauline, and —
that her continued activity constituted a ‘‘business.”
It determined that 30 percent of the business income
was attributable to the assets owned by the corpora-
tion andthe balance to the aspects of the business:
which remained with Pauline; it therefore held that
70 percent of the income was taxable to Pauline and
30 percent to the corporation.’ The court of appeals
affirmed.* *(R. 99a-110a, Pet la-9a. )
*The Tax Court stated (R. 101a):
Plainly, [the transfer of assets by Pauline to the
_ corporation ] was not, an arm’s length transaction. The
corporation was hopelessly insolvent, and it is ‘utterly be-’
yond belief that any unrelated third party would have sold
- @ prosperous business for a non-interest bearing $30,705.57
note of such an insolvent maker where the level of earn-—
ings of that busihess was about $30,000 a year and rising,
and where the sellét. contemplated continued full-time
management of the business without compensation.. Not-
withstanding testimony indicating otherwise, it is all too
clear to us on this record that Paulinggwas acquiring con-
trol of this moribund corporation : i purpose of at-
_ tempting to utilize the net operating
earnings of her successful dress business and to obtain the
actual benefits of those tax-free earnings by having the
corporation pay off, first, her $30,705.57 note, and then the
notes of some $280,000 held by her husband which were ~
otherwise uncollectable—all of which would be received
free of tax!
* The lower courts also sustained the Commissioner’ s slit
tive position that 1954 Code § 269 prevented the corporation .
from carrying forward its previous net operating losses from
the discontinued dairy business, and thus that the corporation
was taxable on the 30 percent of the dress business income
which was allocable to, it. The corporation has not filed a —
petition for a writ of certiorari and the lower courts’ deter-
mination on that.i issue is now final.
carryover of the
dairy business, to offset the resulting; deductions against .
The decisions of the lower courts were correct.
There is no coriflict of — or . other —
warranting further review.
1. Petitioners argue that Pauline’ s activities were -
‘not sufficient to constitute a ‘‘business’’ and that the
Commissioner was thus precluded from reallocating
income to. her under § 482. The Tax Court found
sthat Pauline’s retention of the intangible assets and -
~ her use of them in the continuing operation amounted
to a “business.* Whether a. particular taxpayer’s »
activities are sufficient to constitute a trade or busi-
ithin the meaning of the Code depends priuci-
pally on the facts of each case, and the question is not
readily ‘susceptible to a rule of general applicability.
Moreover, this Coutt has reviewed several cases ih-
_ volving ‘this question under other sections of the —
Code,‘ and there is no present need for the Court to
‘review this question in the context of the particular
_ facts of the case at bar.’
2: There is no conflict between the fevidiniit ey
and the cases cited by petitioners (Pet. 7-8).
Whipple v. ht weenie infra, this Court held on
that “[dJevoting one’s time and energies to the af-
4 See, ¢.g., Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193; Burnet v
Clark, 287 U.S.. 410; Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212;
‘see also Folker .% Jolason, 230 F. 2d 906 (C.A. 2); Schmid-
lapp v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 680 (C.A. 2); Noland v. Com-
missioner, 269 F.2d 108 (C.A.4).
* Since, as the Tax Court found, Pauline had retained yalu-
- able intangible assets, petitioners are incorrect in asserting (Pet.
6) that the instant decision will apply to any case where “a
controlling _ shareholder * * * has elected not to demand from
the corporation a Salary commensurate with the value of his
service.” ,
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fairs of a corporation is not of itself, and without”
| more, a trade or business of the person so engag
(p. 202). However, the Court recognized that if ad-
ditional facts were present, a court might be justified
in holding that the shareholder-employee was engaged
in a trade or business (pp. 203-205). |
Nor does the instant decision conflict with Com- .
‘missioner v. Gross, 236 F. 2d 612 (C.A. 2), since that
ease involved only 1954 Code § 61. The Commissioner
did not there attempt to invoke, .and the courts thus
did not consider, the special remedial provisions of
§ 482, the provision here im question. Cf. Tennessee-
Arkansas Gravel. Co. v. en 112 F. 2d 508,
510 (C.A. 6).°
‘Finally, Moline ‘Properties, Ine. Vv. Gnedidbiiae :
319 U.S. 436, is entirely inapposite since the lower |
courts did not refuse to treat the corporation as a
. Separate - “taxable entity. On the contrary, the Tax
Court. found there was a genuine transfer of tangible
assets to the corporation and that the. portion of the
dress business’. income: properly attributable to those
assets (30 percent) should be taxed to the a toned |
tion (R. 10la—102a, 106a).
°In Tennessee-Arkansas the taxpayer corporation rented: prop-
erty to a related corporation but did not collect any rent. The
Commissioner attempted to tax the lessor corporation on rental .
_ Income without giving the-lessee corporation a corresponding de-
duction for rent paid. . The court held that the Commissioner
may not create income in ‘this manner, but) suggested that the Com- |
missioner might (as he has done in the instant case) use § 482 or .
its predecessor to reallocate some of the reported income from one 9
. Telated taxpayer to another. | |
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Therefore, the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
| THURGOOD Marswat,
Solicitor General.
Ricwarp C. Puan,
. Acting Assistant Aitorney General. '
Harotp C. WILKENFELD, __
ip Wit A. FRIEDLANDER,,
9 ae 2 , Attorneys.
' SEPTEMBER 1966. = : :
o
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