Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Bell v. United States

Supreme Court brief1966

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ae ia Se Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

COR rFrTLeEp

~ | JAN 28 1966 \

ee No. y S 1 JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

an the ;

Supreme Court of the United Stans

: Ocroser TzRM, 1965.

HENRY F. BELL, \

? : Petitioner,

°" 08. .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Respondent. ae

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

‘ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

C. Auten Hicu

- $§tahlman Building

Nashville, Tennessee 37201

. Epwarp B. Henstze, Jr.

: Francis H. Monex

v , - 120 West Madison Street

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Wuium J. Harte

111 West Washington Street

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Counsel for Petitioner

The Scheffer Press, Inc_—ANdover 3-6850 ,

a an

INDEX

: | sia

Opinion Below -...........cscsessessees ae aes ata tal 2

MINI ncsscsetsbisscctississenivesencseansteibitctetipaiansdioganisamineladntatiiaias 2

NE Sr MINI sciccsnacesivskienbiciasasstdgudninntiaticsdianmaiasianaions a

RIE: SEIS csiicinsscincihnsmnoienosndenlstesnuisslnntiniisiaenaacniiiesiabinaes 6

Statement of the i ORE teiche Pe a AIA 6

Reasons for Granting the Wit ............sscssssessseees saiaiaiiee 18

SINS, siscssescctassiscincivteiideibalsisescusductiasieiahliipisninnlnignabieidsekauea 28

Appendix A (Opinion of the Court Below) ................0. la

Appendix B (Opinion of the Court Below on Petition

EP TIIEINID scsciusncsiniistbseniesigutaieniisannbiniighieabaulandennidiiien 22a

Appendix C (Opinion of the e Trial Court on Motion for

BO HEME) cqueesnrsqieseinvinis Aiadwnehansesidiaaniitniinndenenanessuianniet 24a

Appendix D (J udgments of the Court Below) .............. 29a

Appendix E (Nashville Newspaper Publicity) .............. 31a

Zs Appendix F (Statutes, Constitutions, Legislative Com-

mittees and Authoritative Comments on the Crime

of Gambling) ......... pila iiaininadiialeelaibes: aeiedladbabadaiialieaiaed 37a

Appendix G (Statement of the Case and Reasons for

' Granting the Writ from the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari in James R. Hoffa v. United States of

America, Now Pending Before This Court) .............. 55a

CrrTaTIons.

CasEs:

Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 587 (1962) ................ 18

Delaney v. United States, 199. F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir.

TED shvrwisnishsiasslepsteduincieieaiahiscdiiainiiaabaeagtabiaaaicesaipianilicaaiabatinaes 18

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) sseccsssssssessen 25

».

Nein ii

: E | : 3 PAGE

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) ......sesesseess s iiamebdalioe 18

Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589, 27 Pac. 933, 934 (1891) .. 20

Fliashnick v. United States, 223 Fed. 736, 739 (2d Cir..

ee ee inh Siena 22

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S/335 (1963) TR ane OA 25

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 (1942) ........... . 21

Gold v. United States, 26 F. 2d }85, 186 (2d Cir. 1928) .. "99

Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953) .. 23

Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1958) . —

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1961) 0.0... eee 18

Jones v. United States, 342 F. 2d 863, 868 (1964) ........24, 25

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 775 (1946) .. 22

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444-45

CIID. casiinwiiepesesiiesaieecitanibianaalaiibdgsaieciocaaasideiniataaneeteaainalaanin o

Marshall v. United States, 360. U.S. 310 (1959) ............ 18

Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 244 (1905) ...rsssccsssssesneeee 20

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ..........0... 25

Oliver v. United States, 335 F. 2d 724, 128 (D. . Cir.

MUNIN ici siusicssd.dheaplitamanosnsiidssadasesniiaiuncajadebstinibsaasisucahaaseniinidesabini 2

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United — 360 U.S.

| RE CE - Sekscnidlestaindecatstilsepeiticancddaidininntilidnesisannannands 27

- Rex v. Rapp, 1 Dall. 9, 1 L. Eid. 7 (Pa. 1764) ..sssssssscson ‘17

San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th.

CAR TE) scirans cesenannadanetionnesissaieaniancsnnniactitecese wesseces 22

Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1951) «0... 18

Sheppard v. Maxwell, No. 490, Oct. Term, 1965, 34

pk Rp BE: Ree en re aE 18

United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D.C. Mont.

EE: stlbiniass svssseescnsnnuecsecnnsnnnnneccccnscennnecssseggennsssessesssssnsseees ... 24

United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 339, 349 (1958) .......... 26.

¥ J

iii

PAGE

United States v. Maloney, 262 F. 2d 535, 538 (2d Cir.

| EE LANGA OEE 25

United States v. Pennix, 313 F. 24, 531 — Cir.

1963) ........ scanaiaasn Ce a eR Ie. ED 22

Pnited- States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.

Reni eae eee oa

ConsTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND Rutzs:

Fifth Amendment to ‘the Constitution of the United

I cccisnesrccsnannadckieipnuriantinstanentiasoninenssnniianaiiovateintshats 22, 4, 25 °

Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

IE ack titsstiesettesencasnteceemereniecinnnnieinsit sessseesennenenncennnnnnes 2,5 me

18 U.8.0. 1508 .entrcssceseseuee sold edieschionaiasssstiemasionenl 146 ¢

ea, sa) | ae hy : D

Be, Te aceasta nineitleencaccetennenenstavinnninnt aiaindinamniainen 20

BO TEC - TI seiciccecancectconievneneginnneeptscncnecnennnsnincinmmnnnnmainsion 16

Beate Cle), Fr. TE. Cte, FP ccceccccncncicssiccssncnsconssesens 6

— Rule 52(a), F. BR. Crim. Py ou... cseesssessssssesssessnnesneeees #6, 13, 21

Statutes collected in Appendix WP sitesi reossconoseoneyesnnsssonee 37a

MISCELLANEOUS: | }

Blackstone Commentaries *325-327. ....svssssssssusenfeeseeee , 25 —

Note, Controling Press & Radio Influence on trials,

63 Harv. L. Rev. 840 (1950) .........ccccocccccsccccssscecrencses in

24 Am. Jur., Gaming and Prize Contests, sec. 3, p. 399... 20

\ <i ¥

a ae

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ocroser TERM, 1965.

qt,

No. ° €..

HENRY F. BELL, - a4

_. Petitioner,

vs. yee ;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ;

4 -Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

Petitioner, Henry F. Bell, defendant-appellant in. the

court below, petitions this Court to issue its Writ of

Certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in this

gause on October 14, 1965, which affirmed the judgment

_ of the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-

trict of Tennessee; Nashville Division, on April 27, 1964,

convicting petitioner of a violation of Title 18, sec. 1503,

U.S.C., in endeavoring to influence petit jurors in the -

trial of the case of United States v. James R. Hoffa and

* Commercial Carriers, Inc., and sentencing petitioner to a

period of. five years in jail anda fine of $5,000.00, the

inaximum statutory punishment. er

Sot bin

OPINION BELOW.

The opinions of the Court of Appeals aré as yet unre-

_~ ‘ported, copies of which are printed in Appendix A and B.

| JURISDICTION. :

\ The judgment of the Court of Appeals (Appendix D)

was entered on October 14, 1965. A timely Petition for

Rehearing was denied. with a supplemental opinion (Ap-

pendix B) on. December 15, 1965. The jurisdiction of this

Court ‘is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1254(1). c

a QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

4-"

1. Whether petitioner was denied a fair and gueettid :

trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when the

trial court refused to postpone the petitioner’s trial, one

of a group of sensationally publicized cases in a com-

munity for a crime particularly abhorrent to the conscience

‘of the community (jury tampering in the same case),

where four defendants had been convicted’ thirty days

earlier in Chattanooga, ‘Tennessee, and another’ defendant

just three days earlier in the very same court room in

Nashville, Tennessee, with continuous intervening prej-

udicial publicity. .

2. Whether petitioner was denied a fair and impartial

trial in. a.close case of one man’s word against another

. because theYial court applied. a double standard in its evi-

dential rulings favoring the government, wherein evidence

of seventeen misdemeanor convictions (ranging from 1949

through 1962) of the government’s only inculpating wit-

ness was excluded expressly on the ground that felonies °

alone were admissible to impeach, but the very next day

the trial court permitted impeachment of the petitioner

himself for one eighteen year old misdemeanor conviction.

3. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in decid-

ing that the operation’ of a policyeracket is not a crime

involving moral turpitude contrary to the holding in every

case, the statement in every treatise, the conclusion of

every legislative committee, and the expression of every

authoritative commentator. o

4, In a close case of one man’s word against another

, and where the primary issue for the jury was the conflict

in testimony between the only inculpating government wit-

ness and the petitioner, whether the trial court’s exclusion

of seventeen misdemeanor convictions of the government ,

witness and then the next day admitting one misdemeanor

conviction of the petitioner was harmless error as decided

by the Court of Appeals.

5. Whether the indictment of petitioner was invalid

by reason of:

| 5

(a) the delegation of the Jury Commission’s duties

of grand jury, selection to non-official “suggestors”

(consisting orlmarily of bankers, Postmasters and

State Court officials, and not including any wage

earner, manual laborer or representative of organized

labor) and the Jury Commission’s blanket acceptance

of the persons-supplied by the “suggestors” without

any investigation or examination by the Jury Com-

mission to determine whether such persons were qual-

ified or constituted a cross-section of the community;

(b) the trial court’s refusal to grant petitioner a

hearing to prove improper delegationsof the duties

. of the Jury Commission in selecting the grand jury,

and the systematic exclusion of elements of the com-

munity from the grand jury venire; and

tion to ifquire whether the members of the Grand

ce .

( 78

a ;

ae en

Jury panel were biased against petitioner because of

' prejudicial publicity against him relating to the im-

pending Grand Jury investigation.

6. Whether the indictment of the petitioner was invalid

because :

(a) petitioner, admittedly a prospective target de-

fendant, was subpoenaed as a witness before the Grand

Jury which returned. this indictment and was ques-

tioned about matters for which he was later indicted;

(b) the trial court directed petitioner, as a pro-

spective defendant, to answer questions which he had

refused to answer before the Grand Jury; and

Jury that no adverse inference was to arise from

petitioner’s pleading his privilege against self-in-

crimination under the Fifth Amendment.

7. Whether the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial

when the trial court refused petitioner permission. to

inspect the transcribed testimony before the Grand Jury

of the witnesses used by the government on trial.

The foregoing are the questions which petitioner sub-

mits are reasons for granting the writ of certiorari. The

following questions he reserves for argument in the event

the writ is granted without limitation.

8. Taking the evidence most favorable to the Govern-

ment as true, whether one statement to a person who does

not know the jurors that “it was worth a whole lot of

money if I could tamper with them to get them to vote for

acquittal” is sufficient to constitute a violation of Title 18,

sec. 1503, U.S.C.

a oe

9. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a

new trial where one of the petit jurors failed to disclose

the fact that her husband had been subpoenaed as a

government witness to testify before the Grand Jury.

10. Whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court

to permit the government’s witness Ford to testify as

to a hearsay statement made by the witness Bellamy out

of the presence of petitioner.

11. “Whether the indictment was invalid in that it did

not allege an offense and was so vague as to amount to a

violation of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 7(c).

12. Whether the trial court should have granted the

petition for change of judge. |

-e

STATUTES INVOLVED.

1. Section 1503, Title 18, U.S.C. provides in pertinent

part:

“Whoever corruptly * * * endeavors to influence,

intimidate, or impede any * * * petit juror * * * in

the discharge of his duty * * * shall be fined not more

than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,

or, both.” ,

oa 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal oe

provides in pertinent part: Pa

“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which

does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”

3. Rule 6(e) $f the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-

cedure provides in pertinent part:

“Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand

jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any

juror may be made to the attorneys f oA te govern-

ment for use in the performance of their duties.

Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenog-

rapher may disclose matters occurring before the

grand jury only when so directed by the court pre-

liminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding

or when permitted by the court at the request of the

defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist

for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of

mata Semen before the grand jury * *° *.”

A STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In the latter part of 1962, the case of United States v.

James R. Hoffa and Commercial Carriers, Inc. (hereafter

referred to as the Test Fleet case), ended in a mistrial.

Following that trial Judge William Miller ordered an

investigation into charges of jury tampering in that case,

ordered the impaneling of a special Grand Jury to dance’

”

pine Tne

the investigation, and then recused himself from further

consideration of the matter. (D. A. 42a.)? Indictments

against 11 persons including appellant emanated from this

investigation in four separate cases: United States v.

Hoffa, et al.; United States v. Medlin (subsequently sev-

ered from the Hoffa cases); United States v. Bell (the

instant case); and United States v. Cole, et al. All the

foregoing at times herein will at times be referred to as

the Tamper cases.

The indictment against petitioner was in ‘three counts.

Count III charged petitioner with corruptly endeavoring

to obstruct and impede justice by offering to make avail-

able $30,000.00 to one Nathan Bellamy to induce Bellamy

to communicate with, and to cause others to communicate

with, two jurors, Gratin Fields and Mrs. Matthew Walker,

who were petit jurors in the Test Fleet case. Petitioner

was convicted and the maximum statutory punishment

permissible was imposed by the trial court, imprisonment

for 5 years and a fine of $5,000.00.

1, The Pretrial Prejudicial Publicity Accompanying The

“Tamper” Cases.

An unprecedented amount of publicity accompanied

each development in each of the cases. It became common

newspaper parlance to refer to them as the “jury tamper-

ing casap” or the “tamper cases,” a name incidentally

which persists to the present. Petitioner filed a timely

motion to transfer the cause from the district or division

for trial listing as grounds that there was so great a

prejudice against him that he could not obtain a fair and

impartial trial. During the course of ‘the special Grand

* References to “D. A.” are from petitioner’s appendix in

the Court of Appegis; references to “G. A.” are from. the

Government’s a ,

—

Jury investigation there were almost daily reports of the

activities of the Grand Jury, including a story concerning

petitioner’s appearance. (D. A. 60a.) Petitioner’s motion

_ to transfer was denied by the trial court, citing as author-

ity its decision in the Hoffa cases. (D. A. 40a.)

Subsequently the case involving James Hoffa and his

co-defendants (now. pending on petition for writ of cer-

tiorari before this Court)- proceeded toward trial. How-

ever, in November, 1963, it was announced that one of the

attorneys representing Hoffa had attempted to bribe a

prospective juror in the coming trial. This fact was given

widespread néws coverage specifically in the Nashville °

area. (D. A. 68a.) A hearing was conducted and the at-

torney was disbarred and subsequently indicted (Umited

States v. Osborn—the fifth case).

On December 12, 1963, Judge Gray, the trial judge in

the instant case ‘who was to have heard the Hoffa case,

disqualified himself from that case by written memoran-

dum, stating,:“This case and some of the related matters

now pending or heretofore heard in this Court.touch the

integrity of the Court’s own processes so closely that the

duty of the judges to be alert to any possibly disqualifying

factors is especially important.” He expressly signified —

petitioner’s case as one of the cases “related” to the Hoffa

case. (D. A. 44a.) -° ; -

On December 28, 1963, Judge Wilson transferred the

Hoffa case to Chattanooga because the intense local press

coverage prevented him from receiving a fair trial. (D. A.

50a.)

In January, 1964, another disbarment proceeding (Harry

Beard Disbarment) involving alleged jury>tampering in

the Test Fleet case was held by Judge Gray wherein evi-

dence was presented. (D. A. 44a.) The Chattanooga trial

began’ in mid-January, 1964, and lasted six and one-half

- in

weeks, to March 4, 1964, ending in the conviction of Hoffa

and three co-defendants. They were sentenced on March

12, 1964. But of pertinent significance here is the publicity

accompanying the trial of that case in the Nasliville news-

papers. A chronological account by headline of the news-

paper publicity from February 1, 1964, to April 4, 1964,

is included in Appendix E of this brief. (Appendix E,

31a-36a). The actual articles appear as an exhibit to peti-

tioner’s motion for a continuance. (D. A. 50a).

As was the custom the trial was signified in the head-

lines as the “Tamper Trial.” Virtually without exception,

/ @ minute account of the trial appeared each day on the

front pages of both the Tennessean and Banner, the two

Nashville dailies. These accounts included not only the

evidence adduced in the trial, but argument of counsel.

out of the presence of the jury, various offers of evidence,

numerous hearings on the relevancy of evidence, rebukes

by the trial court of defense counsel, etc. Petitioner’s case

was included in this publicity. (Articles on Feb. 7 and

Feb. 22, 1964.) The verdict of the jury of guilty against

four of the defendants in those cases on March 4, 1964,

was accompanied by an explosion of publicity in these

newspapers. The Test Fleet trial (the subject of peti-

tioner’s indictment and for which he was then awaiting

trial) was described as “one of the greatest attacks on the

jury system this country has ever known” and the convic-

tion as a “beacon with the warning that no one may try

to thwart” the integrity of the jury system with. impunity.

(March 5—“Tennessean”.) Later the trial judge ordered

an investigation into possible jury tampering in the Chat-

tanooga case which was also given wide newspaper cover-

age. Subsequent to the jury verdict, the press provided

daily coverage for the post-trial action including the sen-

tencing, new trial, appeal; ete.

| ?

adie

Then followed the trial of Lawrence Medlin, whose case

had not been transferred to Chattanooga. He had origi- |

nally been one of the defendants in the Hoffa cases. His ©

trial was set for March 30, 1964, before Judge Wilson in

Nashville and the case received the usual splash, both

preliminary to and during the trial. In the meantime the .

press was readying the public for petitioner’s trial with

articles on March 10 that his was the next “tampering”

trial and March 22 that the Government was bringing in

the “Billie Sol” prosecutor to try appellant. Petitioner

sought the only relief possible to him under the circum-

stances, a motion for continuance, specifically stating the

motion was not made for purposes of delay. (D. A. 51a.)

The local press translated this into an attempt to “stall”

the trial in an article on April 2, 1964.

A verdict of guilty was returned against Medlin » on

Friday, April 3, 1963, accompanied by front-page head-

lines. Appellant’s motion for continuance was presented -

for hearing the next day, Saturday, Apri] 4, 1964, and

denied that day. Appellant was ordered to and proceeded

to trial Monday morning, April 6, 1964. (D. A. 51a. N.

The Court of Apgdeals concluded tliat the trial judén did

not abuse his discretion in —— the motion for continu-

ance. The Court noted:

“It was for the benefit of Mr. Hoffa that he is

charged with endeavoring to influence jurors. Under

these circumstances, it is not apparent how he could

be disassociated with Mr. Hoffa. At the minute he

went on trial, the issue would be whether he was in-

volved in the Hoffa trial of 1962. The defendant’s case

could not be tried in a vacuum. How long should the

trial court have continued the case? One month?

Three months? Six months? A year?” (Appendix A,

p. 15a) f

= a

2-4. The Double Standard of Evidentiary Rulings Favor- —

ing The Government. | |

The sole direct testimony to support the crime charged

was by the government witness Nathan Bellamy who pur-

portedly had a twenty-minute conversation with petitioner’

in a Nashville restaurant, sometime “in late October or

early November.” The Court of Appeals in its decision

stated the following as to his reliability: “His reliability as

a witness might be subject to question but the government

must take its witnesses where it finds them.” (Appendix

In any event, during cross-examination of Bellamy, de-

fense counsel attempted for impeachment purposes to

question him regarding numerous and recent criminal con-

victions arising out of his activities-as a notorious “num-

’ bers” racketeer. Upon ‘objection by the Government, the

trial court refused to permit the examination and advised

counsel that, for impeachment purposes, it would limit the

examination of the witness, or any subsequent’ witness, to

questions concerning convictidns for felonies only. (D. A.

79a.) :

- In an offer of proof out of the hearing of the jury,

defense counsel displayed to the Court. that Bellamy had

been convicted as many as seventeen times. in the period

ranging from 1949 to as recent as 1962. The convictions

included vagrancy, loitering, operating a disorderly house,

_ loitering around a disorderly house, gaming, keeping a

gaming house, and violations of the State Lottery Law.

(D. A. 79a-82a.) Bellamy admitted he headed a large

policy organization and was one of the chief numbers men

in Nashville with at least twenty agents. (R. 128.) While

none of the seventeen criminal convictions included the

terms “policy” or “nymbers”, they all were charges result-

_—

ing from Bellamy’s “numbers” operations, With regard to

violations of the State Lottery Law (which includes policy),

Bellamy admitted he had been — and fined. (D. A.

79a, 81a.)

The Government rested its case the ig Bellamy testi-

fied, and the very next day, prior to petitionér’s taking the

stand as a witness, defense counsel reminded the Court <

~ of its ruling that cross-examination for impeachment pur-

poses would be limited to questions: regarding prior con-

victions of felonies only. Defense counsel then asked the

Court for a ruling that this same rule would apply to the

petitioner. (D. A. 103a.) The Court, however, ruled that

on cross-examination of the petitioner, the Government

would not be limited to convictions of felonies only, but

could include misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.

The Government then was permitted to question the peti-

tioner concerning his-conviction on a plea of guilty of a

misdemeanor some 18 years prior. (D. A. 104a.)

At the end of the trial just prior to deliberation, the

trial court instructed the jury that the testimony of a

witness‘“may be impeached by showing that he has pre-

viously been convicted of a crime involving moral 4tur- .

pitude. (@.A100b.) }

The Court of Appeals noted that the trial judge jJimited

Bellamy’s. cross-examination to convictions for felonies _

and that the correct rule“includes also crimes involving

moral turpitude. However, it held that the convictions for . .

gaming, keeping a gaming house, vagrancy and loitering,

operating a disorderly house. (which it noted expressly

referred to -operating a numbers game), and loitering

_ around a disorderly house “cannot be considered as involv-

ing moral turpitude.” As to thé alleged convictions for

violating the state lottery law, the Court noted one state-

ment of Bellamy that he put up a cash bond and did not

, a>

— we

go back. The Court then held this was not a convietion

and whether “this applies to all these cases Was not made

: clear by defense counsel.” Defense counsef on petition for

rehearing pointed out to the Court that immediately after

the gratuitous “cash bond” statement of Bellamy, he was

asked if he was convicted and he said yes. (D, A. 81a.)

The Court also noted in its opinion that Bellamy dmitted

_ on cross-examination that he knew his numbers operation

was in violation of state law. (Appendix IA, p. 7a-8a),

As to petitioner’s 18-year-old conviction, the Court stated

it involved moral turpitude and the fact that it occurred

twenty years before went to the weight of the testimony

not to its competence. (Appendix A, p. 8a)

On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals stated

that on further consideration no prejudice resulted to

petitioner on the limitation of Bellamy’s ¢ross-examina-

‘tion, citing the harmless error rule. (Rule 52(a), Federal

Rules Criminal Proeedure. ) (Appendix B, p. 23a) ‘

6, The Grand Jury Selection.

~ The Special Grand Jury which indicted ostiieiain is

the same Grand Jury which indicted James Hoffa andzhis e

co-defendants. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indict-

ment, charging that it was illegally and improperly im-

paneled. By the time the motion was heard, the trial

court had. disposed of the same motion in the Hoffa cases -

which had alleged the same grounds supported by ‘sub-

stantially the same affidavits. In order to save the time —

of the court and counsel, an agreement was made adopting

the same papers presented in the Hoffa edses, and the

~ court deaied the motion to dismiss. (D. A. 171la:178a.) In’

the Court of Appeals, petitioner made a sifnilar métion

and wag granted leave to adopt portions of the brief and ~

—— references ‘i in United States v. Hoffa, et al., Nos.

Ss .

’ si

i. *

pn.

15,876-79. This again was for the convenience of court

and counsel since the same issue.based on identical facts

was being passed on prior to the decision in the instant

case. The Court of Appeals in the instant case followed

its decision in the Hoffa cases and held the Grand Jury

was properly selected and legally uence (Appendix

~ A. p. 19a)

Petitioner in this Court has moved to adopt those por-

tions of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and appendix

references thereto in James R. Hoffa v. United States of

America, which relate to the. illegal and improper impanel-

ling of the Grand Jury. For. the convenience of the Court,

petitioner has included the statement of the case and the

reasons for granting the writ from the Hoffa Petition in

Appendix G, PP. 55a-66a.

‘6. Petitioner’ ‘ Constitutional Privileges in the Grand Jury

Proceedings.

On February 1, 1963, petitioner was ieee as a

witness to appear before the grand jury investigating jury- ~

tampering which returned the indictment against him..

The record indicates that he appeared that day without

counsel and was advised of his right to counsel and his

right to refuse to answer any question. (D. A. 27a.) He

was not apprised of the fact that he was an object of the

investigation then being conducted. He then invoked his

privilege under the Fifth Amendment during the first

interrogation. He was directed to answér certain ques-

tions and when he refused, he was taken by Government

attorneys, still without counsel, before Judge Gray to

invoke the court’s assistance in obtaining answers. The

court was given a transcript of some 14 pages of appel- .

lant’s testimony and informed of some questions appeent

| 8

The questions concerned matters connected with offenses

which later made up the tliree counts of the indictment.

He was asked about his presence within Nashville on

. certain dates; whether he knew Irwin Kahn and William

.» B. Morgan (who testified as Government witnesses at the

trial); and certain questions about the Maryland Farms

and Nobel’s Cafe or the Brentwood ‘Cafe in Brentwood, —

Tennessee. (Glen Noble, the proprietor of Traveler’s

Rest Motel and Nobel’s Cafe which befders the.Maryland

Farms, testified as a Government witness at the trial.)

During the hearing before Judge Gray, petitioner ob-

tained counsel for the first time: The tras script of grand

jury testimony was reviewed by the court and petitioner was

directed to answer certain questions seeking to determine

whether he understood other questions where he pleaded

the privilege. (D. A. 3la.) He was then questioned fur-

ther by the grand jury and was ‘subsequently indicted.

The Grand Jury was never instructed by the court that

no adverse inference was to rise from aphellents pleas

of the: privilege.

The Court of Appeals held that the mere ‘nici

of petitioner before the grand jury was not a violation of

his constitutional rights; that the trial judge merely re-

quired him to answer whether he understood certain ques-

tions; that he was not prejudiced in any way by being

subpoenaed; and that any adverse inference risimg from

the failure of the judge to instruct the ) jury on the priv-

ilege was untenable because there was sufficient direct -

evidence to take the. case to the jury at trial. (Appendix

A, p. 9a)

7. Failure to Permit Examination of Grand Jury Testi-

mony.

The morning of the commencement of the trial peti-.

tioner moved for production of statements and reports to

_—

an $8 in

prospective Government witnesses pursuant to the Jencks

Act, Title 18 §3500, U.S.C. The trial court granted the

motion with the production of statements to follow imme-

diately the direct examination of the witnesses. At the

same time he also moved to inspect the transcribed testi-

mony before the Grand Jury of those witnesses used by

the a ‘at the trial. (Rule 6(e), Federal Rules

Criminal Procedure.) The court summarily denied the

latter motion. (D. A. 54a.)

The Court of Appeals held petitioner was not entitled

to the transcript as a matter of right; that the made no

showing that the ends of justice required it; that at best

he was only entitled to request the trial judge to make

an in camera inspection. and turn over any inconsistencies

in the testimony of a ess. (Appendix A, p. lla).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

¥ Deprivation of a Fair Trial—the trial of defendants

seriatim in a sensationally publicized case in the same com-

munity with but three days intervening the last conviction

and his trial.

Few would contest that the “jury tampering cases” rank

among the most publicized and sensational cases ever

reported. Even discarding the daily accounts carried

‘nationally, few eases, if any, have received such extensive

and intensive publicity for so long a period in a single

community—Nashville, Tennessee—than have these cases.

This was due not only to the fact that James Hoffa was

a principal, but also to continuing episodes in the pre-

trial stage of the proceedings which fed a hostile press.

A review of these episodes reads like a dime novel: the

original Test Fleet trial; the statement from Judge Miller

that there’ was jury tampering, his. ordering an investi-

gation to be conducted by a Special Grand Jury and then

Sal .

his recusation; the Grand Jury inygstigation itself, with

recurrent incidents such as vétitiogte’s confrontation with

Judge Gray for pleading the privilege; ‘the subsequent

indictments; the many hearings on pretrial motions; the

“Osborn” incident resulting in the disbarment of Hoffa’s

attorney (D. A. 68a.); the recusal of Judge Gray in the

Hoffa cases (D. A. 44a); the transfer of the Hoffa cases

té Chattanooga because of prejudicial publicity; the dis-

barment of another attorney—Harry~Beard; the Chat-

. tanooga trial for 614 weeks; the subsequent convictions,

post-trial motions, sentencing, investigations and _Sub-

sequent indictment of one O’Brien for jury tampering in

the Chattanooga case; and finally the Medlin trial and

conviction just three days before petitioner’s trial. |

It was when this publicity had reached a crescendo and

five other defendants had been convicted for the same

crime less than a month earlier that petitioner was forced

to trial.

Since the earliest days of this country, it has been a

simple principle founded on fundamental justice and

fairness not to hurry a criminal proceeding so as to do

injustice to a defendant: As the court stated in Rex v.

Rapp, Pa., 1 Dall. 9, 1 L.Ed. 7 (Pa. 1764): ~

“In all cases whether criminal or civil, a trial shall

not be hurried on, so as to do injustice to the defend-

ant. Rex v. D’Eon, 3 Burr 1513.”

do to

The problem of balancing the right of a

a fair trial and the freedom of the press to comment on

matters of public interesf\has continuously plagued the

courts.’ Petitioner submits that what was just a problem

some 20 years ago has, with the scientific advance of com-

municative media, reached a point where this balance of

rights is now a major impediment to the proper admini-

‘¢

stration of justice ip this country. See Note, Controling

Press & Radio Influence on Trials, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 840 °

(1950).

No lengthy discussion need be made of this Court’s con-

cern of an accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial

before an impartial jury in sensationally publicized cases.

Cf. comments of Frankfurter, J., in Irvin v. Dowd, 366

U.S. 717, 729-30 (1961); and Jackson, J., in Shepherd v.

Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1951); Estes v. Texas, 381_U.S.

532 (1965) ; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).

See Delaney v. United States, 199 F. 2d 107, 115 (1st Cir:

1952). See also Sheppard v. Mazwell, No. 490, October

Term/ wherein the, Court recently granted certiorari. Cf.

34 U.S. Law Week 3171.

The Court of pone recognized petitioner’s ‘Sian

_ in being swept. up in the prejudicial publicity accompany-

ing Hoffa, stating that “it is not apparent liow he could

be disassociated with Mr. Hoffa’’ since it was ‘‘for the

benefit of Mr. Hoffa that he is charged with endeavoring

to influence jurors.” The Court asked how long the case

should have been continued, ‘‘One month? Three months?

Six months? A year.” But petitioner submits this is no

answer. The trial court had the affirmative duty to do

everything ‘“‘humanly possible” to insure fair treatment

to petitioner. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 587

(1962), Douglas, J., dissenting. In any event, everyone

would agree that something more than three days was

humanly possible. It would not have overly disrupted the

trial court’s schedule to put off the trial for a reasonable

time. The Government understandably was pressing for

trial. .

The struggle over the minds ‘of jurors cannot be

refereed in the voir dire as the Court of Appeals suggests.

The extensive saturation of the community mind for so

wen

€

long a period renders the voir dire useless in reaching

impartiality. Few jurors would recognize a prejudice

built slowly op this continuous adverse publicity and

fewer still could brush side “preconceived” opinions al-

though they answered honestly in the affirmative in the

voir dire.

Thus the circle is complete. Although charged with an

attempt to pervert the jury\system; petitioner prays for

the issuance of this Writ to preserve it. The tampering in

this case occurred not in the Test Fleet trial, but in peti-

tioner’s being forced to trial when the prejudicial publicity

_ had reached its highest peak. Petitioner’s motion for con-

tinuance of the trial date for a reasonable period of

time should have been granted.

2-4. Deprivation of Fair Trial. The trial oii double

standard favoring the government on impeachment in a

close case denied petitioner a fair trial and was not harm-

less error. \

Everyone admits that the trial judge excluded impeach-

ment evidence against the government’s chief witness and

permitted the impeachment of petitioner by the applica-

tion of contradictory rulings. A double standard was

applied favoring the government and this fact stands un-

contradicted. Petitioner requested not only what the law

allows for impeachment, but at the very minimum only

what was given to to the government.

This case presents to this Court the question whether

a defendant is entitled to at least equal treatment in the

trial of a aaa publicized case — close on

its facts. :

a) Bellamy’s misdemeanors involved moral turpitude.

The Court of Appeals recognized the trial court applied

an incorrect rule in excluding evidence of the witness

Bellamy’s misdemeanors. The rule is not limited to felonies

— 20 —

only but includes crimes involving moral turpitude. The

Court of Appeals however ruled Bellamy’s convictions in

operating his numbers racket did not involve moral

turpitude. .

This ruling is contrary to the earliest decisions in this

Court [see Marvin v. Trout,° 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905)

(gambling is a vice to be suppressed ‘in the interest of

public morals) ], state courts [see Ex parte Tutile, 91 Cal.

589, 27 Pac. 933, 934 (1891)], general treatises [24 Am.

_Jur., Gaming and Prize Contests, sec. 3, p. 399], and the

conclusions of legislative investigative committees, both

congressional state [see Appendix F., pp. 41a-49a].’

Laan under\ federal law, the mere mailing of policy

ips subjects a person to the same punishment defendant

now faces, 5 years imprisonment. Title 18, sec. 1302, U.S.C.

At least half the states single out this crime as a felony;

_ several provide for punishment similar to defendant’s

punishment; and one (Virginia) stipulates a policy oper-

ator can receive 10 years confinement and a fine. See

Appendix F, pp. 37a-40a.

Every authoritative commentator, beginning with -At-

- torney General (now Senator) Robert Kennedy, through

Adlai Stevenson, Edgar Hoover, Senator Kenneth Keat-

ing, ete. insist that policy is not only dishonest, one

hundred per cent fraudulent, ridden with bribery, cor-

ruption, mob activity, murder, etc.; but to a man they

decry the failure of the law enforcement agencies and

the courts to accept and realize the intrinsic evil in the

crime. See Appendix F, pp. 49a-54a. :

The Court of Appeals is the first court of appellate

jurisdiction to petitioner’s knowledge to reduce this vicious

? Petitioner has collected authorities on the nature of

the crime of gambling too voluminous to be placed in the

body of the Petition. He has inserted them in Appendix

F attached to the petition and made a part hereof. .

—) —

crime to the importance of a traffic Violation. The decision

is not only erroneous but completely ignores the signifi-

ance of the decision in the fight against organized crime

in this country. The decision presents a question of sub-

stantial importance to petitioner’s constitutional rights

_ and to law enforcement generally.

* b) The error cannot be termed harmless.

Apparently recognizing the tenuousness of its original

decision on the impeachment issue, the Court of Appeals

turned to the “harmless” error rule in its supplemental

opinion denying petitioner’s petition for rehearing without

withdrawing or amending its original decision. (Appendix

B, p. 23a).

But resort to this rule is no answer in the instant case.

It cannot be disputed that this case was close, conviction

resting on the word of one man, Nathan Bellamy. His

credibility as against petitioner’s was the sole issue in

the case. “In all cases, the constitutional safeguards are

to be jealously preserved for the benefit of the accused,

but especially is this true where the scales of justice may

_ be delicately poised between guilt and innocence. Then

error, which under some circumstances would not be

ground for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as imma-

terial, since there is a real chance that it might have pro-

vided the slight impetus which swung the scales toward

guilt.” Glasser v. United States, 315 US. 60, 67. (1942).

Especially is this true here where the government’s only

incriminating witness, Nathan Bellamy, in his admittedly

continuous operation of the numbers racket needed the

government’s sanction to stay in business by having a

government gambling stamp. - ‘

This Court and other courts have continually resisted

the application of Rule 52(a) in similar close cases where

the error could only have had a substantial influence on

— 22 —

the outcome. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750,

775 (1946); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444-

45 (1949); Hawkins v. United States, 358,U.S. 74, 79-80

(1958) ; San Fratello v. United States, 340 F. 2d 560, 566

(5th\Cir. 1965); Gold v. Umted States, 26 F. 2d 185, 186 .

(2d Cir. 1928); Fliashnick v. United States, 223 F. 736,

739 (2d Cir. 1915).

Even in cases where the government’s evidence was

substantial, there is grave hesitancy of courts to term

error harmless. The court in Oliver v. United States, 335

F. 2d 724, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1964), refused to do so where

the defendants themselves denied the veracity of incrimi-

nating statements in a document erroneously admitted

into evidence.

But of special significance here is the unswerving rule

in prior decisions in this Court in close cases which turn

on the credibility of witnesses giving conflicting testimony.

Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953), holds

that exclusion of impeaching evidence against the key

government witness could not be harmless. “Except the

testimony of this witness be believed, conviction probably

could not have been had.” The Court further held the

“harmless error” rule “cannot be expanded to justify a

curtailment which keeps from the jury relevant and im-

portant facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial

testimony.’’ 344 U.S. at 423.

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 445 (1949),

discarded the harmless error rule where “as to all vital

phases ... . , the jury ‘was compelled to choose between

believing the petitioner or the complaining witness. The

record persuades us that the jury’s task was difficult at

best.” See also Hawkins v. United States, 358 US. 74, 80

(1958) ; United States v. Penmiz, 313 F. 2d 524, 531 (4th

Cir. 1963).

— 23 —

inally, if there’ were any question of the harmlessness

of the error, it ended with the trial court’s instruction

that the testimony of a witness can be impeached by show-

ing prier condition of a crime involving moral turpitude

and that the juryconsider the conviction only “in deter-

mining the credibility of a witness.” The jury heard but

one witness with a conviction—petitioner, Bellamy’s. con-

victions having been improperly excluded.

Surely the Constitution provides defendants with at

least equal treatment in trials.

5. The Grand Jury Selection. i

For the convenience of both this Court and counsel,

petitioner in this Court has moved to adopt those portions

of the Reasons for Granting the Writ from the Petition

in James R. Hoffa v. United States relative to the illegal

and improper impanelling of the Grand Jury. -These are

identical issues arising from identical facts and petitioner

was given leave to and did adopt the argument and appen-

dix references, thereto in the, Court below.

6.. Deprivation of Constitutional Rights in the Grand

Jury Proceeding. ~ :

There can be no question that the Government had

marked petitioner for indictment before ha was subpoenaed

to testify before the Grand Jury. At the hearing he was

interrogated about persons who later testified against him

at the trial. Kahn and the juror Morgan were the chief

Government witnesses on the first two counts in the

indictment. which subsequently issued (Record 212-237,

258-286). Benedict was subpoenaed by the Government

but did not testify. The other Morgan was labeled appel-

lant’s “co-conspirator” in the first count. The fact that

petitioner was at the Brentwood Cafe or Nobel’s Cafe .

—_— om

near: the Maryland Farms with a man named Jolley was

part of the Government’s evidence under Count III fér

which petitioner was convicted. (R. 239-245). The’ fore- '

going demonstrates: that the Government had completed .

its case against appellant, that he was a “de facto” de- |

fendant ‘although not yet indicted, and that the Govern-

‘ment compelled him to appear before the grand jury,

purportedly as a witness, to gain incriminating evidence

from his own lips or to turn the jury from him in the

event he remained silent.

These facts present important questions of the propri-

ety of the practice of Government attorneys before grand

juries and whether a defendant is entitled to the same

Constitutional rights and privileges in thegrand jury

proceedings as he is afforded after the indictment is .

_ returned. These questions have not heretofore been de-

cided by this Court. zh

of subpoenaing prospective defendants as witnesses before

the grand jury for interrogation. United States v. Scully,

225 F. 2d 113, 116 (24 Cir. 1955) ; United States v. _Edger-

ton, 80 Fed. 374 (D.C. Mont. 1897). Compelling petitioner.

to invoke the constitutional ° privilege could only have

prejudiced him in the eyes of the grand jurors. See

_ Edgerton, J., in Jones v..United States, 342 F. 2d 863, 868

. (1964). Parading him before the grand jury without

benefit of counsel was a violation of his” rights under the

Sixth Amendment. - at

Moreover, the action of the Government in bringing -

_ petitioner before the District ‘Court and using the power

“of the court to.compel him to answer questions served to

compound the violation. As a prospective defendant he

was directed to answer questions by a district judge before

the eyes of the grand jurors. At this point anything

4 2

9° &

* gl

resembling his protection under the Fifth Amendnient:

disappeared. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201

(1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); and

Gideon v. Wainwright,’ 372 U.S. 335 (1963); dictate that

the defendant be protected from such misust of Govern-

ment power: | PsGnis

_ Finally the trial court after directing petitioner’ to

‘answer the questions did not instruct the Grand Jury that

his refusal to answer and the order ‘of. court compelling

him to answér, could: not be an inference of evidence

against him. Whether such an instruction could have

repaired the harm already inflicted is extremely doubtful,

but it would at least have provided: petitioner with some

semblance of protection.

Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court, with its ;

supervisory powers, should not sanction this improper

action of the Government. Their conduct in the instant -

‘cause resembles he ina peine forte et dure described 1/

in Blackstone. Commentaries *325-327. The Government

must pay more than mere lip service=to the privilege

against self-incrimination or suffer the reversal ofa con-

viction. See United States v. Maloney, 262 F. 2d 535; 538

(2d Cir. 1959). ° | |

The Court of Appeals held, in effect; that petitioner

would not have been prejudiced by the government’s.

action because he pleaded the privilege to all questions °

and those that the court directed him to answer were -

“whether we agin the questions propounded: More-

over since there was sufficient evidence to convict, there

was sufficient evidence to indict.. While petitioner cannot

‘accept the Court’s conclusion of an absence of prejudice,

see Edgerton, J.,\in Jones v. United States, 342 F. 2d 863,

868 (1964), even if he were to assume it, he submits the. -

Court’s ‘analysis is fundamentally unsound. The Fifth .

P) | | ‘eas os

s ‘

” x «

i. IF : ae G>. e

* . ‘

Ay. e ‘ 7

. Pa

ie 26 —

Amendment cgmmands the return of an indictment of a

grand jury preparatory to a person’s being “held to an-

swer”,.and the Amendment further commands that the

grand jury be “legally constituted and unbiased.” See Lawn

Appeals cannot relate the evidence adduced at trial, slim

as it is, back to the grand jury proceeding to overcome

the bias of the grand. jury and the improper conduct of

government counsel.

The instant facts present a substantial question Wictat-

ing the application of this Court’s supervisory powers in

’ an area where heretofore government counsel have had

open season on an accused’s constitutional rights 1 in grand

jury proceedings.

7. Fair Trial—Inspection of Bellamy’ s Transcribed Tes-

timony Before the Grand Jury.

It is abundantly clear that the crucial issue in this case

was the credibility of the government’s witness, Bellamy.

His credibility was an obvious issue before the trial

as he was specifically named in the indictment. Therefore

his prior statements of what had occurred were crucial to

the petitioner’s defense during the trial of this cause. His

timely motion for inspection of witness’ grand,jury testi-

mony coupled with his motion for “Jencks Act” state- -

“ments were made. the day the trial began. The statements

were provided but the grand jury. testimony was not.

The Court of Appeals ‘insists that petitioner was not

. entitled to a transcript “as a-matter of right”, and only

when “as showing was made that the ends of justice

required it.” It held no such showing was made.

Petitioner suggests that the primary duty of the trial

court is to see that justice is done. Since the.grand jury

am OF om

limited disclosure to aid the accused is simply allowing

the court’s own records to be utilized in the interest of

justice. Therefore, from this point of view, the simple

issue is whether the trial court should. withhold any of its

own records. which an accused person believe? will be help-

ful to him. When viewed in this light, the answer obviously

is that a federal court should never deny this requested

assistance to an accused.

_ But even assuming the necessity of the “showing of

particularized need” the Court of Appeals requires, ex-

cept by clairvoyance petitioner cannot possibly show the

particularized need suggested until he actually sees the

minutes.

The Court relied on Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United

; States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). But as the dissent (composed .-.

of Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas and the Chief Jus-

tice) pointed out, “It is too late in the day to say...

that the government may insist upon Grand Jury secrecy,

even when the possible prejudice to the accused in a

criminal case is crystal clear, and none of the reasons

justifying secrecy is present.” 360 U.S. at 402

Petitioner submits that while the reasons for the veil

. of secrecy of the Grand Jury testimony and its proceed-

ings hold while the Grand Jury is in existence, prior to

indictment and even prior to discharge ofthe jury, those

reasons weakén at the time the indictment’ is issued and

certainly disappear’ during the actual trial of the defend-

ant. Protection of the witness is no longer in issue because

he testifies at the trial. 7

This question is ripe for re-evaluation by this Court

so that an accused, such as petitioner, is provided with

at least equal&knowledge of his accuser’s prior statements

as is possessed by government counsel.

a aaah natet ceept mele ~ NELLA ARDELL IPR ELE EAI IPE SL MELLEL RL LE LE LADIES BEV APLC LAE SE Sent sits

CONCLUSION.

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully

submits the petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

C. ALLEN HicH

Stahlman Building

Nashville, Tennessee 37201

Epwarp B. HENsLEE, JR.

Francis H. Monex

120 West Madison Street

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Wruiam J. Harte

111 West Washington Street

'° Chicago, Illinois 60602

Counsel for Petitioner

| Tt. ED

JAN 28 1966

HN F. DAVIS, CLERK

an the

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Ocroser Term, 1965.

by .

HENRY F. BELL,

Petitioner, ‘

vs.

UNITED STATES OF’ AMERICA,

Respondent.

——

[ ENDICES A -G TO eas ae

PETITION FOR A WRIT‘OF CERTIORARI °

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

C. ‘Artten: Hicn

Stahlman Building

Nashville, Tennessee 37201 °

Epwarp B. HENsLeEE, JR.

Francis H. Monex

120 West Madison Street

’ Chicago, [Illinois 60602

Wuium J. Harre

111 West Washington Street

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Counsel for Petitioner

The Scheffer Press, Inc—ANdover 3-6850

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AOcToBER TERM, 1965.

No.

HENRY F. BELL,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDICES A-G.TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

- TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

; mS ROR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

\ ¢

° samba

Preparatory Statement.

The following are Appendices A-G made part of peti-

tioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

APPENDIX A |

Nos. 15968-16231.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

= ,; For The Sixth Circuit — 7

Unirep States or AMERICA, - — ) On Appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellee,| United States Dis-

| Potent trict Court for the ~

: = > Middle District of ”

_ Henry F. Bet, Tennessee, Nash-

@ Defendant-Appellant. } ville ‘Division.

Decided October 14, 1965. PF

ss Before: PuiLus and Epwarps, Circuit Judges, and

Ceci, Senior Circuit Judge. . ;

Cecit, Senior Cirdhit-Fadge. This cause is on appeal -

from a judgment of conviction in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Henry

F. Bell,- defendant-appellant, referred to herein as de-

-.fendant, was found guilty by a jury on the third count

_ of a three-count indictment. Count three’ charged that he

corruptly endeavored to obstruct and impede the ad-

*“The Grand Jars further charges: That in or about

the months of October and November 1962, in the Middle

District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, HENRY F.

BEEL, the defendant herein, did unlawfully, knowingly,

wilfiily, and corruptly - ‘endeavor to influence, obstruct,

and impede the due administration of justice in the trial

of United States v. James R. Hoffa and sane Bs Car-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.