Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United Aircraft Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

Supreme Court brief1964

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

diret No. RK) 7 ; | . ei. ~

cree a

ich

INTHE, ‘

" eiperme Court of the United States

Ocropen Ter, 1965

AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, —— & W HITNEY.

AIRCRAFT Division, Petitioner

_ UNITED

Vv.

National Lasor RELations Boarp, Respondent/

5 -

~* on

PETITION, FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

; : UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

@ Uerarp D. Remy |

Josep C. WELIS,° >

Re) . 1120 Tower eee,

aie ; Washington, D. C. 20005.

Attorneys for Petitioner

ReEIELY AND WELLS:

1120 Tower, Building

Washineton, D.C. 20005 |

YF Courdsel

Press or Byaon S. Avams, WasuincTon, D.C.

= Pa

rons

‘ .

| .

/ .

f . . .

. >

| voy

‘ “

| .

{

‘ = .

! ‘

‘ a ; F

| :

’ .

‘ ,

2 - :

| INDEX ; :

ae : : Page

OPIN IANS BeLow ea are eae Sv eracee Cee St a keels echoes 7 5

JURISDICTION oe eee Ey Dae er eg eo ee 2

QUESTIONS aes Seat ks Soak ie nee oo

S. Stature Lyvoivey ...... 656. eee TE ORC Or ore e

| sags OF THE CARE... o-T ecg eee e erent Roe o

. The Facts.....: iad ee bee ge eee e erence Wg ee

. The Board’ s.Decision and Orde 2 ee PO en

. The Second-Cire uit’s . Decision ewes : ap a cae | 11

eas FoR GRANTING THE Ww RIT 2.2.0 e eee CAs Rape

CoxcLrsios ‘Sas gerrrrrrerre re ry etre tS PCT ts 20

APPENDIX A ..2. ee eee eee ee cadeeuba see ees peeeene la

Aprenpix B Ih OE SOE ETE LTT Voerer aeeasae ae

oe : -

vee AUTHORITIES CITED

p> CUASES: : .

iy eee Tractor Ca. Vv. N-L.B.P., 230 I. 2ds 397

cf PRPS RGR ee ert eee QD

Mar sper Drydock Co. v. N.L. R. B.. 183 F ~ 20° 008

je ae * ae ere a Or ee ean a ata ete 18, 20

ON.E,RB. v. Aintree Corp., 135 F, 2.395 (CLA 4). 18, 20

N.LR.B. vi Baheock & Wileox C O., es DL ULS. 103. ; ae on we 1

N.L.R.B. v. Le Toarneas C Ont 324 US. 793 ........5- 12, 14."

= N.L.R.B. v. morn? 5 Pina

Lao _ NEBR Enited Steclwo or &

1 2 16

Republie Aviation © orp. v. N.L.B.B.,.3 a U.S. 793... .12,14

Stoddard- Quirk Mig. Co., 1 33 NLEB Gi) ....... PEERS

STATUTES:! | |

National Labor Relations Act

N 7 Pao ee ee ee ; oe & es are ee re ae a es a a ee ds li

TS to Beer seer es a oe ae on

IN THE

| Supreme Court uf the Hnited States: ,

ae a OcrosEr TERM, 196: A oe eae

| ‘ by he <a ps ‘-- f 4

UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Past & WHITNEY

_ AIRCRAFT Division, Petitioner

3 ae : ae

NaTIoNAL LABOR ReELatIons Boarp, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WHIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

- UNITED ST. , COURT OF APPEALS

S Se/ FOR ee SECOND CIRCUIT

. , al » ° ail .

—_——-—- +

United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt’ & Whitney Air-

craft Division, wavs that @ writ of certiofari issue

to review the pesca: ‘the United States Court of

Ap vetls for the Sec ond Circuit entered in this case

on Bitecowtor 2 , (763.

f*. ‘ OPINIONS BELOW tis

The deci ‘isiont and order of the National Labor Rela-

* tions Board (herein called the Board) is reported at

139 N.L.R.B. 39, and ‘is pr inted in the Joint Appen-

s* « @

dix filed herewith (J.A. 1).' The opinion of the Court

6f Appeals is reported at 324 F! 2d 128, and is printed —

“1 in Appendix B hereto, infra, pp. 2a-Ba. oe.

JURISDICTION

my Ga) . a : .

The ee FM Gol Colirt of iene was entered

+5 on emenrbeT8, 1963. The: jurisdiction ‘of this Court

/* is invoked under 28 U.S.C: | 1254(1). |

? @

_ QUESTIONS PRESENTED | .

1. Whether the Board must consider evidence ‘ad-

duced by ‘an, émployer showing that~ the union and

its supporters had ample opportunity off the employ-

er’s premises to distribute union literature to -em-

ployees at the single entrance to the employer’s plant

and in context with that evidence, and other. evidence

showing alternative methods ‘of communication, evalu-

ate the employer's reasons for invoking a ban on fur-—

ther distribution on. its premises before rejecting the’ -

employer’s reasons for the ban, finding the ban a viola-

tion of Section 8(a)(4) of_the National Labor Rela-

tions Act,-and entering “an ” order preventing the en.

‘ployer from promulgating or enforcing ‘tany’’ pro--

hibition against employees distributing ‘‘any’’ union

literature on their own time in nonworking areas of the

wag *s premises.

. Whether an émployer’s ban en the further use

of ‘ite premises for the distribution by employees dur-

' Numbers following the aubewviatlons “J.A."° refer to pages of

the Joint Appendix ir the veourt below, nine copies of whic *h have

been filed with the Court. .Occasional references to pages of the

egg ‘transeript of maaan are identified by the abbrev iation

‘Tr. adh é -

“3

ing nonworking times of provocative union literature.

disruptive of production and discipline, violates-Sec- -

tion 8(a)4 2 of the National Labor a Act.

STATUTE INV OLVED ’

’ The statutory provisions involved are Sections 7 and

-8(a)(1) of the Nationa] Labor Relations Act (herein >

called the Act). They art printed tn Appendix A

hereto, infra, p. da. -° he fa .

STATEMENTOFTHECASE = »——’:~«.

1, The Facts.

_ Petitioner aud U nited Automobile, Aireraft & Agri-

cultural implement Workers of America’ and its

Local 1234 (herein called the Union) have been in con-

tinuous contractual relations since’ 1953 (J.A., 80-81).

The current: contract provided for: grievance proce:

dures and’ imion bulletin board privileges ini the plant

(J.A. 62-63, 64). I -etitioner employs about 5,000 em-

ployees at flie plant here involved, of which about

_ 4,000 are in the unit represented by the Union (.7.A..

81). There is no eontention that petitioner in any

respect sought to, interfere with the union activities

of its employees or with the Union’s efforts te inerease

‘its membership.

employees off company property, tisually at the base

-of a ramp leading from the publie roadway conto pAti-

_tioner’s premises (J.A..156), Thi that vear, the Union

requested and was giver permission for employees,

‘during nonworking times, to distribute union litera-

‘ture on company premises at the twe tunnels used by

entployees in walking between the company parking —

“lots and the plant proper (.J.A. 156, 82-83 ).

Until 1956, thie i nion had distributed literature te ~~

The distribution was always made to émployees on”

the three shifts as they entered, the plant ‘for work

(J.A. 85, 10% 109, 156). Asa result, the literature

was carried into the plant and frequently disearded in

the tunnels, the cafeterias, the restrooms, the locker-

rooms and the shop floor (J.A. 157, 165,- 167). » This

littering was called to the attention of the Union sev-

eral times (J.A. 157): ° Petitioner, on the other hand,

made its bi-weekly and. monthly publications available

to employees only as they. jeft ‘the plant at the end:

of their shifts (J.A. 157- 158 )..

—_—

In Dec ember 1958, idea ees comaiiied of abusive

| language by employee Celentano, then president of the.

Union, when they refused to accept the ‘Union litera-*

ture he was distributing (J.A.°111, 148, 168): . Be-

cause of: this, petitioner barred Celentano’s further ,

ticipation, in distribytions on its premises (aul...

787). In July 1959, the. Union was still pressing a

grieyance filed because of, petitioner’s action against

‘Celentano. (J A. 167 , 148).

Daring the first part of 1959, International Repre-

_ sentative Greenberg was the ‘administrator of the

‘Union (J.A. 88). In May 1959, Crgenberg, to pro-

mote an increase in union memberships and dues check ’

off authorizations, distributed leaflets at the plant tun-

nels which likened working fer petitioner to life under

communism and fascism, characterized petitioner's

officials as ** F aseist ‘Communist’, ** Storm Trooper’

and **Indiati Giver’*, and promised. to expose how em-

ployeés had been ‘hoodwinked out of raises’? (JA.

66-69 ).: . Petitioner without ‘success, protested to the

Union about the contents of these leaflets (J.A. 147-

148)... ge: ihe

A distpi ed campaign leaflets onthe « company’s prem: .

‘In June 1959, Chamberlain heca ume , president of the’

U nion (J:A. 80). Hall: petitioner’s personnel supe

visor, promptly met with C hamtberlain in an, effort to

improve relationships between petitioner and the

Union by suggesting timely discussion of disagree-

ments and greater use of the! grievance procedures of

the contract, instead of publics ios of supposed griev-

anees in leaflets-and the continuation of Greenberg's

attempt to stir up trouble by distributing le: iflets vili-

fying | petitioner’s officials and containing unfounded

adcusations (J.A. 90, 116-117, 152-153, 1622 164).

Chamberlain rebuffed Hali’s efforts. aor

Between June 23 and September 16, 1959, the Unien

ises at the tunmels which le: iflets, among other things,

criticized the fogd. served in the cafeteria and made

assertions, unfounded ‘in faet, about the operation of

the eaféteria and the prices it charged (J(A. 28, 36,

38, 40); implied that the company had refused to eon

sider U ‘nion ‘sound and conerete plans” ’ for Yelieving

_ trafic at change of shift times (J.A. 28-29, 42), when

the Union never,submitted any such plans to manage-

ment (see -J.A. 116, 117,154; Tr. 336-337) ; asserted

that the employees were required to-work in “het,

stic ‘kly, oily atmosphere,” without ventilation or *“*re-

lief from the oppressive, strength . <apping. mind

weakening wet hheat,”’ and that a “man oF woman who

dies from heat prostration in Ov ant is ny as dead

as one who died -in July”. (J.A. 32, 36-37, 39, 42);

characterized management ass“arrogant” f . A. OA,

oe,

49), greedy, justfultand drunk froni power OI Ae 32

termed the protest of ‘ta-high-official of the company’

against the leaflet criticisms of the cafeterias an.

‘abusive,’

*‘seathing personal attack."’ a *tsenseles:

* be, | .

diatribe’? (ef, J.A. 40-41 .with J.A. 88-89); asserted.

thay employees were in ‘‘hondage’’ (J..A. 31), being

“Pheated” (J.A. 55) and ‘*pushed,. pushed, pushed

r production” (JA. 32); and termed the contract.

w “ith the « company, negotiated by preeeding Union ad-

niinistrations, a “*travesty on justice, "aA ‘‘Sioke book’’.

(JA. 34); “one of thesworst-eoutr: acts in, the aircraft

industry”? (S.A. 35). Wn

. Petitioner complained, unsuecessfully, to Chamber-:

‘ain and other Union officials about the content ef these

leatlets, and w arned them that permission to distribute

Union literaturé on company premises. might be with-

drawn. (J.A. 1604, 165-166, 149), &

In his leaflets of August 24 and September 1, Cham-

berlain renewed hy criticism of the food and prices at:

the cafeteria, asserting that the. cafeteria ‘offers ’such .

delicacies as greasy french fr ied potatoes, warmed

ever hamburgs and frankforts—all at regular prices,”

_and. stating that “more and more workers are carry.

ing, their hinches, not by choice, but by necessity’ (J.A.

36, 38). Assistant Personnel: Manager Corper informed

Chamberlain®that since he had ltd no experience in

the restaurant business he was Mt qualitied to tell the

_ company how to run its cafeterias, and warned Cham-

berlain that the gafeterias were operated for the con-

venience of the employ ees and could: be discontinue

(JA. 88-89, 87). ces °

_ About September 1, employees on the 11 and 11:15

lunch hour shifts eommenced a boycott of one of the |

cateterias by briuging their own lunches, sitting at the

tables, and **booing’’ anyone who approached the food

line (J.-A. 140-151, 118-119). The demonstrations con-

tinued fer about two weeks, and incréased to the point

“4

where the company’s representatives feared that they

might develo}} into something more than ‘‘ just booing”’

(J.Al 191,159). Employees using the ofher cafeteria

began to leave their travs on the tables rather than

put them 6n the conveyor belt ¢Tr. 369). The booing

tinally ceased after the company warned the employees

on these shifts.the if it continued they would be denied,

use of the cafeteria and perhaps otherwise disc ‘ipline?

and super visors stationed themselves in the cafeteria

to see that the warning was heeded (S.A. 151-152, 158- .

ogy.

On Septeriber 8, in the middle of the de monstrationis

in the cafeteria, and while the company was trying to

handle .the situation, Chamberlain distributed another

provocative leaflet ea the food and prices in the .

cafeterias, reciting that ‘the people in this plant sud-

denly rose up and said in effect, ‘We have had enough"

‘Customers began staying away it ‘droves, ail lunch

bags and therines bottles became the order of the day!"

(GJ.A. 40, see 159): | Pe: :

Concluding that the Jeaflets had ‘in **substantial”’

part provoked the cafeteria demonstrations (J.A. 159-

1603, Hally on September 16. “informed Chamberlain

that the Unio in several we a had abuged the privi-

lege of distributing literatur®on the company’s prem- > -

ises and that the privilege was being withdrawn (J.A.

155, 86-87) Hall mentioned the ‘litter problem’ :

the Celentano matter and the Greenberg leatlets

(ibid.). Wall reminded Chamberlain that he had

warned him previously that the Company ‘Sopjeeted to

. 2 The | ‘nion’s leaflet of November 24, 1959, statéd They pushed

us out into Washington Ave. for having ‘incited’ pyople in the

_ ¢afeteria issue *-(J0A. 71 ;

- 8

this distribution of flvers which were designed to incite

employees and to tell them what a lousy place Pratt:

-Whitney was to work’’ and stated that the company

. did not intend to make its ‘‘property available for the

distribution of such literature’? (J.A. 155-156, 87).

A: few days later, Hall repeated the reasons for the -

ban_-to the Union’s. International Representative Di-

frente (J.A. 147). ee

Since September 16, 1959, the Union has hinkin dlis-

tributing its literature where it did until 1956—at the

foot of the. ramp at the only entrance to'the company’s ©

premises (J.A..89, 85). Petitioner showed that the

Union and its supporters had adequate opportunity to

distribute literature to employees at this place (J.A.

~, 143-144, 107-108, 152, 122,106), and Chamberlain ad-

| “mitted, on’ company questioning, that there is no

**problem”’ distributing leaflets at the rimp arid that

the Union has ‘ta system that works very well”? (J.A.

134).° Between August 1959 and the hearing in May

1960, the Union’s membership increased from about

1600 to over 2300 (F.A. 113).

After September 16, the Union in its literature ¢ con-

‘tinued to publish provocative. and yore state-

thents about the cafeteria (J.A. 73, 75, 70-72), plant

ventilation (J°A. 73), and the company’s aan re-

fusal io consider Union plans for improving traffic -

“notw ithstanding that no such plans were ever submitted

to the company (J.-A. 73; Tr. 336-337): continued to

disparage the existing contract between’the company

~~ andThe Chion asa ‘flagrant and shameful miscarriage —

of justice,” a ‘*foolish book of double-talk,”’ a ‘‘joke

book’? (J.A. 73, 76); and continued to provoke and in-

cite employees by-. promised revelations regarding

‘The Ghost of Maloney,’ New and startling informa-

tion in a scandal thought to be dead“ (J.A. 74), which

when released would cause ‘‘excitement’’ and ‘‘con-

sternition’’:(J.A. 76). and which would be released

‘after ‘‘new information’ received was **checked care-

fully”? (J.A. 69-70), and ** ‘The Work Order Scandal.’

How: the abuse of work orders has created a monster —

which must strangle those who gave it birth’? GJ.A.

75), which will ‘‘tell the truth about the handling of

, J , .

work orders,:and how the handling affects not only

_ the worker's future but the company’s future as well”’

(J.A. 76) and expose how the ‘abuse of work orders,

and the growing malignancy which such abuse inevi-

tabiv nourishes, will be our strongest Witness in our

case‘against, ‘The Merit Raise System’ ”’ (J.A. 70).

Needless to say these promised exposures never ap-

peared (J.A. 123). |

Tt was not claimed that petitioner, in- any man-

ner, sought to restrict oral solicitation of union mem-

bership on company premises.

2. The Board's Decision and Order

The Board, without discussion, adopted the ‘‘find-

ings, cone lusions, and recommendations of the Trial

Examiner”? (J.A. 2), and entered an order restraining

petitioner from promulgating or enforeing any rule or

order prohibiting employees, when they are on uon-

working time and in nonworking areas of the plant,

from distributing any {union | jenssets, * ete. (JA.

2-3; italics added ).° .

31%t is significant that the Board. in issuing this -broad order,

refured even to concede, contrary to es: Trial Examiner, that a

ban against use of company premises to —— leaflets of the

Greenberg type would be lawful (.J.A. 2, fn.*1) s :

The Trial Examiner held that, although an employer.

has the *‘undisputed right’? to **deny employees aecess

to its property to distribute uhion literature when such

denial is necessary to maintain production or disci-

pline,’? petitioner's September 16 action nonetheless

was unlawful (J.A. 14). He premised. his conclusion,

in part, upon the view that the employees’ right té use

‘the démpany’s premises ‘‘is riot lost simply because

the information imparted is not entirely accurate, or is

exaggerated or objectionable to the employer, provided;

of course, the information. is not deliberately false or

maliciously inspired”? (J.A. 15). Although agreeing

that. the language in the Greenberg leaflets “appears to

have gone bevond the palé of: protected cancerted ace.

tivity’? and might have justified a ban on liter ature.con-

taining similar language (GJ.A. 16),* he stated of the

Chamberlain leaflets that ** Although the Union’s eriti-

Yeism of Respondent in these leaflets was sharp and

definitely not without partisan. appeal,. and under-

‘standably irritating,’ it ‘did not exceed—the -preper

bounds of lawful comment and concerted aectivity’”

(J.A.°15-16). He refused to find that the ** Union's

leaflets encouraged and contributed to the disturbalices

in the cafeteria’’ stating that there is ‘tnothing in the -

leaflets whi¢h advogated such action’ (J.A.-17). But

then added, *teven ASSUMING that the leaflets incited

— the booing in the cafeteria,”’ the Companuy> had **not

-demonustrated that the ban -~wwas necessary’? (L.A. 17)...

He dismissed the littering and Celentano matter with

auly passing comment (J.A. 11). Finally, hé held ir-

relevant the existence of other means of distribiiting

4 As noted above (fn. 3) the Board refused t6 adopi even this

limitation on the kind of literature the Union could insist on dis-

tributing on petitioner's premises,

el, eae

literature to employees, the existence of grieyance-pro-

cedures through which complaints could Ke-aired with

nianagement, and the absencé of antiation motivation

in the withdrawal of the use of company premises for

the distribution of the literature involved thereby ex-

pressly finding “it unnecessary to determine whether,

the Union had other reasonable alternatives for com-

municating aoe employes: (FA. 17-19).

3. The Second Circuit’ s Decisien

Ou petition of the Board, the Second Circuit, on Noe

vember 6, 1968, issued its opinion and entered me

maw, granting enforcement of the Board's order with-

out modificationa-~ feces 2, /49¢3,

Disregarding the distinctions between oral solicita-

tion and the distribution of literature, and contrary to

the Third Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.,

271 F. 2d 109, the court held that the Board was not

re quired ta consider, jr-evaluating The no" solicitation

rule, whether the employees have alternative means Of

ier

communication’ but could attach a‘! presumption” i

illegality to the ban against the distribution of union

literature by ¥ employers on their own time in non

working areas*’, which presumption could be overcome

‘only ond a Wing that special circumstances thake the

rule necessary, to main tain production. or ‘tise ‘ipline’

(infra, pp. 4a. 3a).

The court disposed of the “resultant littering, result-

ant unruly demonstrations in the plant cafeteria, and

abusive language used by a distributor” by stating that

the ‘record sustains ‘the Board's finding” that these

were ** questionable after-the-fact rationalizations and

insufficient to explain the institution of the rule”

‘infra, p. Ba). As to the contents of the leatlets the

o >

court disposed of this question in a footnote with the

i comment that a hile there ‘may conceivably be -in-

: stances in which union literature is so defamatory that

* an employer would be justified i in prohibiting its distri-

bution on company premises, we do not find that the

leaflets disseminated in the ‘three-month period pre-

ceding the ban in the present case fall into this cate-

gory’ (infra, p. 3a). “* .

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

. 1. ‘On the question of whether the Board was required

to consider the evidence that Union members had, ade-

quate opportunity to distribute literature to employees

at the single entrance to. the plant in evaluating the

ban imposed by petitioner here, the decis ‘ion of the vourt

below. is diveetly_in, feontlict with, the Third Circuit's

__—leeision in N » & RB. v. Rockwed Mfg. Co., 271 F. 2d

109. In that ease, similarly involving a ban against

employee distribution.of literature on-company preni-

ises, the ‘Third Circuit tafter rey iewing this Court‘s

decisions in aE Aviation Corp. \ aparece and

N.L.RLB. Vv. Le Tourneau © Oe; ast U.S. 793; N.L.R.B.’

“V. Babeoch & Wiicor Co, 351 Esso to: and “NL. Rb

Vv. United Steelworkers of Amesioa, 357 U.S. 357) held

at,p. 115) thai— ‘

_* * * the Board.was bound. to consider not oni

the evidence that was offered as to the impact that

the distribution of literature would have on plant

discipline, cleanliness, order, ete., but al<o thre ef-

Aeet that the bar against distributiori would have.

on the ability of the employees to Organize. Thus,

the Board Was constfaitied to consider such evi-

dence as the availability of sidewalk distributions;

the small size of the community as indicating the

°° practicality of home solicitation and telephonic

comminieations, * * *,

Explaining the necessity for this conclasion, the

Third Cireuit (1bid., p. 115) pointed aut—

This is not to say that - tthe Board eould -not

apply a presumption of invalidity to the ne-dis-

tribution rule. But the burden of proving the un

_fair labor practice is on the charging party. -In

order to determiné whether the respondent had

justified its rule the Board is compelled te examine

all of the evidence. Lf the respifittegyt is entitled

to justify its Tuies, the Board must examime re

spondent > evidences Clearly, if the-eriplayvees .

vhave virtually ne alternative opportunities — te

distribute literature and membership applications,

cs then .the respondent ‘ust show strong justifies:

tion for its prohibition,” Conversely whey. a= the:

respondent contends this tase, the enployee:

have readily availatle alternative means of dis

‘tribution, the emplover’s duty to show exceptional

justifying ¢ ire eymstances is lessened,

-The court below conceded that its cone diciet Was 1h

conflict with-the Third Circuit's decision m= loek well

(infra, py Aa) The court below asserted that the Third

Cireuit rej il its “conclusion that available alterna-

tives of communi “ation “mMilist be considered in ev ali

ating: a no-solte ikation rule’ on an erroneous mterpre

tation af the above cited deeisions of this Court—and —

whie i the. court below expre rsa re jected” Centre, yp.

* Ga-Ta },,

Thus, it is submitted, this Court sonra the

writ because ofthe char disagreement between the

Second Circuit here and tle Thiped Cireuit in the Roch-

well ease as to the obligation of #he"Board to consider

all evidence adduced by an employer in Justification

of its-refusal to make its premises available for the

distribution of union literatnre, me nding, ey idence of

alternate means of communication.

¥ *

d *s

. rf

6 7

It is respectfutiy submitted that the Third Cireuit |

contently interpreted this Cour®® decisions regarding

the rights of a union and its employee supporters to use

‘an employer's -premises for the distribution of pro-

Hien literature avd that the cours below, erroneously

refusing to rec ognize a difference hetween distribution |

of union literature and oral solicitation of union mem-

herships a difference recognized even by the Board

Jtself- (see, c.g., Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 28 NLRB

615)—-has misconstrued these dee is}Ous.

Hi the consolidated cases of Be public Aviation Cor b

.N.L.R. I. ak | NV Lgl. ved ‘Totr; sean Co, B24 0,

vi, thix Conrt expressly noted of the Le Tournean “

nation (which involved a ban against the distribution

of union liter ature hy emplovees on their awn time in

the company ‘s parking lots) that (at aL 797 )-

* * * contact on public WiVS OF oO, Hon-compat

property With emplovees,ateor about the éstab-

lishinent is liniited to these emplovees, less than

800 out of 2100, whe are likely to walk across the

public highway near the plant on their way to

Werk, or to those employees who will step their

private automobiles, buses or‘other eonvevaneces on

the public reads for communications. The em-

plovees” dwellings aré-widely- scattered, :

* Se te ‘Republic (which involved discharges for astic.

iting memberships durimg nonworking times and wear

Ing union, buttons in the plant in violation of a broad

no-solicitation rule), the Court noted (at p. 800) thet

it was--- | ae :

** <a nomurban manufacturing establishment for

military production Which entploved. thousands.

Itwas growing rapidly.. “Trains and automobiles

Bathe red Myily many employees fer the plant from

ong Island, certainly larger than walk-

ing dist: ine

wo a ™

Thus, it is clear that this Court in these eases, con- ,

trary to the assertion of the court below (see infra, p.

7a), did regard thé matter of alternate avenues of

“communication as relevant to the questions: presented.

Although, this Contt noted (at pp. 798-799) that

Neither in the Republic nor the Le Tournean cases can

it properly-be said that there was evidence or a finding

that the plant’s physical location made solicitation

away from compaly property ineffective to reach pro-

spective‘union members,” it alsostatéed (at p. S01) that

in neither case whs evidence offered that any un.

usual couditions existed in dabor relations, the plant

location or: otherwise to support anv contention that

conditions at this plant differed. from those occurring

normally at any other large establishment.’’ Noting that

—— hese were the facts upon which the Board reached its

conclusions as to.unfair labor practices” (at p. 801),

and that the emplovers had not applied in the courts

below * ‘to introduce additional evidence to show myi-

is sual circumstances involving their plants of for other

purposes”? ( (at p, 804), this Court held) in substance,

that the Board properly acted in these casts on the’

presumptions adopted in other cases prediéated on its

“appraisal of normal conditions about industrial es-

tablishments*’ (at p. 8045. Here We have an entirely’

differeiit situation. Petitioner adduced evidence show-

ing the adequeey of an alte rhiate place of distribution

which the -Board refused to consider.

The court below plainly misconstruc “d a holding in

NLRB. v..Babeock & Wileor €o., 3: 31 US. 105. This

Court there overruled Board holdings that ‘ea ‘ause ‘it

Was unreasonably difficult for the, union organizer to

reach the employees off company property’ he should

be allowed access to the company parking lots for the

; . =

‘distribution of union literature (see p. 106). The

Court noted that other ‘‘instruments of- publicity

are at hand’? (see p. 113), referrimg to ‘‘the

mails,”’

_“thome”’ visits (see p. 106, fn. J), and held ,that

the Board ‘failed to make a distinction between rules _

of law applicable ‘to. employ ees and those applicable

to nonemployees’’ (at pp. 112-113). Me only “rule”

there involved was whether whén union literature could |

not be distributed off company property its distribution

should be permitted on the premises. The Court held,

~ in substance, that while employees could not. be barred |

. under these circumstancés: unless ‘‘necessary to main- *

tain production or discipline,”’ ‘*no such obligation is

owed nonemployee organizers’? (p. 113). ‘The Court

noted that ‘‘This is not a ‘problem of always open or

always closed doors for union organization on company

property’’ but involves an ‘‘aceommodation’’ between

the property rights of employers and the organizational

rights of employees (p. 112). In conclusion, the Court

stated (pp. 113-114) : : | 7

The Act. requires only that the employer refrain

from interference diserimination, restraint or co-

ercion in the employees’ exercise of their own

- rights. It does not require that the emplover per-_

mit the use of its facilities for organization when

other means aré readily available.

This Court in Babeoc!; d Wilcox, thus plainly held

that the availability of another place to distribute union

literaturecis a relevant factor to be considered even

- when employees are involved. This was reiterated in

N L.R.B. vy. United Steelw orkers of America, CIO,

forcement of rules prohibiting employees from union

‘street’? contacts, ‘the telepiene,”’ and -

solicitation or distribution of literature on company

premises, stated (p: 363): ° - ets

No attempt was made in either of these casés to

make a showing that the no-solicitation rules truly

diminished the ability of the labor organizations

involved to carry their message to the emplovees.

Just as that is a vital consideration in determining

the validity of a no-solicitation rule, see Republic

Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,

supra, 324 U.S. at pages 797-798, 65'S. Ct. at pages

980-986; National Labor Relations Board v. Bab-

cock & Wilcox Co., supra, 351 U.S. at page 112, .

76 S. Ct. at page. 684, it is highly relevant in de-

termining whether a valid rule has been fairly ap-

plied. (Italies added)

The ‘observation ‘of the court below (infra, p. Ta)

that the Steelworkers. decision is inapposite because

‘otherwise valid’’ rules were involved is completely

.. at odds with the foregoing excerpt from that very de-

cision. eo tot, 7 ;

In this matter, the Union members had ample op-

- portunity to distribute their propagandg-to erhployees

_ off company property at the single entrance to the

company’s premises (JsA. 111; supra, p. 8). More-

over, the Union and its supporters had available te them

the‘usual alternate media of communication—the mail.

newspapers, radio,-television, etc. (see T'r. 84-90). In

‘addition, as a recognized and contracting bargaining

agent it had bulletin board privileges in the plant and

established grievance procedures (J.A. 60-64; supra,

p.S).. - i |

‘But assuming that the Second Cireuit were correct

in its interpretation of this Court’s decisions, rather

than the Third Circuil. it nonetheless seems appropri-

ate that the writ here be granted to settle bevond doubt

. 18 . aa

ate ; c . - A Z

‘the holdings of this € ourt on this’ subject as ‘to-w hich

these two circuit courts have so strongly disagreed. The

Board.did fot seek certiorari in Rockweli. The denial

of tlie writ here would contribute to uncertainty rather

‘than certainty.

a? 3. The ban imposed here was not x broad **no-dis-

tribution rule’. Rather, the ban was limited to a

particular type of literature, viz., that which was ‘*de-

sighfd to incite employees and to te ‘Me them. what a

°°. lousy place Pratt Whitney was to’ “work”? (J.A,_155)..

_It was only “the distribution ‘of such litérature”’ on

“company - premise; that Chhnbeain was: told w: as yp

being banned (J.A. 155). The Union has never re-

quested or been denied permission. to distribute proper

diterature on company premises. Instead, at the rantp

* it continued. to, flistribute literature whose, contents

were ‘manifestly destructive of discipline’. Maryland

Drydock Co. ¥. NLRB. 183 F.2d 538, 542: (CLA. 4).

it The Lolding of the court below that petitioner could

not, withdraw use of its premises for the ‘distribution

of such literature is, it is believed! directly in con-

flict with Maryland Drydack Co. v. N-L,R.B., 183 ¥. 2d

538 (CLA. 4), and NLRB. y, Aintree-Corp., 185 F. 2d

394 (CLA. 7), cited to the court below but not mentioned

in its opinion, where bans against distribution of simi-

han ' literature on company premises wefe upheld?

Rieree 4. The i issites involved in ‘this ease are of broad’.

oe /-~Signiticanee. Under the Board’s order, enforced by’

the edurt ‘Dbejow, ‘ petitioner expressly is prohibited

from imposing ‘tany'* restriction on employees dis--

. tributing ‘‘any”’ union literature during nonworking,

* times and in nonworking areas of its premises. In the

glossary of the decisions of the Board and, the eourt_

below, it is clear that the, Board and the eourt below in-

terpret the law to require exactly what the order states

4 =

} , H

! . ” 4 ( «

{ 4, .

. .

3 A 10:

—namely, that an employer make available to em-

_ plovees, during nonworking times, any and: all non-

working jareas of its, premises for the distribution Of

any kind of union literature. Although the Board

and the court below both professed. that an’ exception

is permissible upon a showing of ‘special circum-

stances”. ‘ necessitating a restriction ‘*to maintain pro-

duction lor disc ‘ipline’, it, is clear that such “special

circumstances’, under their decisions, probably never

could ‘be shown.

Thus, the. Board and the court below eliminated, as

faetors to be considered, evidence showing - hat. the

union, the long-standing collective bargaining repre-

sentative. of the employees, had contractual grievance

- procedures; plant bulletin board privileges, and other

adequate places to distribute its propaganda, and that

the employer had no: anti-unien animus. They then

discarded as afterthoughts the series of wiioh ‘abuses.

. culminating in. the eafeteria dis turbane “ex,” assighed

by petitioner % reasons for finally w ‘ithdrawing. use of

its premises for the distribution of the provocative

literature. Ax to the contents of the literature, they

held that employees have a’ praétically unrestrictable ~

right to distribute: any kind of union literature in the

non- working areas of an emplover’s property. \As

to littering, the court below held that sach-tis inevk

table’? and cannot esiablish the Special cireume

(tances * yequired to justify: a ban on use of company :

——— (infra, p. 3a).

os ee c

_ Finally; ax to the breakdown in divipline in the

cafeteria, the Board held, aid the pelien sustained the

‘finding (J.A..17; infra, pe 8a), that the -leatlets dig.

not encourage, the disorders because there Was ‘noth-

ing in the leaf hots Which advocated such action’, bit:

‘even if they did, petitoner, did not shaw that the ban

(}

was necessary’ because it controlled ¢he situation

by threatening the ‘employees with diciplinary, ac-

tion’? (J.A. 17). Under this process of reasoning it

"is impossible: to conceive of a situation in which ‘‘spe-

ig a ban

unlikely

cial circumstances’? may be shown justify)

on the use of company —— It is ST

fella disruption of either eiald: not be con

DV some manner of. disciplinary, action.,

Such an approach disregards entirely tire right of the

_emplover to’ anticipate ‘the effect which [sue ‘h litera-

ture] might normally bk pected to produce’ * and

not wait ‘‘upon ex post facto proof of the results which —

actually flowed from its distribution’. “Maryland Dry-

dock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 183 F. 24/538, 541 (CLA. 4). See

alse NLRB. v. Aintree Corp.,.135 F.2d 395, 397 (C.

Ok Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 230 F.2d 357

359 (C AL 7).

| conc.usiok {

For the foregoing reasons, this petition For a writ of —

certiorari should be granted. ;

; "Respectfully submitted,

Gerarp D, REILLY.

JOSEPH C, WELLS -

1120 Tower gpengh J

. 3 Washington: D. C. 20005

Spat | Attornays for Petitioner-

Remiy-anp WELLS , ra

1120 Tower Building

Washington, D. C. 20005

Of Counsel ;

’ January 1964)

” ad .

' : ‘ .

* ~ .

;

* .

“ <

‘ .

* . / ;

’ 4 ; ‘

. S :

”

= .

‘ .

. * .

. . roa

. ww

. haa f »

. > J :

® .

j 7 a

< » . J

. .

‘ : :

. “> d

< 2

7 .

. j 4 i

tea ’ i

? .

oe . |

‘ .

. ~ “

< Q

. 2

° ‘ : rea .

. ad t ‘

s ; ;

* : .

* .

.” :

3 r

z ¥ ;

. “

“\

APPENDIX

. la | .

APPENDIX A

National Labor Relations Act

RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES

+ Ske. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organiza- a

tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain

ecllectively through representatives of their own choosing,

and to eigage in other concerted activities for the purpose

of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,

and shall also have the right to refrain from ‘any or all of

such activities except to the extent-that such Fight may be

affected by ar agreement requiring membership i a labor

organization as a condition of employment as authorized: in

section 8 (a) (3):

UNFAIR LABOR PRASTICES

Sec. & (a) IY/shall be an unfair labor practice for ali

employer— ;

_ + &l) to interfere with, restrain. or coerce employees

in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section, 7;

° * e 8 3

; 2a

APPENDIX B

UNITE» STATE S COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ee alt ae o 2 see em hm - -« Standen’ iiiediien ae -

ie 4: September Te em, 1963.

( Argued Oc dale 10, 1963 - sociated November 6. 1963. x

“Docket No. 28004 — ek

Natronau Lason RELATIONS Boanp, Petitioner,

Unrrep Ainceart Corporations, Prater &

.Wuirsey Airceart Division, Respondent.

Before: Cuark, Moore anp Kavrman, Circuit Judges.

Petition by the National Labor Relations Board for en-

- forcement of its order of October 10, 1962, 139 NLRB No. 12.

Tae National Labs Sitiations Board, finding U nited Air-

craft Corporation, Pratt & W hitney Aircraft Division's

no-solicitation rule to be- in ‘violation of §8(a)(1) of the

National Labor Relatioris Act, 20 U.S. C. $158(a)(1).

dered its Tescissioh fand now seeks enforcement of that

order. Order enforced,

James Pares, Atty., National Labor’ Relations Board,

Washington, D. C. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel,

Dominick L. Manoli, Asso. Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-

Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Solomon |. Hirsh, and

Robert A. Armstrong, Attys. National Labor Relations

Board, Washington, D. C., on the brief}, for petitidner.

‘ Gerard D. Reilly, of Reilly & Wells, Washington, D. (>

on the bri ef).-for re spondent.

working areas. of respondent ’ s plant. Respondent offered

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

The National Laher Relations Board found respondent

to have violated $X(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations,

. Act,.29 T'. 8. C. Sl S8(a)(1), by prohibiting employees from

~memowand »

distributing inion lite afore on.their. _owrm time in non: «.

grounds for its rule: resultant littering.. resultant unruly

demonstrations in the plant cafeteria, and abusive language

used by a distributor of the pamphicts. The Board found

these to be questionable after-the-fact rationalizations and

insufficient to. explain the institution of the rule. The reeord

sustains the Board’s finding.

‘Rules prohibiting solicitation hy employees on their own

time in nonworking areas can be upheld only on 2 showing -

that special circumstances make the rule necessary to main.

tain production or discipline: See Repithbé Aviation Corp.

NN. L. R..B.. 324 0. S. 798, 808, 157 A. 1. R. 1081;

= iL. R. B. v. Babcock d& Wileor Co,..351 U.S. A0K, 113:

JT. R. Bo v. Linda Ja Shoe Co. 5 Cir® 307 FL 2d 35h,

$51 > NLL. R. Boy. Walton M&gi Co. 5 Cir. 289 F.2d 177,

ISO. Since litter is inevitable when leaflets aro distributed ~

and since the literature did not cause the disturbanee in

the cafeteria, respondent has clearly failed to show special!

cireumstanees making its rale necessary for the miain-

‘ tenance of productien or discipline. |

"As an additional justification’ for’ its mossolicitation rule. tne

respondent asserted tnat the leaflets vilified the company antl its

ofticiats in false and, scurrilous fanguage While there may ey)

ceivabiy be instances in which union literature is so defamatory

that an employer would be Justified in prohibiting its distribution

on company premises, we do not find that the leatlets disseminated

‘in the three-month period preceding the ban in the present cave

fali into this category. No proof was offered which would indicate

that any of the statements made were maliciously false; and. a

union engaged in an intensive organizational. campaign should por

be expec ted to communicate in the most moderate of terms

; 4a. | ;

it argues, however, that the Board erred in failing to

consider, in evaluating: the no-solicitatiop, rule, whether the

employees have alternative means of communication. Re-

spondent is not without support in this position. See

NLL, RB. vy. Rockwell Mfg. Co. (Du Bois Division), 3: Cir.,

271 F.2d 109, : a

jt is clear that in exereising its ‘*special function of

applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexi-

ties of industrial life?’ the Board is not required to conser

and make findings on every contention raised in defense or

every aspect of the problem presented, N.L. R. Biv, Eri

Resistor Corp. S05 ULS. 221, 236. It ean in some eases

infer the existence of diserimination from its past experi

“ones im such factual inquiries. Local 357, Internationa!

> Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse men and |

Helpers of Ameri ay, N. 1. R. B.. B65 U. SS. 667, OT5: Radio

Officers’ Union of Commercial Teleqraphers Union; ABEL v.

NOL. R. B., SAT US. 17, 49, 4 AR 2d 621, OF course

presumptions ‘utilized by the Board must be rationally

justifiable: there must be a logical nexus between what is

proved andwhat is presumed. See Republic Aviation Corp.

VON. Lat. BL, supra, 424 US. 793, 804-805, See also 2 Davis.

Administrative Law Treatise $15.04 (1958).

The issue thus presented is whether consideration of

available alternatives is necessary to make the presumption

in question -rational. In Republic Ariation Corp. v:

NOL. BR. BL supra, 8324 U.S. 793, 804, the Supreme Court

considered and approved the NLRB presumption agains!

no-solicitation rules in the ‘*definitive form’? expressed in

Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB SUX, 845, enforeed NV. L. R: B.

v. Penton Packina Co., 5 Cir, 142 F. 2d 1009, eert. denied:

$25 UeS. 750. The-presumption approved clearly was inde-

pendent of the existence of alternative means of communi

‘ation, Cf: VL. RB. vy. United Steelworkers of America,

CTO, 397 US. 357, 367 (opinion of Chief Justice Warren, |

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Reason and the. demands of sound administrative policy

support the Court’s approval of the Peyton Packing Co.

formulation. The chanees are negligibte that alternatives

equivalent to solicitation in the. plant itself would exist. In

the plant the entire work foree may- be contacted by a rela

tively small number of employees with Tittle expense. The

solicitors have the opportunity for personal confrontation,

so that they can present their message with maximum -per-

suasiveness. In contrast, the predictable alternatives bear

without exception the flaws of greater expense and ‘effort,

and a lower degree of effectiveness. Mailed material would

he typieally lost in the daily flood of printed matter which

passes with little impact from mailbox to wastebasket. Tele-

vision and radio appeals, where not precluded entirely, by

cost, would suffer from competition with the family’s favor-

‘ite programs and at best would not compare with personal

solicitation. Newspaper advertisements are subject-to’ simi

lar objections.. Sidewalks and street corners are subject to

the vicissitudes of climate and often foree solicitation at |

awkward times, as when employees are hurrying to or from.

work.

[t might be suggested that it would be harmless to

reauire the Bgayd to make findings in all no-solicitation

cases. But in addition, to being an appreciable increase in

the Board's already unwieldy werk load, this would simply

be an incitement to litigation and casuisiry,

Even apart trom considerations involving the’ remotene-=-

of the existence of realistic alternatives, we feel that the

Board ‘s position is sound. It sunimarized the basis fer its

view in Peyton Racking Co., supra, 49.NLRB 828, 843-844.

quoted with approval in Republic Aviation Corpon. N. L.

R.B.. supra, 824. US. 797%, 802.510: “The Act, of course,

does not prevent an entplover from making and enforeing

. reasonable rules covering the eonduct of employees on.

company time. Working time is for work. It is therefore

Within the provinee 6f'an employer to promulgate and en-

force ‘a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working

hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in the

7 ©

- 6a

absence of evidence that it was adopted for a diseriminatory

purpose. It is no less true that time. outside working hours,

whether before or after work, ‘or during luncheon or. rest

_ periods, is an employee’s time to use as he wishes without

unrease sable restraint, although the employee is pn com-

pany property. It is therefore not within the province of an .

employer to promulgate and enforce a. rule prohibiting

union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours,

although on company property. Such a rule must be pre-

sumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organiza-_

tion and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence

. that special circumstances make the rule neeessary in order |’

pe ;

to maintain production or diseipline.’’ Se@ alse Walton,

Mia. Co. 124 NIRB 1331, 1335.

The Board is manifestly correct. We have long passed

the point where the Immdle of property rights ean he used

arbitrarily or capriciously to restrict a worker's freedom

of association or expression. See N. L. R. BL v.- United —

rit orkers.of America, ClO, supra, 357 UL 5: 357, 369

“(opi

ion ef Chief Justice Warren, concurring in part and

dissenting in part). It is inevitable that the thrust of an

organizational drive would be blunted by rules: which: cut’

into a worker's use of his own time and tmade his associa-

tion and expression subject to management limitations.

Clearly the existenee-of available alternatives would not

mitigate this deleterious effect or insure the employee the -

organizational freedom-which the Act seeks to give him.

Cf. N. L. R. B.v. Erie Re sistor C orp., sapra, 373 U.S 221,

236. See also V. L. RB. v. William Davies Co., 7 Cir..

133 F. 2d 179, cert. denied W itiam Davie sCa.v. XN. a R. B..,

320 1". S. 770.

The Third Cirenit in NV. 1. R.-B. v. Rockwell Mia. Co.

(Du Rois Division), supra, 3 Cir., 271 F. 2d 109, reach@d

the conclusion thet available alternatives of communica-

tion must be considered int evaluating a no-soliecitation rule

not, on a consideration of the rationality of the Board's

fe,

; at Dane ae es

presumption or of the policy involved, but rather 6n ‘the -

_-ground that it was constrained to do so by the governing

law. We do mot so read the trilogy — forms Rockwell's

forgdation.

Republic Aviation Corp. v. y. L. R. B.. supra, 324 U.S.

793, 803, mw. 10, with its.,clear approval of Peyton. Packing

Co., supra, 49 NLRB S28, 843-844, is strong/authority for

the postition that ‘he consideration of available alternatives

is not required. V. 4. &. R. vy. Babe ock & Wilcox Co.; supra,

351 U.S. 105, while holding that honemiployee organizers

could be forbidden. to. ‘solicit on company property when

reasonable alternatives were available, made it clear that

the emplovees in exercise of their rights are not to be

judged by the same standards. as berserk Hurthers

it ae Republic Ariation Corp.'v. N. LR. B.. supra, gat

_U.S. 793, as controling with pe to employees. The

“ea case, NL R. B. vy. United Steelworkers of: America,

C10; supta, 357 UL S. 357,362, did not involve the validity ,

of a no-solicitation rule, but rather the ‘*very narrow and

almost abstract question’? whethe r", when an employer en-

gages in antiunion solicitation in a manrfer forbidden ty

his employees by ar otherwise valid no-solicitation rule,

it is an unfair labor. practice to enforce the rule again-t.

them. In this context the. Court held the consideration of

‘available alternatives to be relevant. This -isSelearly dis-

‘tinguishable from a case where the. justifiableness of the

no-solicitation rule is in question, rather than the propriety

of the employer's: use of means he had forbidde nto the

employees The: Third. Cireuit relied upoti Othe Court

pa&sing reference to Republic Aviation ¢ ‘orp. v. N. LR: B.,

supra, 324-U. S. 793, os authority for the broad propési-

tion that the showing of a diminished union power: to

organize was vital in ascertaining the valyiity of a no-

solicitation rule. V. L. IPB. vy. Rockwell M¢4-Co. (Du Bois

Division), supra, 3 Cer., 271 F.2d 109.) Byt as Chief Jus.

tice Warren pointed out, concurring in part aiid dissenting

—_—w

= Sa -

in part, NL. R. B. v. United Steélworkers: of America,

C10, supra, 357 U.S, 357, 367, the evidence and findings

required by the Court were not required in Republic Avi ld-,

tion Corp. v. N. yx R. B., supra, 324 U.S. 793, or. in Peyton

Packing Co., supra, 49 NLRB 82s, which Republic ap.

proved. We cannot read the Coust’s dictum as erasing

the important qualification established in Republic that

no such showing was required ana employees alone are,

involved. See Time-O-Malic, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 7 aie

264 F. 2d 96, 101. ~ : . ra

The order will accordingly be enforced, -and-a decree of”

enforcement will issue.

—

—~

A .

\ Pi . 2 e

o .

“ .

. .

eo °

: ™ . «-*

ta. ‘< - . ‘ .

\ e

“2 ®

. F]

. e

i Ps .

‘ oe

. . s E .

. ‘

. « . . . . ‘

. .

Ya.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS «,

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT : o

; “No. JS : fe Eee

a Nationar Labor Riarioxs Boarp, Petitioner,

2 ° v. |

he Usirep Amecrarr Conporatios, Pratt axp Warrses

Aimcrarr Divisios, Respoudent.

' Decree

Before: Clark, Moore and Kaufman, Circuit Judges.

Tras Cavse came on to be heard upeh the petition af

the National Labor Relations Board forthe enforcement

of accertain order issued by it against the Respoude nt Ok-

Oetober 10, 1962. The Court heard argument Of respective

counsel -on Qetober 60, 1963, aid has conside red the brie fs

.” and transeript of Seecie fijed in this Gause. On November”

handed down its -gecision dot enforcement of the

Board's order. , ;

Ox Cosine RATION Wipekecr, i is ordered, adjadged and

deerecd by the United States Court of Appeals for the’

Second Circuit that the said order of the National Labor

Relations Board -in said proceeding be enforeed;.and thiat

United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft

Division, its olficers, agents, sueeygsscrs and assigns abide by

and ‘perform the direction of Bhe Board in said erdeg,

contained. a get En

~s Crarues' ih. Chark | )

aes Judge, United States Court: of

Ajipeals for the Second Cireuit

‘ ‘Lgoxsan T. Moons ;

Sze, Unifed States Court. of.

Appeals for ‘the Second Curent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.