Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Southern Railway Co. v. Guilford National Bank of Greensboro

Supreme Court brief1964

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‘ Y iz i Office-Supreme Coury ua

itd se a “eee. nei ant - FILED i

tree a ee ae

: e . No. 6 4-6 % ? |

ne — nad Sar DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

: Supreme Court of the United States

PETER 8. SARELAS; . , |

en Petitioner, -

sf vs.

GEORGE §. PORIKOS, JOHN C. -GEEAS, GEORGE W. ALEX-

ANDER, ANDREW CARDAKAS, THEMIS ANAGNOST,

DEMOSTHENES I. GEORGOULIS, DEMETRIOS . PARRY,

ADAMANTIOS ANDROUTSOPOULOS, JAMES P. ECONOMOS,

GERARD A: SERRITELLA, PHILLIP 8. MAKIN, CHARLES V.

-. FALKENBERG, CATHERINE C. ANAGNOST, and JOHANNA

E. ences mae

—Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

@

. PETER 8S. SARELAS.

30 North ae Salle Street,

i ’ Chicago: 2, Tilwois

; €Entral 6-1442

Petitioner Pro Se.

er . ee ee L a

’

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CC., CHICAGO 18, ILL. LA keview 5-6581

: INDEX

2 ee ee at = PAGE

~ OpinionBelow SF ERM Robe Pe: MERE Sar tr, aes RD 2

_ Documents and Papers Transmitted with Petition Scene oa

Jurisdiétion> 2 RS SLEDS EIN AT fF acta mena vr

Questions Presented ° an | : 4

Constitutional and Statiitory Provisions Involved ee.

Statement of the Case SOP he i ashe bre sires! So : 7

Reasons for Granting ‘the W rit , ate Peaerahs weet fork 12

Conelusign “ypitiessanetecneeecnesees Sede VE NDE Scone wks tee

Seteattind.

| A. Opinion apemow AS res ROR mene PEDERSEN os 25

B. Judgment of the Court, i e-erichietereesnere rpeeeshsnnses 28

‘ES Order Denying Petition ‘for Rehearing ants 29°

nA +. CFBATIONS |

| Cases - |

‘Baldwin y. Morgan, 5 Cir., 251 F.2d 780, 788 (1958) 24

‘Bell v: Hood, 227. U.S, 678, 681-683... ee 23 °

Cohen v. Norris, 9 Cir. , 300 F.2d 24, 29-4962) veer &

Ex part parte Vi irginia, 100 U.S. 339, : 346- PU ea eee “

Harmon vy. Saperior. Court, 9 Cir ., BOT F. od si 798

_ (1962) 23

— — «& Te leg. Co. v. Loa Atigeles, 33 S.Ct, 312

12, 13, 23

&

ww > il ;

eae aes a. PAGE

Lee v. Hodges, 4+-Cir., 321 F. 2d 480, 483, 484 | 1963 3) .22,23

MeGill v. Uhinois Power Co., 163 N.E.2d 454, 457 : 13,477

McNeese v. Board_of Edugation, $8 S.Ct. 1433. 1435- =

1435, | ae PL nahin at Ps viet tran ee I 23 -

Marshall v. Sawyer, 9 Cir., 30] F.2d 6389, 646, (1962) 18, 24

Mon: de ¥. Pape, 365 US. 167, ai 183 1,18,

toca ; 23, 2:

Romero Vv. Ww eakley, 9 Cir., 226 F.2d 399, 401 (1955) . 2

Screws Vv. United States, 32 5p Ss. 91, 10813 . “Be 240

Skolnick | v, Martin, No. 427, Oct.Term, 1963 omen: |

Stiltner: vy. Rhay, 9 Cir., 322 F.2d 3l4y 316 (1963) ......... 21.

Stringer’ v. Dilger, 10 Cir. m 313 F. 2d 536. 240 id - 24

United States v. Classic 313 U S/ 299, 326 uneaes “12,28

Tansor v. Checker Taxi, Co:, 88 N LE: 2d 658, 662-663. 15

Williams v. United States, 341 US. 97 VD nnd, 2A

te oe A dpetetenaes a . =

Congressionai Globe, 42d Congress, Ist Session, .\pp.-.

Rb, Statement of Rep.’ singham arena Sea Th spe ED wat - 25

Congressional Globe, 424 Congress, Ist Session; App.

_ #315, Statement of Rep. Burehatd | 2...... pevsennene To

“Congressional Globe, 42d ongress, Ast Session. App. .

262, ‘Statement of Rep. Dunnell. enherssorecatonienabentenes 18

Csilethalion 7 ei

United Btates Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment,”

Section 1... Saapuacan saeco tagiecas AUST IPN AET LO eos a

‘iil

Statutes ;

U.S. Code Annotated, Title 42, Sectiori 1983, wo! nily 14, 17

US. Code Annotated, ‘Title, 42, Section 1985(2) 5,14,17//

US. Code Annotated, Title 42, Section "1985(3) rae

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IN THE

Supreme Cour of the United States <

a

No.

a . PETER §. SARELAS, oe

; ae (oe ary Petitioner,

” vs. ;

GEORGE 8. PORIKOS, JOHN C. GEKAS, GEORGE W. ALEX. ;

‘ANDER, ANDREW CARDARAS, THEMIS ANAGNOST,

DEMOSTHENES I. GEORGOULIS, DEMETRIOS PARRY,

ADAMANTIOS ANDROUTSOPOULOS, JAMES P. ECONOMOS,

GERARD A. SERRITELLA, PHILLIP 8. MAKIN, CHARLES V. 2.

FALKENBERG, CATHERINE C. ANAGNOST, and JOHANNA

a FETHERSTON;*

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF. CERTIORARI TO THE

_ . UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

_. {) SEVENTE CIRCUIT. | .

A |

“The petitioner, Peter S, Sarelas, prays that a Writ of

-* Certiorari be issued to review the final judgment of the —

- United States Court.of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Petitioner’ = timely Petition for Rehearing in the U nited

States. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit was denied

“on Se —* 4, 1963.

en emmad

.

' OPINION BELOW.

.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals: is reported in full.

in 320° KF. 2d #37. It is. printed herein as Appendix A.

Documents Transmitted w ith Petition.

Certified copies of the followi ing ‘filed i in the United States .

Court of — for the Seventh Circuit, with nine (9)

| additional copies:

1. Petitioner's ‘Brief and Appendix.

2. Respondents’ Brief and Appendis.

3. .P etitioner’ s Reply Brief.

1h ‘Petitioners Petition for Rehearing. a

(No Ans was filed by Respondents to Petitioner’ 8

_Petit n for- Rehearing).

o. “Certified copy of Opinion rendered by the U nited

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit.-

6. ( ‘ertified copy of the Judgment of Court of Appeals,

entered on July 36, 1963.

‘¢€

7. Certified capy ot the Or, der entered on’ ‘September. 4,

* 1963, denying Petition for Rehearing.

. JURISDICTION:

The final judginent of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit, affirming thé dismissal by the

Distriet, Coyrt, was entered on July 30, 1963 (Appendix

B, wifra, page 28). The petitioner filed a timely petition

for rehearing, which was denied on September 4, 1963

(Appendix C, “infra, page 29).

The petitioner therefore invokes the jurisdiction of this”

Court iMder- 28 LS.C.A. Section 1254(1).

s. . ..

.

ey ox af ok oe

- “ a.

The petitioner | invokes this © ouri 's power of supervision

over the lower Federal courts becapise the Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Cireuit, in the-petitioner’s case, has so

.#

far departed from the accepted ‘and usual course of judicial:

lee as follows:

' Although the District, Court refused io’ entertain

: ntlioaie s suit and a Distrigt Judge, in favt, threatened °

and intimidated the petitioner so as to deny the petitioner.

the right cf access to the District Court, ,the Court cf-

Appeals nonetheless passés upon the merits of petitioner’ s

suit for the first time. as“if the Court of Appeals were a

trial court, more

Ss

A “The Court of pale has affirmed a void judgme nit.

= Protas the record on appeal. shows that. ‘the petitioner

et

was not permitted to defend himself ‘or his property.

ugainst the District: Judge’ s, Order dismissing | the case

' with costs, the Court of Appeals disregards ‘the -,void

- foundation of such judgment.

3.. ‘The Opinion of the court of Appeals. relies upon,

| and adopts and recites unprovén allegations froma outside

the record. and agdopts and rélies-upon supposed facets di-

rectly opposite to the record on appeal, thus denying the

petitioner due and. orderly procedures in the Couri of

Appeals. (See, Certified — of Petition for Re hearing ir oo

the Court of Appeals, pp. 2-10).

¢

4., The Court of Appeals sanctions a departure by the

<= Dintriet Court from the accepted and usual course Of. ju-

dicial proceedings. Although the*record on appeal shows

that the District Judge refu-ed.to entertain pefitioner’s ©

suit and intimidated and threatened the petitioner to leave,

the, Court .of Appeals says such daetion is not a denial of

, a hearing ane Hot an arbitrary action: (- Appe mdix A. intr hr,

. page | 27). ‘ | ‘ ‘ = *

.

73 + . ¥

M3 / . “=

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é

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

\ 4: Whether the Distr ict Judge conld refine to entertain

\ petitioner’ s lawsuit w heit*the petitioner sought to invoke

the jurisdic tion of the District ( ‘ourt under the < “tvil Rights

Acts, 422 U.S.C. A. Section 1981 ¢f seq., claiming substantial

injury, under color-of state law, to his right to the equal.

a protection af the Jaws and relying‘upon the due process

o) and wpeivey and. immunities clauses of the Fourteenth

~

ro

Amendment. ett he, . beers “

as” Whether this Court will use its ‘gupervisery power

over the lower federal courts to restrain the district judge.

wheenied petitioner the right of- access to: the district

court by intimidation, insult, and abuse.

3. Whether the respondents, misusing the state com-

pulsory deposition . spower and clothed with eae

‘of state-law, are subject to the sanctions of 42 U.S.C.A., *

Section 1983. ars, ; . =

4.°W hether the respondents 4vho, under the cise of a

® deposition, perpetrated frauds upon the petitioner and.

upon the Illinois state courts so as to obstruct “the due

course of justice cin Ilinois and who injured petitioner

in his reputation and his property because petitioner at-

tempted io enforce his right to the equal protection of.

state jaws,-itre subject to the sanctions of 42 USCA

Section 1985(2). at

" Whether two or ‘more of the vemealiiliies in further-

ance of a natural conspiracy, heing at the same time peti-

tioner’s opponents and also state’ court appointed Depo-

sition Examiners, who conspired, ‘as **constituted authori-

ties’’, to deprive the petitioner of the equal protection of

the laws, are subject to the sanctions of 42 U.S.C.A. See-

tion 1985(3).

Dan 5

6. Whether the Court of Appeals when the record on

appeal shows that the petitioner was denied the right of

access to the district court by intimidation, insult, -and

abuse, can pass,for the first time upon the merits of

petitioner’s tase as if the Court of, Appeals were a trial.

court. ee ere he ie

eons AND STATUTORY

‘PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A.) Amendment XIV to the ¢ ‘onstitution of the United

States, Section eee

“Al persons born ‘or naturalized in the United’.

States, dud. subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside, No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges ‘or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State

_ deprive any person of lifé, liberty, or property, with-

out due procéss of law: nor, deny to any persgn within

’ its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”

.B.) Title 42, L. S: Code Annotated, Scetion 1983:

ME very person who, under color of any statute, ordi- *

nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State * * *,:

- subjects; or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

©“ United States, or other person within the jurisdiction

_ thereof tothe deprivation of any rights, privilegés, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be ljable to the party injured in ay ‘action at law, suit

in equity, or other proper proce cdgps for ‘redress.’

€.) Title 4 42, U. S. Code Annotated, Section 1980 (2 yt

ae if two or more. persons conspire for the,

purpose of impeding, hindéring, “obstructing, or de-"

. feating, in any manner, the due course of justice in

any State * * *, with inteat to deny to any ‘citizeh the

-6 s

Db.)

.

equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his

property for lawfully ‘enforcing, or attempting to en-

force, the right of any person ** * to the equal pro-

teetion of the laws ;"’

Title 42, U.S. Code Xnnotated, Sectidn 1985(3) :

> . *

‘If two or more persons in any State conspire

* *.* for the purpose of preventing or hindering the

constituted authorities of any State * * * from giving

or securing to all persons within such State * * * -the

equal protection of the law.,;* * * in any case of

conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more

persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any

act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,

whereby another is injured in his person or property,

or deprived’ of having and exercising ‘any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party

so injured or deprived:may have an action for the

recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or

deprivation, against any one Or more of ‘thie ‘con-

spiratgrs.”’ '

no!

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. -

The petitioner seeks to hold State Court Deposition ix-

. aminers, and those that collaborated with them, liable for

the. misuse: of the’ power the respondents possessed by

virtue of a State Court Order and made possible only

because the respondents were*clothed with the authority

of the Ilinois ‘State compulsory ‘deposition power. The

respondents, armed with the Court Order and clothe with

the state compulsory deposition power, perpetrated frauds

upon, the petitioner ‘under color of law, and under color

of Iinois customs, -practices, and usages. (App. 7-19; Ree.

8-29). 3 :

tinder. [linois ‘customs, practices, and usagés, and par--

ticularly in Cook County, Llinois, the deposition is not to

assist i the ascertainment ‘of the truth, but rather to

‘assist in reducing the huge backlog of civil4awsuits in the

State’ Courts of Cook County. The compulsory qdepositton

power is wiclded against deponent-litigants under the color

and pretense of law, as a weapon of intimidation to beat

down litigation and to foree plaintiffs to abandon their

lawsuits. Under Illinois custom, practice,’ and usage, both

a defendant and his attorney can be appointed State Court

Deposition Exaniiners. The deposition, under Illinois eus-

tom, practice, and usage, is Without’ supervision and is held:

in a private enclosure, away from the courthouse. ‘Tn

addition, under Illinois customs, practic ves, and usages, the

State Court Deposition Hxaminer is in charge of the

deposition and the notary public, who is yually alse a

court reporter, merely attends to take stenographic notes.

Under color of these Hlinois customs, practices, and

usages, and under the guise and. pretext of taking. the peti-

tioner’s deposition, the respondents committed, condoned,

caused to be done, acauiese¢ed in, the following overt acts

furtherance of a coltispiracy ta obstruet justice in- the

8

See

«

State Courts of Cook County, Illinois, and to deprive the

petitioner of due process and equal protection of the laws,

and to damage the petitioner in his person and property

for attempting to enforce the equal protection of the laws:

1. Although the petitioner had not waived examina-

tion of the transcript of the depositions taken and had

not waived his signature, such transer ipt was not sub- =

mitted*to the petitioner for examination and mgpatare.

(App. 10; Ree. 11). .

2. Such transcript was none ‘theless used as an instru-

ment to intimidate the petitioner and had attached to

it a’false certificate of a, supposed deposition’ officer,

Thomas’ J.. Sheehan, who: was in fact not present at

* all of the depositions and -was‘ not the deposition

officer as he falsely certified. | Such false certificate -

stated: ‘*the said transeript acgurately. state the ques- .

tions put and the answers. made’’. (App. 11:12, 15;

Ree. 13, 16). An-additional false certificate was at-

tached to an adiitional document of *excerpts,-qte-

tations or portions’, -prepared by respomdents: and ~~

* such document cuntaienl: ao

/

(a) at least fifty-tive “(35) false representations .

gird designations of the said Sheehan, labeling hiny

- as ‘* The Court 479

: (b) More than‘ one hundred (100) separate state-*

ments or remarks made by the said Sheehan, con-

sisting of his supposed. rulings, striking peti-

tioner’s answers, changing petitioner’s answers,

and abnsive and derogatory statements agdinst ._

the petitioner, when, in fact, said Sheehan was not’

even present at all.of the depositions and was not

~ _ the deposition officer.

. %

(¢) Omissions, changes, and deletions of : peti-

Honer's answers, — eran Aa ,

(d). ‘Inclusion of questions without ineluding peti-

tioner’ ~ answers thereto.

te

(e) Omissions of plaintiff's numerous objections,

(f) Omission of the exhibits mentioned therein.

tg) Findings of fact by said supposed oe

oflicer, Sheehan, against the petitioner, when, 1

fact, the said Sheehan Was not even present .

some of the depositions. (See, App. 15-14, par. 12, .

i’ through and including **g’’; Ree. 15-16).

ae The “excerpts” of depositions were presented to

the State Court by the respondents, in their eapacity

as both: Deposition Examiners and defendants in the

State Court lawsuit in which the depositions were

taken. Such -prese ntation of the “*exee rpts”’ to the

State ¢ ‘ourt was té.defeat the due course Of justice eee

‘THinois, and to ttefame “tind disparage the petitioner

by destroying his reputation and his credibility. The -

respondents caused such *‘exeerpts’* t» ‘be: presented,

knowing what the falsely and illegally certified tran-

script contained a multiplicity of omissians, de ‘létions,

and insertions, inge niously designed and frandulently

inserted j in such trans¢ript. to discredit and oppress the

petitioner for hav ieatte mpted to enforce, in the state

courts, his right to the equal protection of the laws.

(App. 14- 18; Ree. 16-20). /

4. Such "prese ntation of fgandulently Gemektvn “"ex-

cerpts"’ was used to damage the petitioner in his

property hy causing a State Court. indgment to be

entered against the petitioner, without hearing on the

piprits, resulting tn “greal seamage and expense to the

petitioner for having attempted te /entoree the equal

%

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f -

' the petiti

10 ke

protection of the laws. The petitioner was thus hin-

dered,. 1m, a gbstructed, and: prevented from

‘enforcing his right to the leg: il remedic 's In. the state

courts of Illinois. (App. 18, 19: Ree: 19, 20-21).

2. None of the respondents madetany effort te prevent

er aid in preventing the commission of the wrongs

against the petitioner. (App. 18; Ree. 4-20).

The petitioner instituted action in the Distriet Court on

"June 21, 1962, with Jury Demanded, and sought to invoke

the jurisdiction of the District Court under 98 US.CLA.,’

Sections 1343 and 1331, and songht to invoke the sanctions ,

of 42 ELS.CLA. Sections 1983, ayaa mea

1988, and the sanctions of 18 U.S.C.A. 241 and’ 242. Peti-

ttoner’s case arises under the. ( nited States Constitution

and partieulariy Amendment XTV, Section l.-and the laws

of the United States as aforementioued.

A Ustriet Judge, however, refused to entertain petic

tioner’s lawsuit. ° ;

“The Court: * * * This court will not ente tain

such." pe e, Offici: il Transeript of, Proceedings. APD 4

117; hkee, 221)... . 7 ad .

The petiintic *, Mnaring pi se; Was not ne

speak or. “ies finivh a sentence “The District Judge, or more

accurate ly, the’ persen pretending to be such judge, intimi-

dated, insulted, and abused the petitioner for attempting

to invoke the jurisdiction of the Distriet Court and denied

oe the right of aecess tothe Dis triet Court by |

threat ard intimidation :

*TheCourt: Mr. Marshall. take this gentleman out

if he doesn't govout.”” (Otheial, Transeripr of Pro-

‘eoodings, App. 1hs: Ree, eel). = - ; 38

11 ;

The District Judge entered a judgment on the pleadings

against the petitioner chen. there was nothing before the

District Judge. The respondents’ Motion ‘for a judgment

on the, pleaditigs was noticed to be presented on’ October.

, 1962, vel the District Judge, with nothing before him, .

entered a judginent against the. petitioner on October 9,

1962. (App. 113: Ree. 186-187. App. 116: Ree. 216). The

District Judge entered-a baseless judgment neny oppo-*

site the record, “Such order states:

having heard the argiments of eounsél wae PY

(App. 116, line ‘s 6-72 Ree. 216).

in @ @ &

ee . . . “ar 4 . “i . ? ° -

Yet.tthe Official Transcript of Proeéedings shows tha!

the petitioner, appearing pra se, was not allowed to speak

“or address the court .en any subject and was: threatened

and intimidated to leave: **Mr, Marshall, take this gentle-

man out if he doesn’t go out/? (App. TES; Ree. 221). -

= The District Judge entéred such judgment with éosts.

yét the petitioner’ was. not permitted to defend himselr

against such judgment When and where he was being

assailed, as the FFicial Transeript of Proceedings plainty -

shows. (App. 116, line 16: Rec. 216. App. 116-118: Ret,

D7). 29] ). Loa E

The Court af\ Appeals, ignoring the void and illegal

.

.founmdetion of the. audeme nit of the District ¢ ‘ourt, passed

upon ‘the merits of petitioner’ s cas? at the same time

affirming dismissal. Yet, the District Judge had réfused

to entertain petitioner's suit aye, obviously did not pas-

npon the merits.ef peti itfoner's Claim when the petitioner

“owas. threate ned "aud intimidated to leave,

12

wt . Reasonis for Granting the Writ.

The petitioner's case involves the misitae of the state

compulsory deposition power by State Court Deposition

‘Examiners and collaborators, réspondents here, to perpe

° trate frauds upor the petitioner. Another case pending

- in this Court involves thie misnse of the state.compulsory

deposition, power to perpetrate another type of tort

torture ‘and: injury—iaflieted upon a deponéit-litigant,

Skolnick v; Martin ét al., he ts, Oc ‘tobereTerm, 1963.

In affirming the dismissal of petitioner's case, the Court

* wof Appeals relies upon. its decision. in the Skolnick case,

-317 F. 2d 855 (Appendix A, infra, p. 27). The’ Court

‘of Appeals indicates that the respondents in the petition

er'’s case were not under color of law. But this ruling’ is

cmariy contrary to decisions by this Court::° ~* ,

iotare the provisions of the (Fourteenth) Amend

nent as conctusively fixed by previous decisions are

generic in their terms, are addressed, of course, ti

the states, but adso to every person, whether natural

or yuridu al, who is the ve posttory of stale” power,

By this construction. the reach -of. the Amendment is

shown to be coextensive wih any excercise by a state

of pour, tt ecg r aes exerted” Home Tele

phone & Tele graph "D, Pe Angeles, 227 US. 27s,

287,33 S, Ct. ny, 314, L. Ed. 510. (Emphasis

added). : °

“Misuse of peace, possessed ‘by virtue of state -iaw

and made - ‘possible only because the wrongdoer is

clothed with the-anthority of state law, is action taken

a ‘under volor of’ state gt United Sattes’y. Classic,

es ' 313-TLS. 209, 326, 61S. Ct. 10817 1045, 85, L: Ed. 136s. —

(Emphasis added),

-

%

—_—"

ae ee 4

The -definition of ‘under color ‘of’ ‘state law ‘as in the

Classic case was copied toby this Court in Screws ve

United’ States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-113, 69 S. Ct. 1031, 1038-

1041, 89 L. Ed. 1499; in e illiams v. United State s, 341

U.S; 97, 99, 71S. Ct. a6, d78, 99 L. Ed. 7743 and adhered

_ toj‘and reaffirmed, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U:S,\ 16%, 183- ‘185,

ALS. Ct. 473, 482-483, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492. -

4

*%

As the Mllinais Suprevie Court sdid of Illinois deposi-.

tions taken pursuant to law: *

‘*They are the iniidhen of the power: of th» State

— to compel the testimony-of witnesses rather than uf the

= mgenuity of any lawyer. The State makes available

its compulsory process to compel witnesses to attend

aud give testimony on a pretrial deposition i in order tv

@ssist in the ascertainment of the truth.” McGill v.

Ilinois Power Co., 18. Ul. 2d°242, 246, 163 N.E. Sd 454,

457 (Nevember, 1959). (Emphasis added).

This vigas by the Illinois Supreme Court was reaffirmed

in Tansor yv. Checker Tasi Co.. 27 Ub 2d 250, 188 N.E: 2d

608, 662-663. (March, 1963). -

The Court of “Appeals waives away petitioner’ s case Shy

characterizing’ it as.an ‘abuse of process in the ‘taking of

the depesitions ™’ ( Appendrx A, infra, p. 27).

But it has been said :

adage lh the settled construction ‘of the (Fourteenth)

Amendment is that it presupposes the possibility sot

an abuse by-a_ state officer or representative of the

powers possessed, atid deals with such a contingency.

It provides, therefore, for a case where one who is in

possession of state power uses that power to the doing

©, of the wrongs which the Amendment forbids, even

although the censummation of the wrong may not be

within the powe rs possessed, if the commission of the

~ wrong itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aude d

“by the state authority lodacil m the w rongdoe *

Home Te dephowne Te leqraph, Co. v. Los Angele 8, 227

UWS. 278, 58 S.Ct. S121. (Emphasis-added).

a . . a “4 . . e ¢ Ea,

In addition, although-it is necessary to allege that Ux

respondents were *‘under color of’’ state. law to make them

subject to the sanctions of 42 U.S.C.A. i 1983, it is

not necessary: to allege ‘‘under color of’ law to set forth

a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1985 (2) (3).

The petitioner in his Complaint sts forth AMevations of

the overt acts of respondents clothed with the State com-

pulsory deposition power and thus ‘‘under color of” law.

and allegations of overt acts of respondents jn further-

ance of a conspiracy to obstruct justice in the State Court,

-and to injure the petitioner for having. enforced,‘ or at-

tempted to enforce, the equal protection of the laws: (App.

‘, pars. 8, 9, 10, 11; Ree. 8-9. App. 8, pars. 13, 14; Ree. 9- 10).

‘The Court of Appeals decision in petitioner’ Ss case Is

not only clearly contrary to previous rulings by this C ourt >.

about ‘‘under color of’’ law, but the decision is. eléarls

_ contrary to the legislative débates preceding the passage

of the Ku Klux Act, April 20, 1871, Section 2, now Section

1985(2). The petitioner.’s position is that the overt acts

of the respondents were ‘tunder color of’*-law, put overt

-acts of a combination of persons in furtherance of «a con-

spiracy, to obstruct justice, etc., need not be ‘under color

of’ law to be- subject to the sanctions of 42 U.S.C.A. See-

tion 1985(2). Even if the respondents were only ‘‘indi-

viduals’, they would be subject io the sanctions of Sec-

tion 1985 (2) :

‘*Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been

amended, that the nation cannot by: law provide

against*all’such abuses and denials of right as thes?

in State and by States, or combinations of persons?

. ** * Tf Lanr not right in asserting that the negative’

limitations imposed by the Constitution on States can

he enforced by law against ‘individuals and States,

then’ the Government Was wrong trom the admizistra

v4

15

« oe

tion of Washington: dow n, and the Supreme Court of :

the United States was wrong every time the question

has come before it.’’’ Statément of Representative

J. A. Bingham of Ohio: (Mareh 31, 1871),.Congres-

sional Globe, 42nd Congress, Ist Session, Appendix 85.

( Emphasis added).

‘If the refusal of a State officer, acting: for the

State, to accord equality of civil rights renders him

amenable to punishment-for the offense under United

States law, conspirators who attempt to prevent such

officers from performing such duty-are alse clearlip

liable.’’ Statement of Representative TE. C. Burchard

of Illinois (April 6, 1871), Congressional Globe, 42n d

. Congress, Ist Session,. Appendix: 315: (Emphasis

added). "y 2 >

This Court should grant certiorari and resolve the Fed-

eral questions inherent in petitioner’s case as to the ap- —

‘plieability of 42 U.S.C.A. Section’ 1985(2), and whetlier

‘‘under color of*’ law is, or is not, a. necessary allegation _

to invoke the sanctions of that section.

Il. 7

Can: it be wail without making a. mocké@@y of justioe,

that the misuse of state compulsory deposition power by

State Court. Appointed Deposition ‘Examiners and collabo-

. rators, to perpetrate trauds upon a deponent-litigant in

order to obstruct justice and to injure -him in his person,

or property, tor attempting to enforce the equal proteec-

{i tion of tne laws—can it be said that such acts by tue re-

spondents are not within the sanctions of the Civil Right»

Acts? The misuse of the Illinois state:compulsory depo-

sition power is-carried out by way of a ‘natural’ con.

spiracy. Under Illinois customs, practices, and usages the

>

State Court. Deposition ‘Examiners’ are partisans—they -

are on other oceasions attorneys for the opponents of the’

deponent-litigant. It is only natural that the opponents,

a 16

~~.

being at the same time the State Court Appointed Deposi-,

. . . =~ ‘ *, — * . *. .

> tion Examiners,~‘the consti#tuted authorities”, should or.

.. would conspire, to see to it that the deyonent-litigant is

denied the eqval protection of the laws. For example, a

plaintiff at a deposition as both a witness and a litigant, |

looks to the Deposition Examiner for the equal protection ;

of ‘the laws.. But, under the Illinois customs, usages. and ©

practices, and particularly those custems, practices, and

usages of Cook County, the Deposition Examined is not an

impartial. persen but a partisan, representing defendants -

on other occasions. What équal. protection of the laws

would such’a constituted authority grant to such a plain-

tifft Logically, none. Under Illinois custom, usage and

practice, the State Court Appointed Deposition Examiner é

is in charge of the deposition and fhe deposition is taken’ -

without supervision. The notary-court reporter attends

merely to take stenographic notes. ‘ ;

Asa result of and under color of such customs, practices,

and-usages, outrages are performed and such ourtages¢

have the majesty of law. At depositions, fist fights-.are

not uncommon, though ‘perhaps riot widely reported, and

the intimidation and abuse of ‘deponentsHtigants serves

the cynical purpose to assist in reducing the huge backlog

of cases in’ Cook“County by forcing .deponent-litigants to

abandon their lawsuits, by tormeni, injury, and fright.

Under’ Hiinois ‘customs. practices and usages, and most

particularly the custems, practices; and’ usages of Cook -

County, the compulsory deposition power ix wielded espe-

-cially by orgarized malefactors#s &h instrument of wrong-

-— doine to beat down litigation. The State Courts, if Cook — |

‘County, deny protective orders as a matter of routine,

Under Mllinois customs, practices. and usages, this fear-

some power is put into the hands of partisans as agents

of government, theoretically ‘*to assist in the ascertain: - ”

‘

° s

. cas, 4

a zy

.

¢<

<

<

<

<

a! ak ok | je .

- ponent of the truth’? (McGill vy. Illinois Power Co., 18 I. 2a

"942; 246; 163 N.E. 2d 454, 457)—but actually te beat down

litigation, to reduce the huge backlog of lawsuits, *hich-

_nevertheless grows because of such misuse and Aawless-

ness. Frauds are - committed under pretenze ‘of law

(petitioner's ease): Physically ‘disabled depoxent-litigant= |

‘are further injured (Skolnick V: Ma rtin, No-427, Oct. Term,

_ 1963) and. all tlieSe odious wrongs; vader pretense of

: ‘

authority. ae

An accused person can bé brought to testify and he has,

by settled law and by the Constitation, liberty agamst tor-

ture, liberty against coercion. Can it be said that a depo

nent-litigant at a civ) court -deposition. has no liberty

against partisans acting as agents of government! No,

Constitutional, safeguards? No available Federal .sance

tions? This, Court: sKould grant certiorari. and resolve

- this Federal Congtitational question, so that the Federal

Constitutional safeguards and sanctions are elearly avail-

_able to civi) court deponent-litigants who are injured, in

their persons or in thei? property, by cofibinations of per-

‘cons in furtherance of conspiracies to obstruct justice, to |

defeat the integrity of “judicial process and to destroy the |

- public’s confidence in the Courts..

’ Section 1983 and Section 1985):

If ‘deponent-litigants can be oppressed, defrauded and

deprived of the equal protection of the laws, with impunity

—this undermines the entire judicial systeni. Is,a citizen .-

any less.a Federal citizen bevause he was, compelled, by

‘state compulsory power wielded by partisans, to attend a

‘deposition ? Protection is the very purpose of the eational

government. Re cs .

o

¢ .

\¢ one Congressman said in the legislative debates pre-

ceding the passage of the Ku Kiux Act (now 42 U.S.C.A.

le

“American citizeriship has but little worth 4 this

. Jaw cannot be passed. Hows idle my @eclaratiof, ‘1am

» .

° . ‘«

. .

te

= 4

18

‘an American citizen,’ if all the rights which are

seemingly part and parcel of my possession.as such a

citizen may be at the mercy of assassins and the Gov-

ernment have not the right to protect me! J do not

wish to be told that I must look.to my State for. pro-

tection. The Government claimeg, my allegiance; and

my life when it is in danger; why should it not pro-

tect me in these rights, for which that life may be

given up?’ Statement of Representative Dunnell .of

Minnesota (April 4, 1871), Congressional Globe, 42nd

Congress,. 1st Session, Appendix 262. (Er-~hasis

added).

III.

In petitioner's suit the Court of Appeals indicates, that

the petitioner's Federal lawsuit is barred by a supposed

adjudication in the state courts. Yet, the petitioner was

never heard on the merits of his clafay i iy the state court,

nor is petitioner’s present suit the same as the state court.

lawsuit referred to in the Court of Apprals Opinion: (Ap-

penuix A, infra, p. 26). ”

“Whether there is ‘color’ of state law issa federal,

not a.state question, Marshall vy. Stucyer, 9 Cir, 301,

F. 2d 639,646 (1962). (Emphasis added),

it is not relevant te mention a state remedy as preclud-

ing a federal civil rights remedy : %

“It is ne answer that the State has a law which

af enforced would give velief. . The federal remedy ts

supplementary to the state remedu, and the latter need °

not be first sought and refused vefore the. federal one

is. invoked.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183.

(Emphasis added), © °

IV. LOE OaT

A plaintitf ina Civil Rights Net suit: (pe ‘titioner’) should:

net have.to run-a gauntlet of intimidation, insult, and

“trial Inv orgdeal’* under the guise and pretepse'of judicial

preaceedings in the lower Federal courts. 1X citizen should

a : ro

4

°

= re

not be subjectid to such oppression simply because he at:

tempted to enforce ‘his Civil Rights-by filing a lawsuit in

-the Federal District Court in the district: in which he

resides. This Court should grant ‘certiorari and use its

supervisory power over the lower Federal courts and make

a Clear pronouncement that the Fifth Amendment pro-

hibits such- as ‘the following oppressions under the pre-

tense of judicial proceedings :

1. In the District Court, a be eite’ District judge,

or more accurately a person pretending to be a Dis-

trict judge, in non-judicial acts, denied the petitioner

the right of. access to the District Court by intimida- .

tion, abuse, and insult. Wuen petitioner attempted to

present a motion (App. 116-117;-Ree. 220) in the Dis-

trict Court ‘petitioner was not allowed: to be heard or

to address the presiding judge, or person pretending

* " to .be the presiding judge. The petitioner was not

allowed to finish any sentence. The person pretend-

ing to be District Judge dec lared he would not enter-

tain petitioner’ s lawsuit:

“The Court: * * * This court will not mtr:

tain such.”* (5 a Official. Transeript of Proceed-

‘ings, App. 117; Ree. 221). | F

And then the petitioner was threatened,. insulted, and

‘intimidated to leave: ;

"The Court:, Mr. Marshall, take thie sioaiis..

man out if he daesn't go out.”* (See, Official Tran-

script of Proceedings, App.-118; Ree. 221).

2. In the District (Court, assailing a citizen ( peti-

tioner) in his property - > his lawsuit with

costs, but nos allowing such citizen to speak or he

heard when and whery he is being vissailed | in his

‘rights. (App. 116, line 6: Ree, 216).

20

*3. In the District Court, judgment was entered on’

the pleadings when there ‘was nothing hefore the Dis-

rtict Judge. Respondents’ Motion, for judgment on

the pleadings was noticed to be presented a day after

the District Judge, or person pretending to he District

Judge entered the judgme nt age inst the petitioner.

re 116-118; Ree. 219- 222).

‘A District Judge, or person. pretending t to a such

; ae entered a judgment against the petitionér when

there was nothing before the District Judge. The

District Judges Order states “having heard the argu-

ments of counsel’? (App. 116, lines 6-7; Ree. 216).

Yet, the Official Transcript of Proceedings shows that

the petitioner, appearing pro se, wax not allowed to

speak and instead was intimidated and insulted by the

District Judge, or person pretending tobe the Dis-

trict Judge. : 7

“The Court: Mr. Marshall, take this gentle-

_man out.if he doesn’t go out.’? (App. 118; Ree.

221).

The judgment) Was without foundation, baseless, and

directly opposite to the record. No amount of patch-

work cag make such a void judgment a valid judgment.

Do. In the Court of Appeais, recitals are made in

their written Opinion directly opposite the Record on

Appeal. (See, Petition for Rehearing, py. 4+- ).

6. The Court of Appeals considered matters out-

side the record and. relied upon and recited the same.

in their written Opis, thus enable the respond-

ents to perpetrate a fraud upon the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner pointed this ont to the Court of Ap-

peals, but to no avail. (See, Petition for Rehearing,

page 19). — Pe ,

21 -

7. The Court of Appeals passed upon the merits

of petitioner’s ‘suit, when petitioner was no eard\on

the merits of his claim in the District Coyrt—in faet,-

not heard at-all. The District Judge roluibed to-en

_tertain petitioner’s suit. ‘‘Mr. Marshall, take: thjé

gentleman ac Ce 118; RR a

8. The Court of Appeals caused the recitals direct-

ly vpposite the record, and from outside the record,

to be published (in unofficial reports), thus defaming

: and disparaging the petitioner. (320 F.2d 827).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is baseless, with-

out foundation, an affirmation of a*void judgment. (Peti-

‘tion for Rehearing in Court of Appeals, @p. 11-13). — No

_ amount of patch-work can make it valid..

. If this Court will not grant certiorari and will not use

its supervisery power over, the lower federal courts in the

7th Cireuit—then what does it avail a person that he is a

law-abiding citizen? If the lower federal courts abdicate

‘their duty and will not give remedy, then where is the

citizen to protest’? If the District Court in his district

‘is closed to this petitioner, where shall hé seck redress?

What good are Civil Rights Acts when the right of

access to the District Court is denied? It surely cannot

be duubted that the action of the ‘District Judge, or the -

person pretending to be such, amounts to a trespass.

** Indeed, reasonable access to the courts ix basic to.

all other rights protected by the (Civil Rights) Act,

for it is essential to their enforcement.” Stitmer vy.

Rhay, 9 Cir., 822 F.2d 314,516 (Sept. 9, 1963). _

> “

The Court of Appeals’ ruling in petitioner’s case is directly

opposite to rulings in other Circuits and directly oppo

site to rulings by this Court.

A. The District Judge said he. would not cite sisi

-a lawsuit as petitioner’ s. (App. 117; Ree. 221 . The Court

of appeals said, ‘** *°* we see no de\ial a hearing, «

arbitrary action * * *.’’ (Appendix A, infra, page 27 ’.

This ruling is in direct conflict with other rulings:

(1) ‘*ln refusing to consider appellants’ complaints, the

«district court considers the case from a viewpoint

exactly contrary to this obvious purpose of the civil

‘rights legislation to give the. litigant his choice of a

federal forum rather than that of the state.’ Romero °

v. Weakley, 9 Cir., 226. F.2d 399, 401 (1955). (implhia-

sis added). :

(2) In direct contliet with:

‘Tntiniating no view on whether the plaintiff should

ultimately prevail, we hold that Uo was error for the

District Court to dismiss the complaint without hold-

ing a hearing to dete rmine the facts.” Lee vy. Hodges,

4 Cir., 321 F.2d 480, 483 (1963). ( Emphasis added ).

Brom his complaint it-is evident that he claims |

substantial injurv, uader color of state lays at least to

his right to the equal protection of thé laws; and he

also appears to rely upon, the dune process and the

privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Federal jurisdiction ever. this complaint

is well founded and the possthle catstence of state

remedies does not affvet this jurisdiction. (( ‘iting

Bell v. Hood, S27 & s8e7e, G6 Sc, T7290 TL, Bd. 939,

1946; Mowroe v. Pape, 865 US. 160, P85. ST S.Ct 475,

a) L.Ed. 2d 492, 1961; Mi Ne i a Board ol Liducation.

S73 US. 668) 83 S.Ct. 143, 10 L.Ed. 2d 622, 1963;

Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 842, 344.6 Cir. cert. denied,

368 U.S. S68, 82 S.C “98, 7 | L.Bd 2d 65, 1961).°° 32

hed 480, at 484. (Emphasis added).

a

- Vaughan, 321: F.2d 480, 4 Cir., 1963) Lee v. Hodges,

23

‘*The defendants contend that fhe case concerns a

matter of purely internal state’ business whreh should

be handled by the courts of the state. * * * It is notes

worthy that the basis for abstention * * * has been

undercut by recent action of the Supreme Court.

(Citing Johnson v. Virginia,373 U.S. 61, 83 S.e't. 1058,"

10 L.Ed. 2d 195, 1963; George vy. Clemmons, 373 U.S.

241, .83 S.Ct. 1296, 10 L.Ed. 2d 409, 1968; Wood v.

4 Cir., 321 F.2d‘ 480, at 484 footnote 6. niga (Em

phasis added). . Ce

(3) In divoct! -donflict with Bell y. mae 327 U.S. 678,

681-683, 66 S.Ct. 773. 775-776, 90 L.Ed. 939.

167,

(4) In. direct confliet with Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S.

180, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 480, 482.5 L.kd.2d 492.

(5) In direct confliet with WeNvese v. Board of Educa-

tion, :

2d 622

373 U.S. 668, 83 S.C t. 1433, 1435-1436, 1437 , 10 L.Ed

(6) In direct and complete conflict: with:

“The right to a hearing on the merits of a elaini

over which the court has jurisdiction is of the essence

of our judicial system, and the

judge's feeling that

the case is prebably frivolous does not justify by.

passing that right.“ Marmon vy. Superior Court, 9

Cir., 307 F.2d 796, 798 (1962). ( Emphasis ‘added.4

B.

ents werejot ‘under color of*’ law. This. rwiing. is in-/.

The Court of Appeals imdjeates thai tlie respond

direct confffet with other rulings.

(1) lh direct conflict with Ev Parte Virginie, 100 US.

839, 346-847. 25 Ed. 676, 679. :

(2) In direc™ conthiet - with’ Home Telephone & Teie

graph Co. v. Las Angeles. 227 US. 208, 286, 55 S.Ct. 312,-

314,57 L.Rd. 510. Z | &

(3)

In direet conflict with Unites States vo Classic, 313

U.S. 299, 326. 61.8.0. 1051, 1045, 85 Led. 1368.

ry. 4 |

*

Byer

(4) In direct conflict with Screws v. United States, 325

- US, 91, 108-118, 65 S.Ct. 1051, 1038-1041, 80 L.Ed. 1495.

(5) In direet contlict with. W ihiams. enh waited. States,

“BLU. 97, 99, 71 S.Ct. 276, 578, 95 L:Kd. 774,

(6) In direct and complete ‘conflict with Monroe jv.

“Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476, 5 Likd.2d

492. | .

(7) In direct conflict with Marshall vy. Sawiye - y Cir., a

301 F.2d 639, 646 (1962). . aes

(8) In direct conflict with Laldwin v; Mor ap Vi ir.,

251 F. 2d 780, 788 (1958). /

(9) ‘In’ direct conflict with Stringer vy. Dilge r, 10 Cir.

313 F.2d 536, 540 (1963).

C.~The Court of Appeals indicates: that/the pe tition

was not deprived of *‘any rights * ** sec ‘ured by the Con-

stitution and laws * *-*.*’ (Appendix, AY ‘infra, page 27).

This ruling is in direct conllit with otKer rulings. ’

(1) In direct conflict with:

**In our. view Monroe vy Vape ‘announces the rule

that an allegation ofmepurpose to discriminate or a

purpose to deprive one of any: federal right, is not

“esesnticl ta the statement of a chaim‘under Sec. 1983

predicated on an alleged violation of the due process

“clause of the Fourteenth: Am ndment.”” Cohen v.

Norris, 9 Cir.,°300 F.2d 24, 29 (-1962). (Jmphasis °

added). _

CONCLUSION.

Bay the reasons above stated it is‘re Side ‘ttuliy subigitted

that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

PETER S. SARELAs,

Petitioner, Pro Se.

5)”.

APPENDIX A

ce

° ea

7

~~ Bited States Court of Appeals

For - Sroenth Cirrnit

No, 14011 SEPTEMBER T ERM, 1962 -\PRIL Session, 1963

»

PETER S. SABELAs, . 1

Plainitf?-Appellant,

Vv: i

“

GEORGE S. VPortkos, Jous ©. GeEKAS, | ‘eritc

ies Sar ALEXANDER, ANDREW jee Tron the

Carvaras, THemis ANnacnosr, D- ee ae

MOSTHENES |. GeorGotLis, DEme- r re <a <a tg

TRIOs Parry, AvAMANTIOS ANprovs- b- Lie Northern Dis-

trict of Iihinois,

SOPOULOs, JAMES [2 McoNoMua, Ge- Sins Diviei

. ere ss

_» warp A. Serrireces. Pisa S. Ma- a ve.

é

KIN, CHARLES V. FALKENBER«.) CATH -

ERINE C. ANaGNosT. and JOWANNA

E. FetHERSTON,

Daliidinide-. "an lee en.)

a my —— . aeosoo < ———

July 30. 1963

Before Durry, Ksocu, and Kirky \Crreat Judges.

Kuivey, Circuit Judge, Sarvelas appeals from a Pistriet

Court judgment dismiissiny his uit against fourteey de-

‘fendants under the tederal Civil Rights Acts.’

' Plaintitf invoke. 2 > s 1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,

19835, 1Y8, 1988

26 -

The basis of Sarelas’ suit is an earlier acffon in the

Cirenit Court of Cook County. The Cireuit Court dis-

“missed the conspiracy and defamation charges, | ‘and ‘en-

tered summary judgment against Sarelas on an assault

and battery charge. The Supreme Court of Illinois’ dis-

inissed his appeal and the Supreme Court of the U nited

States denied certiorari, 350 U.S. 904.

The suit at bar-charges the fourteen defendants, thirteen

of whom are Llinois attorneys, with conspiracy, while act-

ing under color of Illinois law, to deprive plaintiff of due

process and equal protection of the laws, in’ the Illinois

Circuit ¢ ‘ourt action. The nub of the overt aets he charges,

pursuant to the alleged conspiracy, is abuse of process in

procuring, having certified and presenting to the Cireuit

Court his depositions taken by virtue of a Cireuit Court

order.

Affidavits in support of defendants’ motiotis to dismiss

and for summary judgment-state that the same claims of —

irreguiarities and abuses in taking depositions were pre-_

sented to the Cireuit Court and passed upon by that court:

and that the same claims were made to the Supreme Court

of Hlineis and on petition for certiorari before the United

States Supreme Court. These sworn statements were not

denied hy Sarelas ir his counter -affidavit.

Sarelay contends the District Court violated his con-

stitutional rights in denying him a hearing and dismissing

his suit without a motion to dis “miss + having been presented

and without an inqurry. .

Vue waseho genuine issue of faet before the District

Conrt upon the Cirenit Court findings and judgment,.

which are fal because plaintiff's appeal to the Supreme

Court-of Ilhmeis was dismissed. Thus a question of law

only was presented to the Distriet Vourt and the reeord

shows the question was extensively briefed by plaintiff,

j a

tiff of ‘‘any rights

, en. ae

His motions were called for hearing and the District Court

presumably was satisfied on the complaint, motions, affi-

davity and briefs, that oral arguments were not ‘needed for

decision. The judgment entered was based upon\mofions

filed, and the exhaustive briefs, and we see no denial of

hearing, or arbitrary action, under the circumstances, Rule

78 EURLCLD., Skolnick v. Martin, 0... F.2d (ith Cir.

1963). It is not important that plaintiff's and not\ de-

fendants’ motions triggered the disposition of the case.

There is no merit to the contention that the District Court

denied plaintiff due process or equal protection of the law,

so as to render the District Court judgment void.

The vital‘question is whether the District Court erred in

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of

action upon which reef can be granted under thie Civil

Rights Acts. We think not:

This ¢ourt dane recently held thit law yers participating

‘in private state court litigation do not act. nnder color of

‘state law within the meaning of the Federal Civil Rights

Acts. Skolnick v. Martin, ........ F. 2d ..... _ (ith Cir. 1963).

Moreover, taking the facts alleged in the complaint us

true, there is no basis for an inference that the defendants,

acting ‘under color of any’? state statute, deprived plain-

* * * secured by the Constitution and

laws * * * °° Whether there were violations of the Illinois

Supreme Court rules on discovery procedure did not pre-

sent a question of deprivation of ‘any rights * * * secured

brit a “question of

abuse of process. in the taking of. the depositions.

ee ee

by the Constitution and laws

Por the vr

A true Copy:

Teste:

‘aeons aiven the nidgment is APFEIRMED. °

Clerk of the United States Court. of

. Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:

:

\

\

a.

= | APPENDIX B |

_ “UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The Seventh Circuit

Chicago 10, Illinois

‘Tuesday, July 30, 1963 ©

° _.._ Before ;

-How. F. Ryan Durry, Circwt Judge

~ How. Wis. (i, Knocn, Circuit Judge

Hox. Roar J. Kiev, Circuit Judge

|

|

Peter S. SARELAS,

moe: | , Plaintiff-Appellont,

NG, Somes 0 OO, Vs.

(iEORGE Ss. Porikos, ET Mn, . ‘¢

os Defendants- Appellees.

~

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

er e e

am >

‘ "Phis cause came on to be heard on the transeript of the -

record trom the United States District Court for the

' Northern District of Illinois; astern Division, and was

argued by counsel.

4) consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged

by this court that the judgment of the said District €ourt

ini this Gause appealed trom be, and the same is hereby,

AFFIRMED, with costs, in accordance with the opinjon

of this Court filed, this day.

2

29

APPENDIX C_

U NITED & STATES COU RT OF AP V ALS

’ For the Seventh Circuit. —

Chicago 10, Ilinois ”

¥

Wednesday, September 4; 1963

Before ; .

_ Hon. F. Ryay Derry, Circuit Judge

Hon. Win fi. Kyocnu, Circuit Judge

Hoy. Roger J. Kitey, Circuit ‘Judge

~ : : o

PETER S. SARELAS, ~~

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 14011 ; Vs. ;

_GEORGE S$. PoriKos, ET AL., a ‘

‘ie mere

Append from the United States District Court for the

- Northern’ District ot ‘Illinois, Kastern Division.

IT IS ORDERED) by ihe Court that the pefitiontos a

rehearing of this cause be, and the same is“hereby,

DENIED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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